Francisco Caballero and two companions, namely, Ignacio Barabad and Kakong
Sacay, drank "tuba" in a certain house in barrio Ipil, Ormoc City. At about midnight,
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-23249 November 25, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CUNIGUNDA BOHOLST-CABALLERO, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Florencio
Villamor and Attorney Concepcion F. Torrijos for plaintiff-appellee.
Accused-appellant in her own behalf.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:p
Convicted for having killed her husband, Cunigunda Boholst-Caballero seeks a
reversal of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ormoc City finding her guilty
of PARRICIDE and sentencing her "to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of from
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its medium period, as the
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of reclusion temporal in its medium period as the maximum; to indemnify the heirs of
Francisco Caballero in the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs", and prays for an
acquittal based on her plea of self-defense.1
The Solicitor General however asks for the affirmance of the appealed decision
predicated on the following testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution before the trial court:
Cunigunda Boholst and Francisco Caballero, both at the age of twenty, were married
on June 7, 1956, at a ceremony solemnized by the parish priest of the Roman
Catholic Church in Ormoc City.2 The marriage was not a happy one and before the
end of the year 1957 the couple separated. Late in the evening of January 2, 1958,
Francisco Caballero and his companions proceeded home. On the way, they saw
Francisco's wife, Cunigunda, standing at the corner of the yard of Igmedio Barabad
Cunigunda called Francisco and when the latter approached her, Cunigunda suddenly
stabbed Francisco with a knife marked by the prosecution as its Exhibit C. Francisco
called for help to his two companions who upon seeing that Francisco was wounded,
brought him to the St. Jude Hospital.3 Dr. Cesar Samson, owner of the hospital,
personally attended to the victim and found a "punctured wound on the left lumbar
region measuring 1 inch externally" (Exhibit B). First aid was given, but because there
was a need for blood transfusion and the facilities of the hospital were inadequate to
provide the necessary treatment, Dr. Samson suggested that the patient be
transported to Cebu City.4 In the meantime, Cunigunda Caballero had gone to the
Police Department of Ormoc City, surrendered to desk sergeant Restituto Mariveles
and informed the latter that she stabbed her husband.5 While Francisco Caballero was
confined at the hospital, he was interrogated by Patrolman Francisco Covero
concerning the identity of his assailant and he pointed to his wife Cunigunda. The
questions propounded by Pat. Covero and the answers given by the victim were
written down in a piece of paper on which the victim affixed his thumbmark (Exhibit D)
in the presence of his brother, Cresencio Caballero, and another policeman, Francisco
Tomada.6 On January 4, 1958, Francisco Caballero was brought to Cebu City on
board the "MV Ormoc" but the trip proved futile because the victim died at noontime of
the same day from the stab wound sustained by him. 7
Appellant, on the other hand, pleads that We discard the proof adduced by the
prosecution and believe instead what she declared before the trial judge briefly
summarized as follows:
After her marriage to Francisco Caballero on June 7, 1956, appellant lived with her
husband in the house of her parents in barrio Ipil, Ormoc City, and their marriage,
although not a harmonious one, was blessed with a daughter; her married life was
marked by frequent quarrels caused by her husband's "gambling, drinking, and
serenading", and there were times when he maltreated and beat her; after more than
a year she and her husband transferred to a house of their own, but a month had
hardly passed when Francisco left her and her child, and she had to go back to live
with her parents who bore the burden of supporting her and her child; in the month of
November, 1957, her daughter became sick and she went to her husband and asked
for some help for her sick child but he drove her away and said "I don't care if you all
would die"; in the evening of January 2, 1958, she went out carolling with her friend,
Crispina Barabad, and several men who played the musical instruments; at about
12:00 o'clock midnight they divided the proceeds of the carolling in the house of
Crispina Barabad after which she went home, but before she could leave the vicinity of
the house of Crispina, she met her husband Francisco, who upon seeing her, held her
by the collar of her dress and asked her: "Where have you been prostituting? You are
a son of a bitch."; she replied: "What is your business. Anyway you have already left
us. You have nothing to do with us"; upon hearing these words Francisco retorted:
"What do you mean by saying I have nothing to do with you. I will kill you all, I will kill
you all"; Francisco then held her by the hair, slapped her face until her nose bled, and
pushed her towards the ground, to keep herself from falling she held on to his waist
1
and as she did so her right hand grasped the knife tucked inside the belt line on the
left side of his body; because her husband continued to push her down she fell on her
back to the ground; her husband then knelt over her, held her neck, and choked her
saying. "Now is the time I can do whatever I want. I will kill you"; because she had "no
other recourse" as she was being choked she pulled out the knife of her husband and
thrust it at him hitting the left side of his body near the "belt line" just above his left
thigh; when she finally released herself from the hold of her husband she ran home
and on the way she threw the knife; in the morning of January 3, she went to town,
surrendered to the police, and presented the torn and blood-stained dress worn by her
on the night of the incident (see Exhibit I); Pat. Cabral then accompanied her to look
for the weapon but because they could not find it the policeman advised her to get any
knife, and she did, and she gave a knife to the desk sergeant which is the knife now
marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution.8
The sole question thus presented in this appeal is: did appellant stab her husband in
the legitimate defense of her person?
As part of this law is the settled jurisprudence that he who seeks justification for his act
must prove by clear and convincing evidence the presence of the aforecited
circumstances, the rationale being that having admitted the wounding or killing of his
adversary which is a felony, he is to be held criminally liable for the crime unless he
establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-defense. 11
In this case of Cunigunda Caballero, the trial court did not find her evidence clear and
convincing, and gave these reasons for its conclusion: a) appellant's testimony is
inherently improbable as brought out by her demonstration of the incident in question
during the trial of the case; b) there was no wound or injury on appellant's body
treated by any physician: c) appellant's insistence that the weapon used by her was
Moro hunting knife and not Exh. C is incredible; d) she gave contradictory statements
concerning the report made by her to the police authorities that she was choked by
her husband; and e) her husband's abandonment of her and her child afforded the
motive behind appellant's
attack. 12

The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds We are constrained, however, to disagree with the court a quo and depart from the
justification in man's natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his person or rights rule that appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on facts
from impending danger or peril; it is based on that impulse of self-preservation born to testified to by the witnesses.
man and part of his nature as a human being. Thus, in the words of the Romans of
ancient history: Quod quisque ob tutelam sui fecerit, jure suo ficisse existimetur.9 To
An examination of the record discloses that the trial judge overlooked and did not give
the Classicists in penal law, lawful defense is grounded on the impossibility on the part
due importance to one piece of evidence which more than the testimony of any
of the State to avoid a present unjust aggression and protect a person unlawfully
witness eloquently confirms the narration of appellant on how she happened to stab
attacked, and therefore it is inconceivable for the State to require that the innocent
her husband on that unfortunate night. We refer to the location of the wound inflicted
succumb to an unlawful aggression without resistance; while to the Positivists, lawful
on the victim.
defense is an exercise of a right, an act of social justice done to repel the attack of an
aggressor.10
Appellant's account of that fatal occurrence as given in her direct testimony follows:
Our law on self-defense is found in Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Q At that precise time when you were going
home to the place of your parents, did any
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur
unusual incident occur?
any criminal liability:

A Yes, sir.
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
that the following circumstances concur:
Q What was it?
First. Unlawful aggression;
A At the time when I went down from the
house of Crispina Barabad, when I reached
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
near the banana hill, my husband held me.
or repel it;

Q What happened when your husband,

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
Francisco Caballero, held you?
defending himself.

xxx xxx xxx

2
A He asked me from where did I prostitute
myself.
Q What did you answer?
A I answered that I did not go (on)
prostituting. I told him that I was only forced
to accompany with the carolling in order to
earn money for our child.
Q What part of your body did your husband,
Francisco Caballero, hold you?
A He held me at the collar of my dress.
(Witness holding the right portion of the collar
of her dress.)
Q After you answered Francisco, what did he
do?
A He said "Where have you been
prostituting? You are a son of a bitch." Then I
told him "What is your business. Anyway you
have already left us. You have nothing to do
with us."
Q When Francisco heard these words, what
did he do?
A Francisco said "What do you mean by
saying l have nothing to do with you. I will kill
you all. I will kill you all."
Q And then, what happened?
A He held my hair and slapped my face
twice. Then I staggered and my nose was
bleeding.
Q Do you mean to say that blood flowed out
of your nose?
A Yes, sir.
Q After you were slapped twice and your
nose begun to bleed, what happened next?
A He held the front part of my dress just
below the collar and pushed me towards the
ground. .
Q While your husband was holding your
dress below the neck and tried to push you
down, what did you do?
A I held a part of his body in order that I
would not fall to the ground.
Q And then what happened?
A Because I struggled hard in order that I
would not fall to the ground I held his belt and
that was the time I got hold of a weapon
along his belt line.
Q After that what happened?
A He shoved my hands upward and pushed
me to the ground and that was the time my
hands were released. He was choking me.
Q When you said your hands were released,
was that before or after you were choked by
Francisco Caballero?
A At that time when I was about to fall to the
ground that was the time I released my
hands.
Q When you were almost fallen to the
ground, where were the hands of Francisco
Caballero?
A On my hair.
Q You mean to say the two hands of
Francisco Caballero?
3
 A One of his hands was holding my hair. The
other hand pushed me.
COURT:
Q What hand was holding your hair?
A His right hand was holding my hair while
his left hand pushed me.
ATTORNEY GARCIA:
Q When you were fallen to the ground what
happened?
A While I lay prostrate on the ground and
believing that I have no other recourse, while
his left hand was holding my neck, I was able
to take hold of the weapon from his belt line
and I thrust it to him.
Q What was this weapon which you were
able to get from his belt line?
A It was a hunting knife." (tsn. pp. 53-55,
witness Cunigunda Caballero)
On cross-examination, appellant was asked by the private prosecutor to show her
position when she stabbed her husband and she did, and although the stenographic
notes on that demonstration are very sketchy which We quote:
Q Please demonstrate to this Court when you
made the thrust to your husband?
A When I took hold of the hunting knife I
made the thrust in this manner. (Witness held
the ruler with her right hand kneeled on the
floor)" (tsn. p. 67, ibid)
still We can get a clear picture of what appellant must have done, from the questions
and answers immediately following the above-quoted portion of the transcript, viz:
Q You want to make us understand that
when you thrust the weapon to the body of
your husband you were lying down flat to the
ground?
A I was lying flat on the ground face upward. I
was a little bit inclined because tried to
struggle trying to get away from the hold of
my husband.
Q You want to make us understand that your
back was touching the ground when you
made the thrust to your husband?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q Where were you kneeled by your,
husband?
A On my right thigh. (ibid; emphasis supplied)
Thus, with her husband kneeling over her as she lay on her back on the ground and
his hand choking her neck, appellant, as she said, had no other recourse but to pull
out the knife inserted at the left side of her husband's belt and plunge it at his body
hitting the left back portion just below the waist, described by the attending physician,
Dr. Cesar Samson, as the left lumbar region. The fact that the blow landed in the
vicinity from where the knife was drawn is a strong indication of the truth of appellant's
testimony, for as she lay on the ground with her husband bent over her it was quite
natural for her right hand to get hold of the knife tucked in the left side of the man's
belt and thrust it at that section of the body nearest to her hand at the moment.
We do not agree with the trial judge's observation that as demonstrated by the
accused it was physically impossible for her to get hold of the weapon because the
two knees of her husband were on her right thigh "which would have forced her to put
her right elbow towards the ground"(see p. 9 of Decision), for even if it were true that
the two knees of Francisco were on his wife's right thigh, however, there is nothing in
the record to show that the right arm of the accused was held, pinned down or
rendered immobile, or that she pressed her elbow to the ground, as conjectured by the
trial judge, in such a manner that she could not reach for the knife. On the contrary, as
indicated earlier, accused testified and so demonstrated that she was lying flat on her
back, her husband kneeling over her and her right arm free to pull out the knife and
strike with it.
The trial judge also referred the a demonstration made by appellant of that portion of
her testimony when she was held by the hair and pushed down to the ground, and His
Honor commented that "(S)he could not be falling to the ground, as shown to the
4
Court by her, considering the fact that the pushing was to and fro as shown in her
demonstration." (p. 8, Decision) The trial judge, however, failed to consider that it is
humanly impossible to have an exact and accurate reproduction or reenactment of an
occurrence especially if it involves the participation of persons other than the very
protagonists of the incident being re-enacted. In this particular instance appellant was
asked by the private prosecutor to show how she was pushed down by her husband,
and her demonstration is described in the stenographic transcript as follows:
Q Please demonstrate to this Court the
position of your husband and you while your
husband held your hair.
A He did this way. (Witness held the hair of
the Court Interpreter with his left hand and his
right hand held the right shoulder of the
Interpreter and pulled the Interpreter to and
fro. The Interpreter represented as the
accused and the accused as the deceased.)
Q Where were your two hands?
A My two hands held his waist line. (tsn. 66,
witness Cunigunda Caballero; emphasis
supplied)
In that demonstration, accused represented the victim while she in turn was
impersonated by the court interpreter, and so it was difficult if not impossible for the
two to give an accurate reenactment considering that the accused assumed a role not
hers during the actual incident and the court interpreter played a part which was not
truly his. At any rate, the accused showed how one hand of her husband held her hair
while the other pushed her down by the shoulder, and to portray how she in turn
struggled and tried to push back her husband to keep herself from falling, she "pulled
the interpreter (representing the accused) to and fro." The fact is that Francisco
succeeded in forcing appellant down to the ground as portrayed by the latter when,
following the foregoing demonstration, she was asked by the private prosecutor to
show how she stabbed her husband — a matter which is discussed in pages 8 and 9
of this Decision.
It is this particular location of the wound sustained by the victim which strongly
militates against the credibility of the lone prosecution witness, Ignacio Barabad. This
witness declared that on that night when husband and wife met on the road,
Cunigunda called Francisco and when the latter was near, she immediately stabbed
him. If that were true, that is, husband and wife were standing face to face at a
distance of one-half meter when the stabbing occurred (tsn. p. 11, witness Ignacio
Barabad), it would have been more natural and probable for the weapon to have been
directed towards the front part of the body of the victim such as his abdomen or chest,
rather than at his back, left side, just above the left thigh.
In cases such as the one now before Us where there are directly conflicting versions
of the incident object of the accusation, the Court in its search for the truth perforce
has to look for some facts or circumstances which can be used as valuable aids in
evaluating the probability or improbability of a testimony, for after all the element of
probability is always involved in weighing testimonial evidence13, so much so that
when a court as a judicial fact-finder pronounces judgment that a set of facts
constitute the true happening it does so not of its own personal knowledge but as the
result of an evaluating process of the probability or improbability of a fact sought to be
proved.
Thus, in People vs. Aquino, L-32390, December 28, 1973, a decision of the First
Division of this Court penned by Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal, the plea of self-
defense of the accused-appellant was sustained on the basis of certain "physical and
objective circumstances" which proved to be of "decisive importance" in ascertaining
the veracity of the plea of self-defense, to wit: the location of the wound on the right
side of the throat and right arm of the deceased, the direction of the trajectories of the
bullets fired by the accused, the discovery of bloodstains at the driver's seat, the
finding of the dagger and scabbard of the deceased, and so on. 14
In the case of appellant Cunigunda Caballero, We find the location of the fatal wound
as a valuable circumstance which confirms the plea of self-defense.
Another, is the lack of motive of appellant in attacking and killing her husband on that
particular night of January 2. Although it is the general rule that the presence of motive
in the killing of a person is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the
identity of the assailant is duly established by other competent evidence or is not
disputed, as in this case, nonetheless, the absence of such motive is important in
ascertaining the truth as between two antagonistic theories or versions of the
killings. 15
We disagree with the statement of the court a quo that appellant's motive for killing her
husband was his abandonment of her and his failure to support her and her child.
While appellant admitted in the course of her testimony that her marriage was not a
happy one, that she and her husband separated in the month of October, 1957, and
since then she and her child lived with her parents who supported them, nevertheless
she declared that notwithstanding their separation she still loved her husband (tsn. p.
59, cross-examination of appellant). As a matter of fact, appellant had been living with
her parents for several months prior to the incident in question and appeared resigned
to her fate. Furthermore, there is no record of any event which occurred immediately
prior to January 2 which could have aroused her feelings to such a degree as to drive
her to plan and carry out the killing of her husband.
On the other hand, it was Francisco Caballero who had a reason for attacking his wife,
Cunigunda. Meeting his wife unexpectedly at past midnight on the road, Francisco
reacted angrily, and suspecting that she was out for some bad purpose he held her by
the collar of her dress and said: "Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of
a bitch." This was followed by a slapping on the face until Cunigunda's nose bled,
5
pulling of her hair, pushing her down to the ground, and strangling her — all of which
constituted the unlawful aggression against which appellant had to defend herself.
Next to appellant's lack of motive for killing her husband, is her conduct shortly after
the occurrence. As soon as the sun was up that morning of January 3 (the stabbing
occurred past midnight of January 2), Cunigunda went to the city and presented
herself at the police headquarters where she reported that she stabbed her husband
and surrendered the blood-stained dress she wore that night. On this point, the trial
judge stated that appellant made contradictory statements in her testimony concerning
the report made by her to the police authorities, for while at the start she declared that
she did not report the "choking by her husband", she later changed her testimony and
stated that she did relate that fact. (p. 10, Decision)
We have gone over the stenographic transcript of the testimony of appellant on direct
examination and nowhere is there a positive and direct statement of hers that she did
not report that she was choked by her husband. What the trial judge asked of
appellant was whether or not she told the police about the fist mark on her face and
her answer was "No, sir, I forgot." (tsn. p. 55, supra) And on appellant's cross-
examination, there was no question propounded and therefore there was no answer
given on the subject-matter of appellant's report to the police concerning the incident
except for the following:
COURT:
Q Did you show that dress to the police
authorities the following day?
A I was not able to wear that, Your Honor,
because it was torn out.
Q You did not bring that to the police
authorities?
A I showed it to the police authorities, and
they told me to keep it, not to touch it. (Tsn.
p. 65, ibid)
We do not see, therefore, the alleged contradiction in appellant's testimony which was
singled out by His Honor as one of his reasons for discrediting her plea of self-
defense.
That appellant made it clear to the police that she stabbed her husband because he
attacked her is confirmed by no less than the prosecution witness, Patrolman Restituto
Mariveles, who was on duty at the desk when appellant arrived at the police
headquarters. This witness on cross-examination declared:
Q And she also told you that on that night
previous to the incident her husband
Francisco Caballero beat her up, is that right?
A She told me that she was met on the way
by her husband immediately after carolling
and she was manhandled by her husband
and when she was struggling to get loose
from her husband she happened to take hold
of a knife that was placed under the belt of
her husband and because she was already
half conscious she did not know that she was
able to thrust said knife to the stomach of her
husband. (tsn. p. 23, witness R. Mariveles)
It is indeed regrettable that the statements made by appellant to the police upon her
surrender were not taken down in writing to serve as a faithful and reliable account of
her report, nevertheless, We are satisfied by the fact, which is not disputed, that of her
own accord appellant went to the police authorities early in the morning of January 3,
informed Policeman Mariveles that she stabbed her husband because he manhandled
her which rendered her "half-conscious", and brought and showed the dress she wore
during the incident which was torn by the collar and with blood stains due to the
bleeding of her nose. Another policeman, Joventino de Leon, who at the time was
property custodian of the Ormoc City police, corroborated appellant's testimony
concerning the dress marked Exhibit 1 for the defense. (tsn. p. 70 witness J. de Leon)
If there was no clear and positive statement in appellant's testimony either on direct or
cross examination that she informed the police that she was choked by her husband, it
was because, as We noted, no question was propounded to her on that point.
While We are on this subject of appellant's surrender, mention is to be made of the
knife marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution. In her testimony, appellant stated that
Exhibit C was not the knife actually used by her in stabbing her husband because the
true weapon was her husband's Moro hunting knife with a blade of around six inches
which she threw away immediately after the incident; that when she was asked by Pat.
Mariveles to look for the weapon and she could not find it, she was advised by
policeman Cabral who helped her in the search to get any knife and surrender it to the
desk officer and so she took the knife Exhibit C and presented it to Pat. Mariveles.
(tsn. appellant pp. 56-57, 60) This testimony of appellant was taken against her by the
court a quo which held that her declaration could not have been true. We find however
no strong reason for disbelieving the accused on this point. Appellant does not deny
that she turned over Exhibit C to Pat. Mariveles as the knife with which she stabbed
her husband but she claims that she did so upon advise of another policeman, Pat.
Cabral, and it is quite significant that the latter was not called upon by the prosecution
to refute such declaration. There is sincerity in appellant's attempt to rectify a
misstatement made by her to Pat. Mariveles and We are inclined to believe and in fact
We do believe that the fatal weapon must have had indeed a blade of around six
inches as stated by appellant for it to penetrate through the left lumbar region to the
victim's large intestine and cause the discharge of fecal matter (tsn. Dr. C. Samson, p.
6)
6
All the elements of self-defense are indeed present in the instant case. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, We find that accused-appellant acted
in the legitimate defense of her person, and We accordingly set aside the judgment of
conviction and ACQUIT her with costs de oficio.
The element of unlawful aggression has been clearly established as pointed out
above.
So Ordered.
The second element, that is, reasonable necessity for the means employed is likewise
present. Here we have a woman who being strangled and choked by a furious Makalintal, C.J, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
aggressor and rendered almost unconscious by the strong pressure on her throat had
no other recourse but to get hold of any weapon within her reach to save herself from
Castro, J, is on leave.
impending death. Early jurisprudence of this Court has followed the principle that
the reasonable necessity of the means employed in self-defense does not depend
upon the harm done but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. (U.S. vs.
Paras, 1907, 9 Phil. 367, citing Decision of Dec. 22, 1887) And so the fact that there
was no visible injury caused on the body of the appellant which necessitated medical
attention, a circumstance noted by the trial court, is no ground for discrediting self-
defense; what is vital is that there was imminent peril to appellant's life caused by the
unlawful aggression of her husband. The knife tucked in her husband's belt afforded Republic of the Philippines
appellant the only reasonable means with which she could free and save herself from SUPREME COURT
being strangled and choked to death. What this Court expressed in the case of People Manila
vs. Lara, 1925, 48 Phil. 153, 160, is very true and applicable to the situation now
before Us, and We quote:
EN BANC

It should be borne in mind that in emergencies of this kind human

nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in
obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is
apparent, as in this case, that a person has reasonably acted
upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act
and to hold the actor irresponsible in law for the consequences. 16
Equally relevant is the time-honored principle: Necessitas Non habet legem. Necessity
knows no law.
The third element of self-defense is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.Provocation is sufficient when it is proportionate to the
aggression, that is, adequate enough to impel one to attack the person claiming self-
defense. 17 Undoubtedly appellant herein did not give sufficient provocation to warrant
the aggression or attack on her person by her husband, Francisco. While it was
understandable for Francisco to be angry at his wife for finding her on the road in the
middle of the night, however, he was not justified in inflicting bodily punishment with
an intent to kill by choking his wife's throat. All that appellant did was to provoke an
imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her husband, which is not a sufficient
provocation under the law of self-defense. Upon being confronted by her husband for
being out late at night, accused gave a valid excuse that she went carolling with some
friends to earn some money for their child. January 2 was indeed within the Christmas
season during which by tradition people carol from house to house and receive
monetary gifts in a Christian spirit of goodwill. The deceased therefore should have
given some consideration to his wife's excuse before jumping to conclusions and
taking the extreme measure of attempting to kill his wife.
G.R. No. L-162 April 30, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIOSCORO ALCONGA and ADOLFO BRACAMONTE, defendants. DIOSCORO
ALCONGA, appellant.
Jose Avanceña for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Barcelona for appellee.
HILADO, J.:
On the night of May 27, 1943, in the house of one Mauricio Jepes in the Municipality
of San Dionisio, Province of Iloilo several persons were playing prohibited games
(t.s.n., pp. 95, 125). The deceased Silverio Barion was the banker in the game of
black jack, and Maria de Raposo, a witness for the prosecution, was one of those
playing the game (t.s.n., p. 95). Upon invitation of the said Maria de Raposo, the
accused Dioscoro Alconga joined her as a partner, each of them contributing the sum
of P5 to a common fund (t.s.n., pp. 95, 125). Maria de Raposo played the game while
the said accused posted himself behind the deceased, acting as a spotter of the cards
of the latter and communicating by signs to his partner (t.s.n., pp. 95-96, 126). The
deceased appears to have suffered losses in the game because of the team work
between Maria de Raposo and the accused Alconga (t.s.n., pp. 96, 126). Upon
discovering what the said accused had been doing, the deceased became indignant

7
and expressed his anger at the former (t.s.n., pp. 96, 126). An exchange of words
followed, and the two would have come to blows but for the intervention of the
maintainer of the games (t.s.n., p. 96). In a fit of anger, the deceased left the house
but not before telling the accused Alconga, "tomorrow morning I will give you a
breakfast" (t.s.n., p. 96), which expression would seem to signify an intent to inflict
bodily harm when uttered under such circumstances.
The deceased and the accused Alconga did not meet thereafter until the morning of
May 29, 1943, when the latter was in the guardhouse located in the barrio of Santol,
performing his duties as "home guard" (t.s.n., pp. 98-100). While the said accused
was seated on a bench in the guardhouse, the deceased came along and, addressing
the former, said, "Coroy, this is your breakfast," followed forthwith by a swing of his
"pingahan" (t.s.n., p. 100). The accused avoided the blow by falling to the ground
under the bench with the intention to crawl out of the guardhouse (t.s.n., pp. 100-101).
A second blow was given but failed to hit the accused, hitting the bench instead (t.s.n.,
p. 101). The accused manage to go out of the guardhouse by crawling on his
abdomen (t.s.n., p. 101). While the deceased was in the act of delivering the third
blow, the accused, while still in a crawling position (t.s.n., p. 119), fired at him with his
revolver, causing him to stagger and to fall to the ground (t.s.n., p. 101). Rising to his
feet, the deceased drew forth his dagger and directed a blow at the accused who,
however, was able to parry the same with his bolo (t.s.n., pp. 101-102). A hand-to-
hand fight ensued (t.s.n., p. 102). Having sustained several wounds, the deceased ran
away but was followed by the accused (t.s.n., p. 6). After running a distance of about
200 meters (t.s.n., pp. 21, 108), the deceased was overtaken, and another fight took
place, during which the mortal bolo blow — the one which slashed the cranium — was
delivered, causing the deceased to fall to the ground, face downward, besides many
other blows deliver right and left (t.s.n., pp. 6, 28). At this instant, the other accused,
Adolfo Bracamonte, arrived and, being the leader of the "home guards" of San
Dionisio, placed under his custody the accused Alconga with a view to turning him
over to the proper authorities (t.s.n., pp. 102-105).
On their way to San Dionisio, the two accused were stopped by Juan Collado, a
guerrilla soldier (t.s.n., pp. 80, 104). Adolfo Bracamonte turned over Alconga to
Collado who in turn took him to the headquarters (t.s.n., pp. 81, 104). In the afternoon
of the same day, Collado delivered Alconga to Gregorio Barredo, a municipal
policeman of San Dionisio, together with the weapons used in the fight: a revolver, a
bolo, and a dagger (t.s.n., pp. 81, 104).
The injuries sustained by the deceased were described by police sergeant Gil G.
Estaniel as follows:
P. ¿Y que hicieron ustedes cuando ustedes vieron a Silverio Barion? — R.
Examine sus heridas.
P. ¿Donde ha encontrado usted las heridas, en que parte del cuerpo? — R.
En la cabeza, en sus brazos, en sus manos, en la mandibula inferior, en la
parte frente de su cuello, en su pecho derecho, y tambien en el pecho
izquierdo, y su dedo meñique habia volado, se habia cortado, y otras
perqueñas heridas mas.
P. ¿En la cabeza, vio usted heridas? — R. Si, señor.
P. ¿Cuantas heridas? — R. Una herida en la region parietal derecha y una
contusion en la corona de la cabeza.
P. ¿Vio usted el craneo? — R. En la craneo llevaba una herida, en quel el
craneo se ha roto.
P. ¿En el pecho, herida ha encontrado usted? — R. Debajo de la tetilla
derecha, una herida causada por una bala.
P. ¿Y otras heridas en el pecho, puede usted decir que clase de heridas?
— R. Heridas causadas por bolo.
P. ¿Como de grande acquellas heridas en el pecho? — R. No recuerdo la
dimension de las heridas en el pecho.
P. ¿Pero en la cabeza? — R. La cabeza se rajo por aquella herida causada
por el bolo. (T.s.n., p. 25.)
It will be observed that there were two stages in the fight between appellant and the
deceased. The initial stage commenced when the deceased assaulted appellant
without sufficient provocation on the part of the latter. Resisting the aggression,
appellant managed to have the upper hand in the fight, inflicting several wounds upon
the deceased, on account of which the latter fled in retreat. From that moment there
was no longer any danger to the life of appellant who, being virtually unscathed, could
have chosen to remain where he was. Resolving all doubts in his flavor, and
considering that in the first stage the deceased was the unlawful aggressor and
defendant had not given sufficient provocation, and considering further that when the
deceased was about to deliver the third blow, appellant was still in a crawling position
and, on that account, could not have effectively wielded his bolo and therefore had to
use his "paltik" revolver — his only remaining weapon — ; we hold that said appellant
was then acting in self-defense.
But when he pursued the deceased, he was no longer acting in self-defense, there
being then no more aggression to defend against, the same having ceased from the
moment the deceased took to his heels. During the second stage of the fight appellant
inflicted many additional wounds upon the deceased. That the deceased was not
fatally wounded in the first encounter is amply shown by the fact that he was still able
to run a distance of some 200 meters before being overtaken by appellant. Under
such circumstances, appellant's plea of self-defense in the second stage of the fight
cannot be sustained. There can be no defense where there is no aggression.
8
 Although the defendant was not the aggressor, he is not exempt from
criminal liability for the reason that it is shown that he struck several blows,
among them the fatal one, after the necessity for defending himself had
ceased, his assailant being then in retreat. Therefore one of the essential
ingredients of self-defense specified in No. 4, article 8 of the Penal Code is
wanting (now article 11, case No. 1, Revised Penal Code). (United
States vs. Dimitillo, 7 Phil., 475, 476; words in parenthesis supplied.)
. . . Even if it be conceded for the moment that the defendants were
assaulted by the four (offended parties), the right to kill in self-defense
ceased when the aggression ceased; and when Toledo and his brothers
turned and ran, without having inflicted so much as a scratch upon a single
one of the defendants, the right of the defendants to inflict injury upon them
ceased absolutely. They had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure. A
fleeing man is not dangerous to the one from whom he flees. When danger
ceases, the right to injure ceases. When the aggressor turns and flees, the
one assaulted must stay his hand. (United States vs. Vitug, 17 Phil., 1, 19;
emphasis supplied.)
Upon the foregoing facts, we hold that appellant's guilt of the crime of homicide has
been established beyond reasonable doubt. The learned trial court appreciated in his
favor of two mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender and provocation on the part
of the deceased. The first was properly appreciated; the second was not, since it is
very clear that from the moment he fled after the first stage of the fight to the moment
he died, the deceased did not give any provocation for appellant to pursue much less
further to attack him.
The only provocation given by him was imbibed in, and inseparable from, the
aggression with which he started the first stage of the fight. The evidence, as weighed
and appreciated by the learned trial judge, who had heard, seen and observed the
witnesses testify, clearly shows that said stage ended with the flight of the deceased
after receiving a bullet wound in his right breast, which caused him to stagger and fall
to the ground, and several bolo wounds inflicted by appellant during their hand-to-
hand fight after both had gotten up. The learned trial judge said:
The evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense in support of
their respective theories of the case vary materially on certain points. Some
of these facts have to be admitted and some have to be rejected with the
end in view of arriving at the truth. To the mind of the Court, what really
happened in the case at bar, as can de disclosed by the records, which lead
to the killing of the deceased on that fatal morning of May 29, 1945 (should
be 1943), is as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In the morning of May 29, 1943, while Dioscoro Alconga was alone in the
guardhouse performing his duties as guard or "ronda" in Barrio Santol, the
deceased Silverio Barion passed by with a "pingahan". That was the first
time the deceased and the accused Alconga had met since that eventful
night of May 27th in the gambling house of Gepes. Upon seeing the
accused Alconga, who was then seated in the guardhouse, the deceased
cried: "Coroy, this is now the breakfast!" These words of warning were
immediately followed by two formidable swings of the "pingahan" directed at
the accused Alconga which failed to hit him. Alconga was able to avoid the
blows by falling to the ground and crawling on his abdomen until he was
outside the guardhouse. The deceased followed him and while in the act of
delivering the third blow, Dioscoro Alconga fired at him with his revolver
thereby stopping the blow in mid-air. The deceased fell to the ground
momentarily and upon rising to his feet, he drew forth a dagger. The
accused Alconga resorted to his bolo and both persons being armed, a
hand-to-hand fight followed. The deceased having sustained several
wounds from the hands of Alconga, ran away with the latter close to his
heels.
The foregoing statement of the pertinent facts by the learned trial judge is in
substantial agreement with those found by us and narrated in the first paragraphs of
this decision. Upon those facts the question arises whether when the deceased
started to run and flee, or thereafter until he died, there was any provocation given by
him from appellant to pursue and further to attack him. It will be recalled, to be given
with, that the first stage of the fight was provoked when the deceased said to appellant
"Cory, this is now the breakfast," or "This is your breakfast," followed forthwith by a
swing or two of his "pingahan." These words without the immediately following attack
with the "pingahan" would not have been uttered, we can safely assume, since such
an utterance alone would have been entirely meaningless. It was the attack, therefore,
that effectively constituted the provocation, the utterance being, at best, merely a
preclude to the attack. At any rate, the quoted words by themselves, without the
deceased's act immediately following them, would certainly not have been considered
a sufficient provocation to mitigate appellant's liability in killing or injuring the
deceased. For provocation in order to be a mitigating circumstance must
be sufficient and immediately preceding the act. (Revised Penal Code, article 13, No.
4.)
Under the doctrine in United States vs. Vitug, supra, when the deceased ran and fled
without having inflicted so much as a scratch upon appellant, but after, upon the other
hand, having been wounded with one revolver shot and several bolo slashes, as
aforesaid, the right of appellant to inflict injury upon him, ceased absolutely —
appellant "had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure" said deceased — for the
reason that "a fleeing man is not dangerous to the one from whom he flees." If the law,
as interpreted and applied by this Court in the Vitug case, enjoins the victorious
contender from pursuing his opponent on the score of self-defense, it is because this
Court considered that the requisites of self-defense had ceased to exist, principal and
indispensable among these being the unlawful aggression of the opponent (Rev.
Penal Code, article 11, No. 1; 1 Viada, 5th ed., 173).
Can we find under the evidence of record that after the cessation of said aggression
the provocation thus involved therein still persisted, and to a degree sufficient to
9
extenuate appellant's criminal responsibility for his acts during the second stage of the
fight? Appellant did not testify nor offer other evidence to show that when he pursued
the deceased he was still acting under the impulse of the effects of what provocation,
be it anger, obfuscation or the like. The Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 13. Mitigating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
immediately preceded the act.
It is therefore apparent that the Code requires for provocation to be such a mitigating
circumstance that it not only immediately precede the act but that it also
be sufficient. In the Spanish Penal Code, the adjective modifying said noun is
"adecuada" and the Supreme Court of Spain in its judgment of June 27, 2883,
interpreted the equivalent provision of the Penal Code of that country, which was the
source of our own existing Revised Penal Code, that "adecuada"
means proportionate to the damage caused by the act. Viada (Vol. 11, 5th ed., p. 51)
gives the ruling of that Supreme Court as follows:
El Tribunal Supremo ha declarado que la provocacion o amenaza que de
parte del ofendido ha de preceder para la disminucion de la responsabilidad
criminal debe ser proporcionada al daño que se cause, lo cual no concurre
a favor del reo si resulta que la unica cuestion que hubo fue si en un
monton de yeso habia mas omenos cantidad, y como perdiera la apuesta y
bromeando dijera el que la gano que beberia vino de balde, esa pequeña
cuestion de amor propio no justificaba en modo alguno la ira que le impelio
a herir y matar a su contrario. (S. de 27 de junio de 1883, Gaceta de 27 de
septiembre.)
Justice Albert, in his commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1946 edition, page
94, says: "The provocation or threat must be sufficient, which means that it should be
proportionate to the act committed and adequate to stir one to its commission"
(emphasis supplied).
Sufficient provocation, being a matter of defense, should, like any other, be
affirmatively proven by the accused. This the instant appellant has utterly failed to do.
Any way, it would seem self-evident that appellant could never have succeeded in
showing that whatever remained of the effects of the deceased's aggression, by way
of provocation after the latter was already in fight, was proportionate to his killing his
already defeated adversary.
That provocation gave rise to a fight between the two men, and may be said, not
without reason, to have spent itself after appellant had shot the deceased in his right
breast and caused the latter to fall to the ground; or — making a concession in
appellant's favor — after the latter had inflicted several bolo wounds upon the
deceased, without the deceased so much as having scratched his body, in their hand-
to-hand fight when both were on their feet again. But if we are to grant appellant a
further concession, under the view most favorable to him, that aggression must be
deemed to have ceased upon the flight of the deceased — upon the end of the first
stage of the fight. In so affirming, we had to strain the concept in no small degree. But
to further strain it so as to find that said aggression or provocation persisted even
when the deceased was already in flight, clearly accepting defeat and no less clearly
running for his life rather than evincing an intention of returning to the fight, is more
than we can sanction. It should always be remembered that "illegal aggression is
equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent
kind.
Agresion ilegitima. — Agresion vale tanto como acometimiento. Para que
exista el derecho de defensa es preciso que se nos acometa, que se nos
ataque, o cuando menos, que se nos amenace de atacarnos de un modo
inmediato e inminente; v. gr., desenvainando el puñal para herirnos con el o
apuntando la pistola para dispararla contra nosotros. (Viada, 5. a edicion,
173.)
After the flight of the deceased there was clearly neither an assault nor a threatened
assault of the remotest kind. It has been suggested that when pursuing his fleeing
opponent, appellant might have thought or believed that said opponent was going to
his house to fetch some other weapon. But whether we consider this as a part or
continuation of the self-defense alleged by appellant, or as a separate circumstance,
the burden of proof to establish such a defense was, of course, upon appellant, and
he has not so much as attempted to introduce evidence for this purpose. If he really
thought so, or believed so, he should have positively proven it, as any other defense.
We can not now gratuitously assume it in his behalf.
It is true that in the case of United States vs. Rivera (41 Phil., 472, 474), this Court
held that one defending himself or his property from a felony violently or by surprise
threatened by another is not obliged to retreat but may pursue his adversary until he
has secured himself from danger. But that is not this case. Here from the very start
appellant was the holder of the stronger and more deadly weapons — a revolver and
a bolo, as against a piece of bamboo called "pingahan" and a dagger in the
possession of the deceased. In actual performance appellant, from the very beginning,
demonstrated his superior fighting ability; and he confirmed it when after the deceased
was first felled down by the revolver shot in right breast, and after both combatants
had gotten up and engaged in a hand-to-hand fight, the deceased using his dagger
and appellant his bolo, the former received several bolo wounds while the latter got
through completely unscathed. And when the deceased thereupon turned and fled,
the circumstances were such that it would be unduly stretching the imagination to
consider that appellant was still in danger from his defeated and fleeing opponent.
Appellant preserved his revolver and his bolo, and if he could theretofore so easily
overpower the deceased, when the latter had not yet received any injury, it would
need, indeed, an unusually strong positive showing — which is completely absent
from the record — to persuade us that he had not yet "secured himself from danger"
after shooting his weakly armed adversary in the right breast and giving him several
10
bolo slashes in different other parts of his body. To so hold would, we believe, be
unjustifiably extending the doctrine of the Rivera case to an extreme not therein
contemplated.
Under article 249, in relation with article 64, No. 2, of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime committed by appellant is punishable by reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, which would be from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. However,
in imposing the penalty, we take into consideration the provisions of section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103), as amended by Act No. 4225.
Accordingly, we find appellant guilty of the aforesaid crime of homicide and sentence
him to an indeterminate penalty of from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 14 years
and 8 months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum
of P2,000, and to pay the costs.
As thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. So ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
MORAN, C.J.:
I certify that Mr. Justice Feria concurs in this decision.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., dissenting :
I agree to the statement of facts in so far as it concern what is called by the majority
the first stage of the fight. The following narration dealing with the second stage is not
however, in accordance with the record: "Having sustained several wounds, the
deceased ran away but was followed by the accused (t.s.n. p. 6). After running a
distance of about 200 meters (t.s.n. pp. 21, 108), the deceased was overtaken, and
another fight took place, during which the mortal bolo blow — the one which slashed
the cranium — was delivered, causing the deceased to fall to the ground, face
downward besides many other blows delivered right and left (t.s.n. pp. 6, 28)."
It should be noted that the testimony of witness Luis Ballaran for the prosecution has
been completely discarded by the lower court and we can do no better in this appeal.
Had said testimony been given credit, the accused-appellant would appear to have
been the aggressor from the beginning, and the facts constitute of the first stage of the
fight, as testified to by said accused, should not have been accepted by the lower
court. Now, continuing his testimony, the accused stated: "Cuando yo paraba las
puñaladas el se avalanzaba hacia mi y yo daba pasos atras hasta llegar al terreno
palayero (t.s.n., p. 102). Y mientras el seguia avalanzandome dandome puñaladas y
yo seguia dando pasos atras, y al final, cuando el ya quiso darme una puñalada
certera con fuerza el se cayo al suelo por su inercia (t.s.n., p. 102). Si, señor, yo daba
pasos atras y tratando de parar la puñalada (t.s.n., p. 108)."
It thus shown that the accused never pursued the deceased. On the contrary, the
deceased tried to continue his assault started during the first stage of the fight, and the
accused had been avoiding the blows by stepping backward.
There may be error as to the exact distance between the guardhouse and the place
where the deceased fell. What is very clear is that it was during the first stage of the
fight that the deceased received a wound just below the right chest, caused by a bullet
that penetrated and remained in said part of the body. According to the witness for the
prosecution, that wound was also fatal.
Since the lower court by its decision has considered the testimony of the witnesses for
the prosecution to be unworthy of credit, and, as we also believe that said witnesses
were really not present at the place and time of the occurrence, this Court is bound by
the testimony of the witnesses for the defense as to what in fact happened, under and
by which the appellant is shown to have acted in self-defense.
Wherefore, he should be acquitted.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Four witnesses testified for the prosecution. In synthesis their testimonies are as
follows: Luis Ballaran. — On May 29, 1943, at about 9 o'clock a.m., while the two
accused Dioscoro Alconga and Rodolfo Bracamonte were in search for home guards,
Silverio Barion passed by. Alconga invited him for breakfast. But Barion ran and
Alconga followed him. When Barion looked back, Bracamonte hit him with a stick at
the left temple. The stick was of bahi. Barion fell down. Alconga stabbed him with
his bolo. Then he fired with his paltik. After having been fired at with the paltik, Barion
rose up and ran towards his house. The two accused pursued him. Alconga stabbed
him right and left and Bracamonte hit him with his bahi. When Barion breathed no
more, the two accused went to the municipal building of San Dionisio. The witness
went home without approaching Barion. During the whole fight, the witness remained
standing in the home guard shed. At the time there were no other people in the place.
The witness is an uncle of the deceased Barion. The shed was about half a kilometer
from the farm in which the witness was working. The place where Barion fell was
about the middle between the two places. The witness did not intervene in the incident
nor shouted for help. He did not tell anybody of the incident, neither the chief of police,
the fiscal, nor the justice of the peace.
Gil G. Estaniel, Police Sergeant of San Dionisio. — He went in the company of the
justice of the peace to the place of the incident. He saw the body of the deceased
Barion and examined his wounds. The deceased had wounds in the head, arms,
11
hands, lower jaw, neck, chest. The small finger of his right hand was severed. There
were other wounds. The cranium was broken. At the right side of the chest there was
a gunshot wound. After the inspection, the body of the deceased was delivered to the
widow. The accused were arrested, but refused to testify.
Ruperto L. Libres, acting clerk of court since May 16, 1943. — He received
one paltik with blank cartridge, one bolo, one cane of bahi and one dagger, which
weapons he could not produce save the paltik. The other effects were missing due to
transfers caused by frequent enemy penetration in Dingle. The bolo was a rusty
working bolo. The dagger was 6 inches long, made of iron. The bolo was 1 1/2 feet
long. The bahi was a cane of average length, about 2 inches wide and 3/4 of an inch
thick.
Maria de Raposo. — On May 29, 1943, the witness was walking following Silverio
Barion. When the latter passed in front of the home guard shed, Bracamonte pursued
him and hit him with the bahi. Barion fell down; Alconga approached him and stabbed
him with his bolo, after which he shot him with his paltik. When Barion saw that the
accused were looking at Luis Ballaran he rose up and ran towards a ricefield where he
fell down. The accused pursued him and stabbed him right and left. When Barion died,
the accused went away. Bracamonte shouted that he was ready to face the relatives
of the deceased who might feel aggrieved. The witness was about twenty meters from
the place of the incident. The deceased was her cousin. The witness also passed in
front of the shed, but does not know whether Luis Ballaran who was in the shed was
able to see her. She passed at about three meters from Luis Ballaran. Before
Bracamonte delivered the first blow to Barion, the witness did not hear any exchange
of words. When Barion fell, the witness remained standing at the canal of the road
about twenty meters from Ballaran. On Thursday night, May 27, there was gambling
going on in the house of Mauricio Gepes. The witness played black jack with Dioscoro
Alconga against Silverio Barion.
The two accused and three witnesses testified for the defense, and their testimonies
are synthesized as follows:
Juan Collado. — The witness is a soldier who took part in the arrest of Dioscoro
Alconga, whom he delivered to Barredo with a revolver, a bolo and a dagger.
Felix Dichosa. — In the morning of May 29, 1943, the witness was in the home guard
shed. When Bioy (Silverio Barion) was about to arrive at the place, the witness asked
him if he had fish. He answered no and then went on his way. The witness went to the
road and he heard Bioy saying: "So you are here, lightning! Your hour has come." The
witness saw Bioy striking Dioscoro Alconga with the lever he used for carrying fish.
Alconga was not hit. Bioy tried to strike him again, but Alconga sought cover under the
bench of the shed. The bench was hit. When Bioy pursued him and gave him a blow
with a bolo, the witness heard a gunshot and he saw Bioy falling down. Upon falling in
a sitting position, Bioy took a dagger with the purpose of stabbing Alconga. Upon
seeing this, Alconga stabbed Barion right and left, while Barion was coming against
Alconga. When Barion fell into the canal, the witness shouted for help. Rodolfo
Bracamonte and Dalmacio Mendoza came. When the witness came out from the shed
and was at a distance of ten brazas, he saw Ballaran, and requested him to intervene
in the fight, because the witness felt that Bioy was about to kill Alconga. Ballaran went
to their shed and the witness went to his house. At noon, Ballaran went to the house
of the witness to ask him to testify and gave him instructions to testify differently from
what actually had happened. The witness told him that it would be better if Ballaran
himself should testify and Ballaran answered: "I cannot because I was not present.
You can testify better because you were present. I will go down to look for another
witness."
Dalmacio Mendoza. — On the morning of May 29, 1943, he went to the house of
Rodolfo Bracamonte to borrow a small saw and one auger. While the witness was
conversing with Bracamonte, a gunshot was fired. Bracamonte announced that he
was going to the home guard shed and stated: "That Coroy is a fool, because he fired
a revolver which has but one bullet." The witness followed. Upon reaching the shed
they saw Felix Dichosa, who said that Bracamonte and the witness should hurry
because Coroy was to be killed by Bioy. The witness saw Bioy falling. In front of him
was Alconga who took a dagger from the ground. The dagger was in Barion's hand
before he fell. Bracamonte asked Alconga: "Coroy, what did you do to Silverio?"
Alconga answered: "I killed Bioy, because if I did not he would have killed me. My shirt
was pierced by the dagger, and if I did not evade I would have been hit." Bracamonte
said: "Go to town, to the authority, I will accompany you." After leaving the place,
Alconga, Bracamonte and the witness met Luis Ballaran who asked: "Rodolfo, what
happened to the boys?" Rodolfo answered: "Go and help Bioy because I am going to
bring Coroy to the town officer." Ballaran went to the place where Barion was lying,
while Alconga and Bracamonte went to town.
Adolfo Bracamonte. — His true name is Adolfo and not Rodolfo as stated in the
information, which was amended accordingly. He belies the testimonies of Luis
Ballaran and Maria de Raposo. At about 7 o'clock a.m. on May 29, 1943, he went to
the home guard shed, he being the leader. When he found it without guards, he called
Alconga to mount guard and delivered to him the paltik Exhibit A. The witness
returned home to take breakfast. Dalmacio Mendoza came to borrow a small saw and
auger, because the witness is also a carpenter. He heard a gunshot, and he went to
the shed, followed by Dalmacio. When they were approaching the shed, Felix Dichosa
shouted: "Come in a hurry, because Bioy is going to kill Dioscoro Alconga." The
witness asked: "Where are they?" Dichosa showed the place. The witness went
towards the place and he saw two persons fighting. One fell down. Upon seeing
Barion falling, the witness shouted to Alconga: "What happened to you?" Alconga
answered: "Manoy, I stabbed Bioy, because if I did not he was to kill me," showing his
shirt. When Barion fell down the witness saw him with a dagger. Upon meeting him
coming from the opposite direction, Ballaran addressed Bracamonte: "Rodolfo, what
happened?" "Bioy is in the rice land. Help him because I am going to bring Dioscoro to
the town and I will return immediately." Ballaran went to the place where Barion fell.
On the way, Alconga was taken by soldier Juan Collado who later brought him to the
town of San Dionisio. The witness did not carry at the time of the incident any cane
of bahi nor did he carry one on other occasions. The occupation of the deceased was
selling fish and he used to take much tuba. He was of aggressive character and
sturdier than Alconga. Once, Barion gave a fist blow to the witness and on another
12
occasion stabbed him with a bolo, wounding him in the head. For such stabbing, defense to the effect that it is not true, as testified to by Luis Ballaran and Maria de
Barion was held in prison for one month. Raposo, that Bracamonte took active part in the fight and it was he who gave the first
blow to the deceased with his bahi cane, causing him to fall. Ballaran's declaration to
the effect that aside from the two accused, the deceased and himself, no other people
Dioscoro Alconga. — On May 27, Thursday, at night, he went to gamble in the house
were in the place, is directly contradicted by Maria de Raposo who said that she even
of Mauricio Gepes. Mahjong, poker, monte and black jack were being played in the
passed in front of Ballaran, within a few meters from him. There being no way of
house. Maria de Raposo invited Alconga to be her partner in black jack against Barion
reconciling the contradicting testimonies of Ballaran and Maria and of determining
who was then the banker. Each put a share of P5. When Alconga placed himself
who, among the two, declared the truth, we cannot but reject both testimonies as
behind Barion, the latter saw Maria winking to Alconga. Barion looked back at Alconga
unreliable. Felix Dichosa testified that Ballaran went to his house to request him to
saying: "Coroy it seems that you are cheating. Son of a whore." Alconga answered:
testify with instructions to give facts different from those which actually happened.
"Bioy you are also son of a whore." Barion stood up to give a fist blow to Alconga who
Upon Dichosa's suggestion that Ballaran himself testify, Ballaran had to confess that
pinned him to his sit and attempted to give him a fist blow. The owner of the house
he did not see what happened and he was going to look for another witness. The
separated them. Barion struck Maria de Raposo, because he was losing in the game,
prosecution did not dare to recall Ballaran to belie Dichosa.
threw away the cards, took the money from the table, and rose to leave the place.
While he was walking he addressed Alconga: "Coroy you are son of a whore.
Tomorrow I will give you a breakfast. You failed to take lesson by the fact that 2. That Adolfo Bracamonte did not take part in the fight which resulted in Barion's
I boloed the head of your brother," referring to Bracamonte. When Alconga saw Maria death. When Bracamonte arrived at the place of the struggle, he found Barion already
leaving the place, he pursued her asking for his share of the winnings. Maria a cadaver.
answered: "What winnings are you asking for?" Alconga said: "You are like your
cousin. Both of you are cheaters." Maria went away insulting the accused. On The
3. After rejecting the incredible version of Luis Ballaran and Maria de Raposo, the only
morning of the 29th, Alconga went to one of his houses carrying an old working bolo to
version available of what happened is the one given in the testimony of Alconga, well-
do some repairing. He left his long combat bolo in one of his house. On the way he
supported and corroborated by all the other witnesses for the defense.
met Bracamonte who instructed him to mount guard in the home guard shed, because
no one was there. Bracamonte gave him a paltik. After staying about two hours in the
shed, Bioy came and upon seeing him, threw away his baskets and with his carrying 4. That according to the testimony of Alconga, there should not be any question on the
lever gave a blow to Alconga, saying "This is your breakfast." Alconga was not hit following:
because he dodged the blow, by allowing himself to fall down. He sought cover under
a bench with the purpose of going away. Barion gave him another blow, but his lever
hit the bench instead. When Alconga was able to come out from the bench, Barion (a) That Barion had a grudge against Alconga in view of the gambling incident on the
went to the other side of the shed with the intention of striking him. Alconga took night of May 27, in which he promised to give Alconga a breakfast, which upon what
the paltik and fired. Barion fell down losing hold of the lever. Both stood up at the subsequently happened, was in fact a menace to kill him.
same time; Barion took his dagger and stabbed Alconga with it saying: "You are son
of whore. Coroy, I will kill you." Alconga took his bolo to stop the dagger thrust. Barion (b) That while Alconga was alone in the home guard shed, Barion, upon seeing him,
continued attacking Alconga with dagger thrusts, while Alconga kept stepping back in suddenly attacked him with blows with his carrying lever.
the direction of the rice lands. In one of his dagger thrusts, Barion fell down by his own
weight. Alconga took the dagger from his hand, and at the same time Alconga heard
his brother Bracamonte asking: "Coroy, Coroy, what is that?" Alconga answered: (c) That Alconga, to defend himself, at first fired the only bullet available in
"Manoy, I killed Bioy, because if I did not he would have killed me." Bracamonte took the paltik given to him by Bracamonte.
the paltik, the bolo and the dagger and pushing Alconga said: "Go to town." Alconga
added: "Look, Bioy gave me dagger thrusts, if I did not escape he would have killed (d) That although Barion had fallen and lost hold of his carrying lever, he was able to
me," showing his torn shirt. Bracamonte said: "Go to town, I will bring you to the town stand up immediately and with a dagger continued attacking Alconga.
officer." On the way, they met Luis Ballaran who asked: "Rodolfo, what happened to
the boys?" Bracamonte answered: "Uncle Luis, go to help Silverio at the rice land
because I am going to bring my brother to town and I will return soon." (e) That Alconga took his old rusty bolo to defend himself, against the dagger thrusts
of Barion, while at the same time stepping backwards until both reached the rice land,
where Barion fell dead.
For all the foregoing we are convinced:
(f) That the wounds received by Barion, who was sturdier and of aggressive character,
1. That the testimonies of Luis Ballaran and Maria de Raposo are unworthy of credit. were inflicted on him by Alconga while defending himself against the illegal aggression
Both have been contradicted by the witnesses for the defense, and the fact that the of Barion.
lower court acquitted Adolfo Bracamonte, shows that it believed the theory of the

13
(g) That in view of the number of wounds received by Barion, it is most probable that appeal to our pity, but the millions whose lives were spared by the prompt and
Alconga continued giving blows with his bolo even after Barion was already unable to spectacular ending of the war with the help of the atomic energy, are entitled to
fight back. justice, a justice which would have been denied them if the Americans, swayed by
unreasonable feminine compunctions, should have abstained from using the weapon
upon which were pinned the hopes and salvation of those millions of innocent human
(h) The theory of dividing the fight which took place in two stages, in the first one,
beings. While those who cannot offend and the defenseless may merit all our
Barion being the aggressor, and in the second one, as the victim, finds no support in
sympathy and kindness, those who constitutes an actual menace to human life are
the evidence. It seems clear to us that the fight, from the beginning to end, was a
liable to be relentlessly crushed, until the last residuum of menace has been wiped
continuous and uninterrupted occurrence. There is no evidence upon which to base
out.
the proposition that there were two stages or periods in the incident, in such a way
that we might be allowed to conclude that in fact there were two fights.
We vote to acquit appellant.
The fact that Barion died with many wounds might be taken against appellant and may
weaken the theory that he acted only in legitimate self-defense. To judge, however,
the conduct of appellant during the whole incident, it is necessary to consider the
psychology of a person engaged in a life or death struggle, acting under the irresistible FIRST DIVISION
impulses of self-preservation and blinded by anger and indignation for the illegal
aggression of which he was the victim. A person placed in such a crucial situation [G.R. No. L-3515. October 3, 1907. ]
must have to summon all his physiological resources and physical forces to rally to the
one and indivisible aim of survival and, to that end, placed his energies on the level of THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDERSON MACK, Defendant-
highest pitch. In that moment of physical and spiritual hypertension, to ask that a man Appellant.
should measure his acts as an architect would make measurements to achieve
proportion and symmetry in a proposed building or a scientist would make a Amzi B. Kelly, for Appellant.
calibration, so that his acts of self-defense should stop precisely at the undeterminable
border line when the aggressor ceases to be dangerous, is to ask the impossible. Attorney-General Araneta, for Appellee.
Appellant's conduct must be judged not by the standards which may be exacted from
the supermen of the future, if progressive evolution may happen to develop them. SYLLABUS
Appellant's conduct can only be tested by the average standards of human nature as
we found it, which has many limitations and defects. If in trying to eliminate an actual 1. EXCEPTION FROM CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY ON PLEA OF SELF-DEFENSE. —
danger menacing his own existence, appellant was not able to moderate his efforts to An accused person is not entitled to complete exemption from criminal responsibility on
destroy that menace, to the extent of actually killing his aggressor, he is certainly not the plea of self-defense unless each and all of the following facts are established to the
accountable. He is not an angel. We must judge him as man, with its average satisfaction of the court: First, that there was an unlawful aggression; second, that there
baggage of faults and imperfections. After all, the aggressor ought to know that he was reasonable necessity for the employment of the means taken to prevent or resist
acted at his risk, and that by trying to kill a human being he defied fate, he gambled such unlawful aggression; third, that there was no sufficient provocation on the part of
his own life. Fate is always stronger than all its challengers. He who gambles with life, the accused.
like all gamblers, in the end becomes the loser.
2. EFFORTS TO EVADE ASSAULT. — One who is unlawfully assailed need not attempt
Peace cannot remain undisturbed and justice cannot remain unchallenged unless all to retreat where there is no reasonable ground to believe that by so doing he can safely
aggression is stopped, individual or collective. A great number of human miseries are avoid the threatened attack; nor is he required to continue his retreat when there is no
the natural fruits of aggression. One of the means of curbing it is to give a conclusive reasonable ground to believe that he can do so with safety.
notice to all aggressors, that not only are they to pay very dearly for their acts, but that
the victims of their aggression are entitled, in self-defense, to avail themselves of even
the most devastating weapons. Those who allow themselves to run amuck in an DECISION
aggression spree cannot complain because the means of defense of the victims
happen to be destructive. There may be some narrow-minded persons who would
hold illegal the use by the Americans of the atomic bomb to compel Japan to CARSON, J. :
surrender. They must be followers of the philosophy of the sheep. We prefer to follow
the principle of dynamic self-defense for the innocent. Those who are bent on
destroying human beings, must, before they are able to achieve their diabolical
objective, be first destroyed. Those who were killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki may The defendant was charged with the crime of asesinato (assassination) and convicted of

14
the crime of homicidio (homicide). From this judgment of conviction he appealed to this
court.
It is admitted that upon the night of May 4, 1906, the accused, a negro soldier, shot and
killed a municipal policeman named Estanislao Indic. The evidence of record is
contradictor and conflicting in the extreme, but we think that, giving the accused the
benefit of the doubt as to the veracity and credibility of the witnesses, the following
relation of the incidents, as the occurred must be held to be in accordance with the
weight of the evidence.
Just before the shooting, the accused was sitting on a bench a few feet back from the
street, in the town of Tacloban, in the Province of Leyte, in an open space some 3 or 4
feet, width, between the tienda or content of a woman named Olimpia and another
building. The deceased, with another policemen, approached the place directed Olimpia
to close her tienda, and, later, ordered the accused and another soldier who was
standing near by to go to their quarters. The accused did not obey this order, and it is
probable that some words passed between the soldiers, the policemen, and the woman
which angered the deceased, though the weight of the evidence clearly maintain the
contention of the accused that he did and said nothing to provoke or offend the
deceased, except in so far as his failure to obey the order to go to his quarters may have
had that effect. The deceased, who was standing some 10 or 12 feet from the accused,
cursing and abusing him for his failure to obey the order, wrought himself into a passion
dragged himself free from his companion, who was endeavoring to restrain him and take
him away, and started toward the accused, at the same time drawing his bolo and
brandishing it in a threatening manner. Thereupon the accused got up, drew his revolver,
and the deceased having then approached within a distance of from 3 to 6 feet, the
accused fired three shots, one of which took effect in the left breast of the deceased, just
above the nipple, and another in the back of his head.
There was some testimony tending to show that when the shooting took place the
deceased was under the influence of liquor, and that he bore resentment against the
accused arising out of a quarrel about a woman, but these contentions are not
satisfactorily sustained by the evidence, nor it is necessary to take them into
consideration in deciding the case.
Upon the foregoing statement of facts the defendant’s contention that he shot the
deceased in self-defense and is therefore exempt from punishment, must be sustained
The trial court was of opinion that the evidence offered by the accused established "an in
complete defense," which entitles the defendant to a reduction of the penalty, but not to
complete exception from punishment; in support of his opinion the trial judge reasons as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The accused claims exemption from criminal liability on the ground that the act was
committed in self defense. At the outset of the discussion of this point it may be well to
quote the following from an opinion cited by his counsel:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘The defendant, having admitted the killing, has assumed the task of establishing his
defense, not that the burden of proof shifted in the case, but it was necessary for him to,
establish his defense to the satisfaction of the court.’ (United State v. Capisonda 1 Phil.
Rep., 575.)
"It is true that the presumption of innocence is always in favor of the accused, but when,
as here, the Government has actually proven the crime of homicidio, it need not go,
farther and negative a particular and exculpatory plea on the part of the accused such as
self-defense. That must be established by the accused himself ’to the satisfaction of the
court.’
"Article 8, subdivision 4, of the Penal Code prescribes the elements which must exist in
order that self-defense may be established. Counsel for the accused maintains that it is
sufficient if he establishes two of these elements, namely, illegal aggression and lack of
sufficient provocation. But in each of the authorities which he cites on this propositions,
although the court does not emphasize it, there was also present the third element
"reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it" (aggression). Thus
in United States v. Salandanan (1 Phil. Rep., 478) the court lays stress (p. 479) on the
fact that "it can not be asserted that the danger to the defendant had ceased" because
disarmament by the deceased "was the contingency which the accused might well have
reasonable feared." In other words, there was or seemed to be a "reasonable necessity"
or defendant’s part of continuing the struggle. So in United States v. Patala (2 Phil. Rep.,
752) the court says (p. 756): "Considering the nature of the aggression the defendant
could have reasonably believed that his life was in danger and that it was a case of life or
death with him." This again could mean nothing less than that the means employed
seemed reasonably necessary. In United States v. Regis (2 Phil. Rep., 113) the
deceased was the aggressor and the accused, although he had succeeded in wresting
the bolo from the deceased Languido inflicted the wounds because (p. 116) "fearing that
Languido might again possess himself of the weapon In none of these cases does not
court say that this reason able necessity of the means employed" is not essential the
establishment of self-defense and that is failure to especially mention this element is not
to be construed prescribing the rule for which counsel contends is parent from United
States v. De Castro (2 Phil. Rep., 67), in which the opinion was written by the name
judge (Mapa) who wrote the opinions in United States Salandanan and United States v.
Patala (supra) and where after reviewing the facts it is observed (p.
70):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘. . . such means were not reasonably required or necessary to repel the attack . . . It
follows that there is absent in this case one of the three requisites section 4 of article 8 of
the code — that is, the reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the attack
— in order that the necessity for self-defense may be a complete exemption from
criminal liability.’
"Indeed such a constructions as counsel urges would effect a virtual repeal of article 8,
subdivision 4, which recognizes the validity of self-defense only provide ’there are the
following attendant circumstances; not, as in article 403, ’if the deed is attended by any
of the following circumstances.’ It is clear therefore that in order to show himself entitled
to complete acquittal in this case the accused must ’establish to the satisfaction of the
court’ a ’reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel’ the attack. On
this point let us hear the accused.
"He testifies (Def., pp. 47, 49) that saw the deceased approaching when he was ’quite a
distance away, . . . might have been or 10 feet.’ This was apparent (p. 51) before he had
15
turned his dead around and seems that the rear entrance was obstructed by a barrel and influence of liquor and unable to walk straight cold hardly wield a weapon with full force
other articles mentioned. He had been sitting (Def., pp. 21, 42) on a each between the or in such a manner that it could not be dodged.
tienda and the next house on the right. But he could not have been seated much in the
rear of the front of either house for Adams, who was leaning against the corner of the "Moreover the accused admits (Def., pp. 51, 79) — and it is a material circumstance [25
tienda, was not more than 2 feet way (Def., pp. 9, 22), near enough indeed for the Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law. (2 ed.) , 282] — that he was taller than the deceased and he
accused to reach over and touch him (Def., pp. 21, 47) and it seems also (p. 39) that the is unable to say (Def., p. 52) that the latter was taller the Lieutenant Soledad, who was
tendera who had been seated on the steps behind the accused was only about a foot then present in court. If not, the deceased must have been four or five inches shorter
and a half from Adams. Moreover one step seems to have bought the accused to the than the accused and he would have had to reach accordingly in order to strike the
edge of the street (Def., pp. 19, 459. He testifies (Def., p. 49) that there were no fixtures accused in the face or head, which would be the most vulnerable because least
built into the street and he mentions no obstruction of the right except the house and its protected portion. Again the accused is a man of powerful physique, well proportioned
inmate, Townsend, who was standing on the corner (Def., pp. 48, 49). According to his and strong of limb. Could he not have parried the blow or wrested the weapon from the
own testimony the accused, after recognizing his danger, had time enough to rise from man who he says was drunk and unable to walk straight?
his seat, look backward for a way of escape, push Adams aside, extricate his revolver
from the left side of his oath (Def., p. 43) with his right hand (Def., p. 2), change the "Finally, if the use of a firearm seemed necessary, could it not least have been employed
weapon from the right hand to the left (Def., p. 43), and fire the shot that killed the in such a way that fatal results might have been avoided? a shot directed at the
deceased. Since one step brought him to the edge of the street and he ’had to wheel to menacing arm with the same unerring accuracy as that actually fired would have stayed
the right’ anyway (Def., p. 19), it would seem that during this interval he might have found the threatened blow. A bullet in the leg or foot not less surely than that which pierced the
time to move farther to the right, passing around Townsend if necessary, in order to assailant’s heart would have halted him and still spared his life. But the accused directed
dodge the deceased. While the latter was coming 9 or 10 feet, it should not have been his first ball at a vital spot and although he saw that this ’took effect’ and that the
impossible, and hardly difficult, for the accused to have covered the distance necessary deceased ’became helpless within a second’ (Def., p. 43) he fired two additional shots
to place him out of the deceased’s path. If this case were being tried in any of the (Def., pp. 11, 18, 28-44). This certainly did not indicate that the accused was doing no
Federal courts it would be necessary for the accused to show, in order to establish his more than was ’reasonably necessary to prevent or repel’ the attack. It demonstrates a
plea of self-defense, that he had retreated as far as he safely could, even though he was considerable degree of recklessness and, in spite of the witnesses who speak of his
without fault and was in no danger of a murderous attack. [125 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of apparent ’coolness,’ that the accused was in fact greatly excited. Human life is too
Law (2d ed.) , p. 271-272. ] This is not the rule in all or perhaps a majority of the State sacred and the tendency to disregard it too common to justify a court in finding that the
courts, but in view of the recent decision in United States v. Grafton 1 (4 Off. Gaz., 364) it destruction of it under such circumstances is wholly blameless.
seems more than likely that the above rule would be followed in this jurisdiction. Besides,
can it be said that there was ’a reasonable necessity’ of shooting the deceased so long "But although the accused has not established ’to the satisfaction of the court . . .
as the accused could escape? reasonable necessity’ for killing the deceased in order to save himself, he has made
what the courts call an ’incomplete defense’ under article 86 of the Penal Code (United
"Again if escape were impracticable, was it ’reasonably necessary’ for the accused to States v. Mendoza, 2 Phil., Rep., 109; United States v. De Castro, 2 Phil. Rep., 67),
employ a firearm to repel or prevent the threatened attack? The Supreme Court has which entitles him to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees."cralaw virtua1aw library
held, in considering this section, that it is not necessary to use revolver in order to repel
an attack with a calicut (United States v. Mendoza, 2 Phil. Rep., 109), nor to inflict a We agree with the trial court that on a plea of self-defense under the provisions of case 4
mortal wound with a dagger when assailed with a bamboo club. (United States v. Castro, of article 8 of the Penal Code, an accused person is not entitled to exemption from
2 Phil. Rep., 67.) criminal responsibility unless each and all the following facts are established to the
satisfaction of the court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"The bolo carried by the deceased is a formidable-looking weapon with a blade fourteen
and a half inches in length, but it is not a sharp-pointed instrument and the blade is First. That there was an unlawful aggression;
almost blunt through rust and dullness. Indeed it is more than doubtful whether, if applied
with ordinary force against any portion of the accused’s body covered by clothing, it Second. That there was reasonable necessity for the employment of the means taken to
would penetrate the latter. According to the testimony of the accused and his witnesses prevent or resist such unlawful aggression;
the deceased was hardly in condition to use the weapon with more than ordinary force.
Following is the accused’s description of the appearance of the deceased at the time Third. That there was no sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.
(Def., p. 53):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
We think it affirmatively appears from the evidence of record that there was an
"‘He did not walk exactly straight, but he was not exactly staggering about; he was doing unprovoked, illegal aggression on the part of the deceased, as held by the trial court,
the same as any other than man under the influence of liquor.’ after a careful analysis of the testimony; and further that there was reasonable necessity
for the use of the means employed by the accused to defend himself from this unlawful
"This is corroborated by Adams (Def., p. 4) and the tendera (p. 14), A man under the aggression.

16

The trial court held that in shooting and killing the deceased, the defendant adopted a
mode of defense which was not "reasonable necessary," because it was of opinion, first,
that it was possible by taking to flight he might have escaped injury, second, that he
might have parried the blow aimed at him or wrested the bolo from his assailant without
the necessity for the use of his revolver; and third, against his assailant, the accused
might have successfully defended himself against the attack by directing his aim at the
arm or hand with which the bolo was held, or at the legs or feet of his assailant.
We do not think that under all the circumstances in this case it was the duty of the
defendant to take refuge in flight. Without attempting to lay down a rule covering all the
cases wherein it is the duty of one who is unlawfully assailed to ’give ground" instead of
resisting the attack, it is sufficient to hold, that under such circumstances that assailed
person need not attempt to retreat where there is no reasonable ground to believe that
by so doing he can safely avoid the threatened attack; not is he required to continue his
retreat when there is no reason able ground to believe that he can do so with safety.
These prepositions fall within the rule of the Federal courts relied upon in the opinion of
the trial court and applied by him to the facts in this case. (Wheaton’s Criminal Law, 10th
ed., p. 486, and many cases there cited; Bishop’s Criminal Law, 8th ed., secs. 864 and
869, and cases cited; Clark’s Criminal Law, p. 154, and cases cited.)
The defendant was sitting on a beach in a narrow alleyway when the deceased started to
advance upon him from a distance of from 9 to 12 feet, brandishing a formidable looking
bolo." We do not think that under the circumstances the defendant had reasonable
grounds to believe that he could safely make his escape by flight. In order to do so it was
necessary that the defendant, in the second or two required by his assailant to advance
the couple of space which would bring him within striking distance, should recognize his
danger, resolve upon flight rather than resistance, rise from his seat, look backward only
to discover that there were obstacles with made it impracticable to escape to the rear,
step forward a few feet toward his approaching assailant, turn to the right or to the left.
on reaching the street, thus exposing his unprotected body to this assailant’s attack, and
finally distance his pursuer in flight. If the deceased was in fact endeavoring to reach the
defendant and to strike him with his bolo, it is very doubtful whether there was time to
avoid the blow by instant flight; certainly the accused had reasonable grounds to believe
that he could not hope to make his escape with safety; and even though it were true that
"he might have found time" to dodge the deceased" and make his escape by flight, yet it
is too much to ask of one who is in imminent peril of felonious and murderous attack that
without reasonable grounds to believe can safely do so, he should "give ground" rather
than use any other more certain means to defend himself which he may have at hand.
Nor can we agree with the opinion of the trial court that there was no reasonable
necessity for the use of the revolver because the deceased was a smaller man than the
accused and perhaps under the influence of liquor, or because on examination. after the
occurrence, it is discovered that the bolo in the hands of the deceased was "almost blunt
through rust and dullness."cralaw virtua1aw library
Mere physical superiority in no protection to an unarmed man, as against an assailant
armed with a large bolo, and if it be true that the deceased was under the influence of
liquor when he made that attack, his intoxication probably rendered him the more
dangerous unless he was so drunk as to be physically helpless, which is not suggested
in the evidence.
Nor does the fact that after the occurrence the blade of the bolo was found to be "almost
blunt through rust and dullness," and that it is "more than doubtful whether if applied with
ordinary force against any portion of the accused’s body covered by clothing it would
penetrate the latter," justify the conclusion that there who no reasonable necessity for the
defendant’s use of the only weapon at land to resist the onslaught of his adversary. Lying
on the desk in the trial court, in the broad light of day, that bolo was, in the language of
the trial court a "formidable looking weapon, with a blade fourteen and a half inches in
length;" the accused, in apparent imminent danger of his life, court not reasonably be
excepted to take the chance that mere ordinary force would be used in striking, or that
the blow would be given upon some protected part of his body, or that the cutting edge of
the blade was not keen enough to give him his death blow.
The findings of facts occurring in the cases cited in the opinion of the trial judge are not
applicable in this case. On a plea of self-defense the question as to the "reasonable
necessity" for the use of the means employed is one of fact to be determined in
accordance with the particular facts proven in each case.
In the case of the United States v. Mendoza (2 Phil. Rep., 109), the court held that the
character of the weapon in the hands of the aggressor, a calicut, was such that in our
opinion the defendant could not have reasonably believed that it was necessary to kill his
assailant in order to repel the attack. A calicut is a comparatively harmless weapon. It is
an instrument shaped like a small chisel (escoplo) with no point or cutting edge on either
side, and is used for the purpose of taking out the contents of betel nuts or the like.
In the case of the United States v. De Castro (2 Phil. Rep., 67) the accused inflicted a
mortal wound with a dagger and the court held that such means were not reasonably
required or necessary to repel the attack, in view of the fact it was made with nothing
more than a piece of bamboo (una simple caña partida), a weapon insufficient to put the
life of the person attacked in imminent peril, more especial in consideration of the
significance of the attack itself, for, according to the witnesses, the blow struck by the
deceased did not even bruise the accused.
A murderous attack with a formidable-looking boo is a very different from an assault with
a small chisel or a piece of bamboo, and the fact that this court has held that the taking
of life was not reasonably necessary in defending oneself against assault in the latter
cases does not sustain a ruling that taking the life of one’s assailant in the former case
may not become reasonably necessary in the defense of one’s person, as we think it
was in the case at bar.
Finally, if it be admitted that it was reasonably necessary to make use of the revolver, it
would be unreasonable to hold that in the shades of night the defendant, with his
adversary advancing upon him and within a few feet of striking distance, should be held
responsible for a failure to take deliberate and careful aim at the arm or hand that held
the bolo or at the legs or the effect of his assailant. The reasonable and natural thing for
him to do under the circumstances was to fire at the body of his opponent, and thus
make sure of his own life.
It is suggested that since the first shot inflicted a fatal wound there was no necessity for
17
the firing of the two succeeding shows in order to prevent or repel the attack. The record pay me for the five and one-half days work for which you owe me." Cubol replied,
discloses that there shots were fired in rapid succession. Not every wound which proves "What debt!," an exclamation which was followed by an insulting expression. At the
fatal is sufficient to stop an enemy’s attack, and the accused and his assailant were so same time he struck the accused with his fist. The accused arose from the log upon
close at hand that until the assailant fell to the ground it can be said that the accused which he was sitting and moved backward, trying to escape, but Cubol pursued him
was out of danger. Even a wounded man with a drawn bolo in his hand might prove to be and continued striking him with his fists. As the accused receded he found himself
no mean antagonist at close quarters. cornered by a pile of logs, the wings of which extended out on either side, effectually
preventing any further retreat. As Cubol pressed upon him, the accused drew his bolo
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the appellant acquitted of the crime with and delivered a blow on Cubol's right shoulder. Upon this Cubol lunged at the accused
which he was charged, with the costs of both instances de oficio; and if in custody, he with the evident intention of wresting the bolo from the accused. To prevent this the
will be discharged forthwith, or if a liberty under his bond will be cancelled and his accused struck two other blows with the bolo, inflicting two deep cuts on Cubol's
sureties exonerated. ordered. forehead above the left eye. One of these blows broke through the cranium. The other
made a cut extending from the left eyebrow to the nose and upper lip. Upon finding a
Torres, Johnson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur. seat on a log nearby. A witness, named Francisco Villegas, who came up in a
moment, after learning something about the matter, asked Cubol whether he had
Arellano, C.J., dissents. struck the accused blows with his fist. Cubols replied that he had. The witness Villegas
then turned to the accused, who was standing a short distance away, and told him to
put up his bolo and go to the poblacion. Acting upon this suggestion the accused
Republic of the Philippines
immediately repaired to the office of the justice of the peace and surrendered himself
SUPREME COURT
to the authorities. Cubol lived only an hour or so, and died from the effect of the
Manila
wounds received. In one of the pockets of the deceased a knife was found, and the
accused testified that, when he struck the deceased with his bolo, the latter was
EN BANC attempting to draw a knife from his pocket.

G.R. No. L-35524 March 18, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIAN SUMICAD, defendant-appellant.
Felipe K. Medina for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Occidental Misamis, finding the appellant, Julian Sumicad, guilty of the
offense of homicide and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for twelve years and
one day, reclusion temporal, and requiring him to indemnify the family of the deceased
in the amount of P1,000, as well as to pay the costs of prosecution.
On February 23, 1931, the accused, a resident of Buenavoluntad, in the municipality
of Plaridel, Occidental Misamis, was engaged with others in the gratuitous labor of
hauling logs for the construction of a chapel in the barrio above-mentioned. At about
5.30 o'clock in the afternoon on the day mentioned, when the laborers were resting
from the work of the day, one Segundo Cubol happened to pass the place where the
accused was sitting. Prior to this date the accused had rendered five and one-half
days service to Cubol, and as the latter passed, the accused said to him, "Segundo,
The accused was 25 years of age when this case was tried, has a height of 5 feet and
1-½ inches, and weight of 105 pounds. The deceased appears to have been taller,
larger and stronger man. The evidence shows that the deceased was quarrelsome
and in the habit of making frequent trouble by fighting in the places where he
happened to be present with others. In the local courts he had been convicted and
sentenced to jail for assault and battery in two different cases. In another case he was
convicted of the offense of inflicting minor physical injuries, being sentenced to
imprisonment for one month and one day. In still another case he had been convicted
of theft and sentenced to imprisonment for the same period of one month and one
day. The proof leaves no reason to doubt that the deceased was hot-tempered and
that he had the reputation of being a trouble maker. It is a safe inference from this
proof — and there is nothing to the contrary, — that the deceased was with good
reason considered by his neighbors to be a dangerous man.
From the facts above stated it is evident that the quarrel which resulted in the death of
Segundo Cubol was of his own making, and that the accused was not materially to
blame in bringing about the trouble. Two of the elements of self-defense were
therefore clearly present, namely, that the deceased was the aggressor and that there
was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. The only further question
that can therefore arise in discussion the criminal liability of the accused is whether
there was reasonable necessity for the means employed by him to prevent or repel
the aggression to which he was subjected. Upon this point it will be noted that, when
the aggression was begun by the deceased, the accused retreated until he was
cornered in the angle of a pile of logs. His further retreat was this effectually cut off
both in the rear and at the sides. In response to the blows which the deceased
delivered with his fists, the accused first delivered a cut on the left shoulder of the

18
deceased; but, if we rightly interpret the transcript of the record on this point , the
sanitary officer who exclaimed the body of the deceased meant to say that this wound Separate Opinions
alone could not have resulted in death. This we consider to be the decisive turning
point in the case. Upon receiving that cut the deceased should have been admonished
AVANCEÑA, C.J., dissenting:
that further aggression on his part would be met by determined resistance and that
any further advance would be at grave peril to himself. Instead of acting upon this
warning, the deceased pressed forward in the attempt to possess himself of the bolo, I dissent. In my opinion, there is but an incomplete self-defense here. The defendant's
the only means of defense then at the command of the accused. act in wounding the deceased with a bolo so as to bring about the latter's death, was
not a reasonably necessary means of defending himself against the other's attack,
which was but a matter of fisticuffs. The Supreme Court of Spain has held this doctrine
Under these circumstances what might the accused have been reasonably expected
in many cases; e. g., where the deceased attacked the defendant with his fists
to do. Was he to surrender the weapon to his assailant, a larger and stronger man
(November 29, 1883; May 3, 1888; and May 9, 1911); where the deceased, for no
than himself, who was now infuriated by the blood that had been drawn from his
particular reason, threw himself upon the defendant, caught him by the throat, and
shoulder? Or was he justified in keeping the weapon in his hands and, as an ultimate
tried to choke him (November 4, 1910); where the deceased boxed the accused,
resort, in using it as a means for his own defense? Our reply is that he was justified in
knocking him down, and keeping him underneath (November 28, 1910); and where
pursuing the latter alternative; for it would probably have been an act of suicide to
the deceased attacked the accused with an umbrella (April 22, 1896). In all these
permit that weapon to pass into the hands of his assailant. In judging a question of this
cases it was not held that the defendant acted with full justification in self-defense. Our
kind the reputation of the deceased for violence is pertinent, for it tends to show that
own reports contain ruling of the like tenor; in the earliest case, the deceased attacked
when the fatal blows were struck the accused had reasonable grounds for believing
the accused with a piece of bamboo (U.S. vs. De Castro, 2 Phil., 67), and in the latest,
that he was in grave peril to life or limb.
he attacked the defendant with his fists (G.R. No. 34750). 1 In neither was it held that a
complete case of self-defense had been made out. Nor is the defendant's case
It is undoubtedly well established in jurisprudence that a man is not, as a rule, justified improved by the consideration that he aimed the first blow at the deceased's arm, and
in taking the life of one who assaults him with his fist only, without the use of a delivered the last two blows, which caused death, after had attempted to wrench away
dangerous weapon. The person assaulted must, in such case, either resist with the the bolo; for, having received the first blow on the arm, the deceased was justified in
arms that nature gave him or with other means of defense at his disposal, short of acting as he did, in the reasonable belief that the defendant would continue the attack
taking life. But that rule contemplates the situation where the contestants are in the with that weapon.
open and the person assaulted can exercise the option of running away. It can have
no binding force in the case where the person assaulted has retreated to the wall, as
Villamor, J., concurs.
the saying is, and uses in a defensive way the only weapon at his disposal. One is not
required, when hard pressed, to draw fine distinctions as to the extent of the injury
which a reckless and infuriated assailant might probably inflict upon him (Browell vs. OSTRAND, J., dissenting:
People, 38 Mich., 732). And it was not incumbent on the accused in this case, when
assailed by a bully of known violent disposition, who was larger and stronger than
himself. On the contrary, under the circumstances stated, he had the right to resist the I cannot fully agree with the majority in this case and therefore dissent
aggression with the bolo, and if he unfortunately inflicted a fatal blow, it must be
considered to have been given in justifiable self-defense. Upon this point it may be EN BANC
recalled that the deceased, when asked about the circumstances of the homicide,
admitted that he himself was the aggressor; and it is noteworthy that he used no word
placing blame upon the accused.

[G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004]

We are of the opinion that all the elements necessary to constitute justifiable self-
defense were present in this case and the accused should have been acquitted.

The judgment appealed from will therefore be reversed and the appellant absolved
from the information, with costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

Malcolm, Romualdez, Villa-Real and Imperial, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
DECISION

19
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a
novel theory -- the battered woman syndrome (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-
defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration
because there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack on
her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant
constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological
resistance and self-control. This psychological paralysis she suffered diminished her
will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance
of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion
and obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her
batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with their
child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which
overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn childs.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from
BWS, as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply
for and be released from custody on parole, because she has already served the
minimum period of her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision[1] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-
0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the
accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by
Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating
circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused
with the penalty of DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum
of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages.[2]
The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of
Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit
and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly
weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the
following wounds, to wit:
Cadaveric spasm.
Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes
protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the
mouth.
Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the
head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the
blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura
and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the
epidermis.
Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.
which caused his death.[4]
With the assistance of her counsel,[5] appellant pleaded not guilty during her
arraignment on March 3, 1997.[6] In due course, she was tried for and convicted of
parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecutions version
of the facts in this wise:
20
Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc
City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For
a time, Bens younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in
1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay
Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben
and Earl Pierre.
On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving
their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would
pass Bens house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he
found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his
house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for
the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way
home passing the side of the Genosas rented house, he heard her say I wont hesitate
to kill you to which Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent? That was the last
time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas rented
house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and
neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because
she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to
sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no
money to buy it.
That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus
going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in
tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting
area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas rented
house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no
conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor
emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to
find out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he
did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a
borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after
destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the
unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the
lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only
in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the
house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his sons misfortune. Later that day,
Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the
police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the
Genosas rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina
Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where
they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There
was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one
corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben
was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches
long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop
valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be
taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was
conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at
Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been
dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing. The postmortem
examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide
later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Bens death was
cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a
depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on
November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might
have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Arao, appellant went
to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him
there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas house. Ecel went home
despite appellants request for her to sleep in their house.
Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a
fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing
their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light
and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her
from watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she
ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on
the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant
packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon
his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the
bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her You might as well be
killed so nobody would nag me. Appellant testified that she was aware that there was
a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch
long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe,
causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then smashed Ben at his nape
with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran
inside the bedroom.
Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him.
She supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die
on the spot, though, but in the bedroom.[7] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
21
 Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner: residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he
went across the road to wait for the runner and the usher of the masiao game because
during that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the
1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to
ushers and runners so that I can place my bet. On his way home at about 9:00 in the
her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree
evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their
of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her
house was one Fredo who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas
husbands death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had
testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was Marivic
three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
saying I will never hesitate to kill you, whilst Ben replied Why kill me when I am
innocent. Basobas thought they were joking.
2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were
neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both
He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa
sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop
residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every
other suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant
Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben before when he was stricken
partner at fiestas.
with a bottle by Marivic Genosa that he should leave her and that Ben would always
take her back after she would leave him so many times.
3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Bens parents, together with
Bens brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived
Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that
happily. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights
they had been quarreling. He said Ben even had a wound on the right forehead. He
would become violent.
had known the couple for only one (1) year.

4. Bens brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when
Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally
when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that
in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted
for help as his left hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a
week, she returned apparently having asked for Bens forgiveness. In another incident
in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Bens aid
again and saw blood from Bens forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben
and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Bens forgiveness.
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivics mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and
Marivic married in 1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City. She said as
the marriage went along, Marivic became already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada
Genosa said that after the birth of Marivics two sons, there were three (3)
misunderstandings. The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through
his left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck
Ben on the forehead using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was
wounded and also the ear and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third incident
was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she
saw that Bens hand was plastered as the bone cracked.
Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical
intervention.
5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 After we
collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO. They stayed there for
three (3) hours, after which they went to Uniloks and drank beer allegedly only two (2)
bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa
6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and
was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he
would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her
parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would
ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical
help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the
injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or
quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.
7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to
the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified
that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic
was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses grappling
with each other. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had
come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the same night as that testified to by
Arturo Busabos.[8])
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos,
testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15,
1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa
house and saw the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding
with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa. He said after a while,
Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he

22
went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next
morning. (Again, please note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo
Basobas).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living
in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is
his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the
couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and
then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were
quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified if somebody would come. He
testified that while Ben was alive he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he
would go to our house and he will say, Teody because that was what he used to call
me, mokimas ta, which means lets go and look for a whore. Mr. Sarabia further
testified that Ben would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to
me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a
knife was stricken to her. Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been
injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that
in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help
to look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns and some other
places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to
sleep with her in the Genosa house because she might be battered by her husband.
When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that
her husband was already there and was drunk. Miss Arano knew he was drunk
because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his face. Marivic entered the
house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same
night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the
first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every
time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she
was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple were
very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase. She said
Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldnt get in he got a
chair and a knife and showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared us.
She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she
said that when she left Marivics house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still
quarreling.
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at
PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient many times and had also received
treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November
9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These
injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The
prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert
witness.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on
twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits 2 and 2-B. The OPD
Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by
Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit 3.
On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say
whether the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a
psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the patient,
whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided,
testified that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00
in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were
experiencing family troubles. He told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not
hear from her again and assumed that they might have settled with each other or they
might have forgiven with each other.
xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her
husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her
husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby
safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was
suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on
December 1, 1995.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least
five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic
said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was
because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died
in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that
Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16,
1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself
a job as a field researcher under the alias Marvelous Isidro; she did not tell anyone
that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and
that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that
she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to smash him once; that she
was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was
whirled by Ben, he kicked her ass and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw
that she had packed his things.
23
 9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation
was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified
to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.
10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel,
Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take
charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the
autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took the
medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the
Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw some police officer and neighbor
around. She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position
with his back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal
area of the head which she described as a fracture. And that based on her
examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as
to what caused his death.
Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged
her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed with intent to kill, with treachery and
evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit
and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x
which caused his death.
12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and
23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998,
and 5 and 6 August 1998.
13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date,
the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City,
rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus
sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.
14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under
date of 24 January 2000, Marivics trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a
Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2)
drafts of Appellants Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own,
were not conformed to by her.
The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the
entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20
January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G.
Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she
submitted her Brief without counsels to the Court.
This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the
Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben
Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of
Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of
mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the
case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then
the only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of
the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit A) is more akin to a
gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted
Marivics URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case to the trial court for
the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered
woman syndrome plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith
report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and
relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.
18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the
Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had
interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done
at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and psychological
assessment were done at her clinic.
Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years
with her own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a
professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the
Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila
University and St. Josephs College; and was the counseling psychologist of the
National Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the
Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and
a PhD from the U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological Association of
the Philippines and is a member of the American Psychological Association. She is
the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a
member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN
[Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial
24
Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of
families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide
Commission doing research about Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled
Energy Global Psychology (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The
Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this
is the first case of that nature.
Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic
and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases,
she looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that
there are lots of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic
violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.
Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of a lot of incidents of
psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also
sexual abuse.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, the battered woman usually has a very low
opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x
they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen,
they usually think that they provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the
violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually
abusive to them. Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes from a
dysfunctional family or from broken homes.
Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, also has a very low
opinion of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as
being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic)
a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like
gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent. The batterer also usually
comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them feel
entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused each other so
there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the family.
Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman
does not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the
violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in
her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the children.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the
house, or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering
physical violence on both of them. She said that in a normal marital relationship,
abuses also happen, but these are not consistent, not chronic, are not happening day
in [and] day out. In an abnormal marital relationship, the abuse occurs day in and day
out, is long lasting and even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death
on the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered,
it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because inspite of
her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of
loss, such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken
person. And at the same time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had
experienced in the past.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider
filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the
tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxxxxxxxx
19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed
away, appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the
Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association.
He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private
practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he
gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active
duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center
for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he obtained
the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the University of
Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons;
the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine
Association of Military Surgeons.
He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine
Military Academy from the Period 1954 1978 which was presented twice in
international congresses. He also authored The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines 2000, which was likewise published internationally and locally. He had
a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was
the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the
use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
25
Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of the precipator (sic)
and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. or the one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred
Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while (sic) because the individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his
one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry. mind.

Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had xxxxxxxxx
already encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in
1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he
Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend
has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial
themselves, and primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is
intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic
available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in
violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City
the household. He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has reached the lowest
under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
rock bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.

As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence,
xxxxxxxxx
where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and
boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes
confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder depends on the vulnerability Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he
of the victim. Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological
episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out
physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, it will take more repetitive with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very
dangerous.
xxxxxxxxx

In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the anxiety

neurosis or neurologic anxcietism. It is produced by overwhelming brutality, trauma.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo explained that with neurotic anxiety, the victim relives the beating or
trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She
thinks of nothing but the suffering.
On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she
killed her husband Marivicc mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the
trauma. He said that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of
the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at that
point in time that things happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in
her mind. At the time he interviewed Marivic she was more subdued, she was not
super alert anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she
is involved.

xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx

20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the
A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone
public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the
is unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and
records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated.[9]
persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her self-world is damaged.

Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individuals illness,
such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the Ruling of the Trial Court
batterer, he normally internalizes what is around him within the environment. And it
becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he
is so macho; he shows his strong faade but in it there are doubts in himself and prone
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence
to act without thinking.
to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in
bed sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance
xxxxxxxxx

26
of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed --
lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court
for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that
this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the
cause of his death; (2) the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and
(3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of
the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower
court to admit the experts testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part
appellants Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea; and
requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as
well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of
Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan[10] and Alfredo
Pajarillo,[11] supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with
their documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by the lower court
before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the case. [12]
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Courts
consideration:
1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without
reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were
legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.
4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from
impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a
womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa
was a battered husband.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic
Genosa.
6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to Manila and her
subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of
her unborn child.
7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in
determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby
erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her
to the ultimate penalty of death.[13]
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant
acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended
the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not
collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court,
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence
of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance
that could affect the outcome of the case.[14]
In appellants first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion,
reversible error or misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the
27
trial courts disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these
alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously hasty
decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense. We note that
in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of
both the prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of
the documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings and conclusions.
He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of
the accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judges
conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he
failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an obviously
hasty manner. The Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14,
1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took
the trial judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his
judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch should not
be taken against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all,
the dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find
his actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation. [15]
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and
appellant had been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage
contract. In People v. Malabago,[16] this Court held:
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the
case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused
and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate,
however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if
such proof is not objected to.
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of
appellants deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to
Marivic.[17] The defense raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her
direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to
Ben.[18] Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party
making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made
through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made. [19] Other than
merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no
proof that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to
the deceased was made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Bens
death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence.
As the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution, [c]onsidering that the
appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape
with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that
exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually
caused the victims death. Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death
is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was
a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic
review, appellant had not raised the novel defense of battered woman syndrome, for which
such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial
issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense
under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts
that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past
behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from
appellants children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions
are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies
the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary to
present.[20] As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the prosecution
prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now
fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of
Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her
guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the
trial courts appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final resolution
of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-
defense and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the
victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear
and convincing evidence.[21] Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense
(and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from the
prosecution to the defense.[22]
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered
woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been
recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete
self-defense.[23] By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the
syndrome, foreign courts convey their understanding of the justifiably fearful state of
mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of
time.[24]
28
 A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to
any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to
be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If
it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman.[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem,
traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional
dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the
batterers actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve. [26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-
called cycle of violence,[27] which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2)
the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent)
phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal
or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries
to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying
out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways
that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the
violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged,
because her placatory and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right
to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are
not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner
senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted
from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the
more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry,
oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence spirals out of
control and leads to an acute battering incident.[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as
unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the
batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time
of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually
realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate
her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible
pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in
the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always
much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is
futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control,
such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.[30]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident
ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one
hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He
knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her
forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered
woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her
partner will change for the better; and that this good, gentle and caring man is the real
person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional
stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his
well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or
receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him.
Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of
getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most
thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered
womans psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally
dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness.
Underneath this miserable cycle of tension, violence and forgiveness, each partner
may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel
independent, capable of functioning without the other.[31]
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented
several witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he
was cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband
was abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this abusive and
cruelty manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes
he pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each
other.
29
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and
after that I go to him and he said sorry.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and
abusive behavior by your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
A Yes, sir.
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just
quarrel me. [32]
Referring to his Out-Patient Chart[33] on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos
Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this
manner:
Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found
in the chart of your clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for
the record.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower
eyelid and redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area,
pain and contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;

Q Who inflicted these injuries? 3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;

A Of course my husband. 4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2 to trauma. Attending
physician: Dr. Caing;
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending
A Yes, sir. physician: Dr. Canora; and

6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion

xxxxxxxxx
Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Canora.

[Court] /to the witness Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the
attending physician, is that correct?
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Yes, sir.
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury
inflicted on your occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, A Yes, sir.
how frequent was the occurrence?
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended
A Everytime he got drunk. the patient. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?

Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with
something rough substance if force is applied.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.

30
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma? A Yes, sir.

A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of
left breast. So, [pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your
breast is traumatized, there is tenderness pain.
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination
about her pregnancy or for some other findings?
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her
pregnancy.

Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?

xxxxxxxxx
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you able to talk with the patient? Q For how many days?
A Yes, sir. A One day.
Q What did she tell you? Q Where?
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
injuries. And she told me that it was done to her by her husband.

Q You mean, Ben Genosa? xxxxxxxxx

A Yes, sir.
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you
were able to examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she
xxxxxxxxx was 8 months pregnant.

What is this all about?

ATTY. TABUCANON:
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused
hypertension and I think I have a record here, also the same period
sometime in the month of November, 1995 when this incident
from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23)
happened?
times.
A As per record, yes.
Q For what?
Q What was the date?
A Tension headache.
A It was on November 6, 1995.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically? had hypertension?

A Yes, sir. A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our
treatment. She does not response when the medication was given
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was to her, because tension headache is more or less stress related and
the patient pregnant? emotional in nature.

A Yes, sir. Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional
in nature?
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was
she? A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient
is the family history in line of giving the root cause of what is
A Eight (8) months pregnant. causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient all
comes from the domestic problem.
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?

31
 Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in
hypertension which is unfortunately does not response to the
medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood
pressure of the accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is
dangerous level of blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus. [34]
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in
Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that
on some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries
were inflicted upon her by Ben.[35]
Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she had been asked by
Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come
home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was
awakened about ten oclock at night, because the couple were very noisy and I heard
something was broken like a vase. Then Marivic came running into Ecels room and
locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a
knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this
time to find Ben -- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where
they found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to
sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she
heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three
other witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling. [37] Marivic relates in detail the
following backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the
process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995
in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then
after office hours, I boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang.
When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where was
his father, then my second child said, he was not home yet. I was
worried because that was payday, I was anticipating that he was
gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from
school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep
with me at that time because I had fears that he was again drunk
and I was worried that he would again beat me so I requested my
cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because she had fears
that the same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow
her because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
32
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What
else did he do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I
was just worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me
again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want
to avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was
disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation and he
switch off the light and I said to him, why did you switch off the light
when the children were there. At that time I was also attending to
my children who were doing their assignments. He was angry with
me for not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and
[got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching
television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they
were scared and he was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was
carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to
the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me
for packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom
holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you?
How did he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
33
 The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept
on shouting at me that you might as well be killed so there will be
nobody to nag me.
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the
drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the key
then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches
long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed
his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to
open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he
was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I
ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my
mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very
moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I
was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please
describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. [38]
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert
witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met
with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their
talks, the former briefly related the latters ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could
you in laymans term describe to this Court what her life was like as
said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that
she was suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances
of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical
abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she was the one
who was practically the bread earner of the family. The husband
was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking,
even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very
angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had
the experience a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that
34
 the husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband was saying
that the child she was carrying was not his own. So she was very
angry, she was at the same time very depressed because she was
also aware, almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it was
happening day in and day out. [39]
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but
wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you
talked to her about three hours, what was the most relevant
information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The
most important information were escalating abuses that she had
experienced during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you
already knew of the facts of the case or at least you have
substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can
consider them as substantial.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her
husband they were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her
husband that were fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also
battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a
hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered [her]
several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that
room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being
battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying
this matter. I think that is the first time that we have this in the
Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind
happened, it was really a self-defense. I also believe that there had
been provocation and I also believe that she became a disordered
person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the
battering that happened and so she became an abnormal person
who had lost shes not during the time and that is why it happened
because of all the physical battering, emotional battering, all the
psychological abuses that she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test,
what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory.
The purpose of that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of
the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she
someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality
test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a
person that I can trust. That the data that Im gathering from her are
the truth.[41]
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo,
testified on his Psychiatric Report,[42] which was based on his interview and
examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that during the first three years of her
marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and
happy -- until Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to]
gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining
his barkada in drinking sprees.
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his
family, particularly to his wife. The Report continued: At first, it was verbal and
emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed
that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a
35
painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband
went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically
more than eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly
by her husband whenever he was drunk.
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain.
Further quoting from the Report, [s]he also sought the advice and help of close
relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was
happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more frequent and more
severe. x x x.[43]
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Courts
mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman,
her state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely
merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the
events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly pointed out
that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common
law partners are both relevant and necessary. How can the mental state of the
appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why
would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live
with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring
hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her
self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the
reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called battered wife
syndrome.[44]
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint should not be
drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a
person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent
with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar
experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and
misconceptions about battered women.[45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on
domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the United
Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is
charged with the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the
cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the
latters ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the
relationship with no means of escape.[46] In her years of research, Dr. Walker found
that the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in
greater danger of dying then.[47]
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that the battered woman
usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-
sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think
that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that]
they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to
them.[48]
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does
not readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the
latters belief that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep the
family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope for
her spouse to change.[49]
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had
previously testified in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated probably
ten to twenty thousand violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his experience with
domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in
Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic
violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to
her loss of consciousness.[50]
Dr. Pajarillo explained that overwhelming brutality, trauma could result in
posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of anxiety neurosis or neurologic
anxietism.[51] After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons may
believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x x
[A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of
coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victims ability to muster an
active response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases
to believe that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect.[52]
A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of
Pennsylvania, found that even if a person has control over a situation, but believes
that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that situation with coping
responses rather than trying to escape. He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the
individuals thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this phenomenon as
learned helplessness. [T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important
than the individuals set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered
women dont attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to
outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they
believe that nothing they or anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances.[54]
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for
the violent behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her,
and that there is no escape.[55] Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive
anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.[56] Unless a shelter is available, she
stays with her husband, not only because she typically lacks a means of self-support,
but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even
more.[57]
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence
establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her
36
spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman
syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a
conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the
presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there
were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that
led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase
of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of
this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the
syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode
in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute
battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Bens relatively minor abuses? What
means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next
(more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of
the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mothers or
fathers house;[58] that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to
change; and that believing his words, she would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her
spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she
was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how
dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship?
Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences
and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of
the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the
defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and
scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or
deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her
partner or spouse. They corroborated each others testimonies, which were culled from
their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in
court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all
-- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying
circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack
supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman
syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be
considered in the context of self-defense.[59]
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that
crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of
the offense[60] -- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and
honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to
self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided
must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.[61] Thus, the Revised Penal Code
provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense:[62]
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.[63] It
presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -
- on the life or safety of a person.[64] In the present case, however, according to the
testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful
aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to
withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that
time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the
imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens
bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he
would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the
real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is
already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of
the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable
pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she
can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to murder by installment.[65] Still,
impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes)
prior to the defendants use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or
communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. [66] Considering such
circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant
self-defense.[67] In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense --
37
complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim.[68] Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was
not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other
modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate
and appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a
hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any
issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties. [69]
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan,
in her Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic
experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which
broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that
she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed
continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of
psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part. [70]
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the
effect of repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment as
well as the severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic
stress disorder.[71] Expounding thereon, he said:
Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second,
the severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged administration of
battering or the prolonged commission of the battering and the
psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and another
one is the public and social support available to the victim. If nobody
is interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
xxxxxxxxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in
terms of severity of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of the
head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that
precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are
suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face, strangulating
the individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing the individual.
In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to painful
stimulus, like for example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible
because the woman will not only protect herself, she is also to
protect the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic]
degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you
classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or
[atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the
individual will manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher
irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in most
[acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be
thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment,
any prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only
the first day to six (6) months. After this six (6) months you become
chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months
is chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the
individual who is abnormal and then become normal. This is how
you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of
post[t]raumatic stress disorder. [72]
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness
clarified further:
Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x
x x affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated.[73]
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon
appellant resulted in cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological
resistance and natural self-control, psychological paralysis, and difficulty in
concentrating or impairment of memory.
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were
analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power
without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a
resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to
38
paragraphs 9[74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance
should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. [76]
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. [77] To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an
act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is
not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.[78]
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful
aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her
while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should
also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her
life was likewise on that of her fetus.[79]His abusive and violent acts, an aggression
which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally
produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able
to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to
her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear
that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the
cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot
him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no
considerable period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal
equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillos testimony[80] that with neurotic anxiety -- a
psychological effect on a victim of overwhelming brutality [or] trauma -- the victim
relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being
beaten at the time. She cannot control re-experiencing the whole thing, the most
vicious and the trauma that she suffered. She thinks of nothing but the suffering. Such
reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances, must
have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her
from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited
with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as
well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the
severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the
repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which
was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without
depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent
aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when
she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not
only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally
produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself
arising from the defense that the offended party might make. [81] In order to qualify an
act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the
killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have
no place in the appreciation of evidence.[82] Because of the gravity of the resulting
offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. [83]
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the
penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from
the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an open,
depressed, circular fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly how and
when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to establish
indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events
surrounding his death:
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you?
How did he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept
on shouting at me that you might as well be killed so there will be
nobody to nag me
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
39
 A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the
drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the key
then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches
long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed
his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to
open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he
was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I
ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my
mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very
moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I
was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please
describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I
smashed him and I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened
before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to
vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I was frightened I was
about to die because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the
witness at the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the
nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that Ive been through with him, I
took pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my
blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.[84]
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There
is no showing of the victims position relative to appellants at the time of the shooting.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument
or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because
the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant.[85]
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific
purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be
put up by the party attacked.[86] There is no showing, though, that the present
appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband
without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary,
it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same
moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any
convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which
she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt
in her favor.[87]
40
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the
penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5 [88] of
the same Code.[89] The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is
imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account
in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were
shown to have attended the commission of the offense.[90] Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is
next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of
the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and
proper to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years
and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or
14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already served
the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on
parole.[91]
Epilogue
the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by
the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the
requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not
all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is
hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty
is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby
imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible
for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., join Justice
Santiago in her dissent.
Vitug and Quisumbing JJ., in the result.
Ynares-Santiago J., see dissenting opinion.

Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was
neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis the given set of facts in the
present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality.
It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just
and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies
conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and
the distinct personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has
learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellants counsel, Atty.
Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.

While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work
within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them.
Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may
do so.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising

from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of
the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final Republic of the Philippines
acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the SUPREME COURT
battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an Manila
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of

41
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-43588 November 7, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD LUAGUE and WENCESLAO ALCANSARE, defendants-appellants.
Vicente E. Calanog for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.:
The spouses Wenceslao Alcansare and Natividad Luague having been charged with
homicide in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros and sentenced, the
former to the penalty of from eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the
minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum, with the accessories of the law, and the latter to that of from six years and
one day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve years and one day of reclusion
temporal, as the maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law, both to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of Paulino Disuasido in the sum of one thousand pesos,
with costs, appealed to this court for a review of the judgment rendered against them,
praying that the same reversed and that they be acquitted.
Upon examination of the appeal, it appears: that in the morning of February 18, 1935,
while the accused Natividad Luague was in her house situated in Lupuhan, barrio of
Agpañgi, municipality of Calatrava, Occidental Negros, with only her three children of
tender age for company, her husband and co-accused Wenceslao Alcansare having
gone to grind corn in Juan Garing's house several kilometers away, Paulino Disuasido
came and began to make love to her; that as Natividad could not dissuade him from
his purpose, she started for the kitchen where Paulino followed her, notwithstanding
her instance that she could by no means accede to his wishes, for Paulino, bent on
satisfying them at all costs, drew and opened a knife and, threatening her with death,
began to embrace her and to touch her breasts; that in preparing to lie with her,
Paulino had to leave the knife on the floor and the accused, taking advantage of the
situation, picked up the weapon and stabbed him in the abdomen; and that Paulino,
feeling himself wounded, ran away jumping through the window and falling on some
stones, while the accused set forth immediately for the poblacion to surrender herself
to the authorities and report the incident.
Natividad Luague's act in mortally wounding Paulino Disuasido, unaided her husband
and co-accused Wenceslao Alcansare, and in the circumstances above set out,
constitutes the exempting circumstance defined in article 11, subsection 1, of the
Revised Penal Code, because, as stated by a commentator of note, "aside from the
right to life on which rest the legitimate defense of our person, we have the right to
party acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of man's
patrimony." (1 Viada, 172, 173, 5th edition.) "Will the attempt to rape a woman
constitute an aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense?" asks
the same commentator. "We think so," he answer, "inasmuch as a woman's honor
cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, cannot her very existence;
this offense, unlike ordinary slander by word or deed susceptible of judicial redress, in
an outrage which impresses an indelible blot on the victim, for, as the Roman Law
says: quum virginitas, vel castitas, corupta restitui non protest (because virginity or
chastity, once defiled, cannot be restored). It is evident that a woman who, imperiled,
wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability
provided by this article and subsection since such killing cannot be considered a crime
from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so
great an outrage." (1 Viada, 301, 5th edition.)
Similar to the present question was the one determined the Supreme Court of Spain in
a decision of February 21, 1911: "This court in due homage to the principles of
morality and in strict observance of the provision of law justly interpreted, has always
held that one of the rights referred to in article 8, subsection 4, of the Penal Code, is
that which assists a woman in defense of her honor when an attempt is made to repel
the aggression or to avoid in time the imminent danger of its consummation; and in
view of this, it must be conceded upon the findings of the trial court, that the accused
Maria Sanchez Cañistro acted in legitimate self-defense, because the conduct of
Diego Cardenas, who made love to her, in blowing in at midnight, knocking at the door
and demanding admittance and against Maria's refusal, insisting in his purpose and
threatening to break open the door, in the light of prior events and the circumstances
of the case, implies the imminence of an affront against honor, involving an actual and
certain danger to the person so threatened, while at the same time the fact that she
was alone that no help was forthcoming; her founded fear that the door might give way
and the dreaded evil wrought, her consequent helplessness on the advent of that
crisis, and her natural desire to attest openly her conjugal fidelity by foiling all
suspicious aspersions, show the reasonableness of the defensive measures availed of
by her and warrant her complete exemption from liability, inasmuch as, aside from all
these, it does not appear from the decision that said accused had previously
committed any act deserving of censure or marring the just motive which obviously
induced her to repel, as she did, a violence unprovoked by her. Thus viewed, all the
requisites of the exempting circumstance above mentioned are present and should be
taken into consideration, etc." (1 Viada, 304, 5th edition.)
The theory the prosecution, which we consider a trifle unsubstantial is as follows: The
accused Wenceslao Alcansare, thinking that Paulino importuned his wife with
unchaste advances, out of jealousy, decided to get rid of him. His chance to bring
about his plan can when, in the morning of the crime, Paulino happened to pass in
front of the house of the spouses with his friend Olimpio Libosada. The accused wife
invited Paulino to drop in, which the letter and his friend did. The spouses met them at
the threshold. The accused wife asked Paulino whether he had a knife and as the
latter answered in the affirmative, she asked him to lend it to lend it to her because
she wanted to cut her nails, to which Paulino willingly acceded, while the accused wife
42
was cutting her nails, she asked Paulino where he came from and the latter answered,
turning his head around, that he came from the house of one Inting, whereupon the
accused wife slashed him in the abdomen. Paulino tried to return the blow but the
accused husband picked up a stone and struck him in the forehead. Wounded in the
abdomen and in the forehead, Paulino fled therefrom.
The government presented three witnesses to establish this theory. Pablo Alvarez,
barrio lieutenant of Cabuñgahan, testified that on his way to "communal" the day
before the crime, he met the accused wife who told him that she had wanted to see
him and ask his help because her husband, who was jealous of Paulino, was
maltreating her and he was furthermore resolved to assault Paulino at sight. On the
following day, Alvarez, in his way to Bacacay, dropped in the house of the accused
spouses to inquire whether they had tobacco seeds and, as they answered him in the
negative, he went his way. He had hardly left the place when Paulino and Olimpio
arrived, the accused wife inviting the former to drop in. Paulino and Olimpio went to
the threshold of the house and the accused spouses, in turn, went down, and the four
engaged in a conversation which, to Alvarez, seemed a friendly one. The witness left
and when he returned to the place sometime later, he was informed that Paulino had
been stabbed.
The accused were from the barrio of Agpañgi and not from Cabuñgahan where the
witness was the barrio lieutenant. Had the accused wife gone to complain against the
alleged conduct of her husband, she would have sought the lieutenant of Agpañgi, her
barrio. The accused wife, by reporting the incident directly to the municipal authorities
without seeking the intervention of any barrio lieutenant, showed that she knew where
to go in a difficulty.
Were it true that the accused husband, prompted by jealousy, designed to do away
with Paulino, it would have been because he observed that his wife somehow returned
Paulino's attentions, for otherwise he would not have indulge in tragic cogitations.
From any point of view, however, it is quite incomprehensible why the wife would take
upon herself and the husband would charge her with, the execution of the plan. The
observation is no less true if the spouses plotted in common for it would have been
patently disgraceful and cowardly of the husband to thrust its execution upon the wife
at the hazard of her life, and liberty to shield his own, in the event of prosecution; and
there is the husband was thus minded. Under the theory of the prosecution, whether
the accused husband doubted his wife's fidelity or was sure of it, in connection with
Paulino's attentions, the natural thing in either case would be for him, unaided by his
wife, to avenge the affront or punish the offender. In the case at bar, we must assume
that, if the motive attributed to him by the prosecution were true, the accused would
have acted, as would the great majority of men in identical circumstances.
The witness Alvarez, himself testified that he was informed the day before by the wife
of the accused husband that the latter would get even with Paulino at the first
opportunity. The witness saw them together in the morning of the crime and he should
have surmised that the announced tragedy might take place. Rather than foil it, as an
agent of the law, if for no other reason, he went his way unconcerned, as if nothing
serious was impending.
We find his conduct, or that which he claims to have followed, so extremely strange to
be considered true. When the truth is beyond our reach, as is often the case, we have
to be contented with the probable. This is the basis of the so-called presumptions of
fact. The acts which this witness claims to have done are so out of ordinary conduct of
men as to be devoid of probability. Occasionally, indeed, there are those who behave
strangely, but this is the exception and not the rule.
In addition to this, the theory of the prosecution that the accused husband and his wife
had conspired to kill Paulino is overcome by the very facts which the prosecution itself
has attempted to prove. If such conspiracy had really existed, the accused spouses
would have been fully prepared to carry it into execution, because rational beings
differ from those who are not in that when they embark on anything, they make the s
equal to its realization. However, these amused, on the on, had neither a rusty bolo
nor an outworn club to cope with Paulino. The weapon with which Paulino was first
wounded was his own knife which, according to the prosecution, the accused wife had
to borrow from him on the pretext that she wanted to cut her nails, and later a stone
which the accused husband casually picked up from the ground. Yarns of this kind
make good material for fables.
Angel Emia, the other government witness who testified at the trial that he saw the
crime attributed to the two accused by the prosecution, made a previous statement
wherein he disclaimed knowledge of who had stabbed Paulino. Required to explain
the contradiction, he bungled in his attempt. The trial judge erred in giving him credit.
Olimpio Libosada, another government witness, likewise affirmed that he had seen all
that bad transpired, claiming that he then accompanied Paulino, It seem strange,
however, that in the two statements made by Paulino before his death he did not state
that he was accompanied by Libosada or by any other person in the morning of the
crime. It likewise happens that the conduct of this witness, according to his own
testimony, appears to be inconsistent because he did nothing to defend and help
Paulino, his friend and companion, in that most critical moment, and did not report the
crime to the authorities, disappearing from the scene all of a sudden with a very
frivolous excuse that "he was afraid to be implicated". Furthermore, after discarding
the testimony of Angel Emia, there is nothing to corroborate that of Olimpio Libosada
which, by its inherent weakness, cannot be alone and unsubstantiated by other
reliable incriminatory circumstances, support a judgment of conviction.lawphil.net
As to the two statements, Exhibit C and D, styled, ante mortem by the Solicitor-
General, the trial court properly disregarded because them there is no evidence of
record that Paulino had made them under a sense of impending death and with no
hope of recovery.
The trial judge gave unusual importance to the testimony of the two policemen who
testified that they made an ocular inspection of the scene of the crime and found no
bloodstain in the kitchen of the house of the accused spouses. This, according to the
trial judge, destroys the theory of the defense that Paulino was stabbed in said kitchen
by the accused wife when he tried to lie with her through intimidation and violence. We
are of the opinion that the trial judge erred on this point as he did on others. It appears
that the said policemen did not also find any bloodstain on the threshold of the house
43
of the accused spouses where, according to the prosecution, the aggression took
place. Therefore, said testimony contradicts the defense no less than it does the
prosecution.
In resume, we are of the opinion that we should, as we do hereby hold that the
accused Natividad Luague in wounding Paulino Disuasido to death, acted in legitimate
self-defense, and that the other accused Wenceslao Alcansare had no participation in
said act; wherefore, reversing the appealed judgment, we hereby acquit both accused,
and order their immediate release, if in confinement, with costs de oficio.
Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-41674 March 30, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REMEDIOS DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Silvino Lopez de Jesus for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, finding
the defendant guilty of homicide and sentencing her to suffer not more than fourteen
years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporaland not less than eight years
and one day of prision mayor, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Francisco Rivera
in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:
I. El Juzgado a quo, erro al dar absoluto credito a las pruebas de la
acusacion, las que son insuficientes para apoyar una declaracion de
conviccion.
II. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar que los celos fueron el motivo que
impulso a la acusada al agredir al occiso Francisco Rivera.
III. El Juzgado a quo al declarar increible el testimonio de la acusada en
esta causa.
IV. Y el Juzgado a quo erro al no absolver a la acusada.
It appears from the evidence that on the evening of February 18, 1934, Francisco
Ramos and his wife, Brigida Vistada; his sister, Baltazara Ramos; and a woman
named Consuelo or Natividad Santoyo called at the house of the defendant and asked
her to go with them to a wake in honor of one Sion, who had died in the house of
Maria Inguit. About nine o'clock the defendant and her friends started home. They
were followed about five minutes later, according to Enrique Bautista, by the deceased
Francisco Rivera, who had been playing cards in the house where the wake was held.
He was accompanied by Enrique Bautista. Rivera and Bautista overtook defendant's
party. When they reached a narrow part of the path, Rivera went ahead of Bautista. At
that time the members of the defendant's party were walking in single file. Baltazara
Ramos was in the lead and the defendant was the hindmost. She was about two
brazas from the person immediately ahead of her. Francisco Ramos, the only one of
defendant's companions that was called to testify, heard someone cry out "Aruy, Dios
mio". He went back and found that Francisco Rivera had been stabbed under the right
breast. The wounded man was taken to the hospital, where he died the next
afternoon.
Francisco Ramos testified that it took him about two minutes to go back to the place
where Francisco Rivera was. He found and that Enrique Bautista was with the
wounded man, and the defendant had started back towards the house of mourning.
He overtook her. She had a knife in her hand. When they reached the house of Maria
Inguit, Remedios de la Cruz stuck the knife into a table and said that she stabbed
Francisco Rivera because he embraced her.
The case for the prosecution rests upon the testimony of Enrique Bautista. According
to him the defendant waited on the right side of the path near some guava trees and
stabbed Francisco Rivera with a knife in her right hand when he arrived in front of her;
that the injured man cried "Aruy, Dios mio", while the defendant turned around and
returned to the house of Maria Inguit, saying "Icao ay malaon na" (hacia tiempo ya).
He further testified that the defendant stabbed the deceased before either of them had
said anything; that the distance between him and the deceased was about one foot;
that he did not see any of the companions of the defendant after they reached the
path and had to walk one behind the other.
The defendant on the other hand testified that after they had passed a fork in the trail
and reached a narrow part a man suddenly threw his arms around her from behind,
caught hold of her breasts and kissed her, and seized her in her private parts; that she
tried to free herself, but he held her and tried to throw her down; that when she felt
weak and could do nothing more against the strength of the man, she got a knife from
her pocket, opened it, and stabbed him in defense of her honor. She further testified
that the man who attacked her did not say anything; that she asked him who he was
but he did not answer; that when she was assaulted she cried for help, saying "Madre
mia; Dios mio"; that when she was seized, she was about two brazas behind her
44
nearest companion; that when she was face to face with her assailant during the
struggle she could scarcely recognize his face in the darkness and could not be sure
that it was Francisco Rivera.
Her testimony as to what occurred is as follows:
P. ¿Y que paso siendo usted la ultima de entre sus compañeros? — R.
Despues de pasar nosotros en una bifurcacion de los caminos cuando
llegabamos en una parte estrecha el occiso subitamente me abrazo por
detras cogiendome los pechos y basandome.
P. ¿Y entonces que hizo usted cuando usted sintio ese abrazo y beso? —
R. todavia me agarro en mi parte genital y en eso yo trataba de desasirme
de el; el me siguio abrazando cogiendome de los pechos y basandome, y
yo a mi vez seguia tratando de desasirme de el insistentemente.
P. ¿Y que sucedio? — R. Cuando yo trataba de desasirma de el, el me
siguio abrazando y yo a mi vez seguia tratandome de desassirme de el y el
llego a agarrarme en la parte genital y trato de lanzarme.
P. ¿Y que hizo usted cuando le trataba de lanzarle a usted el occiso? — R.
Yo procuraba desasirme de el y cuando me quede debilitada y ya no podia
hacer nada contra la fuerza de el yo saque de mo bolsillo un cortaplumas.
P. ¿Y que hizo usted del cortaplumas? — R. Lo abri porque cuando ya no
podia hacer nada y estaba y a debil yo hice lo que debia hacer en defensa
de mi pudor, le apuñale.
She further testified that she was engaged in selling fruit, and that the fanknife in
question was in a pocket of the overcoat she was wearing that day; that she went off
with her friends without having an opportunity of changing her clothes.
We cannot believe the testimony of Enrique Bautista, because Francisco Ramos, one
of the witnesses for the prosecution, testified that it was a dark night, and Bautista
himself said that he could scarcely see anyone in the darkness ("Apenas se podia ver
a alguien en esa obscuridad."); that he did not see any of the companions of the
defendant.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased had been making love to the
defendant, and also to another girl named Felicisima Sincaban; but the finding of the
trial judge that Francisco Rivera and the defendant were engaged, that she was madly
in love with him and was extremely jealous of Felicisima Sincaban is not sustained by
the evidence of record.
The appellant stabbed the deceased only once, although she retained possession of
the knife, and undoubtedly could have inflicted other wounds on him if she had
desired. In other words she desisted as soon as he released her.
The evidence shows that an officer of the Constabulary went to see the injured man
about eleven o'clock that night in the hospital, but it does not appear that Rivera told
him anything about the circumstances under which he had been stabbed.
The appellant is an illiterate barrio girl, unable to write her name, and scarcely
eighteen years old. We do not believe her story is a fabrication. In this connection it is
to be noted that almost immediately after the incident in question took place, the
appellant said she stabbed Francisco Rivera because he embraced her. It is not
improbable that she was reluctant to relate in the presence of all the people in the
house of Maria Inguit the details of what had occurred.
We are convinced from a study of the record that the deceased did in fact grab hold of
the defendant on the night in question, and whether he intended to rape her or not,
taking into consideration that it was a dark night and that the deceased grabbed her
from behind without warning and without making himself known and refused to say
who he was, and in the struggle that followed touched her private parts, and the fact
that she was unable to free herself by means of her strength alone, we are of the
opinion that she was justified in making use of the pocket-knife in repelling what she
believed to be an attack upon her honor, since she had no other means of defending
herself.
In the case of the United States vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488), this court held that a
person is not criminally responsible when, by reason of a mistake of facts, he does an
act for which he would be exempt if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but
would constitute murder if he had known the true state of facts at the time, provided
that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
The appellant claims to have cried for help, but so far as the record shows her cries
were not heard by any of her companions. Whether she did in fact cry for help, as
claimed by her, or failed to do so because of the suddenness with which the deceased
grabbed her and the fright which it naturally caused, taking into consideration the
circumstances of the case, we still think she is exempt from criminal liability. In the
case of the United States vs. Santa Ana and Ramos (22 Phil., 249), this court held
that a woman in defense of her honor is justified in inflicting wounds or her assailant
with a bolo which she happens to be carrying, even though her cry for assistance
might have been heard by people near by.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant
is acquitted, with the costs de oficio.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Abad Santos, Imperial, Butte, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
45
Separate Opinions

HULL, J., dissenting:

My colleagues possibly through chivalry and compassion have given much greater
credence to the tale of the defendant than it justifies. I am convinced that the trial
judge, who heard her testify, more correctly appreciated the facts of this case.

Goddard, J., concurs.

46
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants.
AVELINA JAURIGUE, appellant.
Jose Ma. Recto for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Enriquez and Solicitor Palma for appellee..
DE JOYA, J.:
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance
of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but
defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months and one day of prision
mayor to thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amando
Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited
with one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by her.
From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court
of Appeals for Southern Luzon, and in her brief filed therein on June 10, 1944, claimed
—
(1) That the lower court erred in not holding that said appellant had acted in
the legitimate defense of her honor and that she should be completely
absolved of all criminal responsibility;
(2) That the lower court erred in not finding in her favor the additional
mitigating circumstances that (a) she did not have the intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that actually committed, and that (b) she voluntarily
surrendered to the agents of the authorities; and
(3) That the trial court erred in holding that the commission of the alleged
offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of having been
committed in a sacred place.
The evidence adduced by the parties, at the trial in the court below, has sufficiently
established the following facts:
That both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased Amado
Capina lived in the barrio of Sta. Isabel, City of San Pablo, Province of Laguna; that
for sometime prior to the stabbing of the deceased by defendant and appellant, in the
evening of September 20, 1942, the former had been courting the latter in vain, and
that on one occasion, about one month before that fatal night, Amado Capina
snatched a handkerchief belonging to her, bearing her nickname "Aveling," while it
was being washed by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.
On September 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado
approached her and spoke to her of his love, which she flatly refused, and he
thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her breasts, on account of
which Avelina, resolute and quick-tempered girl, slapped Amado, gave him fist blows
and kicked him. She kept the matter to herself, until the following morning when she
informed her mother about it. Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife,
whenever she went out, evidently for self-protection.
On September 15, 1942, about midnight, Amado climbed up the house of defendant
and appellant, and surreptitiously entered the room where she was sleeping. He felt
her forehead, evidently with the intention of abusing her. She immediately screamed
for help, which awakened her parents and brought them to her side. Amado came out
from where he had hidden under a bed in Avelina's room and kissed the hand of
Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, asking for forgiveness; and when Avelina's mother made
an attempt to beat Amado, her husband prevented her from doing so, stating that
Amado probably did not realize what he was doing. Nicolas Jaurigue sent for the
barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada, and for Amado's parents, the following morning.
Amado's parents came to the house of Nicolas Jaurigue and apologized for the
misconduct of their son; and as Nicolas Jaurigue was then angry, he told them to end
the conversation, as he might not be able to control himself.
In the morning of September 20, 1942, Avelina received information that Amado had
been falsely boasting in the neighborhood of having taken liberties with her person
and that she had even asked him to elope with her and that if he should not marry her,
she would take poison; and that Avelina again received information of Amado's
bragging at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day.
At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, September 20, 1942, Nicolas
Jaurigue went to the chapel of the Seventh Day Adventists of which he was the
treasurer, in their barrio, just across the provincial road from his house, to attend
religious services, and sat on the front bench facing the altar with the other officials of
the organization and the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada. Inside the chapel it was
quite bright as there were electric lights.
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival
of her father, also for the purpose of attending religious services, and sat on the bench
47
next to the last one nearest the door. Amado Capina was seated on the other side of
the chapel. Upon observing the presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to
the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by her right side, and, without saying a
word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of
her right thigh. On observing this highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado
Capina, Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with
her right hand the fan knife marked Exhibit B, which she had in a pocket of her dress,
with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right
hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at
the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches
deep, which was necessarily mortal. Nicolas Jaurigue, who was seated on one of the
front benches, saw Amado bleeding and staggering towards the altar, and upon
seeing his daughter still holding the bloody knife, he approached her and asked: "Why
did you do that," and answering him Avelina said: "Father, I could not endure
anymore." Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes later. Barrio lieutenant
Casimiro Lozada, who was also in the same chapel, approached Avelina and asked
her why she did that, and Avelina surrendered herself, saying: "Kayo na po ang
bahala sa aquin," meaning: "I hope you will take care of me," or more correctly, "I
place myself at your disposal." Fearing that Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio
lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein defendant and appellant to go
home immediately, to close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the
house, unless accompanied by him. That father and daughter went home and locked
themselves up, following instructions of the barrio lieutenant, and waited for the arrival
of the municipal authorities; and when three policemen arrived in their house, at about
10 o'clock that night, and questioned them about the incident, defendant and appellant
immediately surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed said policemen
briefly of what had actually happened in the chapel and of the previous acts and
conduct of the deceased, as already stated above, and went with said policemen to
the police headquarters, where her written statements were taken, and which were
presented as a part of the evidence for the prosecution.
The high conception of womanhood that our people possess, however humble they
may be, is universal. It has been entertained and has existed in all civilized
communities.
A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a virtuous
woman represents the only true nobility. And they are the future wives and mothers of
the land. Such are the reasons why, in the defense of their honor, when brutally
attacked, women are permitted to make use of all reasonable means available within
their reach, under the circumstances. Criminologists and courts of justice have
entertained and upheld this view.
On the other hand, it is the duty of every man to protect and show loyalty to
womanhood, as in the days of chivalry. There is a country where women freely go out
unescorted and, like the beautiful roses in their public gardens, they always receive
the protection of all. That country is Switzerland.
In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate
defense of our own person, we have the right to property acquired by us, and the right
to honor which is not the least prized of our patrimony (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed.,
pp. 172, 173).
The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her
in a state of legitimate defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be
esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her very existence; and it is evident
that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded
exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be considered a crime from
the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great
an outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare,
62 Phil., 504). .
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her
aggressor, in the defense of her honor. Thus, where the deceased grabbed the
defendant in a dark night at about 9 o'clock, in an isolated barrio trail, holding her
firmly from behind, without warning and without revealing his identity, and, in the
struggle that followed, touched her private parts, and that she was unable to free
herself by means of her strength alone, she was considered justified in making use of
a pocket knife in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, and
which ended in his death, since she had no other means of defending herself, and
consequently exempt from all criminal liability (People vs. De la Cruz, 16 Phil., 344).
And a woman, in defense of her honor, was perfectly justified in inflicting wounds on
her assailant with a bolo which she happened to be carrying at the time, even though
her cry for assistance might have been heard by people nearby, when the deceased
tried to assault her in a dark and isolated place, while she was going from her house
to a certain tienda, for the purpose of making purchases (United States vs. Santa Ana
and Ramos, 22 Phil., 249).
In the case, however, in which a sleeping woman was awakened at night by someone
touching her arm, and, believing that some person was attempting to abuse her, she
asked who the intruder was and receiving no reply, attacked and killed the said person
with a pocket knife, it was held that, notwithstanding the woman's belief in the
supposed attempt, it was not sufficient provocation or aggression to justify her
completely in using deadly weapon. Although she actually believed it to be the
beginning of an attempt against her, she was not completely warranted in making
such a deadly assault, as the injured person, who turned out to be her own brother-in-
law returning home with his wife, did not do any other act which could be considered
as an attempt against her honor (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391)..
In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capina, when the
latter climbed up her house late at night on September 15, 1942, and surreptitiously
entered her bedroom, undoubtedly for the purpose of raping her, as indicated by his
previous acts and conduct, instead of merely shouting for help, she could have been
perfectly justified in killing him, as shown by the authorities cited above..
48
According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court
in this case, when the deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on the
same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper
portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric
lights, and there were already several people, about ten of them, inside the chapel,
including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the
organization; and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no
possibility of her being raped. And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at the base
of the left side of his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep,
causing his death a few moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of
her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts and circumstances of the
case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability..
But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and
unconditionally surrendered to the barrio lieutenant in said chapel, admitting having
stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident, and agreed to go to her house
shortly thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant,
an agent of the authorities (United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472); and the further
fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed
against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion
and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be considered
as mitigating circumstances in her favor (People vs. Parana, 64 Phil., 331; People vs.
Sakam, 61 Phil., 27; United States vs. Arribas, 1 Phil., 86).
provisions of article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, she is entitled to a reduction by
one or two degrees in the penalty to be imposed upon her. And considering the
circumstances of the instant case, the defendant and appellant should be accorded
the most liberal consideration possible under the law (United States vs. Apego, 23
Phil., 391; United States vs. Rivera, 41 Phil., 472; People vs. Mercado, 43 Phil., 950)..
The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide; and if it
should be reduced by two degrees, the penalty to be imposed in the instant case is
that of prision correccional; and pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 4103
of the Philippine Legislature, known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein
defendant and appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from arresto mayor in its medium degree, to prision correccional in its medium degree.
Consequently, with the modification of judgment appealed from, defendant and
appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four
months, and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amado Capina, in
the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to
exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Defendant and appellant should also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive
imprisonment, and the knife marked Exhibit B ordered confiscated. So ordered..
Ozaeta, Perfecto, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased
but merely wanted to punish his offending hand with her knife, as shown by the fact
that she inflicted upon him only one single wound. And this is another mitigating
circumstance which should be considered in her favor (United States vs. Brobst, 14
Phil., 310; United States vs. Diaz, 15 Phil., 123). Separate Opinions

The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that the offense was
committed by the defendant and appellant, with the aggravating circumstance that the
killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship, cannot be legally sustained;
as there is no evidence to show that the defendant and appellant had murder in her
heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. Avelina is not a criminal by nature.
She happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a God-fearing young
woman, typical of our country girls, who still possess the consolation of religious hope
in a world where so many others have hopelessly lost the faith of their elders and now
drifting away they know not where.
HILADO, J., concurring:
In past dissenting and concurring opinions my view regarding the validity or nullity of
judicial proceedings in the Japanese-sponsored courts which functioned in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation has been consistent. I am not abandoning
it. But in deference to the majority who sustain the opposite view, and because no
party litigant herein has raised the question, I have taken part in the consideration of
this case on the merits. And, voting on the merits, I concur in the foregoing decision
penned by Justice De Joya.

The questions raised in the second and third assignments of error appear, therefore,
to be well taken; and so is the first assignment of error to a certain degree.

In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the
deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and form and under the circumstances above
indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide, with no
aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating circumstances
of a qualified character to be considered in her favor; and, in accordance with the

49
 FIRST DIVISION
G. R. No. 120646 - February 14, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. APOLINAR DANDO, Accused-
Appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Siniloan,
Laguna finding PO3 Apolinar E. Dando ("accused-appellant") guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder.
The Information filed against accused-appellant reads:
That on or about 6:19 o'clock in the evening of November 20, 1991 at Barangay M.
Pandeño, Municipality of Siniloan, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while conveniently armed with a
deadly weapon (cal. 45) with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot several
times one CESAR CASTRO y VALMONTE with the said weapon, thereby inflicting
upon him gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body which directly caused his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the surviving heirs of the victim.
That the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
On the same date, accused-appellant filed a motion for inhibition and for a change of
venue of the case because several staff members of Branch 33, RTC of Laguna were
related to the victim. On February 12, 1992, Judge Venancio M. Tarriela, the Presiding
Judge of said branch, granted the motion.2 On May 14, 1992, this Court approved the
change of venue and designated Judge Jose C. Mendoza of Branch 26, RTC of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, to try and decide the case.3
Accused-appellant filed a petition for bail4 which was denied after hearing on the
ground that the evidence against accused-appellant is strong.5 Accused-appellant
then went to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari questioning the denial of his
petition for bail.
Subsequently, on account of another motion for inhibition, 6 filed by accused-appellant
alleging that a prosecution witness in the hearing for the petition for bail was related to
a staff member of Branch 26, the case was re-raffled and transferred to Branch 28,
RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, presided by Judge Fernando Paclibon, Jr.
On June 18, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing accused-
appellant's petition questioning the denial of his motion for bail, for lack of merit. 7
During trial and after the prosecution witness had already rested its case, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 28, RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, likewise, inhibited himself
from further hearing the case when accused-appellant questioned his impartiality
because of his refusal to grant accused-appellant's motion to recall prosecution
witness Susana Masacupan to the witness stand as a hostile witness. 8 The case was
transferred back to Branch 26, RTC of Laguna, then presided by Judge Pablo
Francisco.
On May 2, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Apolinar Dando guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder as charged in the information, qualified by treachery and
committed with the aggravating circumstances of use of craft or disguise and evident
premeditation and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of Cesar Castro as follows:
a.) the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
b.) the sum of P1,628,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; and
c.) the sum of P35,974.00 as reimbursement for expenses incurred in the wake and
burial of the victim; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.9
The prosecution's account of the case as narrated in the brief of the Solicitor General
is as follows:
Prosecution witness Aldwin Gemanel testified that on November 20, 1991, he went to
the house located at Pandiño Street, Siniloan, Laguna of his uncle, Angelito Millares,
Jr. (Junior Millares) to look for his (Gemanel's) father. Junior Millares' house was
about 100 to 150 meters away from that of the victim, Cesar Castro. Upon arrival at
his uncle's place, a party was on-going as it was the birthday of the former (p. 3, tsn,
June 17, 1992). At the said party, gunshots were fired by appellant and Junior Millares
to celebrate the occasion (p. 4, tsn, October 20, 1992 and pp. 14-15, tsn, August 26,
1993). After a few hours at the birthday party, Gemanel decided to go to his
grandmother's house, a mere three (3) houses away from his uncle's house (p. 5, tsn,
June 17, 1992). On the way to his grandmother's house, he saw appellant Apolinar
Dando, sat on the side-car of a tricycle parked along Pandiño Street in front of Junior
Millares' house and placed a white handkerchief over his face (p. 5-6, tsn, Ibid).
Though puzzled by the action of appellant, Gemanel proceeded to his grandmother's
house and stayed there for almost an hour (pp. 20-21, tsn, September 22, 1993).
50
When Gemanel went out of the house, he saw appellant get off the tricycle with the
handkerchief covering his face and walk towards the direction of the town plaza (pp.
30-31, tsn, Ibid.). At that time, Gemanel followed appellant and then he (Gemanel)
entered a bakery to buy bread (pp. 28-29, tsn, Ibid). While inside the bakery, Gemanel
heard a shot, so he ran outside to look where the shot came from (p. 36, tsn, Ibid).
Thereupon, he saw appellant with the same white handkerchief covering his face,
firing three (3) more shots at Cesar Castro, who was standing on the street in front of
his (Castro's) house. After the fourth shot appellant ran towards the "paraanan" or
alley, to the direction of the town plaza (pp. 37-43, tsn, Ibid).
Gemanel rushed home and told his mother what he had just witnessed (p. 53, tsn,
September 22, 1993). His mother then went to the crime scene while he was left to
tend their store (p. 54, tsn, Ibid.) When his mother came back after about ten (10)
minutes, he confided to her that he saw appellant shoot Cesar Castro (p. 54, tsn, Ibid).
His mother then advised him not to tell anyone. Then he went to the crime scene for a
closer look of the victim (p. 55, tsn, Ibid).
The following day on November 21, 1991, Gemanel was fetched by police officers
from his school and was brought to the municipal building for questioning. The day
after, on November 22, 1991, he executed a statement (Exhibit "A"; pp. 8-9, tsn, July
14, 1992).
Gemanel further testified that he was present when a slug was recovered from the
front yard of his uncle's (Millares') house (p. 11, tsn, July 14, 1992). He personally saw
the slug which was subsequently handed to Celso Castro, son of Cesar Castro. He
learned that the slug found was one of those fired from the service pistol of appellant
when the latter fired his gun during the birthday party of his uncle (pp. 11-12, tsn, Ibid).
Susan Masakupan, 29 years of age, married and a resident of Pandiño Street,
Siniloan, Laguna, corroborated the testimony of Gemanel. She testified that on or
about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of November 20, 1991, while she was getting dry
clothes hanging at their clothesline located at their front yard, a man wearing a white
polo shirt with designs and a pair of khaki pants and had a handkerchief covering his
face passed by. Surprised with the man's covered face, her gaze followed the man
until the latter stopped by victim Cesar Castro. Thereupon the man shot Cezar Castro
and when the latter fell down, the man continued on shooting at Cesar Castro two (2)
or more shots. After the additional shots, the man ran towards an alley (pp. 2-5, tsn,
July 21, 1992).
SPO4 Efren Palma, Deputy Station Commander of the PNP, Siniloan, Laguna,
testified that three (3) slugs and three (3) empty shells were recovered from the crime
scene on the night of November 20, 1991 (p. 6, tsn, October 5, 1992).
Josue Flores, property custodian of the PNP, Siniloan, Laguna, testified that he issued
to appellant, who is a member of PNP, Siniloan, Laguna, (one 1) service firearm,
which was a caliber .45 pistol, Remington, with serial number 1945012 (pp. 3, 5 and 7,
tsn, August 11, 1992).
Florentino Rañada, a member of the Central Intelligence Service of Siniloan, Laguna,
testified that he received from the Siniloan, Laguna police station the following
specimens:
- one (1) slug .45 caliber ammunition;
- three (3) pieces slug for .45 caliber ammunition;
- three (3) pieces empty shells for a .45 caliber ammunition;
- one (1) piece caliber Remington pistol with serial number 1945012.
and issued a receipt for them (Exhibits "E" and "E-1"; pp. 17-20, tsn, August 11,
1992).
Rañada further testified that one (1) slug of a .45 caliber pistol recovered from the
body of the victim, which was turned over to him by Arvee Castro, brother of the victim
(pp. 27-28, tsn, Ibid) has [sic] sent together with the above specimens to the PNP
crime laboratory for ballistic examination (p. 30, tsn, Ibid).
Susan R. Jalla, PNP officer and criminologist, testified that she conducted a ballistic
examination on the specimens submitted (Exhibits "H", "I", "J" and "K"; pp. 11-13,
tsn Ibid).
She issued a certification (Exhibit "N") stating: ". . . microscopic examination, MS-1,
MRS-1, MRS-15 revealed the same individual characteristics as the test bullets and
test cartridges, respectively fired from the above-mentioned firearm" (p. 17, tsn, Ibid).
Dr. Priscilla Realeza, Rural Health Physician of Pakil, Laguna, testified that she
conducted a postmortem examination on the cadaver of Cesar Castro. She issued an
Autopsy Report (Exhibits "R" and "R-1") finding that the victim sustained eleven (11)
gunshot wounds (pp. 6-7, tsn Ibid) and that one (1) bullet slug was extracted from his
body (p. 12, tsn, Ibid).10
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, gave the following version of the incident: On
November 20, 1991, he was a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) with
the rank of PO3 and detailed as security to the mayor of Siniloan, Laguna. At around
one o'clock in the afternoon of that day, he arrived at the house of Junior Millares who
was then celebrating his birthday. He participated in a drinking spree up to three
o'clock in the afternoon. On that occasion, there was no firing of a gun. He did not
bring his gun to the birthday party because he was not in a habit of bringing his gun
when he attended such occasions.11 When he left the party, he went straight home
and slept. He woke up at around midnight because of an upset stomach and vomitted.
He went back to sleep and woke up the second time in the morning of November 21,
1991, changed his clothes, ate his breakfast and went to work at around eight o'clock
51
in the morning.12It was only on November 22, 1991 that he learned from his wife that
the Chief of Police and the Mayor were looking for him and that he was a suspect in
the killing of Castro. After eating his supper, he went to the municipal building where
the Chief of Police informed him that he was a suspect in the killing of Castro and was
placed under technical arrest. He surrendered his firearm for ballistic examination to
show that he had nothing to do with the killing. Thereafter, he did not know what
happened to firearm.13
The testimony of accused-appellant as to his whereabouts during the time the crime
was committed was supported by his wife Herninia Dando who testified before the trial
court that on November 20, 1991 she went home at 4 o'clock in the afternoon to cook
their supper. Less than an hour later, her husband arrived, went to the sala and slept
until the next morning. They had breakfast together and after that, they went to their
respective places of work.14
Accused-appellant assign the following errors committed by the trial court, to wit:
I Salinas, who likewise fired said gun twice and then it was returned to accused-
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ALDWIN OF GEMANEL THAT
ACCUSED APPELLANT APOLINAR DANDO WAS THE ASSAILANT WHO SHOT
THE VICTIM CESAR CASTRO.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE EMPTY SHELLS AND SLUGS
SUBMITTED FOR BALLISTIC EXAMINATION WERE THOSE RECOVERED FROM
THE SCENE OF THE CRIME AND ONE SLUG FROM THE BODY OF THE VICTIM
AND CAME FROM THE SERVICE FIREARM OF THE ACCUSED APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF EMPTY SHELLS AND SLUGS PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION AS TAINTED OR POLLUTED, AND HIGHLY UNRELIABLE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF ALDWIN
GEMANEL AND THE BALLISTIC EXAMINATION OF THE SERVICE FIREARM OF
ACCUSED APPELLANT CONSTITUTED PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND IN
SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUAAND
TO PAY THE HEIRS THE SUM OF P1,620,000.00 FOR LOSS OF EARNING
CAPACITY OF THE VICTIM, AND OTHER DAMAGES.15
The first and third issues shall be dealt with together as they are interrelated.
Accused-appellant assails the testimony of Aldwin Gemanel alleging that it was
marred by inconsistencies and was incredible, therefore, unworthy of belief. Among
these inconsistencies, according to accused-appellant, are:
1. Gemanel testified that there was a birthday party attended by accused-appellant in
the house of his (Gemanel's) uncle, Junior Millares, and there he saw accused-
appellant pull out his gun and fire a shot downward on the floor. However, Millares
himself testified that accused-appellant merely gave to him the gun and it was he
(Millares) who fired two shots. Then he handed the gun to another guest, Agustin
appellant.16
2. Gemanel testified that moments before the shooting of Castro, he saw accused-
appellant in front of the house of Millares putting a handkerchief to cover his face and
then going inside the tricycle to rest. However, during the summary examination by the
Municipal Judge who conducted the preliminary investigation, he testified that he saw
accused-appellant on board the tricycle sleeping.17
3. Gemanel testified that he was barely one house away from the place of the
shooting when he heard a shot. When he looked at the place where the shot came
from, he saw a man already sprawled on the ground and the man, whose face was
covered by a handkerchief, fired two (2) more shots at the victim and left passing
through a pathway. In other words, there were three (3) shots fired. Later, he changed
his testimony stating that there were four (4) shots fired.18
4. Gemanel testified that after the shooting, he approached the victim then he went to
his mother telling her that Castro was shot without naming the assailant. He later
testified that after the shooting, he went home to his mother and revealed to her the
identity of the assailant as Apolinar Dando. Then he went back to the scene of the
crime and saw that policemen were already investigating the incident. When asked by
the police investigator, he told him right then and there that it was accused-appellant
who shot the victim.19
The foregoing inconsistencies are but minor details and they do not discredit the
positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. The
testimony of Gemanel on the events that transpired on November 20, 1991 was clear,
straightforward and consistent. Thus:
52
DIRECT-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL: A: - To my uncle Junior's house, sir, where there was a drinking spree.

Q: - On November 20, 1991, where were you? Q: - Do you know why them was a drinking spree at the time?

WITNESS A: - Yes, sir, it was my uncle Junior's birthday.

A: - I was on Pandeño Street Siniloan, Laguna, sir. Q: - What was your purpose in going to the place of your uncle's birthday?

Q: - In what particular place in Brgy. Pandeño? A: - I was going to look for my father, sir.

A: - About the middle of that area, sir. Q: - Did you. . .while you were there, by the way, where is the house of your uncle
located?
Q: - You were at the middle part of that area. Will you kindly tell to this Honorable
Court your point of reference as to the place where you were at the time? A: - On Pandeño Street, sir.

A: - What I am saying is that I am at the middle of Pandeño Street, sir. Q: - How far from your house, how many houses apart?

FISCAL A: - About 15 houses, sir.

Q: - And when you said you were at the middle portion of Pandeño Street, will you tell Q: - What is the full name of your uncle Junior?
this Honorable Court the nearest house where you were at the time?
A: - Junior Millares, sir.
WITNESS
Q: - While you were there at the birthday celebration of your uncle Junior, what did
A: - Cesar Castro's house, sir. you notice thereat?

Q: - And what are you doing then? WITNESS

A: - None, sir, I was then going to my grandmother's house. A: - There was a firing of gun, sir.

Q: - And were you able to proceed to the house of your grandmother? Q: - Do you know the person who fired his gun at the time?

A: - Yes, sir. A: - Yes, sir, Polly Dando.

Q: - But prior to proceeding to the house of your "lola" did you go to any other place? Q: - Do you know Polly Dando personally?

A: - Yes, sir. A: - Yes, sir.

Q: - Where? Q: - Do you know the real name of Polly Dando?

53
A: - Yes, sir, Apolinario Dando.
Q: - Where did you see Apolinario Dando fired his gun?
A: - Under the table pointing downwards, sir.
Q: - Do you know the caliber used by Dando?
ATTY. RAGAZA
Incompetent, your Honor.
COURT
Objection noted, if he knows.
WITNESS
A: - Yes, sir.
FISCAL
Q: - Will you tell this Honorable Court the caliber?
A: - A .45 caliber, "yung lapad", sir.
Q: - Have you already seen a gun of that caliber?
A: - Yes, sir.
Q: - Where?
A: - On TV and on posters, sir.
xxx-xxx-xxx
Q: - After that, where did you go?
A: - I went to my grandmother, sir.
Q: - Where is the house of your grandmother located?
A: - Also an Pandeño Street, sir.
Q: - How far from the house of your uncle Junior?
A: - Three houses away, sir.
Q: - What did you do in the house of your lola?
A: - I entered the house, sir.
Q: - After that, what else happened?
A: - I went out, sir.
Q: - Where did you go?
A: - On the street, sir.
Q: - Were you alone at the time?
A: - Yes, sir.
Q: - While you were on the street, did you notice of any unusual incident?
A: - Yes, sir.
Q: - What was that incident?
A: - I saw Polly boarded a tricycle, sir.
Q: - When you said Polly Dando boarded a tricycle, you mean to say Dando went
somewhere else?
WITNESS
A: - No, he merely sat on board a tricycle which was parked there, sir.
Q: - This tricycle has a driver?
54
A: - None, sir. A: - Yes, sir.

Q: - What else did you notice? Q: - What was that incident?

A: - I saw Polly Dando placed a handkerchief over his face, sir. A: - Polly Dando got off the tricycle, sir.

xxx-xxx-xxx Q: - Where did he go?

FISCAL A: - Towards the plaza, sir.

Q: - Do you know the color of the handkerchief? Q: - And what did you do?

A: - Yes, sir, white with small drawings. A: - I followed Polly, sir.

Q: - Will you tell this Honorable Court the attire used by the accused Apolinario Q: - Up to what point did you follow him?
Dando?
A: - About 2 houses, sir.
A: - He was wearing a white polo shirt, sir, and a khaki pants.
Q: - While following Dando, what happened next?
Q: - After you saw Apolinar Dando sat on a tricycle and put a handkerchief on his face,
what else happened?
A - I entered a bakery, sir.

WITNESS
Q: - What was your purpose in going to that bakery?

A: - He merely rested for a short while, sir.

A: - I was going to buy bread, sir.

Q: - After that, what happened?

Q: - Were you able to buy bread?

A: - I left, sir.
A: - No, sir.

Q: - You mean to say after you saw Apolinar sat on a tricycle and put a handkerchief
FISCAL
on his face and rested for a while, you went to your lola's house?

Q: - Where did you proceed after that?

A: - Yes, sir.

A: - I heard a shot, sir.

Q: - After that, where did you proceed?

Q: - What did you do. . . .

A: - I merely stayed on the street, sir.

ATTY. RAGAZA
Q: - And again, while there on the street, did you again notice any unusual incident?

55
I moved to strike out the answer for not being responsive. WITNESS

COURT A: - No, sir.

Sustained FISCAL

FISCAL Q: - At that precise moment when you heard the gunshot and you go (sic) to the street
to find our where the shot came from, where was Apolinar Dando at the time?
Q: - While you were at the bakery, what else happened?
ATTY. RAGAZA
WITNESS
There is no testimony that Apolinar Dando was present at the time.
A: - I heard a shot, sir.
COURT
Q: - What shot did you hear?
There was no testimony that Apolinar Dando was them. The fiscal was asking where
was Apolinar at the time. He was not asking why he was there. He did not assume.
A: - A gunshot, sir.

WITNESS
Q: - When you heard that gunshot, what did you do?

A: - I saw him walked a few steps and then fired his gun at Cesar, on his side, sir.
A: - I went beside the street, sir.

xxx-xxx-xxx
Q: - What did you find out?

Q: - After you saw Apolinar for the second time at the sprawled body of Cesar, what
A: - I saw Cesar Castro already sprawled on the ground, sir.
else happened?

Q: - Was Cesar Castro alone at the time?

A: - He ran and went towards an alley, "paraanan", sir.20

A: - Yes, sir.
On cross-examination, Gemanel gave substantially the same testimony:

Q: - And do you know what was the cause of Cesar's falling to the ground?
Q: - In answer to the question of the Court in the last hearing, you said you saw Dando
going to the plaza and you followed him far a distance of about 2 houses, during the
ATTY. RAGAZA time you were following, did you meet any person?

Incompetent, your Honor, he already saw Cesar already sprawled on the ground. A: - None, sir.

COURT Q: - And during all the time that you were following Dando, was he wearing a
handkerchief over his face?
May answer. We will see the answer.
A: - Yes, sir.

56
Q: - But you did not have much interest, that is why you stop following him and A: - First, I was inside the bakery when I heard a shot so I immediately went out and
stopped at a bakery? saw Dando firing two shots on Ka Cesar who was already lying on the ground, sir. 21

A: - Yes, sir. xxx-xxx-xxx

ATTY. RAGAZA ATTY. BALCE:

Q: - And then you heard a shot? Q: - You heard a shot and you went out and stopped at this point marked by an "x"?

WITNESS A: - Yes, sir.

A: - Yes, sir. Q: - And it was only a gunshot that you heard?

Q: - Exactly, where were you when you heard the first shot? A: - On that moment, one.

A: - In the bakery about to buy bread, sir. Q: - Just after the shot, did you not hear any person crying out in panic.

Q: - Where were you facing? A: - Nobody, sir.

A: - Towards the bakery, sir. COURT:

Q: - Was there anybody attending to you in the bakery? Q: - After that first shot, did you hear any other shot?

A: - Yes, sir. A: - I heard, Your Honor.

Q: - Now, you were merely waiting for bread that you would buy in that bakery? COURT:

A: - Yes, sir, when suddenly I heard a shot. Q: - How many shots did you hear after hearing the first shot?

Q: - How many shots did you hear while you were in the bakery? A: - Three to four shots, Your Honor.

A: - First, I heard one shot so I went out of the bakery and I saw Ka Cesar being shot, ATTY. BALCE:
sir.
I move that the last answer be placed in tagalog.
Q: - How many shots in all did you hear?
A: - "Mga tatlo o apat"
A: - Three, sir.
Q: - What did you say?
Q: - What was the interval between the first and the second shot?
A: - "Tatlo po o apat".

57
ATTY. BALCE:
But your first answer that I heard was "tatlo bale apat."
A: - Yes sir.
COURT:
Q: - Did you know where the shots came from?
A: - Yes, Your Honor.
Q: - Where?
A: - From the house of Ka Cesar.
COURT:
Q: - After hearing those shots, what did you observe, if any?
A: - The person with his handkerchief covering his face, was running and entered an
alley, "paraanan".22
Well-settled is the rule that "inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to
strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion
of rehearsed testimony."23 Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies refer only to
inconsequential details and not to the crux of the case that Gemanel saw accused-
appellant gun down Castro. Gemanel never wavered on this point even for a single
moment. The consistency on the part of Gemanel in identifying accused-appellant as
the perpetrator of the crime makes him a credible witness. His testimony cannot be
discredited by a mere alibi and denial on the part of accused-appellant.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses in criminal cases and it should be rejected when
the identity of the accused is sufficient and positively established by the
prosecution.24 Moreover, in order to overcome the evidence of the prosecution, the
accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time it was committed.25 In the present case, accused-appellant
failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime
when it was committed. He even admitted that his house was only about one-and-a-
half kilometers away from the house of Millares, 26 which was very near the place
where Castro was shot to death. Undoubtedly, the distance did not render it
impossible for accused-appellant to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. Accused-appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily fail.
As to the alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of Gemanel and that of
Millares, we find the testimony of Gemanel to be more credible since the inconsistency
lies in the affidavit and testimony of Millares himself. In his affidavit, Millares averted
that he fired the gun first and then accused-appellant fired the gun twice.27 In his
testimony in court, however, he (Millares) claimed that after firing the gun, he gave the
gun to Agustin Salinas.28 Confronted with the inconsistent statements of Millares and
the straightforward and categorical testimony of Gemanel, which was corroborated by
that of Susana Masacupan, this Court believes and gives credence to the latter.
When he testified in court, Gemanel was then only thirteen (13) years old and a
second year high school student at Siniloan Public Highhool. Indeed "the testimony of
a child of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful than that of older
persons, so that once established that he has fully understood the character and
nature of an oath, his testimony should be given full credence.29
In the second and third issues raised in his brief, accused-appellant opines that there
is no proof showing that the empty shells and slugs recovered at the scene of the
crime were the same empty shells and slugs submitted for ballistic examination.
According to accused-appellant, the relatives of the victim tampered with these pieces
of evidence making the same tainted or polluted, therefore, unreliable.
Other than these bare allegations, however, accused-appellant failed to prove by
convincing evidence any irregularity in the handling by the police officers of these
particular pieces of evidence. The ballistic examination report is thus clothed with the
presumption of regularity. At any rate, the presentation of weapons (or the slugs and
bullets, as in this case) used and ballistic examination are not prerequisites for
conviction.30 The corpus delicti and the positive identification of accused-appellant as
the perpetrator of the crime are more than enough to sustain his conviction.
Anent the fifth issue, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting
him for murder and awarding in favor of the victim's heirs the sum of P1,620,000.00
for his loss of earning capacity and other damages.
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death31 if committed with any of the following circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.
xxx-xxx-xxx
5. With evident premeditation.
58
xxx-xxx-xxx
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape.32 In this case, accused-appellant, whose face
was covered by a handkerchief; approached the victim, who was merely standing by
the gate in front of his house, and shot him. The victim was undoubtedly caught
unaware and had no chance of putting up any defense. Clearly, treachery attended
the commission of the crime since the attack, although frontally, was no less sudden
and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or offer any defense of his
person.33
expenses of fifty percent (50%) of his gross earnings, his total net earning capacity
amounts to P979,000.00.39
As to the expenses actually incurred by the family of the victim for the wake and burial,
Celso Castro was able to prove during trial that they incurred the sum of P39,974.00.
The amount of P35,974.00 awarded by the trial court as reimbursement of funeral
expenses is, accordingly, increased to P39,974.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that accused-appellant shall pay the heirs of the
victim the following amounts:

The trial court further established that there was evident premeditation and that
1. death indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00;
accused-appellant used "craft, fraud or disguise" in committing his dastardly act:

2. compensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of P979,000.00; and

. . . When DANDO (accused-appellant) boarded the tricycle parked in front of the
residence of Angelito Millares, Jr., he did so not to rest or sleep there. He was there,
with a handkerchief over his face, lying in wait for Cesar Castro to come out and stand 3. reimbursement of funeral expenses in the amount of P39,974.00.
by the gate of his house as he customarily did while taking a rest. And DANDO stayed
inside the tricycle for a couple of hours, like an eagle waiting for its prey. From the
parked tricycle, DANDO could clearly see the gate of Cesar Castro's house, 100 to SO ORDERED.
150 meters away. DANDO'S stay inside the tricycle lasted for about two (2) hours, a
sufficient time for him to reflect on the consequences of his plan to kill Cesar Castro. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
And when Cesar Castro did finally come out, and stood there unarmed by the gate of
his house, DANDO swiftly swooped down on his prey and triggered the burst from his
service firearm which snuffed the life of his victim. 34

Given the foregoing attendant aggravating circumstances, the trial court properly
sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, the
amount it awarded in favor of the heirs of the victim should be modified in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence.

The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000 as indemnity for the death for
Cesar Castro. Said amount is awarded without need of further proof other than the
death of the victim.35 In addition, the heirs are also entitled to receive a compensation
for the loss of earning capacity of the victim. The formula for computing the same as
established in decided cases36 is as follows:

Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income - Necessary Living
Expenses

The life expectancy is equivalent to two thirds (2/3) multiplied by the difference of 80
and the age of the deceased.37 Since Castro was 47 years old at the time of his death,
his life expectancy was 22 more years.38 Celso Castro testified that his father earned
P3,000.00 monthly or P36,000.00 annually from the sash factory. In addition, the
victim's annual income from farming, as found by the trial court, was P53,000.00. The
gross annual income of the deceased was P89,000.00. Allowing for necessary living

59
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5318 December 23, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL BUMANGLAG, ET AL., defendants. - GREGORIO BUNDOC, appellant.
Iñigo Bitanga for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the night of January 2, 1909, Rafael Bumanglag, an inhabitant of the pueblo of
San Nicolas, Province of Ilocos Norte, missed 4 baares or 40 bundles of palay which
were kept in his granary, situated in the place called "Payas," barrio No. 16 of the said
pueblo, and on proceeding to search for them on the following morning, he found them
in an inclosed filed which was planted with sugar cane, at a distance of about 100
meters from his granary; thereupon, for the purpose of ascertaining who had done it,
he left the palay there, and that night, accompanied by Gregorio Bundoc, Antonio
Ribao, and Saturnino Tumamao, he waited near the said field for the person who
might return to get the palay. A man, who turned out to be Guillermo Ribis, made his
appearance and approaching the palay, attempted to carry it away with him, but at
that instant Bumanglag, Bundoc, and Ribao assaulted the presumed thief with sticks
and cutting and stabbing weapons; as a result of the struggle which ensued the
person attacked fell down and died instantly, Bumanglag and his companions
believing that Guillermo Ribis was the author of several robberies and thefts that had
occurred in the place.
In view of the foregoing, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint on January 15, 1909,
charging Rafael Bumanglag, Gregorio Bundoc, and Antonio Ribao with the crime of
homicide, and the trial judge, on February 5 of the present year, rendered judgment in
the case, sentencing the three accused persons to the penalty of fourteen years eight
months and one day of reclusión temporal, with the accessories, and to the payment
of an indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, and the costs in equal parts,
from which decision only Gregorio Bundoc appealed.
From the facts above mentioned, fully proven in this case, the commission of the
crime of homicide, defined and punished by article 404 of the Penal Code, is inferred,
inasmuch as Guillermo Ribis was violently deprived of his life in consequence of
serious wounds and bruises, some of them of a mortal nature, as appears from a
certificate issued by a physician who examined the body of the deceased, and who
ratified said certificate at the trial under oath.
The accused Bundoc, the only appellant, pleaded not guilty, but, in the absence of
justification, and his exculpatory allegation being unreasonable, it is not proper to hold
that he assaulted and killed the deceased, with the help of his codefendants, in order
to defend himself from an attack made by the former with a bolo.
Both Gregorio Bundoc and his codefendants Bumanglag and Ribao declared that,
during the fight with the deceased Ribis, they only beat the latter with sticks, because
he unsheathed the bolo he carried; but from the examination made of the body it
appeared that several serious wounds had been inflicted with cutting and stabbing
weapons, besides some bruises, and according to the declaration of the health officer
Felipe Barba, which declaration was confirmed by the municipal president of Laoag,
the bolo worn by the deceased was in its sheath and hanging from his waist; therefore
it can not be concluded that the deceased even intended to assault his murderers with
his bolo either before he was attacked by them or during the fight, because, had Ribis
made use of the bolo he carried sheathed, the bolo would have been found
unsheathed at the place where the fight occurred, and it is not reasonable to believe
that, before falling to the ground in a dying condition he succeeded in sheathing his
bolo, in which condition it was found on his body.
It is therefore indisputable that, without any prior illegal aggression and the other
requisites which would fully or partially exempt the accused from criminal
responsibility, the appellant and his two companions assaulted Guillermo Ribis with
sticks and cutting and stabbing arms, inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds,
and therefore, the said accused is guilty of the crime of homicide as co-principal by
direct participation, fully convicted, together with his codefendants who are already
serving their sentence.
In the commission of the crime we should take into account the mitigating
circumstance No. 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, because the defendant acted with
loss of reason and self-control on seeing that Guillermo Ribis was taking material
possession of the palay seized and hidden by him on the previous night, thus
committing one of the numerous unlawful acts perpetrated at the place, to the damage
and prejudice of those who, by their labor endeavor to provide themselves with the
necessary elements for their subsistence and that of their families. The special
circumstance established by article 11 of the same code should be also considered in
favor of the accused, in view of the erroneous and quite general belief that it is legal to
punish, even to excess the thief who, in defiance of law and justice, while refusing to
work, devotes himself to depriving his neighbors of the fruits of their arduous labors;
these two circumstances are considered in the present case as especially admissible,
without any aggravating circumstance, and they determine, according to article 81,
rule 5, of the Penal Code, the imposition of the penalty immediately inferior to that
prescribed by the law, and in its minimum degree, and therefore —
60
By virtue of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that, the judgment
appealed from being reversed with respect to Gregorio Bundoc only, the latter should
be, and is hereby, sentenced to the penalty of six years and one day of prisión mayor,
to the accessories of article 61 of the code, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
jointly or severally with his codefendants, in the sum of P1,000, and to pay one-third
the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Mapa, and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., dissenting:
The defendants in this case were convicted of the crime of homicide in causing the
death of Guillermo Ribis, and sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day
of reclusión temporal, accessories, indemnification, and costs.
Gregorio Bundoc is the only one who appealed.
On the night of the 21st of February, 1909, Rafael Bumanglag, a resident of the
pueblo of San Nicolas, Province of Ilocos Norte, found missing from his granary,
situated at a place called Payas, barrio No. 16 of said pueblo, 4 baaresand
40 manojos of palay, and the inclosure within which the palay was situated torn down
and partly destroyed. The following morning he discovered a portion of the
missing palay in a field of sugar cane about 100 meters from the granary from which it
was taken. For the purpose of discovering who was the author of the crime and of
bringing him to justice, he secured the assistance of Gregorio Bundoc, Antonio Ribao,
and Saturnino Tumamao, the first being his cousin and the others in his neighbors and
friends, to watch with him the succeeding night in the vicinity of thepalay, acting upon
the expectation that the robber would return to secure it. Some time after dark of the
night succeeding the robbery, Bumanglag, and the other persons mentioned, gathered
together in said field of sugar cane, near to the palay in question, placing themselves
so as to surround it in a measure, and awaited the appearance of the malefactor. At
about 10 o'clock there came into the field the deceased, Guillermo Ribis, who
approached the palay, picked it up, and started to carry it away. At this moment
Bumanglag presented himself in front of Ribis, stopping his further progress,
whereupon Ribis attacked him viciously with a bolo and they engaged in a hand-to-
hand struggle. Bumanglag, upon finding that he was likely to be killed by the robber
because of his great strength and the fact that he was armed with a bolo, called for
assistance, whereupon his three companions rushed forward and seeing the extremity
in which Bumanglag was, joined in the struggle for the purpose of his protection.
Within a few minutes Ribis fell to the earth mortally injured and soon expired.
The only proofs in the trial relating to the death are the statements and testimony of
the defendants themselves. Immediately after the death of Ribis, they, acting
voluntarily, went to the nearest justice of the peace and stated what had occurred.
Each one signed a statement of the facts constituting the occurrence as he
understood them. Later each one of defendants testified on the trial.
Bundoc, in the written statement made by him before the justice of the peace, said
that at about 10 o'clock of the night in question he saw Ribis enter the field, going
toward the place where the palay was located, and a little while afterwards Bumanglag
called him and his companions to come to his assistance because a man was
attacking him and that thereupon he, Bundoc and his companions, "went to the
assistance of Bumanglag, who was fighting with Ribis, and, in view of the fact that it
appeared that Bumanglag was not able to resist his adversary because he had a bolo
and Bumanglag had only a bamboo stick," he and his companions took part in the
fight solely to protect his cousin and that, during the struggle that followed, the
decedent was killed. He said further that he recognized the deceased, Ribis, as a
resident of San Nicolas, and that he was a person of bad character and was known as
the author of various robberies and burglaries which had occurred in that vicinity.
The statements of the other defendants are substantially the same as that of
Bundoc.itc-alf
Upon the trial Bumanglag testified, relative to the acts of defendants from which the
death of Ribis resulted, that Ribis came into the field, arranged the palay in handy
form picked it up, and started to go away with it; that thereupon Bumanglag told him to
halt; that Ribis instantly dropped his bundle to the ground and immediately attacked
Bumanglag with a bolo, striking at him several times but failing to hit him on account of
stalks of sugar cane which Bumanglag interposed between himself and his assailant;
that, while Ribis was trying to kill him with his bolo, he called to his companions for
help, at the same trying to defend himself with blows of his bamboo stick; that his
companions soon arrival, and, between the three, they struck him several blows, from
which he died immediately; that they carried no weapons except bamboo sticks, while
the deceased was armed with a large bolo.
The statement of Bumanglag made upon the trial is somewhat different from his
statement made before the justice of the peace but is more in accord with the
statements of the other defendants in the case, both before the justice of the peace
upon the trial of the case. Bundoc testified that Bumanglag called for help because he
was being attacked by the robber, who was armed with a bolo, and that he was likely
to be killed at any instant, and that he and his companions, desiring to defend
Bumanglag from his imminent peril, ran forward to his assistance, and that during the
fight which occurred, the deceased was killed.
These are the only proofs before us relative to the manner in which Ribis met his
death. The court below, however, refused to believe the story of defendants because
of certain alleged contradictory circumstances which appear in the proofs. These
circumstances, as presented by the court below and here argued by the fiscal, are that
(1) while the defendants claim in their statements and testimony that the deceased
attacked Bumanglag with his bolo, nevertheless, when the body of the decedent was
the nest day taken possession of by the justice of the peace, the bolo was still in its
sheath; and (2) that while the defendants stated and testified that they were not armed
61
with any kind of weapons except bamboo sticks or clubs, still the testimony of Barba, assistance; that his companions, on arriving, saw that he was likely to be killed at any
the sanitary inspector of that district, shows that some of the wounds upon the instant and they, endeavoring to save his life, attacked the decedent.
deceased were made with sharp instruments. Upon these two circumstances,
impugning, as it is alleged they do, the evidence of the defendants in their own behalf,
It is not known who among the defendants killed the decedent or what blow caused
the court below found the defendants guilty of homicide.
his death. All that is known is that in the struggle which occurred, resulting from the
efforts of three of the defendants to save the life of the fourth, the decedent met his
The only evidence in relation to these two circumstances is that of the justice of the death.
peace and the sanitary inspector, who assert that when they went to examine the
body and take charge of it, the next day after the death, they found the bolo in its
It nowhere appears, except from the fact of death itself, that the defendants sought or
sheath. It appears, however, that no one watched the body during the interval running
intended to kill the decedent. Their sole purpose appears from the evidence to have
between the time when the death occurred and when the body was first examined,
been accomplished as well by disabling as by killing him; and it must not be forgotten
and therefore no one knows how it was handled or what was done with or to it. As to
in this connection that the effect produced by the use of their bamboo sticks was not
the other point, namely, that the wounds were made with sharp instruments, it may be
that which is ordinarily produced. This consideration was regarded by this court as
said that the witness Barba, the sanitary inspector, who is the only one who testified in
having much importance in the case of the United States vs. Sosa (4 Phil Rep., 104).
relation to that matter, stated that the only two wounds that were mortal were located,
This court has, moreover, held that a piece of bamboo (una simple caña partida),
one in the right side of the head, caused by a sharp instrument, the other a contusion
exactly what was used by defendants in the case at bar, was a weapon insufficient
at the base of the neck upon the left side, not made with a sharp instrument. He does
ordinarily to put the life of a person attacked in imminent peril. (U. S. vs. De Castro, 2
not say which one of the wounds caused the death of the decedent, neither does he
Phil. Rep., 67; U. S. vs. Mack, 8 Phil. Rep., 701).
state the fact upon which he bases his claim that the wounds were made with sharp
instruments. He is simply states his conclusions, without presenting the facts from
which such conclusions naturally spring. It is well known, however, that a wound, I am convinced that there is a strong doubt of the criminal responsibility of the
smooth edged and clean cut, and simulating with remarkable closeness a wound defendants, particularly of the appellant. Article 8 of the Penal Code reads in part as
made with a sharp cutting instrument, may be and frequently is produced by a wooden follows:
instrument or club, particularly where, as in this case, said instrument or club is
extremely hard and has a sharp edge. The witness Barba was not a physician or
The following are not delinquent and are, therefore, exempt from criminal
surgeon and had had little experience with wounds. His judgment was scarcely better
than that of the average man. In no sense was he qualified as an expert. Besides, and liability:
this is very important, the only wounds found upon the person of deceased were about
the head, neck, and face. No wound was found on any other part of the person. Does
this look like the use of knives or bolos by the defendants? If they had been using
such weapons it is almost certain that the fatal wound would have been found in the
body and not the head; or, if in the head, the wound made would have been far more
extensive and ghastly than any of those found. 5. He who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural, or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his
It appears from the undisputed testimony (if we except the two circumstances above relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those by consanguinity within
referred to ) that the decedent was a man of bad reputation; that he was a thief, a the fourth civil degree, provided the first and second circumstances
robber, and a convicted criminal, having served at least one term in prison for robbery; mentioned in the foregoing number are attendant, and provided that in case
that he was known in all that country as a leader of criminal bands and as an all- the party attacked first gave provocation, the defendant took no part therein.
around desperado; that he was a man of exceptionally large stature and of unusual
strength; that at the time of his attack upon Rafael Bumanglag he was armed with a 6. He who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided the
bolo; that on the evening before his death he had robbed the granary of Bumanglag, first and second circumstances mentioned in No. 4 are attended and that
taking a part of the property which he had stolen away with him at the time and leaving the defender is not actuated by revenge, resentment, or other illegal motive.
the other portion, which he was unable to carry, in a place where it would be easily
accessible when he desired later to remove it; that on the night of the event he had
returned to carry away the balance of the property which he had stolen the night Subdivision 4 is as follows:
before; that while in the act of taking it he was surprised and confronted by the owner
thereof; that he immediately assailed said owner viciously with his bolo, and to 4. He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the
pressed him that, for the protection of his life, he called upon his friends for following attendant circumstances:

62
 (1) Illegal aggression.lawphi1.net
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
That there was an unlawful aggression seems to me to be undisputed under the
evidence. The great preponderance of the testimony, in fact the undisputed evidence,
is to that effect. Every witness who touched the subject testified positively that the
assault upon Bumanglag was made with a bolo . It is admitted that the decedent had
one at the time of the assault. Nevertheless the fiscal contends that the assault was
not made with a bolo and bases that contention upon the single fact, before adverted
to, that, many hours after the assault, the bolo was found in its sheath on the dead
man's body. The probative effect of that fact is founded purely in an inference which
necessarily presupposes that the bolo had not been replaced in its sheath by anyone
after the death of Ribis, his body having been left unwatched, as before stated, for a
considerable period of time. It seems to me, however, that that inference is met and
sufficiently overcome by the manifest and perfect unreasonableness of the
assumption, which must necessarily arise from that inference, that a man f the
character f the decedent, having been caught red-handed in the commission of a
robbery by the owner of the property against which the felony had been and was being
committed, and that owner armed with a club, would attack such owner with his naked
hands when he carried at his side a formidable weapon with which to defend himself
in precisely such an emergency. It is wholly unreasonable, if not positively
unbelievable, that the decedent, under all the circumstances of this case, did not draw
his bolo. That he did unsheath it and did attack Bumanglag therewith is the sworn
statement of every witness who testified on that subject. This proof, taken in
connection with the unreasonableness of the claim that the decedent, caught red-
handed in felony, attacked with his bare hands a man armed with a club, the man
against whose property he was in the very act of perpetrating a felony, and permitted
himself to be beaten to death, when he carried at his side a formidable and effective
weapon of aggression as well as defense, can not be overcome by a mere inference
deduced from the circumstance that the bolo, many hours after the event, was found
in its sheath. The entire evidence, fairly considered, reasonably establishes it seems
to me, not only an unlawful but a dangerous aggression. (Supreme court of Spain, 17
November, 1897; 6 July, 1898; 16 March, 1892; 11 December, 1896; 26 January,
1897; 11 December, 1896; 6 April, 1904; 27 June, 1894; 30 January, 1904; 16
February, 1905; 10 July, 1902; 27 June, 1903; 28 February, 1906; 17 March, 1888; 29
May, 1888; 13 February, 1890; 20 January, 1894; 24 October, 1895; 27 January,
1896; 11 December, 1896; 26 January, 1897; 30 September, 1897; 10 February,
1898; 6 July, 1898; 21 December, 1898; 24 January, 1899; 29 September, 1900; 12
January, 1901; 21 April, 1902; 20 December, 1902; 4 February, 1903; 11 July, 1903;
11 July, 1904; 22 March, 1905; 8 July, 1905.)
In the case of Stoneham vs. Commonwealth (86 Va., 523, 525, 526), where the
defendant was being followed up by deceased who was wholly unarmed and without
any demonstration of violence except raising his fist, and the defendant shot and killed
him, the court said:
The accused was closely pressed by an attacking man, who was his
superior in strength, and his situation was one which justified his fear of
grievous bodily harm; and, if the jury had found the facts as certified by the
court, they should have found the homicide to be excusable self-defense
under all the circumstances of this case. (Parishe's case, 81 Va., 1.)
Moreover it is admitted that the defendant, Bumanglag, was upon his own land and
was, therefore, defending his habitation against a violent and wrongful invasion when
the assault upon him was made in the manner proved.
A person may repel force by force in defense of his habitation or property,
as well as in defense of his person, against one who manifestly intends and
endeavors by violence or surprise to commit a known felony upon either,
and, if need be, may kill his adversary. (25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of L., 275.)
In the case of United States vs. Brello (9 Phil. Rep., 424), the court said (p. 425):
The evidence of the defendant and his witnesses was to the effect that at 10
o'clock at night Candelario came to the house of the defendant, knocked at
the door, and instead upon the defendant coming out saying that if he did
not he would burn the house. The defendant refused to go out and
thereupon Candelario broke the door down, came in and attacked the
defendant with a cane, throwing him to the ground two or three times. He
defended himself as well as he could and finally seized a bolo and struck
Candelario in the stomach. Immediately after the affair the defendant
presented himself to the authorities of the town, stating that had
happened. It does not appear that Candelario had any other weapon than a
cane.
These facts to our mind constitute a complete
defense.lawphi1.net Candelario committed a crime in entering the house as
he did, the defendant was justified in protecting himself with such weapons
as were at his hand, and if from that defense the death of the aggressor
resulted, that result must be attributed to his own wrongful act and can not
be charged to the defendant.
(The italics do not appear in the original.)
If the defendant in the above case was in danger of death or of great bodily harm, and
that danger was imminent, and if the means employed by him to repel the assault
were reasonably necessary to attain that result, then, how much more perfectly were
these conditions present in the case at bar! If the defendant in the case cited was
entitled legally to be relieved from all criminal liability, upon what subtle distinction,
63
and, above all, upon what principles of justice, shall we found a judgment declaring
guilty the appellant at bar?
While the premises upon which the assault occurred were not, strictly speaking, the
habitation of the defendant, Bumanglag, still as matter of law no substantial distinction
is made between habitation and premises. The Supreme Court of the United States
has held directly (Beard vs. United States, 158 U. S., 550) that for the purpose of self-
defense there is no difference between one's habitation and his premises. In that case
the court said, in part, Mr. Justice Harlan writing (p. 559):
But the court below committed an error of a more serious character when it
told the jury, as in effect it did by different forms of expression, that if the
accused could have saved his own life and avoided taking the life of Will
Jones by retreating from and getting out of the way of the latter as he
advanced upon him, the law made it his duty to do so; and if he did not,
when it was in his power to do so without putting his own life or body in
imminent peril, he was guilty of manslaughter. The court seemed to think if
the deceased had advanced upon the accused while the latter was in his
dwelling house and under such circumstances as indicated the intention of
the former to take life or inflict great bodily injury, and if, without retreating,
the accused had taken the life of his assailant, having at the time
reasonable grounds to believe, and in good faith believing, that his own life
would be taken or great bodily harm done him unless he killed the accused,
the case would have been one of justifiable homicide. To that proposition
we give our entire assent. But we can not agree that the accused was under
any greater obligation, when on his own premises, near his dwelling house,
to retreat or run away from his assailant, than he would have been if
attacked within his dwelling house. The accused being where he had a right
to be, on his own premises, constituting a part of his residence and home, at
the time the deceased approached him in a threatening manner, and not
having by language or by conduct provoked the deceased to assault him,
the question for jury was whether, without fleeing from his adversary, he
had, at the moment he struck the deceased, reasonable grounds to believe,
and in good faith believed, that he could not save his life or protect himself
from great bodily harm except by doing what he did, namely, strike the
deceased with his gun, and thus prevent his further advance upon him.
Even if the jury had been prepared to answer this question in the
affirmative — and if it had been so answered the defendant should have
been acquitted — they were instructed that the accused could not properly
acquitted on the ground of self-defense if they believed that, by retreating
from his adversary, by "getting out of the way," he could have avoided
taking life. We can not give our assent to this doctrine. (Erwin vs. State, 29
Ohio St., 186, 193, 199 Runyan vs. State, 57 Ind., 80, 84; Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1 par. 850; 2 Wharton's Criminal Law, par. 1019, 7th ed.;
Gallargher vs. State, 3 Minn., 270; Pond vs. People, 8 Mich., 150, 177;
State vs. Dixon, 75 N.C., 275, 295; State vs. Sherman, 16 R. I., 631;
Fields vs. State, 32 N. E. Rep., 780; Eversole vs.Commonwealth, 26 S. W.
Rep. 816; Haynes vs. State, 17 Ga., 465, 483; Long vs. State, 52 Miss., 23,
35; Tweedy vs. State, 5 Ia., 433; Baker vs. Commonwealth, 19 S. W. Rep.,
975; Tingle vs. Commonwealth, 11 S. W., 812; 3 Rice's Ev., par. 360.)
In the case of State vs. Cushing (14 Wash., 530), the court lays down the proposition
that a defendant while on his own premises outside of his dwelling house, was there
he had a right to be, and if the deceased advanced upon him in a threatening manner
and the defendant at the time had reasonable grounds to believe, and in good faith did
believe, that the deceased intended to take his life or do him great bodily harm, the
defendant was not obliged to retreat nor to consider whether he could safely retreat,
but was entitled to stand his ground and meet any attack made upon him in such way
and with such force as, under all the circumstances, he at the moment honestly
believed and had reasonable to believe was necessary to save his own life or protect
himself from great bodily harm.
It is also admitted that the defendant, Bumanglag, was defending his property from
one who by surprise and violence was endeavoring to commit a felony against it.
Under such circumstances, if necessary to prevent the felony, he could lawfully kill the
person attempting it. (See 25 Am. & Ency. of Law, 275, above quoted; U.
S. vs.Wiltberger, 28 Fed. Cas., 727, 729; Commonwealth vs. Pipes, 158 Pa. St., 25,
30; Stoneham vs. Commonwealth, 86 Va., 523, 525; Ayers vs. State, 60 Miss., 709,
714; Crawford vs. State, 35 Am. St. Rep., 242; People vs. Stone, 82 Cal., 36, 37, 38.)
It must not be forgotten that the undisputed evidence in the case at bar shows that
Bumanglag, when attacked by deceased, although on his own premises and
defending his own property, did all he could to avoid an encounter, retreating as far as
safety permitted, and interposing between himself and his assailant stalks of sugar
cane to impede the blows aimed at him, at the same time warding off the bolo thrusts
with his bamboo stick.
It appears, therefore, that there was not only an unlawful against the defendant,
Bumanglag, personally, but also that there was a wrongful invasion of his habitation
and an attempt to commit a felony against his property.
It fairly appearing that there was an unlawful aggression, it is evident that the danger
to Bumanglag was imminent and certain. It is difficult to conceive how, with a weapon
in the hands of decedent no more deadly than a bolo, the defendant could have been
in danger more imminent and certain. A notorious desperado (Hood vs. State, 27 So.
Rep., 643) had been caught red-handed in a felony. He was large, powerful
(Stoneham vs. Commonwealth, 86 Va., 523, 525), and vicious. It was dark. So far as
he knew, he was alone with his discoverer. He carried a fighting bolo. His discoverer
had only a bamboo stick. A long term in State prison stared him in the face. There was
one way to avoid it and only one — to kill his discoverer. If Bumanglag escaped, his
arrest and conviction would surely follow. Can any one doubt, under these
circumstances, what such a man do? Bumanglag, as he confronted and recognized
the man with whom he had to deal, realized instantly the imminence and certainty of
his danger; and, assault, Bumanglag knew that, without assistance from appreciated
and realized by his companions when they heard his cries for help. They knew Ribis,
his criminal record, his desperate character, his unusual strength.
64
(People vs. Webster, 139 N. Y. 73; State vs. Martin, 9 Ohio Dec., 778;
State vs. Broussard, 39 La. Ann., 671; State vs.Bowles, 146 Mo., 6; State vs. Knapp,
45 N. H., 148.) They knew he was armed and their companion was not. They knew it
lay with them whether Bumanglag was killed or not. From their viewpoint was not their
participation in the struggle fully justified?
It has been suggested that the means used by the defendants were not reasonably
necessary for the protection of their companion, and that, being so many against one,
they should not have struck the decedent with their clubs, but rather, should have
seized him with their hands, disarmed him and made him prisoner. Among all the
reasons assigned by the prosecution to sustain the conviction in this case this, to my
mind, is the only one that in anywise appeals to reason or judgment. In fact it is the
only ground presented by the Government upon which such conviction can be
sustained, if it can be sustained at all. Still, giving that contention all of the weight
which it justly carries, I yet am entirely lacking in confidence that it is sound under the
circumstances of this case and established law applicable thereto, and is, I believe,
fully and fairly met by the substance of the following observations:
I remember, on occasion, seeing, in the public square in my native town, a large and
powerful American attacked by a diminutive Italian armed with a stiletto. I remember
seeing the American running backward, leaping and dodging frantically to avoid the
vicious thrusts aimed by the pursuing Italian at a vital part. I remember also that at
least a half dozen other Americans were at the rear of the Italian, closely following him
and yelling to him at the top of their voices to desist, but not one daring to grapple with
him to save the person attacked; and it was only when another American, having
rushed into the yard of the hotel and secured a stick of wood, returned to the scene
and gave the Italian from behind a heavy blow over the head with the club, stretching
him senseless, that the assault was terminated.
The question naturally arises, Why did not some one seize the Italian? The answer is,
for the simple reason that a furious and vicious man armed with a dagger and skilled
in its use is an individual dangerous to the very extreme, and the man who seizes him
with his naked hands runs the chances of his life. This is known to all. But, comes the
reply. Why not all seize him at once and thus avoid the danger to one? The
suggestion is simple but the execution is most difficult — in most cases little short of
impossible. On such an occasion the time within which action must be secured is of
the very shortest. Everything is excitement and confusion. Everybody yells and
dreads, but no body thinks. If there happens to be one who does think, he has no
companions in the process. There is, and in the vast majority of cases there can be,
no concert of action. The aid rendered in such cases is almost invariably individual.
In the case at bar, as in the illustration, there was a fierce struggle between two men.
The one was defending his own property on his own premises and performing a
service to society by doing his part to render amenable to the law a desperate and
reckless criminal. The other was an invader, a despoiler, wholly unrestrained by
conscience or deterred by law — an inveterate enemy of society and his kind. He was
armed with a dangerous weapon. He was desperate, vicious, criminal, and powerful,
surprised in an act of felony. It was dark. He was attempting to take the life of his
opponent. It was unknown, and unknowable, when, in that struggle, the fatal blow
would be delivered. It might come at any instant. Ought it fairly to be required as a
matter of law that the defendants, rushing forward to assist their companion, should,
under these circumstances, attempt the seizure of this powerful and desperate man
with their naked hands, in the dark, without the ability, be reason of the conditions, to
see the weapon and the manner in which it was being used? Would not such a
requirement put them in great danger of being themselves seriously wounded, even if
it did not add to the danger of their companion? It is the unquestioned law, and it be
rigorously enforced, that life can not be taken except in necessity, but it is as
unquestioned that he who in danger of his life from an assault, as well as the one who
comes to his assistance, is not required to do anything which will increase his danger
or enhance the opportunity of the aggressor to accomplish his end. (U. S. vs. Mack, 8
Phil. Rep., 701; U. S. vs. Paras, 9 Phil. Rep., 367; supreme court of Spain, 25
September, 1875; U. S. vs. Herbert, 26 Fed. Cas., No. 15354a; State vs. Robertson,
50 La. Ann., 92; 25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of L., 273.) Moreover if the life of Bumanglag
was to be saved at all, the aggressor must be dealt with quickly and summarily.
Events were unrolling rapidly. There was a life in danger, every instant becoming more
imminent. There was no time to think; no time for deliberate, careful judgment and
nice precision; no opportunity to devise means or lay plans. Under such
circumstances the law does not hold men to the standards of careful thought and calm
judgment. (Allen vs. U. S., 150 U. S., 551; State vs. West, 45 La. Ann., 14, 23;
Brownell vs. People, 38 Mich., 732; supreme court of Spain, 7 December, 1886;
Viada, Penal Code, vol. 1, 157-160.)
In order to make perfectly available the defense that they were rightfully defending
Bumanglag, and that the means they employed were reasonably necessary, it is not
essential that there should be absolute and positive danger to the person whose
protection is attempted. If there is a wellgrounded and reasonable belief that the
person is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, an attempt to defend him
by means which appear reasonably necessary is justifiable. The reasonable
appearance is the important thing. (Shorter vs. People, 2 N. Y., 193, 197;
Brown vs. Com., 86 Va., 466; Logue vs. Com., 38 Pa. St., 265; Murray vs. Com., 79
Pa. St., 311, 317; Pond vs.People, 8 Mich., 149, 150; Hurd vs. People, 25 Mich., 404,
405; People vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207; People vs. Herbert, 61 Cal., 544;
Campbell vs. People, 16 III., 17; Enlow vs. State, 154 Ind., 664; Hubbard vs. State, 37
Fla., 156; Alvarez vs. State, 37 Fla., 156; Oliver vs. State, 17 Ala., 587;
Stewart vs. State, 1 Ohio St., 66, 71; 25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 262, 263; U.
S. vs. Paras, 9 Phil. Rep., 367.)
In deciding this case we must, therefore, under the law, put ourselves in the position of
the defendants at the time of the event. It is from their point of view that they are to be
judged.
If they honestly believed, and had apparently reasonable grounds for that belief, that
the life of their companion was in imminent danger or that he was likely to suffer great
bodily harm, and that the means which they used to protect him were reasonably
necessary to that end, they can not be convicted. (Viada, Penal Code, vol. 1, 98;
People vs.Bruggy, 93 Cal., 476; Harris vs. State, 96 Ala., 24; U. S. vs. Outerbridge, 5
Sawy, (U. S. Circ.), 620.) I am convinced that the facts and circumstances of this case
65
were sufficient to induce and support the belief in the minds of the defendants that
their companion's life was in imminent danger and that the means which they
employed were reasonably necessary to secure his protection. (Supreme court of
Spain, 2 January, 1873; 5 April, 1873; 30 April, 1874; 31 May, 1879; 17 March, 1885;
26 November, 1886; 26 November, 1886; 2 March, 1888; 4 April, 1889; 5 July, 1890;
6 December, 1890; 30 December, 1890; 11 February, 1896; 9 December, 1896; 24
May, 1898; 28 May, 1889; 10 December, 1898; 15 November, 1899; 9 January, 1900;
1 June, 1901; 16 April, 1902; 3 January, 1903; 14 January, 1903; 20 March, 1903;
July, 1909; 26 October, 1904; 17 November, 1904; 20 October, 1904; 29 October,
1904; 8 March, 1905.) In other words, it would seem under all the circumstances, that
it can not fairly be charged that the defendants, particularly the appellant, acted
otherwise than as reasonable men would have acted in the same situation; and after
all this is the real test. (Allen vs. U. S., 150 U. S., 551; Hickory vs. U. S., 151 U. S.,
303; Christian vs. State, 96 Ala., 89; People vs. Hurley, 8 Cal., 390;
Gainey vs. People, 97 III., 270; State vs. West, 45 La. Ann., 14.)
While most of the authorities above cited refer to self-defense only, the principles they
enunciate are fully applicable to the case at bar, because, generally speaking, what
one may do in his own defense another may do for him. (25 Am. & Ency. of Law, 274,
and cases there cited.)
Under the circumstances of this case I can not feel that the fair and impartial
administration of justice requires that we should refine doctrines, draw uncertain
distinctions, invoke doubtful presumptions, employ fine analyses, or seize upon
equivocal circumstances for the purpose of the convicting the appellant of homicide, of
for the purpose of establishing a doctrine which may have as a result that a criminal,
invading his neighbor's premises feloniously and in the nighttime for the purpose of
robbery, and surprised and taken in his wanton act, may feel that he is in any way or
to degree privileged under the law when, in attempting to make his outrage against
man and society secure from detention and punishment, he seeks by every means in
his power to destroy the life of his discover. Every man ought to lend his hand in
assisting society to apprehend and punish offenders against its institutions and laws,
and while the wanton or illegal destruction of human life, under the guise of such
assistance, ought to be promptly, vigorously, and unrelentingly punished, still, where
such person, acting in the honest belief that he is saving the life of one who is
viciously attacked by a criminal whose recognition or apprehension is attempted, in
the defense of such person, causes the death of the criminal, the court ought not to be
drawn from its usual, even and steady course in order to provide a punishment.
(Supreme court of Spain, 5 February, 1887; Viada, Penal Code, vol. 1, 160, 161.)
This court has gone very far in the direction of liberality in lying down the principles
governing the defense of self-defense and the means that may be legally employed to
make that defense effective — very much further, indeed, than it is necessary to go
absolved the appellant in the case at bar. In the case of United States vs. Patala (2
Phil. Rep., 752), the court says, page 756:
It appears from the testimony of the defendant that at the time of the
occurrence he was cleaning fish on board the steamship Compañía de
Filipinas; that without any provocation on his part the deceased, who was
the cock of the boat, believing that some of the fish was missing, slapped
him and kicked him; that no being satisfied with this, when the defendant
started to run away from him, the deceased pursued him and attacked him
with a knife; that the defendant, taking advantage of some favorable chance
during the struggle, succeeded in wresting the knife from the deceased and
inflicted upon him a wound in the left side, from the result of which he died a
few hours later.
. . . The aggression on the part of the deceased was in every respect
unjustified, and the defendant had a perfect right to repel the attack in the
most adequate from within his power under the critical circumstances of a
sudden assault.
. . . He had reason to believe that he was placed in the alternative of killing
or being killed when he was being attacked and pursued with a deadly
weapon. This was the only weapon used during the struggle and it
necessary had to be either in his possession or in the hands of the
deceased. If through a fortunate accident he came into possession of the
knife, he could have lost control of it through a similar accident and then
found himself at the mercy of his assailant. Therefore the act of the
defendant rendering his assailant powerless as well as he could under the
critical circumstances of the moment, and repelling his aggression,
constitute, in our opinion, a true case of self-defense, which exempts the
defendant from any criminal liability under paragraph 4 of articles 8 of the
Penal Code.
The same doctrine is laid down in the similar case of the United States vs.
Salandanan (1 Phil. Rep., 478). (See also U. S., vs. Brello, 9 Phil. Rep., 424; U.
S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. Rep., 517; U. S. vs. Bailon, 9 Phil. Rep., 161.)
There is neither claim nor evidence that any of the defendants were actuated in their
defense of Bumanglag by revenge, resentment, or other illegal motive, and from this
point of view the case requires no discussion.
As to the question of reasonable doubt.
In discussing the questions of burden of proof and reasonable doubt in
cases involving self-defense, the courts have stated various confusing and
apparently contradictory propositions, but the general rule deducible from
the authorities seems to be that when the prosecution has made a prima
facie case against the accused, it is for him to introduce evidence showing
self-defense, if he sets up the plea; but that if upon the whole testimony,
both on the part of the State and the accused, the jury has a reasonable
doubt whether he acted in self-defense or not, he is entitled to the benefit of
the doubt and to an acquittal. (25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 283.)
66
The doctrine above stated is fully supported by the authorities. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
In the case of Lillinienthal vs. United States (97 U. S., 237, 266), the court said:

EN BANC
In criminal cases the true rule is that the burden of proof never shifts; that, in
all cases, before a conviction can be had, the jury must be satisfied from the
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the affirmative of the issue G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983
presented in the accusation, that the defendant is guilty in the manner and
form as charged in the indictment. . . . Where the matter of excuse or
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
justification of the offense charged grows out of the original transaction, the
vs.
defense is not driven to the necessity of establishing the matter in excuse or
MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant.
justification by a preponderance of the evidence, and much less beyond a
reasonable doubt. If, upon a consideration of all the evidence, there be a
reasonable doubt of guilt of the party, the jury are to give him the benefit of The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
such doubt.
Gonzalo B. Callanta (counsel de oficio) for defendant-appellant.
To the same effect are Tweedy vs. State (5 Iowa, 433); Wharton's Criminal Evidence,
p. 236; Tiffany vs.Commonwealth (121 Pa. St., 165); People vs. Coughin (65 Mich.,
704).

The section casts upon the defendant that burden of proving circumstances
of mitigation, or that justify or excuse the commission of the homicide. This
does not mean that he must prove such circumstances by a preponderance
of the evidence, but that the presumption that the killing was felonious
arises from the mere proof by the prosecution of the homicide, and the
burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, etc., is thereby cast upon
him. He is only bound under this rule to produce such evidence as will
create in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of his guilt of the offense
charged." (People vs. Flanagan, 60 Cal., 3; 44 Am. Rep., 52;
People vs. Smith, 59 Cal., 607.) "It can make no difference whether this
reasonable doubt is the result of evidence on the part of the defendant
tending show circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or excuse the
killing, or from other evidence coming from him or the prosecution. The well-
settled rule that a defendant shall not be convicted unless the evidence
proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the whole and every
material part of the case, no matter whether it is as to the act of killing, or
the reason for a manner of its commission. (People vs. Bushton, 80 Cal.,
160, 164; Alexander vs. People, 96 III., 96; People vs. Riodan, 117 N. Y.,
71.)
Reading the evidence in this case in the light of reason and of the principles
enunciated by the courts, I can not but feel that, under all the circumstances, there is a
strong doubt of appellant's legal responsibility for the crime charged. In my opinion,
therefore, the judgment of the court below should be reversed and the appellant
acquitted.
Carson, J., concurs.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato,
Branch I, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1815 and 1816 for murder which, after a joint trial,
resulted in the conviction of the accused in a decision rendered on September 8,
1970, with the following pronouncement:
Thus, we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation offset by
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The proper
penalty imposable, therefore, is RECLUSION PERPETUA (Arts.
248 and 64, Revised Penal Code).
Accordingly, finding Mamerto Narvaez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder,
(a) In Criminal Case No. 1815, he is hereby sentenced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Davis Q. Fleischer in the sum of P 12,000.00 as compensatory
damages, P 10,000.00 as moral damages, P 2,000.00 as
attorney's fees, the offended party having been represented by a
private prosecutor, and to pay the costs;
(b) In Criminal Case No. 1816, he is hereby sentenced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Flaviano Rubia in the sum of P12,000.00 as compensatory

67
 damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees, the offended party having been represent by a
private prosecutor, and to pay the costs (p. 48, rec.).
The facts are summarized in the People's brief, as follows:
At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan,
Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez together with the two deceased
Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of
George Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place
was in the boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by
George Fleischer. This is located in the municipality of Maitum,
South Cotabato. At the place of the fencing is the house and rice
drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez (pp. 179-182, t.s.n., Pieza II).
At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that
the walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he
saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant
would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of
his ricemill. So he addressed the group, saying 'Pare, if possible
you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over
what is good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's
compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: 'No,
gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his
equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As
Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing
there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting
him (pp. 127-133, t.s.n., Defense transcript). Both Fleischer and
Rubia died as a result of the shotting' (pp. 9-14, t.s.n., Pieza I, pp.
8-9, Appellant's Brief, p.161, rec.).
It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal
battle between the Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which deceased Fleischer was the
secretary-treasurer and deceased Rubia the assistant manager, on the one hand, and
the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom was appellant.
From the available records of the related cases which had been brought to the Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 28858-R and 50583-R) and to this Court on certiorari (G.R.
No. L-26757 and L-45504), WE take judicial notice of the following antecedent facts:
Appellant was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went to
Mindanao in 1937 and settled in Maitum, a former sitio of Kiamba and now a separate
municipality of South Cotabato. He established his residence therein, built his house,
cultivated the area, and was among those who petitioned then President Manuel L.
Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation and nearby
Kalaong Plantation totalling about 2,000 hectares, for distribution among the settlers.
Shortly thereafter, Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an
American landowner in Negros Oriental, filed sales application No. 21983 on June 3,
1937 over the same area formerly leased and later abandoned by Celebes Plantation
Company, covering 1,017.2234 hectares.
Meanwhile, the subdivision was ordered and a public land surveyor did the actual
survey in 1941 but the survey report was not submitted until 1946 because of the
outbreak of the second world war. According to the survey, only 300 hectares
Identified as Lots Nos. 22, 26 and 38, Ps. 176 Kiamba, were set aside for Sales
Application No. 21983, while the rest were subdivided into sublots of 5 to 6 hectares
each to be distributed among the settlers (pp. 32-33, G.R. No. L-45504).
The 300 hectares set aside for the sales application of Fleischer and Company was
declared open for disposition, appraised and advertised for public auction. At the
public auction held in Manila on August 14, 1948, Fleischer and Company was the
only bidder for P6,000.00. But because of protests from the settlers the corresponding
award in its favor was held in abeyance, while an investigator was sent by the Director
of Lands to Kiamba in the person of Atty. Jose T. Gozon Atty. Gozon came back after
ten days with an amicable settlement signed by the representative of the settlers. This
amicable settlement was later repudiated by the settlers, but the Director of Lands,
acting upon the report of Atty. Gozon, approved the same and ordered the formal
award of the land in question to Fleischer and Company. The settlers appealed to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who, however, affirmed the decision
in favor of the company.
On May 29, 1950, the settlers filed Civil Case No. 240 in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato which then consisted only of one sala, for the purpose of annulling the order
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which affirmed the order of the
Director of Lands awarding the contested land to the company. The settlers as
plaintiffs, lost that case in view of the amicable settlement which they had repudiated
as resulting from threats and intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation and fraudulent
machination on the part of the company. They appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-
G.R. No. 28858-R) which likewise affirmed on August 16, 1965 the decision of the
Court of First Instance in favor of the company.
This resulted in the ouster of the settlers by an order of the Court of First Instance
dated September 24, 1966, from the land which they had been occupying for about 30
years. Among those ejected was the appellant who, to avoid trouble, voluntarily
dismantled his house, built in 1947 at a cost of around P20,000.00, and transferred to
his other house which he built in 1962 or 1963 near the highway. The second house is
not far from the site of the dismantled house. Its ground floor has a store operated by
Mrs. June Talens who was renting a portion thereof. He also transferred his store from
his former residence to the house near the highway. Aside from the store, he also had
a rice mill located about 15 meters east of the house and a concrete pavement
between the rice mill and the house, which is used for drying grains and copra.
On November 14, 1966, appellant was among the settlers on whose behalf Jose V.
Gamboa and other leaders filed Civil Case No. 755 in the Court of First Instance of
68
Cotabato, Branch I. to obtain an injunction or annulment of the order of award with
prayer for preliminary injunction. During the pendency of this case, appellant on
February 21, 1967 entered into a contract of lease with the company whereby he
agreed to lease an area of approximately 100 to 140 square meters of Lot No. 38 from
the company (Exh. 9, p. 1, Folder of Exhibits for Defense) for a consideration of
P16.00 monthly. According to him, he signed the contract although the ownership of
the land was still uncertain, in order to avoid trouble, until the question of ownership
could be decided. He never paid the agreed rental, although he alleges that the milling
job they did for Rubia was considered payment. On June 25, 1968, deceased
Fleischer wrote him a letter with the following tenor:
You have not paid six months rental to Fleischers & Co., Inc. for
that portion of land in which your house and ricemill are located
as per agreement executed on February 21, 1967. You have not
paid as as even after repeated attempts of collection made by Mr.
Flaviano Rubia and myself.
In view of the obvious fact that you do not comply with the
agreement, I have no alternative but to terminate our agreement
on this date.
I am giving you six months to remove your house, ricemill,
bodega, and water pitcher pumps from the land of Fleischers &
Co., Inc. This six- month period shall expire on December 31,
1966.
In the event the above constructions have not been removed
within the six- month period, the company shall cause their
immediate demolition (Exhibit 10, p. 2, supra).
On August 21, 1968, both deceased, together with their laborers, commenced fencing
Lot 38 by putting bamboo posts along the property line parallel to the highway. Some
posts were planted right on the concrete drier of appellant, thereby cutting diagonally
across its center (pp. 227-228, t.s.n., Vol. 2), with the last post just adjacent to
appellant's house (p. 231, t.s.n., supra). The fence, when finished, would have the
effect of shutting off the accessibility to appellant's house and rice mill from the
highway, since the door of the same opens to the Fleischers' side. The fencing
continued on that fateful day of August 22, 1968, with the installation of four strands of
barbed wire to the posts.
At about 2:30 p.m. on the said day, appellant who was taking a nap after working on
his farm all morning, was awakened by some noise as if the wall of his house was
being chiselled. Getting up and looking out of the window, he found that one of the
laborers of Fleischer was indeed chiselling the wall of his house with a crowbar (p.
129, t.s.n., Vol. 6), while deceased Rubia was nailing the barbed wire and deceased
Fleischer was commanding his laborers. The jeep used by the deceased was parked
on the highway. The rest of the incident is narrated in the People's Brief as above-
quoted. Appellant surrendered to the police thereafter, bringing with him shotgun No.
1119576 and claiming he shot two persons (Exh. Pp. 31, Defense Exhibits).
Appellant now questions the propriety of his conviction, assigning the following errors:
First Assignment of Error: That the lower court erred in convicting
defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of
his person; and
Second Assignment of Error: That the court a quo also erred in
convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defense of
his rights (p. 20 of Appellant's Brief, p. 145, rec.).
The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not disputed. Appellant admitted
having shot them from the window of his house with the shotgun which he
surrendered to the police authorities. He claims, however, that he did so in defense of
his person and of his rights, and therefore he should be exempt from criminal liability.
Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art. 11,
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, but in order for it to be appreciated, the following
requisites must occur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself (Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as
amended).
The aggression referred to by appellant is the angry utterance by deceased Fleischer
of the following words: "Hindi, sigue, gademit, avante", in answer to his request
addressed to his compadre, the deceased Rubia, when he said, "Pare, hinto mona
ninyo at pag-usapan natin kung ano ang mabuti" (pp. 227-229, t.s.n., Vol. 6). This was
in reaction to his having been awakened to see the wall of his house being chiselled.
The verbal exchange took place while the two deceased were on the ground doing the
fencing and the appellant was up in his house looking out of his window (pp. 225-
227, supra). According to appellant, Fleischer's remarks caused this reaction in him:
"As if, I lost my senses and unknowingly I took the gun on the bed and unknowingly
also I shot Mr. Fleischer, without realizing it, I shot Mr. Fleischer" (p. 132, supra). As
for the shooting of Rubia, appellant testified:
When I shot Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia was nailing and
upon hearing the shot, Mr. Rubia looked at Mr. Fleischer and
69
 when Mr. Fleischer fell down, Mr. Rubia ran towards the jeep and
knowing that there was a firearm in the jeep and thinking that if he
will take that firearm he will kill me, I shot at him (p. 132, supra,
Emphasis supplied).
The foregoing statements of appellant were never controverted by the prosecution.
They claim, however, that the deceased were in lawful exercise of their rights of
ownership over the land in question, when they did the fencing that sealed off
appellant's access to the highway.
A review of the circumstances prior to the shooting as borne by the evidence reveals
that five persons, consisting of the deceased and their three laborers, were doing the
fencing and chiselling of the walls of appellant's house. The fence they were putting
up was made of bamboo posts to which were being nailed strands of barbed wire in
several layers. Obviously, they were using tools which could be lethal weapons, such
as nail and hammer, bolo or bamboo cutter, pliers, crowbar, and other necessary
gadgets. Besides, it was not disputed that the jeep which they used in going to the
place was parked just a few steps away, and in it there was a gun leaning near the
steering wheel. When the appellant woke up to the sound of the chiselling on his
walls, his first reaction was to look out of the window. Then he saw the damage being
done to his house, compounded by the fact that his house and rice mill will be shut off
from the highway by the fence once it is finished. He therefore appealed to
his compadre, the deceased Rubia, to stop what they were doing and to talk things
over with him. But deceased Fleischer answered angrily with 'gademit' and directed
his men to proceed with what they were doing.
The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the fencing
would have resulted in the further chiselling of the walls of appellant's house as well
as the closure of the access to and from his house and rice mill-which were not only
imminent but were actually in progress. There is no question, therefore, that there was
aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and Rubia was actually
participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of
appellant, but on his property rights.
The question is, was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right to
fence off the contested property, to destroy appellant's house and to shut off his
ingress and egress to his residence and the highway?
Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence his
land or tenements.
However, at the time of the incident on August 22, 1968, Civil Case no. 755 for
annulment of the order of award to Fleischer and Company was still pending in the
Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The parties could not have known that the case
would be dismissed over a year after the incident on August 22, 1968, as it was
dismissed on January 23, 1970 on ground of res judicata, in view of the dismissal in
1965 (by the Court of Appeals) of Civil Case No. 240 filed in 1950 for the annulment of
the award to the company, between the same parties, which the company won by
virtue of the compromise agreement in spite of the subsequent repudiation by the
settlers of said compromise agreement; and that such 1970 dismissal also carried the
dismissal of the supplemental petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on
November 28, 1968 to annul the sales patent and to cancel the corresponding
certificate of title issued to the company, on the ground that the Director of Lands had
no authority to conduct the sale due to his failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements for publication. The dismissal of the government's supplemental petition
was premised on the ground that after its filing on November 28, 1968, nothing more
was done by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines except to adopt all the evidence
and arguments of plaintiffs with whom it joined as parties-plaintiffs.
Hence, it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed hoping for a favorable
judgment in Civil Case No. 755 filed on November 14, 1966 and his execution of the
contract of lease on February 21, 1967 was just to avoid trouble. This was explained
by him during cross-examination on January 21, 1970, thus:
It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. that we better
rent the place because even though we do not know who really
owns this portion to avoid trouble. To avoid trouble we better pay
while waiting for the case because at that time, it was not known
who is the right owner of the place. So we decided until things will
clear up and determine who is really the owner, we decided to
pay rentals (p. 169, t.s.n., Vol.6).
In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 (Exh.10, p. 2, Defense
Exhibits) within which to vacate the land. He should have allowed appellant the
peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of chiselling the walls of
his house and closing appellant's entrance and exit to the highway.
The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point:
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto.
He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive
another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the
competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be
protected in or restored to said possession by the means
established by the laws and the Rules of Court (Articles 536 and
539, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or
cause damage to appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while
he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. The assault on
70
appellant's property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated by
law.
Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened
assault of immediate and imminent kind (People vs.
Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522).
In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property which
he had the right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For
this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property (Emphasis
supplied).
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article
11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing
his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
WE find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of appellant who was defending his property. As a
matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first
and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers. His
plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no
provocation at all.
Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not
all the elements for justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible
for the death of his victims, but he could be credited with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The qualifying circumstance of
treachery cannot be appreciated in this case because of the presence of provocation
on the part of the deceased. As WE held earlier in People vs. Manlapaz (55 SCRA
598), the element of a sudden unprovoked attack is therefore lacking.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, "it must clearly appear that the method of
assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a special view to the
accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that the party
assailed might have made. This cannot be said of a situation where the slayer acted
instantaneously ..." (People vs. Cañete, 44 Phil. 481).
WE likewise find the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident premeditation
not sufficiently established. The only evidence presented to prove this circumstance
was the testimony of Crisanto Ibañez, 37 years old, married, resident of Maitum,
South Cotabato, and a laborer of Fleischer and Company, which may be summarized
as follows:
On August 20, 1968 (two days before the incident) at about 7:00
A.M., he was drying corn near the house of Mr. and Mrs. Mamerto
Narvaez at the crossing, Maitum, South Cotabato, when the
accused and his wife talked to him. Mrs. Narvaez asked him to
help them, as he was working in the hacienda. She further told
him that if they fenced their house, there is a head that will be
broken. Mamerto Narvaez added 'Noy, it is better that you will tell
Mr. Fleischer because there will be nobody who will break his
head but I will be the one.' He relayed this to Mr. Flaviano Rubia,
but the latter told him not to believe as they were only Idle threats
designed to get him out of the hacienda (pp. 297-303, t.s.n., Vol.
2).
This single evidence is not sufficient to warrant appreciation of the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. As WE have consistently held, there must be
"direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victim, .... it is not enough that
premeditation be suspected or surmised, but the criminal intent must be evidenced by
notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the crime" (People vs.
Ordioles, 42 SCRA 238). Besides, there must be a "showing" that the accused
premeditated the killing; that the culprit clung to their (his) premeditated act; and that
there was sufficient interval between the premeditation and the execution of the crime
to allow them (him) to reflect upon the consequences of the act" (People vs. Gida, 102
SCRA 70).
Moreover, the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibañez, as a laborer of the deceased
Davis Fleischer, neutralizes his credibility.
Since in the case at bar, there was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation to
kill the victims nor that the accused premeditated the killing, and clung to his
premeditated act, the trial court's conclusion as to the presence of such circumstance
may not be endorsed.
Evident premeditation is further negated by appellant pleading with the victims to stop
the fencing and destroying his house and to talk things over just before the shooting.
But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, it appearing that appellant surrendered to the
authorities soon after the shooting.
Likewise, We find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime.
The appellant awoke to find his house being damaged and its accessibility to the
71
highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being closed. Not only was his house being landowners, were the ones prejudiced. Thus, the moral and material suffering of
unlawfully violated; his business was also in danger of closing down for lack of access appellant and his family deserves leniency as to his civil liability.
to the highway. These circumstances, coming so near to the time when his first house
was dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house, must have so
Furthermore, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code requires a person convicted
aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason causing him to reach
of prision correccional or arrests mayor and fine who has no property with which to
for his shotgun and fire at the victims in defense of his rights. Considering the
meet his civil liabilities to serve a subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one (1) day for
antecedent facts of this case, where appellant had thirty years earlier migrated to this
each P 2.50. However, the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 5465 on April
so-called "land of promise" with dreams and hopes of relative prosperity and
21, 1969 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation
tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at the hands of the deceased, his
of the damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of
dispassionate plea going unheeded-all these could be too much for any man-he
proceedings. Considering that Republic Act 5465 is favorable to the accused who is
should be credited with this mitigating circumstance.
not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not being
attended by any qualifying nor aggravating circumstance, but extenuated by the
WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense-in view of the presence of
ONLY TWO (2) HOMICIDES, MITIGATED BY THE PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING
unlawful aggression on the part of the victims and lack of sufficient provocation on the
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS WELL AS BY TWO (2)
part of the appellant-and by two generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary
GENERIC MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND
surrender and passion and obfuscation.
OBFUSCATION, WITHOUT ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, APPELLANT
IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF FOUR (4)
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR, TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF HEIRS OF
as reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 69, supra, the penalty lower by one or two DAVIS FLEISCHER AND OF FLAVIANO RUBIA IN THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND
degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of (P 4,000.00) PESOS, WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT
some of the conditions required to justify the same. Considering that the majority of ANY AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
the requirements for defense of property are present, the penalty may be lowered by
two degrees, i.e., to prision correccional And under paragraph 5 of Article 64, the
CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR ALMOST
same may further be reduced by one degree, i.e., arresto mayor, because of the
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS NOW SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON
presence of two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance.
AUGUST 22,1968, HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED. NO COSTS.

The civil liability of the appellant should be modified. In the case of Zulueta vs. Pan
SO ORDERED.
American World Airways (43 SCRA 397), the award for moral damages was reduced
because the plaintiff contributed to the gravity of defendant's reaction. In the case at
bar, the victims not only contributed but they actually provoked the attack by damaging Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera,
appellant's properties and business. Considering appellant's standing in the Escolin Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.
community, being married to a municipal councilor, the victims' actuations were
apparently designed to humiliate him and destroy his reputation. The records disclose
that his wife, councilor Feliza Narvaez, was also charged in these two cases and Aquino, J., is on leave.
detained without bail despite the absence of evidence linking her to the killings. She
was dropped as a defendant only upon motion of the prosecution dated October 31, Plana, J., in the result.
1968. (p. 14, CFI rec. of Crim. Case No. 1816), but acted upon on November 4, 1968
(p. 58, CFI rec. of Criminal Case No. 1815).
Separate Opinions

Moreover, these cases arose out of an inordinate desire on the part of Fleischer and
Company, despite its extensive landholdings in a Central Visayan province, to extend ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
its accumulation of public lands to the resettlement areas of Cotabato. Since it had the
capability-financial and otherwise-to carry out its land accumulation scheme, the lowly I dissent. The self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers to unlawful aggression
settlers, who uprooted their families from their native soil in Luzon to take advantage on persons, not property Plana, J., in the result.
of the government's resettlement program, but had no sufficient means to fight the big
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

72
While I agree with the order to release the appellant, I am constrained to dissent in
part. It is true that Art. 429, Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that the owner or
legal possessor of a thing may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property. It seems to me, however, that an attack on the person defending his property
is an indispensable element where an accused pleads self-defense but what is
basically defended is only property.
Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and defense of
property can only be invoked when it is coupled with some form of attack on the
person of one entrusted with said property. The defense of property, whether
complete or incomplete, to be available in prosecutions for murder or homicide must
be coupled with an attack by the one getting the property on the person defending it.
In the case now before Us, there is absolutely no evidence that an attack was
attempted, much less made upon the person of appellant. The mere utterance "No,
gademit proceed, go ahead" is not the unlawful aggression which entitles appellant to
the pela of self-defense. I agree with the majority opinion that the crime is homicide
but without any privileged mitigating circumstance.
Therefore, since the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) homicides,
mitigated by the two generic mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
obfuscation, without any aggravating circumstance, maximum the sentence the
appellant should have served was prision mayor plus the indemnification to each
group of heirs of Davis Fleischer and of Flamiano Rubia of the sum of Four Thousand
(P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment, but without any award for moral
damages and attorney's fees.
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property. It seems to me, however, that an attack on the person defending his property
is an indispensable element where an accused pleads self-defense but what is
basically defended is only property.
Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and defense of
property can only be invoked when it is coupled with some form of attack on the
person of one entrusted with said property. The defense of property, whether
complete or incomplete, to be available in prosecutions for murder or homicide must
be coupled with an attack by the one getting the property on the person defending it.
In the case now before Us, there is absolutely no evidence that an attack was
attempted, much less made upon the person of appellant. The mere utterance "No,
gademit proceed, go ahead" is not the unlawful aggression which entitles appellant to
the pela of self-defense. I agree with the majority opinion that the crime is homicide
but without any privileged mitigating circumstance.
Therefore, since the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) homicides,
mitigated by the two generic mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
obfuscation, without any aggravating circumstance, maximum the sentence the
appellant should have served was prision mayor plus the indemnification to each
group of heirs of Davis Fleischer and of Flamiano Rubia of the sum of Four Thousand
(P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment, but without any award for moral
damages and attorney's fees.
Considering that appellant has been under detention for almost fourteen (14) years
now since August 22, 1968, he has served the penalty and should be released.

Considering that appellant has been under detention for almost fourteen (14) years
now since August 22, 1968, he has served the penalty and should be released.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers to unlawful aggression
on persons, not property Plana, J., in the result.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

While I agree with the order to release the appellant, I am constrained to dissent in
part. It is true that Art. 429, Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that the owner or
legal possessor of a thing may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to

73
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5749 October 21, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PONCIANO ESMEDIA and MENA ESMEDIA, defendants-appellants.
W. L. Wright, for appellants.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal from a sentence rendered by the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Antique, condemning Ponciano Esmedia and Mena Esmedia to twelve
years and one day of reclusion temporal, to jointly and severally pay to the heirs of
Ciriaco Abando the sum of P1,000, to the heirs of Santiago Abando the sum of
P1,000, and to pay the costs of the cause, for the crime of double homicide.
Ciriaco Abando, his wife, and their son, Santiago, lived in the jurisdiction of the
municipality of Sibalom, in the barrio of Bongboñgan, Province of Antique. Gregorio
Esmedia, father of these two accused, son-in-law of Ciriaco Abando and brother-in-
law of Santiago Abando, lived in the same barrio. These tow families lived very near to
each other and owned adjoining rice lands. Before this trouble occurred there had
been a dispute between these two families relative to the ownership of the rice land
then occupied by Ciriaco Abando. About 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 24th of
June, 1909, Ciriaco Abando instructed his son, Santiago, to go to a certain place in his
rice field to let out the water in order that they could plant rice the said field. In
compliance with these instructions of his father, Santiago proceeded to the place
designated, and while at work doing what he had been ordered by his father to do,
Gregorio Esmedia appeared on the scene and started a quarrel with Santiago. Soon
thereafter Gregorio drew a dagger and stabbed Santiago in the back. Santiago fell to
the ground, but arose immediately and attacked Gregorio with his bolo, inflicting
several wounds on the said Gregorio in consequence of which he fell to the ground.
Before this trouble finally terminated the two accused and Ciriaco Abando appeared in
that immediate vicinity.
These two accused contend that they were working in their rice field near by, and on
seeing Ciriaco Abando and Santiago Abando attacking their father, Gregorio, they
started to the place to render their father assistance, Ponciano starting first; that when
Ponciano got near the place of the trouble he was met by Ciriaco and Santiago who
attacked him with bolos and clubs and that he, Ponciano, in self-defense, knocked
them both down, and after they had fallen the other accused, Mena Esmedia, arrived.
Ponciano further contends that he did not use a bolo in this fight, but used a club only.
The prosecution in the court below contended that when these two accused saw the
fight between their father and Santiago they rushed to the place and proceeded to kill,
as they thought, Santiago, and on seeing Ciriaco approaching they met him and killed
him outright.
As a result of this fight Ciriaco was left dead on the scene, Gregorio received fatal
wounds from which he died within about four hours, and Santiago also received fatal
wounds from which he died five days later.
Ciriaco Abando received two wounds on the top of his head, one 8 centimeters and
the other 3 centimeters in length, caused by some cutting instrument, and also
sustained a fracture of the skull, apparently caused be means of a blow. He also had a
wound on the head 3 centimeters in depth; another on the neck below the left ear 3 ½
centimeters in depth and 3 centimeters in lenght; the left eye was bruised and he also
had a wound on the palm of the right hand 3 centimeters in length and 2 millimeters in
depth.
Santiago Abando received in all seven wounds, one crosswise of the head, back of
the left ear, 8 centimeters in lenght and 1 centimeter in depth, another on top of the
head, just above the first wound, 5 centimeters in length and a half centimeter in
depth, a third wound on the left part of the neck 4 centimeters in length, all of these
three wounds having been caused by a cutting instrument; a fourth wound, also
caused by some sharp instrument, 1 centimeter in depth and 8 centimeters in length,
on the top of the head; a fifth wound, 2 ½ centimeters in length and 5 millimeters in
depth, which was in the nature of a contusion, appeared on the frontal region of the
head; a sixth wound, 2 centimeters in length and 3 ½ centimeters deep, in the back;
and a seventh wound on the left hand, 4 centimeters in length, 2 ½ centimeters wide,
and 2 millimeters in depth, which had apparently been caused by some cutting
instrument.
The body of Gregorio Esmedia showed four wounds; a wound or bruise on the front of
the head, 5 by 6 centimeters in dimension; another wound, caused by a cutting
instrument, running across the head, 6 centimeters in lenght; another wound,
apparently caused by a blow with some blunt instrument, on the breast; and another
wound 1 centimeter in depth, apparently caused by a cutting instrument, and also a
bruise on the left arm.
The accused Ponciano Esmedia, received one wound on the head, but it was not of
serious nature; the other accused, Mena Esmedia, escaped uninjured. 1awphil.net
74
The prosecution presented Andrea Lactoson, 60 years of age, wife of the deceased
Ciriaco, and Julian Alagos, a young boy about 16 years of age, a grandson of Ciriaco.
These two witnesses saw the fight and gave a detailed account of the same. While it
is true that these two witnesses contradicted themselves to some extent on cross-
examination, they having testified on direct examination that Ciriaco never did reach
the scene of the fight but was killed by the two accused while on his way there,
whereas on cross-examination they testified that Ciriaco was therewhen the accused
arrived, yet it is clear that they intended to say that when the two accused arrived
Ciriaco was in that vicinity but they did not mean to say that he was at the very side of
his son.
The theory of the defense that Ponciano was attacked by Ciriaco and Santiago is
untenable, as the nature and character of the wounds on the bodies of these two
persons show clearly that at least some of them were inflicted by bolos, and Ponciano
must have used a bolo in the fight, though he contends that he only made use of a
club. The bolo wounds on the heads of Gregorio and Santiago were of such a serious
nature that it would have been impossible for them to have gone any distance after
having been wounded. So they could not have rushed toward Ponciano and attacked
him after having received these wounds. Santiago was stabbed in the back by
Gregorio, but this wound of itself was not necessarily fatal.
After a careful consideration of this entire record we are thoroughly satisfied that the
following facts, aside from those we have already related, have been
established:1awphil.net
The two accused arrived on the scene about the time the fight between Santiago and
Gregorio was terminating, and on seeing their father, Gregorio, lying in the mud and
water, fatally wounded and dying, and honestly believing that Santiago, who was
standing at the time, would inflict other wounds upon their father, they, in his defense,
immediately killed Santiago. Ciriaco was near the scene at this time and on seeing
him to the two accused, under this great excitement, proceeded to attack him, and as
a direct result of the blows inflicted by them he fell to the ground, dying immediately.
Ciriaco was an old man, about 80 years of age, and used a cane to assist him in
walking about.
Ciriaco, was a man 80 years of age and did not arrive on the scene until after the
trouble between the two accused and Santiago had terminated.
As we have said, these two accused killed this old man, Ciriaco, while laboring under
great excitement and in the heat of passion, and it might be insisted that under these
circumstances they should be given the benefit of No. 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code,
as an extenuating circumstance. This provision should be applied to reduce the
penalty in cases where the provocation which caused the heated passion was made
by the injured party. In the case at bar the provocation was made by Santiago and not
Ciriaco, as Ciriaco arrived after the fight had terminated and there was then no
provocation running from the old man, Ciriaco, to these accused. He was entirely
unarmed and made no demonstration and said no word prior to the assault upon him
by the two accused. So the state of mind into which these two accused were thrown
by the provocation induced by Santiago can not modify the extent of their punishment
for killing the old man. In other words, before this provision can be applied as an
extenuating circumstance it is necessary, as we have said, that the person injured
should have executed the act producing arrebato y obcecacion. It can not be applied
when an assault is made upon a person who had taken no part in the quarrel and had
not in any manner provoked the accused. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain
dated October 17, 1904, published in the Official Gazette on December 23 following;
decision of the supreme court of Spain dated January 12, 1894; White vs. State, 44
Tex. Cr. Rep., 346; State vs. Jackson, 45 La. Ann., 1031; State vs. Vinso, 171 Mo.,
576.)
In view of the fact that these two accused are ignorant the aggravating circumstance is
compensated by the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code which we applied in
this case.
The sentence appealed from is, therefore, affirmed; provided, however, that these two
accused, Ponciano Esmedia and Mena Esmedia, be condemned to fourteen years
eight months an one day of reclusion temporal, and to the accessory penalties; and,
provided further, that they be declared exempt from criminal responsibility for causing
the death of Santiago Abando, which exemption relieves them from paying any
indemnity to the heirs of the said Santiago Abando.

Under the provisions of No. 5, article 8 of the Penal Code, the two accused are Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
exempt from criminal responsibility for having caused the death of Santiago Abando,
inasmuch as it has been shown that they inflicted these wounds upon him in defense
of their father who was fatally wounded at the time. They honestly believed, and had
good grounds upon which to found their belief, that Santiago would continue his attack
upon their father. They are, however, guilty of having caused the death of the old man,
Ciriaco Abando. When they attacked and killed him the other trouble had terminated
and they were not in danger of bodily harm from him.

In the commission of this crime of homicide, we must take into consideration No. 20 of
article 10 of the Penal Code which provides, as an aggravating circumstance, that
"when the act is committed with insult or in disregard for the respect which may be
due the aggrieved party on account of his rank, age, . . ." inasmuch as the deceased,

75
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004]
VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty (Ty) filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45,
seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20995, promulgated on 31 July 2001. The Decision affirmed with modification
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, dated 21 April
1997, finding her guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22[2] (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B.P.
22 against Ty before the RTC of Manila. The Informations were docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465. The accusatory portion of the Information in
Criminal Case No. 93-130465 reads as follows:
That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila
Doctors Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino Check No.
Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the
amount of P30,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in
full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90)
days from the date hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to
pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the check or to make arrangement for
full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
Contrary to law.[3]
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the number of the checks
and dates of issue. The data are hereunder itemized as follows:
Criminal Case No. Check No. Postdated Amount
93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 30,000.00
93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 P30,000.00
93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 P30,000.00
93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 P30,000.00
93-130463 487706 30 November 1992 P30,000.00
93-130464 487708 30 January 1993 P30,000.00
93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 P30,000.00[4]
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty pleaded
not guilty.[5]
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Tys mother Chua Lao So Un was
confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June
1992. Being the patients daughter, Ty signed the Acknowledgment of Responsibility
for Payment in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990.[6] As of 4 June
1992, the Statement of Account[7]shows the total liability of the mother in the amount
of P657,182.40. Tys sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital from 13 May
1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount of P418,410.55.[8] The
total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty
executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in
installments.[9] To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated
checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each
covering the amount of P30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But they
were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to
insufficiency of funds, with the Account Closed advice. Soon thereafter, the
complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the demand
letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7) Informations subject of the
instant case.[10]
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury. She averred that she was forced to issue the
checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly
treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She alleged that her
mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and
television set, and subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone
line, late delivery of her mothers food and refusal to change the latters gown and
bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospitals suspending medical treatment of her
mother. The debasing treatment, she pointed out, so affected her mothers mental,
psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she would not
be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with
the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an
account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mothers immediate
discharge.[11]
Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the prosecution, the
trial court found that Ty issued the checks subject of the case in payment of the
hospital bills of her mother and rejected the theory of the defense. [12] Thus, on 21 April
1997, the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of
violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term. The dispositive part of
the Decision reads:
CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks
in payment of a valid obligation, which turned unfounded on their respective dates of
maturity, is found guilty of seven (7) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
76
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per
count or a total of forty-two (42) months.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. Before the Court of
Appeals, Ty reiterated her defense that she issued the checks under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She
also argued that the trial court erred in finding her guilty when evidence showed there
was absence of valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks and the payee
had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the account. She protested that the trial
court should not have applied the law mechanically, without due regard to the
principles of justice and equity.[14]
In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of
the trial court with modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead
sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00) equivalent to double
the amount of the check, in each case.[15]
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Tys defenses of
involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and the hospitals knowledge of her
checking accounts lack of funds.It held that B.P. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a
worthless check punishable as a special offense, it being a malum prohibitum. What
the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it
was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. [16]
Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable
consideration for the issuance of the checks as they were issued in payment of the
hospital bills of Tys mother.[17]
In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court
applied the case of Vaca v. Court of Appeals[18] wherein this Court declared that in
determining the penalty imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law should be observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human
material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness, with due regard to the protection of the social order.[19]
Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same issues raised
before the Court of Appeals. More specifically, she ascribed errors to the appellate
court based on the following grounds:
A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
PETITIONER WAS FORCED TO OR COMPELLED IN THE
OPENING OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBJECT CHECKS.
B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF
AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A GREATER INJURY OR IN
AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.
C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF
VALUABLE CONSIDERATION IN THE ISSUANCE OFTHE
SUBJECT CHECKS.
D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE CHECKS
WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE LACK OF FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNT.
E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE
HONORABLE TRIAL COURT [,] SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED
CRIMINAL LAW MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
In its Memorandum,[20] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing
jurisprudence, contends that a check issued as an evidence of debt, though not
intended to be presented for payment, has the same effect as an ordinary check;
hence, it falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. And when a check is presented for payment,
the drawee bank will generally accept the same, regardless of whether it was issued in
payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee said obligation. What the law
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued
nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a
worthless check is malum prohibitum.[21]
We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Tys conviction.
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked
certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the
case.[22] Jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is
limited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose
factual findings are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms
the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of
support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious
abuse of discretion.[23]
In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse the
factual findings arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of this case. She,
however, claims that the issuance of the checks was under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She
would also have the Court believe that there was no valuable consideration in the
issuance of the checks.
However, except for the defenses claim of uncontrollable fear of a greater injury
or avoidance of a greater evil or injury, all the grounds raised involve factual issues
which are best determined by the trial court. And, as previously intimated, the trial
court had in fact discarded the theory of the defense and rendered judgment
accordingly.
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments unsuccessfully
raised before the trial court and the Court of Appeals. They likewise put to issue
77
factual questions already passed upon twice below, rather than questions of law
appropriate for review under a Rule 45 petition.
The only question of law raisedwhether the defense of uncontrollable fear is
tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal liabilityhas to be resolved in the
negative. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following
requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be
real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed.[24]
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such
gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. [25] It should
be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb.[26] A mere threat
of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. [27] A
person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such
that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will
as well.[28] It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for
escape.[29]
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and
imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checksa condition the
hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be dischargedfor fear that
her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the
hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not
the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-
threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged
unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her
death. Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say that any fear exempts one from
criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might commit
suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to
deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved
exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to
commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her
to avoid committing one. By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or
security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form
of postdated checks or jewelry.[30] And if indeed she was coerced to open an account
with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to
avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks
without funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel
advised her not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks because the
moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem.[31] Besides, apart from petitioners
bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to corroborate and bolster her
claim that she was compelled or coerced to cooperate with and give in to the hospitals
demands.
Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of
her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying circumstance of state of necessity
under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find application in this case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt
the actor from liability under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided
actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3)
that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.[32]
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or
anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may
happen in the future, this defense is not applicable.[33] Ty could have taken advantage
of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the
choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure
her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury
feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more
so, the willful inaction of the actor.[34] In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks
was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting
circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the justifying circumstance of state of
necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had Ty been
able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done without her full
volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is quite clear that neither uncontrollable
fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of the bounced
checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the Civil
Case[35] for damages filed by Tys mother against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for
purposes of disposing the case at bench. While the findings therein may establish a
claim for damages which, we may add, need only be supported by a preponderance of
evidence, it does not necessarily engender reasonable doubt as to free Ty from
liability.
As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued for valuable
consideration.[36] Section 24[37] of the Negotiable Instruments Law creates a
presumption that every party to an instrument acquired the same for a
consideration[38] or for value.[39] In alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that the
checks were issued without consideration. She must present convincing evidence to
overthrow the presumption.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of
proof. Valuable consideration may in general terms, be said to consist either in some
right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given,
suffered or undertaken by the other aide. Simply defined, valuable consideration
means an obligation to give, to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the
contract, such as the maker or indorser.[40]
78
 In this case, Tys mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities of
the hospital. For the care given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to pay the
hospital by virtue of her relationship with them and by force of her signature on her
mothers Contract of Admission acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on the
promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital.
Anent Tys claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her personal
obligation because she was not the patient, and therefore there was no consideration
for the checks, the case of Bridges v. Vann, et al.[41] tells us that it is no defense to an
action on a promissory note for the maker to say that there was no consideration
which was beneficial to him personally; it is sufficient if the consideration was a benefit
conferred upon a third person, or a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the instance
of the promissor. It is enough if the obligee foregoes some right or privilege or suffers
some detriment and the release and extinguishment of the original obligation of
George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants meets the requirement.Appellee accepted one
debtor in place of another and gave up a valid, subsisting obligation for the note
executed by the appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient consideration for the new notes.
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance.[42] B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its
contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the
obligation.[43] The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and
putting them into circulation.[44] As this Court held in Lim v. People of the
Philippines,[45] what is primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and the
fact of its worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of their issuance, a
required element under B.P. Blg. 22.
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for
insufficiency of funds.[46] If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.[47]
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she did not
have sufficient funds with the drawee bank and such knowledge necessarily
exonerates her liability.
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer
with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an offense
penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check,
hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential.[48]
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals[49] wherein this
Court inquired into the true nature of transaction between the drawer and the payee
and finally acquitted the accused, to persuade the Court that the circumstances
surrounding her case deserve special attention and do not warrant a strict and
mechanical application of the law.
Petitioners reliance on the case is misplaced. The material operative facts
therein obtaining are different from those established in the instant petition. In the
1992 case, the bounced checks were issued to cover a warranty deposit in a lease
contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. It was
a modus operandi whereby the supplier was able to sell or lease the goods while
privately financing those in desperate need so they may be accommodated. The
maker of the check thus became an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the
guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all from the
deposit, since the checks were used as collateral for an accommodation and not to
cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value.
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an actual
account or for value. Substantial evidence, as found by the trial court and Court of
Appeals, has established that the checks were issued in payment of the hospital bills
of Tys mother.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of
imprisonment, absent any proof that petitioner was not a first-time offender nor that
she acted in bad faith.Administrative Circular 12-2000,[50] adopting the rulings in Vaca
v. Court of Appeals[51] and Lim v. People,[52] authorizes the non-imposition of the
penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain conditions. However, the
Court resolves to modify the penalty in view of Administrative Circular 13-
2001[53] which clarified Administrative 12-2000. It is stated therein:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the
application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances
of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of
fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as
the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the
Judge. Should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not
remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22; (2) the judges
concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the
peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone
79
would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice; (3) should only a
fine be imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to
the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.[54]
lance. The policeman dodged, it, and to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the
bullet did not hit him. The criminal ran away, without parting with his weapon. These
peace officer went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing
him.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 31 July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of
violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner
Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each
dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is
also ordered to pay private complainant, Manila Doctors Hospital, the amount of Two
Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P210,000.00) representing the total amount of the
dishonored checks. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
The policeman was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to reclusion
temporal and the accessory penalties. He appeals from that judgment which must be
reversed.
That killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the
obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to
commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the
policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal,
was justified by the circumstances.lawphil.net
Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code being considered, Felipe Delima committed no
crime, and he is hereby acquitted with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Araullo C.J., Street. Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18660 December 22, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FELIPE DELIMA, defendant-appellant.

Tancinco & Rosales for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence.

Some days afterwards the policeman Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found
him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape
of a lance, and demanded his surrender. The fugitive answered with a stroke of his

80
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124670. June 21, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATROLMAN
DOMINGO BELBES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 18, Patrolman Domingo
Belbes stood charged of Murder. The information against him reads:
"That on or about the 16th of February, 1990 at 9:00 oclock in the
evening, more or less, inside the campus of Pili National High
School, at Barangay Pili, Municipality of Bacacay, Province of
Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with treachery, taking
advantage of nighttime, employing means to insure or afford
impunity, with the use of high powered firearm, and with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, suddenly,
unexpectedly and without any warning, attack, fire and shoot
successively with an armalite rifle (M-16) FERNANDO B.
BATALLER while the latter was intoxicated, thereby hitting and
inflicting upon him multiple serious and mortal wounds on his
head, at the right lower face, the chest (front) at the left antero
lateral approximately 5 cm. below but lateral to the left nipple, at
the left lateral waistline, thereby lacerating the liver, hitting the
stomach portions of the large and small intestines and lower
vertebrae, and the chest (back) at the middle back and another at
the left back, lateral level of the lower rib, which caused Fernando
B. Batallers direct and instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of his legal heirs.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW."[1]
When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty.
The facts established during trial by the prosecution is summarized by the appellee in
its brief, thus:
"In the evening of February 16, 1990, appellant Pat. Domingo
Belbes and Pat. Jose Pabon were assigned by the Bacacay
Station Commander to maintain peace and order at the Junior
and Senior Prom of Pili Barangay High School, Pili, Bacacay,
Albay.
Around 9:00 p.m. while Teacher-In-Charge Mila Ulanca, appellant, Pat. Pabon
and Elmo Bes were watching the dance, two students, Riselle Banares and
Juliana Basaysay, approached Mrs. Ulanca and said "Mam, it seems that there is
somebody making trouble." Appellant and Pat. Pabon, armed with an armalite
rifle and a .38 caliber revolver, respectively, responded forthwith. Moments after
the two police officers left, bursts of gunfire-- "Rat-tat-tat-tat-tat" filled the air.
Fernando Bataller, a graduating student of Pili Barangay High School, was hit on
different parts of his body and died.
Moments before the gruesome incident, Fernando Bataller, then drunk, was in
the company of Carlito Bataller and Rosalio Belista. While Fernando was
vomiting and holding on to the bamboo wall of the schools temporary building,
the bamboo splits broke. At this instance, appellant and Pat. Pabon appeared.
Without warning, appellant fired his gun. Fernando slumped on the ground,
bathed with his own blood. Appellant and Pat. Pabon fled from the crime scene.
Fernando was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. As shown in the
autopsy report, Fernando suffered the following gunshot wounds: (1) head,
located at the right lower face, skin, muscles, blood vessels, nerves, bone torn
away; (2) chest (front, located at left, antero lateral approximately 5 cm. below
but lateral to the left nipple, another gunshot wound on the same location with
tattooing located at left lateral waistline; (3) chest (back) located at the middle
back at the level of the lowest rib, skin and superficial muscles torn away,
another gunshot wound located at the left back, lateral level of the lowest rib, with
tattooing. (Citations omitted)"[2]
In his defense, the accused-appellant presented his version of the fatal incident,
summed up by the trial court as follows:
"The accused, Domingo Belbes in his defense testified that he was at Pili Barangay
High School with P/Cpl. Jose Pabon because they were detailed by their Station
Commander. x x x At 9:00 p.m. two female students reported to them and Mrs. Ulanca
that somebody was making trouble at the back of the temporary building. They were
requested by Mrs. Ulanca to see what happened and they went to the place. There they
came upon somebody who was making trouble and destroying the wall of the
temporary building. He came to know that it was Fernando Bataller. Fernando Bataller
had some companions, Carlito Bataller and certain Belista. Fernando Bataller was more
than 20 years old at that time and Carlito was about Fernandos age. He saw Fernando
destroying the wall of the temporary building which was made of bamboo splits. Pabon
was in front of him. The two companions were prevailing upon Fernando. Fernando
was drunk or a little bit tipsy. He was not vomiting but he smelled of wine. They
approached Fernando and identified themselves as policemen. Fernando did not mind
them. Fernando stabbed Pabon with a knife. Belbes knew because he saw the glint of
the blade when the thrust was made on Pabon. Pabon and Bataller were about one (1)
meter away from each other. Pabon was not hit, for he was able to move backward.
81
Fernando made two thrusts on Pabon. After Pabon retreated because of the knife over Fernando (instead of tolerating the hostility of the deceased), he could have
thrusts, he (Belbes) was also stabbed by Fernando. He was hit on his lower left prevented the shooting incident.
shoulder. He was able to hold Fernandos hand because he wanted to get the knife from
him. His firearm was slung on his shoulder. Fernando was able to free himself.
Regrettably, appellant offers no material evidence to sufficiently support his claim of
Fernando made another thrust and Belbes moved to his left. Then he made a warning
self-defense on the face of mortal danger while on police duty. The cross-examination
shot. After the warning shot, Fernando suddenly grabbed his firearm. Belista was quite
of Carlito Bataller did not bear out his averments of fraternal bias and psychological
aggressive at that moment, while Carlito wanted to kick him. Fernando was able to hold
guilt or moral taint in Carlitos testimony. The testimony of the single witness, if positive
the barrel of the armalite. They struggled with each other and the gun went off
and clear, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction, even in a charge for
considering that his armalite was semi-automatic, with one squeeze of the trigger one
murder.[5] Moreover, when the issue boils down to the credibility of witnesses, the
shot came out. During the process of grappling for the armalite he could not recall how
findings of the trial court deserve great respect since it is in a better position to
many shots came out. When his service armalite went off he saw Fernando fall to the
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in court, and to discern its
ground. When Fernando fell, he took the knife from his hand. The people gathered
dimensions, both verbal and non-verbal.[6] The relationship of a witness to the victim
around them. They asked that Fernando be brought to the hospital. After one hour, the
does not necessarily diminish the formers credibility.[7]
police mobile car arrived. They proceeded to the Police Station. There they turned over
the knife to the Desk Officer. The knife is now with the Provincial Command."[3]
It is a settled rule that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of
a witness deserve respect because it is in a better position to determine whether the
Defense witness Jose Pabon, also a policeman, who was present when the incident
witness was telling the truth or not, having observed the demeanor of the witness
happened, corroborated the testimony of the appellant. However, on cross-
while testifying on the witness stand.[8] In the case at bar, there appears to be no
examination, Pabon belied the fact that the appellant fired a warning shot. Pabon
cogent reason why we should not adhere to this rule.
likewise failed to mention anything about aggression on the part of the companions of
the deceased, namely Carlito Bataller and Rosalio Belista. He only recalled that said
companions ganged up on Belbes after he shot the deceased. Where the accused owns up to killing the victim in self-defense, the burden of
evidence shifts to him. He must show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed
acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger.[9] To prove self-defense,
Finding the defense weak, while the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently strong,
the accused must show with clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) he is not the
the trial court convicted the appellant of murder and sentenced him to reclusion
unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he
perpetua.
employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. Self-defense, like
alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. It is well settled in this jurisdiction
In this appeal, counsel de oficio raised one issue: that once an accused had admitted that he inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased,
it was incumbent upon him, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying
circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. He
WAS THE TRIAL [Court] CORRECT IN HOLDING ACCUSED-
cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution but on the strength of his own
APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER?[4]
evidence, "for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be
disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing."[10]
We shall now consider this matter as well as the more basic issues of self-defense
claimed by appellant and the credibility of the witness for the prosecution. Appellant
Appellant testified that upon responding to the report of two students, he and
policeman admits firing the fatal gunshots that hit the deceased student. But he claims
Patrolman Pabon, saw Fernando Bataller destroying the bamboo wall of the schools
that he did so in self-defense. He contends that he was only performing his official
temporary building. Fernando appeared to be drunk and a little bit tipsy. They
functions when he responded in the course of police duties to the information that
approached Fernando and identified themselves as policemen but the former ignored
somebody was making trouble and disturbing the peace. Being in charge of
them. Instead, Fernando lunged with a knife at Patrolman Pabon but the latter avoided
maintaining peace and order within the vicinity, he ascertained the veracity of the
the thrust. Afterwards, Fernando also stabbed the appellant and hit his left shoulder.
information given by the students concerned. He asserts that in the absence of intent
As another thrust was coming, appellant claims he fired a warning shot. Fernando
and voluntariness, he cannot be faulted for the death of the deceased.
grabbed the armalite and they struggled until the gun went off hitting Fernando,
according to appellant.
At the outset, we note that appellant questions the credibility of the sole eye-witness
for the prosecution, Carlito Bataller. He states that Carlito is the cousin and friend of
We have serious questions on accused-appellants claim of self-defense, on his part,
the deceased. In his view, Carlito had strong motive to falsely testify against him.
against the alleged aggressiveness of the deceased student. First, why was the knife
Moreover, appellant says that Carlito kindled some moral guilt because he contributed
allegedly used by the deceased mis-handled? It was not even subjected to
to the sudden death of his cousin. Appellant alleges that if only Carlito had prevailed
fingerprinting. Second, why was the wound on appellants shoulder medically

82
examined only after the lapse of more than twenty-one hours? Was it possibly self-
inflicted? According to the doctor who examined him, Dr. Evelyn Amador, it was a
possibility.[11] Lastly, as observed by the trial court, if it was true that they grappled
face to face with each other, why was the victim hit sideways, as testified to by
Amador?
The time factor here appears significant. Mrs. Mila Ulanca testified that it only took
about six seconds from the time Patrolman Belbes left his seat until she heard the
burst of gunshots.[12]This testimony is not contradicted or rebutted.
thereafter.[21] In this case, appellant intended to fire AT the victim, and in fact hit ONLY
the victim.
We conclude that appellant is guilty only of homicide, mitigated by the incomplete
justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty. The penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty
should be reclusion temporal in its minimum period, which is 12 years and 1 day to 14
years and 8 months. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the minimum of said
penalty should be taken from prision mayor.

Thus, appellants claim of self-defense could not prosper. The evidence on record, WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court convicting appellant Domingo Belbes of
however, reveals an incomplete justifying circumstance defined in Article 11, the crime of murder is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of the crime of
paragraph number 5 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] A person incurs no criminal liability homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision
when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. But mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal minimum,
we must stress there are two requisites for this justifying circumstance: (a) that the as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a duty or in the P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P20,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the
lawful exercise of a right: and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary costs.
consequence of the due performance of such right or office.[14] In the instant case, only
the first requisite is present; admittedly appellant acted in the performance of his duty.
SO ORDERED.
However, the second requisite is lacking, for the killing need not be a necessary
consequence of the performance of his duty. His duty is to maintain peace and order
during the Junior and Senior Prom. But he exceeded such duty, in our view, when he Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
fired his armalite without warning. No doubt, the concept of mitigating circumstances is
founded on leniency in favor of an accused who has shown less perversity in the
commission of an offense.[15] Though his protestation of innocence is unavailing, his
offense could only be characterized as homicide, not murder, as hereafter shown.

On one hand, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as to rule out
murder. Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. For the same to be considered as a
qualifying circumstance, two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means,
method or manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from
defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given the
latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means, method or manner of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. [16] There is no
showing that the shooting was premeditated or that appellant, in shooting the victim,
employed means, methods or forms to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended victim might make. Likewise, mere
suddenness of the attack does not necessarily imply treachery. [17]

On the other hand, the offense is definitely not reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide because the shooting was intentional. [18] Illustrations of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide are: (1) exhibiting a loaded revolver to a friend, who was killed by
the accidental discharge brought about by negligent handling;[19] or (2) discharging a
firearm from the window of ones house and killing a neighbor who just at the moment
leaned over the balcony front;[20] or (3) where the defendant, to stop a fist fight, fired
his .45 caliber pistol twice in the air, and, as the bout continued, he fired another shot
at the ground, but the bullet ricocheted and hit a bystander who died soon

83
 Republic of the Philippines Labuguen as chairman, and Benjamin Adriatico, Andres Afos, Juanito Casal, Santiago
SUPREME COURT Casal, Benjamin Abella, Servillano Afos, Mariano Ajel, Felimon Labuguen, Felix
Manila Murphy, Pedro Turqueza, and Delfin Labuguen as members; while Felix Alverne and
Juan Balmaceda were named prosecutors, Policarpio Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and
Lino Inovermo as counsel for the accused. Later, Atty. Jovito Barreras voluntarily
EN BANC
appeared and served as counsel for Borjal. Sgt. Esteban Cabanos observed the
proceedings for several days upon instructions of Headquarters, 15th Infantry. The
G.R. No. L-4445 February 28, 1955 trial lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on all accounts and
imposed upon him instruction from his superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the
records of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review. Said records
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
were returned by Lt. Col. Arnold to Beronilla on April 18, 1945 with the following
vs. instructions:
MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO PACULDO, and
JACINTO ADRIATICO, defendants-appellants.
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
Agripino A. Brillantes, Valera, Eufemio and Bernardez for appellants. In the Field
Prospero C. Sanidad and Claro M. Recto for defendant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jaime R. de los Angeles
and Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee.
16 April 1945

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Msg. No. 337

This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, Subject: Arsenio Borjal, Charges Against
and Jacinto Adriatico from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra To: Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra.
(Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal
in the evening of April 18, 1945, in the town of La Paz , Province of Abra.
1. Returned herewith are the papers on the case of Arsenio Borjal.
2. This is a matter best handled by your government and whatever
Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and disposition you make of the case is hereby approved.
continued to serve as Mayor during the Japanese occupation, until March 10, 1943,
when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt upon his life by unknown persons.
On December 18, 1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of (Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry, Philippine Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Army, operating as a guerrilla unit in the province of Abra. Simultaneously with his Commanding
appointment as Military Mayor, Beronilla received copy of a memorandum issued by
Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a
jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and
Received April 18, 1945, 10:35 a.m.
abetting (of ) the enemy" (Exhibit 9). He also received from the Headquarters of the
15th Infantry a list of all puppet government officials of the province of Abra (which
included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La Paz), with a memorandum instructing all (Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA
Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints from Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra
people of the municipality for collaboration with the enemy (Exhibit 12-a).
(Exhibit 8, 8-a)
Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the province of
Abra were in progress, Arsenio Borjal returned to La Paz with his family in order to
and on the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of
escape the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions, placed Borjal
Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico acted as executioner and Antonio Palope as grave digger.
under custody and asked the residents of La Paz to file complaints against him. In no
Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church was asked to administer the last
time, charges of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority were filed
confession to the prisoner, while Father Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan Church
against Borjal; a 12-man jury was appointed by Beronilla, composed of Jesus
performed the last rites over Borjal's remains. Immediately after the execution,

84
Beronilla reported the matter to Col. Arnold who in reply to Beronilla's report, sent him Defendant Jesus Labuguen, then a master sergeant in the Philippine Army, applied for
the following message: and was granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (Records, pp. 618-20). The rest of the defendant filed their application for
amnesty with the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, who denied their application
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
on the ground that the crime had been inspired by purely personal motives, and
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Abra for trial on the merits.
In the Field

Upon motion of defense counsel, the case against defendant Jesus Labuguen, who
22 April 1945 had been granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, was ordered provisionally dismissed: defendant Juan Balmaceda was
discharged from the information so that he might be utilized as state witness, although
actually he was not called to testify; while the case against defendants Antonio Palope
Msg. No. 398 (the grave digger) and Demetrio Afos( a boloman) was dismissed for lack of sufficient
Subject: Report and information Re Borjal case evidence.
To: Military Mayor Beronilla
Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10, 1950, the Court
1. Received your letter dated 18 April 1945, subject, above. below rendered judgment, acquitting the members of the jury and the grave digger
2. My request that you withhold action in this case was only dictated Antonio Palope on the ground that they did not participated in the killing of Arsenio
because of a query from Higher Headquarters regarding same. Actually, I Borjal; acquitting defendants Jesus Labuguen, Felix Alverne, Severo Afos, and Lauro
believe there was no doubt as to the treasonable acts of the accused Parado upon insufficiency of evidence to establish their participation in the crime; but
Arsenio Borjal and I know that your trial was absolutely impartial and fair. convicting defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and
Consequently, I Can only compliment you for your impartial independent Jacinto Adriatico as conspirator and co-principals of the crime of murder, and
way of handling the whole case. sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Arsenio Borjal
jointly and severally in the amount of P4,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD insolvency, and each to pay one fourth of the costs. In convicting said defendants the
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA Court a quo found that while the crime committed by them fell within the provisions of
Commanding the Amnesty Proclamation, they were not entitled to the benefits thereof because the
crime was committed after the expiration of the time limit fixed by the amnesty
proclamation;: i.e., that the deceased Arsenio Borjal was executed after the liberation
Received April 26, 1947 7:00 a.m. of La Paz, Abra.

(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused Beronilla, Paculdo,
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra Velasco and Adriatico appealed to this Court.

(Exhibit 21, 21-a)
Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor, Policarpio Paculdo as Clerk
of the jury, Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda as prosecutors, Jesus Labuguen, Delfin
Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen, Servillano Afos, Andres Afos, Benjamin Adriatico,
Juanito Casel, Santiago Casel, Mariano Ajel, Felix Murphy, Benjamin Abella, and
Pedro Turqueza as members of the jury, Jacinto Adriatico as executioner, Severo
Afos as grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as an alleged conspirator, were
indicted in the Court of First Instance of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and
confederating in the execution of Arsenio Borjal. Soon thereafter, the late President
Manuel A. Roxas issued Executive Proclamation No. 8, granting amnesty to all
persons who committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance
of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution
and trial of the late Arsenio Borjal were done pursuant to express orders of the 15th
Infantry Headquarters. (Exhibit 9 and 12-a), instructing all military mayors under its
jurisdiction to gather evidence against puppet officials and to appoint juries of at least
12 bolomen to try the accused and find them guilty by two thirds vote. It is to be noted
that Arsenio Borjal was specifically named in the list of civilian officials to be
prosecuted (Exhibit 12-b).
In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and sentencing of
Borjal was done in accordance with instructions of superior military authorities, altho it
point to irregularities that were due more to ignorance of legal processes than
personal animosity against Borjal. The state, however, predicates its case principally
on the existence of the radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall area

85
commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the illegality of Borjal's
conviction and sentence, and which the prosecution claims was known to the accused
Beronilla. Said message is as follows:
"Message:
VOLCKMANN TO ARNOLD CLN UNDERSTAND THAT MUNICIPALITIES OF
ABRA HAVE ORGANIZED JURY SYSTEM PD BELIEVE THAT THIS BODY IS
ILLEGAL AND CANNOT TRY PUNISHMENTS THEREOF PD SPECIFIC
INSTANCE IS BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION FRO PROPER AND
IMMEDIATE ACTION ON ONE ARSENIO BORJAL OF LA PAZ WHO HAS BEEN
TRIED CMA CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO BE HANGED PD REPORT
ACTION TAKEN BY YOU ON THIS MATTER PD MSG BEGINS CLN"
(EXH. H)
The crucial question thus becomes whether or not this message, originally sent to
Arnold's quarters in San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was relayed by the latter to appellant
Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the morning of April 18, 1945, together with the package
of records of Borjal's trial that was admittedly returned to and received by Beronilla on
that date, after review thereof by Arnold (Exhibit 8-8-a). Obviously, if the Volckmann
message was known to Beronilla, his ordering the execution of Borjal on the night of
April 18, 1945 can not be justified.
We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find no
satisfactory proof that Beronilla did actually receive the radiogram Exhibit H or any
copy thereof. The accused roundly denied it. The messenger, or "runner", Pedro
Molina could not state what papers were enclosed in the package he delivered to
Beronilla on that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who
claimed to have been present at the delivery of the message, state the contents
thereof.
The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the Volckmann
message, Exhibit H, was Rafael Balmaceda, a relative of Borjal, who claimed to have
been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at the receipt of the message and to have
read it over Beronilla's shoulder. This testimony, however, can not be accorded
credence, for the reason that in the affidavit executed by this witness before Fiscal
Antonio of Abra (Exhibit 4), Balmaceda failed to make any mention of the reading, or
even the receipt, of the message. In the affidavit, he stated:
Q. In your capacity as policeman, do you know of any usual occurrence that
transpired in La Paz, Abra? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you state what is the event? — A. On April 17, 1945, I was assigned as
guard at the Presidencia where Mayor Arsenio Borjal is confined. On the 18th of
April, 1945, six bolomen came to me while I was on duty as guard, that Mayor
Borjal should be tied, on orders of Mayor Beronilla, Mayor Borjal wanted to know
the reason why he would be tied, as he had not yet learned of the decision of the
jury against him. Mayor Borjal wrote a note to Mayor Beronilla, asking the reason
for his being ordered to be tied. I personally delivered the note of Borjal to Mayor
Beronilla. Mayor Beronilla did not answer the note, but instead told me that I
should tie Mayor Borjal, as tomorrow he would die, as he cannot escape. I
returned to the Presidencia, and Mayor Borjal was tied, as that was the ordered of
Mayor Beronilla.
The plain import of the affidavit is that the witness Rafael Balmaceda was not with
Beronilla when the message arrived, otherwise Beronilla would have given him his
orders direct, as he (Balmaceda) testified later at the trial. Moreover, it is difficult to
believe that having learned of the contents of the Volckmann message, Balmaceda
should not have relayed it to Borjal , or to some member of the latter's family,
considering that they were relatives. In addition to Balmaceda was contradicted by
Bayken, another prosecution witness, as to the hatching of the alleged conspiracy to
kill Borjal. Balmaceda claimed that the accused-appellants decided to kill Borjal in the
early evening of April 18, while Bayken testified that the agreement was made about
ten o'clock in the morning, shortly after the accused had denied Borjal's petition to be
allowed to hear mass.
Upon the other hand, Beronilla's conduct belies his receipt of the Volckmann
message. Had he executed Borjal in violation of superior orders, he would not have
dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the very same day, April 18th, 1945, as
he did (Exhibit 20), half an hour after the execution. And what is even more important,
if Borjal was executed contrary to instructions, how could Lt. Colonel Arnold on April
21, 1945, write in reply (Exhibit 21, 21-a) "I can only compliment you for your impartial
but independent way of handling the whole case" instead of berating Beronilla and
ordering his court martial for disobedience?
Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be
ascertained, failed to transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this being so,
the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be rejected, because
the accused had no need to conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly
sentenced to death.
The state claims that the appellants held grudges against the late Borjal. Even so, it
has been already decided that the concurrence of personal hatred and collaboration
with the enemy as motives for a liquidation does not operate to exclude the case from
the benefits of the Amnesty claimed by appellants, since then "it may not be held that
the manslaughter stemmed from purely personal motives" (People vs.
Barrioquinto,* G. R. Nos. L-2011 and 2267, June 30, 1951). Actually, the conduct of
the appellants does not dispose that these appellants were impelled by malice (dolo).
The arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the higher command;
the appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel, one of them (attorney Jovito
86
Barreras) chosen by Borjal's sister; the trial lasted nineteen (19) days; it was For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants
suspended when doubts arose about its legality, and it was not resumed until are acquitted, with costs de oficio.
headquarters (then in Langangilang, Abra) authorized its resumption and sent an
observer (Esteban Cabanos, of the S-5) to the proceedings, and whose suggestions
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo
on procedure were followed; and when the verdict of guilty was rendered and death
and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
sentence imposed, the records were sent to Arnold's headquarters for review, and
Borjal was not punished until the records were returned eight days later with the
statement of Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby
approved" (Exhibit 8), which on its face was an assent to the verdict and the sentence.
The lower Court, after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really committed
treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and hidden American
officers to be captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court is
convinced that it was not for political or personal reason that the accused decided to
kill Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p. 727).

It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-
appellants acted upon orders, of a superior officers that they, as military subordinates,
could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware of their illegality,
without any fault or negligence on their part, we can not say that criminal intent has
been established (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507; Peo. vs. Pacana, 47 Phil., 48; Sent.
of the Tribunal Supremo of Spain, 3 July 1886; 7 January 1901; 24 March 1900; 21
Feb. 1921; 25 March 1929). Actus non facit reum nisi mens si rea.

To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute,
be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty
or to consequence, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus
non facit reum, nisi mens rea-a crime is not committed if the minds of the person
performing the act complained of be innocent. (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507).

But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they are
charged, the Court below should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the
Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off. Gaz., 2072)on the ground that the
slaying of Arsenio Borjal took place after actual liberation of the area from enemy
control and occupation. The evidence on record regarding the date of liberation of La
Paz, Abra, is contradictory. The Military Amnesty Commission that decided the case of
one of the original accused Jesus Labuguen, held that La Paz, Abra, was liberated on
July 1, 1945, according to its records; and this finding was accepted by Judge Letargo
when he dismissed the case against said accused on March 15, 1949. On the other
hand, Judge Bocar and Hilario, who subsequently took cognizance of the case, relied
on Department Order No. 25, of the Department of the Interior, dated August 12,
1948, setting the liberation of the Province of Abra on April 4, 1945, fifteen days before
Borjal was slain. The two dates are not strictly contradictory; but given the benefit of
the Presidential directive to the Amnesty Commissions (Adm. Order No. 11, of
October 2, 1946) that "any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within
the (amnesty) proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the accused" (42 Off. Gaz.,
2360), as was done in People vs. Gajo, Phil., 107 46 Off. Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.

87
 Republic of the Philippines other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the mental condition of the accused,
SUPREME COURT or to place the latter under a competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial court
Manila then issued an order directing that the accused be placed under the chief alienist or an
assistant alienist of the Psychopatic Hospital for his personal observation and the
subsequent submission of a report as to the true mental condition of the patient. Dr.
EN BANC
Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his
report, Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was called again. Dr.
G.R. No. L-45130 February 17, 1937 Fernandez appeared before the court and ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the
accused was not in a condition to defend himself. In view thereof, the case was
suspended indefinitely.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant. On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could
be discharged from the hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a
recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez, appeared and testified that
Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant. the accused "had recovered from the disease." On February 27, 1936, the accused
Undersecretary of Justice for appellee. was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.

LAUREL, J.:
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the
information above-quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the
On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an information heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
charging Celestino Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the crime of murder,
committed as follows: The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following
assignment of errors:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the accused
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any justifiable motive and with
has had dementia only occasionally and intermittently and has not had it
the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison, attack, assault and stab the said immediately prior to the commission of the defense.
Carlos Guison on the different parts of his body with a knife, thereby inflicting upon
him the following injuries, to wit:
B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows that
during and immediately after the commission of the offense, the accused did not
"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the show any kind of abnormality either in behavior, language and appearance, or any
superior surace of the right lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab kind of action showing that he was mentally deranged.
wounds located respectively at the posterior and lateral lumbar region, and left
elbow", which directly caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three days
afterwards. C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden was
on the defense to show hat the accused was mentally deranged at the time of the
commission of the offense, and that the defense did not establish any evidence to
On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The this effect.
defense counsel forthwith objected to the arraignment on the ground that the
defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the Psychopatic
Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring the Director of the Hospital to D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in not
render a report on the mental condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio Joson, acquitting him thereof.
assistant alientist, rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March
23, 1935, the case was again called for the arraignment of the accused, but in view of
It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino Bonoan
the objection of the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring the doctor of the
met the now deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to
Psyhopatic Hospital who examined the defendant to appear and produce the complete
Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at the time in the barbershop, heard
record pertaining to the mental condition of the said defendant. Pursuant to this order,
the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned around and saw the
Dr. Toribio Joson appeared before the court on March 26, 1935 for the necessary
accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife, from the side of Guison who
inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense asked the court to summon the

88
said, also in Tagalog, "I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him
and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left side. The assaultt was witnessed by
policeman Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took
possession of the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General
Hospital where he died two days later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy performed
on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not seem
necessary to indulge in any extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for
the prosecution. The defense set up being that of insanity, the only question to be
determined in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-appellant was insane at the
time of the commission of the crime charged.
On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental
corollaries as to the legal presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence
required, theories abound and authorities are in sharp conflict. Stated generally, courts
in the United States proceed upon three different theories. (See Herzog, Alfred W.,
Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity
in Criminal Cases, p. 11 et seq.) Thefirst view is that insanity as a defense in a
confession and avoidance and as must be proved beyond reasonable doubt when the
commission of a crime is established, and the defense of insanity is not made out
beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the
time of committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit
the accused on the ground of insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N.
J. L., 196). The second view is that an affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed
by a preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity is not to be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th
ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149;
Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia,
Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The third view is that the prosecution
must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United States, 160 U. S. 496;
40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United States, 186 U. S., 413; 46
Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed.
Cas. No. 15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal view is
premised on the proposition that while it is true that the presumption of sanity exists at
the outset, the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of the crime charged,
and hence affirms sanity as one essential ingredients, and that a fortiori where the
accused introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes the duty of the State to
prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs. Bacos
[1922], 44 Phil., 204). The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, but insanity is presumed,
and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental
incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez
[1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this
doctrine.
In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at the
time he killed the deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative allegation rests
on the defense. Without indulging in fine distinctions as to the character and degree of
evidence that must be presented sufficiently convincing evidence, direct or
circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind that the accused was insane
at the time of the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's mental
condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of
his mind a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not
required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S.
W., 1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E.,
14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of
derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to established insanity as a
defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the
motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to
the practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial
evidence, if clear and convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the time
of the commission of the act for which he was prosecuted on the theory that the
insanity was only occassional or intermittent and not permanentor continuous (32 C.
J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the danger of indulging in the preseumption
ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or spasmodic insanity.We appreciate the reason
forthe contrary rule. To be sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law
from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from
physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not
cconcerned with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to show the continuance
thereof during the intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a particular
and isolated attack prior to the commission of the crime charged, and ending with a
positive diagnosis of insanity immediately following the commission of the act
complained of. Upon the other hand, there are facts and circumstances of record
which can not be overlooked.The following considerations have weighed heavily upon
the minds of the majority of this court in arriving at a conclusion different from that
reached by the court below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the
prosecution, it appears that the herein defendant-appellant, during the periods
from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to January 10, 1926, was
confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a
disease diagnosed as dementia præcox. His confinement during these periods, it
is true, was long before the commission of the offense on December 12, 1934, but
this is a circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of the ailment at
the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any rational or
scientific foundation.
(b) All persons suffering from dementia præcox are clearly to be regarded as
having mental disease to a degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for
their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in
Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I, p. 613).
89
According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular Psychopathic Hospital,
the symptoms of dementia præcox, in certain peeriods of excitement, are similar
to those of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.) and, in either case, the mind
appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes affected by this kind of
disease, either dementia præcox or manic depresive psychosis, during the period
of excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if
viewed under the general medico-legal classification of manic-depressive insanity,
"it is largely in relation with the question of irrestible impulse that forensic relations
of manic actions will have to be considered. There is in this disorder a pathologic
lessening or normal inhibitions and the case with which impulses may lead to
actions impairs deliberations and the use of normal checks to motor impulses"
(Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol,
I, p. 617).
(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco,
at one time an interne at San LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately
preceding December 12, 1934 — the date when the crime was committed
— the defendant and appellant had "an attack of insomnia", which is one of
the symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia præcox (Exhibit 3, defense
testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).
(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the
police station on the very same day of the perpetration of the crime, and
although attempted were made by detectives to secure a statement from
him (see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10)
he was sent by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day
following the commission of the crime. This is an indication that the police
authorities themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the acused, which
doubt found confirmation in the official reports submitted by the specialists
of the San Lazaro Hospital.
(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio
Joson, which report was made within the first month of treatment, the
defendant was suffering from a form of psychosis, called manic depressive
psychosis.We quote the report in full:
INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL
MANDALUYONG, RIZAL
January 15, 1935.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic
Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,
Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.
1. MENTAL STATUS:
(a) General behavior. — The patient is undetective, staying most of the time in his
bed with his eyes closed and practically totally motionless. At other times, however,
but on very rare occassions and at short intervals he apparently wakes up and then
he walks around, and makes signs and ritualistic movements with the extremities and
other parts of the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he refuses to take
even the food offered by his mother or sister, so that there have been days in the
hospital when he did not take any nourishment. On several occassions he refused to
have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear untidy. He
would also sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some of the intervals he
displayed impulsive acts, such as stricking his chest or other parts of the body with
his fists and at one time after a short interview, he struck strongly with his fist the
door of the nurse's office without apparent motivation. He also sometimes laughs, or
smiles, or claps his hands strongly without provocation.
(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to
speak, and would not answer in any form the questions propounded to him. Very
often he is seen with his eyes closed apparently praying as he was mumbling words
but would not answer at all when talked to. At one time he was seen in this condition
with a cross made of small pieces of strick in his hand. He at times during the
interviews recited passages in the literature as for example the following.
"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del hombre.
(Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are among the attributes of a dependable
character.)"
At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.
(c) Mood. — Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks
anxious and rather irritable. He himself states that the often feels said in the hospital.
(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was acccessible he was found
oriented as to place and person but he did not know the day or the date.
(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states that during the nights that he
could not sleep he could hear voices telling him many things. Voices, for example,
told that he should escape. That he was going to be killed because he was
benevolet. That he could sometimes see the shadow of his former sweetheart in the
hospital. There are times however when he could not hear or see at all anything.
90
(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occassion he told the examiner that
he could not talk in his first day in the hospital because of a mass he felt he had in
his throat. He sometimes thinks that he is already dead and already buried in the La
Loma Cemetery.
(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.
(h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but his
memory for recent events or for example, for events that took place during his stay
in the hospital he has no recollection at all.
(i) Grasp of general informartion. — He has a fairly good grasp of general
information. He could not, however, do simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.
( j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might have
been insane during his first days in the hospital, but just during the interview on
January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment were, of course, nil during
his stuporous condition. During the last two days he has shown marked
improvement in his behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent in his speech.
2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:
The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering from a
form of physchosis, called Manic depressive psychosis.
(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M.
Assistant Alienist
In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A.
Fernandez, another assistant alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the
following conclusion was reached:
I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the Manic
Depressive form of psychosis. It might be premature to state before the court has
decided this case, but I believe it a duty to state, that this person is not safe to be at
large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality lacking in control,
overtly serious in his dealings with the every day events of this earthly world, taking
justice with his own hands and many times executing it in an impulsive manner as
to make his action over proportionate — beyond normal acceptance. He is
sensitive, overtly religious, too idealistic has taste and desires as to make him
queer before the average conception of an earthly man.
He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.
(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused at
the time of the commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso
Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from
the latter for the reason for the assault and the defendant-appellant replied that the
deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that appellant bought the knife,
Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been
watching for Guison in order to kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective,
was also called and corroborated the testimony of policeman Arnoco. That such kind
of evidence is not necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the
commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of
Forensic Medicine, University of Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d
ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of dementia præcox, "the crime is ussually
preceded by much complaining andplanning. In these people, homicidal attcks are
common, because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their
property is being taken."
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was
demented at the time he perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information
and that conseuently he is exempt from criminal liability. Accordingly, the judgment of
the lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with
costs de oficio in both instances. In conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code, the defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro
Hospital or such other hospital for the insane as may be desiganted by the Director of
the Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First Instance
of Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.
D.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
IMPERIAL, J., dissenting:
I agree with the dissenting opinions of Hustices Diaz and Concepcion.
There is not question as to the facts constituting the crime imputed to the accused.
The disagreement arises from the conclusions which both opinions attempt to infer
therefrom. The majority opinon establishes the conclusion that the accused was not in
his sound mind when he committed the crime because he was then suffering
from dementia præcox. The dissenting opinions, in establishing the conclusion that the
accused was then in the possession of his mental facilities, or, at leats, at a lucid
91
interval, are based on the fact admitted by the parties and supported by expert
testimony, that the accused, before the commission of the crime, had been cured
of dementia præcox and later of manic depressive psychosis. The majority opinion
admits that there is no positive evidence regarding the mantal state of the accused
when he comitted the crime, but it infers from the facts that he must have then been
deprived of his reason. This inference is not sufficiently supported by the circumtantial
evidence. I it is admitted that the legal presumption is that a person who commits a
crime is in his right mind (U. S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil., 62; U. S. vs.
Guevara, 27 Phil., 547; U. S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil., 218; U. S. vs. Martinez, 34 Phil.,
305; People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil., 204), because the law presumes all acts and
ommissions punishable by law to be voluntary (art. 1, Penal Code; article 4,
subsection 1, Revised Penal Code), and if, as it appears, there is sufficient or
satisfactory evidence that the accused was mentally incapacitated when he committed
the crime, the conclusion of fact must be the same presumption established by law,
that is, that he was in his right mind, and the conclusion of law must be that he is
criminal liable.
The appellant was afflicted with insanity only for a few days during the months stated
in the majority opinion; April 1922 and January 1926, but he was later pronounced
cured in the hospital where he had been confined because he had already returned to
normalcy by recovering his reason. For this one fact alone, instead of stating that he
acted during a lucid interval on said occasion, it should be said on the contrary, taking
into consideration the explanations given by him to the policemen who arrested him
and to other witnesses for the prosecution with whom he had been talking before and
after the incident, that he acted while in the full possession of his mental faculties.
The fact that the appellant was aflicted with manic depressive psychosis after the
crime, as certified by Drs. Toribio Joson, J. A. Fernandez and Elias Domingo who
examined him, does not prove that he was so afflicted on the date and at the time of
the commission of the crime nor that said ailment, taking for granted that he was
suffering therefrom, had deprived him of his reason to such an extent that he could not
account for his acts.

There is no evidence of record to show that the appellant was actually insane when he
There is another detail worth mentioning which is that no credit was given to the
committed the crime or that he continued to be afflicted with said ailment for which he
conclusions of fact arrived at by the judge who tried the case. He observed and heard
had to be confined in the insane asylum for some days during the months above-
the witnesses who testified and he had the advantage of testing their credibility
stated, in 1922 and 1926. The most reasonable rule which should be adopted in these
nearby. After weighing all the evidence he arrived at the conclusion that the accused
cases is the one followed by various courts of the United States stated in 32 C. J.,
committed the crime while he was in his right mind. This court generally gives much
757, section 561, and 16 C. J., 538, 539, section 1012 as follows:
weight to the conclusions of fact of the judge who tried the case in the first instance
and does not reject them useless they are clearly in conflict with the evidence.
If the insanity, admitted, or proved, is only occassional or intermittent in its
nature, the presumption of its continuance does not arise, and he who relies
DIAZ, J., dissenting:
on such insanity proved at another time must prove its existence also at the
time alleged. (32 C. J., 757, sec. 561.)
I do not agree to the majority opinion. The appellant committed the crime while he was
sane, or at least, during a lucid interval. He did not kill his victim without rhyme or
Where it is shown that defendant had lucid intervals, it will be presumed that
reason and only for the sake of killing him. He did so to avenge himself or to punish
the offense was committed in one of them. A person who has been
his victim for having refused, according to him, to pay a debt of P55 after having made
adjudged insane, or who has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum
him many promises. He so stated clearly to the policeman who arrested him
for the insane, is presumed to continue insane; but as in the case of prior
immediately after the incident; and he made it so understood to the witness Mariano
insanity generally, a prior adjudication of insanity does not raise a
Yamson, a friend of both the appellant and his victim, before the commission of the
presumption of continued insanity, where the insanity is not of a permanent
crime.
or continuing character, or where, for a considerable period of time, the
person has been on parole from the hospital or asylum to which he was
The law presumes that everybody is in his sound mind because ordinarily such is his committed, or where he escaped from the asylum at a time when he was
normal condition. Insanity is an exception which may be said to exist only when about to be discharged. (16 C. J., 538, 539, sec. 1012.)
thereis satisfactorily evidence establishing it and it certainly is not always permanent
because there are cases in which it comes and takes place only occasionaly and lasts
On the other hand, in Clevenger's Medical Jirusprudence of Insanity (vol. 1, pp. 482
more or less time according to the circumstances of the individual, that is, the
and 484, the following appears:
condition of his health, his environment, and the other contributory causes thereof.
The law itself recognizes this, so much so that in establishing the rule that insane
persons are excempt from criminal liability, because they commit no crime, it also Fitful and exceptional attacks of insanity are not presumed to be continuous.
makes the exception that this is true only when they have not acted during a lucid And the existence of prior or subsequent lunacy, except where it is habitual,
intervals (art. 12, subsec. 1, of the Revised Penal Code). does not suffice to change the burden of proof. And where an insane person
has lucid intervals offenses committed by him will be presumed to have
been committed in a lucid intervals unless the contrary appears. The maxim

92
 "Once insane presumed always to be insane" does not apply where the
malady or delusion under which the alleged insane person labored was in
its nature accidental or temporary, or the effect of some sickness or
disease.
And in order to raise a presumption of continuance it must be of permanent
type or a continuing nature or possessed of the characteristics of an
habitual and confirmed disorder of the mind. And it must appear to have
been of such duration and character as to indicate the probability of its
continuance, and not simply the possibility or probability of its recurrence.
And there should be some evidence tending to show settled insanity as
contradistinguished from temporary aberration or hallucination, to justify an
instruction which does nor recognize such a distinction.
It is alleged that the appellant was suffering from insomia before he committed the
crime in question. Such condition does not necessarily prove that on the day in
question he was actually insane. Insomia, according to Dr. Elias Domingo, is not an
exlcusive symptom of insanity; other diseases and ailments also have it (t. s. n., p.19).
In view of the foregoing considerations and of those stated in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Concepcion, I vote for the affirmance of the appealed sentence, because in my
opinion it is supported by the evidence and in accordance with law.
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
I dissent: Above all, I wish to state: (1) that the crime committed by the accused is an
admitted fact; and (2) that I adhere to the statement of the majority that it is settled in
this jurisdiction that a defense based upon the insanity of the accused should be
established by means of clear, indubitable and satisfactory evidence.
On December 12, 1934, the accused stabbed the deceased Carlos Guison who, as a
result the wounds received by him, died in the hospital two days after the aggression.
It is alleged that the accused was insane at the time he committed this crime. What
evidence is there of record in support of this defense? Mention has been made of the
fact that the accused had been confined in the san Lazaro Hospital and later in the
Psychopathic Hospital. He was confined in the San Lazaro Hospital from April 11 to
April 26, 1922. He returned to the hospital on January 6, 1926, and left on the 10th of
said month and years. Dr Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital
was questioned as follows:
Q. When he left the hospital, can you state whether he was already
completely cured of his insanity? — A. He wassocially adjustable.
Q. What do you mean by socially adjustable? — A. That he could adapt
himself to environment.
There is no evidence that from the month of January, 1926, when he was declared
cured at the Psychopathic Hospital, to December 12, 1934, the date of the crime, he
had shown signs of having had a relapse. Therefore it is a proven fact during the long
period of nine years the accused had been sane.
It is alleged, however, that four days before the crime the accused was under
treatment by Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco because he was suffering from insomia. Dr.
Francisco admitted that he was not a specialist in mental diseases. He is, therefore,
disqualified from testifying satisfactorily on the mental condition of the accused four
days before the crime; and in fact neither has Dr. Francisco given any convincing
testimony to prove that when the accused was under treatment by him he was
suffering from dementia præcox, as the only thing he said was that the accused-
appellant had an attack of insomia which is one of the symptoms of and may lead
to dementia præcox(Exhibit 3; t. s. n., pp. 13, 14). This is not an affirmation of a fact
but of a mere possibility. The innoncence of the accused cannot be based on mere
theories or possibilities. To prove insanity as a defense, material, incontrovertible
facts, although circumstantial, are necessary.
On the contrary the evidence shows that on the day the accused committed the crime
he talked and behaved as an entirely normal man. Policemen Damaso T. Arnoco and
Benjamin Cruz testified that the accused, after having been asked why he had
attacked Carlos Guison, replied that it was because Guison owed him P55 for a long
time and did not pay him. The accused stated that he bought the knife with which he
had stabbed Guison on Tabora Street for fifty centavos and he had been waiting for
two days to kill Guison. The accused took his dinner at noon on December 12th. The
statement of the accused which was taken in writing by detectives Charles Strubel and
Manalo on December12th was left unfinished because Cruz of the Bureau of Labor
arrived and told the accused not to be a fool and not to make any statement.
Thereafter the accused refused to continue his statement. All of these show that on
that day the accused behaved as a sane man and he even appeared to be prudent,
knowing how to take advantage of advice favorable to him, as that given him by Cruz
of the Bureau of Labor. Furthermore it cannot be said hat the accused had stabbed
Guison through hallucination because it is an established fact that his victim really
owed him money as confirmed by the fact that when Guison was stabbed he cried to
the accused "I am going to pay you", according to the testimony of an eyewitness.
Therefore the motive of the aggression was a real and positive fact: vengeance.
Some days after the commission of the crime, the accused was placed under
observation in the Psychopathic Hospital because he showed symptoms of a form of
psychosis called depressive psychosis from which he had already been cured when
the case was tried. This pyschosis is of course evidence that the accused was afflicted
with this ailment after the commission of the crime. It would not be casual to affirm that
the commission of the crime had affected his reason. Nervous shock is one of the
causes of insanity (Angeles, Legal Medicine, p. 728); but it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the accused was also mentally deranged on the day of the crime, aside
from the ciscumstance that the evidence shows just the contrary. I am, therefore, of
the opinion that the appealed sentence should be affirmed.
93
Republic of the Philippines The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by Felicula's failure
SUPREME COURT to buy medicine for Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a
Manila heated alteration. Felicula told her husband that it would be better if he were dead
("Mas maayo ka pang mamatay"). That remark infuriated Ambal and impelled him to
attack his wife (Exh. 1).
SECOND DIVISION

On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with parricide in the
G.R. No. L-52688 October 17, 1980
municipal court. After a preliminary examination, the case was elevated to the Court of
First Instance where on March 4, 1977 the fiscal filed against Ambal an information for
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.
vs.
HONORATO AMBAL, accused-appellant.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's counsel de oficio
manifested that the defense of Ambal was insanity.

AQUINO, J.:
Honorato Ambal appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camiguin
convicting him of parricide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to
pay an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of his deceased wife, Felicula
Vicente-Ambal (Criminal Case No. 155-C).
The trial court in its order of September 15, 1977 directed the municipal health officer,
Doctor Maximino R. Balbas, Jr., a 1960 medical graduate who had undergone a six-
month training in psychiatry in the National Mental Hospital, to examine Ambal and to
submit within one month a report on the latter's mental condition (p. 65, Record).
Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977 found that Ambal was a "passive-
aggressive, emotionally unstable, explosive or inadequate personality" (Exh. 1).

In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found under some flowering
plants near the house of Honorato Ambal located in Barrio Balbagon, Mambajao,
Camiguin, Felicula Vicente-Ambal, 48, mortally wounded. She asked for drinking
water and medical assistance.
She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her body. She was placed in
an improvised hammock and brought to the hospital where she died forty minutes
after arrival thereat (Exh. B and G).
Doctor Balbas testified that during the period form February 1 (twelve days after the
killing) to November 3, 1977, when he placed Ambal under observation, the latter did
not show any mental defect and was normal (44-46 tsn November 3,1977).
Asked directly whether Ambal suffered from a mental disease or defect, Doctor Balbas
replied: "Before the commission of the crime, he was normal. After the commission of
the crime, normal, but during the commission of the crime, that is what we call
"Psychosis" due to short frustration tolerance" (45 tsn).

On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula, after entrusting his child
to a neighbor, went to the house of the barangay captain and informed the latter's
spouse that he (Honorato) had killed his wife Feling. After making that oral confession,
Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and surrendered to a policeman, also
confessing to the latter that he had liquidated his wife.
The policeman confiscated Ambal's long bolo, the tip of which was broken (Exh. F).
Ambal was bespattered with blood. His shirt was torn. He appeared to be weak.
The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels and
bickerings which were exacerbated by the fact that the wife sometimes did not stay in
the conjugal abode and chose to spend the night in the poblacion of Mambajao. The
couple had eight children.
Doctor Cresogono Llacuna,a 1937 medical graduate who undertook a two-month
observation of mental cases and who in the course of his long practice had treated
around one hundred cases of mental disorders, attended to Ambal in 1975. He found
that Ambal suffered from a psychoneurosis, a disturbance of the functional nervous
system which is not insanity (65 November 15, 1977). The doctor concluded that
Ambal was not insane. Ambal was normal but nervous (68 He had no mental disorder.
Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on November 16, 1977 or about ten
months after the incident. He said that at the time of the killing he did not know what
he was doing because he was allegedly not in full possession of his normal mental
faculties. He pretended not to know that he was charged with the capital offense of
having killed his wife.
But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead because he was informed of her
death. During his confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked food for his

94
fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he worked in the town plaza or was sent unescorted to
buy food in the market.
He said that his wife quarrelled with him. She was irritable. he admitted that he rode
on a tricycle when he surrendered on the day of the killing. He remembered that a
week before the incident he got wet while plowing. He feel asleep without changing his
clothes. At midnight, when he woke up, he had chills. That was the commencement,
his last illness.
The trial court concluded from Ambal's behavior immediately after the incident that he
was not insane and that he acted like a normal human being. We agree with the
court's conclusion.
Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from
passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression
resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against
sane murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of
insanity. (People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 94.)
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability an imbecile or an
insane person unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. *
According to the dictionary imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency while an
insane person is one who has an unsound mind or suffers from a mental disorder.
"imbecil vale tanto como escaso de razon y es loco el que ha perdido el juico." An
insane person may have lucid intervals but "el embecil no puede tener, no tiene estos
intervalos de Corazon, pues en el no hay una alteracion, sino una carencia del juico
mismo" (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92.)
Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or
defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of
the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or
disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or
disordered volition" (Sec. 1039, Revised Administrative Code).
The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary (Art. 800, Civil Code re
Testamentary Succession; U.S. vs. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305, 308).
The law always presumes all acts to be voluntary. It is improper to
presume that acts were executed unconsciously (People vs. Cruz,
109 Phil. 288, 292; People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147, 153; U.S. vs.
Guevara, 27 Phil. 547; People vs. Fausto, 113 Phil. 841).
When there is no proof that the defendant was not of sound mind
at the time he performed the criminal act charged to him, or that
he performed it at the time of madness or of mental derangement,
or that he was generally considered to be insane — his habitual
condition being, on the contrary, healthy — the legal presumption
is that he acted in his ordinary state of mind and the burden is
upon the defendant to overcome this presumption (U.S. vs.
Zamora, 32 Phil. 218.)
Without positive proof that the defendant had lost his reason or
was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration
of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition
(U.S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil. 62).
A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental incapacity, has
the burden of establishing that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very moment
when the crime was committed (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204.)
What should be the criterion for insanity or imbecility? We have adopted the rule,
based on Spanish jurisprudence, that in order that a person could be regarded as an
imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime (People vs. Formigonez, 87 Phil. 658, 660)
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be
complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused
acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not
exclude imputability. (People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288,292; People vs. Renegado, L-
27031, May 31,1974,57 SCRA 275, 286.)
A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and who tried to vindicate his honor by
taking violent measures to the extent of killing his wife (whom he suspected of
infidelity) can hardly be regarded as an imbecile (Formigones case).
Where the accused had a passionate nature, with a tendency to having violent fits
when angry, his acts of breaking glasses and smashing dishes are indications of an
explosive temper and not insanity, especially considering that he did not turn violent
when a policeman intercepted him after he had killed his wife. (Cruz case.)
There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who
has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to
use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons who get
into a quarrel or fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight.
An extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a madman.
The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is
insane. The popular meaning of the word I "crazy" is not
synonymous with the legal terms "insane", "non compos mentis,"
"unsound mind","idiot", or "lunatic" (U.S. vs. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88,
91.)
95
 The heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger,
hatred, or revenge is not insanity. (People vs. Foy, 138 N.Y. 664,
cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 92.)
One who, in possession of a sound and, commits a criminal act
under the impulse of passion or revenge, which may temporarily
dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot
nevertheless be shielded from the consequences of the act by the
plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of a
criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the
person committing it was insane, and that the offense was the
direct consequence of his insanity (State vs. Strickly, 41 Iowa
232, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 94.)
The defense of insanity was rejected in a case where the accused killed by
strangulation a sixteen-year-old girl, who got leaves from his banana plants, and sliced
the flesh of her legs, thighs and shoulders, cooked the flesh and ate it like a cannibal.
(People vs. Balondo, L-27401, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 155).
Being weak-minded does not necessarily mean that the accused is insane (People vs.
Martin, 120 Phil. 14, 20-21).
Justice Cardozo in his article, "What Medicine Can Do For The Law", traces briefly the
origin of the rule regarding insanity as a defense. He says:
In the early stages of our law, way back in medieval times,
insanity was never a defense for crime. The insane killer, like the
man who killed in self-defense, might seek a pardon from the
king, and would often get one. He had no defense at law.
Gradually insanity was allowed, but only within narrow limits This
was what was become known as the wild-beast stage of the
defense. Then the limits of the defense were expanded, but still
slowly and narrowly. The killer was excused if the disease of the
mind was such that he was incapable of appreciating the
difference between right and wrong. At first this meant, not the
right and wrong of particular case, but right and wrong generally
or in the abstract, the difference, as it was sometimes said,
between good and evil. Later, the rule was modified in favor of the
prisoner so that capacity to distinguish between right and wrong
generally would not charge with responsibility if there was no
capacity to understand the difference in relation to the particular
act, the subject of the crime.
The rule governing the subject was crystallized in England in
1843 by the answer made by the House of Lords to questions
submitted by judges in the famous case of McNaghten, who was
tried for the murder of one Drummond, the secretary of Sir Robert
Peel.
In the M'Naghten case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, Clark and Finelly 200, the following rule was
laid down: "To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a
defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not, to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong."
In the M'Naghten case, it appears that Daniel M'Naghten shot Edward Drummond on
January 20, 1843. Drummond died as a consequence of the gunshot wound on April
25, 1843. Drummond was the private secretary of Sir Robert Peel, prime minister
M'Naghten shot Drummond, thinking he was Sir Robert. M'Naghten labored under the
the insane delusion that he was being hounded by his enemies and that the prime
minister was one of them. Medical evidence tended to prove that M'Naghten was
affected by morbid delusions which carried him beyond the power of his own control,
leaving him unable to distinguish right and wrong, and that he was incapable of
controlling his conduct in connection with the delusion. The jury found him not guilty by
reason of insanity.
As stated in another case, the "test of the responsibility for criminal acts, when insanity
is asserted, is the capacity of the accused to distinguish between right and wrong at
the time and with respect to the act which is the subject of the inquiry. (Coleman's
case,1 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 1.)
Another test is the so-called "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming
defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and his knowledge that the
act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or
lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent himself from doing the act,
then he cannot be found guilty." The commission of the crime is excused even if the
accused knew what he was doing was wrong provided that as a result of mental
disease he lacked the power to resist the impulse to commit the act. (State v. White,
270 Pac. 2d. 727, 730; Leslie Kast, 31 North Dakota Law Review, pp. 170, 173.)
The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called right wrong test, supplemented by the
irresistible impulse test, does not alone supply adequate criteria for determining
criminal responsibility of a person alleged mental incapacity." "An accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a mental
defect. A mental disease relieving an accused of criminal responsibility for his unlawful
act is a condition considered capable of improvement or deterioration; a mental defect
having such effect on criminal responsibility is a condition not considered capable of
improvement or deterioration, and either congenital, or the result of injury or of a
physical or mental disease." (Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F. 2nd. 862, 874, 45 A.L.R.
2d. 1430 [1954].)
96
As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, "the general test of criminal responsibility may be stated to
be the capacity to understand the nature and consequences of the act charged and
the ability to distinguish between right and wrong as to such act, and in a majority of
jurisdictions this is the exclusive test."
And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the M'Naghten case exists along with
the "irresistible impulse" test or some other formula permitting a defendant to be
exculpated on the ground that, although he knew the act was wrong, he was unable to
refrain from committing it.
Since the broadest test suggested, which is the Durham or
"Product" rule, also permits inability to distinguish between right
and wrong to be considered, even though it refuses to limit the
inquiry to that topic, it would appear that insanity which meets this
test is a defense in all Anglo-American jurisdictions and that the
only controversy is over whether there are some cases in which
the right-and-wrong test is not met, but in which a defense on
grounds of insanity should nevertheless be recognized. (21 Am
Jur 2d 118.)
In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any
sufficient evidence. The presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not
completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he mortally
wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any mental disease or defect.
The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law-
enforcing authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was
wrong and that he was going to be punished for it.
Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to
the authorities. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide
with reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser penalty should be imposed because of
the presence of one mitigating circumstance and the absence of aggravating
circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Fernandez and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Justice Concepcion, Jr., is on leave.
Justice Fernandez was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., (Chairman), concurring:
I concur in the judgment in this case on the bases of existing local jurisprudence cited
in the main opinion. The brilliant and scholarly dissertation by Justice Aquino in his
main opinion deserve full study and consideration, but I prefer to lavish myself to the
rulings on insanity in our jurisprudence which I feel adequately provide enough basis
for clear judgment.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur in finding Honorato Ambal guilty of parricide and reclusion perpetua is the
correct penalty. However, I wish to add these observations: The wife of the appellant
appears to have been a shrew. The worst thing that can happen to a person is to have
an unbearable spouse. The deceased was a neglectful wife. She stayed away from
the conjugal home at time and prior to her death she failed to buy medicine for her
husband who had influenza and even had the gall to tell him, "mas maayo ka
pangpatay." This, together with the mental condition of Ambal described in the main
opinion, should entitle him to two additional mitigating circumstances, namely:
obfuscation (Art. 13, par. 6, R.P.C.) and illness (Idem., par. 9.) To be sure, the
presence of these additional mitigating circumstances will not cause the reduction of
the penalty because Art. 63, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code prevails over Art. 64,
par. 5 of the same Code. (People vs. Relador, 60 Phil. 593 [1934].) But under the
circumstances the appellant is deserving of executive clemency and I so recommend.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., (Chairman), concurring:
I concur in the judgment in this case on the bases of existing local jurisprudence cited
in the main opinion. The brilliant and scholarly dissertation by Justice Aquino in his
main opinion deserve full study and consideration, but I prefer to lavish myself to the
rulings on insanity in our jurisprudence which I feel adequately provide enough basis
for clear judgment.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur in finding Honorato Ambal guilty of parricide and reclusion perpetua is the
correct penalty. However, I wish to add these observations: The wife of the appellant
appears to have been a shrew. The worst thing that can happen to a person is to have
an unbearable spouse. The deceased was a neglectful wife. She stayed away from
the conjugal home at time and prior to her death she failed to buy medicine for her
97
husband who had influenza and even had the gall to tell him, "mas maayo ka
pangpatay." This, together with the mental condition of Ambal described in the main
opinion, should entitle him to two additional mitigating circumstances, namely:
obfuscation (Art. 13, par. 6, R.P.C.) and illness (Idem., par. 9.) To be sure, the
presence of these additional mitigating circumstances will not cause the reduction of
the penalty because Art. 63, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code prevails over Art. 64,
par. 5 of the same Code. (People vs. Relador, 60 Phil. 593 [1934].) But under the
circumstances the appellant is deserving of executive clemency and I so recommend.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33211 June 29, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ERNESTO PUNO y
FILOMENO, Accused whose death sentence is under review.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a defense the exempting
circumstance of insanity.chanrobles virtual law library
There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of September 8, 1970,
Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver, entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col
(Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. The house was located in the area known as Little Baguio,
Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal
On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying: "Mangkukulam ka
mambabarang mayroon kang bubuyog". Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck
her several times on the head with a hammer until she was dead.chanrobles virtual
law library
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in the bedroom with the
old woman, and by Lina Pajes, 27, a tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that
Puno's eyes were reddish. His look was baleful and menacing. Puno was a neighbor
of Aling Kikay.chanrobles virtual law library
After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken refuge, and,
according to Hilaria, he made the following confession and threat: "Huwag kayong
magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi
ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda." Or, according to Lina, Puno said:
"Pinatay ko na iyong matanda. Huwag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo
ng pulis, kayo ang paghihigantihan ko. "
After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio Tugatog, Malabon and then
went to the house of his second cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San Jose,
Calumpit, Bulacan, reaching that place in the evening. How he was able to go to that
place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the record.chanrobles virtual law library
Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left, notified the Malabon
police of the killing. Corporal Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He found Aling Kikay
sprawled on her bed already dead, Her head was bloody. Her blanket and pillows
were bloodstained. He took down the statements of Lina and Hilaria at the police
station. They pointed to Puno as the killer (pp. 15- 17, Record).chanrobles virtual law
library
A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an autopsy.
He certified that the victim had lacerated wounds on her right eyebrow and contusions
on the head caused by a hard instrument, On opening the skull, the doctor found
extensive and generalized hemorrhage. The cause of death was intracranial,
traumatic hemorrhage (Exh. A).chanrobles virtual law library
Puno's father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon policemen brought him to
the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10, 1970 (p. 14,
Record). He was charged with murder in the municipal court. He waived the second
stage of the preliminary investigation.chanrobles virtual law library
On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at
Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the information as aggravating circumstances were evident
premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex.chanrobles virtual law library
Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five months after the
killing, pretended that he did not remember having killed Aling Kikay- He believes that
there are persons who are "mangkukulam," "mambabarang" and "mambubuyog and
that when one is victimized by those persons, his feet might shrink or his hands might
swan. Puno believes that a person harmed by a "mambabarang" might have a
headache or a swelling nose and ears and can be cured only by a quack doctor
(herbolaryo). Consequently, it is necessary to kill the "mangkukulam" and
"mambabarang".chanrobles virtual law library
Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children. He is married with two children.
He finished third year high school. His father is a welder. Among his friends are
drivers. (Exh- B).chanrobles virtual law library
Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno's wife, testified that on the night before the murder, Puno's
eyes were reddish. He complained of a headache. The following day while he was
feeding the pigs, he told Zenaida that a bumble bee was coming towards him and he
warded it off with his hands. Zenaida did not see any bee.chanrobles virtual law library
98
Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of his mother. He
wanted to use that cord in tying his dog. He asked for another rope when Zenaida
admonished him not to use that cord. Puno tied the dog to a tree by looping the rope
through its mouth and over its head. He repeatedly boxed the dog.chanrobles virtual
law library
Aida Gabriel, Zenaida's elder sister, saw Puno while he was boxing that dog. Aida
observed that Puno's eyes were bloodshot and his countenance had a ferocious
expression.chanrobles virtual law library
Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno came to
their house in Barrio San Jose, Calumpit. Ernesto was soaking wet as there was a
flood in that place. He was cuddling a puppy that he called "Diablo". He called for
Teotimo's mother who invited him to eat. Ernesto did not eat. Instead, he fed the
puppy.chanrobles virtual law library
Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an English song. When
Teotimo asked him to change his wet clothes, Ernesto refused. Later, he tried on the
clothes of Teotimo's father. When told that Teotimo's father had been dead for a
couple of years already, Ernesto just looked at Teotimo.chanrobles virtual law library
While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he emitted a moaning
sound until he fell asleep. Ernesto was awakened the next morning by the noise
caused by persons wading in the flood. Ernesto thought they were his
fellow cursillistas.chanrobles virtual law library
The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that puno was
insane when he killed Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that Puno acted with
discernment.chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R. Reyes
Memorial Hospital, to whom Puno was referred for treatment ten times between
September 8, 1966 and July 24, 1970, testified that Puno was an out-patient who
could very well live with society, although he was afflicted with "schizophrenic
reaction"; that Puno knew what he was doing and that he had psychosis, a slight
destruction of the ego. Puno admitted to Doctor Maravilia that one cause of his
restlessness, sleeplessness and irritability was his financial problem (7 tsn November
4, 1970). Doctor Maravilla observed that Puno on July 4, 1970 was already
cured.chanrobles virtual law library
Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno was first
brought to that hospital on July 28, 1962 because his parents complained that he
laughed alone and exhibited certain eccentricities such as kneeling, praying and
making his body rigid. Doctor Robles observed that while Puno was suffering from
"schizophrenic reaction", his symptoms were "not socially incapacitating" and that he
could adjust himself to his environment (4 tsn January 20, 1971). He agreed with
Doctor Maravilla's testimony.chanrobles virtual law library
Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National Mental Hospital, testified
that from his examination of Puno, he gathered that Puno acted with discernment
when he committed the killing and that Puno could distinguish between right and
wrong (5 tsn January 1 1, 197 1). Doctor Vicente also concluded that Puno was not
suffering from any delusion and that he was not mentally deficient; otherwise, he
would not have reached third year high school (8-19 tsn January 1 1, 197
1).chanrobles virtual law library
On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of the offense, Doctors
Vicente, Robles and Victorina V. Manikan of the National Mental Hospital submitted
the following report on Puno (Exh. B or 2):
Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient Service
of the National Mental Hospital for schizophrenia in 1962 from which he recovered; in
1964 a relapse of the same mental illness when he improved and in 1966 when his
illness remained unimproved.chanrobles virtual law library
His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at the San Lazaro
Compound up to July, 1970. He was relieved of symptoms and did not come back
anymore for medication. On September 8, 1970, according to information, he was able
to kill an old woman. Particulars of the offense are not given.
MENTAL CONDITION
... Presently, he is quiet and as usual manageable. He is fairly clean in person and
without undue display of emotion. He talks to co-patients but becomes evasive when
talking with the doctor and other personnel of the ward. He knows he is accused of
murder but refuses to elaborate on it.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS
In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who previously was suffering from a
mental illness called schizophrenia, is presently free from any social incapacitating
psychotic symptoms.
The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and amnesia of several isolated
accounts in his life do not fit the active pattern of a schizophrenic process. It may be
found in an acutely disturbed and confused patient or a markedly, retarded individual
of which he is not.chanrobles virtual law library
However, persons who recover from an acute episode of mental illness like
schizophrenia may retain some residual symptoms impairing their judgment but not
necessarily their discernment of right from wrong of the offense committed.
99
The foregoing report was submitted pusuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court and the
order of the trial court dated November 16, 1970 for the mental examination of Puno in
the National Mental Hospital to determine whether he could stand trial and whether he
was sane when he committed the killing.chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the killing of Francisca Col
was wrong and that he would be punished for it, as shown by the threats which he
made to Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the old woman's companions who
witnessed his dastardly deed.chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had gone
berserk, he would have killed also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he singled out Aling
Kikay signified that he really disposed of her because he thought that she was a
witch.chanrobles virtual law library
Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he "meticulously observed the
conduct and behavior of the accused inside the court, most especially when he was
presented on the witness stand" and he was convinced "that the accused is sane and
has full grasp of what was happening" in his environment.chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to death and ordered him to
pay the heirs of the victim an indemnity of twenty-two thousand pesos (Criminal Case
No. 509).chanrobles virtual law library
His counsel de oficio in this review of the death sentence, contends that the trial court
erred in not sustaining the defense of insanity and in appreciating evident
premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex as aggravating
circumstances.chanrobles virtual law library
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the evidence
on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very
moment of its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547). Insanity should be proven by
clear and positive evidence (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204).chanrobles virtual law
library
The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col because he
had chronic schizophrenia since 1962; he was suffering from schizophrenia on
September 8, 1970, when he liquidated the victim, and schizophrenia is a form of
psychosis which deprives a person of discernment and freedom of will.chanrobles
virtual law library
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime (People vs- Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660).chanrobles virtual
law library
Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act,
that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment
because there is complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is total
deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability." (People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October 17, 1980; People
vs. Renegade, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275, 286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil.
288, 292. As to "el trastorno mental transitorio as an exempting circumstance, see I
Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 15th Ed., 1974. pp. 498-504 and art. 8 of the Spanish
Penal Code.)
After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions in the light of the strict rule just stated
and the circumstances surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that Puno
was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and helpless victim. The facts and
the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic occasion he was not
completely deprived of reason and freedom of will.chanrobles virtual law library
In People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the accused was confined in the
National Mental Hospital for thirteen days because he was suffering from
schizophrenia of the paranoid type. His confinement was recommended by Doctor
Antonio Casal of the San Miguel Brewery where the accused used to work as a
laborer. About one year and two months later, he killed Doctor Casal because the
latter refused to certify him for re-employment. His plea of insanity was rejected. He
was convicted of murder.chanrobles virtual law library
In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the killing as murder. The
qualifying circumstance is abuse of superiority. In liquidating Francisco Col, Puno, who
was armed with a hammer, took advantage of his superior natural strength over that of
the unarmed septuagenarian female victim who was unable to offer any resistance
and who could do nothing but exclaim " Diyos ko ".chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an
unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that
superiority which qqqs sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from
which the woman was unable to defend herself" (People vs. Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122,
1127 citing U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; U.S. vs. Camiloy 36 Phil. 757 and People
vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446).chanrobles virtual law library
Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be appreciated because the
evidence does not show (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the
crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination
and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the
crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Ablates, L-
33304, July 31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241, 247).chanrobles virtual law library
The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del culpable juntamente con
su serenidad o frialdad de animo." It is characterized (1) "por la concepcion del delito
y la resolucion de ejecutarlo firme, fria, reflexival meditada y detenida" and (2) "por la
100
persistencia en la resolucion de delinquir demostrada por el espacio de tiempo
transcurrido entre dicha resolucion y la ejecucion del hecho Premeditation should be
evident, meaning that it should be shown by "signos reiterados v externos, no de
meras sospechas" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 1974 or 15th Ed., pp- 582-
3).chanrobles virtual law library
Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of her old age
should be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances. Disregard of sex is not
aggravating because there is no evidence that the accused deliberately intended to
offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed manifest disrespect to her womanhood
(People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55
SCRA 382, 404, People vs, Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14 Phil.
190).chanrobles virtual law library
However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender to the authorities and, as contended by
counsel de oficio, the offender's mental illness (mild psychosis or schizophrenic
reaction) which diminished his will-power without however depriving him of
consciousness of his acts. (See People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, People vs. Amit,
82 Phil. 820 and People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658.)
Thus, it was held that la equivocada creencia de los acusados de que el matar a un
brujo es un bien al publico puede considerarse como una circunstancia atenuante
pues los que tienen la obsession de que los brujos deben ser eliminados estan en la
misma condicion que aquel que, atacado de enfermedad morbosa pero consciente
aun de lo que hace, no tiene verdadero imperio de su voluntad" (People vs. Balneg 79
Phil. 805, 810).chanrobles virtual law library
It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder should be imposed (Arts.
64[41 and 248, Revised Penal Code).chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua The indemnity imposed by the trial court is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, CJ., concurring:
I am unable to arrive at that stage of moral certainty as to the guilt of the accused and
hence concur in the dissent of Justice Makasiar, with the observation that the
reference in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Aquino to Ambat, where he was also the
ponente, with its learned and scholarly discourse on the law on insanity, gives me the
opportunity to express my preference for a liberal reading of Durham v. US, 1 therein
cited. For some eminent commentators, the M' Naghten doctrine no longer speaks
with authority. In the light of the advances in medical science there is, for me, a need
for the reexamination of what until now are authoritative pronouncements on this
subject.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The appellant should not be held liable for the crime of murder. He was
mentally ill when he committed the alleged killing of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), a 72-
year old widow. His medical records, as properly evaluated and confirmed by the
expert testimony of the three physicians/psychiatrists who examined and treated him,
undeniably establish the fact that appellant had been ailing with a psychotic disorder
medically known as chronic schizophrenia of the paranoid type.chanrobles virtual law
library
Inevitably, WE must look into the nature of appellant's mental disease. Thus, Noye's
Modern Clinical Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, explains:
Symptomatically, the schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and
bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness, suspiciousness, or periods of impulsive
destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently
directed and considered inappropriate by the observer. The interpersonal perceptions
are distorted in the more serious states by delusional and hallucinatory material. (p.
355, supra).
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish
between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.
Formerly called dementia praecox, it is the most common form of psychosis and
usually develops between the ages of 15 and 30 (Encyclopedia and Dictionary of
Medicine and Nursing, MillerKeane p. 860).chanrobles virtual law library
For a clear appreciation of appellant's mental condition, quoted hereunder are
pertinent portions of the discussion on the paranoid type of schizophrenia:
Paranoid Types. The features that tend to be most evident in this type or phase are
delusions, which are often numerous, illogical, and disregardful of reality,
hallucinations, and the usual schizophrenic disturbance of associations and of affect,
together with negativism.chanrobles virtual law library
Frequently the prepsychotic personality of the paranoid schizophrenic is characterized
by poor interpersonal rapport. Often he is cold, withdrawn, distrustful, and resentful of
other persons. Many are truculent, have a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude, and are
argumentative, scornful, sarcastic, defiant, resentful of suggestions or of authority, and
101
given to caustic remarks. Sometimes flippnant, facetious responses cover an
underlying hostility.
... The patient's previous negative attitudes become more marked, and
misinterpretations are common. Ideas of reference are among the first symptoms.
Disorders of association appear. Many patients show an unpleasant emotional
aggressiveness, Through displacement, the patient may begin to act out his hostile
impulses. His grip on reality begins to loosen. At first his delusions are limited, but
later they become numerous and changeable ... Delusions of persecution are the most
prominent occurrences in paranoid schizophrenia, but expansive and obviously wish-
fulfilling Ideas and hypochondriacal and depressive delusions are not uncommon.
With increasing personality disorganization, delusional beliefs become less logical.
Verbal expressions may be inappropriate and neologistic. The patient is subjected to
vague magical forces, and his explanations become extremely vague and irrational.
Imaginative fantasy may become extreme but take on the value of reality. Repressed
aggressive tendencies may be released in a major outburst some inarticulate
paranoids may manifest an unpredictable assaultiveness. Many paranoid
schizophrenics are irritable, discontented, resentful, and angrily suspicious and show
a surely aversion to being interviewed. Some manifest an unapproachable,
aggressively hostile attitude and may have in a bitter aloofness" Noye's Modern
Clinical Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, pp. 380 and 381, emphasis supplied).
On the prognosis of schizophrenia, the aforenamed source thus further states:
Occasionally one observes a schizophrenic episode of a mild, fleeting nature with no
subsequent recurrence In many instances, however, the favorable outcome should be
characterized as 'social recovery rather than as 'cured' or as full recovery. By this it is
meant that the patient is able to return to his previous social environment and to
previous or equivalent occupation, but with minor symptoms and signs, such as
irritability, shyness, or shallowness of affective responses.chanrobles virtual law library
From what has been said, it is evident that in any given case the effect upon the
personality and future adjustment of the appearance of a schizophrenic reaction may
be quite uncertain. In some cases the course is continuously progressive; in others it
is intermittent. More frequently it is a question of remissions and relapses in which,
although from the first interests and habits tend to be undermined insidiously, there
occur periods of adjustment at a lower level for a considerable period of time. It is
estimated that 40 per cent of' the schizophrenic patients who enter public mental
hospitals or clinics recover or improve; the other 60 per cent fail to improve or
ultimately suffer that permanent malignant disorganization of personality somewhat
inaccurately designated as deterioration Of committed patients who improve
sufficiently to be released, about 80 per cent leave the mental hospital within the first
year of residence. The expectancy of recovery falls with each year of continued
illness. Roughly, about one-third of those patients who are hospitalized during the first
year of their illness make a fairly complete recovery; one-third get a bit better and
become able to return to outside life but remain damaged personalities and may have
to return to the hospital from time to time. ... (pp. 387-388, supra emphasis supplied).
When appellant was examined and treated for the first time on July 28, 1962, his
father revealed the patient's initial symptoms of laughing alone and making gestures,
poor sleep and appetite, praying and kneeling always and making his body rigid (per
consultation chart, p. 154, CCC rec.). Upon interview on aforesaid date, appellant
stated that "he could see God" and "That a neighbor is bewitching her" ("pinapakulam
ako") Why? "hindi ko alam kung bakit" (p. 156, CCC rec.).chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant underwent eighteen (18) treatments and checkups from July 28, 1962 to
July 24, 1970 which covered eight (8) years before the alleged crime was committed
on September 8, 1970 (Medical Certificates, pp. 25 and 26, CCC rec.). In the medical
certificate dated September 15, 1970, the following was reflected:
Diagnosis - Schizophrenic Reaction - Recovered (1962) Improved (1964) Unimproved
(1966).
Per the same record dated November 22, 1966, appellant's diagnosis was described
as "Schizo- Reaction Relapse" and his condition of termination was indicated as
"Unimproved".chanrobles virtual law library
In appellant's "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated January 31, 1968 (p.
126, CCC rec.), his condition of termination was described as merely "improved"
neither "recovered" nor "unimproved".chanrobles virtual law library
In another "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated August 31, 1968, patient's
condition of termination was also described as "improved" only and "treatment not
completed" was noted therein (p. 137, CCC rec.).chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant was treated eighteen (18) times in the National Mental Hospital and Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital from July 28, 1962 to July 24, 1970 or for a span of 8 years,
characteristic of the chronic nature of his mental disease (pp- 4-5, TSN, November 12,
1970). Thus, on direct examination, Dr. Carlos Vicente confirmed:
Q - From your study, when he was an out patient at the National Mental Hospital and
its extension at the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital, would you say that he was and has
been suffering from chronic schizophrenia?
A - Yes, chronic, because it started in 1962 and became in remission in 1970, July. (p.
10, TSN, January 11, 1971, emphasis supplied).
For chronic schizophrenia, the patient does not recover fully in two months' time. His
condition may simply be "in remission", which term means "social recovery", not cured
or fully recovered. Dr. Vicente thus stated:
Q - How long, if there is any usual period, does a schizophrenic attack last at any
given time?
102
A - That is waivable (sic). There are those who cannot recover after ten days or three
months (p. 14, TSN, January 11, 19 7 1, emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
On a schizophrenic's behavior pattern:
Q - Is it possible that a person suffering from chronic schizophrenia can have a violent
reaction?
A - Yes, it is Possible, if he was at that time. If he is schizophrenic at the time"
(Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 10, TSN, January 20, 197 1, emphasis
supplied).chanrobles virtual law library
Q - By suffering from schizophrenia, would you say that his suffering has affected his
power of control over his will?
A - During the time that he was suffering, he could not stick to the right. He made
mistakes at the time that he was mentally sick.chanrobles virtual law library
Q - His power of control over his will to commit a crime is affected?
A - Yes, sir.chanrobles virtual law library
Q - Are you sure of that?
A - Yes, somehow it is controlled by some Ideas, example, one who has that (im)pulse
to kill will kill" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 17, TSN, January 11, 1971,
emphasis supplied).
On the mental condition of appellant when the alleged crime was committed which is
and should be considered determinative of his liability:
Q - Would you be able to state Doctor whether the accused when he committed the
act was suffering from an onset of schizophrenic reaction from which he has been
known to be suffering since 1962"
A - It is possible, sir, that he was already suffering from an onset of the schizophrenic
reaction at that time" (Testimony of Dr. Reynaldo Robles, p. 6, TSN, January 20,1971,
emphasis supplied).
It should be stressed that between July 24, 1970 when appellant suffered from his last
attack or relapse and September 8, 1970 when he committed the alleged crime, barely
1 month and 15 days had elapsed. Medically speaking, the interval was not sufficient
time for appellant's full recovery nor did such time give any guaranty for his mental
disease to be "cured."
Appellant was stin mentally sick at the time he attacked the victim. He previously
suffered from a "displacement of aggressive and hostile behavior" when he got angry
with his wife and when he tied and boxed their dog. He had the mental delusion that a
"mangkukulam" was inflicting harm on him. This delusion found its mark on the victim
whom he believed was the "mangkukulam" and fearing that she would harm him,
appellant had to kill her in self-defense. Simply stated, the victim was a mere
consequence of his mental delusion. He killed the "mangkukulam" as personified by
the victim; he did not kin Aling Kikay herself. And the said fatal act was made by
appellant in defending himself from the "mangkukulam".chanrobles virtual law library
While it has been established that appellant was "manageable" and was "presently
free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms" during the trial, the fact
remains that at the very moment of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still a
mentally sick person. No evidence was produced to prove otherwise against the bulk
of appellant's medical history for 8 years clearly indicative of his mental
psychosis.chanrobles virtual law library
As earlier stated, "social recovery" of a schizophrenic does not mean that he is "cured"
(totally recovered) from the disease.chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing, appellant should be acquitted of the charge of murder.
Teehankee, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, CJ., concurring:
I am unable to arrive at that stage of moral certainty as to the guilt of the accused and
hence concur in the dissent of Justice Makasiar, with the observation that the
reference in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Aquino to Ambat, where he was also the
ponente, with its learned and scholarly discourse on the law on insanity, gives me the
opportunity to express my preference for a liberal reading of Durham v. US, 1 therein
cited. For some eminent commentators, the M' Naghten doctrine no longer speaks
with authority. In the light of the advances in medical science there is, for me, a need
for the reexamination of what until now are authoritative pronouncements on this
subject.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
103
I dissent. The appellant should not be held liable for the crime of murder. He was
mentally ill when he committed the alleged killing of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), a 72-
year old widow. His medical records, as properly evaluated and confirmed by the
expert testimony of the three physicians/psychiatrists who examined and treated him,
undeniably establish the fact that appellant had been ailing with a psychotic disorder
medically known as chronic schizophrenia of the paranoid type.chanrobles virtual law
library
Inevitably, WE must look into the nature of appellant's mental disease. Thus, Noye's
Modern Clinical Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, explains:
Symptomatically, the schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and
bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness, suspiciousness, or periods of impulsive
destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently
directed and considered inappropriate by the observer. The interpersonal perceptions
are distorted in the more serious states by delusional and hallucinatory material. (p.
355, supra).
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish
between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.
Formerly called dementia praecox, it is the most common form of psychosis and
usually develops between the ages of 15 and 30 (Encyclopedia and Dictionary of
Medicine and Nursing, MillerKeane p. 860).chanrobles virtual law library
For a clear appreciation of appellant's mental condition, quoted hereunder are
pertinent portions of the discussion on the paranoid type of schizophrenia:
Paranoid Types. The features that tend to be most evident in this type or phase are
delusions, which are often numerous, illogical, and disregardful of reality,
hallucinations, and the usual schizophrenic disturbance of associations and of affect,
together with negativism.chanrobles virtual law library
Frequently the prepsychotic personality of the paranoid schizophrenic is characterized
by poor interpersonal rapport. Often he is cold, withdrawn, distrustful, and resentful of
other persons. Many are truculent, have a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude, and are
argumentative, scornful, sarcastic, defiant, resentful of suggestions or of authority, and
given to caustic remarks. Sometimes flippnant, facetious responses cover an
underlying hostility.
... The patient's previous negative attitudes become more marked, and
misinterpretations are common. Ideas of reference are among the first symptoms.
Disorders of association appear. Many patients show an unpleasant emotional
aggressiveness, Through displacement, the patient may begin to act out his hostile
impulses. His grip on reality begins to loosen. At first his delusions are limited, but
later they become numerous and changeable ... Delusions of persecution are the most
prominent occurrences in paranoid schizophrenia, but expansive and obviously wish-
fulfilling Ideas and hypochondriacal and depressive delusions are not uncommon.
With increasing personality disorganization, delusional beliefs become less logical.
Verbal expressions may be inappropriate and neologistic. The patient is subjected to
vague magical forces, and his explanations become extremely vague and irrational.
Imaginative fantasy may become extreme but take on the value of reality. Repressed
aggressive tendencies may be released in a major outburst some inarticulate
paranoids may manifest an unpredictable assaultiveness. Many paranoid
schizophrenics are irritable, discontented, resentful, and angrily suspicious and show
a surely aversion to being interviewed. Some manifest an unapproachable,
aggressively hostile attitude and may have in a bitter aloofness" Noye's Modern
Clinical Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, pp. 380 and 381, emphasis supplied).
On the prognosis of schizophrenia, the aforenamed source thus further states:
Occasionally one observes a schizophrenic episode of a mild, fleeting nature with no
subsequent recurrence In many instances, however, the favorable outcome should be
characterized as 'social recovery rather than as 'cured' or as full recovery. By this it is
meant that the patient is able to return to his previous social environment and to
previous or equivalent occupation, but with minor symptoms and signs, such as
irritability, shyness, or shallowness of affective responses.chanrobles virtual law library
From what has been said, it is evident that in any given case the effect upon the
personality and future adjustment of the appearance of a schizophrenic reaction may
be quite uncertain. In some cases the course is continuously progressive; in others it
is intermittent. More frequently it is a question of remissions and relapses in which,
although from the first interests and habits tend to be undermined insidiously, there
occur periods of adjustment at a lower level for a considerable period of time. It is
estimated that 40 per cent of' the schizophrenic patients who enter public mental
hospitals or clinics recover or improve; the other 60 per cent fail to improve or
ultimately suffer that permanent malignant disorganization of personality somewhat
inaccurately designated as deterioration Of committed patients who improve
sufficiently to be released, about 80 per cent leave the mental hospital within the first
year of residence. The expectancy of recovery falls with each year of continued
illness. Roughly, about one-third of those patients who are hospitalized during the first
year of their illness make a fairly complete recovery; one-third get a bit better and
become able to return to outside life but remain damaged personalities and may have
to return to the hospital from time to time. ... (pp. 387-388, supra emphasis supplied).
When appellant was examined and treated for the first time on July 28, 1962, his
father revealed the patient's initial symptoms of laughing alone and making gestures,
poor sleep and appetite, praying and kneeling always and making his body rigid (per
consultation chart, p. 154, CCC rec.). Upon interview on aforesaid date, appellant
stated that "he could see God" and "That a neighbor is bewitching her" ("pinapakulam
ako") Why? "hindi ko alam kung bakit" (p. 156, CCC rec.).chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant underwent eighteen (18) treatments and checkups from July 28, 1962 to
July 24, 1970 which covered eight (8) years before the alleged crime was committed
on September 8, 1970 (Medical Certificates, pp. 25 and 26, CCC rec.). In the medical
certificate dated September 15, 1970, the following was reflected:
104
Diagnosis - Schizophrenic Reaction - Recovered (1962) Improved (1964) Unimproved
(1966).
Per the same record dated November 22, 1966, appellant's diagnosis was described
as "Schizo- Reaction Relapse" and his condition of termination was indicated as
"Unimproved".chanrobles virtual law library
In appellant's "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated January 31, 1968 (p.
126, CCC rec.), his condition of termination was described as merely "improved"
neither "recovered" nor "unimproved".chanrobles virtual law library
In another "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated August 31, 1968, patient's
condition of termination was also described as "improved" only and "treatment not
completed" was noted therein (p. 137, CCC rec.).chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant was treated eighteen (18) times in the National Mental Hospital and Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital from July 28, 1962 to July 24, 1970 or for a span of 8 years,
characteristic of the chronic nature of his mental disease (pp- 4-5, TSN, November 12,
1970). Thus, on direct examination, Dr. Carlos Vicente confirmed:
Q - From your study, when he was an out patient at the National Mental Hospital and
its extension at the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital, would you say that he was and has
been suffering from chronic schizophrenia?
A - Yes, chronic, because it started in 1962 and became in remission in 1970, July. (p.
10, TSN, January 11, 1971, emphasis supplied).
For chronic schizophrenia, the patient does not recover fully in two months' time. His
condition may simply be "in remission", which term means "social recovery", not cured
or fully recovered. Dr. Vicente thus stated:
Q - How long, if there is any usual period, does a schizophrenic attack last at any
given time?
A - That is waivable (sic). There are those who cannot recover after ten days or three
months (p. 14, TSN, January 11, 19 7 1, emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
On a schizophrenic's behavior pattern:
Q - Is it possible that a person suffering from chronic schizophrenia can have a violent
reaction?
A - Yes, it is Possible, if he was at that time. If he is schizophrenic at the time"
(Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 10, TSN, January 20, 197 1, emphasis
supplied).chanrobles virtual law library
Q - By suffering from schizophrenia, would you say that his suffering has affected his
power of control over his will?
A - During the time that he was suffering, he could not stick to the right. He made
mistakes at the time that he was mentally sick.chanrobles virtual law library
Q - His power of control over his will to commit a crime is affected?
A - Yes, sir.chanrobles virtual law library
Q - Are you sure of that?
A - Yes, somehow it is controlled by some Ideas, example, one who has that (im)pulse
to kill will kill" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 17, TSN, January 11, 1971,
emphasis supplied).
On the mental condition of appellant when the alleged crime was committed which is
and should be considered determinative of his liability:
Q - Would you be able to state Doctor whether the accused when he committed the
act was suffering from an onset of schizophrenic reaction from which he has been
known to be suffering since 1962"
A - It is possible, sir, that he was already suffering from an onset of the schizophrenic
reaction at that time" (Testimony of Dr. Reynaldo Robles, p. 6, TSN, January 20,1971,
emphasis supplied).
It should be stressed that between July 24, 1970 when appellant suffered from his last
attack or relapse and September 8, 1970 when he committed the alleged crime, barely
1 month and 15 days had elapsed. Medically speaking, the interval was not sufficient
time for appellant's full recovery nor did such time give any guaranty for his mental
disease to be "cured."
Appellant was stin mentally sick at the time he attacked the victim. He previously
suffered from a "displacement of aggressive and hostile behavior" when he got angry
with his wife and when he tied and boxed their dog. He had the mental delusion that a
"mangkukulam" was inflicting harm on him. This delusion found its mark on the victim
whom he believed was the "mangkukulam" and fearing that she would harm him,
appellant had to kill her in self-defense. Simply stated, the victim was a mere
consequence of his mental delusion. He killed the "mangkukulam" as personified by
105
the victim; he did not kin Aling Kikay herself. And the said fatal act was made by
appellant in defending himself from the "mangkukulam".chanrobles virtual law library
While it has been established that appellant was "manageable" and was "presently
free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms" during the trial, the fact
remains that at the very moment of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still a
mentally sick person. No evidence was produced to prove otherwise against the bulk
of appellant's medical history for 8 years clearly indicative of his mental
psychosis.chanrobles virtual law library
As earlier stated, "social recovery" of a schizophrenic does not mean that he is "cured"
(totally recovered) from the disease.chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing, appellant should be acquitted of the charge of murder.
Teehankee, J., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 126116. June 21, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERLINDO YAM-ID alias
ELY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the decision dated June 17, 1997 of Branch 29
of the Regional Trial Court of the 7th Judicial Region stationed in Toledo City in its
Criminal Cases No. TCS-2381 and 2382 finding accused-appellant ERLINDO YAM-ID
guilty of murder and frustrated homicide, respectively, and sentencing him to suffer the
supreme penalty of death in the first case. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, in Crim. Case No. TCS-2381
this Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime of Murder and pursuant to Rep. Act
7659 hereby imposes the Mandatory penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the parents
of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay actual damages in the amount of
P40,000.00.
In Crim. Case No. TCS-2382, this Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime of
Frustrated Homicide under Art. 249 RPC in relation to Art. 50 and after applying the
indeterminate sentence law, it is hereby the sentence of this Court that said accused
will suffer the penalty of SIX (6) Years and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor in its
minimum period to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision mayor in its maximum period. The
OIC, Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to remand the records of these cases to
the Supreme Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 45, Rollo.)
The case for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General as follows:
Julius Cantutay was a resident of Saksak, Pinamungajan, Cebu. Appellant Erlindo
was his neighbor. So, too, was Danilo Tejamo, his uncle, and six (6) year old Jerry
Tejamo his cousin (p. 2, tsn, July 31, 1995).
On April 1, 1994, at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, Julius was sent by his
grandmother, Amanda Ceniza, to Brgy. Tutay, Pinamungajan, Cebu, to
deliver benignit, a local delicacy, to his aunt Bebing Dequiado. Jerry Tejamo was with
Julius. On their way to Dequiados house, they passed by the house of appellant who
greeted them, Good Evening. After said salutation, appellant suddenly unsheathed a
long bolo. On instinct, Julius pushed Jerry, who was then walking in front of him, and
told the latter to run. Appellant ran after the two. Jerry was overtaken by Julius. Julius
momentarily stopped to wait for Jerry, but appellant caught up with Jerry. Appellant
stabbed Jerry with the bolo on the left portion of his back. Not content, appellant held
Jerry by the hair and hacked him on the nape. Jerry fell to the ground. As a coup de
grace, appellant stabbed Jerry on the right side of his back. Jerry died on the
spot. Appellant then knelt over the prostrate body of Jerry and sucked the blood from
his neck (pp. 3-9, tsn, July 31, 1995).
Scared out of his wits, Julius ran towards the house of Jerry to the latters father,
Danilo Tejamo. Danilo was then sleeping, Julius narrated the harrowing incident to
Aniceta Tejamo, wife of Danilo. Aniceta Tejamo is the sister of Juliuss father, hence,
an aunt (p. 5, tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).
Aniceta roused Danilo from his sleep and both of them ran to the site of the
incident. Before they could reach the place, however, they were met by appellant, who
had a bolo in hand. Danilo asked appellant the whereabouts of his son. Appellant
instead answered, I will kill all of you, and immediately hacked Danilo. Danilo was able
to dodge the attack, but he slipped and fell to the ground. Appellant struck at the fallen
Danilo, who tried to parry the attack, but Danilo nevertheless got hit on the bridge of
his nose. Danilo tried to stand, but appellant hacked him anew. This time, Danilo was
hit on the head, and he fell to the ground, bloodied (pp. 7-11, tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).
106
Since Danilo was not moving anymore, Aniceta shouted that Danilo was already
dead. Appellant took hold of Danilos collar to finish him off. Inexplicably, the tip of the
bolo hit appellants stomach and blood oozed from the wound. Perturbed, appellant ran
towards his house and threw the bolo to the ground. Danilo regained consciousness
and sought treatment (pp. 12-15, tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).
Expenses for the wake and burial of Jerry amounted to P40,000.00 (p. 14, tsn, ibid.)
(pp. 109-112, Rollo.)
During the trial, accused-appellant denied killing the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo
and pleaded self-defense for his assault on Danilo Tejamo, Jerrys father. He
contended that due to a land dispute between his family and the in-laws of Danilo
Tejamo, the latter tried to kill him by firing at his house. In retaliation, he hacked Danilo
Tejamo at the forehead but Danilo shot him, hitting him below the navel, in the
process, causing a prolapse (the exposure of his intestines). Then, he lost
consciousness.
The trial court did not give credence to accused-appellants tale and after trial on
the merits, it found him guilty as charged.
In this automatic review, accused-appellant now makes a complete turn-around
and admits killing Jerry Tejamo. He, however, would plead insanity, and, as to his
conviction for frustrated homicide regarding his attack on Danilo Tejamo, accused-
appellant seeks reversal on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove his intent to
kill.
The People contends that accused-appellant should not be allowed to change
his theory on appeal. We do not agree. An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole
action for review on any question including those not raised by the parties (People vs.
Villaruel, 261 SCRA 386 (1996); People vs. Godines, 196 SCRA 765 [1991]; People
vs. Villagracia, 226 SCRA 374 [1993]; see also Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268
SCRA 332 [1997]). The reason for this rule is that every circumstance in favor of the
accused should be considered (Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
[1986]). This legal maxim acquires greater significance in this case where accused-
appellant faces the supreme penalty of death. It is our policy that in a death penalty
case, the Court cannot rush to judgment even when a despicable homicidal felon is
involved for an erroneous conviction will have a lasting stain in our escutcheon of
justice (People vs. Alicundo, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]).
At this instance, the defense, now as represented by the Public Attorneys Office
(PAO), contends that at the time of the incident, accused-appellant was suffering from
a chronic mental disorder, otherwise known as schizophrenia, which is characterized
by a persons inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and is often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions (Encyclopedia and Dictionary of
Medicine and Nursing, Miller-Keane, p. 860 cited in the Brief for the Accused-
Appellant, p. 63, Rollo).
Accused-appellants defense of insanity is anchored on the testimony of Dr.
Antonio Yapha who treated his wound. Said doctor testified that contrary to accused-
appellants claim that Danilo shot him, he did not find any entrance for the alleged
gunshot wound. The doctor said that a wound caused by a .38 caliber slug will not
result in a prolapse, that is, the intestines slipping out of the usual place. In the words
of the defense, this belied the testimony of accused-appellant that his stomach had a
prolapse and instead bolstered the testimony of the prosecution witness that accused-
appellant tried to kill himself with a long bolo (Brief for the Accused-Appellant. p.
63, Rollo). As further proof of insanity, the defense cites accused-appellants gruesome
act of sucking Jerry Tejamos blood after he had mercilessly stabbed the boy to death.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance, and as such
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Ambal, 100 SCRA 35[1980]). In
considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a criminal prosecution, the starting
premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind, or otherwise stated,
the law takes for granted that acts are done consciously. Insanity being the exception
rather than the rule in the human condition, the moral and legal presumption is that
freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person and that a
felonious or criminal act (delicto deloso) has been done with deliberate intent, that is,
with freedom, intelligence and malice and that whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as
a defense has the burden of proving its existence (People vs. Aldemita, 145 SCRA
451 [1987] citing Article 800, Civil Code; US vs. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305, 308
[1916]; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292 [1960]; People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147,
153 [1939]; US vs. Guevarra, 27 Phil. 547 [1914]; People vs. Renegado, 57 SCRA
275, 286 [1974]; US vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218 [1915]; People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204
[1923]).
In the case at bar, the defense regrettably failed to discharge its burden of
proving that accused-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the
crime. The only intimation of insanity that accused-appellant could point at is the non-
medical opinion of the PAO that accused-appellant was suffering
from schizophrenia because he sipped his victims blood and tried to kill himself
afterwards. No medical certificate was presented to substantiate the claim of
insanity. No testimony was proffered to support the allegation. We are not aware that
the PAO now has the expertise, more so the authority, to diagnose its clients of their
mental condition. While we agree that sucking Jerrys blood and stabbing ones self in
the stomach are not acts expected of a normal person, we, however, have to be
careful in distinguishing between insanity and passion or eccentricity, mental
weakness or mere depression resulting from some physical ailment. The State should
guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity
(People vs. So, 247 SCRA 708 [1995]; People vs. Dungo, 199 SCRA 860 [1991]
citing People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87; see also People vs. Ambal, supra).
We do not discount the possibility that accused-appellant may have lost his
mind after killing the 6-year old Jerry as manifested by his slurping of the boys blood
and his attempt to commit suicide.However, for insanity to be appreciated as an
exempting circumstance, it must be present immediately before or at the very moment
the crime is committed, and not thereafter. We do not believe that accused-appellant
was insane when he killed Jerry and hacked Danilo before attempting to take his own
life. To reiterate, no iota of evidence was presented to prove the same. Verily, the
defense of insanity was not even raised during the trial of the case. It is invoked only
now on appeal, giving us the impression that it is but an afterthought.
107
 And now to the propriety of the penalty imposed.
The trial court cited the following as the attendant circumstances that qualified
the killing of Jerry Tejamo to murder, or aggravated the same, to wit:
1. Bad blood existed between the family of the accused and the
complainants father-in-law due to a land dispute prior to the incident
therefore premeditation exist;
2. Treachery - the sudden and unexpected attack by the accused against
unarmed minor who is 6 years old without any means to defend
himself and the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack (Pp.
vs. Molato, G.R. No. 66634, 29 February 1989; Pp. vs. Canzano, 95
SCRA);
3. The killing of the victim Jerry Tejamo, a minor 6 year old child
constitutes an aggravating circumstance. There is treachery when an
adult illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death
(U.S. vs. Butag, 38 Phil. 746).
(p. 43, Rollo.)
and having earlier explained that
. . . The brutal and senseless killing of Jerry Tejamo, a 6 year old child manifest
accuseds perversity and callousness as a cold blooded murderer and brings him to
fore as a heinous criminal under Rep. Act 7659 which defines heinous as a grievous,
odious and hateful offense by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity and repugnant and outrageous to the common
standard and norms of decency and morality in a just civilized and orderly
society. This is the kind of man the accused is.
(p. 42, Rollo.)
meted out on accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No.
TCS-2381.
We affirm the finding of the trial court that treachery attended the killing of the 6-
year old Jerry Tejamo for when an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years
and causes his death, treachery exists (People vs. Sancholes, 271 SCRA 527 [1997];
see also People vs. Caritativo, 256 SCRA 1 [1996]).
The trial court, however, erred in finding that evident premeditation attended the
commission of the crime. The following requisites must concur before evident
premeditation may be appreciated: (a) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his
determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Magno,
260 SCRA 300 [1996]). Here, the prosecution omitted or failed to present any
evidence to show any, much less, all of the above elements. The bad blood that
allegedly exists between accused-appellants family and the in-laws of Danilo Tejamo,
Jerrys father, does not, in any way, prove evident premeditation.
It was thus treachery that qualified the killing of Jerry Tejamo to
murder. However, there being neither an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance,
the maximum penalty of death imposed by the trial court must be reduced to the
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in line with our decisions in People vs.
Magno, supra, and People vs. Lucas, (240 SCRA 66 [1995]) where we explained that
if there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, then the crime, although
falling under Republic Act No. 7659, will not be punished by death but by the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Anent the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. TCS-2382, the Office of the
Solicitor General correctly observes that the crime committed by accused-appellant in
stabbing Danilo Tejamo constituted only attempted homicide since the wounds
suffered by Danilo were not life threatening. Article 253 of the Revised Penal Code
provides the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide. Under Article 51
of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted crime is two degrees lower
than that prescribed by law. Attempted homicide is thus punishable by prision
correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty to be
meted out on accused-appellant should be anywhere within the range of one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor, and the maximum should
be taken from the medium period of prision correccional (Art. 64, par. 1) the range of
which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2)
months.Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the
commission of the Attempted Homicide, the accused-appellant shall be sentenced to
an indeterminate prison term of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as
minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional medium as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED, finding accused-
appellant GUILTY of MURDER in Criminal Case No. TCS-2381 and sentencing him to
suffer the reduced penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is likewise ordered to
indemnify the parents of the victim the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and
to pay actual damages in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos. In
Criminal Case No. TCS-2382, accused-appellant is found guilty of ATTEMPTED
HOMICIDE instead and sentenced to two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision
correcional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, and Buena, JJ., on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
108
[G.R. No. 129291. July 3, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENRICO A.
VALLEDOR, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos. 9359, 9401, and 9489,
convicting accused-appellant of the crimes of murder, attempted murder and
frustrated murder, respectively.
The informations filed against accused-appellant read:
In Criminal Case No. 9359, for murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in the afternoon, at Barangay Tagumpay,
Puerto Princesa City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill and while
armed with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and stab therewith one Elsa Villon Rodriguez thereby inflicting upon the latter
stabbed (sic) wound on the chest, which was the immediate cause of her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No.9401, for attempted murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in the afternoon, at Bgy. Tagumpay,
Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premiditation (sic) and
while armed with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and stab therewith one Ricardo Maglalang thereby inflicting upon the
latter physical injuries on the different parts of his body, thus commencing the
commission of the crime of murder directly by overt acts and does not perform all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony by reason of some causes or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance that is, by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said Ricardo Maglalang which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
In Criminal Case No.9489, for frustrated murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991 at Bgy. Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named
accused, with intent to kill with treachery and evidence (sic) premeditation and while
armed with a butcher knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and stab therewith on (sic)Roger Cabiguen, hitting him on his right
forearm, thus performing all the acts of execution which produce the crime of murder
as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to
him which saved his life.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
After his arrest, accused-appellant was intermittently confined at the National
Center for Mental Health. Thus, he was arraigned only on February 19, 1993 wherein
he pleaded not guilty.[5] Thereafter, the cases were archived until November 15, 1994,
when accused-appellant was declared mentally fit to withstand trial.[6] This time,
accused-appellant admitted commission of the crimes charged but invoked the
exempting circumstance of insanity. The lower court thus conducted reverse and joint
trial, at which the following facts were established:
On March 6, 1991, at around 1:45 in the afternoon, Roger Cabiguen was in his
house at Burgos Street, Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City. He was working
on a lettering job inside his bedroom together with his first cousin, then 25-year old
Elsa Rodriguez, and his friends, Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua. Roger was
working at his table and seated on his bed while Elsa was across the table. Antonio
was on the left side, while Simplicio was seated near the door, on the right side of
Roger.[7]
All of a sudden, accused-appellant entered the room; uttered Rogers nickname
(Jer) and immediately attacked him with a knife, but Roger was able to parry the thrust
and was stabbed instead on the right forearm. Accused-appellant then stabbed Elsa
Rodriguez on the chest and said, Ako akabales den, Elsa. (I had my revenge,
Elsa). Thereafter, accused-appellant fled, leaving the stunned Simplicio and Antonio
unharmed.[8]
Roger and Elsa were immediately brought to the hospital. On their way out,
Antonio noticed a commotion and saw that Ricardo Maglalang, a neighbor of the
victim, was wounded.Antonio learned from the by-standers that Ricardo was likewise
stabbed by accused-appellant.[9]
Upon reaching the hospital, Elsa was declared dead on arrival. Roger on the
other hand was treated for the 5-centimeter wound sustained by him on his right
forearm.[10]
Prosecution witness Roger Cabiguen testified that sometime in 1980, accused-
appellant suspected him of killing his pet dog. In 1989, accused-appellant courted Elsa
but she jilted him.On one occasion, Elsa spat on and slapped accused-appellant.[11]
Accused-appellants defense of insanity was anchored on the following facts:
109
 Accused-appellant, then 30 years of age, was a resident of Barangay
Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, and employed as provincial jail guard at the
Palawan Provincial Jail. Sometime in January 1990, Pacita Valledor, his mother
noticed that accused-appellant was behaving abnormally. For days he was restless
and unable to sleep. He likewise complained that their neighbors were spreading
rumors that he was a rapist and a thief. This prompted Pacita to bring his son to Dr.
Deriomedes de Guzman, a medical practitioner. Pacita disclosed to Dr. de Guzman
that insanity runs in their family. After examining accused-appellant, Dr. de Guzman
diagnosed him as suffering from psychosis with schizophrenia. [12] He prescribed a
depressant known as Thoracin, which kept accused-appellant sane for a period two
months.[13]
On March 4, 1991, Pacita noticed that accused-appellant was again acting
strangely. She left to buy Thoracin but when she returned he was nowhere to be
found.[14]
On March 6, 1991, at around 6:00 in the morning, accused-appellant was seen
swimming across the river of Barangay Caruray, San Vicente, Palawan. Barangay
Captain Rufino Nuez and Barangay Councilman Antonio Sibunga took accused-
appellant out of the water and took him on board a pump boat. Inside the boat,
accused-appellant kept on crying and uttering words to the effect that his family will be
killed. Suspecting that accused-appellant was mentally ill, Barangay Captain Nuez,
asked Councilman Sibunga to accompany accused-appellant to Puerto Princesa
City. Sibunga acceded and thereafter took a jeepney with accused-appellant at
Barangay Bahile. At about 1:00 in the afternoon, they reached Junction I at the
intersection of the National Highway and Rizal Avenue, Puerto Princesa
City. Suddenly, accused-appellant jumped off the jeepney. Sibunga tried but failed to
chase accused-appellant, who immediately boarded a tricycle. Later that day, he
learned that accused-appellant killed and harmed somebody.[15]
Meanwhile, at around 2:00 in the afternoon of March 6, 1991, Pacita Valledor
was awakened by her daughter who told her that accused-appellant has returned. She
rushed out of the house and saw him standing in the middle of the road, dusty and
dirty. She asked him where he came from but his answer was Pinatay niya kayong
lahat. Pacita dragged him inside the house and later learned that he killed and
wounded their neighbors. Thirty minutes later, accused-appellant was arrested and
detained at the city jail.[16]
On March 11, 1991, Dr. Manuel Bilog, City Health Officer I of Puerto Princesa
City interviewed accused-appellant and thereafter made the following conclusions and
recommendation, to wit:
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
Cooperative; talkative but incoherent
Disoriented as to time, place and person
DISPOSITION AND RECOMMENDATION:
Respectfully recommending that subject patient be committed to the National Mental
Hospital, Metro Manila for proper medical care and evaluation soonest. [17]
The defense offered in evidence the April 27, 1992 medical findings on
accused-appellant by Dr. Guia Melendres of the National Center for Mental Health,
pertinent portion of which reads:
REMARKS AND RECCOMENDATION:
In view of the foregoing history, observations, physical mental and psychological
examinations the patient Enrico Valledor y Andusay is found suffering from Psychosis
or Insanity classified under Schizophrenia. This is a thought disorder characterized by
deterioration from previous level of functioning, auditory hallucination, ideas of
reference, delusion of control, suspiciousness, poor judgment and absence of insight.
Likewise, he is found to be suffering from Psychoactive Substance Use Disorder,
Alcohol, abuse. This is characterized by a maladaptive pattern of psychoactive
substance use indicated by continued use despite knowledge of having a persistent or
recurrent social, occupational, psychological or physical problems. [18]
Dr. Oscar Magtang, a psychiatrist assigned at the Medical Service of the PNP,
Puerto Princesa City was likewise presented by the defense to interpret the aforecited
findings of Dr. Melendres.[19]
On February 28, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment of
conviction. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused ENRICO A. VALLEDOR is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of MURDER in Criminal Case No.
9359; of FRUSTRATED MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9489; and of ATTEMPTED
MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9401 as charged herein. Accordingly he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No.
9359; reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 9489; and imprisonment of from EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS in Criminal Case No. 9401. It is
understood that the accused shall serve these penalties successively or one after the
other.
The accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim Elsa Villon
Rodriguez the sum of P50,000.00 and to indemnify the victim Roger Cabiguen, the
sum of P14,000.00 as actual damages, and the sum P15,000.00 for loss of income.
Considering that the accused is found to be suffering from a serious mental disorder at
present as certified to by the National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City,
Metro Manila, the service of his sentence is hereby ordered SUSPENDED pursuant to
Article 12 and 79 of the Revised Penal Code. He (Enrico Valledor) is ordered shipped
to and confined at the National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, Metro
110
Manila, for his treatment, until such time that he becomes fit for the service of his
sentence at the national penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. As to his civil liability,
the same is subject to execution after this judgment shall have become final
executory.
IT IS ORDERED.[20]
Accused-appellant interposed this appeal and raised the lone assignment of
error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE
FACT THAT WHEN HE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE OFFENSE CHARGED HE
WAS MENTALLY ILL, OUT OF HIS MIND OR INSANE AT THE (sic) TIME.[21]
The appeal has no merit.
In considering a plea of insanity as a defense, the starting premise is that the
law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all
acts to be voluntary, and it is improper to presume that acts were done
unconsciously.[22]
In People v. Estrada,[23] it was held that:
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of
entertaining a criminal intent." He must be deprived of reason and act without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total
deprivation of freedom of the will.
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an
exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the
evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to
the very moment of its execution.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties which is manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full
and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his acts. Hence, insanity
may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject,
such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance,
his acts and conduct consistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational
acts and beliefs, as well as his improvident bargains. The vagaries of the mind can
only be known by outward acts, by means of which we read thoughts, motives and
emotions of a person, and through which we determine whether the acts conform to
the practice of people of sound mind.[24]
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to discharge the burden of
overcoming the presumption of sanity at the time of the commission of the crime. The
following circumstances clearly and unmistakably show that accused-
appellant was not legally insane when he perpetrated the acts for which he was
charged: 1) Simplicio Yayen was positioned nearest to accused-
appellant but the latter chose to stab Roger and Elsa; 2) Accused-appellant called out
the nickname of Roger before stabbing him; 3) Simplicio Yayen and Antonio
Magbanua who were likewise inside the room were left unharmed; 4) Accused-
appellant, a spurned suitor of Elsa, uttered the words, Ako akabales den, Elsa. (I had
my revenge, Elsa) after stabbing her; and 5) Accused-appellant hurriedly left the room
after stabbing the victims.
Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be performed by one who
was in a state of a complete absence of the power to discern. Judging from his acts,
accused-appellant was clearly aware and in control of what he was doing as he in fact
purposely chose to stab only the two victims. Two other people were also inside the
room, one of them was nearest to the door where accused-appellant emerged, but the
latter went for the victims. His obvious motive of revenge against the victims was
accentuated by calling out their names and uttering the words, I had my revenge after
stabbing them. Finally, his act of immediately fleeing from the scene after the incident
indicates that he was aware of the wrong he has done and the consequence thereof.
Accused-appellants acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit: crying; swimming
in the river with his clothes on; and jumping off the jeepney; were not sufficient to
prove that he was indeed insane at the time of the commission of the crime. As
consistently held by this Court, A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and
conclusively prove that he is legally so.[25]Then, too, the medical findings showing that
accused-appellant was suffering from a mental disorder after the commission of the
crime, has no bearing on his liability. What is decisive is his mental condition at the
time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving that
he was legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his
felonious acts.
In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant should be held liable only for
attempted murder and not frustrated murder. The wound sustained by Roger
Cabiguen on his right forearm was not fatal. The settled rule is that where the wound
inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted
murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have
brought about death.[26]
Pursuant to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed
upon the principal of an attempted crime shall be lower by two degrees than that
prescribed for the consummated felony. Before its amendment by R.A. No. 7659,
Article 248 provided that the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. Under Article 61(3), the penalty two degrees lower would
be prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. As there is no modifying
circumstance, the medium period of the penalty, which is prision mayor minimum,
should be imposed. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant is
entitled to a minimum penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correcional in its medium period, the penalty next lower than the penalty for attempted
murder.[27]
111
 For the murder of Elsa Rodriguez, in Criminal Case No. 9359, the trial court
correctly imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was proven by the
prosecution.
Accused-appellants civil liability must be modified. Not being substantiated by
evidence, the award of P14,000.00 as actual damages, and P15,000.00 for loss of
income, to Roger Cabiguen in Criminal Case No. 9489, should be deleted. However,
in lieu thereof, temperate damages under Article 2224 of the Civil Code may be
recovered, as it has been shown that Roger Cabiguen suffered some pecuniary loss
but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. For this reason, an award of
P10,000.00 by way of temperate damages should suffice.[28]
In addition to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity which was properly
awarded by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 9359, the heirs of Elsa Rodriguez are
entitled to another P50,000.00 as moral damages which needs no proof since the
conviction of accused-appellant for the crime of murder is sufficient justification for
said award.[29] The heirs of the deceased are likewise entitled to the amount of
P29,250.00 representing actual damages[30] based on the agreement of the parties.[31]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, is MODIFIED as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 9359, accused-appellant Enrico A. Valledor is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Elsa
Rodriguez the following amounts: P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P29,250.00 as actual damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt only of the crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and to indemnify Roger Cabiguen in the
amount of P10,000.00 by way of temperate damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. 9401, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148695. May 27, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RANDY
BELONIO y LANDAS, appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review before this Court is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental (Branch 50 stationed in Bacolod City) in Criminal
Case No. 00-20595, dated February 26, 2001, finding Randy Belonio y Landas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to death.
The Amended Information dated April 27, 2000, charged appellant with Murder
as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of January, 2000, in the City of Talisay, Province of
Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with an improvised knife, with intent to kill, and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one RAMY TAMAYO, thus causing injuries in the
vital parts of the body of the latter which caused his instantaneous death.
That accused RANDY BELONIO y LANDAS is a recidivist for having been convicted
by final judgment of 4 years, two (2) months, one day to six years in Crim. Case 94-
16609 entitled: People of the Philippines vs. Randy Belonio y Landas for Homicide.[2]
Upon his arraignment on May 24, 2000,[3] appellant, assisted by his counsel de
oficio, pleaded not guilty.
In his Brief,[4] the Solicitor General narrates the factual antecedents of the case,
as summarized by the trial court, as follows:
Jennifer Carampatana testified that on January 6, 2000, her grandmother was buried
and there was a wake in their house at Brgy. Zone 14 in the evening. Her first cousin,
the late Ramy Tamayo, also called Ramon Tamayo, arrived in their house at about
10:00 P.M. together with his wife.
Jennifer invited Ramy to talk outside of their house. Before they could sit on a nearby
bench, Ramy decided to buy cigarettes from a store only a few meters away. The
store was furnished with a small opening for the store-keeper to attend to the
customers and Ramy was occupying that space in front of the opening to pay when
the accused Randy Belonio arrived. Randy tried to force his way in front of the
112
opening and as a consequence, he bumped on Ramy. Jennifer saw that Randy gave
Ramy a long and hard look.
Jennifer said that he and Ramy sat and talked on the bench. The accused came over
and sat on the other end of the bench. Then the accused asked Ramy for the latters
cigarette lighter. The accused asked Ramy from what place did he come from and
why was he there. Ramy answered the accused in a normal manner.
The accused left but after a few minutes he returned, Jennifer, who was facing the
direction of the approaching accused, saw him and noticed that he was wearing long
sleeves. Ramy Tamayo could not see the accused as he was facing sideways to
Jennifer. Without saying a word and without warning, the accused delivered a
stabbing blow with a dagger which was concealed in his hand. Ramy was hit on the
right chest, Jennifer stood up and ran towards her house shouting for help. There at
the gate of the fence of her house, she heard another thudding sound of a stabbing
blow. When Jennifer entered her house, she announced that Ramy was stabbed.
Jennifer and her relatives rushed out of the house. Jennifer saw the accused running
away towards the back of the barangay hall. The Tanods who came over failed to find
the accused. Then when the Barangay Captain and the policemen arrived, Jennifer
informed them of the direction towards which the accused fled. The accused was
arrested from one (1) of the houses near the barangay hall where he took refuge.
Dr. Raul V. Pama, Jr. was the acting City Health Officer of Talisay City on January 6,
2000. He conducted an autopsy on the remains of Ramy Tamayo and listed his
findings in a necropsy report which he prepared. These findings are as follows:
1. Stabbed wound, 1.7 cm. in length, sutured sharp on one (1) and (inferior portion)
and blunt on the other end (superior portion) located at the 4th intercostal space;
Dr. Pama explained that the wound is just above the left nipple and it penetrated
downward hitting the left side on the heart;
2. Stabbed wound at the sternal. The wound is situated just above the site of the first
wound.
The first wound was fatal as it damaged the heart. [5]
In his Brief,[6] Randy Belonio adopted the above findings of the trial court and
the prosecution. However, he raises the defense of insanity, an exempting
circumstance, and for such purpose, depends on the expert assessment of his
witness, Dr. Antonio Gauzon, who certified thus:
This is an individual who is suffering from (Schizophrenia), Chronic Undifferentiated
and probably triggered by (s)ubstance abuse of Shabu and Marijuana.
Recommending treatment and rehabilitation in a mental institution like the National
Center for Mental (H)ealth in Mandaluyong City or treatment in the psychiatric unit of
the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Regional Hospital in Bacolod City and later
rehabilitation in the Negros (O)ccidental Mental Health Center at Paglaum Village,
Bacolod City.[7]
The RTC was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of
Murder and that he had full control of his mental faculties. It held that the testimony of
Dr. Ester Regina Servando was more weighty and credible than that of Dr. Gauzon. [8]
The trial court convicted appellant, thus:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Randy Belonio y Landas
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as charged in the Information, as Principal by
Direct (Participation) with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery and the
special aggravating circumstance of recidivism. There are no other aggravating
circumstances nor is there any mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, the accused is
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
The accused is held civilly liable to pay the heirs of Randy Tamayo the following
amounts:
1. The sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
2. The sum of P3,629.70 as reimbursement for hospital expenses;
3. The sum of P940,716.00 as compensatory damages; and
4. The sum of P100,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Jinky Tamayo as moral
damages.[9]
Hence this automatic review.
In his brief, appellant assigns this lone alleged error of the court a quo for our
consideration:
The trial court seriously erred in not appreciating the exempting circumstance of
insanity pursuant to Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended favoring the
accused-appellant.[10]
In support of his appeal, appellant argues that he was not in his right and normal
frame of mind when the killing took place. He avers that no normal person would ever
bump another person, give the latter a hard look and eventually stab him to death. He
adds that he and the victim did not know each other at that time.[11]
Appellant also asseverates that Dr. Gauzon is a reliable expert witness and is
more knowledgeable and experienced than Dr. Servando.[12] He explains that Dr.
Servando was once under the tutelage of Dr. Gauzon and that at the time of their
113
respective testimonies, the former was only 37 years old, while the latter was 57 years
old.[13] Appellant also cites portions of the trial courts Decision where Dr. Gauzon
referred him to the Bacolod City Health Office for psychiatric examination. The trial
court also branded the accused as a homicidal maniac, which appellant says, is
judicial notice of his mental sickness.[14] In sum, he concludes that all of these
circumstances show that he was insane at the time of the killing.
We find these arguments without merit.
The moral and legal presumption is that one acts with free will and intelligence,
and that a felonious or criminal act has been done with deliberate intent, that is, with
freedom and intelligence.[15] Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance, and as such
must be adequately proved.[16] The law presumes that all persons are of sound mind,
and that acts are done consciously.[17]
In the case at bar, the defense utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving
that appellant was insane. The testimony or proof of appellants insanity must relate to
the time preceding or the very moment of the commission of the offense
charged.[18] We find the evidence adduced by the defense sorely insufficient to
establish his claim that he was insane at the time he killed Tamayo.
The main circumstances presented by the defense that remotely evinces that
appellant was insane at that time was his act of bumping the victim, without any
apparent reason, giving him a long hard look, and then eventually stabbing
him. However, this sequence of events cannot overcome the legal presumption of
sanity, let alone prove appellants insanity.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. Proof of the existence of some abnormality of the
mental faculties will not exclude imputability, if it can be shown that the offender was
not completely deprived of freedom and intelligence. [19] As culled from the trial courts
findings, Belonio, after giving the victim a hard and resentful look, sat near the latter,
lighted his cigarette and conversed with him.[20] Afterwards, he left and came back
armed with a dagger with which he stabbed Tamayo.Immediately thereafter, he
escaped and went into hiding. Contrary to a finding of the existence of insanity, these
acts tend to establish that Belonio was well aware of what he had just committed, and
was capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Otherwise, he would not have
attempted to escape and go into hiding.
Aside from the bumping incident earlier discussed, the only other evidence of
insanity that appellant could relevantly point to is the medical certificate prepared by
Dr. Antonio Gauzon stating that Belonio was suffering from schizophrenia. This
witness was presented to refute the findings of the prosecutions expert witness Dr.
Ester Regina Servando which negated the existence of this mental condition.
A run-through of Dr. Gauzons testimony strengthens this Courts resolve to
affirm the lower courts findings. Part of his testimony is reproduced as follows:
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q. Now, from this Medical Certificate, Doctor, there is specifically mentioned
here that the subject here was found to be incoherent and irrelevant and
disoriented as to time, person and place, and that there was plight of
ideas and adjustment, as well as insights. Will you kindly explain this to
this Honorable Court?
A. What meant there is that, when you talk to the individual, sometimes you get
answers right, sometimes it is wrong. That is when you say that he is
incoherent. When you say irrelevant, that pertain to the question. Now, as
far as dates, he could not remember the date. As far (as) the place, he
could not recall the place when he was in my office. And some of the
persons that were with him, he could not identify them. Now, when I say
that there was plight of ideas, that (was) when he was talking. As a matter
of fact, I gave an example, when I asked a question when I asked him
about the first killing incident and his answer was, face to face kami,
simbahan namon kag inagaw namon ang baril because of warship. That
is only one, because there were others that you could not understand
what he was talking about whether you have to rely only on other
things. And sometimes, he would talk on things which are not there. That
means he was hallucinating. Now, judgment is usually poor. Because,
when I asked him of what he will do regarding the case, he would just say
that, Ti, amo na ya. And he said, Ano kamo da ya? kay ang warship. So, I
was asking him about the values of what he was doing and he could not
give me that answer. And he does not know what he was doing. That
means that there was no reality testing. He does not know what is the real
fantasy.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Now in your opinion as an expert in terms of Psychiatry, about how long has
the subject, Randy Belonio, been suffering from his mental disorder that
you mentioned in your Medical Certificate?
A. Since childhood. If you would notice, I put there in the history that his father
was medically disabled when he was ten (10) years old, and the mother
was only a fish vendor and there were, I think, eight (8) to ten (10) in the
family and with a meager income and have to (fend) for themselves. And
in a very young age of ten (10), the parents had the attitude of Bahala na
ang kabata-an. That means, they have to take care of themselves. At age
13, he was brought by the relative to Manila, and although he was
incoherent, you can get from his answer by mentioning so many places,
(like) Manila, Pasay, Caloocan, Novaliches, MRT, Cubao. That means, at
age 13, he was already around these areas (f)ending for himself. And the
(s)treet (u)rchins, you know for a fact, that they are influenced by
drugs. So, by that time, with that dysfunctional family, and without any
family to take care of himself, he was not doing what the society expects
him to do. So that they have dysfunctional family and with dysfunctional
relatives. So, the value system was really poor. So that the thinking
process of this individual was not developed to what the society expects
him to be.So, it started at that time. So, when he was taking shabu, it
triggered every tissue that the symptoms came out. Thats why, he
114
 became suspicious, (he) became irritable and anybody who would try to
not befriend him and tried to be angry with him, he would immediately
suspect that something would happen to him in which he would react by
defending himself, and probably by killing. This individual had, actually,
committed, say, killing. I would not say murder because thats your term,
but he had killed already three (3) persons in different years. So, he does
not already know what he was doing because he was psychotic, which in
your parlance is insane.
Q. Now, Doctor, on January 6, 2000, and even prior to this date, what you are
trying to say is that, this subject, Randy Belonio, was already suffering
from schizophrenia?
A. Yes.[21]
Dr. Gauzon testified that based on his interview with Belonio on October 25,
2000 (around nine months after the stabbing incident) the latter was suffering from
schizophrenia. However, the evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the
offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of alleged abnormal
behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime.[22]
The first set of facts narrated by the doctor relates to Belonios condition during
the interview, months after the incident. His report was silent as regards the incidents
occurring prior to or during the circumstance for which Belonio stands trial. The
second part of his testimony dwelt on Belonios life history, which was offered to prove
that he had been suffering from his alleged condition since childhood.
However, perusing the story as narrated by the doctor, the same was a mere
statement of Belonios life and family history, explaining what brought about his
supposed mental condition.There was no showing that he was actually suffering from
schizophrenia during his juvenile years. To demonstrate that he had been suffering
from this condition, the doctor pointed to the fact that he has already killed three (3)
persons, including the present incident. However, such conclusion is non sequitur and,
at best, a circuitous argument. Further, the veracity of these findings is belied by the
fact that the accused did not raise this defense during his prosecutions for the other
killings. No other circumstances evincing its existence were presented during trial.
Furthermore, Dr. Gauzons examination cannot surmount Dr. Servandos
punctilious and overwhelming analysis, which took two days to narrate. She explained
the history of the accused, including his family and medical background, conducted a
mental status examination, which was based on her direct interviews with him, and
gave a series of other written psychological examinations.[23]
The portion of Dr. Servandos testimony pertinent to her findings regarding
Belonios mental condition is quoted as follows:
FISCAL AGRAVIADOR:
Q. Can you please read for the record this (r)esult which consist only of one (1)
sentence?
A. Psychiatric Evaluation Result. Base(d) on history, mental status examination,
and psychological examination, patient was noted to be evasive,
suspicious, and manipulative but no psychotic features were observed
upon evaluation. x x x.
Q. So, let us first, may I ask, what do you me(a)n by patient was noted to be
evasive, suspicious, and manipulative?
A. Actually, during the psychological examination, we have to give series of
questions. And then the patient (does) not answer directly to our
question. He would go around the bush. And then, after that, we also
found out during the result of the psychological examination that the same
pattern was noted.
Q. Does this mean that he was totally capable of being manipulative or evasive?
A. Yes.
Q. He did it intentionally?
A. Yes.
Q. With the knowledge that he knew the answer but does not want to give the
answer?
A. Yes.
Q. Meaning to say, that he has full control of his mental faculties that time?
A. Yes.
Q. Because there was an intention to be manipulative and there was an
intention to be evasive because he was suspicious?
A. Yes.
Q. When you said that there was no psychotic features(,) x x x (w)hat does this
mean?
A. When you say psychosis, those are compose[d] of symptoms such as
delusion and hallucination that are being extracted from the patient or
being displayed by the patient. However, during the examination, the
symptom or the patients answers are not enough to put him to a criteria of
psychosis because the delusion and the hallucination as well as the
thought process, the thought contents must be concretized enough in
order for us to determine to diagnose that this patient is actually suffering
from psychosis.
Q. So, subjected to your examination, this patient did not come up to the level
where he could be diagnosed as having delusion and hallucinations?
A. Leading to psychotic features.
Q. So, that is the meaning of not having psychotic features?
A. Yes.[24]
115
 The insanity issue raised by appellant boils down to the credibility of these two
expert witnesses and their respective testimonies. The time-honored doctrine is that
the question of which witness to believe is one best addressed by the trial court. The
findings of fact of the judges who heard the evidence are accorded great respect and
are seldom disturbed on appeal for they had the opportunity to directly observe the
witnesses, and to determine by their demeanor on the stand the probative value of
their testimonies.[25] The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the trial
court which found Dr. Servandos testimony more credible for the following reasons:
1. It could not be gainsaid that Dr. Servando is a disinterested and unbiased
witness. She does not know the accused and she is not known to the accused. She
will not be benefited if the Court upholds her findings and she had no reason to testify
falsely. On the other hand, Dr. Gauzon was admittedly paid for his services, hence, it
could not be truly said that he is an impartial and disinterested witness. If his findings
(are) upheld, the benefit to the practice of his profession is enormous;
2. As a government official, Dr. Servando has the presumption of regularity in the
performance of her duty. No such presumption arises in favor of Dr. Gauzon;
3. The findings of Dr. Servando that the accused is evasive and manipulative is
supported by the Courts own observation. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
4. The conclusion of Dr. Gauzon is principally based on his interview with the accused
and the members of the accuseds family. It was the members of the accuseds family,
the sister of the accused who informed Dr. Gauzon that at the age of 13, the accused
began to use drugs. The information that the family of the accused was impoverished;
that the accused spent his adolescence in Metro-Manila; that the accused was a
neglected child were all supplied by the kins of the accused who were not presented
as witnesses. There was no showing that Dr. Gauzon took precautionary steps to
validate the information.On the other hand, Dr. Servando also conducted interview of
the accused and his accompanying relatives including the BJMP guard who escorted
him. In addition, Dr. Servando conducted a series of written tests which are tailored to
determine the mental capacity of a person. The result of the written tests confirms the
observation of Dr. Servando in the interview that the accused is evasive and
manipulative.[26]
Unlike in other jurisdictions, Philippine courts have established a more stringent
criterion for the acceptance of insanity as an exempting circumstance. In our
jurisdiction, mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough; there must be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act.
Every individual is presumed to have acted with complete grasp of ones mental
faculties. Appellants past does not discredit the facts that (1) he did not act with
complete absence of the power to discern; (2) he was not deprived of reason; and (3)
he was not totally deprived of his will.
As held in People vs. Madarang,[27]
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He
admits committing the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at
the time of its commission. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone
and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the
issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime. x x x.[28]
Inasmuch as Belonio failed to present convincing evidence to establish his
alleged insanity at the time he stabbed Tamayo, we are constrained to affirm his
conviction.
We must add that we have meticulously reviewed the records of this case,
especially the evidence of the prosecution. We find no reason to modify, much less
reverse, the findings of the trial court that, indeed, appellants guilt for murder has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
We now look into the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court.
Under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, any
person found guilty of murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. The
same Code further instructs that when in the commission of the crime there is present
an aggravating circumstance which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.[29]
A review of the records supports the conclusion of the trial court on the
presence of treachery, which qualified the crime to murder. For treachery to be
appreciated, two elements must concur: (1) the means of execution employed gave
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.[30]
In the present case, Jennifer Carampatana testified on how the killing was
executed, as follows:
Q. What did you do there?
A. While we were conversing at that bench, after a short while, or five (5)
minutes, Randy Belonio came and he asked to light his cigarette because
Ramy was smoking at that time. He was allowed by Ramy to light his
cigarette.
Q. Was there any conversation between Ramy Tamayo and Randy
Belonio aside from asking lighting of cigarette?
A. While asking to light the cigarette, Randy inquired from Ramy why he
was there, Ramy told him that he is attending the wake of his
grandmother. Further, Randy asked him where he came from?And
Ramy answered that he is from Hda. Bubog.
Q. After that what did Randy Belonio do if he did anything?
116
A. He (sat) for a while, and a little while after that, he took a look at Let me interrupt. He was facing you? Ramy was facing you while you
Ramy. After some minutes, he went out. were facing the direction where the house of Randy Belonio, so that
Ramy was facing on the other side?
Q. And after few minutes was there any incident happened?
WITNESS:
A. After three (3) minutes Randy went back. He just walk normally, and
when he was near Ramy he stabbed Ramy hitting on the chest and A. Yes, sir.
while the weapon was still on the breast of Ramy I stood up and ran
away. COURT:

Q. From what direction did Randy came when he approach you? Proceed.

A. He came from their house because their house is near our house. APP AGRAVIADOR:

Q. In relation to you, where is this house located? Q. When Randy Belonio suddenly thrust the knife on the chest of Ramy
Tamayo, did you see the reaction of Ramy Tamayo?
A. Witness indicating that he came from her side, where the house is
situated. A. He was not able to move. After that, I want to ran to the house.

Q. And which side did you sit, the side near the direction of the house of APP AGRAVIADOR:
Randy Belonio or far from the house of Belonio?
Q. When for the first time did you see the weapon used by Randy Belonio
A. The other side. in taking the life of Ramy Tamayo?

COURT: A. When he thrusted that knife.

It was Ramy who was sitting near the house of Ramy? COURT:

WITNESS: Before or after he delivered the stabbing blow?

Yes, sir. A. At the moment he delivered the stabbing blow, that was the first time I
saw that knife.
APP AGRAVIADOR:
APP AGRAVIADOR:
Q. And what was the position of Ramy Tamayo when he was suddenly
stab. Q. When you saw Randy Belonio approaching Ramy Tamayo x x x, you
did not see the knife?
A. He was sitting in this manner.
A. Because he was wearing long sleeve to cover his hand.[31]
COURT INTERPRETER:
Appellants acts of leaving, then returning after a few minutes armed with a knife
Witness illustrating by crossing her legs over the other legs and move -- which he concealed while approaching the victim and which he used in stabbing him
slightly her body was in side way. -- while the latter was sitting, unaware and not forewarned of any danger, manifest a
deliberate employment of means to ensure the killing without risk to himself arising
APP AGRAVIADOR: from the defense which the victim might make.
Q. That means that Ramy Tamayo did not see Randy Belonio who was coming The aggravating circumstance of recidivism, which was alleged in the
from the house? Information was also duly proven. A recidivist is one who at the time of his trial for one
crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
A. Yes, Maam. embraced in the same title of this Code.[32] The records[33] show that appellant was
COURT: previously convicted by final judgment of Homicide, which like Murder, falls under the
title of Crimes against Persons.

The award by the court a quo of P50,000 as civil indemnity is in accordance with
jurisprudence.[34] The amount of P25,000 as exemplary damages should also be given

117
because of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of recidivism. However, the
court erred in awarding the amount of P940,716 as loss of earning capacity. In
accordance with the formula adopted by the Court in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA (31
SCRA 511 [1970]), and using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality,[35] the loss
of Tamayos earning capacity is to be computed as follows:
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x (Gross Annual Income Living
Expenses)
award for loss of earning capacity is INCREASED to P1,362,545; moral damages
is REDUCED to P50,000; actual damages is DELETED but temperate damages
of P25,000 and exemplary damages of P25,000 are awarded.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659 amending Section 23 of the Revised
Penal Code, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this
decision, to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

where: Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 the age of the deceased)
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
= 2/3 (80-24) x [(P200x365)- P36,500] Davide, Jr., C.J., and Puno, J., on official leave.

=P1,362,545

The award for loss of earning capacity should therefore be P1,362,545.

There being testimonial evidence in support of moral damages, an award for it is

proper. However, it should be reduced to the more reasonable amount of P50,000
considering that it is not meant to enrich an injured party.

Actual damages for the hospital expenses in the amount of P3,627.70 were duly
supported by receipts. However instead of awarding actual damages, we grant
temperate damages in accordance with People vs. Andres,[36] where the Court said:

[W]e declared in the case of People vs. Villanueva that:

when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to

less than P25,000, as in this case, the award of temperate damages
for P25,000 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser
amount. Conversely, if the amount of actual damages proven
exceeds P25,000, then temperate damages may no longer be
awarded; actual damages based on the receipts presented during
trial should instead be granted.

The victims heirs should, thus, be awarded temperate damages in the

amount of P25,000.[37]

Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless they submit to
the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be
lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision in Criminal Case No. 00-20595 convicting

the appellant of the crime of murder and sentencing him to DEATH is AFFIRMED. The

118
Republic of the Philippines The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife,
SUPREME COURT but that he loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao,
Manila or have any motive for assaulting them.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.
Carlos S. Tan for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores,
municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in
the said barrio and visitors were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred
Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and
while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his
wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo
attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he
wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five
days later as a result of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the
mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction
he was sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties,
to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. From
this sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the
defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin
Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and when he was about to go down,
he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the commission of the
crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon
he had a severe stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was
then when he fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed
that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason
of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to
come down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his
wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his
wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to
multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which
he is charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the
apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that
there are none, but that simply they are not known to us, for we cannot probe into
depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden away and inaccessible
to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral perversion
may lead a man commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of
committing it. But under the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was
the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact
that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose
protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he
himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack
of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also
motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor
stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a
dream, under the influence of an hallucination and not in his right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the
deceased was direct result of the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it.
Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does not clearly show this to have
been the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody saw how the
wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife. He only
seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is
that the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the
room as he was coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his
wife but he was defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife
was really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the
courts finds that the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is
charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in the Government insane asylum,
whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds that his liberty would no
longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

119
 Republic of the Philippines especially those to which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings before any
Congress of the Philippines authority shall be conducted in the best interest of the child and in a manner
Metro Manila which allows the child to participate and to express himself/herself freely.
The participation of children in the program and policy formulation and
implementation related to juvenile justice and welfare shall be ensured by
Thirteenth Congress
the concerned government agency.
Second Regular Session

(c) The State likewise recognizes the right of children to assistance,

including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development.
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fifth day of July, two thousand
and five.
(d) Pursuant to Article 40 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child, the State recognizes the right of every child alleged as, accused
Republic Act No. 9344 of, adjudged, or recognized as having infringed the penal law to be treated
in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and
worth, taking into account the child's age and desirability of promoting
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
his/her reintegration. Whenever appropriate and desirable, the State shall
WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
adopt measures for dealing with such children without resorting to judicial
COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
proceedings, providing that human rights and legal safeguards are fully
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
respected. It shall ensure that children are dealt with in a manner
appropriate to their well-being by providing for, among others, a variety of
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in disposition measures such as care, guidance and supervision orders,
Congress assembled: counseling, probation, foster care, education and vocational training
programs and other alternatives to institutional care.
TITLE I
GOVERNING PRINCIPLES (e) The administration of the juvenile justice and welfare system shall take
into consideration the cultural and religious perspectives of the Filipino
people, particularly the indigenous peoples and the Muslims, consistent with
CHAPTER 1 the protection of the rights of children belonging to these communities.
TITLE, POLICY AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

(f) The State shall apply the principles of restorative justice in all its laws,
Section 1. Short Title and Scope. - This Act shall be known as the "Juvenile policies and programs applicable to children in conflict with the law.
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006."It shall cover the different stages involving children
at risk and children in conflict with the law from prevention to rehabilitation and
reintegration. SEC. 3. Liberal Construction of this Act. - In case of doubt, the interpretation of any
of the provisions of this Act, including its implementing rules and regulations (IRRs),
shall be construed liberally in favor of the child in conflict with the law.
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall be observed
at all times:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - The following terms as used in this Act shall be
defined as follows:
(a) The State recognizes the vital role of children and youth in nation
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism (a) "Bail" refers to the security given for the release of the person in custody
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. of the law, furnished by him/her or a bondsman, to guarantee his/her
appearance before any court. Bail may be given in the form of corporate
security, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures
that will ensure the observance of international standards of child protection,

120
(b) "Best Interest of the Child" refers to the totality of the circumstances and
conditions which are most congenial to the survival, protection and feelings
of security of the child and most encouraging to the child's physical,
psychological and emotional development. It also means the least
detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and
development of the child.
(e) "Child" refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years.
(d) "Child at Risk" refers to a child who is vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses because of personal, family and social
circumstances, such as, but not limited to, the following:
(1) being abused by any person through sexual, physical,
psychological, mental, economic or any other means and the
parents or guardian refuse, are unwilling, or unable to provide
protection for the child;
(2) being exploited including sexually or economically;
(3) being abandoned or neglected, and after diligent search and
inquiry, the parent or guardian cannot be found;
(4) coming from a dysfunctional or broken family or without a
parent or guardian;
(5) being out of school;
(6) being a streetchild;
(7) being a member of a gang;
(8) living in a community with a high level of criminality or drug
abuse; and
(9) living in situations of armed conflict.
(e) "Child in Conflict with the Law" refers to a child who is alleged as,
accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an offense under Philippine
laws.
(f) "Community-based Programs" refers to the programs provided in a
community setting developed for purposes of intervention and diversion, as
well as rehabilitation of the child in conflict with the law, for reintegration into
his/her family and/or community.
(g) "Court" refers to a family court or, in places where there are no family
courts, any regional trial court.
(h) "Deprivation of Liberty" refers to any form of detention or imprisonment,
or to the placement of a child in conflict with the law in a public or private
custodial setting, from which the child in conflict with the law is not permitted
to leave at will by order of any judicial or administrative authority.
(i) "Diversion" refers to an alternative, child-appropriate process of
determining the responsibility and treatment of a child in conflict with the law
on the basis of his/her social, cultural, economic, psychological or
educational background without resorting to formal court proceedings.
(j) "Diversion Program" refers to the program that the child in conflict with
the law is required to undergo after he/she is found responsible for an
offense without resorting to formal court proceedings.
(k) "Initial Contact With-the Child" refers to the apprehension or taking into
custody of a child in conflict with the law by law enforcement officers or
private citizens. It includes the time when the child alleged to be in conflict
with the law receives a subpoena under Section 3(b) of Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or summons under Section 6(a) or
Section 9(b) of the same Rule in cases that do not require preliminary
investigation or where there is no necessity to place the child alleged to be
in conflict with the law under immediate custody.
(I) "Intervention" refers to a series of activities which are designed to
address issues that caused the child to commit an offense. It may take the
form of an individualized treatment program which may include counseling,
skills training, education, and other activities that will enhance his/her
psychological, emotional and psycho-social well-being.
(m) "Juvenile Justice and Welfare System" refers to a system dealing with
children at risk and children in conflict with the law, which provides child-
appropriate proceedings, including programs and services for prevention,
diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and aftercare to ensure their normal
growth and development.
(n) "Law Enforcement Officer" refers to the person in authority or his/her
agent as defined in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, including a
barangay tanod.
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 (0) "Offense" refers to any act or omission whether punishable under special
laws or the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
(p) "Recognizance" refers to an undertaking in lieu of a bond assumed by a
parent or custodian who shall be responsible for the appearance in court of
the child in conflict with the law, when required.
(q) "Restorative Justice" refers to a principle which requires a process of
resolving conflicts with the maximum involvement of the victim, the offender
and the community. It seeks to obtain reparation for the victim; reconciliation
of the offender, the offended and the community; and reassurance to the
offender that he/she can be reintegrated into society. It also enhances
public safety by activating the offender, the victim and the community in
prevention strategies.
(r) "Status Offenses" refers to offenses which discriminate only against a
child, while an adult does not suffer any penalty for committing similar acts.
These shall include curfew violations; truancy, parental disobedience and
the like.
(s) "Youth Detention Home" refers to a 24-hour child-caring institution
managed by accredited local government units (LGUs) and licensed and/or
accredited nongovernment organizations (NGOs) providing short-term
residential care for children in conflict with the law who are awaiting court
disposition of their cases or transfer to other agencies or jurisdiction.
(t) "Youth Rehabilitation Center" refers to a 24-hour residential care facility
managed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
LGUs, licensed and/or accredited NGOs monitored by the DSWD, which
provides care, treatment and rehabilitation services for children in conflict
with the law. Rehabilitation services are provided under the guidance of a
trained staff where residents are cared for under a structured therapeutic
environment with the end view of reintegrating them into their families and
communities as socially functioning individuals. Physical mobility of
residents of said centers may be restricted pending court disposition of the
charges against them.
(u) "Victimless Crimes" refers to offenses where there is no private offended
party.
CHAPTER 2 restorative justice;
PRINCIPLES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
SEC. 5. Rights of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - Every child in conflict with
the law shall have the following rights, including but not limited to:
(a) the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) the right not to be imposed a sentence of capital punishment or life
imprisonment, without the possibility of release;
(c) the right not to be deprived, unlawfully or arbitrarily, of his/her liberty;
detention or imprisonment being a disposition of last resort, and which shall
be for the shortest appropriate period of time;
(d) the right to be treated with humanity and respect, for the inherent dignity
of the person, and in a manner which takes into account the needs of a
person of his/her age. In particular, a child deprived of liberty shall be
separated from adult offenders at all times. No child shall be detained
together with adult offenders. He/She shall be conveyed separately to or
from court. He/She shall await hearing of his/her own case in a separate
holding area. A child in conflict with the law shall have the right to maintain
contact with his/her family through correspondence and visits, save in
exceptional circumstances;
(e) the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as
well as the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his/her liberty
before a court or other competent, independent and impartial authority, and
to a prompt decision on such action;
(f) the right to bail and recognizance, in appropriate cases;
(g) the right to testify as a witness in hid/her own behalf under the rule on
examination of a child witness;
(h) the right to have his/her privacy respected fully at all stages of the
proceedings;
(i) the right to diversion if he/she is qualified and voluntarily avails of the
same;
(j) the right to be imposed a judgment in proportion to the gravity of the
offense where his/her best interest, the rights of the victim and the needs of
society are all taken into consideration by the court, under the principle of
(k) the right to have restrictions on his/her personal liberty limited to the
minimum, and where discretion is given by law to the judge to determine
whether to impose fine or imprisonment, the imposition of fine being
preferred as the more appropriate penalty;
122
 (I) in general, the right to automatic suspension of sentence;
(m) the right to probation as an alternative to imprisonment, if qualified
under the Probation Law;
(n) the right to be free from liability for perjury, concealment or
misrepresentation; and
same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion,
proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other
government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the
child in conflict with the law.

(o) other rights as provided for under existing laws, rules and regulations.

TITLE II
The State further adopts the provisions of the United Nations Standard Minimum
STRUCTURES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice or "Beijing Rules", United Nations
WELFARE
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency or the "Riyadh Guidelines", and
the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty.
SEC. 8. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC). - A Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Council (JJWC) is hereby created and attached to the Department of Justice
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age
and placed under its administrative supervision. The JJWC shall be chaired by an
or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
undersecretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development. It shall ensure
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
the effective implementation of this Act and coordination among the following
Section 20 of this Act.
agencies:

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
(a) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless
he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. (b) Department of Education (DepEd);

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption (c) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);
from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
(d) Public Attorney's Office (PAO);
SEC. 7. Determination ofAge. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the
(e) Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR);
law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child
may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other
pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on (f) Parole and Probation Administration (PPA)
information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of
the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor. (g) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);

Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of (h) Philippine National Police (PNP);.
the information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for
the determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide the case within (i) Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP);
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested
parties.
(i) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);

If a case has been fiied against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the
appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the (k) Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA);

123
 (l) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(m) Other institutions focused on juvenile justice and intervention programs.
The JJWC shall be composed of representatives, whose ranks shall not be lower than
director, to be designated by the concerned heads of the following departments or
agencies:
(a) Department of Justice (DOJ);
(b) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);
(c) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC)
(d) Department of Education (DepEd);
(e) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
(f) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
(g) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(h) Two (2) representatives from NGOs, one to be designated by the
Secretary of Justice and the other to be designated by the Secretary of
Social Welfare and Development.
The JJWC shall convene within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of this Act. The
Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of Social Welfare and Development shall
determine the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the JJWC.
The JJWC shall coordinate with the Office of the Court Administrator and the
Philippine Judicial Academy to ensure the realization of its mandate and the proper
discharge of its duties and functions, as herein provided.
SEC. 9. Duties and Functions of the JJWC. - The JJWC shall have the following
duties and functions:
(a) To oversee the implementation of this Act;
(b) To advise the President on all matters and policies relating to juvenile
justice and welfare;
(c) To assist the concerned agencies in the review and redrafting of existing
policies/regulations or in the formulation of new ones in line with the
provisions of this Act;
(d) To periodically develop a comprehensive 3 to 5-year national juvenile
intervention program, with the participation of government agencies
concerned, NGOs and youth organizations;
(e) To coordinate the implementation of the juvenile intervention programs
and activities by national government agencies and other activities which
may have an important bearing on the success of the entire national juvenile
intervention program. All programs relating to juvenile justice and welfare
shall be adopted in consultation with the JJWC;
(f) To formulate and recommend policies and strategies in consultation with
children for the prevention of juvenile delinquency and the administration of
justice, as well as for the treatment and rehabilitation of the children in
conflict with the law;
(g) To collect relevant information and conduct continuing research and
support evaluations and studies on all matters relating to juvenile justice and
welfare, such as but not limited to:
(1) the performance and results achieved by juvenile intervention
programs and by activities of the local government units and other
government agencies;
(2) the periodic trends, problems and causes of juvenile
delinquency and crimes; and
(3) the particular needs of children in conflict with the law in
custody.
The data gathered shall be used by the JJWC in the improvement of the
administration of juvenile justice and welfare system.
The JJWC shall set up a mechanism to ensure that children are involved in
research and policy development.
(h) Through duly designated persons and with the assistance of the
agencies provided in the preceding section, to conduct regular inspections
in detention and rehabilitation facilities and to undertake spot inspections on
their own initiative in order to check compliance with the standards provided
herein and to make the necessary recommendations to appropriate
agencies;
124
 (i) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of trainings for the personnel of the
agencies involved in the administration of the juvenile justice and welfare
system and the juvenile intervention program;
(j) To submit an annual report to the President on the implementation of this
Act; and
(k) To perform such other functions as may be necessary to implement the
provisions of this Act.
SEC. 10. Policies and Procedures on Juvenile Justice and Welfare. - All
government agencies enumerated in Section 8 shall, with the assistance of the JJWC
and within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, draft policies and procedures
consistent with the standards set in the law. These policies and procedures shall be
modified accordingly in consultation with the JJWC upon the completion of the
national juvenile intervention program as provided under Section 9 (d).
SEC. 11. Child Rights Center (CRC). - The existing Child Rights Center of the
Commission on Human Rights shall ensure that the status, rights and interests of
children are upheld in accordance with the Constitution and international instruments
on human rights. The CHR shall strengthen the monitoring of government compliance
of all treaty obligations, including the timely and regular submission of reports before
the treaty bodies, as well as the implementation and dissemination of
recommendations and conclusions by government agencies as well as NGOs and civil
society.
TITLE
PREVENTION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
CHAPTER
THE ROLE OF THE DIFFERENT SECTORS
SEC. 12. The Family. - The family shall be responsible for the primary nurturing and
rearing of children which is critical in delinquency prevention. As far as practicable and
in accordance with the procedures of this Act, a child in conflict with the law shall be
maintained in his/her family.
SEC. 13. The Educational System. - Educational institutions shall work together with
families, community organizations and agencies in the prevention of juvenile
delinquency and in the rehabilitation and reintegration of child in conflict with the law.
Schools shall provide adequate, necessary and individualized educational schemes
for children manifesting difficult behavior and children in conflict with the law. In cases
where children in conflict with the law are taken into custody or detained in
rehabilitation centers, they should be provided the opportunity to continue learning
under an alternative learning system with basic literacy program or non- formal
education accreditation equivalency system.
SEC. 14. The Role of the Mass Media. - The mass media shall play an active role in
the promotion of child rights, and delinquency prevention by relaying consistent
messages through a balanced approach. Media practitioners shall, therefore, have the
duty to maintain the highest critical and professional standards in reporting and
covering cases of children in conflict with the law. In all publicity concerning children,
the best interest of the child should be the primordial and paramount concern. Any
undue, inappropriate and sensationalized publicity of any case involving a child in
conflict with the law is hereby declared a violation of the child's rights.
SEC. 15. Establishment and Strengthening of Local Councils for the Protection
of Children. - Local Councils for the Protection of Children (LCPC) shall be
established in all levels of local government, and where they have already been
established, they shall be strengthened within one (1) year from the effectivity of this
Act. Membership in the LCPC shall be chosen from among the responsible members
of the community, including a representative from the youth sector, as well as
representatives from government and private agencies concerned with the welfare of
children.
The local council shall serve as the primary agency to coordinate with and assist the
LGU concerned for the adoption of a comprehensive plan on delinquency prevention,
and to oversee its proper implementation.
One percent (1%) of the internal revenue allotment of barangays, municipalities and
cities shall be allocated for the strengthening and implementation of the programs of
the LCPC: Provided, That the disbursement of the fund shall be made by the LGU
concerned.
III
SEC. 16. Appointment of Local Social Welfare and Development Officer. - All
LGUs shall appoint a duly licensed social worker as its local social welfare and
1 development officer tasked to assist children in conflict with the law.
SEC. 17. The Sangguniang Kabataan. - The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) shall
coordinate with the LCPC in the formulation and implementation of juvenile
intervention and diversion programs in the community.
CHAPTER 2
COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE INTERVENTION PROGRAM
SEC. 18. Development of a Comprehensive Juvenile Intervention Program. - A
Comprehensive juvenile intervention program covering at least a 3-year period shall
be instituted in LGUs from the barangay to the provincial level.
125
The LGUs shall set aside an amount necessary to implement their respective juvenile development officer; or when and where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred
intervention programs in their annual budget. to herein has been found by the Local Social Welfare and Development Office to be
abandoned, neglected or abused by his parents, or in the event that the parents will
not comply with the prevention program, the proper petition for involuntary
The LGUs, in coordination with the LCPC, shall call on all sectors concerned,
commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development
particularly the child-focused institutions, NGOs, people's organizations, educational
Office pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise ,known as "The Child and
institutions and government agencies involved in delinquency prevention to participate
Youth Welfare Code".
in the planning process and implementation of juvenile intervention programs. Such
programs shall be implemented consistent with the national program formulated and
designed by the JJWC. The implementation of the comprehensive juvenile
intervention program shall be reviewed and assessed annually by the LGUs in
coordination with the LCPC. Results of the assessment shall be submitted by the
provincial and city governments to the JJWC not later than March 30 of every year.
TITLE V
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM
SEC. 19. Community-based Programs on Juvenile Justice and Welfare. -
Community-based programs on juvenile justice and welfare shall be instituted by the
CHAPTER I
LGUs through the LCPC, school, youth organizations and other concerned agencies.
INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE CHILD
The LGUs shall provide community-based services which respond to the special
needs, problems, interests and concerns of children and which offer appropriate
counseling and guidance to them and their families. These programs shall consist of SEC. 21. Procedure for Taking the Child into Custody. - From the moment a child
three levels: is taken into custody, the law enforcement officer shall:

(a) Primary intervention includes general measures to promote social justice
and equal opportunity, which tackle perceived root causes of offending;
(b) Secondary intervention includes measures to assist children at risk; and
(c) Tertiary intervention includes measures to avoid unnecessary contact
with the formal justice system and other measures to prevent re-offending.
(a) Explain to the child in simple language and in a dialect that he/she can
understand why he/she is being placed under custody and the offense that
he/she allegedly committed;
(b) Inform the child of the reason for such custody and advise the child of
his/her constitutional rights in a language or dialect understood by him/her;
(e) Properly identify himself/herself and present proper identification to the
child;

(d) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words and from sexually harassing
or abusing, or making sexual advances on the child in conflict with the law;
TITLE IV
TREATMENT OF CHILDREN BELOW THE AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
(e) Avoid displaying or using any firearm, weapon, handcuffs or other
instruments of force or restraint, unless absolutely necessary and only after
SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. - If it has been
all other methods of control have been exhausted and have failed;
determined that the child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the
authority which will have an initial contact with the child has the duty to immediately
release the child to the custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence (f) Refrain from subjecting the child in conflict with the law to greater
thereof, the child's nearest relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local social restraint than is necessary for his/her apprehension;
welfare and development officer who will determine the appropriate programs in
consultation with the child and to the person having custody over the child. If the
(g) Avoid violence or unnecessary force;
parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to take
custody, the child may be released to any of the following: a duly registered
nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay official or a member of the (h) Determine the age of the child pursuant to Section 7 of this Act;
Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a local social welfare and

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 (i) Immediately but not later than eight (8) hours after apprehension, turn Public Attorney's Office; (2) the child's parents, guardian, or nearest relative, as the
over custody of the child to the Social Welfare and Development Office or case may be; and (3) the local social welfare and development officer. In the absence
other accredited NGOs, and notify the child's apprehension. The social of the child's parents, guardian, or nearest relative, and the local social welfare and
welfare and development officer shall explain to the child and the child's development officer, the investigation shall be conducted in the presence of a
parents/guardians the consequences of the child's act with a view towards representative of an NGO, religious group, or member of the BCPC.
counseling and rehabilitation, diversion from the criminal justice system, and
reparation, if appropriate;
After the initial investigation, the local social worker conducting the same may do
either of the following:
(j) Take the child immediately to the proper medical and health officer for a
thorough physical and mental examination. The examination results shall be
(a) Proceed in accordance with Section 20 if the child is fifteen (15) years or
kept confidential unless otherwise ordered by the Family Court. Whenever
below or above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old, who acted
the medical treatment is required, steps shall be immediately undertaken to
without discernment; and
provide the same;

(b) If the child is above fifteen (15) years old but below eighteen (18) and
(k) Ensure that should detention of the child in conflict with the law be
who acted with discernment, proceed to diversion under the following
necessary, the child shall be secured in quarters separate from that of the
chapter.
opposite sex and adult offenders;

CHAPTER 2
(l) Record the following in the initial investigation:
DIVERSION

1. Whether handcuffs or other instruments of restraint were used,

SEC. 23. System of Diversion. - Children in conflict with the law shall undergo
and if so, the reason for such;
diversion programs without undergoing court proceedings subject to the conditions
herein provided:
2. That the parents or guardian of a child, the DSWD, and the
PA0 have been informed of the apprehension and the details
(a) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committee is not more than
thereof; and
six (6) years imprisonment, the law enforcement officer or Punong Barangay
with the assistance of the local social welfare and development officer or
3. The exhaustion of measures to determine the age of a child other members of the LCPC shall conduct mediation, family conferencing
and the precise details of the physical and medical examination or and conciliation and, where appropriate, adopt indigenous modes of conflict
the failure to submit a child to such examination; and resolution in accordance with the best interest of the child with a view to
accomplishing the objectives of restorative justice and the formulation of a
diversion program. The child and his/her family shall be present in these
(m) Ensure that all statements signed by the child during investigation shall
activities.
be witnessed by the child's parents or guardian, social worker, or legal
counsel in attendance who shall affix his/her signature to the said
statement. (b) In victimless crimes where the imposable penalty is not more than six (6)
years imprisonment, the local social welfare and development officer shall
meet with the child and his/her parents or guardians for the development of
A child in conflict with the law shall only be searched by a law enforcement officer of
the appropriate diversion and rehabilitation program, in coordination with the
the same gender and shall not be locked up in a detention cell.
BCPC;

SEC. 22. Duties During Initial Investigation. - The law enforcement officer shall, in
(c) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committed exceeds six (6)
his/her investigation, determine where the case involving the child in conflict with the
years imprisonment, diversion measures may be resorted to only by the
law should be referred.
court.

The taking of the statement of the child shall be conducted in the presence of the
SEC. 24. Stages Where Diversion May be Conducted. - Diversion may be
following: (1) child's counsel of choice or in the absence thereof, a lawyer from the
conducted at the Katarungang Pambarangay, the police investigation or the inquest or

127
preliminary investigation stage and at all 1evels and phases of the proceedings custody and correspondingly charged in court. The document transmitting said
including judicial level. records shall display the word "CHILD" in bold letters.

SEC. 25. Conferencing, Mediation and Conciliation. - A child in conflict with law SEC. 29. Factors in Determining Diversion Program. - In determining whether
may undergo conferencing, mediation or conciliation outside the criminal justice diversion is appropriate and desirable, the following factors shall be taken into
system or prior to his entry into said system. A contract of diversion may be entered consideration:
into during such conferencing, mediation or conciliation proceedings.
(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged;
SEC. 26. Contract of Diversion. - If during the conferencing, mediation or
conciliation, the child voluntarily admits the commission of the act, a diversion program
(b) The frequency and the severity of the act;
shall be developed when appropriate and desirable as determined under Section 30.
Such admission shall not be used against the child in any subsequent judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative proceedings. The diversion program shall be effective and (c) The circumstances of the child (e.g. age, maturity, intelligence, etc.);
binding if accepted by the parties concerned. The acceptance shall be in writing and
signed by the parties concerned and the appropriate authorities. The local social
welfare and development officer shall supervise the implementation of the diversion (d) The influence of the family and environment on the growth of the child;
program. The diversion proceedings shall be completed within forty-five (45) days.
The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended until the completion of the (e) The reparation of injury to the victim;
diversion proceedings but not to exceed forty-five (45) days.
(f) The weight of the evidence against the child;
The child shall present himself/herself to the competent authorities that imposed the
diversion program at least once a month for reporting and evaluation of the
effectiveness of the program. (g) The safety of the community; and

Failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract of diversion, as certified
by the local social welfare and development officer, shall give the offended party the
option to institute the appropriate legal action.
The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended during the effectivity of
the diversion program, but not exceeding a period of two (2) years.
SEC. 27. Duty of the Punong Barangay When There is No Diversion. - If the
offense does not fall under Section 23(a) and (b), or if the child, his/her parents or
guardian does not consent to a diversion, the Punong Barangay handling the case
shall, within three (3) days from determination of the absence of jurisdiction over the
case or termination of the diversion proceedings, as the case may be, forward the
records of the case of the child to the law enforcement officer, prosecutor or the
appropriate court, as the case may be. Upon the issuance of the corresponding
document, certifying to the fact that no agreement has been reached by the parties,
the case shall be filed according to the regular process.
(h) The best interest of the child.
SEC. 30. Formulation of the Diversion Program. - In formulating a diversion
program, the individual characteristics and the peculiar circumstances of the child in
conflict with the law shall be used to formulate an individualized treatment.
The following factors shall be considered in formulating a diversion program for the
child:
(a) The child's feelings of remorse for the offense he/she committed;
(b) The parents' or legal guardians' ability to guide and supervise the child;
(c) The victim's view about the propriety of the measures to be imposed;
and

SEC. 28. Duty of the Law Enforcement Officer When There is No Diversion. - If
the offense does not fall under Section 23(a) and (b), or if the child, his/her parents or
guardian does not consent to a diversion, the Women and Children Protection Desk of
the PNP, or other law enforcement officer handling the case of the child under
custody, to the prosecutor or judge concerned for the conduct of inquest and/or
preliminary investigation to determine whether or not the child should remain under
(d) The availability of community-based programs for rehabilitation and
reintegration of the child.
SEC. 31. Kinds of Diversion Programs. - The diversion program shall include
adequate socio-cultural and psychological responses and services for the child. At the

128
different stages where diversion may be resorted to, the following diversion programs (c) At the level of the appropriate court:
may be agreed upon, such as, but not limited to:
(1) Diversion programs specified under paragraphs(a)and (b)
(a) At the level of the Punong Barangay: above;

(1) Restitution of property; (2) Written or oral reprimand or citation;

(2) Reparation of the damage caused; (3) Fine:

(3) Indemnification for consequential damages; (4) Payment of the cost of the proceedings; or

(4) Written or oral apology; (5) Institutional care and custody.

(5) Care, guidance and supervision orders; CHAPTER 3

PROSECUTION
(6) Counseling for the child in conflict with the law and the child's
family; SEC. 32. Duty of the Prosecutor's Office. - There shall be a specially trained
prosecutor to conduct inquest, preliminary investigation and prosecution of cases
involving a child in conflict with the law. If there is an allegation of torture or ill-
(7)Attendance in trainings, seminars and lectures on:
treatment of a child in conflict with the law during arrest or detention, it shall be the
duty of the prosecutor to investigate the same.
(i) anger management skills;
SEC. 33. Preliminary Investigation and Filing of Information. - The prosecutor
(ii) problem solving and/or conflict resolution skills; shall conduct a preliminary investigation in the following instances: (a) when the child
in conflict with the law does not qualify for diversion: (b) when the child, his/her
parents or guardian does not agree to diversion as specified in Sections 27 and 28;
(iii) values formation; and and (c) when considering the assessment and recommendation of the social worker,
the prosecutor determines that diversion is not appropriate for the child in conflict with
(iv) other skills which will aid the child in dealing with the law.
situations which can lead to repetition of the offense;
Upon serving the subpoena and the affidavit of complaint, the prosecutor shall notify
(8) Participation in available community-based programs, the Public Attorney's Office of such service, as well as the personal information, and
including community service; or place of detention of the child in conflict with the law.

(9) Participation in education, vocation and life skills programs. Upon determination of probable cause by the prosecutor, the information against the
child shall be filed before the Family Court within forty-five (45) days from the start of
the preliminary investigation.
(b) At the level of the law enforcement officer and the prosecutor:

CHAPTER 4
(1) Diversion programs specified under paragraphs (a)(1) to (a)(9) COURT PROCEEDINGS
herein; and

SEC. 34. Bail. - For purposes of recommending the amount of bail, the privileged
(2) Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of mitigating circumstance of minority shall be considered.
the crime;

129
SEC. 35. Release on Recognizance. - Where a child is detained, the court shall
order:
(a) the release of the minor on recognizance to his/her parents and other
suitable person;
(b) the release of the child in conflict with the law on bail; or
(c) the transfer of the minor to a youth detention home/youth rehabilitation
center.
The court shall not order the detention of a child in a jail pending trial or hearing of
his/her case.
SEC. 36. Detention of the Child Pending Trial. - Children detained pending trial may
be released on bail or recognizance as provided for under Sections 34 and 35 under
this Act. In all other cases and whenever possible, detention pending trial may be
replaced by alternative measures, such as close supervision, intensive care or
placement with a family or in an educational setting or home. Institutionalization or
detention of the child pending trial shall be used only as a measure of last resort and
for the shortest possible period of time.
Whenever detention is necessary, a child will always be detained in youth detention
homes established by local governments, pursuant to Section 8 of the Family Courts
Act, in the city or municipality where the child resides.
In the absence of a youth detention home, the child in conflict with the law may be
committed to the care of the DSWD or a local rehabilitation center recognized by the
government in the province, city or municipality within the jurisdiction of the court. The
center or agency concerned shall be responsible for the child's appearance in court
whenever required.
SEC. 37. Diversion Measures. - Where the maximum penalty imposed by law for the
offense with which the child in conflict with the law is charged is imprisonment of not
more than twelve (12) years, regardless of the fine or fine alone regardless of the
amount, and before arraignment of the child in conflict with the law, the court shall
determine whether or not diversion is appropriate.
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty
of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which
may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various chcumstances of the
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - Upon the
recommendation of the social worker who has custody of the child, the court shall
dismiss the case against the child whose sentence has been suspended and against
whom disposition measures have been issued, and shall order the final discharge of
the child if it finds that the objective of the disposition measures have been fulfilled.
The discharge of the child in conflict with the law shall not affect the civil liability
resulting from the commission of the offense, which shall be enforced in accordance
with law.
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds
that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with
the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed
to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child
in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years.
SEC. 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in conflict with the law shall be
credited in the services of his/her sentence with the full time spent in actual
commitment and detention under this Act.
SEC. 42. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. - The court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a child in conflict with the law, and upon
application at any time, place the child on probation in lieu of service of his/her
sentence taking into account the best interest of the child. For this purpose, Section 4
of Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976", is
hereby amended accordingly.
CHAPTER 5
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS
SEC. 43. Confedentiality of Records and Proceedings. - All records and
proceedings involving children in conflict with the law from initial contact until final
disposition of the case shall be considered privileged and confidential. The public shall
be excluded during the proceedings and the records shall not be disclosed directly or
indirectly to anyone by any of the parties or the participants in the proceedings for any
purpose whatsoever, except to determine if the child in conflict with the law may have
130
his/hes sentence suspended or if he/she may be granted probation under the They shall be handled by female doctors, correction officers and social workers, and
Probation Law, or to enforce the civil liability imposed in the criminal action. shall be accommodated separately from male children in conflict with the law.

The component authorities shall undertake all measures to protect this confidentiality SEC. 48. Gender-Sensitivity Training. - No personnel of rehabilitation and training
of proceedings, including non-disclosure of records to the media, maintaining a facilities shall handle children in conflict with the law without having undergone gender
separate police blotter for cases involving children in conflict with the law and adopting sensitivity training.
a system of coding to conceal material information which will lead to the child's
identity. Records of a child in conflict with the law shall not be used in subsequent
SEC. 49. Establishment of Youth Detention Homes. - The LGUs shall set aside an
proceedings for cases involving the same offender as an adult, except when beneficial
amount to build youth detention homes as mandated by the Family Courts Act. Youth
for the offender and upon his/her written consent.
detention homes may also be established by private and NGOs licensed and
accredited by the DSWD, in consultation with the JJWC.
A person who has been in conflict with the law as a child shall not be held under any
provision of law, to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by
SEC. 50. Care and Maintenance of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - The
reason of his/her failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in
expenses for the care and maintenance of a child in conflict with the law under
response to any inquiry made to him/her for any purpose.
institutional care shall be borne by his/her parents or those persons liable to support
him/her: Provided, That in case his/her parents or those persons liable to support
him/her cannot pay all or part of said expenses, the municipality where the offense
was committed shall pay one-third (1/3) of said expenses or part thereof; the province
to which the municipality belongs shall pay one-third (1/3) and the remaining one-third
(1/3) shall be borne by the national government. Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds
TITLE VI
(2/3) of said expenses; and in case a chartered city cannot pay said expenses, part of
REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION
the internal revenue allotments applicable to the unpaid portion shall be withheld and
applied to the settlement of said obligations: Provided, further, That in the event that
SEC. 44. Objective of Rehabilitation and Reintegration. - The objective of the child in conflict with the law is not a resident of the municipality/city where the
rehabilitation and reintegration of children in conflict with the law is to provide them offense was committed, the court, upon its determination, may require the
with interventions, approaches and strategies that will enable them to improve their city/municipality where the child in conflict with the law resides to shoulder the cost.
social functioning with the end goal of reintegration to their families and as productive
members of their communities.
All city and provincial governments must exert effort for the immediate establishment
of local detention homes for children in conflict with the law.
SEC. 45. Court Order Required. - No child shall be received in any rehabilitation or
training facility without a valid order issued by the court after a hearing for the purpose.
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other
The details of this order shall be immediately entered in a register exclusively for
Training Facilities. - A child
children in conflict with the law. No child shall be admitted in any facility where there is
no such register.
in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to
serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
SEC. 46, Separate Facilities from Adults. - In all rehabilitation or training facilities, it
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
shall be mandatory that children shall be separated from adults unless they are
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
members of the same family. Under no other circumstance shall a child in conflict with
the law be placed in the same confinement as adults.
SEC. 52. Rehabilitation of Children in Conflict with the Law. - Children in conflict
with the law, whose sentences are suspended may, upon order of the court, undergo
The rehabilitation, training or confinement area of children in conflict with the law shall
any or a combination of disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and
provide a home environment where children in conflict with the law can be provided
welfare of the child as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with quality counseling and treatment.
with the Law.

SEC. 47. Female Children. - Female children in conflict with the law placed in an
If the community-based rehabilitation is availed of by a child in conflict with the law,
institution shall be given special attention as to their personal needs and problems.
he/she shall be released to parents, guardians, relatives or any other responsible

131
person in the community. Under the supervision and guidance of the local social
welfare and development officer, and in coordination with his/her parents/guardian, the
child in conflict with the law shall participate in community-based programs, which
shall include, but not limited to:
(1) Competency and life skills development;
(2) Socio-cultural and recreational activities;
(3) Community volunteer projects;
(4) Leadership training;
(5) Social services;
(6) Homelife services;
(7) Health services; .
(8) Spiritual enrichment; and
(9) Community and family welfare services.
In accordance therewith, the family of the child in conflict with the law shall endeavor
to actively participate in the community-based rehabilitation.
Based on the progress of the youth in the community, a final report will be forwarded
by the local social welfare and development officer to the court for final disposition of
the case.
If the community-based programs are provided as diversion measures under Chapter
II, Title V, the programs enumerated above shall be made available to the child in
conflict with the law.
SEC. 53. Youth Rehabilitation Center. - The youth rehabilitation center shall provide
24-hour group care, treatment and rehabilitation services under the guidance of a
trained staff where residents are cared for under a structured therapeutic environment
with the end view of reintegrating them in their families and communities as socially
functioning individuals. A quarterly report shall be submitted by the center to the
proper court on the progress of the children in conflict with the law. Based on the
progress of the youth in the center, a final report will be forwarded to the court for final
disposition of the case. The DSWD shall establish youth rehabilitation centers in each
region of the country.
SEC. 54. Objectives of Community Based Programs. - The objectives of
community-based programs are as follows:
(a) Prevent disruption in the education or means of livelihood of the child in
conflict with the law in case he/she is studying, working or attending
vocational learning institutions;
(b) Prevent separation of the child in conflict with the law from his/her
parents/guardians to maintain the support system fostered by their
relationship and to create greater awareness of their mutual and reciprocal
responsibilities;
(c) Facilitate the rehabilitation and mainstreaming of the child in conflict with
the law and encourage community support and involvement; and
(d) Minimize the stigma that attaches to the child in conflict with the law by
preventing jail detention.
SEC. 55. Criteria of Community-Based Programs. - Every LGU shall establish
community-based programs that will focus on the rehabilitation and reintegration of the
child. All programs shall meet the criteria to be established by the JJWC which shall
take into account the purpose of the program, the need for the consent of the child
and his/her parents or legal guardians, and the participation of the child-centered
agencies whether public or private.
SEC. 56. After-Care Support Services for Children in Conflict with the Law. -
Children in conflict with the law whose cases have been dismissed by the proper court
because of good behavior as per recommendation of the DSWD social worker and/or
any accredited NGO youth rehabilitation center shall be provided after-care services
by the local social welfare and development officer for a period of at least six (6)
months. The service includes counseling and other community-based services
designed to facilitate social reintegration, prevent re-offending and make the children
productive members of the community.
TITLE VII
GENERAL PROVISIONS
CHAPTER 1
EXEMPTING PROVISIONS
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SEC. 57. Status Offenees. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized
if committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished
if committed by a child.
SEC. 58. Offenses Not Applicable to Children. - Persons below eighteen (18) years
of age shall be exempt from prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and prostitution
under Section 202 of the Revised Penal Code, of mendicancy under Presidential
Decree No. 1563, and sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619, such
prosecution being inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child: Provided, That said persons shall undergo appropriate counseling and
treatment program.
SEC. 59. Exemption from the Application of Death Penalty. - The provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and other special laws
notwithstanding, no death penalty shall be imposed upon children in conflict with the
law.
CHAPTER
PROHIBITED ACTS
SEC. 60. Prohibition Against Labeling and Shaming. - In the conduct of the
proceedings beginning from the initial contact with the child, the competent authorities
must refrain from branding or labeling children as young criminals, juvenile
delinquents, prostitutes or attaching to them in any manner any other derogatory
names. Likewise, no discriminatory remarks and practices shall be allowed particularly
with respect to the child's class or ethnic origin.
SEC. 61. Other Prohibited Acts. - The following and any other similar acts shall be
considered prejudicial and detrimental to the psychological, emotional, social, spiritual,
moral and physical health and well-being of the child in conflict with the law and
therefore, prohibited:
(a) Employment of threats of whatever kind and nature;
(b) Employment of abusive, coercive and punitive measures such as
cursing, beating, stripping, and solitary confinement;
(c) Employment of degrading, inhuman end cruel forms of punishment such
as shaving the heads, pouring irritating, corrosive or harmful substances
over the body of the child in conflict with the law, or forcing him/her to walk
around the community wearing signs which embarrass, humiliate, and
degrade his/her personality and dignity; and
(d) Compelling the child to perform involuntary servitude in any and all forms
under any and all instances.
CHAPTER 3
PENAL PROVISION
SEC. 62. Violation of the Provisions of this Act or Rules or Regulations in
General. - Any person who violates any provision of this Act or any rule or regulation
promulgated in accordance thereof shall, upon conviction for each act or omission, be
punished by a fine of not less than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) but not more
than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) or suffer imprisonment of not less than eight
(8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court, unless a higher penalty is provided for in the Revised Penal
Code or special laws. If the offender is a public officer or employee, he/she shall, in
addition to such fine and/or imprisonment, be held administratively liable and shall
suffer the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
CHAPTER 4
APPROPRIATION PROVISION
SEC. 63. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the initial
2 implementation of this Act shall be charged to the Office of the President. Thereafter,
such sums as may be necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall be
included in the succeeding General Appropriations Act.
An initial amount of Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) for the purpose of setting up
the JJWC shall be taken from the proceeds of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office.
TITLE VIII
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
SEC. 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. -
Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the
time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall
be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Such
officer, upon thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether to release the
child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention programs as
provided under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and undergoing
rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be released, unless it is
contrary to the best interest of the child.
SEC. 65. Children Detained Pending Dial. - If the child is detained pending trial, the
Family Court shall also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary
and, if not, determine appropriate alternatives for detention.
133
If detention is necessary and he/she is detained with adults, the court shall SEC. 72. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its
immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth detention home. publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

SEC. 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the
Law. - The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the
JJWC, within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all
children in conflict with the law under their custody.
Approved,

SEC. 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion
and Court Proceedings. - If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending FRANKLIN DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA JR.
diversion and court proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in consultation President of the Senate Speaker of the House of Representatives
with the local social welfare and development officer or the Family Court in
consultation with the Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 1402 and House Bill No. 5065 was
Court, as the case may be, shall determine the appropriate disposition. In case the
finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on March 22, 2006.
appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the child in conflict
the law has already availed of probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other
similar laws, the child may apply for probation if qualified under the provisions of the OSCAR G. YABES ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Probation Law. Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Represenatives
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. -
Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
Approved: April 28, 2006
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time
the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving
sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences President of the Philippines
shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so
qualified under this Act or other applicable law.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

TITLE IX
FINAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 69. Rule Making Power. - The JJWC shall issue the IRRs for the
implementation of the provisions of this act within ninety (90) days from the effectivity
thereof.

SEC. 70. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act
is declared unconstitutional or invalid by the Supreme Court, the other sections or
provisions hereof not dfected by such declaration shall remain in force and effect.

SEC. 71. Repealing Clause. - All existing laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations
or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

134
EN BANC MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC November 24, 2009

RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW

RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson and Members of the Subcommitee
on Rules Procedure for Family Courts submitting for this Court's consideration and
approval the proposed revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, the Court
Resolved to APPROVE the same.
This Resolution shall take effect on December 1, 2009 following its publication in
two(2) newspapers general circulation not later than November 27, 2009.
November 24, 2009.
REVISED RULE ON CHILDREN IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. - This Rule shall apply to all criminal cases
involving children in conflict with law.
A child in conflict with the law is a person who at the time of the commission of the
offense is below eighteen (18) years old but not less than fifteen (15) years and one
(1) day old.
This Rule shall not apply to a person who at the time of the initial contact as defined in
Sec. 4 (q) of this Rule shall have reached the age of eighteen (18) in which case, the
regular rules on criminal procedure shall apply without prejudice to the rights granted
under Secs. 53,54,55 and 56 of this Rule.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Section 2. Objective. - The objective of this Rule is to ensure that the justice system
Chief Justice
treats every child in conflict with the law in a manner that recognizes and upholds
human dignity and worth, and instills in the child respect for the fundamental rights ad
freedom of others. The Rule considers the developmental age of the child and the
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA desirability of the child's reintegration in the assumption of a constructive role in
Associate Justice Associate Justice society in accordance with the principles of balanced and restorative justice.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO To attain this objective, the Rule seeks:
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(a) To provide child-appropriate proceedings, including programs and
services for crime prevention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. aftercare to ensure the normal growth and development of the child in
NACHURA
Associate Justice conflict with the law;
Associate Justice

(b) To provide procedural rules dealing with children in conflict with the law
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE that take into account their distinct circumstances, assure all parties of a fair
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO hearing with each party's constitutional and statutory rights recognized and
Associate Justice
Associate Justice respected, and ensure that appropriate disposition measures are
implemented by law enforcers social services and the courts;
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice (c) To divert from the formal justice system children in conflict with the law
who can be cared for or placed under community continuum alternative
programs of treatment, training and rehabilitation in conformity with the
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD principles of balanced and restorative justice;
Associate Justice Associate Justice

135
 (d) To deal with the child in a family environment whenever possible, and to
separate the child from the parents only when necessary for the child's
welfare or in the interest of public safety.
(e) To remove from children in conflict with the law the stigma of criminality
and criminal behavior;
(f) to promote, facilitate and implement in administrative and judicial
proceedings respect for the view of the child;
(g) To provide for the care, protection and wholesome moral, mental, and
physical development of children in conflict with the law; and
(h) To promote and protect the rights and interest of children as zones of
peace in situations of armed conflict, but who are alleged to be in conflict
with the law. (a)
Section 3. Interpretation. - This Rule shall be interpreted liberally to promote the best
interest of the child in conformity with Philippine laws, the United Nations' Convention
on the Rights of the Child and relevant international treaties and protocols.
Section 4. Definitions. - As used in this Rule,
(a) Age of criminal responsibility is the age when a child, fifteen (15) years
and one (1) day old or above but below eighteen (18) years of age, commits
an offense with discernment.
(b) Bail refers to the security given for the release of the child in custody of
the law, furnished by the child, the child's parent, guardian, or a bondsman,
to guarantee the child's appearance before the court. Bail may be posted in
a form such as corporate security, property bond or cash deposit.
(c) Balanced and Restorative Justice is a principle in juvenile justice that
requires a process of resolving conflicts with the participation of the victim,
the child in conflict with the law, and the community. It seeks to obtain
reparation for the victim; reconciliation to the victim, the child in conflict with
the law, and the community, and the reassurance that the child in conflict
with the law can be reintegrated into society. It also enhances public safety
by involving the victim, the child in conflict with the law, and the community
in prevention strategies. (a)
(d) Best interest of the child refers to the totality of congenial to the survival,
protection and feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to the
child's physical, psychological and emotional development. It also means
the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and
development.
(e) Case study report is a written report on the social case inquiry conducted
by the social worker of the local government unit or the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or by the social worker designated by the
court on the social, cultural, economic and legal status or condition of the
child in conflict in the law. It shall include, among other matters, the child's
development age; educational attainment; family and social relationships;
the quality of the child's peer group; the strengths and weaknesses of the
family; parental control; the child's attitude towards the offense ; the harm or
damage done to others resulting from the offenses, if any; and the attitude
of the parents towards the child's responsibility for the offense. The social
worker shall also include an initial determination of the child's discernment
in the commission of the offense. (a)
(f) Community continuum refers to the aftercare of a child in conflict with the
law and is a provides continuous guidance and support to the child in
conflict with the law upon release from rehabilitation and subsequent
reintegration into society. Community continuum for the child includes timely
release, suitable residence, food, clothing, available employment and
sufficient means to facilitate successful reintegration in local government
unit and other appropriate agencies. (n)
(g) Corporal punishment is any kind of physical punishment inflicted on the
body as distinguished from pecuniary punishment or fine.
(h) Court refers to a designated family court or in places where there are no
designated family courts, any regional trial court hearing family and youth
cases. (a)
(i) Deprivation of Liberty refers to any form of detention or imprisonment, or
to the placement of a child in conflict with the law in a public or private
custodial setting, from which the child in conflict with the law is not permitted
to leave at will except by order of any judicial or administrative authority. (a)
(j) Discernment means the capacity of the child at the time of the
commission of the offense to understand the differences between right and
wrong and the consequences of the wrongful act.
(k) Disposition conference is a meeting held by the court with the social
worker who prepared the case study report, together with the child in conflict
with the law and the parents or guardian ad litem, and the child's counsel for
the purpose of determining the disposition measures appropriate to the
personal and special circumstances of the child.
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(l) Diversion refers to an alternative child-appropriate process of determining
the responsibility and treatment of a child in conflict with the law on the
basis of the child's social, cultural, economic psychological or educational
background without resorting to formal court adjudication.
(m) Diversion programs refer to programs the child in conflict the law is
required to undergo in lieu of formal court proceedings.
(n) Expedited Transfer of a Child is a process where a child who commits an
offense is immediately brought by the apprehending officer or private
individual to a social worker for preliminary determination of
discernment. (n)
(o) Guardian Ad Litem is a person appointed by the court to protect the best
interest of the child. (a)
(p) In conflict with the law means take into custody, detained, or charged
with the commission of an act defined and punished as a crime or offense
under the law, including violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations, and
ordinances of local government units. (a)
(q) Initial contact refers to apprehension or taking into custody of a child in
conflict with the law by law enforcement officers or private citizens. It
includes the time the child alleged to be in conflict with the law receives a
subpoena under Section 3 (b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure or summons under Section 6 (a) or Section 9(b) of the same
Rule in cases that do not require preliminary investigation, or where there is
no necessity to place the child alleged to be in conflict with the law under
immediate custody. (n)
(r) Intake report is the initial written report containing the personal and other
circumstances of the child in conflict with the law prepared by the social
worker assigned to assist the child entering the justice system.
(s) Intervention programs refer to a series of individualized treatment
activities or programs designed to address issues that caused the child to
commit an offense . These may include counseling, skills, training,
education, and other activities that are aimed to improve and enhance the
child's psychological, emotional and psychosocial well being. (n)
(t) Law Enforcement Officer refers to the person in authority or an agent as
defined in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, including a barangay
tanod. (n)
(u) Non-Serious Offense refers to an offense where the imposable penalty
for the crime committed is not more than six (6) years imprisonment. (n)
(v) Probation is an alternative disposition, ordered by the court, under which
a child in conflict with the law is released after conviction and sentence and
permitted to remain at home or with an appropriate custodian, subject to
certain terms and conditions imposed by the court.
(w) Recognizance is an undertaking in lieu of a bond, assumed by a mother
or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the
nearest relative, or any responsible member of the community to assume
custody of a child in conflict with the law and be responsible for the
appearance of the child in court whenever required during the pendency of
the case. (a)
(x) Segregation refers to the procedure where, upon initial contact with a
child alleged to have committed an offense, the law enforcer places the
child in a separate and different area from adult detention prisoners, and
ensures that female children are separated from male children. (n)
(y) Serious offense refers to an offense where the imposable penalty for the
offense committed exceeds six (6) years imprisonment. (a)
(z) Status offenses refers to offenses that discriminate only against a child,
such as curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience and the like. (n)
(aa) Suspended sentence is the holding in abeyance of the service of the
sentence imposed by the court upon a finding of guilt of the child in conflict
with the law, whereby the child undergoes rehabilitation within a fixed period
under such terms and conditions as may be ordered by the court. (n)
(bb) Victimless Crimes refer to offenses where there are no private offended
parties. (n)
(cc) Youth detention home refers to a 24-hour child-caring institution
managed by accredited local government units and licensed and/or
accredited non-government organizations providing short-term residential
care for children in conflict with the law and where the child may be
physically restricted by order of any judicial, administrative or other public
authority, and from which the child is not permitted to leave at will, pending
court disposition of the charge or transfer to other agencies or
jurisdiction. (a)
(dd) Youth rehabilitation center refers to a 24-hour residential care facility
managed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development, local
government units, licensed and/or accredited non-government organizations
monitored by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. The
Center provides care, treatment and rehabilitation services for children in
conflict with the law under a structured therapeutic environment through the
137
 guidance of a trained staff, where the physical mobility of the children may
be restricted pending court disposition of their cases. (a)
Section 5. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority and shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law
until proven to be eighteen years old or older at the time of the commission of the
offense. The age of the child shall be determined according to the following rules:
(1) The best evidence to prove the age of a child is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth;
(2) In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents
such as baptismal certificates and school records or any pertinent document
that shows the date of birth of the child;
(3) In the absence of the documents under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
section due to loss, destruction or unavailability, the testimony of the child,
the testimony of a member of the family related to the child by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the child pursuant to Sec.40, Rule 130 of
the Rules on Evidence, the testimonies of the other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence, shall suffice.
Section 6. Burden of Proof of Age. - Any person alleging the age of the child in
conflict with the law has the burden of proving the age of such child.
If the age of the child is contested prior to the filing of the information in court, a case
for determination of age under summary proceeding may be filed before a court which
shall render its decision within 24 hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all
the parties. (n)
In all cases involving a child, the court shall make a categorical finding as to the age of
the child.
Section 7. Exemption from Criminal Liability. - A child fifteen years of age or under at
the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program as provided for in
Republic Act No. 9344 when consented to by the child and the parents. (a)
Exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption from civil liability which
shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of Article 221 of the Family Code
in relation to Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the act or omission of the child involves a quasi-delict,
Article 2180 of the Civil Code shall apply.
Section 8. Procedure for Handling Children Exempted from Criminal Liability. - If it is
determined at the initial contact that the child is 15 years of age or below, the
procedure provided in Section 20, Republic Act No. 9344 shall be observed as follows:
(a) The authority who had the initial contact with the child shall immediately
release the child to the custody of the mother or father, or the appropriate
guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest relative.
(b) The authority shall immediately notify the local social welfare and
development officer of the taking of the child into custody.
(c) The local social welfare and development officer shall, with the consent
of the child and the person having custody over the child, determine the
appropriate intervention programs for the child.
(d) If the child's parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or
if they refuse to take custody, the child may be released to any of the
following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization; a
barangay official or a member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of
Children; a local social welfare and development officer; or, when and
where appropriate, the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
(e) If the child has been found by the local social welfare and development
office to be abandoned, neglected or abused by the parents, or if the
parents and the child do not consent to or do not comply with the prevention
program, the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the Local
Social Welfare and Development Office shall file before the court a petition
for involuntary commitment pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as "The Child and Youth Welfare Code." (a)
Section 9. Procedure for Children Not Exempted from Criminal Liability. - A child
fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old or above but below eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense shall, at the sound discretion of the court
and subject to its supervision, be released on recognizance to the care of the willing
and responsible mother or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian, or, in their
absence, the nearest relative. However, if the prosecution determines that the child
acted with discernment, the child shall be proceeded against in accordance with Secs.
25 to 29 or, in case of diversion, Secs. 31 to 38 of this Rule.
Section 10. Determination of Discernment. - Discernment is preliminarily determined
by a social worker and finally by the court in the case of a child charged with a non-
serious offense. In all other cases, discernment is determined by the court.
The determination of discernment shall take into account the ability of a child to
understand the moral and psychological components of criminal responsibility and the
138
consequences of the wrongful act; and whether a child can be held responsible for
essentially antisocial behavior.
Section 11. Duties of a Person in Authority Taking a Child into Custody. - Any person
taking into custody a child in conflict with the law shall:
(a) Assign an alias to the child;
(b) Ensure that the blotter details containing the true name of the child, if
any, are modified, to reflect the alias by which the child shall be known
throughout the proceedings;
(c) Explain to the child in simple language and in a dialect that can be
understood the reason for placing the child under custody, and the offense
allegedly committed;
(d) Advise the child of his/her constitutional rights in a language or dialect
understandable to the child;
(e) Present proper identification to the child;
(f) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words and from sexually harassing
or abusing, or making sexual advances on the child;
(g) Avoid displaying or using any firearm, weapon, handcuffs or other
instrument of force or restraint, unless absolutely necessary and only after
all methods of control have been exhausted and have failed;
(h) Avoid violence or unnecessary force and refrain from subjecting the child
to greater restraint than is necessary for apprehension and custody;
(i) Ensure that a body search of the child is done only by a law enforcement
officer of the same gender as that of the child;
(j) Ensure expedited transfer of the child by immediately, or not later than
eight (8) hours after apprehension, turning over custody of the child to the
local social welfare and development office or other accredited non-
government organizations;
(k) Notify the child's parents, guardians or custodians or in their absence,
the child's nearest relative and the Public Attorney's Office of the child's
apprehension;
(l) Ensure that the child is not locked up in a jail or detention cell during the
investigation;
(m) Bring the child immediately to an available government medical or
health officer for a thorough physical and mental examination;
(n) Ensure that should detention of the child in conflict with the law be
necessary, the segregation of the child be secured in quarters separate
from that of the opposite sex and adult offenders, except where a child is
taken into custody for reasons related to armed conflict, either as
combatant, courier, guide or spy, and families are accommodated as family
units in which case, the child shall not be separated from the family;
(o) Record all the procedures undertaken in the initial investigation including
the following: whether handcuffs or other instruments of restraint were used,
and if so, the reason for such use; that the parents or guardian of the child,
the Department of Social Welfare and Development, and the Public
Attorney's Office were informed of the taking into custody of the child and
the details thereof; the measures that were undertaken to determine the age
of child, and the precise details of the physical and medical examination or
in case of failure to submit a child to such examination, the reason
therefore; and
(p) Ensure that all statements signed by the child during the investigation
are witnessed and signed by the child's parents or guardian, social worker
or legal counsel in attendance. (n)
Section 12. Rights of a Child Under Custody. - At the custodial investigation, a child
who has been taken into custody shall have the following rights:
(a) At the police station, to be immediately assisted by a lawyer and a social
worker who shall make sure that the child is effectively informed of his/her
rights, as far as the child's maturity and discernment allow;
(b) To demand that the questioning or interrogation take place in conditions
that respect the rights of the child and are complaint with child-sensitive
procedural rules;
(c) To have the child's family located and notified with dispatch;
(d) To be informed, together with the parents, guardians or custodians or
nearest relatives, by the social welfare and development officer of the local
government unit or of the Department of Social Welfare and Development of
the consequences of the offense alleged to have been committed with a
view towards counseling and rehabilitation, diversion from criminal justice
system and reparation if appropriate;
139
 (e) To have the results of the child's medical and dental examination kept and, should a case be filed in court, submit to the court the corresponding intake
confidential unless otherwise ordered by the court. Whenever medical report prior to the arraignment.
treatment for any physical or mental defect is necessary, to demand that
steps must be immediately taken by the medical officer to provide the child
Section 17. Filing of Criminal Action. - A criminal action may be instituted against a
with the necessary and proper treatment;
child in conflict with the law by filing a complaint with the prosecutor.

(f) To have the right of privacy respected and protected at all times,
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under
including the utilization of all measures necessary to promote this right,
the direction and control of the public prosecutor assigned to the court.
including the exclusion of the media; and

Petitions for confinement of a child drug dependent shall be filed under Section 21 of
(g) While under investigation, not to be fingerprinted or photographed in a
the Rule on Children Charged under Republic Act No. 9165. (n)
humiliating and degrading manner.

Section 18. Prosecution of Civil Action. - When a criminal action is instituted against a
Section 13. Taking Custody of a Child Without a Warrant. - The law enforcement
child in conflict with the law, the action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
officer or a private person taking into custody a child in conflict with the law without a
offense charged shall be governed by Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
warrant shall observe the provisions in Sections 5, 8 and 9 of Rule 113 of the Revised
Procedure.
Rules of Criminal Procedure and shall forthwith deliver the child to the nearest police
station. The child shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 19. Preliminary Investigation. - As far as consistent with this Rule, the
preliminary investigation of a child conflict with the law shall be governed by Section 3
of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. A specially trained prosecutor
Section 14. Conduct of Initial Investigation by the Police. - The police officer
shall be assigned to conduct the inquest, preliminary investigation and prosecution of
conducting the initial investigation of a child conflict with the law shall do so in the
the case involving a child in conflict with the law. The child, on the other hand, shall be
presence of either or both of the parents, guardian or custodian, or in their absence,
assisted by a private lawyer or if none, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office. If
the nearest relative of the child, the child's counsel of choice, or a lawyer from the
there is an allegation or evidence of torture or ill-treatment of a child in conflict with the
Public Attorney's Office, and the local social welfare officer. A representative of a non-
law during custody or detention, it shall be the duty of the prosecutor to investigate the
government organization, religious group, or member of the Barangay Council for the
same. (n)
Protection of Children shall be allowed to be present at the investigation in the
absence of the parents, guardian, relative, or social welfare officer. (a)
Section 20. Conduct of Preliminary Investigation. - Preliminary investigation shall be
conducted in the following instances: (a) when the child in conflict with the law does
Section 15. Guidelines for Fingerprinting and Photographing of the Child. - The
not qualify for diversion; (b) when the child, the parents or guardian do not agree to
following guidelines shall be observed when fingerprinting or photographing the child:
diversion as provided in Sections 27 and 28 of Republic Act No. 9344; or (c) when,
after considering the assessment and recommendation of the social worker, the
(a) The child's fingerprint and photograph files shall be kept separate from prosecutor determines that diversion is not appropriate for the child in conflict with the
those of adults and shall be kept confidential. They may be inspected by law law. (n)
enforcement officers only when necessary for the effective discharge of their
duties and upon prior authority of the court; and
At the preliminary investigation, should there arise a need for clarificatory questions to
be propounded on the child, the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness shall apply.
(b) The fingerprint and photograph shall be removed from the files and
destroyed: (1) if the case against the child is not filed, or is dismissed; or (2)
Section 21. Filing of Information. - If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause
when the child reaches twenty-one (21) years of age and there is no record
to hold the child in conflict with the law for trial, there being discernment, the
that the child committed an offense after reaching eighteen (18) years of
corresponding Resolution and Information shall be prepared for the approval by the
age.
provincial or city prosecutor, a s the case may be. The child and the mother or father,
or appropriate guardian or custodian, or in the absence thereof, the nearest relative,
Section 16. Intake Report by the Social Welfare Officer. - Upon the taking into and the child's private counsel or lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office shall be
custody of a child in conflict with the law, the social welfare officer assigned to the furnished forthwith a copy of the approved resolution and the Information.
child shall immediately undertake a preliminary background investigation of the child

140
The Information shall be filed with the court within forty-five (45) days from the start of
the preliminary investigation. (n)
No Information shall be filed against a child for the commission of the following:
(a) status offences;
(b) vagrancy and prostitution under Section 202 of the Revised Penal Code;
(c) mendicancy under Presidential Decree No. 1563; and
(d) sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619.
Children taken into custody for the foregoing shall, with their consent and that of their
parents, guardian or custodian, instead undergo appropriate counseling and treatment
program. (n)
Section 22. Duties of the Clerk of Court Upon Receipt of information. - The Clerk of
Court, upon receipt of the Information, shall:
(1) Maintain a separate case docket or logbook for cases involving children
in conflict with the law. Whenever possible, the Clerk of Court shall use
color coding or other method to easily distinguish the records of children in
conflict with the law from the other case records;
(2) Determine whether the offense charged qualifies for diversion, that is it
punishable by imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) years, regardless
of fine, or fine alone regardless of the amount;
(3) If the crime charged is punishable by such imprisonment, immediately
assign a temporary case number in accordance with Sec. 23 of this Rule
and raffle off the case to a court so that its Diversion Committee can
immediately undertake the appropriate action under Section 33 of this Rule;
and
(4) If the crime charged does not quality for diversion because it is
punishable by imprisonment of more than twelve (12) years, the case shall
be assigned a regular criminal case docket number raffled off to a court for
formal proceedings. (n)
Section 23. Docketing of the Case - a case that qualifies for diversion under
paragraph 3 of the preceding Section shall not be docketed as a regular criminal case
but instead shall be assigned a temporary case number as follows: CICL-(no.) ___-
(year) ___ -D (which means diversion), before the same is raffled off to the
appropriate court.
Section 24. Venue - Subject to the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, any criminal or civil action involving a child in conflict
with the law shall be instituted and tried in the appropriate court nearest the place
where the offense was committed or where any of its essential elements occurred.
Section 25. Released of Children on Recognizance to the Parents, Guardian,
Custodian or Nearest Relative. - The release of a child from a custody during the
pendency of the case involving a non-serious offense as defined in Sec. 4 (u) of this
rule may be ordered by the court only after a hearing for that purpose, and upon
favorable recommendation of the social worker assigned to the child, with the
conformity of the public prosecutor and the private complainant. The child shall be
released to the custody of a willing and responsible mother or father, or appropriate
guardian or custodian or in their absence, the nearest relative, who shall be
responsible for the child's good behavior and appearance in court whenever required.
No child shall be ordered detained in jail pending trial or hearing of the child's case,
subject to the provisions of this Rule. (n)
Section 26. Commitment and transfer to a youth Rehabilitation Center. - A child
charged with non-serious offense as defined in Section 4 (u) of this Rule, unless
released on bail or recognizance, may be transferred to a youth detention home
rehabilitation center or other appropriate facility such as the Department of Social
Welfare and Development which shall ensure the appearance of the child in court.
In the absence of a youth detention home established by the local government
pursuant to Section 8 of the Family Courts Acts, in the city or municipality where the
child resides or, a local rehabilitation center recognized by the government in the
province, city or municipality within the jurisdiction of the court, or the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or other appropriate local rehabilitation center, the
youth shall be placed under the care of a provincial, city or municipality jail which shall
ensure the appearance of the child in court when so required. (a)
Section 27. Bail as a Matter of right. - All children in conflict with the law shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right before final conviction of an offense not punishable
by reclusion perpetua life imprisonment.
Section 28. When Bail Not a Matter of Right. - No child charged with an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong. In this case, the court shall commit the to a youth detention
home or youth rehabilitation center, or in the absence thereof, to the care of a
provincial, city or municipal jail as provided for in Section 27 of this Rule, which shall
be responsible for the appearance of the child in court whenever required.
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Section 29. Care of Child in Youth Detention Homes or Rehabilitation Centers. - The (a) The past records, if any, involving the child in conflict with the law;
child in conflict with the law who has been transferred to a youth rehabilitation center
or youth detention home shall be provided with a healthy environment. If the child is
(b) The likelihood that the child will be an obvious threat to himself/herself
placed under the care of the provincial, city or municipal jail, the child shall be
and the community;
provided with adequate quarters separate from adults and prisoners of the opposite
sex depending on the age, sex, sexual lifestyle, and such other circumstances and
needs of the child. (c) Whether the child has feeling of remorse for the offense committed;

Section 30. Case Study Report. - After the institution of the criminal action, the social (d) If the child or the parent are indifferent or hostile; and whether this will
worker assigned to the child shall immediately undertake a social case inquiry of the increase the possibility of delinquent behavior; and
child and the child's family, the child's environment and such other matters relevant to
aid the court in the proper disposition of the case. The report shall be submitted to the
court preferably before arraignment. If not available at that time, the Report must be (f) If community-based programs for the rehabilitation and reintegration of
the child are available.
submitted to the court as soon as possible.

Section 31. Diversion Committee - In each court, there shall be organized a Diversion If the Committee finds that diversion is appropriate, it shall design a diversion program
in accordance with Section 34 of this Rule for the consideration and approval of the
Committee composed of its Branch Clerk of Court as chairperson; the prosecutor, a
lawyer of the Public Attorney's Office assigned to the court, and the social worker court.
assigned by the court to the child, as members.
Should the Committee determine that diversion is not appropriate, it shall make the
Section 32. Proceedings Before Arraignment - The Diversion Committee shall corresponding report and recommendation in accordance with Section 31 of this Rule.
determine if the child can be diverted and referred to alternative measures or services.
Subject to pertinent provisions of this Rule and pending determination of diversion by The Committee cannot recommend diversion in case the child or the private
the Committee, the court shall release the child on recognizance to the parents, complainant objects.
guardian or custodian, or nearest relative; or if this is not advisable, commit the child
to an appropriate youth detention home or youth rehabilitation center which shall be
responsible for the presence of the child during the diversion proceedings. Section 34. Diversion programs. -The Committee shall design a diversion program
talking into consideration the individual characteristics and peculiar circumstances of
the child in conflict with the law. The program shall be for a specific and definite period
If the Diversion Committee determines that diversion is not proper, or when the child and may include any or a combination of the following:
or the private complainant object to the diversion, or when there is failure if the
diversion program if undertaken by the child, it shall submit a report to the court
recommending that the case be subjected to formal criminal proceedings. The court in (a) Written or oral reprimand or citation;
turn shall direct the transmittal of the records of the case to the Office of the Clerk of
Court for the assignment of a regular criminal docket number to the case as follows: (b) Written or oral apology;
CICL Crim. Case No.___-___( year). The Office of the Clerk of Court shall thereafter
return the case to the court for arraignment and formal proceedings.
(c) Payment of the damage caused;

Section 33. Proceeding Before the Diversion Committee. - Upon receipt by the
Committee of a case for diversion from the Office of the Clerk of Court, the (e) Payment of the cost of the proceedings;
chairperson shall call for a conference with notice to the child, the mother or father, or
appropriate guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest relative, the child's (f) Return of the property;
counsel, and the private complainant and counsel to determine if the child can be
diverted to the community continuum instead of formal court proceedings.
(g) Guidance and supervision orders;

In determining whether diversion is appropriate for the child, the Committee shall
consider the following factors: (h) Counseling for the child and his family;

142
 (i) Training, seminar and lectures on (i) anger management skills; (ii)
problem-solving and/or conflict resolution skills; (iii) values formation; and
(iv) other skills that will aid the child to properly deal with situations that can
lead to a repetition of the offense;
(j) Participation in available community-based programs;
(k) Work-detail program in the community; or
(l) Institutional care and custody.
The Committee shall also include in the program a plan that will secure satisfaction of
the civil liability of the child in accordance with Sec. 2180 of the Civil Code. Inability to
satisfy the civil the liability shall not by itself be a ground to discontinue the diversion
program of a child. On the other hand, consent to diversion by the child or payment of
civil indemnity shall not in any way be construed as admission of guilt and used as
evidence against the child in the event that the case is later on returned to the court
for arraignment and conduct of formal proceedings.
The court shall act on the recommendation within five (5) days from the termination of
the hearing.
Section 36. Undertaking. - In all cases where a child in conflict with the law is granted
diversion by the court, the child, together with the mother or father, or appropriate
guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest relative, and the child's counsel
shall sign an undertaking to comply with their respective duties and obligation under
the terms and conditions of the express agreement by complainant assisted by
counsel to the diversion of the child, shall be approved by and enforced under the
supervision and control of the court. It shall contain the following minimum principal
terms and conditions:
(a) The child shall appear before the social worker assigned to the child by
the Court that approved the diversion program at least once a month for
evaluation of its effectiveness.
(b) The child shall faithfully comply with the term and conditions of the
program. Should the child fail to do so, the Committee shall report such
failure to the court which shall set a show- cause hearing with notice to the
child and private complainant. The court shall thereafter determine whether
to allow the child to continue with the diversion program, or to end the same
and direct that the case now undergo a formal proceeding.
Should the child be permitted by the court to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of
another court, control and supervision over such child shall be transferred to the
appropriate court of that place. The diversion records of the case such as the minutes
of the diversion proceedings, copy of the undertaking, the intake and case study
reports and all other pertinent documents shall be transmitted to the court to which
jurisdiction over the diverted child has been transferred.
Section 37. Report of Social Worker. - The court social worker shall conduct regular
monthly visit to the child undergoing diversion proceedings and shall submit the
corresponding reports about the status of the diverted child to the committee. At any
time before or at the end diversion period, the committee shall file with trhe court of
the report recommending termination or extension of diveertion, as the case may be.
The report and recommendation shall be heard by the court within fifteen (15) dyas
form receipt, with notice to the members of the Committee, the child, the mother or
father, or the appropriate guardian or custodian, or in the absensce thereof, the
nearest relative, the child's councel, and the complainant and counsel.
The court shall thereafter determine whether the diversion program has been full and
satisfactorily complied with
Section 38. Closure Order. - On the basis of the report and recommendation of the
Committee, the court may:
(a) Issue a closure order terminating the case if it is convinced that the child
has complied satisfactorily with the diversion program; or
(b) Extend the period of diversion if it is convinced that the child may still be
rehabilitated; or
(c) Order the case to undergo formal court proceedings if it finds that the
child has not complied with the diversion program, is incorrigible, or that the
program is not serving its purpose.
In case of the judicially-approved transfer of residence of the child in conflict with the
law, the court to which supervision of the diversion program was transferred shall
make the proper finding. IF it finds that diversion has been successful. It shall order
the closure of the case. However, if it determines that diversion has failed it shall
return the case to the original court for formal criminal proceedings.
Section 39. Rights of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - In all criminal proceedings,
the child in conflict with the law shall have the following rights which shall be respected
and protected by the court:
(a) To be presumed innocent until guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt;
(b) To be informed promptly and directly of the nature and cause of the
charge and if appropriate, through the child's mother, father, legal guardian,
or appropriate custodian;
143
(c) To be present at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to (i) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him/her;
promulgation of judgement. The child may, however, waive presence at the
rial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in the bail bond, unless presence at
(j) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of
the trial is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The
witnesses and production of other evidence in the child's behalf
absence of the child without justifiable cause at the trial of which there was
due notice shall be considered a waiver of the right of the child to be
present. Escape by the child under custody shall be deemed a waiver of the (k) To have speedy and imparial trial, with legal or other appropriate
right to be present in all subsequent hearings until custody over such child is assistance and preferable in the presence of the child's parents or legal
gained; guardian or custodian, unless such presence is considred not to be in the
best interest of the child taking into account the latter's age or other peculiar
circumstances;
(d) To have legal and other appropriate assistance in the preparation and
presentation of the child's defense; in case of a child arrested for reasons
related to armed conflict, to have immediate free legal assistance; (l) To be accorded all the rights un der the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness;
(e) If detained, to be released (I) on recognizance to the willing and
responsible mother or father or appropriate guardian or custodian, or in the (m) To have the child's privacy fully protected in all stages of the
absence thereof, the nearest relative; (ii) on bail; or (iii) by commitment to a proceedings; and
youth detention home or youth rehabilitation center, 1avvphi1
(n) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.
(f) Not to be detained in a jail or transferred to an adult facility pending trial
or hearing of the case, unless detention is used as a last resort which must
Section 40. Rights if Victims of Offences Committed by Children in Conflict with the
be done for the shortest time possible, and only upon order by the court;
Law. - In any case involving a child in conflict with the law, the victim has the following
rights:
(g) In the case the child has been arrested for reasons related to armed
conflict, either as combatant, courier, guide or spy:
(1) To be reasonably protected from the child in conflict with the law;

(i) To be segregated and have separate detention quarters from

adults except where families ate accommodated as family un its;
(ii) To immediate free legal assistance in the absence of private
counsel;
(iii) To immediate notice of such arrest to the parents, guardians
or custodians or nearest relatives of the child; and;
(2) To timely notice of any public proceedings, or any parole proceedings
involving the crime or of any release or escape of the child in conflict with
the law;
(3) Not to be excluded from any public proceeding, unless the court, after
receiving any clear and convincing evidence, determines that the testimony
by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony
in that proceeding.

(iv) To be released on recognizance within twenty-four (24) hours
to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or any responsible member of the community as
determined by the court.
(h) To testify as a witness in his/her own behalf; and subject to cross-
examination only on matters covered by direct examination. The child shall
not be compelled to be a witness against himself/herself and the child's
silence shall not in any manner prejudice him/her;
(4) To be reasonably heard at any administrative or public proceeding
involving diversion, release, plea, suspension of sentence and
determination of disposition measures, or any parole proceeding;
(5) To confer with the prosecutor in the case;
(6) To avail of legal assistance from the Public Attorney's Office, Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. any other legal aid office or any law
practitioner.1avvphi1

144
 (7) To be informed of the availability of compensation from the Department
of Justice Board of Claims in accordance with the provisions of Rep Act.
No.7309.
(8) To be entitled to support services from the Department of Social Welfare
and Development and local government units;
(9) To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under the
Family Code;
(10) To be informed of the rights and the services available to victims of
offenses including the right to apply for a protection order;
(11) To full and timely restitution as provided in law;
(12) To proceedings that are free from unreasonable delay; and
(13) To be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and
privacy.
Section 41. Responsibilities of the Court. - For the protection of the rights of the child
in the conflict with the law, the court shall have the following responsibilities:
(1) To monitor the status of a child whose case is pending in its court placed
in a youth detention center or other institution during the pendency of the
child's case;
(2) To receive and investigate complaints concerning violations of the rights
of the child whose case is pending on its court;
(3) To require all professionals working for the welfare of the child, such as
barangay captains, teachers, social workers, medical professionals, and law
enforcers, to render regular monthly reports to the court.
(4) To order access to adequate services for rehabilitation, counseling and
other forms of reintegration for the child;
(5) To ensure that the child who is capable of forming his or her own views
has the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child,
and that such views be accorded due weight in accordance with the
developmental age and maturity of the child;
(6) To ensure that the child, either directly or through a representative , is
provided the opportunity to be heard in all proceedings affecting such child;
(7) To ensure communication at all times between the judge and the child;
(8) To ensure that the child sits with close family members of the child's
choice during the court proceedings;
(9) To ensure that the child can communicate freely with counsel at all
times;
(10) To ensure that the child is informed in age-appropriate language of all
stages of the judicial proceeding affecting such child;
(11) To ensure that a child placed in a Youth Detention Home or Youth
Rehabilitation Center or in any child facility be given appropriate medical
examination in order to determine and put on record any evidence of ill-
treatment; to identify any physical or mental condition requiring medical
attention; and thereafter make sure that child is provided by adequate
treatment and medical attention;
(12) To insure that a child is informed as soon as possible of the death,
serious illness or injury of any immediate family member and be allowed to
visit the ill family member or attend the funeral, when appropriate and
advisable;
(13) To ensure if a child dies during the pendency of the case or within six
(6) months of release, an independent inquiry is conducted on the
circumstances of the death and a report thereof, including the child's death
certificate, be made available to the child's mother or father , guardian,
custodian or nearest relative;
(14) When appropriate and advisable, to allow the child temporarily leave
the detention home or rehabilitation center by means of an "out-on-pass"
order to attend special family occasions such as Christmas and New Year
celebrations. The "out-on-pass" order shall contain reasonable restrictions
to ensure safety, security and timely return to detention as may be
determined by the court;
(15) To allow at all times, and from the moment of initial contact, any
member of the family or the guardian of the child to visit the child, unless
prejudicial to the latter's best interest;
(16) To allow the appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem if available and
advisable, to enable the child to raise concerns and complaints without fear
or retribution; and
145
 (17) To undertake all other appropriate measures to ensure the promotion of
the best interest of the child and the child's eventual reintegration in society.
Section 42. Determination of the Bests Interests of the Child. - The following factors
may be considered in determining the best interests of a child in conflict with the law:
the child's age and sex, the child's mental and physical health, the mental and
physical health of the parents, their lifestyle and other social factors; the emotional ties
between the parents and the child, the ability of the parents to provide the child with
food, shelter, clothing and medical care; the established living pattern for the child
concerning school, home, community and religious institution, quality of schooling, the
existence of other relatives who may be in a better position to be with the child and the
child's relationship with these relatives; the child's background, maturity and level of
understanding, sexual lifestyle and any other characteristics and needs of the child
that the court may deem relevant.
Section 43. Arraignment and Plea. - The provisions of Rules 116 and 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply to the arraignment of the child in the
conflict with the law. The arraignment shall be scheduled within three (3) days from
the date of receipt of the complaint or information by the court, unless a shorter period
is provided for by law.
In case the child is not assisted by a private counsel, the court shall immediately
appoint its Public Attorney as the child's counsel de oficio.
Arraignment shall be held in chambers and conducted by the judge by furnishing the
child and counsel a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in a
language or dialect known to and understand by the child, explaining the nature and
consequences of a plea of guilty or not guilty and asking the child's plea.
Section 44. Pre-trial. - The provisions of Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure shall govern the pre-trial of the child in conflict with the law. Agreements or
admissions made during the pre-trial conference shall be in writing and signed by the
child, the mother, the father or duly appointed guardian, and counsel; otherwise, the
agreements or admissions shall not be admissible against the child.
Whenever possible and practicable, the court shall explore all possibilities of
settlement of the case, except its criminal aspects. Plea bargaining shall be resorted
to only as a last measure when it shall serve the best interest of the child and the
demands of truth and restorative justice.
Section 45. Trial. - All hearings shall be conducted in am manner conductive to the
best interest of the child and in an environment that will allow the child to participate
fully and freely in accordance with the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness.
Section 46. Guiding Principles in Judging the Child. - Subject to the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and other special laws, the judgment against a
child in conflict with the law shall be guided by the following principles:
(1) The judgment shall be in proportion to the gravity of the offense, and
shall consider the circumstances and the best interest of the child, the rights
of the victim, and the needs of society in line with the demands of balanced
and restorative justice.
(2) Restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the
minimum. Where discretion is given by the law to the judge whether the
penalty to be imposed is fine or imprisonment, the imposition of fine should
be proffered as the more appropriate penalty.
(3) No corporal punishment shall be imposed.
(4) In case of the presence of any exculpatory evidence or doubt in the
prosecution's evidence, the doubt shall be resolved In favor of the child.
Section 47. Promulgation of Sentence. - If. After the trial, the court should find the
child in conflict with the law guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, it
shall impose the proper penalty, including any civil liability which the child may have
incurred, and promulgate the sentence in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Revised Rules if Criminal Procedure.
Section 48. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. - If the child
is found guilty of the offense charged, the court, instead of executing the judgments of
conviction, shall palce the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application. Suspension of sentence can be availed of even if the child
is already eighteen years (18) of age or more but not above twenty-one (21) years old,
at the time of the pronouncement of guilt, without prejudice to the child's availing of
other benefits such as probation, if qualified, or adjustment of penalty, in interest of
justice.
The benefits of the suspended sentence shall not apply to a child in conflict with the
law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, but shall nonetheless apply to one
who is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty and in lieu thereof, reclusion perpetua, and after application of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority.
If the child in conflict with the law reaches eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 9344, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a maximum period of up to the time the child reaches twenty-one (21)
years of age, or to order service of sentence.
146
Section 49. Disposition Conference. -In case of suspended sentence, the court shall
set the case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation
of sentence with notice to the social worker of the court, the child and the parents or
guardian ad litem of the child and the child's counsel , the victim and counsel. At the
conference, the court shall proceed to determine and issue any or a combination of
the following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the
child:
(1) Care, guidance, and supervision of orders;
(2) Community service orders;
Section 52. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. - The court may, after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a child in conflict with the law and upon application at
any time, place the child on probation if qualified, in lieu of service of sentence taking
into account the best interest of the child.
Section 53. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in conflict with the law who has
undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of the sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which the child has
undergone preventive imprisonment, if the child agrees voluntarily in writing to abide
by the same or similar disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in
any of the following cases:

(1) When the child is a recidivist or has been convicted twice or more times
(3) Drug and alcohol treatment
of any crime; or

(4) Participation in group counseling and similar activities; and

(2) When upon being summoned for execution of sentence, the child failed
to surrender voluntarily.
(5) Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or other centers for children in conflict with
A child who does not agree to the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
the law authorized by the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
prisoners shall be credited in the service of the sentence with four-fifths of the time
Development.
during which the child has undergone preventive imprisonment.

Section 50. Compliance with the Disposition Measures. - The social worker assigned
Whenever the child has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or
to the child shall monitor the compliance by the child in conflict with the law with the
more than the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which the
disposition measures and shall submit regularly to the court a status and progress
child may be sentenced and the case is not yet terminated, the child shall be released
report on the matter. The court may set a conference for the evaluation of such report
immediately without prejudice to the continuation of any on-going intervention
in the presence, if practicable, of the child, the parents or guardian, counsel and other
program, and the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under
persons whose presence may be deemed necessary.
review. In case the maximum penalty to which the child may be sentenced is
destierro, the child shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
Section 51. Discharge of Child Subject of Disposition Measure. - Upon the
recommendation of the social worker assigned to the child, the court shall, after due
Any form of physical restraint imposed on the child in conflict with the law, including
notice to all parties and hearing, dismiss the case against the child who has been
community service and commitment to a rehabilitation center, shall be considered
issued disposition measures, even before reaching eighteen(18) years of age, and
preventive imprisonment.
order a final discharge if it finds that the child has been rehabilitated and has shown
the capability to be a useful member of the community.
Section 54. Confidentiality of Proceedings and Record. - All proceedings and records
involving children in conflict with the law from initial contact until final disposition of the
If the court finds that the child (a) is incorrigible; or (b) has not shown the capability of
case by the court shall be considered privileged and confidential. The public may be
becoming a useful member of society; or (c) has willfully failed to comply with the
excluded from the proceedings and pursuant to the provisions of Section 31 of the
conditions of the disposition or rehabilitation program; (d) or the child's continued stay
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, the records shall not be disclosed directly or
in the training institution is not in the child's best interest, the child shall be brought
indirectly to anyone by any of the parties or the participants in the proceeding for any
before the court for execution of the judgment.
purpose whatsoever, except to determine if the child may have the sentence
suspended under Section 38 of this Rule or if the child may be granted probation
The final release of the child shall not extinguish the civil liability. The parents and under the Probation Law, or to enforce the civil liability imposed in the criminal action.
other persons exercising parental authority over the child shall be civilly liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of the child living in their
The court shall employ other measures to protect confidentiality of proceedings
company and under the parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses
including non-disclosure of records to the media, the maintenance of a separate police
provided by law.

147
blotter for cases involving children in conflict with the law and the adoption of a system said deceased struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning immediately
of coding to conceal material information, which lead to the child's identity. The to the place where Epifanio Rarang was in order to continue playing with
records of children in conflict with the law shall not be used in subsequent proceedings him. The accused, offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of
or Juan Ragojos, who was taller and more robust than he, looked around the
yard for a stone with which to attack the now deceased Juan Ragojos, but
finding none, he approached a cousin of his named Romualdo Cocal, to ask
Republic of the Philippines
the latter to lend him his knife. Epifanio Rarang, who had heard what the
SUPREME COURT
accused had been asking his cousin, told the latter not to give the accused
Manila
his knife because he might attack Juan Ragojos with it. The accused,
however, succeeded in taking possession of the knife which was in a pocket
EN BANC of his cousin's pants. Once in possession of the knife, Valentin Doqueña
approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him another
blow with his fist, to which the deceased answered that he did not want to
G.R. No. 46539 September 27, 1939
do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger that the accused. Juan
Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the accused, continued playing and,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, while he was thus unprepared and in the act of stopping the ball with his two
vs. hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he carried.
VALENTIN DOQUEÑA, defendant-appellant.
The order also contains the following conclusions and findings of fact which we are not
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for appellant. at liberty to alter, not being called upon or authorized to do so, in view of the nature of
Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant Attorney Paredes, Jr., for the appeal before us, by section 138 of the Administrative Code, as amended by
appellee. Commonwealth Act No. 3:

DIAZ, J.:
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by stabbing him in the
breast with a knife on November 19, 1938, in the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan.
The court, after trying the case, held that the accused acted with discernment in
committing the act imputed to him and, proceeding in accordance with the provisions
of article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99,
ordered him to be sent to the Training School for Boys to remain therein until he
reaches the age of majority. From this order the accused interposed an appeal
alleging that the court erred in holding that he had acted with discernment and in not
having dismissal the case.
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen years, nine months and
five days old. The incident that gave rise to the aggression committed by him on the
deceased is narrated in the appealed order as follows:
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now
deceased Juan Ragojos and one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in
the yard of the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Province of
Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in said yard, intervened
and, catching the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach.
For this act of the accused, Juan Ragojos chased him around the yard and,
upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape. Said accused then turned
against the deceased assuming a threatening attitude, for which the reason
Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doqueña
committed the crime in question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the
intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such
pupil, he was one of the brightest in said school and was a captain of a
company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time he was studying
therein he always obtained excellent marks, this court is convinced that the
accused, in committing the crime, acted with discernment and was
conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and so also has this
court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during
the trial of this case.
The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us that
the appeal taken from said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is error to
determine discernment by the means resorted to by the attorney for the defense, as
discussed by him in his brief. He claims that to determine whether or not a minor acted
with discernment, we must take into consideration not only the facts and
circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the minor, but also his state of
mind at the time the crime was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal
for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of
reasoning he could have had at that moment. It is clear that the attorney for the
defense mistakes the discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the
Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention which, as a
mitigating circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in article 13
of said Code. The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an
act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right

148
and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, On September 27, 2002, an Information charging petitioner (then only 12
the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behaviour of said years old) with rape was filed with the RTC of Pasay City. The inculpatory portion of
minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even
during the trial (U.S. vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This was done by the trial court, and the Information reads:
the conclusion arrived at by it is correct.
That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, in
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered. Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NEIL LLAVE
Y FLORES, aka NIEL F. LLAVE, a minor over nine (9) years of
age and under fifteen (15) but acting with discernment, by means
FIRST DIVISION
of force threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant,
DEBBIELYN SANTOS y QUITALES, a minor, seven (7) years of
NIEL F. LLAVE, G.R. No. 166040
age, against her will and consent.
Petitioner,
Present:
Contrary to law.[3]
PANGANIBAN, C. J.,
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
The Case for the Prosecution
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-
NAZARIO, JJ. * The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of Pasay City.[4] One of
their children, Debbielyn, was born on December 8, 1994.[5] In 2002, she was a Grade
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
II student at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City[6] and attended
Respondent. Promulgated:
April 26, 2006 classes from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m.[7]

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou sold quail eggs
at a nearby church.[8] Adjacent to their house was that of Teofisto Bucud, a barbecue
DECISION vendor who would usually start selling at 6:30 p.m.[9] Next to Teofistos residence was

CALLEJO, SR., J.: a vacant house.[10]

Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived home at past 6:00 p.m.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
She changed her clothes and proceeded to her mothers store. Marilou asked her
in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 affirming, with modification, the Decision[2] of the Regional
daughter to bring home the container with the unsold quail eggs. [11] Debbielyn did as
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 02-1779 convicting
told and went on her way. As she neared the vacant house, she saw petitioner, who
Petitioner Neil F. Llave of rape.
suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow blocks which was in front of the vacant
house. There was a little light from the lamp post. [12] She resisted to no
avail.[13] Petitioner ordered her to lie down on the cement. Petrified, she complied. He

149
removed her shorts and underwear then removed his own. He got on top of
[14]
her. She felt his penis being inserted into her vagina. He kissed her.
and cried.[16] She was sure there were passersby on the street near the vacant house
at the time.
It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the girls cries. He rushed
to the place and saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked from the waist
down. Teofisto shouted at petitioner, and the latter fled from the scene. Teofisto told
[17]
Debbielyn to inform her parents about what happened. She told her father about the
incident.[18] Her parents later reported what happened
authorities.[19] Debbielyn told the police that petitioner was a bad boy because he was
[20]
a rapist.
Teofisto testified that at about 6:25 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he went out of their
house to get his barbecue grill. He heard someone moaning from within the adjacent
vacant house.[21] He rushed to the place and saw petitioner, naked from waist down,
[22]
on top of Debbielyn, making pumping motions on her anus. The girl was crying. He
[23]
shouted at petitioner, Hoy, bakit ginawa mo yan? Petitioner hurriedly put his shorts
on and fled.[24] Neighbors who had heard Teofisto shouting arrived.[25] Later, Teofisto
gave a written statement to the police investigator regarding the incident.
Domingo Santos testified that at about 6:30 p.m. that day, he was inside their house.
His daughter, Kimberly Rose, suddenly told him that Debbielyn had been raped near
[27]
the vacant house by petitioner. He rushed to the place and found her daughter
crying. When he asked her what happened, she replied that she had been abused. He
brought Debbielyn to their house and then left.[28] He then looked for petitioner and
found him at his grandmothers house. A barangay tanod brought petitioner to
the barangay hall.[29]On September 25, 2002, he brought her daughter to the
Philippine General Hospital Child Protection Unit at Taft Avenue, Manila where she
was examined by Dr. Mariella S. Castillo.
Dr. Castillo declared on the witness stand that she was a physician at the Child
[15]
She felt pain Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital. On September 25, 2002, she
interviewed the victim who told her Masakit ang pepe ko, Ni-rape ako.[30] Dr. Castillo
also conducted a genital examination on the child, and found no injury on the hymen
and perineum, but found scanty yellowish discharge between the labia
[31]
minora. There was also a fresh abrasion of the perineal skin at 1 oclock position
near the anal opening.[32] She declared that the findings support the theory that blunt
force or penetrating trauma (such as an erect penis, finger, or any other foreign
body[33]) was applied to the perineal area[34] not more than six or seven days
to the police before.[35] The abrasion could have been caused on September 24, 2002. She found
no spermatozoa in the vaginal area or injury at the external genitalia;[36] neither did she
find any other injury or abrasion on the other parts of the victims body. [37] She
concluded that her findings were consistent with the victims claim that she was
sexually abused by petitioner.
Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez, for his part, testified that on September 24, 2002,
Marilou Santos arrived at the barangay hall and reported that her daughter had been
raped by petitioner who was then in his aunts house at Cadena de Amor
Street. Barangay Captain Greg Florante ordered him and Barangay Tanod Efren
[26]
Gonzales to proceed to Cadena de Amor Street and take the boy into custody, and
they did as they were told.[38]
The Case for the Accused
Petitioner, through counsel, presented Dr. Castillo as witness. She declared
that the abrasions in the perineal area could have been caused while the offender was
on top of the victim.[39] She explained that the distance between the anus and the
genital area is between 2.5 to 3 centimeters.[40] The abrasion was located at of an inch
from the anal orifice.

150
 Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman
[41]
the Pasay City South High School. He had been one of the three outstanding
students in grade school and received awards such as Best in Mathematics. [42] He
also finished a computer course and received a Certificate of Completion from the
Philippine Air Force Management Information Center.[43] He denied having raped the
private complainant. He declared that at 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he was
outside of their house to buy rice in the carinderia[44] and he saw her on his way
back.[45] He also met his father, who asked him what he had done to their neighbor. He
was also told that the victims father was so angry that the latter wanted to kill
him.[46] He did not ask his father for the name of the angry neighbor. He was also told
to pass by Cadena de Amor Street in going to his aunts house. Petitioner also
declared that his mother prodded him to go to his aunts house.[47] Later, Domingo
and Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez arrived at his aunts house and brought him to
the barangay hall. He did not know of any reason why Debbielyn and her parents
would charge him with rape.[48]
Petitioner also declared that he played cards with Debbielyn.[49] While
confined at the Pasay City Youth Home during trial, he had a crush on Issa, a young
female inmate.Using a piece of broken glass (bubog) about half-an-inch long, he
inscribed her name on his right thigh, left leg and left arm.[50]
Nida Llave testified and identified her sons Certificate of Live Birth, in which
it appears that he was born on March 6, 1990.[51] She declared that at about 6:30
p.m. on September 24, 2000, Marilou Santos and Marilyn Bucud arrived in their house
looking for her son. According to Marilyn, her son had raped the private complainant.
She went to their house to look for her son and came across Domingo Santos who
threatened to kill her son. She and her husband proceeded to the house of his sister
Josefina at Cadena de Amor Street where petitioner had hidden for a while.[52]
At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered judgment convicting Neil of
the crime charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
at
FROM ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court opines that
the prosecution has proven the guilt of the xxx Niel Llave y Flores
beyond reasonable doubt when he forcibly pulled the complainant
towards the vacant lot, laid on top of her and had carnal
knowledge with the [complainant] against her will and consent
who is only seven (7) years old (sic). Moreover, he being a minor,
he cannot be meted with the Death penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the CICL [Child in
Conflict with the Law] Niel Llave y Flores guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, and crediting him with the special mitigating
circumstance of minority, this Court hereby sentences him
to prision mayor minimum, Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight
(8) years, and pay civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php50,000.00).[53]
The trial court declared that based on the evidence of the prosecution that
petitioner pushed the victim towards the vacant house and sexually abused her,
petitioner acted with discernment. It also considered petitioners declaration that he
had been a consistent honor student.[54]
Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, where he averred the following
in his Brief as appellant therein:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE
MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES OF THE TESTIMONY OF
COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THAT OF THE MEDICAL
REPORT ON THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION OF BLEEDING.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS
TEOFISTO BUCUD WHO HAS REASON TO FABRICATE A
SCENARIO AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE HE
HAS PERSONAL VENDETTA AGAINST THE LATTERS
FAMILY/RELATIVES.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE THEORY
OF THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE BY HAVING CARNAL
151
 KNOWLEDGE, BEING CONTRARY TO THE PHYSICAL I
EVIDENCE.[55] WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
CONVICT PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision with modification as to the II
penalty meted on him. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, WHO WAS A MINOR
ABOVE 9 YEARS BUT BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AT THE
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant TIME OF THE CRIME, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT.
appeal is hereby MODIFIED in that the accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four III
(4) months of prision correccional medium as the minimum to WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as the PROCESS OF LAW.
maximum. Additionally, the accused-appellant is ordered to pay
the complaining witness the amount of P50,000 by way of moral ARGUMENTS
damages and P20,000 by way of exemplary damages.
I
SO ORDERED.[56] THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN
THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THE
Petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration,[57]contending that the MEDICAL REPORT BELIE THE FINDING OF RAPE.
prosecution failed to adduce proof that he acted with discernment; hence, he should
II
be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion in a PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS.
III
[58]
Resolution dated November 12, 2004 on the following finding: PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT DISCERNMENT.

As regards the issue of whether the accused-appellant IV

acted with discernment, his conduct during and after the crime THE TESTIMONY RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION IS
betrays the theory that as a minor, the accused-appellant does HEARSAY.
not have the mental faculty to grasp the propriety and
consequences of the act he made. As correctly pointed out by the V
prosecution, the fact that forthrightly upon discovery, the accused- THE COMPLAINT IS FABRICATED.
appellant fled the scene and hid in his grandmothers house
intimates that he knew that he did something that merits VI
punishment. PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.[60]

Contrary to the urgings of the defense, the fact that the

accused-appellant is a recipient of several academic awards and
is an honor student further reinforces the finding that he [is] The issues raised by the petitioner in this case may be summarized as
possessed [of] intelligence well beyond his years and is thus
follows: (1) whether he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation; (2)
poised to distinguish, better at least than other minors his age
could, which conduct is right and which is morally whether he had carnal knowledge of the private complainant, and if in the affirmative,
reprehensible.[59]
whether he acted with discernment in perpetrating the crime; (3) whether the penalty
imposed by the appellate court is correct; and (4) whether he is liable to pay moral
Petitioner now raises the following issues and arguments in the instant damages to the private complainant.
petition before this Court:

ISSUES On the first issue, petitioner avers that he was deprived of his right to a
preliminary investigation before the Information against him was filed.

152

On the second issue, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of Debbielyn. He insists that
her testimony is inconsistent on material points. He points out that she claimed to
have felt pain in her vagina when petitioner inserted his penis to the point that she
cried; this, however, is negated by Dr. Castillos report stating that there was no
evidence of injury on the victims external genitalia. Petitioner maintains that as against
the victims testimony and that of Dr. Castillos report, the latter should prevail.
According to petitioner, mere touching of the female organ will not suffice as
factual basis of conviction for consummated rape. Moreover, the victims testimony
lacks credibility in view of her admission that, while she was being allegedly ravished
by him, there were passersby along the street. Besides, petitioner avers, an abrasion
may be caused by an invasion of the body through the protective covering of the
skin. Petitioner insists that the prosecution failed to prove the cause of the abrasion.
Petitioner also claims that the victim was tutored or coached by her parents
on her testimony before the trial court. Dr. Castillo testified that when she interviewed
Debbielyn, the latter admitted to her that she did not understand the meaning of the
word rape and its Filipino translation, hinalay, and that the genital examination of the
girl was at the insistence of the latters parents.
Petitioner avers that Teofisto Bucuds testimony has no probative weight
because and had an ill-motive to testify against him. Petitioner stated, on cross-
examination, that his uncle, Boy, had the house rented by Teofisto
demolished. Petitioner avers that the witness persuaded the victims parents to
complain against him, as gleaned from the testimony of Police Investigator Milagros
Carroso.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that petitioner
was subjected to an inquest investigation under Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as gleaned from the Certification of the City Prosecutor
incorporated in the Information. It avers that the absence of external injuries does not
negate rape; neither is it necessary that lacerations be found on the hymen of a
victim. Rape is consummated if there is some degree of penetration within the vaginal
surface. Corroborative evidence is not necessary to prove rape. As long as the
testimony of the victim is credible, such testimony will suffice for conviction of
consummated rape. When the victim testified that she was raped, she was, in effect,
saying all that is necessary to prove that rape was consummated. Petitioners evidence
to prove ill-motive on the part of Teofisto Bucud in testifying against him is at best
flimsy. Moreover, it is incredible that the victim and her parents would charge
petitioner with rape solely on Teofistos proddings.
The OSG insists that the petitioner acted with discernment before, during,
and after the rape based on the undisputed facts. The submission of the OSG follows:
Petitioner argues that since he was only 12 years old at
the time of the alleged rape incident, he is presumed to have
acted without discernment under paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code. Under said provision, the prosecution has
the burden of proving that he acted with discernment. In the
instant case, petitioner insists that there was no evidence
presented by the prosecution to show that he acted with
discernment. Hence, he should be exempt from criminal liability.
Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit.
Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code
is defined as follows: the discernment that constitutes an
exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen (15) years of age but over nine (9), who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong (People v. Doquena, 68 Phil.
580 [1939]). For a minor above nine but below fifteen years of
age, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of
his act (Guevarra v. Almodova, G.R. No. 75256, January 26,
1989).
Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal Law (p.
375, 1998 Ed.), writes that discernment is more than the mere
understanding between right and wrong. Rather, it means the
mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15 years of age to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act (People v.
153
Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G. 4062]). Hence, in judging whether a minor
accused acted with discernment, his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, which may be
known and should be determined by considering all the
circumstances disclosed by the record of the case, his
appearance, his attitude and his behavior and conduct, not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also after and
even during the trial should be taken into consideration (People v.
Doquena, supra).
In the instant case, petitioners actuations during and after the
rape incident, as well as his behavior during the trial showed that
he acted with discernment.
The fact appears undisputed that immediately after
being discovered by the prosecutions witness, Teofisto Bucud,
petitioner immediately stood up and ran away. Shortly thereafter,
when his parents became aware of the charges against him and
that private complainants father was looking for him, petitioner
went into hiding. It was not until the Barangay Tanod came to
arrest him in his grandmothers house that petitioner came out in
the open to face the charges against him. His flight as well as his
act of going into hiding clearly conveys the idea that he was fully
aware of the moral depravity of his act and that he knew he
committed something wrong. Otherwise, if he was indeed
innocent or if he was not least aware of the moral consequences
of his acts, he would have immediately confronted private
complainant and her parents and denied having sexually abused
their daughter.
second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power,
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish
a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because the infant
has no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability
(Guevarra v. Aldomovar, 169 SCRA 476 [1989], at page 482).
The foregoing circumstances, from the time the incident
up to the time the petitioner was being held for trial, sufficiently
satisfied the trial court that petitioner acted with discernment
before, during and after the rape incident. For a boy wanting in
discernment would simply be gripped with fear or keep mum. In
this case, petitioner was fully aware of the nature and illegality of
his wrongful act. He should not, therefore, be exempted from
criminal liability. The prosecution has sufficiently proved that
petitioner acted with discernment.[61]
In reply, petitioner asserts that the only abrasion found by Dr. Castillo was
on the peri-anal skin and not in the labia of the hymen. He further insists that there can
be no consummated rape absent a slight penetration on the female organ. It was
incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the accused acted with discernment but
failed. The mere fact that he was an honor student is not enough evidence to prove
that he acted with discernment.
The petition is not meritorious.

During the trial, petitioner submitted documentary

evidence to show that he was a consistent honor student and has,
in fact, garnered several academic awards. This allegation further
bolstered that he acted with discernment, with full knowledge and On the first issue, petitioners contention that he was deprived of his right to
intelligence. The fact that petitioner was a recipient of several
academic awards and was an honor student further reinforces the a regular preliminary investigation is barren of factual and legal basis. The record
finding that he was possessed of intelligence well beyond his shows that petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant. Section 7, Rule 112 of
years and thus was able to distinguish, better than other minors of
his age could, which conduct is right and which is morally the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
reprehensible. Hence, although appellant was still a minor of
twelve years of age, he possessed intelligence far beyond his
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without
age. It cannot then be denied that he had the mental capacity to
warrant. When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant
understand the difference between right and wrong. This is
involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation,
important in cases where the accused is minor. It is worthy to note
the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without
that the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting
need of such investigation provided an inquest has been
circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the
conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent on
unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed
the part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the
by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper
second element of dolus, the Supreme Court has stated: The

154
 court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting
officer or person. however, her straightforward testimony shows that the rape passed the stage of
consummation.[67] She testified that petitioner dragged her behind a pile of hollow
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance blocks near the vacant house and ordered her to lie down. He then removed her
with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
shorts and panty and spread her legs. He then mounted her and inserted his penis
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the
presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may into her vagina:
apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within
fifteen (15) days from its inception. Fiscal Barrera:

After the filing of the complaint or information in court Q: From what time up to what time?
without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five A: From 12:00 oclock noon up to 6:00 p.m.
(5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his Q: September 24, 2002 and going over the calendar, it was
defense as provided for in this Rule. Tuesday. Did you go to school from 12:00
oclock noon up to 6:00 p.m.?
A: Yes, Sir, on the same date I went to school.

As gleaned from the Certification[62] of the City Prosecutor which was incorporated in Q: At about 6:00 p.m., Sept. 24, 2002, where were you?
A: I went home.
the Information, petitioner did not execute any waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code before the Information was filed. He was arraigned with the Q: And by whom you are referring to your house at 1-C Carnation
St., R. Higgins, Maricaban, Pasay City?
assistance of counsel on October 10, 2002, and thereafter filed a petition for A: Yes, Sir.
bail.[63]Petitioners failure to file a motion for a preliminary investigation within five days Q: And what did you do after you went home?
from finding out that an Information had been filed against him effectively operates as A: I changed my clothes and then I proceeded to the store of my
mother.
a waiver of his right to such preliminary investigation.[64]
Q: And where is that store of your mother where you went?
A: It is near our house, walking distance.
On the second issue, a careful review of the records shows that the prosecution
Q: What is your mother selling in that store?
adduced evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had carnal A: She sells quail eggs.
knowledge of the private complainant as charged in the Information. In People v.
Q: And were you able to immediately go to the store of your
Morata[65] the Court ruled that penetration, no matter how slight, or the mere mother where she was selling quail eggs?
A: Yes, sir.
introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum, constitutes carnal
knowledge. Hence, even if the penetration is only slight, the fact that the private Q: And that was past 6:00 p.m. already?
A: Yes, sir.
[66]
complainant felt pains, points to the conclusion that the rape was consummated.
Q: And what happened when you went to the store where your
mother is selling quail eggs past 6:00 p.m.?
From the victims testimony, it can be logically concluded that petitioners A: My mother asked me to bring home something.

penis touched the middle part of her vagina and penetrated the labia of the Q: What were these things you were asked by your mother to
bring home?
pudendum. She may not have had knowledge of the extent of the penetration;
A: The things she used in selling.

155
 A: When Totoy ran away, I was left and Kuya Teofe told me to tell
Q: And did you obey what your mother told you to bring home the matter to my parents.
something?
A: Yes, Sir. Q: Did you tell your parents what Totoy did to you?
A: Yes, Sir.[68]
Q: And what happened to you in going to your house?
A: Totoy pulled me.

Q: Pulled you where? On cross-examination, the victim was steadfast in her declarations:
A: Totoy pulled me towards an uninhabited house.

Q: What happened after Totoy pulled you in an uninhabited ATTY. BALIAD:

house?
A: He told me to lie down on the cement. Q: Again, in what particular position were you placed by Totoy
when he inserted his penis inside your vagina?
Q: What happened after he laid you down on the cement? A: I was lying down.
A: He removed my shorts and panty. He also removed his shorts.
Q: Aside from lying down, how was your body positioned at that
Q: After Totoy removed your shorts and panty and he also time?
removed his shorts, what happened next? A: He placed on top of me.
A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q: After he placed on top of you, what else did he do to you, if
Q: What did you feel when Totoy inserted his penis inside your any?
vagina? A: He started to kiss me and then he inserted his penis inside my
A: It was painful. vagina.

Q: Aside from inserting his penis inside your vagina, what else did Q: Did you feel his penis coming in into your vagina?
you do to you? A: Yes, Sir.
A: He kissed me on my lips.
Q: Are you sure that his penis was inserted inside your vagina?
Q: After Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina and kissed A: Yes, Sir.[69]
you on your lips, what did you do?
A: I cried.
When questioned on cross-examination whether she could distinguish a vagina from
Q: What happened when you were crying when he inserted his
penis inside your vagina and kissed you on your lips. an anus, the victim declared that she could and proceeded to demonstrate. She
What happened next?
reiterated that the penis of petitioner penetrated her vagina, thus, consummating the
A: Somebody heard me crying.
crime charged:
Q: Who heard you crying?
A: Kuya Teofe, Sir. Atty. Baliad:
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the
accused, Neil Llave or Totoy inserted his penis in your
vagina, do you recall that?
Q: What happened after you cried and when somebody heard you A: Yes, Sir.
crying?
A: Totoy ran away. Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel that the penis of Neil
entered your vagina?
Q: After Totoy ran away, what happened next? A: Yes, Sir.

156
 Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where is your pepe?
A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
Q: Where is your anus?
A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in
this case penetrated only in your vagina and not in your
anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused
neither by his penis touched any part of your anus?
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.[70]
While it is true that Dr. Castillo did not find any abrasion or laceration in the private
complainants genitalia, such fact does not negate the latters testimony the petitioner
had carnal knowledge of her. The absence of abrasions and lacerations does not
disprove sexual abuses, especially when the victim is a young girl as in this
case.[71] According to Dr. Castillo, the hymen is elastic and is capable of stretching and
[72]
reverting to its original form. The doctor testified that her report is compatible with
the victims testimony that she was sexually assaulted by petitioner:
Atty. Baliad:
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the
accused, Neil Llave or Totoy inserted his penis in your
vagina, do you recall that?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel (sic) that the penis of
Neil entered your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where is your pepe?
A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
Q: Where is your anus?
A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in
this case penetrated only in your vagina and not in your
anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused
neither by his penis touched any part of your anus?
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.
xxxx
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: Based on your testimony doctor, and the medico genital
examination propounded on the report that the victim
here, Debbielyn Santos is complaining that around 6:00
in the evening of September 24, 2002, she was
sexually abused and that on the following day,
September 25, you interviewed her and stated to you
that her genitalia was hurting and in binocular (sic)
masakit ang pepe ko, ni-rape ako, would your findings
as contained in this Exh. B and C be compatible with
the allegation if the minor victim that she was sexually
abused on September 24. 2002 at around 6:00 p.m.?
Atty. Baliad:
Objection, Your Honor. The one who narrated the
incident is the mother.
Court:
What is your objection?
Atty. Baliad:
The objection, Your Honor, is the question propounded
is that it was the minor who made the complaint
regarding the allegation.
Fiscal Barrera:
The answer were provided..
Court:
The doctor is being asked whether or not her findings is
compatible with the complaint of the
minor. Overruled. Answer.
Witness:
A It is compatible with the allegation of the minor.
Fiscal Barrera:
Confronting you again with your two (2) medico-genital
documents, the Provincial and Final Report mark[ed] in
evidence as Exhs. B and C, at the lower portion of
157
 these two exhibits there appears to be a signature
above the typewritten word, Mariella Castillo, M.D.,
whose signature is that doctor?
A Both are my signatures, Sir.[73]
Dr. Castillo even testified that the abrasion near the private complainants anal orifice
could have been caused by petitioner while consummating the crime charged:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: With your answer, would it be possible doctor that in the
process of the male person inserting his erect penis
inside the vagina, in the process, would it be possible
that this abrasion could have been caused while in the
process of inserting the penis into the vagina touch the
portion of the anus where you find the abrasion?
A: It is possible, Sir.
Q: Now, are you aware, in the course of your examination, that
the alleged perpetrator is a 12-year-old minor?
A: I only fount it out, Sir, when I testified.
Q: Do you still recall your answer that a 12-year-old boy could
cause an erection of his penis?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: To enlight[en] us doctor, we, not being a physician, at what
age could a male person can have erection?
A: Even infants have an erection.[74]
Petitioners contention that the private complainant was coached by her
parents into testifying is barren of merit. It bears stressing that the private complainant
testified in a straightforward and spontaneous manner and remained steadfast despite
rigorous and intensive cross-examination by the indefatigable counsel of the
petitioner. She spontaneously pointed to and identified the petitioner as the
perpetrator.
It is inconceivable that the private complainant, then only a seven- year old
Grade II pupil, could have woven an intricate story of defloration unless her plaint was
true.[75]The Presiding Judge of the trial court observed and monitored the private
complainant at close range as she testified and found her testimony credible. Case
law is that the calibration by the trial court of the evidence on record and its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, as well as its findings of facts and the
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded conclusive effect by this Court
unless facts and circumstances of substance were overlooked, misconstrued or
misinterpreted, which, if considered would merit a nullification or reversal of the
decision. We have held that when the offended party is young and immature, from the
age of thirteen to sixteen, courts are inclined to give credence to their account of what
transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and
embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter to which they testified is
not true.[76]
Neither do we lend credence to petitioners claim that the charge against him
is but a fabrication and concoction of the private complainants parents. Indeed,
petitioner admitted in no uncertain terms that the spouses had no ill-motive against
him. Thus, Neil testified as follows:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: As you testified earlier that you have played post cards with
Debbielyn Santos alias Lyn-lyn and you have no quarrel
or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn. Do you know of any
reason why Lyn-lyn complaint (sic) against you for
sexual abuse?
A: I dont know of any reason, Sir.
Q: You also testified that you do not have any quarrel or
misunderstanding with Lyn-lyns parents, spouses
Domingo Santos, Jr. and Marilou Santos, do you think
of any reason as to why they would file a complaint
against you for molesting their 7-year-old daughter?
A: I do not know of any reason why they filed a complaint against
me, Sir.
Fiscal Barrera:
That would be all, Your Honor.[77]
158
 There is no evidence that the parents of the offended party coached their
daughter before she testified. No mother or father would stoop so low as to subject
their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that
such a traumatic experience would damage their daughters psyche and mar her life if
[78]
the charge is not true.
On the other hand, when the parents learned that their daughter had been
assaulted by petitioner, Domingo tried to locate the offender and when he failed, he
and his wife reported the matter to the barangay authorities. This manifested their
ardent desire to have petitioner indicted and punished for his delictual acts.
That petitioner ravished the victim not far from the street where residents
passed by does not negate the act of rape committed by petitioner. Rape is not a
respecter of time and place. The crime may be committed by the roadside and even in
[79]
occupied premises. The presence of people nearby does not deter rapists from
[80]
committing the odious act. In this case, petitioner was so daring that he ravished the
private complainant near the house of Teofisto even as commuters passed by,
impervious to the fact that a crime was being committed in their midst.
Case law has it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape, the only evidence that can
be offered to prove the guilt of the offender is the testimony of the offended party.
Even absent a medical certificate, her testimony, standing alone, can be made the
basis of conviction if such testimony is credible. Corroborative testimony is not
essential to warrant a conviction of the perpetrator.[81] Thus, even without the
testimony of Teofisto Bucud, the testimonies of the offended party and Dr. Castillo
constitute evidence beyond reasonable doubt warranting the conviction of petitioner.
Teofistos testimony cannot be discredited by petitioner simply because his uncle
caused the demolition of the house where Teofisto and his family were residing. It
bears stressing that Teofisto gave a sworn statement to the police investigator on the
very day that the petitioner raped Debbielyn and narrated how he witnessed the crime
being committed by the petitioner.[82] In the absence of proof of improper motive, the
presumption is that Teofisto had no ill-motive to so testify, hence, his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.[83]
The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment when he had
carnal knowledge of the offended party; hence, the CA cannot be faulted for affirming
the trial courts ruling.
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person
over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he
acted with discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an
essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit
act.[84] On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the
accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or
deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and
during the trial.[85] The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor
knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the
gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting
victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby
would not be able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto
Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape
arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his grandmothers
house to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay
tanods arrived and took him into custody.
The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade school
student and even received awards. While in Grade I, he was the best in his class in
159

his academic subjects. He represented his class in a quiz bee contest.[86] At his the
age of 12, he finished a computer course.
In People v. Doquea,[87] the Court held that the accused-appellant therein
acted with discernment in raping the victim under the following facts:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused
Valentin Doquea committed the crime in question, he was a
7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality of
Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest
in said school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps
thereof, and during the time he was studying therein he always
obtain excellent marks, this court is convinced that the accused,
in committing the crime, acted with discernment and was
conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and so also
has this court observed at the time said accused was testifying in
his behalf during the trial of this case.[88]
The CA ordered petitioner to pay P50,000.00 as moral
and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. There is no factual basis for the award of
exemplary damages. Under Article 2231, of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages
may be awarded if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. In this case, no aggravating circumstance was alleged in the
Information and proved by the People; hence, the award must be deleted.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 162052. January 13, 2005]
ALVIN JOSE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 affirming with modification the Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, convicting the accused therein
of violation of Section 21(b), Article IV in relation to Section 29, Article IV of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended.
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were charged with the
said crime in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of Calamba, Province of
Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, not being licensed or
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and
deliver to other person METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (or shabu)
weighing 98.40 grams, a regulated drug, and in violation of the aforestated law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
damages
The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution established the
following:
[O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth Regional Narcotics
Unit received an information from an unnamed informant. Said unnamed informant
was introduced to him by former Narcom P/Senior Inspector Recomono. The
information was that a big time group of drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100
grams of shabu at Chowking Restaurant located at Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna.
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was assigned to act as the poseur-
buyer. SPO2 William Manglo and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the other members of the
team. SPO1 Guevarra was provided with marked money consisting of a P1,000.00 bill
on top of a bundle of make-believe money bills supposedly amounting to P100,000.00.
P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro, SPO2 William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna went to the place
on a Mitsubishi Lancer while SPO1 Guevarra and the informant boarded an L-300
van. They arrived at the Chowking Restaurant at about 11:00 in the morning. They
positioned their cars at the parking area where they had a commanding view of people
going in and out (TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 2-8 and TSN, July 11, 1996, pp. 4-7).
160
It was about 4 oclock in the afternoon when a Toyota Corolla with Plate No. UBV-389
arrived. Sonny Zarraga was the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant
approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga. Then, the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio
Guevarra and informed the latter that Sonny Zarraga had with him 100 grams
of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered to buy the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked
SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money to buy 100 grams of shabu. Guevarra
responded in the affirmative. He showed the aforecited bundle of money bills. Sonny
Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and handover (sic) to Bonifacio
Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, in turn, handed the bundle of money bills.
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to signify that the transaction
was consummated (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 3-8). Immediately thereafter, William
Manglo and Wilfredo Luna approached and introduced themselves as Narcom
Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose. The buy-bust bundle of
money bills and the shabu were recovered. The two were brought to Camp Vicente
Lim for investigation. Edgar Groyon conducted the investigation. The shabu was
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 9-10
and TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13). P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo
examined the shabu. She reported and testified that the specimen, indeed, was a
second or low grade methamphetamine hydrochloride (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 31-
36).[4]
On the other hand, the accused therein were able to establish the following
facts:
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November 13, 1995, they were at SM
Mega Mall (sic), Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to change money. Suddenly, a person
with a hand bag appeared and ordered them to handcuff themselves. They were later
able to identify three of these people as Police Supt. Joseph Roxas Castro, SPO3
Noel Seno and a certain Corpuz. They were all in civilian clothes.
Zarraga was nowhere to be seen. There was a commotion inside the bank which
prompted the bank manager to call the police.
Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose who was left at the room
and brought them to Camp Vicente Lim. There, they were investigated.
The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny Zarragas jewelry, P85,000.00
in cash and Sonny Zarragas car spare tire, jack and accessories. Noel Seno was even
able to withdraw the P2,000.00 using Sonny Zarragas ATM card.[5]
On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting both accused of
the crime charged and sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of P2 million each and to pay the
cost of suit.
In the service of sentence, the preventive imprisonment undergone both by the
accused shall be credited in their favor.
Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is hereby ordered to deliver and
surrender the confiscated Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs
Board.

They proceeded to where Sonny Zarragas car was parked. Sonny Zarraga was forced SO ORDERED.[6]
to board another car while another person drove Sonny Zarragas car with Alvin Jose
as passenger. They drove towards Greenhills. They were eventually blindfolded. On
the way to Greenhills, one of the men opened the gloves compartment of Sonny On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred that the trial court erred as
Zarragas car. One of the men saw a substance inside the said compartment. He follows:
tasted it. Said person asked Sonny Zarraga if he could come up with P1.5 Million I
peso (sic). Col. Castro even showed the picture of Sonny Zarragas mother-in-law who
was supposed to be a rich drug pusher.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE
TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside the said room, Sonny
Zarragas cellular phone rung. It was a call from Sonny Zarragas wife. Col. Castro
talked to Pinky Zarraga and asked her if she could pay P1.5 Million as ransom for the II
release of Sonny Zarraga. Sonny Zarraga instead offered to withdraw money from the
bank in the amount of P75,000.00. The agreement was that in the bank, Pinky
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
Zarraga would withdraw the money and deliver it to Col. Castro in exchange for Sonny THE MERE PRESENTATION OF THE SHABU IN COURT IS NOT
Zarragas release. The agreement did not materialize. Col. Castro and Pinky Zarraga
SUFFICIENT TO FIND, WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, THAT THE
met inside the bank but Pinky Zarraga refused to withdraw the money as Sonny

161
 APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE CRIME OF SELLING PROHIBITED
DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE IDENTITY OF THE DRUG WAS
NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT IN THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND
THE APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED AGAINST
THEM:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER
PENALTY AGAINST THEM.
(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY A
FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF P2 MILLION PESOS (SIC) AND
THE COST OF THE SUIT.[7]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with
modification. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin
Jose, on its finding that he was only thirteen (13) years old when he committed the
crime; hence, he was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and
to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees. The appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that since the Information failed to allege that he acted with
discernment when the crime was committed and that the prosecution failed to prove
the same, he should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari,
alleging that
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER
DESPITE (1) THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER, WHO WAS ONLY 13 YEARS OLD
WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY HIM IN CONSPIRACY
WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY ZARRAGA, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2)
THE ABSENCE OF A DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER
SO ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE
PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.[8]
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code, a minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability unless he acted with
discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Article
192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as amended by P.D. No. 1179, as provided
for in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. He avers that the prosecution was
burdened to allege in the Information and prove beyond reasonable doubt that he
acted with discernment, but that the prosecution failed to do so. The petitioner insists
that the court is mandated to make a finding that he acted with discernment under
paragraph 1, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code and since the CA made no such
finding, he is entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the allegation
in the Information that the petitioner and his co-accused conspired and confederated
to sell the shabusubject of the Information sufficiently avers that the petitioner acted
with discernment; hence, there was no need for the public prosecutor to allege
specifically in the Information that the petitioner so acted. It contends that it is not
necessary for the trial and appellate courts to make an express finding that the
petitioner acted with discernment. It is enough that the very acts of the petitioner show
that he acted knowingly and was sufficiently possessed with judgment to know that the
acts he committed were wrong.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age
and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law
applies even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and penalized by a special
penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age in order for him
to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is that a minor of
such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime the capacity to know
what is wrong as distinguished from what is right or to determine the morality of
human acts; wrong in the sense in which the term is used in moral wrong.[9] However,
such presumption is rebuttable.[10] For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable,
the prosecution is burdened[11] to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or
circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what
he was doing and that it was wrong.[12] Such circumstantial evidence may include the
utterances of the minor; his overt acts before, during and after the commission of the
crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the commission of the crime;
his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus
delicti.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the petitioner, who was thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was
committed, acted with discernment relative to the sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer.
The only evidence of the prosecution against the petitioner is that he was in a car with
his cousin, co-accused Sonny Zarraga, when the latter inquired from the poseur-
buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, if he could afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra
replied in the affirmative, after which the accused Zarraga called the petitioner to bring
out and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft paper. The petitioner
handed over the plastic containing the shabu to accused Zarraga, who handed the
same to the poseur-buyer:
Q Whom did you approach to buy the shabu?
A The two of them, Sir.
Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car, what did you tell
them?
162
A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, Sir.
Q And what was your response?
A I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir.
Q And what happened next?
A After that I showed my money, Sir.
Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the affirmative specifically.
I withdraw that.
Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford to buy 100
grams tell us who asked you that question?
A Sonny Zarraga, Sir.
Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was his response?
A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, Sir.
Q Did his companion bring out the shabu?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened to the shabu?
A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny Zarraga.
Q After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with the shabu?
A He handed it to me, Sir.
Q After this shabu was handed to you, what happened next?
A After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and then I handed to
him the money, Sir.
Q When you say money, which money are you referring to?
A The P1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money, Sir.
Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused, what happened
next?
A I made signs to my companions, Sir.
Q What signs did you give?
A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head, Sir.
Q And how did your companions respond to your signal?
A After scratching my head, my companions approached us and arrested
them.
Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested Sonny Zarraga?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Tell us.
A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir.
Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny Zarraga was
arrested by these police officers?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Please tell us.
A They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives, Sir.
Q And after that, what happened?
A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga, Sir.[13]
Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to you by the
accused?
A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir.
Q Who made the request for its examination?
A SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir.
Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you. What did you do
with the shabu?
A While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1 William Manglo, Sir.
Q Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the accused, in what
container was it contained?
A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was wrapped in a
plastic and white soft paper, Sir.[14]
It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with the poseur-buyer
relative to the sale of shabu. It was also accused Zarraga who received the buy-
money from the poseur-buyer. Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic
bag to accused Zarraga, the petitioner merely sat inside the car and had no other
participation whatsoever in the transaction between the accused Zarraga and the
poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that the petitioner knew what was inside the
plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he handed over the same to his
cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age because
he knew that pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs. We quote
the testimony of the poseur-buyer:
ATTY. VERANO:
163
 Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your informant? Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on November 13,
1995 and did I hear it right that you went to Manuela at 5 oclock in
A No, Sir. the afternoon?
Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Yamson? WITNESS:
A I dont know the exact age, what I know is that he is a minor, Sir. A Yes, Sir.
Q Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)? Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from Filinvest, Quezon
City? You left Filinvest, Quezon City, at 12 oclock?
A I dont know, Sir.
A No, Sir.
Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit, you stated the
age of the boy? Q What time did you leave?
A I cannot recall anymore, Sir. A After lunch, Sir.
Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his age, were you Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that you were in the
not surprised that a young boy like that would be in a group selling custody of the police, you said that at one occasion on that day, you
drugs? have (sic) a chance to be with your cousin in a [L]ancer car and it
was inside that [L]ancer car when your cousin saw his own cellular
FISCAL: phone on one of the seats of the car, is that correct?
It calls for an opinion, Your Honor. A Yes, Sir.
ATTY. VERANO:
Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity to make a call
May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate why or how this to anybody since the day that you were arrested?
very young boy (sic) selling 100 grams of shabu. A He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the cellular phone.
COURT:
Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular phone appeared
The witness may answer. inside that [L]ancer car?

WITNESS: A No, Sir.

A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are being used by
pushers.[15]
Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor failed to elicit from the
petitioner facts and circumstances showing his capacity to discern right from wrong.
We quote the questions of the public prosecutor on cross-examination and the
petitioners answers thereto:
FISCAL:
Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said that you were
accosted by a male person at the workshop and then you went out
of Megamall and when you went outside, this man saw the key of
the car dangling at the waist. At whose waist?
A From my cousin.
Q And at that time, that person did not have any knowledge where your
car was?

Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed. A No, Sir.

COURT: Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the third level
parking area of SM Megamall, is that correct?
Please proceed.
A Yes, Sir.
FISCAL:
Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio call to anybody?

A No, Sir.

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 Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of Megamall, he petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot thereby be concluded that he conspired
had not made any call? with his co-accused. Indeed, in People v. Estepano,[17] we held that:

A No, Sir.
Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Renes mental capacity to fully
Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of the Megamall, appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of
you claimed that there was already this group which met you? Rene did not, in any way, attempt to show his discernment. He was merely asked
about what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16 April 1991 and whether he
A Yes, Sir. participated therein. Accordingly, even if he was, indeed, a co-conspirator, he would
still be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption
Q And this group were the policemen who are the companions of the of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his age. The cross-examination of Rene
male person who arrested you? could have provided the prosecution a good occasion to extract from him positive
A Yes, Sir. indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the government miserably
squandered the opportunity to incriminate him.[18]
Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that time?
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
A No, Sir.
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 which affirmed the Decision of the
Q These people do not know your car? Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, is SET ASIDE. The petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence. [19]
A No, Sir.
No costs.
FISCAL:
SO ORDERED.
No further question, Your Honor.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
ATTY. VERANO:

No re-direct, Your Honor.

COURT:

Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug user nor have
you seen any shabu. In support of your claim, are you willing to
submit yourself to an examination?

WITNESS:

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this Court?

A Yes, Sir.

COURT:

The witness is discharged.[16]

The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove that the petitioner
conspired with his co-accused to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and thereby proved
the capacity of the petitioner to discern right from wrong, is untenable. Conspiracy is
defined as an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime and decide
to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the parties to such conspiracy to
discern what is right from what is wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the

165
Republic of the Philippines CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the
SUPREME COURT victim being only five years old.7
Manila
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.8 During pre-trial,9 the defense
FIRST DIVISION admitted the existence of the following documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA,
showing that she was born on 3 December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape
incident; and (3) medical certificate, upon presentation of the original or upon
G.R. No. 182239 March 16, 2011
identification thereof by the physician.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their
vs.
respective versions of the story.
HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-Appellant.

Evidence for the Prosecution

DECISION

The testimonies of AAA,10 her father FFF,11 and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki
PEREZ, J.:
[Julito]12 may be summarized in the following manner:

Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot
FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFF’s house is along
prevail over the victim’s positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
the road. That of appellant lies at the back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To
crime.1 For it to prosper, the court must be convinced that there was physical
access the road, appellant has to pass by FFF’s house, the frequency of which the
impossibility on the part of the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time
latter describes to be "every minute [and] every hour." Also, appellant often visits FFF
of the commission of the crime.2
because they were close friends. He bore no grudge against appellant prior to the
incident.13
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has
become final and executory only after his disqualification from availing of the benefits
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the
of suspended sentence on the ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of
time – playing at the basketball court near her house, fetching water, and passing by
twenty-one (21) years, shall still be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation,
her house on his way to the road. She and appellant used to be friends until the
and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as "An
incident.14
Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of Justice, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." At about past 6 o’clock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old
daughter CCC to the store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC.
When CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not alarmed. He thought she was
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,3 appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks
watching television at the house of her aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita].15
before this Court the reversal of the judgment of his conviction. 4

The Facts
In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the Regional Trial Court and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 1679-13-141[1],6 appellant was accused of the crime
of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening
more or less, at barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-
year old minor child.
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay
Rum.16 At the store, he saw appellant place AAA on his lap. 17 He was wearing
sleeveless shirt and a pair of short pants.18 All of them left the store at the same
time.19 Julito proceeded to the house of Rita to watch television, while appellant, who
held the hand of AAA, went towards the direction of the "lower area or place."20
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short
pants21 when he held her hand while on the road near the store. 22 They walked
towards the rice field near the house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the
Perochos].23 There he made her lie down on harrowed ground, removed her panty
and boxed her on the chest.24 Already half-naked from waist down,25 he mounted her,
and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and made a

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push and pull movement.26 She felt pain and cried.27 Afterwards, appellant left and
proceeded to the Perochos.28 She, in turn, went straight home crying.29
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs. 30 She was without
slippers.31 He found her face greasy.32 There was mud on her head and blood was
oozing from the back of her head.33 He checked for any injury and found on her neck a
contusion that was already turning black.34 She had no underwear on and he saw
white substance and mud on her vagina.35 AAA told him that appellant brought her
from the store36 to the grassy area at the back of the house of the Perochos; 37 that he
threw away her pair of slippers, removed her panty, choked her and boxed her
breast;38 and that he proceeded thereafter to the Perochos.39
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos. 40 He asked the
appellant what he did to AAA.41Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at the
store and that AAA followed him.42 FFF went home to check on his
daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back to appellant, asked again,44 and boxed him.45
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching
television at the house of Rita.46AAA and her mother MMM arrived.47 AAA was
crying.48 Julito pitied her, embraced her, and asked what happened to her, to which
she replied that appellant raped her.49 Julito left and found appellant at the
Perochos.50 Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you really rape the child, the daughter
of [MMM]?" but the latter ignored his question.51Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, told appellant
that the policemen were coming to which the appellant responded, "Wait a minute
because I will wash the dirt of my elbow (sic) and my knees." 52 Julito did found the
elbows and knees of appellant with dirt.53
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the
incident blottered.54 FFF also had AAA undergo a physical check up at the municipal
health center.55 Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a
medical certificate56 dated 29 January 2003. It reads:
Injuries seen are as follows:
1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.
2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like
material
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock position
Impression
MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
HYMENAL LACERATIONS
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,57 AAA submitted herself to another
examination at the provincial hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B.
Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the provincial hospital, attended to her and issued a
medico-legal certificate dated 29 January 2003,58 the pertinent portion of which reads:
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and
7 there is no bleeding in this time of examination. (sic)59
Evidence for the Defense
Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To
corroborate his testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the
witness stand to affirm that he was at the Perochos at the time of the commission of
the crime.60 Luzvilla even went further to state that she actually saw Julito, not
appellant, pick up AAA on the road.61 In addition, Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sister-in-
law of appellant’s aunt, Gloria,62 testified on the behavior of Julito after the rape
incident was revealed.63
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands
at the back of FFF’s house.64He denied that there was a need to pass by the house of
FFF in order to access the road or to fetch water.65 He, however, admitted that he
occasionally worked for FFF,66 and whenever he was asked to buy something from
the store, AAA always approached him.67
At about 8 o’clock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos
to attend a birthday party. At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors, including appellant
and his uncle Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered together in a drinking
session, appellant’s uncle sent him to the store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store
is only about 20 meters from the house, he was able to return after three (3) minutes.
He was certain of the time because he had a watch . 68
167
Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house
attending the birthday party; and that appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the
evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay from the store. She recalled that appellant was
back around five (5) minutes later. She also observed that appellant’s white shorts and
white sleeveless shirt were clean.69
At 6:30 in the evening,70 Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the
kitchen having a drink with his uncle Alejandro and the rest of the visitors. 71 She went
out to relieve herself at the side of the tree beside the road next to the house of the
Perochos.72 From where she was, she saw Julito, who was wearing black short pants
and black T-shirt, carry AAA.73 AAA’s face was covered and she was wiggling. 74 This
did not alarm her because she thought it was just a game. 75 Meanwhile, appellant was
still in the kitchen when she returned.76 Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw
Julito, now in a white T-shirt,77 running towards the house of Rita.78 AAA was slowly
following behind.79 Luzvilla followed them.80 Just outside the house, Julito embraced
AAA and asked what the appellant did to her.81 The child did not answer.82
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and
testified that appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left
shoulder of the appellant, boxed him, and left. FFF came in the second time and again
boxed appellant. This time, he had a bolo pointed at appellant. Appellant’s uncle
Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and another Civilian Voluntary Organization (CVO)
member admonished FFF.83
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o’clock in the evening, she was watching
the television along with other people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who
was wearing only a pair of black short pants without a shirt on, entered the house
drunk. He paced back and forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito tightly
embraced AAA and asked her what happened. AAA did not answer. Upon Antonia’s
advice, Julito released her and went out of the house. 84
Appellant further testified that at past 7 o’clock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a
finger at him, brandished a bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but
returned at around 8 o’clock in the evening. This time, he boxed appellant and asked
again why he molested his daughter.85
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,86 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape committed upon a 5-year old girl, the court sentences him to death and orders
him to pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
With costs87
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating
that appellant was apparently born on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen
(17) years old when the crime was committed on 28 January 2003. 88 The trial court
appreciated the evidence and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion
perpetua.89 Thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the
accused is amended in order to consider the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority. The penalty impos[a]ble upon the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to
reclusion perpetua. xxx
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its
disposition in view of the ruling in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of cases
where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.90
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant
Hermie M. Jacinto is ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
and to pay the costs.91
On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant’s
Notice of Appeal.92 This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their
respective supplemental briefs.93 Both parties manifested that they have exhaustively
discussed their positions in their respective briefs and would no longer file any
supplement.94
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE"95 by invoking the principle that "if the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more reasonable explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then
the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a
conviction."96
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we
consider the three well-entrenched principles:
168
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.
difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature
of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs
the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the
positioned?
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 97
A They were apart.
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be
sufficient to convict the accused.98More so, when the testimony is supported by the Q Who pushed them apart?
medico-legal findings of the examining physician.99
A Hermie.
Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive identification of
the perpetrator of the crime,100except when it is established that it was physically
Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the
commission of the crime.101
A Yes.
I
Q What was that?
A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of
age even in the absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, A His penis.
threat or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.102
Q Where did he push his penis?

That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts
culminating in the insertion of appellant’s organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA A To my vagina.
and the medical findings of the physicians sufficiently proved such fact.
Q Was it painful?
AAA testified:
A Yes.
PROS. OMANDAM:
Q What was painful?
xxxx
A My vagina.
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed
you, what else did he do to you? Q Did you cry?

A He mounted me. A Yes.103

Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?
A Yes.
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and
re-phrased in order to test that AAA well understood the information elicited from her,
said it all – she had been raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says
in effect all that is essential to show that rape was committed. 104 Significantly, youth
and immaturity are normally badges of truth and honesty.105

169
Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo106 revealed that the
hymenal lacerations at 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock positions could have been caused by
the penetration of an object; that the redness of the introitus could have been "the
result of the repeated battering of the object;" and that such object could have been an
erect male organ.107
The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physician’s finding of penetration
conclusively established the essential requisite of carnal knowledge. 108
II
The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of
the commission of the crime are now in dispute.
The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that
appellant was elsewhere when the crime was committed. 109
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify
her assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she could
have a good look at him during the commission of the crime.110 AAA had known
appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant and AAA even walked together from the road
near the store to the situs criminus111 that it would be impossible for the child not to
recognize the man who held her hand and led her all the way to the rice field.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony
of AAA.
The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused,
whom she called "kuya" and who used to play basketball and fetch water near their
house, and who was wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her,
was convincing and persuasive. The defense attempted to impute the crime to
someone else – one Julito Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal, was steadfast and did not
equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is older,
who molested her.112
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the
trial court of the credibility of the witnesses deserves full weight and respect
considering that it has "the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ manner of testifying,
their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and the scant or full realization of their
oath,"113 unless it is shown that material facts and circumstances have been "ignored,
overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted."114
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
xxx His and his witness’ attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime
to someone else is xxx a vain exercise in view of the private complainant’s positive
identification of accused and other corroborative circumstances. Accused also
admitted that on the same evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked him
"What is this incident, Pare?", thus corroborating the latter’s testimony that he
confronted accused after hearing of the incident from the child."115
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in
finding his denial and alibi weak despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate
his testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over their respective testimonies that
even destroyed the credibility of the appellant’s very testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy
Tanduay; that he gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had already been drinking
long before he bought Tanduay at the store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro.
On cross-examination, she revealed that her husband was not around before, during,
and after the rape incident because he was then at work.116 He arrived from work only
after FFF came to their house for the second time and boxed appellant. 117 It was
actually the fish vendor, not her husband, who asked appellant to buy
Tanduay.118 Further, the drinking session started only after the appellant’s errand to
the store.119
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is
contrary to Gloria’s statement that her husband was at work.
Luzvilla’s testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia
Perocho. Antonia recalled that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvilla’s
claim that Julito wore a white shirt on his way to the house of Rita. In addition, while
both the prosecution, as testified to by AAA and Julito, and the defense, as testified to
by Gloria, were consistent in saying that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvilla’s
recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored black and later changed to
white), and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.
Also, contrary to Luzvilla’s story that she saw AAA walking towards Rita’s house three
(3) minutes after she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled
that AAA arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial court’s
appreciation in order. Thus:
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell
her father that Hermie had raped her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita
Lingkay to cry among strangers who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would
have the court believe. When the child was seen at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito
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Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only later, after she had been brought there by her
mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a look at her ˗ just as Julito Apiki
said.120
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the
same having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed
thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify as such, "they being related or were one way or
another linked to each other."121
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his
whereabouts, still, the defense of alibi cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of
the commission of the crime.122
As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never
left their sight, save from the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary
human experience. Moreover, considering that the farmland where the crime was
committed is just behind the house of the Perochos, it would take appellant only a few
minutes to bring AAA from the road near the store next to the Perochos down the
farmland and consummate the crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
appellant could have committed the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and
immediately returned to his uncle’s house.129 Unfortunately, the testimonies of his
corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that he was within the immediate
vicinity of the scene of the crime.130
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to
have been at the time and place of the commission of the crime.
All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs
criminis and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at
the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. 123
In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the
commission of the crime was considered not physically impossible to reach in less
than an hour even by foot.125 Inasmuch as it would take the accused not more than
five minutes to rape the victim, this Court disregarded the testimony of the defense
witness attesting that the accused was fast asleep when she left to gather bamboo
trees and returned several hours after. She could have merely presumed that the
accused slept all throughout.126
In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of
the appellant that he was in their company at the time of the commission of the crime
were likewise disregarded by this Court in the following manner:
III
In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly
considered Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite
the commission of the crime three (3) years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.
We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v.
Sarcia:131
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]132 allows the retroactive application of the Act to
those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity
of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the
commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case
wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review. 133 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Ruben Nicolas, the appellant’s part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty
appellant’s sister-in-law and co-worker, in unison, vouched for the appellant’s physical
presence in the fishpond at the time Rachel was raped. It is, however, an established
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below
fact that the appellant’s house where the rape occurred, was a stone’s throw
eighteen (18) years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have
away from the fishpond. Their claim that the appellant never left their sight the
acted with discernment, in which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in accordance
entire afternoon of December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites
with the Act shall be observed.134
to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost four hours, since she testified that she,
too, was very much occupied with her task of counting and recording the fishes being
harvested. Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away from the We determine discernment in this wise:
fishpond, could not have focused his entire attention solely on the appellant. It is,
therefore, not farfetched that the appellant easily sneaked out unnoticed, and
along the way inveigled the victim, brought her inside his house and ravished Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of
her, then returned to the fishpond as if he never left.128 (Emphasis his unlawful act.135 Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking
supplied.)1avvphi1

171
into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
case.136
Civil Liability
xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he
was doing and that it was wrong.137 Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature
We have consistently ruled that:
of the crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness. 138

The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character
In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated
of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death
and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim
penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion
xxx, to weaken her defense" are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellant’s
perpetua.149
mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his unlawful action. 139

Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.
The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born on 3 December 1997.
Considering that she was only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her on 28
January 2003, the law prescribing the death penalty when rape is committed against a
child below seven (7) years old141 applies.
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition
against the imposition of the penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No.
9346;142 and (2) the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the appellant,
which has the effect of reducing the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by
law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.143
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime
has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her
family.150 The respective awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount
of ₱75,000.00 each are, therefore, proper.151
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
which effectively lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded
by the Court of Appeals in the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱75,000.00 as moral damages. And, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, 152 the
amount of exemplary damages should be increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse
of the Period of Suspension of Sentence

Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with
of penalties provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. 145 Consequently, in its
the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the
appreciation of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it
judgment of conviction is pronounced. Thus:
lowered the penalty one degree from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen
of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.146 (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may
have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
We differ.
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however,
In a more recent case,147 the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already
J. Leonardo-de Castro, clarified: eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18
years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always xxxx
in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty
because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the
death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty
Court of Appeals held that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.148 (Emphasis supplied.)
as amended,154 the aforestated provision does not apply to one who has been

172
convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to
imprisonment.155 restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that
he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of
the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision
promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the
in Sarcia,156 overturning the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:
offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.

The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in
the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The
accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.164
said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended
sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she
has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the
principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic
suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall be remanded to the court of
a heinous crime.157
origin to effect appellant’s confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.

The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations 158 on Senate Bill No. 1402
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
(Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the
CR HC No. 00213 finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt
new position of this Court to cover heinous crimes in the application of the provision
of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death
on the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law. The
penalty imposed on the appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is
pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:
ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The case is
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with
or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or
SO ORDERED.
by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s] proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and
Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and
restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child’s restoration, rehabilitation and Associate Justice
reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)159
WE CONCUR:
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children
in Conflict with the Law,which reflected the same position.160
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended Chairperson
sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until
the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.161 Section 40162 of the law and Section 48163 of the Rule are clear on the matter. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old. CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of
the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the Associate Justice

173
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in DECISION
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated February

FIRST DIVISION 8, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560, which affirmed with modification the
Decision[2]dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183563
City, Branch 7, in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53, finding the accused-
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present: appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of
statutory rape and seven (7) counts of rape against the private complainant AAA. [3]
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN, On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charged[4] with eight (8)
counts of rape in separate informations, the accusatory portions of which state:
DEL CASTILLO, and
- versus -
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46

Promulgated:

That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of

[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
December 14, 2011 this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully,
HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA, unlawfully and feloniously, succeed in having carnal knowledge of
the said [AAA], who was then only eight (8) years old, without
Accused-Appellant. her consent and against her will.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

174
 Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[5]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is
the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated
by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal
knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her
will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[6]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-48
That sometime in the month July 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is
the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated
by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal
knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her
will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[7]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-49
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is
the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated
by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal
knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her
will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[8]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-50
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is
the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated
by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal
knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her
will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[9]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-51
175
 That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is
the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated
by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal
knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her
will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[10]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-52
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is
the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated
by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal
knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her
will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[11]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is
the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated
by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal
knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her
will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a relative by consanguinity within the third civil
degree.[12](Emphases ours.)
During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on November 28, 2000, he
entered a plea of not guilty.[13] On March 13, 2001, the pre-trial conference of the
cases was conducted and the parties stipulated on the identity of the accused-
appellant in all the cases, the minority of the victim and the fact that the accused
appellant is the uncle of the victim.[14]
The pre-trial order containing the foregoing stipulations was signed by the
accused and his counsel. The cases were then heard on consolidated trial.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove the charges
against the accused-appellant. AAA testified that she was born on November 1,
1987.[15] In one afternoon when she was only eight years old, she stated that the
accused-appellant raped her inside their house. She could not remember, though, the
exact month and date of the incident. The accused-appellant stripped off her shorts,
panties and shirt and went on top of her. He had his clothes on and only pulled down
his zipper. He then pulled out his organ, put it in her vagina and did the pumping
176
motion. AAA felt pain but she did not know if his organ penetrated her vagina. When the results of the medical examination conducted on AAA by Dr. Rommel Capungcol
he pulled out his organ, she did not see any blood. She did so only when she and Dr. Melissa Adel Gagala on October 26, 1999; and (2) Exhibit B - the Social Case
urinated.[16] Study Report[20] pertaining to AAAs case, which was issued by the Municipal Social
Welfare and Development Office of the Province of Leyte.

AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in July 1999
for five times on different nights. The accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:
BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the house of AAAs neighbor. He came to AAAs house,
took off her panty and went on top of her. She could not see what he was wearing as it
was nighttime. He made her hold his penis then he left. When asked again how the P. E. Findings: Surg. Findings:
accused-appellant raped her for five nights in July of the said year, AAA narrated that
- (-) Physical injuries.
he pulled down her panty, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain as he put his
OB- NOTES:
penis into her vagina. Every time she urinated, thereafter, she felt pain. AAA said that
she recognized the accused-appellant as her assailant since it was a moonlit night - Patient came in with history of
and their window was only covered by cloth. He entered through the kitchen as the rape since 8 year old for so many
times. last act was March 1999.
door therein was detached.[17]

O: Pelvic Exam:

AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in Ext. Genetalia grossly normal.
August 1999 at nighttime. He kissed her and then he took off his shirt, went on top of
Introitus: Old, healed incomplete
her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and in her chest because he was
laceration at 3 & 9 oclock position
heavy. She did not know if his penis penetrated her vagina. She related that the
Speculum Exam: not done due to resistance.
accused-appellant was her uncle as he was the brother of her mother. AAA said that
she did not tell anybody about the rapes because the accused-appellant threatened to Internal Exam:
kill her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint when he proceeded to also rape
her younger sister, DDD.[18]
Vaginal smear for presence of
spermatozoa: = NEGATIVE[21]

After the testimony of AAA, the prosecution formally offered its documentary
evidence, consisting of: (1) Exhibit A - the Medico-Legal Report,[19] which contained

177
 Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-appellant to the
witness stand to deny the informations filed against him and to refute the testimony of
AAA. He testified that when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995, he
was only 13 years old as he was born on February 23, 1982. In 1995, he worked in
Sagkahan, Tacloban City as a houseboy for a certain Gloria Salazar and he stayed
there up to 1996. He stated that he was working in Tacloban City when the alleged
rapes happened in the municipality of XXX. When he would go home from Tacloban,
he would stay at the house of a certain Fred Antoni. He did not go to the house of AAA
as the latters parents were his enemies. He said that he had a quarrel with AAAs
parents because he did not work with them in the ricefields. He further recounted that
in July 1999, he was also living in Tacloban City and worked there as a dishwasher at
a restaurant. He worked there from 1998 up to September 1999. The accused-
appellant likewise stated that in August 1999, he was still working at the same
restaurant in Tacloban City. While working there, he did not go home to XXX as he
was busy with work. He denied that he would have drinking sprees with AAAs
stepfather, BBB, because they were enemies.[22]
On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the mother of
AAA was his sister and they were close to each other. He said that his parents were
still alive in 1995 up to October 1999 and the latter then resided at Calaasan,
Alangalang, Leyte. He indicated that his parents house was about two kilometers
away from the house of AAA.While he was working at the restaurant in Tacloban City,
he would visit his parents once every month, mainly on Sundays.[23]
The Judgment of the RTC
On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 7, rendered a
Decision convicting the accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art.
266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and
further amended by R.A. 8353 (Rape Law of 1997) and R.A. 7659
(Death Penalty Law) the Court found accused HENRY
ARPON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ONE COUNT OF
STATUTORY RAPE and SEVEN COUNTS OF RAPE charged
under the informations and sentenced to suffer the maximum
penalty of DEATH, and to indemnify the victim, [AAA] the amount
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for each count of Rape
and pay moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos and pay the cost.[24] (Emphases in the
original.)
The court a quo found more credible the testimony of AAA. The fact that
AAA was in tears when she testified convinced the trial court of the truthfulness of her
rape charges against the accused-appellant. If there were inconsistencies in AAAs
testimony, the trial court deemed the same understandable considering that AAA was
pitted against a learned opposing counsel. The delay in the reporting of the rape
incidents was not also an indication that the charges were fabricated. Moreover, the
trial court ruled that the findings of the medico-legal officer confirmed that she was
indeed raped. The accused-appellants defense of alibi was likewise disregarded by
the trial court, declaring that it was not physically impossible for him to be present in
XXX at any time of the day after working hours while he was working in Tacloban
City. The trial court stated that the accused-appellant was positively identified by AAA
as the person who sexually abused her and she held no grudge against him. The trial
court imposed the penalty of death as it found that AAA was less than 18 years old at
the time of the commission of the rape incidents and the accused-appellant was her
178

uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. The trial court also
appreciated against the accused-appellant the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
confidence and nighttime.
The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25] of the RTC
Decision, asserting that the trial court failed to consider his minority as a privileged
mitigating circumstance. As stated in his direct examination, the accused-appellant
claimed that he was born on February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13 and 17
years old when the incidents of rape allegedly occurred in 1995 and 1999,
respectively. In a Resolution[26] dated November 6, 2002, the trial court denied the
accused-appellants motion, holding that the latter failed to substantiate with clear and
convincing evidence his allegation of minority.
The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic review and were
docketed as G.R. Nos. 165201-08.[27] The parties then filed their respective
briefs.[28] On February 7, 2006, we resolved[29] to transfer the cases to the Court of
[30]
Appeals pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo. The cases were docketed in the
appellate court as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On February 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed
decision, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City in Criminal
Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53 is AFFIRMED with
modification awarding exemplary damages to [AAA] in the amount
of Twenty[-]Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos for each count of
rape and clarification that the separate award of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages likewise pertains to each
count of rape. The death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion
perpetua in accord with Rep. Act No. 9346.[31]
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the inconsistencies pointed out by the
accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA were not sufficient to discredit her. The
appellate court held that the exact age of AAA when the incidents of rape occurred no
longer mattered, as she was still a minor at the time. More significant was her
straightforward, categorical and candid testimony that she was raped eight times by
the accused-appellant. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the ruling of the RTC
that AAAs charges of rape conformed with the physical evidence and the accused-
appellants uncorroborated defense of alibi could not stand against the positive
identification made by AAA.
As regards the attendant circumstances, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
relationship of the accused-appellant to AAA was both alleged in the informations and
admitted by the accused-appellant. The appellate court, however, differed in
appreciating against the accused-appellant the qualifying circumstance of AAAs
minority. The lone testimony of AAA on the said circumstance was held to be an
insufficient proof therefor. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime was also ruled to
be inapplicable as it was not shown that the same was purposely sought by the
accused-appellant or that it facilitated the commission of the crimes of rape. In view of
the presence of the qualifying circumstance of relationship, the Court of Appeals
awarded exemplary damages in favor of AAA.
179
 THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[32] of the above decision and AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT
the same was given due course by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[33] dated May TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

27, 2008.

III

On November 17, 2008, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and
required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.[37]
30 days from notice.[34] Thereafter, in a Manifestation and Motion[35] filed on December
24, 2008, the plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prayed that
it be excused from filing a supplemental brief. On February 3, 2009, the accused-
appellant submitted a Supplemental Brief.[36]

The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the part of the RTC to give
weight to the incredible testimony of AAA. He alleges that AAA could not state with

The Issues consistency the exact date when she was first supposedly raped, as well as her age at
that time. The accused-appellant also avers that AAA could not remember the dates of
the other incidents of rape charged, all of which were allegedly described in a uniform
manner. Contrary to the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant
In the accused-appellants brief, the following issues were invoked:
posits that the above inconsistencies cannot merely be discounted as insignificant. He
further insists that the qualifying circumstances of AAAs minority and her relationship
to the accused-appellant were not duly proven by the prosecution. The accused-
I
appellant, thus, prays for a judgment of acquittal.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE
The Ruling of the Court
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

180

After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to
deny the appeal, but with a modification of the penalties and the amount of
indemnities awarded.
To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-appellant
guilty of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts of qualified rape.
Under the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46, the first incident of
rape was alleged to have occurred in 1995 when AAA was only eight years
old. However, the accused-appellant points out that the prosecution failed to
substantiate the said fact as AAAs testimony thereon was too inconsistent and
incredible to be worthy of any belief. He explains that AAA initially claimed that she
was raped for the first time when she was eight years old. Nonetheless, during her
testimony regarding the incidents of rape that occurred in July 1999, she said that the
accused did the same thing that he did to her when she was only seven years old. On
her redirect examination, AAA then stated that she was first raped in 1998 when she
was eleven (11) years old.
Presently, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of
rape by sexual intercourse as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is
committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse
of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years
of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
In particular, Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of
statutory rape, the elements of which are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge
of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented.[38]
The above provision came into existence by virtue of Republic Act No.
[39]
8353, or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997.[40] Prior
to this date, the crime of rape was penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code,[41] which provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
181

1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
In People v. Macafe,[42] we explained the concept of statutory rape under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in this wise:
Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed
statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing
rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. Hence, force
and intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is
the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took
place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot
have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's
consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to
discern evil from good.[43] (Emphasis ours.)
Manifestly, the elements of statutory rape in the above-mentioned
provisions of law are essentially the same. Thus, whether the first incident of rape
charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before the amendment of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, or in 1998, after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the
prosecution has the burden to establish the fact of carnal knowledge and the age of
AAA at the time of the commission of the rape.
Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, the date of the
commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the
gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman.[44] Inconsistencies and
discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not
grounds for acquittal.[45]
As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the
substance of AAAs testimony. On this matter, we reiterate our ruling in People v.
Condes[46] that:
Time and again, the Court has held that when the
decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective
testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions
deserve great respect and are often accorded finality. The trial
judge has the advantage of observing the witness' deportment
and manner of testifying. Her "furtive glance, blush of conscious
shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or
the scant or full realization of an oath" are all useful aids for an
accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The
trial judge, therefore, can better determine if witnesses are telling
the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting
testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity
to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even
more stringent application where said findings are sustained by
the [Court of Appeals].[47]
In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of AAA
and we found no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that the accused-
appellant indeed committed the first incident of rape charged. AAA positively identified
182
 A: My younger brother and I.
the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the dastardly crimes. With tears in her
eyes, she clearly and straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape as follows:

Q: About your mother and step father where were they?

[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE] A: In the ricefield.

Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened when you PROS. SABARRE:
were still 8 years old?

May we make it of record that the witness is crying.

[AAA]

COURT:
A: There was but I cannot anymore remember the exact month
and date.

Have it on record.

Q: Just tell what happened to you when you were still 8 years
old?
PROS. SABARRE:
A: I was raped by Tiyo Henry.

Q: Do you still recall was it in the morning, in the afternoon or

Q: How did he rape you? evening?

A: He stripped me of my panty, shorts and shirts. A: In the afternoon.

Q: Do you remember what place did he rape you? xxxx

A: Yes, sir in our house.

Q: After your clothes and [panty] were taken off by accused what
did he do to you next if any?
Q: Who were the persons present then at that time?
A: He went on top of me.

183
 Q: Was he still with his clothes on or already naked?
Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in
A: He has still clothes on, he did not take off his pants, he only
July 1999, the Court disagrees with the ruling of the trial court that all five counts were
pulled down the zipper.
proven with moral certainty. The testimony of AAA on the said incidents is as follows:

Q: And when he pulled down the zipper and went on top of you
what did he do next if any? Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in July
1999?
A: He was pumping on me.
A: Five times.

Q: Did he pull out his organ?

Q: Was it in the daytime or night time?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Night time.

Q: And where did he place his organ?

Q: Was it in different nights or on the same night?
A: In my vagina.
A: Different nights.

Q: When he kept on pumping what did you feel?

Q: Who were present then at that time when he raped you five
A: Pain.[48] times?

A: My Kuya and other siblings.

The above testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Q: You have companions why were you raped?

Report of Dr. Capungcol and Dr. Gagala, who found old, healed, incomplete hymenal A: Because they were sleeping.
lacerations on the private part of AAA. [W]hen the testimony of a rape victim is
consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has
been carnal knowledge.[49] Q: How did he rape you on that July night for five times, will you
please narrate to the court?

184
A: Because they have been drinking, he came to our house, ATTY. SABARRE:
pulled out my panty and went on top of me.

Q: You said you were raped on that July evening for five nights
Q: With whom was he drinking? how did he rape you?

A: With my step father. A: (witness did not answer)

Q: Where did they drink? PROS. SABARRE:

A: In our neighbor.

Make it of record that the witness is crying again.

Q: When he took off your shorts and panty what was the accused
wearing at that time?
Q: Why are you crying?
A: I do not know because I could not see since it was night time.
A: I am angry and hurt.

Q: When he was on top of [you] was he still wearing something?

PROS. SABARRE:
A: No, sir.

Your honor please may I be allowed to suspend the proceeding

Q: What did he do with his penis? considering that the witness is psychologically incapable
of further proceeding.
A: He made me hold it.

xxxx
Q: Then after he made you hold it what did he do with it?

A: He left.
Q: I have asked you how did the accused rape you will you please
narrate the whole incident to this honorable court?

xxxx A: The same that he did when I was 8 years old, he went on top
of me.

185
 From the above testimony, AAA merely described a single incident of
Q: What was the same thing you are talking about? rape. She made no reference whatsoever to the other four instances of rape that were
likewise supposedly committed in the month of July 1999.
A: He pulled down my panty and went on top of me and pump.

Q: When he pump what did you feel? The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly committed in

A: Pain. August 1999. AAA narrated only one incident of rape in this manner:

Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in the

month of August 1999?

A: Two times.
COURT:

Q: Was it during day time or night time?

Why did you feel pain?
A: Nighttime.

A: He placed his penis inside my vagina, everytime I urinate I feel

pain. Q: How did he rape you again that August 1999?

A: He kissed me.

ATTY. SABARRE;

Q: After kissing you what did he do next?

How did you recognize that it was Henry Arpon when it was night A: He took off his shirts.
time?

Q: After he took off his shirts what happened?

A: It was a moonlight night and our window was only covered by
cloth as cover.[50] A: He went on top of me and pump.

186
 Q: When he made a pumping motion on top of you what did you
feel?
A: My vagina was painful and also my chest because he was
heavy.
Q: Why did you feel pain in your vagina?
A: Because he was raping me.
Q: Did his penis penetrate your vagina?
A: I do not know.
Q: If this Henry Arpon is present now in court could you recognize
him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is he?
A: That man (witness pointing a detention prisoner when asked
his name answered Henry Arpon).[51]
It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct
crime that the law requires to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's
evidence must pass the exacting test of moral certainty that the law demands to
satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellant's presumption of innocence. [52] Thus,
including the first incident of rape, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish
three instances when the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her.
The allegation of the accused-appellant that the testimony of AAA described
the incidents of rape in a uniform manner does not convince this Court. To our mind,
AAAs narration of the sexual abuses committed by the accused-appellant contained
an adequate recital of the evidentiary facts constituting the crime of rape, i.e., that he
placed his organ in her private part.[53] Etched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that
a victim of a savage crime cannot be expected to mechanically retain and then give an
accurate account of every lurid detail of a frightening experience a verity born[e] out of
human nature and experience.[54]
We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellants defense of
alibi deserves scant consideration. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is
easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must
adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs
criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed.[55] [S]ince alibi is a
weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the
face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the
crime.[56]
In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of the trial
court that:
The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few
kilometers and can be negotiated by passenger bus in less than
one (1) hour, hence, it is not impossible for the accused to be
present in [XXX] at any time of the day after working hours while
working in Tacloban. Besides, the accused has his day off every
Sunday, which according to him he spent in [XXX], Leyte.
187

The accused was positively identified by the victim as
the person who sexually molested her beginning that afternoon of
1995, and subsequently thereafter in the coming years up to
August 1999. She can not be mistaken on the identity of the
accused, because the first sexual molestation happened during
the daytime, besides, she is familiar with him being her uncle, the
brother of her mother.[57]
Furthermore, the Court rejects the contention of the accused-appellant that AAA may
have been prompted to falsely testify against him (accused-appellant) in view of the
latters quarrel with AAAs parents when he refused to work with them in the rice
fields.[58] Aside from being uncorroborated, we find the same specious and
implausible. Where the charges against the appellant involve a heinous offense, a
minor disagreement, even if true, does not amount to a sufficient justification for
dragging a young girl's honor to a merciless public scrutiny that a rape trial brings in its
wake.[59]
As to the accused-appellants objection that there was no proof of the age of the victim,
we affirm the trial courts finding that the prosecution sufficiently established the age of
AAA when the incidents of rape were committed. The testimony of AAA that she was
born on November 1, 1987,[60] the voluntary stipulation of the accused, with assistance
of counsel, regarding the minority of the victim during pre-trial and his testimony
regarding his recollection of the age of the victim,[61] his own niece, all militate against
accused-appellants theory. In People v. Pruna,[62] the Court established the guidelines
in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance,
as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended
party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live
birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school
records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice
to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable,
the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the
exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years
old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years
old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother
or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's
188
 testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving
the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be
taken against him. (Emphases ours.)
Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time she took the
witness stand (when she was 14 years old), the victim, as to her body and facial
features, was indeed a minor.[63]
That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force, threat or
intimidation need no longer be belabored upon. [I]n rape committed by close kin, such
as the victims father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is
not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.[64]
Penalties
On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the former Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the crime of rape with reclusion
perpetua. The sixth paragraph thereof also provides that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common law-spouse of the parent of the
victim. (Emphases ours.)
Similarly, the present Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code relevantly recites:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the
next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the
victim. (Emphases ours.)
The Court finds that the circumstances of minority and relationship qualify the three (3)
counts of rape committed by the accused-appellant. As a special qualifying
circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victims minority and her
189
relationship to the accused must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable
[65]
doubt. In the instant case, the informations alleged that AAA was less than eighteen
(18) years of age when the incidents of rape occurred and the accused-appellant is
her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. The said
circumstances were also admitted by the accused-appellant during the pre-trial
conference of the case and again admitted by him during his testimony.[66]
In People v. Pepito,[67] the Court explained that [t]he purpose of entering into
a stipulation or admission of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the
court, as well, of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the
truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. These admissions during the
pre-trial conference are worthy of credit. Being mandatory in nature, the admissions
made by appellant therein must be given weight. Consequently, for the first incident of
rape, regardless of whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998, the imposition of
the death penalty is warranted. For the second and third counts of rape, the imposable
penalty is also death.
Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of the accused-appellant
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Although this matter was not among
the issues raised before the Court, we still take cognizance of the same in accordance
with the settled rule that [i]n a criminal case, an appeal throws open the entire case
wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned,
that may be found in the appealed judgment.[68]
Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise
known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, provides for the rule on how to
determine the age of a child in conflict with the law,[69] viz:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. The child in conflict with
the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall
enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is
proven to be eighteen (18) years of age or older. The age of a
child may be determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the
absence of these documents, age may be based on information
from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In
case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in
his/her favor.
Furthermore, in Sierra v. People,[70] we clarified that, in the past, the Court deemed
sufficient the testimonial evidence regarding the minority and age of the accused
provided the following conditions concur, namely: (1) the absence of any other
satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar
documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of
testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of the accused at
the time of the complained incident without any objection on the part of the
prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accused's and/or
his relatives' testimonies are untrue.[71]
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on February 23,
1982 and that he was only 13 years old when the first incident of rape allegedly
happened in 1995.[72] Other than his testimony, no other evidence was presented to
prove the date of his birth. However, the records of this case show neither any
190

objection to the said testimony on the part of the prosecution, nor any contrary
evidence to dispute the same. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals should have
appreciated the accused-appellants minority in ascertaining the appropriate penalty.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic Act No. 9344
took effect on May 20, 2006, the said law is still applicable given that Section 68
thereof expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are
Serving Sentences. Persons who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who
were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the
commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be
adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they
are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.
People v. Sarcia [73]
further stressed that [w]ith more reason, the Act should apply to [a]
case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No.
9344 is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A
child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability
and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has
acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this
Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established
does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Emphases ours.)
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the minimum age limit of
criminal irresponsibility in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended,[74]i.e., from under nine years of age and above nine years of age and under
fifteen (who acted without discernment) - to fifteen years old or under and above
fifteen but below 18 (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from
criminal liability.[75]
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in Criminal Case No.
2000-01-46 was allegedly committed in 1995, the testimony of the accused-appellant
sufficiently established that he was only 13 years old at that time. In view of the failure
of the prosecution to prove the exact date and year of the first incident of rape, i.e.,
whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously discussed, any doubt
therein should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the
latter.[76] The Court, thus, exempts the accused-appellant from criminal liability for the
191
first count of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No.
9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.
For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the year 1999, the
accused-appellant was already 17 years old. We likewise find that in the said
instances, the accused-appellant acted with discernment. In Madali v. People,[77] the
Court had the occasion to reiterate that [d]iscernment is that mental capacity of a
minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be
known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case. In this case, the fact that the
accused-appellant acted with discernment was satisfactorily established by the
testimony of AAA, which we had already found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified that
she at first did not tell anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at the hands of
the accused-appellant because the latter told her that he would kill her mother if she
did so. That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in an effort to conceal his
dastardly acts only proved that he knew full well that what he did was wrong and that
he was aware of the consequences thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and in conformity with our ruling in Sarcia, when the offender is a minor
under eighteen (18) years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of
determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, for the
second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty imposable upon the accused-
appellant is reclusion perpetua for each count.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the
circumstance of his minority, the latter would have been entitled to a suspension of
sentence for the second and third counts of rape under Section 38 of Republic Act No.
9344, which reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the
child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged,
the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which
may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead
of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application. Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be supplied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the
various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court Rule on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied in the instant
case given that the accused-appellant is now about 29 years of age and Section 40 of
Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to the application of a suspended sentence,
namely, when the child reaches a maximum age of 21. The said provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to
Court. If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not
192
 been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully
failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be
brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached
eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the
court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to
extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period
or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one
(21) years.(Emphasis ours.)
Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic Act No.
9344 is warranted in the instant case, to wit:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in
Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict
with the law may after conviction and upon order of the court, be
made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular
penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the [Bureau of Corrections], in coordination with the
[Department of Social Welfare and Development].
Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the second and
third incidents of rape shall not be affected by the above disposition and the same
shall be enforced in accordance with law and the pronouncements in the prevailing
jurisprudence.
Civil Liability
The Court recently ruled in People v. Masagca, Jr.[78] that [c]ivil indemnity is
mandatory when rape is found to have been committed. Based on prevailing
jurisprudence, we affirm the award of P75,000.00 to the rape victim as civil indemnity
for each count. We also explained in Sarcia that [t]he litmus test x x x in the
determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed,
which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of
whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.[79] The trial
courts award of civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for each count of rape is therefore
increased to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape committed in the
instant case.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same is justified without need of proof other
than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries
[from the experience she underwent].[80] We also increase the trial courts award
of P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape herein
established in keeping with the recent case law.[81]
Lastly, we affirm the Court of Appeals award of exemplary damages. As held
in People v. Llanas, Jr.,[82] [t]he award of exemplary damages is also proper not only to
deter outrageous conduct, but also in view of the aggravating circumstances of
minority and relationship surrounding the commission of the offense, both of which
were alleged in the information and proved during the trial. The appellate courts award
193
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is raised to P30,000.00 for each of the three (3)
counts of rape in keeping with the current jurisprudence on the matter.[83]
No costs.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
February 8, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
(1) For the first count of rape herein established, the accused-appellant Henry
EN BANC
Arpon y Juntilla is hereby EXEMPTED from criminal liability.

G.R. No. L-34665 August 28, 1931

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

(2) For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-appellant is vs.
DONATO BINDOY, defendant-appellant.
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of QUALIFIED RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty Florentino Saguin for appellant.
of reclusion perpetua for each count. Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLAMOR, J.:

The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis to
(3) As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA for the penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of
each of the three (3) counts of rape P75,000.00 as civil law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the
costs. The crime charged against the accused is homicide, according to the following
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary information:
damages, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6%
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod, municipality
from the date of finality of this Decision. of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with his bolo wounded
Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a serious wound in the chest
which caused his instant death, in violation of article 404 of the Penal Code.

(4) The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in this
action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344. instance contends that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
and in convicting him of the crime of homicide.

194
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal
a tuba wineshop in the barrio market of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the case.
of Occidental Misamis, started by some of the tuba drinkers. There were Faustino
Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One Donato Bindoy, who was also
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant to the
there, offered some tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having already
effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo,
done so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an
and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards
interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in to defend his
his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was
wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a
therefore hit in the chest, without Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed
disturbance which attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his family,
behind him. The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later,
lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what was happening, while Bindoy
and asked him about his wound when he replied: "I think I shall die of this wound."
and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy
And then continued: "Please look after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't
succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's
starve," adding further: "This wound was an accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I
hand towards the left behind the accused, with such violence that the point of the bolo
at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any
reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy.
rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.

There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had it existed,
Neither is there any indication that the accused was aware of Emigdio Omamdam's
would have greatly facilitated the solution of this case. And we deem it well to repeat
presence in the place, for, according to the testimony of the witnesses, the latter
what this court said in United States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:
passed behind the combatants when he left his house to satisfy his curiosity. There
was no disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy and Omamdam, on the contrary, it
appears they were nephew and uncle, respectively, and were on good terms with The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals,
each other. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he hit directed to the importance of definitely ascertaining and proving, when
Omamdam; he was only defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying possible, the motives which actuated the commission of a crime under
to wrench away from him, and his conduct was perfectly lawful. investigation.

The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the description given In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the
by the sanitary inspector who attended him as he lay dying, tallies with the size of the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of
point of Bindoy's bolo. evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the guilty person
to indulge the criminal act.
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio
Omamdam's death, but the defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally and In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the appellant is
without malicious intent. entitled to acquittal according to article 8, No. 8, Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment
appealed from is reversed, and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with
costs de oficio. So ordered.
Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having seen the
accused stab Omamdam with his bolo. Such testimony is not incompatible with that of
the accused, to the effect that he wounded Omamdam by accident. The widow Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Romualdez, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ.,
testified that she knew of her husband's wound being caused by Bindoy from his concu
statement to her before his death.
Republic of the Philippines
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the accused SUPREME COURT
stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on that occasion. The defendant, Manila
indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas, who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo
from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated, there is no evidence to
EN BANC
show that he did so deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. If, in his
struggle with Pacas, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead
of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his act, since G.R. No. 1352 March 29, 1905
whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although

195
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle, promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the
vs. Philippine Commission).
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime,
Hipolito Magsalin for appellants. which seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee. takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and
therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable according to law.
MAPA, J.:
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment
appealed from, we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the
instances. So ordered.
penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of
assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of the American school-teachers
Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because, without Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
having taken part in the said crime as principals or as accomplices, they took part in
the burial of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime.
EN BANC
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto
Baculi, although he confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it [G.R. No. 1481. February 17, 1903. ]
appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the murderers of the
four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated by THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. LIBERATO EXALTACION ET
the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for AL., Defendants-Appellants.
the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans were killed;
that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but the Alberto Barretto, for Appellants.
he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he
heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.
the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of
their guns they forced him to bury the corpses. SYLLABUS

The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of
irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances
when he executed the acts which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took
any part in any way in the execution of the crime with which he has been charged;
there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses
for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did not
take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of the
occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and
guilt, made before an official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique
Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as
legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of
the defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the
statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the
confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to
the other defendants that nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not
appear to have been made freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or
1. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; DURESS. — The defendants were captured by
brigands, who compelled them, by threats of death, to take and subscribe an oath to
support the Katipunan Society, an organization created for the purpose of subverting
the Government by force: Held, That the duress under which the defendants acted
relieves them from criminal liability.
DECISION
TORRES, J. :
March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to the court of that province
an information charging Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco with the
crime of rebellion, in that they, subsequently to the 4th day of November, 1901,
willfully and illegally bound themselves to take part in the rebellion against the
Government of the United States in these Islands, swearing allegiance to the
Katipunan Society, the purpose of which was to overthrow the said Government by
force of arms, this against the statute in the case made and provided.

196

In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial governor of Bulacan,
testified under oath that the two defendants were arrested in the month of March,
1903, the police some days before having captured a number of documents in the
encampment of one Contreras, a so-called general of bandits, situated at a place
called Langca, of the town of Meycauayan, among which documents appeared the
papers now in pages 2 and 3 of the record, signed by the said Exaltacion and
Tanchinco, who recognized the said documents when they were exhibited to them;
that the said defendants stated to the witness that they had signed the documents
under compulsion; that the purpose of the Katipunan Society was to obtain the
independence of the Philippines; that this statement was made in the house of the
parish priest of Meycauayan in the presence of Exequiel Casa and Fernando Nieto.
The latter, upon their examination as witnesses, testified to the same facts stating that
the defendants told Governor Tecson that they had signed the said documents under
fear of death at the hands of the thieves by whom they had been captured. The
witness Casas, the municipal president of Meycauayan, testified that he held office as
such in place of the former president, Don Tomas Testa, who was kidnapped in the
month of October, 1902.
The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the second July 17, 1902,
were written in Tagalog, and contain an oath taken in the name of God, and a
covenant on the part of the subscribers to carry out the superior orders of the
Katipunan, and never disobey them until their death in the defense of the mother
country. The two accused under oath, testified to having signed the said documents
and alleged that they did not so under compulsion and force while they were held as
captives by the thieves; that the defendant Tanchinco was captured in the fields one
day when he was going to work on his farm by three armed men, unknown to him,
who asked him if he was an agent or friend of President Testa, and upon his replying
in the negative they compelled him in view of his denial to sign a document, now on
page 3 of the record.
witness Morales.
The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two documents above referred
to, signed by the accused, is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the latter or to justify the
imposition upon them f the penalty inflicted by the judgment of the curt below.
The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnapped by
brigands who belonged to the Contreras band, and that they signed the said
documents under compulsion and while in captivity, relieve them from all criminal
liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are charged. The conduct of the
defendants in presenting themselves first to the local president of Meycauayan and
subsequently to Lieut. Bonifacio Morales, of the Bulacan Government Volunteers, as
soon as they were released by the bandits is corroborative of their testimony, and is
the best demonstration of their innocence. This conclusion is not overcome by the
trifling discrepancy between the testimony of the witness Yusay and that of the
defendant Tanchinco nor the fact that Exaltacion was unable to determine the date
when he was captured or that on which he appeared before President Testa.
The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by Act No. 292 not
having been established at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of the opinion
that the judgment below must be reversed and the defendants acquitted with the costs
de oficio. The judge below will be informed of this decision and a copy of the judgment
entered herein will be furnished him for his information and guidance. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Willard, Mapa, McDonough and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact that he was EN BANC
captured at a place called Kaibiga in the township of Novaliches, and that on the day
following his release, having been unable to pay the $300 which was demanded of
G.R. No. L-6082 March 18, 1911
him, he reported to the president, Tomas Testa. The defendant Liberato Exaltacion
under oath testified that he was captured near Meycauayan by five persons, unknown,
dressed as policemen and armed with guns or revolvers; that these men bound him THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
and took him into the forest and there compelled him by threats of death to sign the vs.
document now on page 2 of the record; that thereupon they allowed him to go upon ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant.
promise to return. This defendant testified that Antero Villano and Tomas Rivera saw
him while on the road in the hands of the thieves. Both the accused testified that as
soon as they were released they presented themselves to the president, Don Tomas C.W. Ney for appellant.
Testa, in the presence of witnesses, and subsequently went to Bonifacio Morales, a Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
lieutenant of volunteers, and reported to him the fact that they had been captured.
CARSON, J.:
The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano, Dalmacio Ferrer, and Hipolito
de Leon — of whom the last two were present when Tanchinco appeared before
Senor Testa, the president of Meycauayan, and reported to him what had happened to The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal
him — all testified to the same fact and corroborated the statements of the accused and arbitrary detention" of the complaining witness for a period of three days, and
with respect to their capture and their subsequent report to President Testa and to the sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.

197
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant must be
of the lawful authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his functions as municipal reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is charged, with the
president, to make arrest of the complaining witness which resulted in his alleged costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered.
unlawful detention. As we understand the evidence, the alleged offense with which the
complaining witness in this case was charged was committed by him in the presence
Arellano, C.J., Mapa , Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.
of the municipal president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a
police officer for the making of arrest without warrant, under the doctrine laid down in
the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472). Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be reversed, unless the
evidence discloses that having made the arrest, the defendant arbitrarily and without
legal authority, as it is alleged, cause the complaining witness to be detained for a EN BANC
period of three days without having him brought before the proper judicial authority for
the investigation and trial of the charge on which he was arrested. But so far as we
G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936
can gather from the extremely meagre record in this case the arrested man was in fact
brought before a justice of the peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest. True,
three days were expended in doing, so, but it was conclusively proven at the trial that THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
at the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in vs.
the municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat. The evidence
discloses, moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first
to one and then to the other of the adjoining municipalities for trial, the failure to Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.
secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the written complaint, which Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It
does not appear why the prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on both DIAZ, J.:
occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume that in this respect the officers
in charge were controlled by local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like,
which, as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion
boats safer and more commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of perpetua and the corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit,
the two adjoining municipalities. Josefina Bandian appealed from said sentence alleging that the trial court erred:

It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not
sorry to see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and delay in the proceedings
incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this record upon which to base a finding that
his defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent detention of the prisoner
otherwise than in the due performance of his official duties; and there can be no doubt
of his lawfully authority in the premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the
trivial nature of the offense for which the arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact
that there was no judicial officer in the remote community where the incident occurred
at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the
peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence
on this point that in a particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful
violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an
arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a neighboring
municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the forces of law and order
were supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr.
Nepomuceno that she had thrown away her newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in
sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's
neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house,
apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the
place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from
the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering
and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and,
having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to
her house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought
her to her house, what happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was

198
very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin
Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested
him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the
appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of a
newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few
moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body
to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby which had just been
shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio
Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to
the appellant's house and found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her
house and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion
upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant gave birth in her
house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to
kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom
she had theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of another
man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force to his
conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her
child, when he went to her house at the time and on the date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr.
Nepomuceno whose testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary, was
contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the appellant, as will be
stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that the
appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree with
both. On the contrary, he maintains that the appellant may be guilty only of
abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the
abandonment having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in
question died. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of
the child were not caused by the hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that
usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully
or consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or
omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence,
the person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the full
enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he
may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death
in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or
imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her
affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took
place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol — she considers him
her husband as he considers her his wife — began a year ago; as he so testified at
the trial, he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning,
affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the appellant
in her womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the
birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her
pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and
Adriano Comcom that the child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to
the appellant's house after the appellant had left the place, staggering, without
strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact
she was helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far
from the truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all
these the fact that the appellant denied having made any admission to said physician
and that from the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This illness
and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the
hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she
is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to
childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event; and
the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere laborer earning only twenty-five
centavos a day — is uneducated and could supplant with what she had read or
learned from books what experience itself could teach her, undoubtedly were the
reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her
or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered
lawful or insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12,
Revised Penal Code), to take her child from the thicket where she had given it birth,
so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the
thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she
had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as
that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because
of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness
and extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by
mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such
circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting
that the appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she
later failed to take her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes
entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the alleged errors attributed to
the lower court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under such
circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in
her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had bee accused and
convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection with
this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., and Abad Santos, J., concur.
199

Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian not on the ground that she is
exempt from criminal liability but because she has committed no criminal act or
omission.
The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in question the accused Josefina
Bandian had spent a year of marital life with her lover Luis Kirol by whom she was
begotten with a child for the first time. Her said lover knew that she was pregnant and
both were waiting for the arrival of the happy day when the fruit of their love should be
born. Since she became pregnant she continuously had fever, was weak and dizzy.
On January 31, at about 7 o'clock in the morning, she went down from her house and
entered a thicket about four or five brazas away, where the residents of said place
responded to the call of nature. After some minutes the accused emerged from the
thicket staggering and apparently unable to support herself. Her neighbor Valentin
Aguilar, who saw her enter the thicket and emerged therefrom, ran to help her,
supported her and aided her in going up to her house and to bed. Asked by Aguilar
what happened to her, she merely answered that she was very dizzy. Thinking that he
alone was unable to attend to her, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived
nearby, and requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the appellant's hemorrhage.
Adriano had scarcely gone about five brazas, when he saw the body of a newborn
child near the path adjoining the thicket where the accused had been a few moments
before. Upon being informed of the discovery, Valentin Aguilar told Adriano Comcom
to bring the child into the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether or not the child
shown to her was hers, the appellant answered in the affirmative. After an autopsy
had been made of the body, it was found that the child was born alive.
Unconscious, precipitate or sudden deliveries are well known in legal medicine among
young primiparæ who, by reason of their ignorance of the symptoms of parturition and
of the process of expulsion of fetus, are not aware that they are giving birth when they
are responding to an urgent call of nature (Dr. A. Lacassagne, Precis de Medicine
Legale, pages, 799-781; Annales de Medicine Legale, December 1926, page 530;
Vibert, Manual de Medicina Legal y Toxicologia, vol. I, pages 512-514). There is no
doubt that the accused, in her feverish, weak and dizzy condition when she went into
the thicket to defecate and being a primipara with no experience in childbirth, was not
aware that upon defecating she was also expelling the child she was carrying in her
womb. Believing that she did nothing more to respond to an urgent call of nature
which brought her there, she returned home staggering for lack of strength to support
herself and for being dizzy, without suspecting that she was leaving a newborn child
behind her, and she only knew that she had given birth when she was shown the
already dead child with wounds on the body produced by the bites of pigs.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and omissions punishable by
law are felonies, which may be committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also
by means of fault (culpa); there being deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent, and fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill.
As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered and that the child had
been exposed to the rough weather and to the cruelty of animals, it cannot be held
that she deceitfully committed the crime of infanticide or that of abandonment of a
minor, because according to the above-cited legal provision there is deceit when the
act punishable by law is performed with deliberate intent. Suffering from fever and
from dizziness, the appellant under the circumstances was not aware that she had
given birth and, consequently, she could not have deliberately intended to leave her
child, of whose existence she was ignorant, to perish at the mercy of the elements and
of the animals. Neither can it be held that she faultily committed it because, as already
stated, not knowing for lack of experience in childbirth that in defecating — a perfectly
lawful physiological act, being natural — she might expel the child she carried in her
womb, she cannot be considered imprudent, a psychological defect of a person who
fails to use his reasoning power to foresee the pernicious consequences of his willful
act. Having had no knowledge of the fact of her delivery, the accused could not think
that by leaving the child in the thicket, it would die as a consequence of the rough
weather or of the cruelty of animals. Neither can she be considered negligent because
negligence is the omission to do what the law or morals obliges one to do, which
implies knowledge of the thing which is the subject matter of the compliance with the
obligation. Inasmuch as the accused was not aware of her delivery, her mind cannot
contemplate complying with her legal and moral duty to protect the life of her child.
Neither can it be held that the appellant lacked foresight because, having been
absolutely ignorant of her delivery, she could not foresee that by abandoning her child
in a thicket it would die. Neither can it be held that her act was the result of lack of skill
because she did not know that to defecate in a state of pregnancy might precipitate
her delivery, and as defecation is a natural physiological function, she could not refrain
from satisfying it.
We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting circumstance of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads: "Any person who, while performing a lawful act with
due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it,"
because although the lawful act of satisfying a natural physiological necessity
accidentally provoked the delivery, the delivery itself was not an injury, but the
exposure of the child at the mercy of the elements and of the animals which cased its
death. As the child was born alive, if the accused had been aware of her delivery and
she had deliberately abandoned the child, her accidental delivery would not exempt
her from criminal liability because then the death of said child no longer would have
been accidental. Neither can we consider the seventh exempting circumstance of
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code consisting in the failure to perform an act
required by law, when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, because this
exempting circumstance implies knowledge of the precept of the law to be complied
with but is prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, that is by some motive
which has lawfully, morally or physically prevented one to do what the law commands.
In the present case, what the law requires of the accused-appellant, with respect to
200
the child, is that she care for, protect and not abandon it. Had she been aware of her
delivery and of the existence of the child, neither her debility nor her dizziness
resulting from the fever which consumed her, being in the full enjoyment of her mental
faculties and her illness not being of such gravity as to prevent her from asking for
help, would constitute the lawful or insuperable impediment required by law. Having
been ignorant of her delivery and of the existence of the child, to her there was
subjectively no cause for the law to impose a duty for her to comply with.
The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, a twenty-
six year old former detention prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. He had been
accused of murder and then set at liberty on June 9, 1966 after posting bail. He went
to Barrio Camongo, Dumalinao where his father resided. On July 31, 1966, he
intended to go to his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but night overtook him in
the town. He decided to sleep in the Buug municipal building where there would be
more security.

Having had no knowledge of the expulsion of her fetus, the death thereof resulting Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o'clock, he witnessed an
from its exposure to the rough weather and to the cruelty of the animals cannot be extraordinary occurrence. He saw Policeman Ural (with whom he was already
imputed to the accused, because she had neither deceitfully nor faultily committed any acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the detention prisoner, Felix Napola. As a
act or omission punishable by law with regard to the child. consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the tormentor,
stepped on his prostrate body.
Imperial and Laurel, JJ., concur.
Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He poured its
contents on Napola's recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a match and left the
Republic of the Philippines
cell. Napola screamed in agony. He shouted for help. Nobody came to succor him.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the municipal
building. Before his departure, Ural cautioned him: "You better keep quiet of what I
SECOND DIVISION
have done" (sic). Alberto did not sleep anymore that night. From the municipal
building, he went to the crossing, where the cargo trucks passed. He hitchhiked in a
truck hauling iron ore and went home.

G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974 Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the thirty-year old
victim, whom she treated twice, sustained second-degree burns on the arms, neck,
left side of the face and one-half of the body including the back (Exh. A). She testified
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
that his dermis and epidermis were burned. If the burns were not properly treated,
vs.
death would unsue from toxemia and tetanus infection. "Without any medical
DOMINGO URAL, accused-appellant.
intervention", the burns would cause death", she said. She explained that, because
there was water in the burnt area, secondary infection would set in, or there would be
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. complications.
Torres and Solicitor Vicente P. Evangelista for plaintiff-appellee.
Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a certificate of death
Vicente Cerilles and Emeliano Deleverio for accused-appellant. indicating "burn" as the cause of death (Exh. B).

AQUINO, J.:p
This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of Judge Vicente G.
Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, convicting him of murder,
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Felix
Napola in the sum of twelve thousand pesos and to pay the costs (Criminal Case No.
3280).
The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which the prosecution
(represented by Fiscal Roque and the private prosecutor, Delfin Agbu) handled the
case. It bewailed the prosecution's failure to present as witnesses Juanito de la Serna
and Ernesto Ogoc, the detention prisoners who saw the burning of Napola. They had
executed a joint affidavit which was one of the bases of the information for murder.1
It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim's widow, who was present in court, was a vital
witness who should have been presented as a witness to prove the victim's dying
declaration or his statements which were part of the res gestae.2

201
In this appeal appellant's three assignment of error may be condensed into the issue
of credibility or the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
His story is that at around nine o'clock in the evening of July 31, 1966 he was in the
municipal jail on guard duty. He heard a scream for help from Napola. He entered the
cell and found Napola's shirt in flames. With the assistance of Ernesto Ogoc and
Anecio Siton, Ural removed Napola's shirt. Ural did not summon a doctor because,
according to Napola, the burns were not serious. Besides, he (Ural) was alone in the
municipal building.
Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, whom the trial court branded "as a
complete liar", testified that she heard Napola's scream for help. She saw that
Napola's shirt was burning but she did not know how it happened to be burned. She
said that Ural and Siton removed the shirt of Napola and put out the fire.
Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard by Ural at eight-
thirty in the evening of July 31st. Matugas denied that Alberio was in the municipal
building at eight o'clock.
The trial court held that Ural's denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of
Alberio. It observed that Ural's alleged act of removing Napola's burning shirt was at
most an indication that he was "belatedly alarmed by the consequence of his evil act"
but would not mean that he was not the incendiary.
Appellant Ural (he was thirty-four years old in March, 1969), in assailing the credibility
of Alberio, pointed out that he was not listed as a prosecution witness and that he was
convicted of murder.
Those circumstances would not preclude Alberio from being a credible witness. It
should be noted that the accused was a policeman. Ordinarily, a crime should be
investigated by the police. In this case, there was no police investigation. The crime
was investigated by a special counsel of the fiscal's office. That might explain why it
was not immediately discovered that Alberio was an eyewitness of the atrocity
perpetrated by Ural.
The testimonies of Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, and Policeman
Matugas are compatible with the prosecution's theory that Ural burned Napola's shirt.
Ultimately, the factual issue is: who should be given credence, Alberio or Ural? As
already stated, the trial court which had the advantage of seeing their demeanor and
behavior on the witness stand, chose to believe Alberio. This Court, after a searching
scrutiny of the whole record, does not find any justification for disbelieving Alberio.
This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides that
"criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended". The presumption is
"that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule
131, Rules of Court).
The rationale of the rule in article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que es causa de la
causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused)."Conforme a dicha doctrina no alteran la relacion de causalidad las
condiciones preexistentes (como las condiciones patologicasdel lesionado, la
predisposicion del ofendido, la constitucion fisica del herido, etc.); ni las condiciones
sobrevenidas (como el tetanos, la pulmonia, o la gangrena sobrevenidos a
consequencia de la herida)" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 12th Ed., 1968, p. 335-
336).
The similar rule in American jurisprudence is that "if the act of the accused was the
cause of the cause of death, no more is required" (40 C.J.S. 854). So, where during a
quarrel, the accused struck the victim with a lighted lamp, which broke and fell to the
floor, causing the oil to ignite and set fire to the rug, and, in the course of the scuffle,
which ensued on the floor, the victim's clothes caught fire, resulting in burns from
which he died, there was a sufficient causal relation between the death and the acts of
the accused to warrant a conviction of homicide (Williams vs. U.S., 20 Fed. 2nd 269,
40 C.J.S. 854, note 90).
There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon another person,
which result in the death of the latter, is guilty of the crime of homicide, and the fact
that the injured person did not receive proper medical attendance does not affect the
criminal responsibility" (U.S. vs. Escalona, 12 Phil. 54). In the Escalona case, the
victim was wounded on the wrist. It would not have caused death had it been properly
treated. The victim died sixty days after the infliction of the wound. It was held that lack
of medical care could not be attributed to the wounded man. The person who inflicted
the wound was responsible for the result thereof.
The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio) (Par. 3,
Art. 248, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Masin, 64 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil.
418, 432, 440).3
The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position
(Par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code). He could not have maltreated Napola if he was
not a policeman on guard duty. Because of his position, he had access to the cell
where Napola was confined. The prisoner was under his custody. "The policeman,
who taking advantage of his public position maltreats a private citizen, merits no
judicial leniency. The methods sanctioned by medieval practice are surely not
appropriate for an enlightened democratic civilization. While the law protects the police
officer in the proper discharge of his duties, it must at the same time just as effectively
protect the individual from the abuse of the police." U.S. vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352).
But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the offender
had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" (Par. 3, Art. 13,
Revised Penal Code). It is manifest from the proven facts that appellant Ural had no
202
intent to kill Napola. His design was only to maltreat him may be because in his Separate Opinions
drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention cell.
When Ural realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola
BARREDO, J., concurring:
to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary.

Except for the unnecessary reference to the supposed statement of the deceased to
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating,
his wife and the joint affidavit of Ogoc and De la Serna, all of which were not properly
circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial court properly imposed the
presented in evidence, hence it is preferable not to mention them in order to avoid any
penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for murder
suspicion that our judgment has been influenced by factors other than evidence duly
(Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
presented in court, I concur.

Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against
Fernando, J., concurs.
the appellant.

Footnotes
So ordered.

1 Republic of the Philippines ...

Zaldivar (Chairman) and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

Province of Zamboanga del Sur ...)

Antonio, J., took no part.

Municipality of Pagadian

JOINT-AFFIDAVIT

WE, ERNESTO OGOC married, and JUANITO DE LA CERNA,

single, both of legal age, farmers, residents of Lakewood,
Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur and at Buug Zamboanga del Sur,
Separate Opinions respectively, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with
law hereby depose and say:

That both of us were confined inside the municipal jail of Buug

BARREDO, J., concurring:
Except for the unnecessary reference to the supposed statement of the deceased to
his wife and the joint affidavit of Ogoc and De la Serna, all of which were not properly
presented in evidence, hence it is preferable not to mention them in order to avoid any
suspicion that our judgment has been influenced by factors other than evidence duly
presented in court, I concur.
Fernando, J., concurs.
Zamboanga del Sur on July 31, 1966 for offenses allegedly
committed by us and on same date our companions inside the
said jail were Anisio Siton and Felix Napola, the latter being
confined for being drunk;
That at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less on July 31,
1966, our policeman guard by the name of Domingo Ural entered
the jail and called for Felix Napola. He called for him and told him
that Felix Napola is aggressive. When Felix Napola went near
Domingo Ural, the latter boxed him at his lower chin and he fell to
the cement floor of the jail. He kicked him also at the same spot
after Felix Napola fell to the floor. Because Felix Napola cannot
stand anymore, Domingo Ural got a bottle and poured the
contents of said bottle to the dress of Felix Napola. Domingo Ural
lighted a match and burned the spot where the substance in the
bottle was poured in the dress of Felix Napola. The dress of Felix

203
Napola got burned and Felix Napola got burned. He was forced to
stand up and asked mercy from Domingo Ural. Instead Domingo
Ural locked the jail and went out and Domingo Ural threatened us
not to talk about the burning of Felix Napola to anybody or else he
will burn us also.

When Felix Napola was already suffering much from the burns he
sustained, Ural became frightened and he and Anisio Siton
helped put out the fire.

Affiants further sayeth none.

(SGD.) Ernesto Ogoc (SGD.) Juanito de la Cerna

ERNESTO OGOC JUANITO DE LA CERNA

(Affiant) (Affiant)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of

September, 1966 here at Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur.

(
S
G
D
.
)

B
a
2 Mrs. Napola (Mapola) testified at the preliminary investigations
conducted by Basilio T. Roque, a special counsel, that shei
learned from a neighbor that her husband suffered burns in thel
municipal jail in the evening of July 31, 1966. Her husband toldi
her that Policeman Ural had burned him. Ural allowed her to bringo
Napola to the dispensary where he was treated. Because of the
injuries on his mouth and his swollen gums, he could not eat andT
move his head. He was confined in jail due to drunkenness. He.
was burned from the waist up to the neck and on the back and
right arm. She reported the case to the mayor. That functionaryR
said that he would not take any hand in the case. Mrs. Napolao
was cross-examined by Ural's counsel. q
u
e
At the same preliminary investigation the witnesses, Ernesto
Ogoc and Juanita de la Serna, testified and were cross-examined

204
by Ural's counsel. The accused presented evidence at the
preliminary investigation.
3 "Un sujeto, despues de cohabitar con una prostituta, encendio
un mixto que aplico a uno de los latones de petroleo que habia
proximos a la cama en que yacieron, inflamandose el contenido
de aquel y cayendo el liquido sobre la prostituta, que fallecio a
consequencia de las quemaduras.
El Tribunal Supreme declara:
Que segun el articulo 418 del Codigo penal, es reo de asesinato
el que por medio de incendio mata a persona que no le este
ligada por alguno de los vinculos familiares senalados en el art.
417, entendiendose empleado el incendio en este concepto
juridico cuando se mata o intenta matar por medio de fuego
aplicado directa o immediamente sobre la persona objeto de la
accion criminal, siempreque lo sea con riesgo de propagacion a
cosas distintas, en cualquiera de las condiciones previstas en el
capitulo 7, titulo 13 del libro 2. del Codigo penal; cuyo medio de
ejecucion de aquel delito, principal en la intencion del culpable
estima la ley con el grave caracter que atribuye tambien a la
inundacion y al empleo del veneno, no solo por los peligros que
implica, sino igualmente por la notoria malicia, semejante a la
alevosia, que revela la accion que para su exito no se detiene
ante el respeto de otros derechos que pone en inminente riesgo o
quebranta y lesion a impulso de decidia resolucion.
Que todas estas consideraciones aparecen manifiestas en el acto
ejecutado por el procesado, puesto que voluntariamente empleo
el petroleo inflamado para lesionar a la interfecta, poniendo el
fuego, que por su natural poder se propago al local en que se
cometio el delito, al servicio de su proposito punible;
constituyendo por esto el incendio, elemento integrante del delito
de asesinato, ... (Sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de 1887, 11
Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, 175).
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 144734 March 7, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DENNIS DUNGCA MANALO, FREDDIE DUNGCA, MICHAEL DUNGCA, and
BENJAMIN CRUZ, JR., accused,
FREDDIE DUNGCA, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
For the horrible demise of Rodrigo Malonzo, four individuals, namely, Dennis Dungca
Manalo, Freddie Dungca, Michael Dungca, and Benjamin Cruz, Jr., were charged with
murder in an information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of August 1997, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually aiding
and abetting one another, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of their superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the person of RODRIGO
MALONZO y PANGILINAN by stabbing him several times on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and fatal injuries which
caused his death.1
Of the four accused, the first to be apprehended was Dennis Dungca Manalo, who
pleaded guilty to the lesser crime of homicide during the pre-trial conference. Taking
into consideration such voluntary plea of guilty and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the trial court, in its decision2 dated 17 June 1999, sentenced him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight years and one day of prision
mayor as minimum to thirteen years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the
victim’s heirs in the amount of P50,000 as death indemnity.
205
The next to be arrested was accused Benjamin Cruz, Jr., alias "Pogi." After trial, he
was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice to the crime of murder in
the trial court’s decision3 dated 22 September 1999. He was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from twelve years of prision mayor as minimum to
seventeen years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the victim’s
heirs P47,000 as actual damages and P50,000 as moral damages; he was further
held subsidiarily liable for the P50,000 death indemnity adjudged against Dennis.
Subsequently, herein accused-appellant Freddie Dungca (hereafter FREDDIE) was
arrested. Michael Dungca, however, has remained at large.1âwphi1.nêt
At the separate trial of the case against FREDDIE, the prosecution adopted the
testimonies of the eyewitness Rolando Bengco (hereafter ROLANDO), the victim’s
wife Evangeline Malonzo, and the investigating police SPO3 Delfin Moyco, which were
presented during the trial against Benjamin. The victim’s brother Ramon Malonzo was
also presented as an additional witness.
Culled from their testimonies, it was established that at about 9:00 p.m. of 10 August
1997, while ROLANDO was on his way home after buying barbecue at the corner of
Pampang Road and P. Zamora St. in Angeles City, he saw accused Dennis Dungca
and the victim Rodrigo Malonzo having an altercation, with the latter demanding
payment for the bicycle allegedly stolen by the former. In the next instant, he heard
Rodrigo shout "Bili yu ko!" (Release me!"). Upon glancing back, ROLANDO caught
sight of FREDDIE holding Rodrigo’s right hand and Michael, the left. Dennis pulled out
a knife and repeatedly stabbed Rodrigo on his chest, while Benjamin, who was behind
the victim, was pushing the victim towards Dennis. ROLANDO forthwith ran away and
looked for the victim’s brother Ramon. Upon finding the latter, he broke the bad news
to him. On their way to the crime scene, he revealed to Ramon the authors of the
crime as Dennis, Michael, FREDDIE and Benjamin. Upon arriving at the crime scene,
they saw Rodrigo lying down on the ground, bathed in a pool of his own blood.4
Later, SPO3 Moyco arrived in a mobile patrol. He, together with ROLANDO and
Ramon, then rushed the victim to the hospital. On the way, Rodrigo told his brother
Ramon that Dennis, FREDDIE, and Benjamin were the ones who attacked him. Not
long after, Ramon drew his last breath and was pronounced dead upon arrival at the
hospital.5The post-mortem examination on the victim’s cadaver disclosed that the
cause of his death was "massive and traumatic hemorrhage due to multiple stab
wounds," the most serious of which were those in the heart and lungs.6
The victim’s wife testified that she had been suffering sleepless nights since the death
of her husband,7 and she spent P3,500 for the flowers;8 P17,900 for the funeral
services;9 and P25,600 for the memorial lot.10
As might be expected, FREDDIE proffered a different version. He claimed that in the
morning of 10 August 1997, while he was having a drinking spree with Benjamin and
their two friends along P. Zamora St., Angeles City, he saw and heard Dennis and
Rodrigo cursing each other. While Rodrigo’s hands were tucked inside the front
pockets of his pants, Dennis stabbed him. FREDDIE summoned Dennis to ask why he
was doing it. Unmindful of his call, Dennis continued stabbing Rodrigo. After his last
thrust on the victim, Dennis fled and the people nearby scampered away. FREDDIE
was the only one left. When this incident was unfolding, ROLANDO and Michael
Dungca were nowhere in sight.11
After a while, the victim’s brother Ramon arrived and brought the victim to the hospital.
FREDDIE then went to his hometown, Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga. Learning that he
was being hunted by the victim’s relatives, he decided not to return to Angeles City
anymore.12
FREDDIE’s testimony was corroborated by Edgar Datu. Specifically, he testified that
he saw FREDDIE among the people standing near the store watching while the
unfortunate event was unfolding before their eyes.13
In its decision14 dated 24 March 2000, the trial court ruled that conspiracy could be
deduced from the acts of the three assailants, with two of the accused holding the
arms of the victim and the third, thrusting a knife into the victim’s chest. Thus, it held
FREDDIE equally liable as the two other assailants and appreciated against him the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. It then convicted him of murder
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of
the victim P47,000 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; and P50,000 as
death indemnity to be paid by him and Dennis jointly and severally. Hence, this
appeal.
In his Brief, accused-appellant FREDDIE imputes to the trial court the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BLINDLY BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY
OF ROLANDO BENGCO NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT HE WAS
NOT PRESENT AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME AND THE PRESENCE
OF EVIDENCE SHOWING THE BIAS CHARACTER OF HIS TESTIMONY
IN THE LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED SHOWING THE
CONTRARY.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CRIME AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOU[B]T.
III
206
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT IMPUTING MOTIVE ON THE PART
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS ROLANDO BENGCO AGAINST
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO SATISFY HIS LUST FOR VENGEANCE.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.15
On the other hand, the OSG asseverates that these errors are aimed at assailing the
findings of facts of the trial court, particularly the full faith and credence it attached to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Since the trial court was in a better
position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and absent certain facts of
substance which have been overlooked that might affect the result of the case, there
is no cogent reason to rule differently on the issue of credibility. It then prays that the
trial court’s decision be affirmed in toto, since the prosecution was able to establish
appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We find the appeal to be bereft of merit.
Time and again we have ruled that the findings of facts of the trial court, especially on
the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great respect and even finality.
This is so because the trial court has the peculiar advantage to observe the witnesses
firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination; it
is, therefore, in the best position to assess their credibility. 16 Nevertheless, we shall
address the issues raised by the appellant.
In his Brief, FREDDIE claims that ROLANDO was nowhere to be found in the area
when the stabbing incident occurred. In support of this claim, he harps on the
testimony of prosecution witness SPO3 Moyco that he saw ROLANDO for the first
time only when he went back to the crime scene to investigate. According to him,
Moyco’s testimony is devoid of any statement that ROLANDO was present at the
crime scene from the time of the incident up to the time the victim was brought to the
hospital.
We are not convinced. Apropos is the testimony of SPO3 Moyco:
ATTY. Pamintuan: (to witness)
Q So you saw for the first time Rolando Bengco at the scene of the
incident?
A Hindi ko po alam noon na nandoon si Bengco. Ng malaman ko noong
mag-imbistiga ako, sir, kasi inuna ko muna ang victim para madala sa
hospital para ma-save ang life niya.
Q After you have gone from the hospital you went back to the scene of
the incident or to your station?
A No, sir, sa lugar ng pinangyarihan. At the scene nag-conduct ako ng
imbestigasyon.
Q That is where you met Rolando Bengco?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you meet Rolando Bengco?
A Nakita ko po sa lugar ng pinangyarihan. Dahil napagtanungan ko
iyong ibang tao doon sabi nila si Roland Bengco daw po ang naka[k]ita sa
pagsaksak sa victim ni Dennis.
Q Who told you that?
A Iyong mga istambay doon, sir.17
Certainly, SPO3 Moyco was not in a position to testify that ROLANDO was present at
the crime scene when the crime was being committed because, in the first place,
Moyco came to the scene only after the stabbing incident occurred. That Moyco did
not notice the presence of ROLANDO when he brought the victim to the hospital is
understandable. His dominant concern then was to save the life of the victim. He was
too preoccupied to notice or recognize the persons present in the area. It was only
when he was informed by the bystanders that ROLANDO had witnessed the
commission of the crime that he paid particular attention to ROLANDO.
Appellant next attempts to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses by
inviting our attention to the following alleged inconsistencies in their testimonies:
(1) At first, ROLANDO stated that both of the victim’s hands were held
behind his back while he was being stabbed, but later he demonstrated that
both of victim’s hands were stretched sideways as if crucified.
(2) ROLANDO and Ramon testified that the former was the one who
reported the incident to the latter. Evangeline, on the other hand, testified
that it was their neighbor Manuel de la Cruz who informed her of the
incident; her children, brother-in-law Ramon, and mother-in-law were with
her at the time this information was relayed to her.
207
 (3) SPO3 Moyco and ROLANDO said that the police car broke down and
that they transferred the victim to another vehicle, while Ramon stated that
he and the police brought the victim direct to the hospital.
These inconsistencies pertain merely to minor details. In a plethora of cases, it has
been held that discrepancies and inconsistencies on trivial matters neither impair the
integrity of the prosecution’s evidence as a whole nor reflect on the witness’ honesty.
Such inconsistencies, which might have been caused by the natural fickleness of
memory, even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken the credibility of the witness, for
they shake off the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. 18
In another effort to plant some seeds of doubt on the credibility of the eyewitness
ROLANDO, appellant points out the failure of the former to name the police who took
down his statements. Again, this matter is too trivial to affect the credibility of
ROLANDO. It does not detract from the established fact that he witnessed the
commission of the crime and positively identified appellant as one of the perpetrators
thereof.
Lastly, FREDDIE asserts that improper motive existed on the part of ROLANDO that
taints his testimony. He admitted that on 24 December 1993, he mauled and beat
ROLANDO with a 2" x 2" piece of wood, which rendered the latter unconscious and
caused him serious injuries for which he almost died. 19 To satisfy his lust for
vengeance, ROLANDO seized this chance to strike back at him by implicating
appellant in the killing of Rodrigo.
We are not convinced. Worthy to note is the testimony of ROLANDO that he did not
know who was responsible for his injuries because he was very drunk at the time; he
did not even come to know who brought him to the hospital. None of his drinking
companions told him about the incident, for they had no knowledge either.20
In refutation of such claim of ROLANDO, appellant argues that considering the
seriousness of the injuries ROLANDO sustained, it would be contrary to the natural
course of human behavior for him to be disinterested to know how it happened, who
were responsible, and who brought him to the hospital; yet in the incident subject of
this case, "he took all the trouble to locate the brother of Rodrigo Malonzo to tell him of
what happened to Rodrigo and even went to the extent of helping in bringing the
victim to the hospital and offered to testify for the prosecution."
Contrary to appellant’s claim, such acts of ROLANDO cannot be taken as a way of
extracting revenge. Instead, he must be commended for helping in bringing the victim
to the hospital and in bringing the culprits to the bar of justice. That he did not know
who were responsible for the injuries he sustained in that previous incident is
confirmed by the fact, as admitted by appellant, 21 that he did not file a complaint
against his assailants. Had he known his attackers, the best balm that could assuage
what he suffered would have been to see them behind bars for the crime committed
against him, and not just to implicate them in a crime committed against another.
We see no shred of doubt that ROLANDO had witnessed how the accused snuffed
out the life of Rodrigo and how appellant participated therein. Moreover, as correctly
held by the trial court, the absence of defensive wounds on the victim’s arms bolsters
the testimony of ROLANDO that the victim was held immobile by the appellant and his
co-accused while the victim was being stabbed; it also belies appellant’s allegation
that the victim tried to ward off the blows.
Indeed, the act of the appellant of holding the victim’s right hand while the victim was
being stabbed by Dennis shows that he concurred in the criminal design of the actual
killer. If such act were separate from the stabbing, appellant’s natural reaction should
have been to immediately let go of the victim and flee as soon as the first stab was
inflicted.22 But appellant continued to restrain the deceased until Dennis completed his
attack.
Conspiracy was evident from the acts of the four accused, with two of them seizing the
victim’s arms and holding him immobile, one holding his back, and another thrusting a
knife on the victim. These acts indubitably point to a joint purpose, concerted action,
and community of interest.23 Having joined in the criminal conspiracy, appellant in
effect adopted as his own the criminal design of his co-conspirators.24 Hence, as a co-
conspirator whose participation emboldened the actual killer and contributed to the
success of the common design, appellant is liable as a co-principal in the killing of
Rodrigo.25
Aside from ROLANDO’s positive identification of FREDDIE as one of the culprits, the
dying declaration of the victim pointing to him (FREDDIE) as one of the assailants
affirms appellant’s complicity in the crime. Doubtless, that declaration satisfies all the
requisites for it to be admissible, to wit, (1) it refers to the cause and circumstances
surrounding the declarant’s death; (2) it was made under the consciousness of an
impending death; (3) it was made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestion
of improper influence; (4) it was offered in a criminal case in which the death of the
declarant is the subject of the inquiry; and (5) the declarant must have been
competent to testify as a witness had he been called upon to testify. 26
We agree with the trial court in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. It was established that FREDDIE and Michael were holding the
hands of the victim behind his back and Benjamin was pushing him toward Dennis as
the latter was successively thrusting the knife at the victim. This clearly shows that the
four accused deliberately took advantage of their number and combined strength to
consummate the crime; they used excessive force out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the deceased, who was then alone and unarmed. 27 The latter
was certainly no match to the four accused. Hence, with the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the killing is elevated to murder. 28
Now on the civil liability of the accused-appellant.
Under the Revised Penal Code, if there are two or more persons civilly liable for a
felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond. 29 This
208
notwithstanding, the principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their
respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their
quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable. 30
As earlier stated, Dennis Dungca Manalo, who was held guilty as principal in the killing
of Rodrigo Malonzo, was sentenced to pay the victim’s heirs P50,000 as death
indemnity. No actual or moral damages were adjudged against him for lack of proof
thereof. In a separate decision, Benjamin Cruz, Jr., who was found guilty as an
accomplice, was held subsidiarily liable for the death indemnity imposed on Dennis
and was further ordered to pay P47,000 as actual damages and P50,000 as moral
damages.
Conformably with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, herein accused-
appellant, as principal in the crime of murder, should be declared solidarily liable for
the death indemnity of P50,000 awarded to the victim’s heirs, as well as for the actual
and moral damages adjudged against Benjamin.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City,
Branch 59, in Criminal Case No. 97-590, finding accused-appellant FREDDIE
DUNGCA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the victim’s heirs P47,000 as actual
damages and P50,000 as moral damages, and to pay solidarily with Dennis
Dungca P50,000 as death indemnity is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
his liability for the actual and moral damages is solidary with Benjamin Cruz, Jr.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12883 November 26, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CLEMENTE AMPAR, defendant-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Magbaboy, municipality of San Carlos,
Province of Occidental Negros. Roast pig was being served. The accused Clemente
Ampar, a man of three score and ten, proceeded to the kitchen and asked Modesto
Patobo for some of the delicacy. Patobo's answer was; "There is no more. Come here
and I will make roast pig of you." The effect of this on the accused as explained by him
in his confession was, "Why was he doing like that, I am not a child." With this as the
provocation, a little later while the said Modesto Patobo was squatting down, the
accused came up behind him and struck him on the head with an ax, causing death
the following day.
As the case turns entirely on the credibility of witnesses, we should of course not
interfere with the findings of the trial court. In ascertaining the penalty, the court,
naturally, took into consideration the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. The court,
however, gave the accused the benefit of a mitigating circumstance which on cursory
examination would not appear to be justified. This mitigating circumstance was that
the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one
committing the felony.
The authorities give us little assistance in arriving at a conclusion as to whether this
circumstance was rightly applied. That there was immediate vindication of whatever
one may term the remarks of Patobo to the accused is admitted. Whether these
remarks can properly be classed as "a grave offense" is more uncertain. The Supreme
court of Spain has held the words "gato que arañaba a todo el mundo," "landrones,"
and "era tonto, como toda su familia" as not sufficient to justify a finding of this
mitigating circumstance. (Decisions of January 4, 1876; May 17, 1877; May 13, 1886.)
But the same court has held the words "tan landron eres tu como tu padre" to be a
grave offense. (Decision of October 22, 1894.) We consider that these authorities
hardly put the facts of the present case in the proper light. The offense which the
defendant was endeavoring to vindicate would to the average person be considered
as a mere trifle. But to this defendant, an old man, it evidently was a serious matter to
be made the butt of a joke in the presence of so many guests. Hence, it is believed
that the lower court very properly gave defendant the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance, and correctly sentenced him to the minimum degree of the penalty
provided for the crime of murder. lawph!1.net
Judgment of the trial court sentencing the defendant and appellant to seventeen years
four months and one day of cadena temporal, with the accessory penalties provided
by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Modesto Patobo, in the amount of one
thousand pesos, and to pay the costs is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. So ordered.

Filemon A. Cosio for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

209
Arellano, C.J., Torres, and Araullo, JJ., concur. Herein appellant was charged with the aforementioned crime in an Information which
Johnson, J., concurs in the result. reads as follows:
Street, J., did not sign.
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at night time,
purposely sought to insure and better accomplish his criminal
design, in the City of Manila. Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together with five (5) others whose
true names, real Identities, and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, evident
Separate Opinions
premeditation, and treachery, attack, assault. and use personal
violence upon one DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y SABAYAN, by then
and there mauling him and hitting him with a baseball bat at the
back of the head, a vital part of the body, thereby inflicting upon
the said DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y SABAYAN a club wound on the
head which was the direct and immediate cause of his death.
CARSON, J., concurring:

Contrary to law. (Original Records of Criminal Case No, 85-

I concur. I think, however, that the extenuating circumstances attending the 40579, p. 1)
commission of the crime fall under the provisions of section 7 of the Penal Code rather
than under the provisions of section 5 of that Code as indicated in the opinion.
He was likewise charged with the crime of Frustrated Homicide in an Information
which reads as follows:
SUPREME COURT
Manila
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at night time,
purposely sought to insure and better accomplish his criminal
SECOND DIVISION
design, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together with five (5) others whose
true names, real identities, and present whereabouts are still
unknown, and helping one another, with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
G.R. No. 96444 June 23, 1992 personal violence upon one RENATO PEREZ Y RUIDERA, by
mauling and hitting him with a baseball bat at the back, a vital part
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, of the body, thereby inflicting upon him a club wound at the back
vs. which is necessarily mortal and fatal, thus performing all the acts
LEANDRO PAJARES y FLORENTINO, accused-appellant. of execution which would have produced the crime of homicide,
as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, because
of the timely and able medical attendance rendered upon the said
RENATO PEREZ RUIDERA which prevented his death.
PARAS, J.:
Contrary to law (Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40580,
This is an appeal from the decision * of the Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch VIII, p. 1)
Manila dated October 25, 1990 in Criminal Case No. 85-40579 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Leandro Pajares y Florentino" convicting herein appellant Pajares of the Appellant Pajares pleaded not guilty to both charges (Original Records of Criminal
crime of Murder. Case No. 85-40579, p. 5; Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40580, p. 8).
Upon the petition of herein appellant that the two (2) cases be consolidated, a joint
trial ensued.

210
The prosecution presented Renato R. Perez, Cpl. Benigno Dong, Salud Manguba,
Pat. Conrado Bustillos, Dr. Norman Torres, Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, Rosita Viojan
and Arlene Viojan as witnesses while only appellant Leandro Pajares took the witness
stand for the defense.
Renato R. Perez, a resident of 1386-K Burgos St., Paco, Manila, is the same Renato
Perez who is the victim in Criminal Case No. 85-40580 for Frustrated Homicide. He
testified that at about 11:30 p.m. on October 11, 1985, he and the deceased Diosdado
Viojan were on their way to a store located at Gomez St., Paco, Manila to buy
something. They were walking abreast with each other, the deceased was at his right
side and was a bit ahead of him, when appellant Pajares suddenly appeared from
behind and hit Viojan with a baseball bat at the back of his head. The latter ran a short
distance and fell down near the store of one Alex Blas. When Perez tried to help
Viojan. he, too, was attacked by Pajares with the baseball bat hitting him at the back
below the left shoulder. He then grappled with the appellant for the possession of the
baseball bat but the latter's companions, namely: Rudy Dokling, Popoy, Inggo and
Lauro Duado mauled him until he lost consciousness. He was brought to the
Philippine General Hospital by Eugene Panibit and Joselito Perez where he was
treated for the injuries he sustained (TSN, Hearing of January 7, 1986, pp. 4-23). He
identified in court the baseball bat used by Pajares (TSN, Hearing of September 16,
1986, p. 36).
On cross examination, he averred that he has known appellant Pajares for less than a
year and that although they both live in Zone 89, he and the deceased belonged to a
group which is an adversary of the group of the accused (Ibid., pp. 39-41).
Cpl. Benigno Dong, of the Zamora Police Department Station No. 6, WPD, testified
that he was on duty on October 12, 1985 when one Napoleon Gabawa sought their
assistance regarding a killing incident that happened in Gomez Street, Paco, Manila.
They went to the house of appellant Leandro Pajares at 1453 Gomez St., Paco,
Manila and invited the latter and his brother to the station for questioning regarding the
aforementioned incident. Pajares verbally admitted his participation in the incident
(TSN, Hearing of March 11, 1986, p. 26). The incident was registered in the Police
Blotter Entry (Exhibits "A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579.
pp. 30-33)
On cross examination, he admitted that he placed appellant Pajares under arrest after
he verbally admitted that he was responsible for the death of Diosdado Viojan, but the
booking sheet and arrest report has not been accomplished yet (TSN, Hearing of
March 11, 1986, p 27).
Salud Manguba, Forensic Chemist of the National, Bureau of Investigation, testified
that she examined a baseball bat for the presence of blood upon the written request of
Pat. Conrado Bustillos (Exhibit "C-1", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-
40579, p. 69). In connection with the study she made, she submitted Biology Report
No. B-85-1342 (Exhibit "C". Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 68)
that shows the absence of blood on the baseball bat (TSN, Hearing of June 23, 1986,
pp. 30-32).
Pat. Conrado G. Bustillos, testified that relative to a telephone call he received from
the Philippine General Hospital on October 12 1985 he went to the morgue of the said
hospital to investigate a dead on arrival case of one Diosdado Viojan. A close
examination of the body of the latter showed that he suffered a fracture at the back of
the skull. Thereafter, he proceeded to the scene of the crime to make an ocular
inspection where he was informed that there was another victim by the name Renato
Perez. Pat. Bustillos further testified that Renato Perez was investigated at the
Homicide Section and that the latter executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "F" Original
Records of Criminal Case No, 85-40579, p 208) in relation to the incident. In the same
manner, Roberto Pajares. brother of herein appellant was also investigated and who
also executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "G", Ibid., p. 219) The alleged murder
weapon, a baseball bat, was turned over to him by Cpl. Ben Macalindog (TSN,
November 18, 1986, p. 46).
Dr. Norman Torres, a resident physician at the Philippine General Hospital, testified
that on October 12, 1985, a certain Diosdado Viojan was brought to the emergency
room of the Philippine General Hospital for head injury, left occipital region. The victim
was in critical condition necessitating immediate surgery. He did not personally attend
the operation but learned that the victim died while undergoing the surgery. Witness
further averred that the injury could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a
baseball bat (TSN, Hearing of December 2, 1986, p. 46).
Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation,
testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Diosdado Viojan and in
connection therewith submitted Autopsy Report No. N-85-2161 (Exhibit "L", Original
Records on Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 224) indicating that the cause of death
was "Hemorrhage, meningeal, severe, traumatic". He further testified that a single
forceful blow against the head using a blunt instrument like a baseball bat could have
caused the injury (TSN, Hearing of June 15, 1987, pp. 58-60).
Rosita S. Viojan, mother of the deceased Diosdado Viojan, testified that when her son
died, she hired the services of Tree Amigos Funeral Parlor for P12,000.00 as
evidenced by Official Receipt No. 10511 (Exhibits "P" and "Q", Original Records of
Criminal Case No. 85-40579, pp. 228-229) (TSN, Hearing of February 23. 1988, p.
66).
Arlene Viojan, widow of Diosdado Viojan. testified that prior to the incident her
husband was working with PEMCO earning about P500.00 a week. At the time of the
incident, she was three (3) months on the family way. She gave birth to a baby girl and
it was her parents-in-law who paid for the expenses during her delivery. At the
moment, she is living with her parents (TSN, Hearing of April 4, 1988, p. 67).
Appellant Leandro Pajares y Florentino denied the allegations of the prosecution. He
asserts that he knew the deceased Diosdado Viojan by the name Dado, having met
him once at the store, and Renato Perez by the name Balat. At the time of the
incident, he was inside the store of Alex Blas with about eight (8) other People
watching television. Hence, he did not see who hit Diosdado Viojan and Renato
Perez. After the commotion, upon the advise of Alex Blas, he went home and slept. At
211
about 3:30 in the morning of October 12, 1985, he was arrested inside their house.
Without asking any question, he went with the arresting officers to the police station
(TSN, Hearing of August 1, 1988, pp. 72-76).
At the police detachment, he was coerced to admit his participation in the crime since
a gun was poked at him. He identified his signature at the Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report (Exhibit "J", Original Records of Criminal Case No 85-40579, p. 222) but
alleged that he signed the same without being allowed to read the contents thereof
without the assistance of counsel and while being held at the collar at the back of his
shirt. He likewise averred that during investigation the investigating policemen
molested him like "pinipitik-pitik" his ears with rubber band or chopping his neck with
karate chops (Ibid., pp. .77-78). He, however, admitted that even after several days he
did not complain about what were done to him (Ibid., p. 128).
On cross examination, he testified that his house is about five (5) houses away from
the store of Alex Blas, the scene of the crime (TSN, Hearing of August 22, 1983, pp.
90-91). He likewise denied any knowledge about any quarrel between his brother,
Roberto Pajares and the deceased Diosdado Viojan (TSN, Hearing of September 19,
1988, p. 108).
As aforementioned, the trial court rendered a decision on October 25, 1990, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
is hereby rendered finding herein accused LEANDRO PAJARES
y FLORENTINO of 1433-B, Gomez St., Paco, Manila, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the charges against him, as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40579:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder as defined and penalized by Art. 248, par, 1, Rev.
Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstance to
consider, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment
of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the accessory penalties of the
law; to pay Arlene Viojan and her child the sum of: P30,000,00;
P12,000.00 as funeral expenses; P15,000.00 as moral damages;
and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees; and
finally the costs of the suit.
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40580:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Slight Physical Injuries as defined in par. 1, Art. 266 and
penalized by Art. 27, both of the Rev. Penal Code, hereby
sentencing him to an imprisonment of ONE (1) MONTH; and to
pay the cost of suit.
Done in Manila, this 25th day of October, 1990.
SO ORDERED. (RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 38)
Hence this appeal.
Appellant Pajares asserts that the trial court gravely erred in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua upon him. He avers that such a penalty is tantamount to a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment which is prohibited by the Constitution. Appellant
points out that hours before the clubbing incident, Roberto Pajares, appellant's
younger brother, was mauled by the group of Diosdado Viojan as cited by the lower
court referring to the entry in the Police Blotter and the sworn statement of Roberto
Pajares. The mauling of the latter is a big insult and truly offending to the appellant
and his family. Hence, the clubbing of Diosdado Viojan by herein appellant was a
vindication of the grave offense committed against his family. a mitigating
circumstance under paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering
further that the appellant was just nineteen (19) years old at the time he committed the
offense the penalty imposed by the court a quo should have been seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day (Brief for the Appellant, Rollo, pp. 52-58).
The appeal is devoid of merit.
In convicting herein appellant of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery, the trial
court relied heavily on the testimony of prosecution witness Renato Perez which it
found to be credible. According to the lower court, the latter "gave his account on what
was done to them by the accused and his companions in a simple, candid,
straightforward manner" (RTC Decision. Rollo, p. 36).
It is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the testimony of witnesses by the trial
court is received on appeal with the highest respect because it is the trial court that
has the opportunity to observe them on the stand and detect if they are telling the truth
or lying in their teeth (People v. Santito, Jr., G.R. No. 91628, August 22, 1991 [201
SCRA 87]). The appellate court can only read in cold print the testimony of the
witnesses which commonly is translated from the local dialect into English. In the
process of converting into written form the statement of living human beings, not only
fine nuances but a world of meaning apparent to the judge present, watching and
listening, may escape the reader of the written translated words (People v. Arroyo,
G.R. No. 99258, September 13, 1991 [201 SCRA 616]).
Appellant's sole defense is alibi. According to him, he was inside the store of Alex
Blas, watching television, when the incident occurred, Alex Blas even advised him to
go home so as not to be involved in the incident. However, the latter was not
presented to corroborate appellant's testimony. Alibi is the weakest defense an
212
accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it must be so convincing as to preclude any
doubt that the accused could have been physically present at the place of the crime or
its vicinity at the time of the commission (People v. Lacao, Sr., G.R. No. 94320,
September 4. 1991 (201 SCRA 317]). In the case at bar, appellant was within the
vicinity of the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Furthermore, appellant was Positively identified by Renato Perez as the perpetrator of
the crime. In the face of the clear and positive testimony of the prosecution witness
regarding the participation of the accused in the crime, the accused's alibi dwindles
into nothingness. The Positive identification of the accused by the witness as the
perpetrator of the crime cannot be overcome by the mere denial of the accused. Such
positive identification of the accused that he killed the victim establishes the guilt of the
accused beyond moral certainty (People v Arroyo, supra).
The trial court correctly ruled that the crime was attended by treachery. There is
treachery, the law says, when the offender adopts means, methods or forms in the
execution of the felony which ensure its commission without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make (People v. Cuyo, G.R. No.
76211, April 30, 1991 [196 SCRA 447]). As found by the trial court, appellant Pajares
hit Diosdado Viojan with a baseball bat from behind without any warning thereby
precluding any possible retaliation from the victim.
Having established the guilt of herein appellant. the next question is whether or not the
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense can be
appreciated in his favor. While it may be true that appellant's brother Roberto Pajares
was mauled by the companions of the deceased at about 11:30 a.m. of October 11,
1985 as show in the entry in the Police Blotter (Exhibits "A" to "A-3", Original Records
of Criminal Case No. 85-40579. pp. 30-33) and by appellant's brother himself (Exhibits
"G", "Q" and "A" Nos. 7-9, Ibid., p. 219), it must be emphasized that there is a lapse of
about ten (10) hours between said incident and the killing of Diosdado Viojan. Such
interval of time was more than sufficient to enable appellant to recover his serenity
(People v. Benito, G.R. No. L-32042, December 17, 1976 [74 SCRA 271]). Hence, the
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be
appreciated in his favor.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with
modification that the indemnity is increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with the
policy of this Court on the matter.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 4971 September 23, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
AUGUSTUS HICKS, defendant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.
Jose Robles Lahesa for defendant.
TORRES, J.:
For about five years, from September, 1902, to November, 1907, Augustus Hicks, an
Afro-American, and Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived together in
the municipality of Parang, Cotabato, Moro Province, until trouble arising between
them in the last-mentioned month of 1907, Agustina quitted Hick's house, and,
separation from him, went to live with her brother-in-law, Luis Corrales. A few days
later she contracted new relations with another negro named Wallace Current, a
corporal in the Army who then went to live in the said house.
On the 21st of December following, at about 7:30 p. m., Augustus Hicks together with
a soldier named Lloyd Nickens called at said house, and from the sala called out to his
old mistress who was in her room with Corporal Current, and after conversing with her
in the Moro dialect for a few minutes, asked the corporal to come out of said room; in
response thereto the corporal appeared at the door of the room, and after a short
conversation, Current approached Hicks and they shook hands, when Hicks asked
him the following question: "Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?," to which
Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not want to live with you any
longer, but if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can live with her." The accused
then replied: "God damn, I have made up my mind;" and as Corporal Current saw that
Hicks, when, he said this, was drawing a revolver from his trousers' pocket, he caught
him by the hand, but the latter, snatching his hand roughly away, said: "Don't do that,"
whereupon Current jumped into the room, hiding himself behind the partition, just as
Hicks drew his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola who was close by in the sala of the
house. The bullet struck her in the left side of the breast; she fell to the ground, and
died in a little more than an hour later.
Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went to render
assistance and wrested the weapon from the hand of the accused. The latter
immediately fled from the house and gave himself up to the chief of police of the town,
H. L. Martin, asking him to lock him up in jail; and, when a few minutes later a
213
policeman came running in and reported that Hicks had fired a shot at Agustina, the
said chief of police caused Hicks to be arrested. The latter, when once in jail, threw
eight revolver cartridges out of the window; these were picked up by a policeman who
reported the occurrence and delivered the cartridges to his chief.
In view of the foregoing the provincial fiscal on the 8th of February, 1908, filed a
complaint with the Court of First Instance of said province charging Augustus Hicks
with the crime of murder. Proceedings were instituted, the trial court, after hearing the
evidence adduced, entered judgment on the 10th of September of the same year,
sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to be executed according to the law,
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The
case has been submitted to this court for review.
The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the present case, constitute
the crime of murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, in that the
woman Agustina Sola met a violent death, with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery (alevosia), she being suddenly and roughly attacked and unexpectedly fired
upon with a 45-caliber revolver, at close, if not point blank range, while the injured
woman was unarmed and unprepared, and at a time when she was listening to a
conversation, in which she was concerned, between her aggressor and third person,
and after usual and customary words had passed between her and her aggressor.
From all of the foregoing it is logically inferred that means, manners, and forms were
employed in attack that directly and specially insured the consummation of the crime
without such risk to the author thereof as might have been offered by the victim who,
owing to the suddenness of the attack, was doubtless unable to flee from the place
where she was standing, or even escape or divert the weapon.
The accused, Augustus Hicks, pleaded not guilty, but notwithstanding his exculpatory
allegations which were certainly not borne out at the trial, the evidence in the case is
absolutely at variance therewith and conclusively establishes, beyond peradventure of
doubt, his culpability as the sole fully convicted author of the violent and treacherous
death of his former mistress, Agustina Sola.
It is alleged by the accused that when he withdrew his hand from that of Current, who
had seized him, he fell backward but managed to support himself on his two hands,
and when he got up again the said corporal threatened him with a revolver thrust into
his face; whereupon he also drew his revolver, just as Edward Robinson caught him
from behind, when his revolver went off, the bullet striking the deceased.
This allegation appears to be at variance with the testimony of the witnesses Wallace
Current, Edward Robinson, Luis Corrales, and Lloyd Nickens in their respective
declaration, especially with that of the second and third, who witnessed the actual
firing of the shot by the aggressor at the deceased, as shown by the fact that
Robinson immediately approached the accused in order to take his weapon away from
him which he succeeded in doing after a brief struggle, whereupon the aggressor ran
out of the house. Thus, the shot that struck the deceased in the breast and caused her
death was not due to an accident but to a willful and premeditated act on the part of
the aggressor with intent to deprive the victim of her life.
In addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as above referred to, the
presence of other aggravating circumstances, such as premeditation, and the fact that
the crime was committed in the dwelling of the deceased should be taken into
consideration. The last-mentioned circumstances appears proven from the testimony
of several witnesses who were examined at the trial of the case.
Inasmuch as in the present case the crime has already been qualified as committed
with treachery, the circumstance of premeditation should only be considered as a
merely generic one. Premeditation is, however, manifest and evident by reason of the
open acts executed by the accused. According to the testimony of Charles Gatchery
and Eugenio R. Whited, Hicks asked leave from the former to be absent from the
canteen where he was working on the morning of the day when the affray occurred,
alleging that his mind was unsettled and that he feared getting into trouble. It is also
shown by the fact that Whited, who was in Hicks' house about noon upon the latter's
invitation, and while both where drinking gin, and while the revolver, the instrument of
the crime, was lying on the table on which were also several loaded cartridges, heard
the accused repeatedly say, referring to the deceased, that her time had come, adding
that he would rather see her dead than in the arms of another man, and when the
accused went to bed apparently very much worried, and refusing to answer when
called, the witness left him. On the day after the crime the police found on a table in
the cuprit's house several loaded cartridges, a bottle of oil and a piece of cloth used
undoubtedly for cleaning the revolver.
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and
after due reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man,
and in order to accomplish his perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact
that he was already provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other
loaded cartridges besides those already in his revolver, he entered the house,
greeting everyone courteously and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be a
proper manner, disguising his intention and claiming her by his apparent repose and
tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving
himself properly as he had planed to do beforehand.
As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no mitigating circumstances
is present, not even that mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, to
wit loss of reason and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense,
inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of
self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from
vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.
From the foregoing considerations, and as the judgment appealed from is in
accordance with the law, it is our opinion that the same should be affirmed, as we do
hereby affirm it with costs, provided, however, that the death penalty shall be executed
according to the law in force, and that in the event of a pardon being granted, the
culprit shall suffer the accessory penalties of article 53 of the Penal Code unless the
same be expressly remitted in the pardon. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
214
Republic of the Philippines This was the view taken by the Court of Spain upon a similar state of facts as set forth
SUPREME COURT in its sentence of July 4, 1892, which is summarized by Viada (p. 69, in question 19,
Manila art. 9 of vol. 6) as follows:

EN BANC Shall he who kills a woman with whom he is living in concubinage for having
caught her in her underclothes with another party and afterwards shoots
himself, inflicting a serious wound, be responsible for that crime with the
G.R. No. L-7094 March 29, 1912
extenuating circumstance of having acted with violent passion and
obfuscation? The Audiencia of Santiago de Cuba did not so hold and its
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, judgment was reversed by the supreme court for the improper disregard of
vs. article 9, number 8, of the Penal Code for Cuba and Puerto Rico: "The facts
HILARIO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant. held to be true by the trial court, and which were the immediate cause of the
crime by producing in the accused strong emotion which impelled him to the
criminal act and even to attempt his own life, were a sufficient impulse in the
F.C. Fisher for appellant. natural and ordinary course to produce the violent passion and obfuscation
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee. which the law regards as a special reason for extenuation, and as the
judgment did not take into consideration the 8th circumstance of article 9 of
CARSON, J.: the code, the Audiencia rendering it seems to have violated this legal
provision."
The guilt of the defendant and appellant of the crime of homicide of which he was
convicted in the court below is conclusively established by the evidenced of record. It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep.., 217), we held that the
"causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such
as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and
The trial court was of opinion that its commission was not marked by either immoral passions," and declined to give the benefit of the provisions of this article to
aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and sentenced the convict to fourteen the convict in that case on the ground that the alleged causes for his loss of self-
years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, the medium degree of the control did not "originate from legitimate feelings." But in that case we found as facts
penalty prescribed by the code. Burt we are of opinion that the extenuating that:
circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9 should have been taken into
consideration, and that the prescribed penalty should have been imposed in its
minimum degree. Subsection 7 of article 9 is as follows: All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused,
deliberately and after due reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had
left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse intention
The following are extenuating circumstances: with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a
clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges
xxx xxx xxx besides those already in his revolver, he entered the house, greeting
everyone courteously and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be
in a proper manner, disguising his intention and calming her by his apparent
That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his
produced passion and obfuscation. criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had planned to do
beforehand.
The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of passion, killed the
deceased, who had theretofore been his querida (concubine or lover) upon In the former case the cause alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the aggressor was
discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance. We the convict's vexation, disappointment and deliberate anger engendered by the refusal
think that under the circumstances the convict was entitled to have this fact taken into of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect
consideration in extenuation of his offense under the provisions of the above-cited right to do; his reason for killing her being merely that he had elected to leave him and
article. with his full knowledge to go and live with another man. In the present case however,
the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion and
obfuscation" was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the
sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in

215
the arms of another. As said by the supreme court of Spain in the above-cited
decision, this was a "sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and natural course of things to
produce the passion and obfuscation which the law declares to be one of the
extenuating circumstances to be taken into consideration by the court.
Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the
extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9, and by the reduction of
the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal to twelve
years and one day of reclusion temporal, the judgment of conviction and the sentence
imposed by the trial court should be and are hereby affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Trent, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., concurring:
I agree except as to the application of the extenuating circumstance presented by
paragraph 7, article 9, Penal Code. In my judgment it is not warranted by the facts or
the law.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 126096. July 26, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMADO SANDRIAS
JAVIER, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Once again, we are given the heavy task of reviewing a judgment of conviction
imposing the death penalty in a crime so dastardly and repulsive incestuous
rape. Considering that a persons life is at stake, we are burdened to come up with an
error-free judgment amidst our frailties and imperfections, lest our conscience be
bothered for rendering an irrevocable and irreversible error.
In the case under review, three separate complaints were filed against accused-
appellant charging him with rape committed on October 20, 1994 and sometime on
November, 1994 and December, 1994, against his daughter, Julia Ratunil Javier. The
first complaint charged:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 95-136
The undersigned complainant, who is a minor of 16 years of age, single, herein
assisted by her grandmother, Mrs. Librada Ratunil, after being duly sworn to law,
hereby accuses her father AMADO SANDRIAS JAVIER, who is detained under Illegal
Possession of Firearm charge, of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That in or about October 20, 1994, at more or less 1 oclock in the afternoon, at Zone
5, Baikingon, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, as father of herein complainant, by
means of force, violence, and intimidation, while inside our dwelling house at the
afore-mentioned place, and when said accused and herein aggrieved party were
alone in their said dwelling house as the undersigned aggrieved-party-complainants
mother was out doing laundry work as a laundry woman, held and pulled undersigned
complainant to accuseds bedroom in said dwelling house and as the undersigned
refused, wrestled and shouted for help, accused boxed and hit undersigneds stomach
to unconsciousness and did then and there, against complainants will and consent,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned who
noticed upon regaining consciousness that she was already stripped of her pairs of
panty and pants and feeling extreme pain of her private parts, and then and there
accused threatened the undersigned of death if undersigned complainant would reveal
the incident to undersigneds mother or to anybody else, thus, resulting to
undersigneds pregnancy as examined and found out by the doctor, all against the will
and consent of the undersigned, to her great damage and prejudice.
Contrary to and in Violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659.
(p. 7, Rollo.)
The two other complaints were identically worded as the above complaint
except that they respectively charged that the rape therein alleged occurred in
November and December 1994.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the cases
were jointly tried.
As principal witness for the prosecution, Julia recounted her harrowing
experience at the hands of her father. Her testimony was capsulized by the trial court
in this wise:
216
At about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of October 20, 1994, while her mother was out
doing some laundry for neighbors, thus she and the accused were left alone in their
house at Zone 5, Baikingon, Cagayan de Oro City, and while she was at the porch of
their house, accused called for her to the conjugal room and while thereat grabbed her
right hand. She shouted for help but nobody came to her rescue from neighbors, the
nearest of whom was about 60 meters away. Accused continued his sexual assault on
her by boxing her abdomen resulting to her unconsciousness. When she regained
consciousness, she felt pain in her vagina which was bleeding and wet with some
sticky fluids. She cried but was warned by the accused that should she make an
outcry and report the incident to her mother, he will kill her. Out of fear, and knowing
that accused has a handgun, she held her outcry.
Parenthetically, the accused was also charged of Illegal Possession of Firearm in
Criminal Case No. 95-141 committed on March 20, 1995 also raffled to this branch, to
which he pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly on May 8, 1996.
Complainant further declared that applying practically the same force and intimidation
and about the same time (1:00 P.M.) and again while complainants mother was out
doing some laundry for neighbors, accused repeated the sexual assault on her on
November 18, 1994 and December 19, 1994.
Complainant testifying further declared that she has three older brothers and a
sister. That she is the youngest and the only one who lived with her parents. Her three
older brothers lived in Manila, Cotabato and the last one with her grandmother, Vda.
De Librada Ratunil.
Out of fear, she kept the incident to herself until she felt some unusual pain in her
body and when she can no longer manage said situation, she finally broke her silence
by going to her grandmother, Librada Vda. De Ratunil at 165 Capistrano Street,
Cagayan de Oro City in the evening of March 15, 1995. She was asked by her
grandmother about the author of her pregnancy, she answered that it was her father,
the herein accused.
Complainant on cross examination, admitted having a sweetheart and were engaged
for one year already prior to the incident. Her sweetheart, whom she identified as
Michael Apduhan pays her a visit at times but on Saturday afternoon only with her
mother around. Consequently, there was no occasion that she met her sweetheart
alone for either her mother is around in the house or went out with her sweetheart with
her barkada during disco dances on the eve of fiestas.
(pp. 24-26, Rollo.)
Julias grandmother, Librada Vda. De Ratunil, corroborated Julias story and
narrated that on March 15, 1995, Julia arrived at her house and upon knowing the
things that happened to her granddaughter, she wrote Julias mother, Emma, her
daughter, and informed her of the matter. They decided to report the matter to the
police authorities at the Bulua Police Station in Cagayan de Oro City where they
executed the complaints (tsn, October 11, 1995, pp. 19-20).
Dr. Tammy Uy of the National Bureau of Investigation, Region 10, examined the
victim and made the following findings:
GENITAL EXAMINATION
Pubic hairs, fully grown, abundant. Labiae mejora and minor, both gaping. Fourchete,
moderately lax. Vestibular mucusae, violaceous and with engorded veins. Hymen, tall,
thick, fleshy, with old healed complete laceration at 9:00 oclock position, and an old
healed deep incomplete lacerations at 6:00 non-coaptable. Hymenal orifice, originally
annular, admits a glass tube of 2.5 cms. Diameter with slight resistance. Vaginal walls,
lax; rugosities obliterated. Uterus, enlarged with palpable fundus and with a fundic
height of 12 cms. (between the umbilicus and sumphysis pubs). Cervix, soft, non-
tender, enlarged, bluish-purpole. Light yellow muccoid cervical discharge is noted.
CONCLUSION
1. Genital findings present, compatible with sexual intercourse with man on or about
20 October 1994 as alleged and subsequently thereafter.
2. Probable signs of pregnancy present, consistent with the early part of the second
trimester of pregnancy,
REMARKS:
Pregnancy Test gave + sign.
(pp. 23-24, Rollo.)
Meanwhile, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) took
custody of Julia who gave birth to a baby boy on August 22, 1995 but whom she
would like to put up for adoption because he is a reminder of what her father did to her
(tsn, Oct. 11, 1995, pp. 14-15).
Likewise, Julia was examined by DSWD Psychologist Ma. Lavern Labitad
Jabien who found her to be suffering from inferiority complex and exhibiting feelings of
inadequacy and insecurity. Julia was also said to lack security in human relations
because of her experience and the brutal treatment she received from her father, and
mentally deficient as a result of poor parenting or parental deprivation (tsn, October
18, 1995, pp. 7-9).
Accused-appellant vehemently disputed the charges against him, alleging that
the same were engineered by his mother-in-law, Librada Vda. De Ratunil, who
despises him for being a drunkard. He further declared that Julia is an errant daughter,
217
who after reaching the age of 14, started attending dances and acquired several
sweethearts but only one of them paid visits at their house. Thus, he beat her,
especially when he discovered her to be pregnant (tsn, December 6, 1995, pp. 14-18,
26).
Accused-appellant claimed that from October to November, 1994, he was
working as a mason in the house of Bernabe Granada which is about 200 meters from
his house. Among his co-workers were a certain Bermon, Dayata, and Dudong
Granada, the son of Bernabe Granada. His working hours were from 6 A.M. to 6
P.M. Likewise, from December 1994 to February 1995, he said he was working at
Carlito Caudors house, also spending the same working hours therein. At the same
time, he was also a member of the Barangay Tanod of Baikingon (tsn, supra, pp. 9-
13).
To bolster accused-appellants contention that he was working at the time the
rape incidents happened, the defense presented his employers, Bernabe Granada
and Carlito Caudor. Granada testified that in October 1994, he engaged accused-
appellant for masonry work in the lay-outing of his house. Accused-appellant worked
from 8 to 11:30 oclock in the morning and from 1 to 4 oclock in the afternoon and
oftentimes took his lunch at the workplace. His house is located in Zone 6 while that of
accused-appellant is in Zone 5. Accused-appellant stopped working for Granada on
January 20, 1995 (tsn, March 13, 1996, pp. 4-5). On the other hand, Caudor testified
that he had known accused-appellant for 15 years and that for the months of October
and November, accused-appellant worked in Caudors house from 8 to 11:30 oclock in
the morning and from 1 to 4:30 oclock in the afternoon. Among his co-workers were
Matias Remerane, Julieto Dayata, and Danilo Caudor (tsn, January 31, 1996, pp. 3-6).
After trial, on June 8, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of the 10th Judicial Region,
Branch 21, in Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by the Honorable Arcadio D. Fabria
rendered judgment finding accused-appellant Amado Sandrias Javier guilty of Rape
under Criminal Case No. 95-136 and of Qualified Seduction in Criminal Cases No. 95-
147 and 95-148, and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of RAPE in Criminal Case No. 95-136 defined and penalized by Art. 335 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and hereby sentences him to
death and in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-147 and 95-148 finds him guilty of Qualified
Seduction under Article 337 of Paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences
him to an indeterminate penalty in each case of (5) years, (5) months and (11) days
of Prision Correccional as minimum to (6) years, (8) Months and 20 days of Prision
Mayor as maximum and to indemnify the offended party the sum of P50,000 as moral
and exemplary damages, to support the child until he shall have reached the age of
majority and to pay the costs.
The accused is further ordered to recognize and acknowledge the said child as his
son.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 35, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant assails said judgment and anchors his appeal on the general
and catch-all argument that the trial court erred in convicting him despite the failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant questions the credibility of complainant mainly because she
has a sweetheart and used to attend discos and benefit dances which lasted until
midnight. He vainly tries to portray a picture of complainant as an unchaste and
impure woman who was impregnated by her sweetheart at the tender age of
16. However, this Court believes that vilifying aspersion need not necessarily cast
doubt on complainants credibility nor would it negate conclusively the existence of
rape. It should be pointed out that the moral character of the victim is immaterial in the
prosecution and conviction of the accused.The Court has ruled that even a prostitute
can be the victim of rape (People vs. Edualino, 271 SCRA 189 [1997]) for she can still
refuse a mans lustful advances (People vs. Iglanes, 272 SCRA 113 [1997]). In the
case at bench, complainant is certainly not a prostitute. She even clarified on cross-
examination that she was always in the company of friends whenever she attended
discos and fiesta celebrations and that she never went out alone with her
sweetheart. She likewise stressed that whenever her sweetheart visited her at their
house on Saturdays, her mother and father were always present (tsn, October 4,
1995, pp. 5-11). Indeed, accused-appellants self-serving and unsubstantiated slur that
his daughter is a woman of loose morals betrays his desperation to exculpate himself
from liability. Against complainants positive testimony, accused-appellants self-
exculpatory aspersion that complainant may have had sexual intercourse with other
males simply cannot prevail.
Likewise, accused-appellants contention that the filing of the case was
instigated by complainants grandmother fails to sway the Court from lending full
credence to the testimony of complainant who remained steadfast throughout her
direct and cross-examination. Even in these trying times of poverty and greed, it is
difficult to believe that the grandparents of a child would allow her to be subjected to
the ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and to expose her private parts to
examination just because they do not approve of accused-appellant as their daughters
husband (People vs. Perez, 270 SCRA 526 [1997]). On the contrary, accused-
appellant admitted that his relationship with complainants grandmother is not strained,
as in fact, his mother-in-law used to extend assistance to his family (tsn, December 6,
1995, pp. 23-24).
Accused-appellant also claims that complainant was merely impelled by
revenge in filing the case as he used to scold and beat her for her disobedience,
especially after coming to know of her pregnancy.It is highly inconceivable that
complainant would impute a crime so serious as rape against her own father, if this
were not the plain truth. The Court has oft repeated that it takes a certain amount of
psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her
own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family
including herself to a lifetime of shame (People vs. Sangil, Sr., 276 SCRA 532
[1997]; People vs. Fuensalida, 281 SCRA 452 [1997]).
Complainant cannot be faulted for her delay in reporting the three instances of
rape. Delay in reporting rape does not undermine the charge where it is grounded on
218
the accuseds death threats (People vs. Talabac, 256 SCRA 441 [1996]; People vs.
Gecomo, 254 SCRA 82 [1996]).
Complainant satisfactorily explained her hesitation in reporting the incidents,
thus:
Prosecutor Tagarda
xxxx
Q: And you said you cried, what happened?
A: I kept on crying and he came to me and admonished me that he will kill me if I
will report the matter to my mother.
Q: And when he warned you that he will kill you if you report the matter to your
mother, what did you feel?
A: I was not able to reveal to my mother because I know that he has pistola in his
possession.
xxxx
(tsn, September 27, 1995, p. 10)
More importantly, the aggressor was none other than her father with whom she
lived. Thus, not much explanation is needed to understand the prolonged silence of
the victim.
Accused-appellants defense of alibi was properly rejected by the trial court. He
insisted that at the time the rape incidents happened, he was in his working
place. However, considering that the place where he supposedly was is merely 200
meters from his own house (tsn, December 6, 1995; p. 10; January 31, 1996, p. 8), a
distance which could be covered by a 5-minute leisurely walk, this defense cannot
prevail over complainants positive identification of accused-appellant (People vs.
Escober, 281 SCRA 498 [1997]; People vs. Parrazo, 272 SCRA 512 [1997]).
Courts have always looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have
invariably received it with caution not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable
but also because it is easily fabricated. For alibi to serve as basis for acquittal, it must
be established with clear and convincing evidence. The requisites of time and place
must be strictly met (People vs. Caada, 253 SCRA 277 [1996]).Where the accused
fails to convincingly demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, as in this case, the defense of
alibi must be rejected.
The trial court correctly convicted accused-appellant of the crime of rape in
Criminal Case No. 95-136. However, we cannot agree with its judgment insofar as
Criminal Cases No. 95-147 and 95-148 are concerned.
The trial court concluded:
While the court is convinced that there was sufficient force and intimidation employed
by the accused in committing sexual intercourse on complainant in the October 20,
1994 incident, it entertains some doubts about the degree of force and intimidation as
would warrant a finding of rape for the sexual intercourses committed on November 18
and December 19, 1994.
(p. 34, Rollo.)
The trial court proceeded to convict accused-appellant merely of qualified
seduction under Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code in the aforementioned cases.
A careful perusal of the record would disclose that accused-appellant employed
practically the same force and intimidation in committing the crime on October 20,
1994, November 18, 1994 and December 19, 1994. The commission of rape with
force and intimidation under Article 335 (par. 2) of the Revised Penal Code is clearly
established by the testimony of complainant herself, thus:
Prosecutor Tagada
Q: After you shouted, what happened?
A: My father boxed my stomach or abdomen kuto-kuto.
Q: After your stomach or abdomen was boxed by your father the accused in this
case, what happened to you?
A: I lost consciousness.
Q: Now when you regain(ed) consciousness what happened?
A: I noticed that I have no more short pants and panty.
Q: What else did you notice?
A: I felt pain at my vagina.
Q: What else?
A: And my vagina was bleeding.
Q: What else did you observe?
A: I cried.
Q: Aside from the bleeding oozing from your vagina, what else did you observe?
A: I noticed that there was something when I touched there is sticky fluids.
Q: And you said you cried, what happened?
A: I kept on crying and he came to me and admonished me that he will kill me if I
will report the matter to my mother.
219
Q: And when he warned you that he will kill you if you report the matter to your A: He again called me at their conjugal bedroom of my mother.
mother, what did you feel?
Q: What happened when he called you?
A: I was not able to reveal to my mother because I know that he has pistol in his
possession. A: I refused to do so but there is nothing I could do because nobody heard my
shout.
Q: Did you report when your mother came, did you report the incident?
Q: After you shouted?
A: I did not.
A: He again boxed my abdomen.
Q: Now that happened on October 20, 1994 after same date, what happened
next? Q: What happened when you were boxed by your father?

A: There was something that happened to me after October 20, 1994 to A: I was unconscious.
December.
Q: When you regained consciousness, what did you observe?
Q: December of 19?
A: I dont have panty anymore and no short pants.
A: 1994.
Q: What else did you discover?
Q: What did your father do to you after that incident of October 20, 1994 to
A: I felt pain in my vagina.
December 19, 1994?

A: He again raped me. Q: And what else happened?

Q: And what time your father raped you again? A: Blood was oozing with my vagina.

Q: What happened after that?

A: At 1:00 oclock in the afternoon more or less.

Q: Why, do you know the reason? A: When I touched my vagina, there was a sticky fluid.

A: Because that was the schedule when my mother wash(es) clothes. Q: What did you feel, tell us if any?

A: He frightened me that if I will tell everything to (an)other person I will be killed.

Q: How about in the month of November 1994?

A: He again raped me. Q: And when your father frightened you, what did you feel?

Q: What date in November? A: I was afraid because I was not able to reveal to my mother, I know that he has
a pistola.
A: November 18.
Q: Now, in the month of December what happened in December 1994?
Q: The time is?
A: About the end of December.
A: 1:00 oclock in the afternoon.
Q: What about in December 1994?
Q: And the place is ?
A: He again raped me.
A: At Baikingon.
Q: Where did he rape you?
Q: Where at Baikingon?
A: In the same place in his bedroom.
A: At Zone 5 in our house.
Q: Will you please narrate before the Honorable Court what happened before,
Q: Will you please narrate to the Honorable Court how did your father rape you on what time was that?
November 18, 1994?
A: At 1:00 oclock In the afternoon.

220
Q: And who were in the house when that incident happened at the end of The above testimony plainly shows how accused-appellant took advantage of
December 1994, who were the persons in the house? his moral ascendancy over complainant despite her struggle and resistance.

A: We were only two.
Q: Where was your mother then?
A: She was washing clothes.
Q: Will you narrate before the Honorable court the incident leading to the rape that
occurred to you the last portion of December 1994?
A: Almost at the end of December 1994, I was, at around 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon, again I was raped by my father.
Q: What happened at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon at the end of the last portion of
December 1994?
A: At around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon at the end of December 1994, I was
again called by my father to enter his bedroom.
Q: And did you enter his bedroom when you were called by your father?
A: I did not.
Q: What happened?
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be
overpowering or irresistible when applied (People vs. vs. Errojo, 229 SCRA 49
[1994]). For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great
or be of such character as could not be resisted it is only necessary that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind
(People vs. Caada (253 SCRA 277 [1996]; People vs. Antonio, 233 SCRA 283
[1994]). Accused-appellant, being the father, undoubtedly exerted a strong moral
influence over complainant. In rape committed by a father against his own daughter,
the formers moral ascendancy and influence over the latter may substitute for actual
physical violence and intimidation (People vs. Casil, 241 SCRA 285 [1995]; People vs.
Burce, 269 SCRA 2293 [1997]).
Well-settled is the rule that physical resistance need not be established in rape
when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against
her will to the rapists embrace because of fear for life and personal safety (People vs.
Dones, 254 SCRA 696 [1996]; People vs. Ramos, 245 SCRA 405 [1996]). Obviously,
the use of threat of death by accused-appellant against complainant constituted
sufficient intimidation to cow her into obedience. Finally, this Court has also ruled that
if resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation, then
offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victims
participation in the sexual act voluntary (People vs. Pamor, 237 SCRA 462 [1994]).

A: He pulled my right hand. Moreover, assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the use of force by
accused-appellant, the latter cannot be convicted of qualified seduction. It is only
Q: And then after that? when the complaint for rape contains allegations for qualified seduction that the
accused may be convicted of the latter in case the prosecution fails to prove the use of
A: I shouted but nobody answered. force by the accused (People vs. Antido, 278 SCRA 425 [1997]). To do otherwise
would be violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be
Q: After that? informed of the accusation against him. The accused charged with rape cannot be
A: My panty and my short pant were no longer in my body. convicted of qualified seduction under the same information (People vs. Ramirez, 69
SCRA 144 [1976]). Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are not identical
Q: What did you observe? offenses. While the two felonies have one common element which is carnal
knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary in all other respects (Gonzales vs.
A: I felt the pain in my vagina. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 667 [1994]).
Q: What else did you observe? What the trial court should have done was to dismiss the charges for rape in
Criminal Cases No. 95-147 and 95-148, if indeed, in its opinion, the prosecution failed
A: My whole body feel the pain. to sufficiently establish the existence of force and intimidation, and order instead the
filing of the appropriate information. Be that as it may, this Court believes otherwise
Q: After that, what else happened. Where was your father when you felt that your
and is fully convinced that accused-appellant is guilty as well of these two other counts
whole body was aching?
of rape.
A: My father was already outside the bedroom.
The trial court ordered accused-appellant to recognize the child born to
Q: What did he tell you if any? complainant despite the fact that said accused-appellant is a married man. The rule is
that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring
A: He will kill me if I will report to anybody. of the crime as his child, as the character of its origin legally prevents him from doing
so (People vs. Guerrero, 242 SCRA 606 [1995], citing People vs. De Guzman, 217
(tsn, September 27, 1995, pp. 9-12)

221
SCRA 395 [1993] and People vs. Rizo, 189 SCRA 265 [1990]). Thus, the order of the
court a quo pertaining thereto must be deleted.
Critical and more substantial, however, are certain misgivings we entertain with
respect to the propriety of imposition of death penalty as there is one facet of the case
which necessitates elucidation.Accused-appellant is being charged under Section 11
of Republic Act No. 7659 which amended Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code and
which reads:
SEC. 11. Article 335 of the same Code (Revised Penal Code, as amended) is hereby
amended to read as follows:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed.- Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
In the case at hand, the complaints stated that the rape victim is 16 years old
which therefore qualified her under the aforequoted provision. However, it is significant
to note that the prosecution failed to present the birth certificate of the
complainant. Although the victims age was not contested by the defense, proof of age
of the victim is particularly necessary in this case considering that the victims age
which was then 16 years old is just two years less than the majority age of 18. In this
age of modernism, there is hardly any difference between a 16-year old girl and an 18-
year old one insofar as physical features and attributes are concerned. A physically
developed 16-year old lass may be mistaken for an 18-year old young woman, in the
same manner that a frail and young looking 18-year old lady may pass as a 16-year
old minor. Thus, it is in this context that independent proof of the actual age of a rape
victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the victim is
indeed under 18 years of age as to fall under the qualifying circumstances
enumerated in Republic Act No. 7659. In a criminal prosecution especially of cases
involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must
be established by the prosecution in order for said penalty to be upheld. We have
meticulously examined the records of the case and we are convinced that the
evidence for the prosecution falls short of the required quantum of proof for the proper
imposition and carrying out of the death penalty. Verily, the minority of the victim must
be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Otherwise, failure to
sufficiently establish the victims age is fatal and consequently bars conviction for rape
in its qualified form.
In view of the foregoing consideration, we are constrained to hold accused-
appellant liable only of simple rape, and to reduce the penalty to the lower indivisible
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Inasmuch as the rape in this case is not qualified by any of the circumstances
under which the death penalty is to be imposed, the civil indemnity to be awarded to
the offended party should remain to be P50,000.00 for each count. In line with the
case of People of the Philippines vs. Senen Prades (293 SCRA 411 [1998]), accused-
appellant should indemnify the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages
without need for proof of the basis thereof. Lastly, accused-appellant is liable to pay
complainant the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages to deter other fathers with
perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own
daughters (People vs. Lao, 249 SCRA 137 [1995]; People vs. Sangil, Sr., 276 SCRA
532 [1997]).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED, to wit:
1. Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three
counts of crime of simple rape, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
2. Accused-appellant shall indemnify the victim for each count of rape the
following: (1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral
damages; and (3) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. The portion of the judgment of the trial court ordering accused-
appellant to recognize and acknowledge the child as his son, is
deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on leave.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140937. February 28, 2001]
EXUPERANCIO CANTA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
222
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated August 31, 1999,
and resolution, dated November 22, 1999, of the Court of Appeals,[1] which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Maasin, Southern Leyte, [2] finding
petitioner Exuperancio Canta guilty of violation of P.D. No. 533, otherwise known as
the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, and sentencing him to ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months, and eleven
(11) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
The information against petitioner alleged:
That on or about March 14, 1986, in the municipality of Malitbog, province of Southern
Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, take, steal and carry away one (1) black female cow belonging to Narciso
Gabriel valued at Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) without the knowledge and
consent of the aforesaid owner, to his damage and prejudice in the amount
aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The prosecution established the following facts:
Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a cow, subject of
the case, upon its birth on March 10, 1984. The cow remained under the care of
Erlinda Monter for sometime. Subsequently, Narciso gave the care and custody of the
animal, first, to Generoso Cabonce, from October 24, 1984 to March 17, 1985; then to
Maria Tura, from May 17, 1985 to March 2, 1986; and lastly, to Gardenio Agapay,
from March 3, 1986 until March 14, 1986 when it was lost.[4] It appears that at 5 oclock
in the afternoon of March 13, 1986, Agapay took the cow to graze in the mountain of
Pilipogan in Barangay Candatag, about 40 meters from his hut. However, when he
came back for it at past 9 oclock in the morning of March 14, 1986, Agapay found the
cow gone. He found hoof prints which led to the house ofFilomeno Vallejos. He was
told that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had taken the animal.[5]
Upon instructions of the owner, Gardenio and Maria Tura went to recover the
animal from petitioners wife, but they were informed that petitioner had delivered the
cow to his father, Florentino Canta, who was at that time barangay captain of Laca,
Padre Burgos, Southern Leyte. Accordingly, the two went to Florentinos house. On
their way, they met petitioner who told them that if Narciso was the owner, he should
claim the cow himself. Nevertheless, petitioner accompanied the two to his fathers
house, where Maria recognized the cow. As petitioners father was not in the house,
petitioner told Gardenio and Maria he would call them the next day so that they could
talk the matter over with his father.
However, petitioner never called them. Hence, Narciso Gabriel reported the
matter to the police of Malitbog, Southern Leyte. [6] As a result, Narciso and petitioner
Exuperancio were called to an investigation. Petitioner admitted taking the cow but
claimed that it was his and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. He presented two
certificates of ownership, one dated March 17, 1986 and another dated February 27,
1985, to support his claim (Exh. B).[7]
Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed by
the municipal treasurer, in which the cow was described as two years old and
female. On the reverse side of the certificate is the drawing of a cow with cowlicks in
the middle of the forehead, between the ears, on the right and left back, and at the
base of the forelegs and hindlegs (Exhs. C, C-1 to 4).[8] All four caretakers of the cow
identified the cow as the same one they had taken care of, based on the location of its
cowlicks, its sex, and its color. Gardenio described the cow as black in color, with a
small portion of its abdomen containing a brownish cowlick, a cowlick in the middle of
the forehead, another at the back portion between the two ears, and four cowlicks
located near the base of its forelegs and the hindlegs.[9]
On the other hand, petitioner claimed he acquired the animal under an
agreement which he had with Pat. Diosdado Villanueva, that petitioner take care of a
female cow of Pat. Villanueva in consideration for which petitioner would get a calf if
the cow produced two offsprings. Petitioner claimed that the cow in question was his
share and that it was born on December 5, 1984. This cow, however, was lost on
December 2, 1985. Petitioner said he reported the loss to the police of Macrohon,
Padre Burgos, and Malitbog, on December 3, 1985 (Exh. A and Exh. 1). [10]
Petitioner said that on March 14, 1986, his uncle Meno told him that he had
seen the cow at Pilipogan, under the care of Gardenio Agapay. He, therefore, went to
Pilipogan with the mother cow on March 14, 1986 to see whether the cow would
suckle the mother cow. As the cow did, petitioner took it with him and brought it,
together with the mother cow, to his father Florentino Canta. [11] Maria Tura tried to get
the cow, but Florentino refused to give it to her and instead told her to call Narciso so
that they could determine the ownership of the cow. [12] As Narciso did not come the
following day, although Maria did, Florentino said he told his son to take the cow to the
Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos. Petitioner did as he was told. Three days later,
Florentino and Exuperancio were called to the police station for investigation.[13]
Petitioner presented a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle dated February
27, 1985[14] and a statement executed by Franklin Telen, janitor at the treasurers office
of the municipality of Padre Burgos,to the effect that he issued a Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle in the name of petitioner Exuperancio Canta on February
27, 1985 (Exh. 5).[15] The statement was executed at the preliminary investigation of
the complaint filed by petitioner against Narciso.[16]
Petitioners Certificate of Ownership was, however, denied by the municipal
treasurer, who stated that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had no Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle in the municipality of Padre Burgos (Exhs. E, E-1 and
2).[17] On the other hand, Telen testified that he issued the Certificate of Ownership of
Large Cattle to petitioner on March 24, 1986 but, at the instance of petitioner, he
(Telen) antedated it to February 27, 1985.[18]
223
 On January 24, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty
of the offense charged. In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial
court stated:
From the affidavits and testimonies of the complainant and his witnesses, it is
indubitable that it was accused Exuperancio Canta who actually took the cow away
without the knowledge and consent of either the owner/raiser/caretaker Gardenio
Agapay.
That the taking of the cow by the accused was done with strategy and stealth
considering that it was made at the time when Gardenio Agapay was at his shelter-hut
forty (40) meters away tethered to a coconut tree but separated by a hill.
The accused in his defense tried to justify his taking away of the cow by claiming
ownership. He, however, failed to prove such ownership. Accused alleged that on
February 27, 1985 he was issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A)
for his cow by Franklin Telen, a janitor at the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of
Padre Burgos, a neighboring town. On rebuttal Franklin Telen denied in Court the
testimony of the accused and even categorically declared that it was only on March
24, 1986 that the accused brought the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos,
when he issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle for the cow, and not on
February 27, 1985. Franklin Telen testified thus:
Q. According to the defense, this Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle
was issued by you on February 27, 1985. Is that correct?
A. Based on the request of Exuperancio, I antedated this.
(TSN, June 3, 1992, p. 7)
The testimony of Franklin Telen was confirmed in open court by no less than the
Municipal Treasurer of Padre Burgos, Mr. Feliciano Salva. (TSN, September 29, 1992,
pp. 5-8).
If accused Exuperancio Canta were the owner of the cow in question, why would he
lie on its registration? And why would he have to ask Mr. Franklin Telen to antedate its
registry? It is clear that accused secured a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle
(Exh. 2-A) by feigning and manipulation (Exhs. A & B) only after the act complained of
in the instant case was committed on March 14, 1986. His claim of ownership upon
which he justifies his taking away of the cow has no leg to stand on. Upon the other
hand, the complainant has shown all the regular and necessary proofs of ownership of
the cow in question.[19]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision and denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. It is contended that the prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt his criminal intent in taking the disputed cow.
First. Petitioner claims good faith and honest belief in taking the cow. He cites
the following circumstances to prove his claim:
1. He brought the mother cow to Pilipogan to see if the cow in question
would suckle to the mother cow, thus proving his ownership of it;
2. He compared the cowlicks of the subject cow to that indicated in the
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle issued on February 27, 1985
in his name, and found that they tally;
3. He immediately turned over the cow to the barangay captain, after
taking it, and later to the police authorities, after a dispute arose as to
its ownership; and
4. He filed a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel for violation of P.
D. No. 533.
These contentions are without merit.
P.D. No. 533, 2(c) defines cattle-rustling as
. . . the taking away by any means, methods or scheme, without the consent of the
owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain,
or whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any person or
force upon things.
The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1) a large cattle is
taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of the
owner; (4) the taking is done by any means, methods or scheme; (5) the taking is with
or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished with or without violence or
intimidation against person or force upon things.[20]
These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no question that the cow
belongs to Narciso Gabriel. Petitioners only defense is that in taking the animal he
acted in good faith and in the honest belief that it was the cow which he had
lost. Second, petitioner, without the consent of the owner, took the cow from the
custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact that he knew all along that
the latter was holding the animal for the owner, Narciso. Third, petitioner falsified his
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle by asking Telen to antedate it prior to the
taking to make it appear that he owned the cow in question. Fourth, petitioner adopted
means, methods, or schemes to deprive Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus
manifesting his intent to gain. Fifth, no violence or intimidation against persons or
force upon things attended the commission of the crime.
Indeed, the evidence shows that the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle
which petitioner presented to prove his ownership was falsified. Franklin Telen, the
janitor in the municipal treasurers office, admitted that he issued the certificate to
petitioner 10 days after Narcisos cow had been stolen. Although Telen has previously
executed a sworn statement claiming that he issued the certificate on February 27,
1985, he later admitted that he antedated it at the instance of petitioner Exuperancio
Canta, his friend, who assured him that the cow was his. [21]
224
 Telens testimony was corroborated by the certification of the municipal treasurer
of Padre Burgos that no registration in the name of petitioner was recorded in the
municipal records. Thus, petitioners claim that the cowlicks found on the cow tally with
that indicated on the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle has no value, as this
same certificate was issued after the cow had been taken by petitioner from Gardenio
Agapay. Obviously, he had every opportunity to make sure that the drawings on the
certificate would tally with that existing on the cow in question.
The fact that petitioner took the cow to the barangay captain and later to the
police authorities does not prove his good faith. He had already committed the crime,
and the barangay captain to whom he delivered the cow after taking it from its owner
is his own father. While the records show that he filed on April 30, 1986 a criminal
complaint against Narciso Gabriel, the complaint was dismissed after it was shown
that it was filed as a countercharge to a complaint earlier filed on April 16, 1986
against him by Narciso Gabriel.
Petitioner says that he brought a mother cow to see if the cow in question would
suckle to the mother cow. But cows frequently attempt to suckle to alien
cows.[22] Hence, the fact that the cow suckled to the mother cow brought by petitioner
is not conclusive proof that it was the offspring of the mother cow.
Second. Petitioner contends that even assuming that his Certificate of
Ownership is not in order, it does not necessarily follow that he did not believe in good
faith that the cow was his. If it turned out later that he was mistaken, he argues that he
committed only a mistake of fact but he is not criminally liable.
Petitioners Certificate of Ownership is not only not in order. It is fraudulent,
having been antedated to make it appear it had been issued to him before he
allegedly took the cow in question. That he obtained such fraudulent certificate and
made use of it negates his claim of good faith and honest mistake. That he took the
cow despite the fact that he knew it was in the custody of its caretaker cannot save
him from the consequences of his act.[23] As the Solicitor General states in his
Comment:
If petitioner had been responsible and careful he would have first verified the identity
and/or ownership of the cow from either Narciso Gabriel or Gardenio Agapay, who is
petitioners cousin (TSN, 9/12/91, p. 26). Petitioner, however, did not do so despite the
opportunity and instead rushed to take the cow. Thus, even if petitioner had committed
a mistake of fact he is not exempted from criminal liability due to his negligence.[24]
In any event, petitioner was not justified in taking the cow without the knowledge
and permission of its owner. If he thought it was the cow he had allegedly lost, he
should have resorted to the court for the settlement of his claim. Art. 433 of the Civil
Code provides that The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of
the property. What petitioner did in this case was to take the law in his own
hands.[25] He surreptitiously took the cow from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio
Agapay, which act belies his claim of good faith.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence fully supports the finding of
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty as
charged. There is therefore no reason to disturb their findings.
However, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be modified in two
respects.
First, accused-appellant should be given the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender. The circumstance of voluntary
surrender has the following elements: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested;
(2) the offender surrenders to a person in authority or to the latters agent; and (3) the
surrender is voluntary.[26] In the present case, petitioner Exuperancio Canta had not
actually been arrested. In fact, no complaint had yet been filed against him when he
surrendered the cow to the authorities. It has been repeatedly held that for surrender
to be voluntary, there must be an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the
authorities, showing an intention to save the authorities the trouble and expense that
his search and capture would require.[27] In petitioners case, he voluntarily took the
cow to the municipal hall of Padre Burgos to place it unconditionally in the custody of
the authorities and thus saved them the trouble of having to recover the cow from
him. This circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary surrender and
should be considered in favor of petitioner.
Second, the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of violation of 2(c) of P. D.
No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. However, it erred
in imposing the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12
years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The trial
court apparently considered P. D. No. 533 as a special law and applied 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. However,
as held in People v. Macatanda,[28] P. D. No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty for
its violation is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, thus indicating that the intent of the lawmaker was to amend the
Revised Penal Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact, 10 of
the law provides:
The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended, all laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations which
are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in
the commission of the crime, the penalty to be imposed in this case should be fixed in
its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in relation to Art. 64 of
the Revised Penal Code, petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty,
the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.
e., prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, and the maximum of
which is prision mayor in its maximum period.
225
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that petitioner Exuperancio Canta is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a
prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-40330 November 20, 1978
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADO DANIEL alias "AMADO ATO", accused-appellant.
Eraulio D. Yaranon for appellant.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and
Solicitor Rosalio A. de Leon for appellee.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J:
This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by virtue of a
complaint filed by 13-year old Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado
Ato" of rape alleged to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1965, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the herein accused, armed with a sharp instrument and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersignedcomplaint, against her will, and in her own room
situated at No. 25 Interior, Pinsao, Guisad, Baguio City.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating
circumstance that it was committed in the dwelling of the offended
party, the latter not having givenprovocation for it, is present. (p.
1, CFI record)
The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, after due trial rendered its
decision on May 30, 1966, finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to suffer "not
more than TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal and not less
than SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, and to pay the costs." 1
His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, accused filed a
notice of appeal; forthwith the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its Tenth Division rendered
a decision the dispositive portion of which follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We find that the guilt of the accused
Amado Daniel has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and he
should accordingly suffer the penalty for the crime herein
charged.
We find, however, that the sentence imposed the accused in the
judgment appealed from is not in accordance with law.
Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964,
amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, providing that —
The crime of rape shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed
with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
Under Section 17 of Chapter 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
(Republic Act No. 296, as amended) —
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of
court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts
as herein provided, in —
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty
imposed is death or life imprisonment; ...
226
 WHEREFORE, We hereby certify this case to the Supreme Court
for appropriate further proceedings pursuant to law. 2
By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals the case was certified to
this Court and in a Resolution of March 6, 1975, the same was ordered docketed. 3
Preliminary question —
The certification of the case to Us poses a preliminary question which strikes at the
very root of a long standing practice and procedure evoked for the last forty years or
so since the creation of the Court of Appeals. 4
Is the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to act on an appeal in a criminal case where the
offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death certified to it by the Court of
Appeals with findings of facts and of the guilt of the accused, but without imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua or death on the appellant pursuant to Rule 124, Section
12, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court?5
Mr. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, joined by other ,Justices, expresses the view that
for this Court to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal, the decision before Us must have
imposed on the appellant the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts
warranted.
The rest of the Justices together with the writer of this Opinion, believe otherwise and
hold the view that the dispositive portion of the decision as written and rendered is in
accordance with the Constitution and the law, and vests jurisdiction on the Court to act
on the appeal.
A. In People v. Ramos, decided on November 28, 1947, 6 a case was certified to this
Court by the Court of Appeals without findings of facts and simply on the ground that it
was "on the opinion that the penalty that should be imposed ill this case is reclusion
perpetua, as recommended by the Solicitor-General, and not reclusion temporal, as
imposed by tile lower court." The question arose as to the proper procedure to be
followed by the appellate court in certifying cases to this Court under Section 145-K of
the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 52 which read:
Whenever in any criminal cases submitted to a division the said
division should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, the said Court shall refrain from
entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to
the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been
brought before it on appeal.
In disposing of the issue several matters came up which evoked different, and We
may say, strong reactions from the Justices then composing the Court, but for brevity
we shall not dwell on them. Simply stated, it is was ruled that the Court of Appeals
was duty bound to make its findings of facts to support its opinion that the penalty to
the imposed upon the appellant was either life imprisonment or death so as to bring
the case within the jurisdiction of this Court.
From the Resolution written for the Court by then Mr. Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran,
We quoted the following pertinent portions:
The jurisdiction of this Court predicated upon the opinion of the
Court of Appeals, as provided in the above-quoted provisions of
the law, must of necessity defend upon the correctness of that opi
nion There is nothing in the law precluding this Court from
exercising ing its authority to pass upon such question which
concerns its own jurisdiction. And in order that this Court may
exercise its power of review the Court of appeals is bound to
make in its order f certification such findings of facts as are
necessary to support its conclusion that either life imprisonment
or death is the penalty to be imposed. This is indeed covered by
Rule 52, section 3, which provides th where a court to which an
appeal has been taken has no appellate jurisdiction over lic case
and it certifies the same to the proper court, it must do so "with a
specific and clear statement of grounds therefor." the requirement
of with and specific grounds is precisely a device to prevent
erroneous transmissions of jurisdiction from a lower to a superior
court.
Furthermore, the words "shall refrain from entering judgment
thereon" appearing in the provision above quoted, are sufficient
indication that the Court of Appeals, at the time of certifying the
case to this Court, had already examined the evidence and was
ready to render judgment on the merits, but having found from the
facts established by proof that the penalty to be imposed is either
death or life imprisonment, instead of entering judgment thereon ,
it certifies the case to the Supreme Court for final determination.
Since the Certification is the only ground for determining our
jurisdiction, it must contain not only conclusions of law but also
findings of fact, the latter being more important than the former for
they supply the real basis for determining jurisdiction ...
The instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly
from a Court of First Instance wherein either life imprisonment or
death penalty is imposed, for in such cases, if we assume
jurisdiction even where the judgment appears to be erroneous on
its face, it is because the Court of First Instance has already
exhausted its jurisdiction by rendering judgment on the merits
containing both findings of fact and conclusions of law, and under
such circumstance it is more practical for the administration of the
law that this Court should exercise its appellate jurisdiction by
examining the evidence and correcting all errors both of fact and
227
 of law that might have been committed by the trial court. But here,
the Court of Appeals is refraining from rendering judgment on the
merits and is refusing to complete the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction because it believes that such jurisdiction belongs to
the Supreme Court and thus, it proceeds to transfer the case to
this Court. lt is in that transfer that we believe we may intervene in
order to prevent an erroneous transfer,
xxx xxx xxx
Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is merely a method
designed to make effective the appellate jurisdiction of both the
Court of Appeals and this Court, as defined by law. According to
the law of jurisdiction (section 138, Revised Administrative Code,
as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259), offenses,
for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment,
including offenses arising from the same occurrence or committed
on the same occasion, come within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, and the remaining offenses fall within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals ...
We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like
this, the Court of Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state
its findings of fact necessary to support its conclusion that the
penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment or death. While
this Court will not review the findings of fact, it will pass upon the
correctness of the legal conclusions derived therefrom. And if this
Court finds the conclusions to be correct, it will assume
jurisdiction. If it finds them to be wrong, the case will be returned
to the Court of Appeals. (pp. 613-616, supra, emphasis supplied)
In Ramos, the case was accepted because the Court considered that there was
substantial compliance with the law as the order of certification made reference to the
opinion and recommendation of the Solicitor General whose brief contained sufficient
findings of fact to warrant the conclusion that life imprisonment should be imposed
upon the appellant. Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Briones concurred in the
Resolution.
Justice Gregorio Perfecto in a separate opinion concurred with the principle that the
Court of Appeals is bound to make its findings of fact and study the evidence so as to
determine whether the appellant is guilty or not, but dissented from that portion of the
Resolution which accepted the case as he was of the opinion that the case should
have been remanded to the Court of Appeals.7
Justice Pedro Tuason wrote a separate opinion and dissented from the majority
insofar as it held that it was necessary for the Court of Appeals or a division thereof to
state the reasons for its opinion that death penalty or life imprisonment should be
imposed. He particularly dissented from statements that if this Court found the
conclusions of the Court of Appeals to be wrong, the case should be returned to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings. According to Justice Tuason when a case is
certified to this Court it is placed, by force of the Court of Appeals' opinion, within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the latter to decide the appeal on the merits;
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are neither essential nor necessary. Justice
Tuason was joined in his dissent by Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief
Justice of this Court and Justice Sabino Padilla.8
B. The theory is now advanced that We go one step further than that ruled
in Ramos — that is, for the Court of Appeals not only to make its findings of fact and
finding of guilt, but also to impose the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or death as
the facts warrant in order that We may exercise Our appellate jurisdiction.
We believe that such a judicial ruling will be violence to the letter and spirit of the law
which confers on the Supreme Court the exclusive prerogative to review on appeal
and impose the corresponding penalty in criminal cases where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.
Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vest upon the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction, in "(A)ll criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment."9 This jurisdiction is constitutional: the Supreme Court ma not be
deprived thereof by, Congress then, now the National Assembly. 10
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act 1948 as amended in turn provides that the foregoing
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive.
Basically therefore, the objection to this new theory is one of jurisdiction - the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or
death.
The present controversy springs from the construction given to the second paragraph
of Sec. 12, Rule 124, Rules of Court 11 more particularly to the use of the phrases
"should be imposed" and "shall refrain from entering judgment", viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said
division should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, the said court shall refrain from
entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to
the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been
brought before it on appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
As we construe it, the Rule cited does not charge the appellate
court with the duty of imposing the penalty of reclusion
228
 perpetua or death. All that the Rule requires is that should the
Court of Appeals be of the opinion that death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, it "shall refrain from entering
judgment thereon ...
The clause "entering judgment" means "rendering judgment". Thus, the Court of
Appeals shall refrain from rendering judgment if and when it is of the opinion
that reclusion perpetua or death is the proper penalty for the crime committed. This
can be the only logical interpretation considering that the Court of Appeals is without
jurisdiction to impose the penalties concerned. The phrase "entering judgment" is not
to be equated with an "entry of judgment" as the latter is understood in Rule 36 in
relation to Section 8, Rule 121 and Section 16, Rule 124, Rules of Court. "Entry of
judgment" presupposes a final judgment — final in the sense that no appeal was
taken from the decision of the trial or appellate court within the reglementary period. A
judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the
defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. 12 It is only then that
there is a judgment which is to be entered or recorded in the book of entries of
judgments. 13
It would be incongruous or absurd to state that Section 12, second paragraph, Rule
124 enjoins the Court of Appeals from entering judgment" when there is no judgment
to be entered .
But then the argument is advanced — what is there to be reviewed by the Supreme
Court when the decision being certified contains no penalty or sentence, as
distinguished from appeals from the Court of First Instance where there is a complete
judgment to be passed upon. The answer is simple. Section 12 itself states that the
case is for final determination by the Supreme Court as if the case had been brought
before it on appeal. Hence, based on the findings of facts of the appellate court which
as a rule are conclusive and binding on Us, this Court "will pass upon the correctness
of the legal conclusions derived therefrom" (People v. Ramos, supra) and impose the
correct penalty for the offense committed.
We realize that had Section 12, Rule 124 used the phrase shall refrain
from rendering judgment " there would be no cause for any ambiguity. We can only
assume that the intent of the Rule was so clear to the Court when it drafted the
Revised Rules of Court that it did not envision a possible contrary or adverse
interpretation or ambiguity in its implementation under the phraseology used. It is
incumbent upon Us to construe the Rule in the spirit and intent it was conceived and in
harmony with pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
On the merits of the appeal —
1. Generally in a case of this nature, the evidence of the prosecution consists solely of
the testimony of the offended party. Here We have the declaration of the victim, who
at the time of the incident was a little less than 13 years of age, on the basis of which
the trial court found the charge of rape duly established. The happenings are briefly
summarized in the People's brief as follows:
The offended party in this case is Margarita Paleng who was born
on November 20, 1952 (p. 3, t.s.n., Manipon). She is a native of
Balangabang Tublay, Mountain Province (pp. 3, 12, Id.) At the
time of the incident in question on September 20, 1965,
complainant was temporarily boarding at a house located at
Pinsao Guisad Baguio City, as she was then a first year high
school student at the Baguio Eastern High School (pp. 3, 12,
20, Id.; p. 36, Estigoy).
On September 20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon,
she had just arrived in the City from Tublay in a Dangwa bus (p.
3, Manipon). Because it was then raining and the bus was parked
several meters away from the bus station, she waited inside the
bus (pp. 3, 22, Id.). After about three minutes of waiting, the
accused came and started molesting her by inquiring her name
and getting hold of her bag (pp. 4, 22-24, Id.). But she did not
allow him to hold her bag (p. 24, Id.). She called the attention of
the bus driver and the conductor about the actuation of the
accused, but it seemed that the former were also afraid of him
(pp. 24-25, Id.).
Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked
some 100 meters away (pp. 4, 25, Id.). The accused closely
followed her (p. 4, Id.). When the jeep started to go, the accused
also rode and sat beside her (p. 5, Id.).
When the jeep reached Guisad, she alighted on the road but she
still had to negotiate a distance of ten meters (p. 5, Id.). The
accused also alighted and again he tried to carry her bag (p.
5, Id.). Although he was not allowed to carry her bag, her was
adamant in following her (p. 5, Id.).
Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was
about to close it when the accused dashed in and closed the door
behind him (pp. 31-32, Id.). When she entered her room, the
accused went in (p. 7, Id.). He pulled a dagger eight inches long
and threatened her: "If you will talk, 1 will kill you". (p. 7, Id.).
Margarita was stunned into silence because of her fear (p. i Id.).
Thereupon, the accused held her hair with his left hand and
forced her Lo lie down in bed (p. 7, Id.) He also placed his left
hand with a handkerchief in Margarita's mouth, at the same time
holding the dagger and her neck with his right hand (pp. 7-8, Id.).
She was forcibly made to the down and, at this moment, the
accused removed the buttons of his pants (p. 8, Id.). He then put
down the dagger on tile bed (p. 8, Id.). Her attempts to extricate
229
 herself from the accused was to no avail assile was only 4 ft. and
8 inches tall and weighed about 95 to 100 pounds (p.
35, Id.) while the accused was 5 ft. and 7 inches tall and weighed
about 126 pounds (pp. 8, 59, Id.). He then held his penis (pp. 8.
36, Id.), used his thigh to separate the legs of Margarita (p.
38, Id.). tried, but failed. to remove her panty (p. 36, Id.). He
nonetheless guided his penis and inserted it inside the vagina of
the complainant after prying open the part of her panty covering
her private parts (pp. 9, 36, Id.). Then he succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of the offended party (p. 9, Id.). Margarita lost
consciousness. When she recovered, he was already gone (p.
9, Id.).
The following morning, her father came to visit her. She confided
to him the terrible misfortune which befell her (pp. 9-10, Id.). She
was immediately brought to the Baguio General Hospital where
she was examined (p. 10, Id.). Then they proceeded to the Police
Department. The Chief of Police accompanied them to the Health
Center where she was again examined by Dr. Perfecto O. Micu
who thereafter submitted his medical report (Exh. C; p. 3, rec.; pp.
11, 14-16, Id.). Margarita and her father gave their respective
statements before the police authorities (Exh. B, pp, 5-6, rec.; p.
11, t.s.n.). She signed her criminal complaint prepared by the
Fiscal's Office of Baguio (Exh. A; p. 1, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n. (pp. 2-4,
Brief at p. 83, rollo
The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu was called to the witness stand and
he testified on the physical examination conducted on the person of Margarita Paleng
on September 23, 1965 and his findings as contained in the report were as follows:
1. Hymen-circular-stellate type with healing lacerations at 6:00,
8:00, 9:00 and 11:00 o'clock positions in the face of a clock.
2. Contusions at the base of the hymen at 3:00 & 9:00 o'clock
regions.
3. Vaginal Orifice - tight and hardly admits 2 fingers.
4. Vaginal wall — tight and vaginal folds are prominent.
5. Vaginal smear — negative for spermatozoa and for gram
negative intra or extra-cellular diplococci. (Exh. "C", p. 3, CFI
record)
Dr. Micu concluded that "defloration was recent". He further declared that the
condition of the hymen revealed that Margarita Paleng was a virgin before the incident
complained of, and that the number of lacerations and contusions at the base of the
hymen indicated the degree of force exerted to effect the sexual act. 14
For his defense, appellant claimed that he and Margarita were acquainted with each
other since 1963, and there were occasions when they rode together in a bus; that the
incident of September 20, 1965 inside the room of Margarita was with the latter's
consent, and in fact it was the second time he had carnal knowledge with her, the first
time having occurred inside a shack; that he promised Margarita that he would marry
her, but to his surprise, she filed the instant complaint against him. 15
2. The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent reasons for discarding the
findings of facts of the trial court which were sustained by the Court of Appeals after
the latter had examined the evidence as a result of which it certified the case to this
Court.
Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. But what possible
motive could a thirteen-year old girl barely in her teens have in fabricating a story that
could only bring down on her and her family shame and humiliation and make her an
object of gossip and curiosity among her classmates and the people of her hometown.
It cannot be denied that a public trial involving a crime of this nature subjects the
victim to what can be a harrowing experience of submitting to a physical examination
of her body, an investigation by police authorities, appearance in court for the hearing
where she has to unravel lewd and hideous details of a painful event which she would
prefer to forget and leave it unknown to others. If Margarita did forego all these and
preferred to face the cruel realities of the situation it was due to her simple and natural
instincts of speaking out the truth.
The insinuation that this complaint was filed because appellant had not married the girl
although he promised to marry her, is preposterous. On September 20, 1965,
Margarita was only twelve years and ten months old and was not of marriageable age,
hence, marriage was a legal impossibility. And as regards appellant's testimony that
the complaint was instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay who was Margarita's
uncle, the trial court did not give credit to such a declaration.
Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that Margarita had the opportunity
to ask for help or attract the attention of other people before she reached her boarding
house, she failed to do so. According to counsel there were people at the Dangwa
station, in the busy streets, in the market place, in the jeepney parking place where
the girl took a jeep to proceed to the boarding house, and in the neighboring houses
the closest of which was about 5 meters away, but no attempt was ever made by
complainant to seek help so as to prevent appellant from molesting her. 16
Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was well aware all the time from
the moment she saw the appellate inside the bus that the latter had intentions
of abusing or raping her. All that the appellant did inside the bus was to hold her bag
and she caged the attention of the driver and the conductor to the impertinence of
appellant but the two did not do anything about it. 17 And when Margarita walked from
230
the bus to the jeepney station, although she saw appellant walking behind her she did And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon Aquino, the force or violence
not suspect that he was following her. To a question propounded by His Honor necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the age, size, and strength
whether she suspected that appellant was following her, Margarita answered: "No sir, of the parties and their relation to each other. 23
I did not suspect." 18 All along Margarita could not call the attention of the people in the
street or shout for help inasmuch as at that particular moment the appellant was not
Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter
doing anything against her. And when Margarita reached the boarding house there
submits herself against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety. In this
were no persons around 19 and in fact she went straight to her room and it was at that
case of Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed with a dagger and with it threatened to
particular moment when appellant barged into the room before she could close the
kill the girl if she would talk or scream for help. Her fear naturally weakened whatever
door. In short, the Poor girl was simply taken by surprise by the forced entrance of
resistance Margarita could muster at the time and as a result appellant was able to
appellant who immediately took out an 8-inch long dagger and said "If you will talk I
consummate his coitus on the victim. 24
will kill you."

Persons can have different reactions to a situation like that — some may manifest an
aggressive or violent attitude of confronting a molesting or impertinent fellow while
others, like 12-year old Margarita, may assume a silent. fearful attitude.
Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not offer any resistance to the acts
of the accused at the time the latter was allegedly forcing himself on her as shown by
the medical findings that there were no signs of extra-genital injuries on the girl's body,
and no blood stains on her dress and underwear.
The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and destroy the veracity of
Margarita's straightforward and positive declaration as to how appellant, a 22-year old
farmer in the prime of his manhood, weighing 126 lbs and five feet 21 and six inches
tall,20 overpowered her and succeeded in accomplishing the sexual act despite her
resistance. Margarita was less than 13 years of age, was 4' 8 " in height, and weighed
around 95 lbs.21
In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but be present, and so long
as it brings about the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less
irresistible, is beside the point. 22
All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient for him to
consummate his evil purpose. In U.S. v. Villarosa, 1905, there was a similar situation.
A 12 year old girl was sexually abused in the woods by a man of superior physical
strength. In holding the accused Villarosa guilty of rape the Court held:
It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to
consider the existence of the crime of rape it is not necessary that
the force employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such
character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the
force used by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the
purpose which he had in view. (4 Phil. 434, 437 citing Judgment
May 14, 1878, Supreme Court of Spain. The Villarosa doctrine
has been followed in numerous cases involving the crime of rape
and one of the latest is People v. Equec, 1977, per Justice
Enrique Fernando, 70 SCRA 665.)
One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon, who
at the time of the trial in 1965 was the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that appellant
voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test with the National Bureau of Investigation and
the report of the lie detector examiner is in appellant's favor, that is, the latter was
telling the truth on the questions propounded to him one of which was whether he
forced Margarita Paleng into having sexual intercourse with him and the reply was
"No". 25
On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and conclusions meritorious and
We quote from his decision the following:
As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put
much faith and credit on it. It is well known that the same is not
conclusive. Its efficacy depends upon the time, place and
circumstances when taken and the nature of the subject. If
subject is hard and the circumstances, as in this instant, were not
conducive to affect the subject emotionally, the test will fail. The
subject had nothing more to fear because the trial was over. He
was not confronted by the victim or other persons whom he had a
reason to fear. Naturally, his reaction to the questions
propounded was normal and unaffected and the apparatus could
not detect it. (pp. 172-173, CFI record)
To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly
weapon with the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling
of the offended party. Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a
boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the
term is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law,
that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or
a bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and
uphold.
Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended. However, for lack of the necessary number of
votes, the penalty next lower in degree is to be applied.

231
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of conviction of Amado Daniel for
the crime of rape as charged, and We sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and order him to indemnify Margarita Paleng by way of moral damages in
the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and pay the costs.
Decision Modified.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, J., concurs.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur in the result on the merits.
Castro, C.J., Makasiar, Fernando and Fernandez, JJ., took no part.
Guerrero, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The phrase shall refrain from entering judgment thereon" found in section 12 of Rule
124 and in section 34 of the Judiciary Law means that the Court of Appeals should not
decide the case. The Court of Appeals has been certifying to this Court criminal cases,
wherein the imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua without rendering any
judgment but merely expressing its opinion that the penalty imposed by the trial court
is erroneous and that the imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua. Invariably,
this Court accepted those cases and decided the same. This Court's jurisdiction in
criminal cases, as defined in the Constitution, cannot be diminished but it can be
enlarged.
Appealed criminal cases may be divided into three classes: (1) those wherein the
lower court imposed the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua and which are within
this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction; (2) criminal cases wherein the trial court
imposed reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty and which fall within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and (3) criminal cases wherein the trial court
imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty but a Division of the Court
of Appeals, while in the process of deciding the case, comes to the conclusion that the
imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua. That third class of criminal cases
should be elevated to this Court "for final determination".
Reclusion perpetua was properly imposed in this case upon the appellant who is a
pedophiliac.
CASTRO, C.J., dissenting:
1
The preliminary issue at bar is: What is the correct course of action that the Court of
Appeals should take when, in a criminal case properly appealed to it, that court
determines that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should
be imposed instead of the lesser penalty imposed by the court a quo? Should it refrain
from rendering judgment and forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court? Or
should it render judgment imposingwhat it considers as the proper penalty (either life
imprisonment or death) but refrain from entering judgment and thereafter certify the
case to the Supreme Court?
At the center of scrutiny is the pertinent provision of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended, and the Identical statement in the second paragraph of section 12
of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, both of which read:
Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division [of the
Court of Appeals] the said division should be of the opinion that
the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, the
said court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall
forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final
determination, as if the case had been brought before it on
appeal.
Justices Claudio Teehankee, Cecilia Munoz Palma and Ramon C. Aquino interpret the
phrase "entering judgment" in the inhibitory clause "shall refrain from entering
judgment" to mean "rendering judgment" or "pronouncing judgment," arguing that [t]his
can be the only logical interpretation considering that the Court of Appeals is without
jurisdiction" to impose the penalties of death and life imprisonment. They thus opt to
maintain the present practice1of requiring no more than a forwarding certification
(embodying findings of fact supporting the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed) by the Court of Appeals for the purpose of placing
such case within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
For the reasons hereunder stated, we consider their interpretation unwarranted and
therefore reject the conclusion that it leads to.
2.
232
Section 34 of the amended Judiciary Act and the second paragraph of section 12 of
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court must be construed in the light of the unequivocal
phraseology of paragraph (d), subsection (2), section 5 of Article X of the Constitution,
which states:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferiors courts in —
xxx xxx xxx
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, life
imprisonment;
Varying the language of this provision only to the extent necessary to carry out its
intention, the first subdivision of the third paragraph of section 17 of the Judiciary Act
made exclusive the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in the following words:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal as the law or rules of
court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts
as herein provided in -
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty
imposed is death or life imprisonment: ...
The constitutional mandate, given due statutory acknowledgment, sets forth the
pertinent appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. We accord capital significance to
the phrases "final judgments and decrees of inferior courts and "the penalty imposed."
These phrases are crystal-clear. Read together with the remainder of the provision,
they state in precise and unmistakable terms the sole intended inescapable meaning
that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of inferior
courts in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. No
hermeneutic expertise or exercise can validly fashion some other meaning or
intention.
3.
The constitutionally determined nature of the criminal cases falling within the periphery
of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court fixes our perspective, defines and
delimits our judicial prerogative in the interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act,
and dictates the manner in which the law in question should be read and made
operative.
This being so, the clause enjoining the Court of Appeals to "refrain from entering
judgment" whenever it "should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed" cannot validly be interpreted as a bar to that
appellate court's "rendering judgment." If the meaning given to the law by the minority
should prevail and the case is forwarded, as this case before us was, to the Supreme
Court on a bare certification by the Court of Appeals, then we have the unacceptable
happenstance of an ordinary legislative act upstaging the fundamental law, since,
plainly, the Supreme Court will be constrained to exercise its power to "review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal" in criminal cases where NO "final judgment" in
which "the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment" has been rendered or
pronounced.
The minority view would thus result not only in an unconstitutional imposition on the
Supreme Court of assumption of jurisdiction over a case that is beyond its original
appellate competence but would also compel abandonment by the Court of Appeals of
appellate jurisdiction legally and duly vested in and acquired by it.
4.
Because sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act does not and cannot have primacy or
ascendancy over the Constitution, we assert that the Court of appeals is legally
empowered to impose the penalties of death and life imprisonment. Four basic and
compelling considerations underlie our view.
First: There is no law — no law at all — that states such prohibition in categorical
terms. The minority view rests solely on the strained interpretation foisted on the very
law under consideration — and this interpretation, as we have said, is entirely
unwarranted.
Second: In the case at hand, the Court of appeals duly and legally assumed appellate
jurisdiction over the accused Amado Daniel's appeal from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Baguio sentencing him to suffer a penalty less than life imprisonment.
This cannot be debated since section 29 of the Judiciary Act specifically places such
appeal within the Court of Appeals' jurisdictional ambit with the statement that
The Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all cases, actions, and proceedings, not enumerated i
section seventeen of this Act, properly brought to it.
Thus, absent any constitutional or legal constraints, the Court of Appeals should have
rendered the proper judgment in the case. For, verily, judicial jurisdiction is "the power
with which judges are invested for administering Justice — that is, for trying civil or
233
criminal cases, or both, and deciding them and rendering judgment, ..., 2 (emphasis
supplied)
Third: Harking back to the Constitution, the Court of Appeals, by unmistakable
constitutional categorization, is an "inferior court." And it is its judgments as such
inferior court which, so the Constitution plainly states, are the subject of the Supreme
Court's plenary power of review, revision, reversal, modification or affirmance.
Fourth: Absurdity and incongruity should not be read into the law so as to support the
view that a panel of three Justices of the Court of Appeals is denied the power to
impose the penalties of life imprisonment and death at the same time that such power
is recognized in a single judge of a lower court of admittedly lesser category,
5.
The resulting conclusion that the Court of Appeals must impose the proper penalty
does not justify the apprehension that the Supreme Court will be hampered in the
exercise of its jurisdiction because the findings of fact made by the inferior appellate
court "will have to be respected." This stated procedural practice has never been
honored in the absolute. The ultimate function of the Supreme Court is to render
justice. And we need not elaborate on or belabor the numerous occasions when, to
attain this objective, the Court shunted aside technicalities to bare wide open the
controversy and inquire into each and every aspect, be it legal or factual or a mixture
of both.
And this is one perfect instance where the avowed ends of justice must override
practice and procedure, for, no less than human life is at stake. And this would not be
a novelty. When a trial court's judgment imposing the death penalty is elevated to this
Court en consulta, we strip the case into minutiae: fact by fact, detail by detail, facet by
facet. We see no reason why, when a decision imposing the penalty of death or life
imprisonment is rendered by the Court of Appeals, the same manner of meticulous
inquiry should not be resorted to by the Supreme Court. A sentence imposing death or
life imprisonment is of the self-same gravity, whichever is the sentencing tribunal.3
6.
It is rather obvious that the phrase "entering judgment" is completely disparate from
the term "rendering judgment." There is no need to perambulate and meander the
provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of court need merely be read to
perceive the strikingly sharp antithesis between the two phrases. These sections read:
Section 1. Rendition of judgments. — All judgments determining
the merits of cases shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it [sic] is based, signed by him, and filed with the
clerk of the court.
Section 2. Entry of judgments and orders.— If no appeal or
motion for new trial is filed within the time provided in these rules,
the judgment or order shall be entered by the clerk. The recording
of the judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments shall
constitute its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of
the judgment or order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a
certificate that such judgment or order has become final and
executory.
The word "enter" (which undeniably is the root of "entering") with reference to
judgments has acquired a definite meaning in our procedure. There simply exists no
ambiguity to warrant embroiled interpretation. We need not hammer out meaning from
the word "entered." It is there. Section 2, Rule 36 chisels out the legal import of the
word.4 To repeat and stress the Rule, "[t]he recording of the judgment or order in the
book of entries of judgments shall constitute its entry. Upon the other hand, the
rendition of judgment is the judicial act of the writing by the judge of the decision and
the filing thereof with the clerk of court. 5
Such being the precise acceptations of the terms "entering judgment" and "rendering
judgment," we see no cogent reason why our indisputably learned lawmakers should
have written in the former when they meant the latter. If, as the minority would have it,
the intention was just that, why then has not section 34 of the Judiciary Act been
accordingly amended, considering that the said Act has been amended no less than
ninety (90) times 6 since its enactment thirty years ago in 1948?
The conclusion is thus ineluctable that section 34 of the Judiciary Act means exactly
what it says. (And its intendment cannot and should not be altered through tile
expedient of palpably tortuous and torturous statutory interpretation.) This rightly
projects the limited character of the said section — a procedural device designed to
effect and make effective the jurisdictions of both the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals. Read as written, this section neither imposes nor curtails constitutionally and
legally established jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals canand must render a decision
and impose the proper penalty of death or life imprisonment, and, to effect the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, refrain from entering its judgment, and forthwith
certify tile case to the Supreme Court.
7.
Aside from according the respect that is due to the Constitution and setting aright the
import of section 34 of tile Judiciary Act, our reading of the law will obviate
unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases between the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. We advert to that portion of
the Ramos 7decision, cited with approval by Justice Muñoz Palma, which states:
We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like
this, the Court of Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state
its findings of fact necessary to support its conclusion that the
234
 penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment or death. While
this Court will not review the findings of fact, it will pass upon the
correctness of the legal conclusions derived thereof And if this
Court finds the conclusions to be correct, it will assume
jurisdiction. If it finds then to be wrong the case will be returned to
the Court of Appeals. (emphasis supplied)
imposed reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty and which fall within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and (3) criminal cases wherein the trial court
imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty but a Division of the Court
of Appeals, while in the process of deciding the case, comes to the conclusion that the
imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua. That third class of criminal cases
should be elevated to this Court "for final determination".

We particularly and especially object to the return of the ease to the Court of Appeals Reclusion perpetua was properly imposed in this case upon the appellant who is a
if the Supreme Court "finds" the legal conclusions in the certification "to be wrong." pedophiliac.
This incident will never come to pass if section 34 is correctly construed — that is, as
we construe it — for, the Supreme Court will acquire jurisdiction over the case from
CASTRO, C.J., dissenting:
the very inception and can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully
completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.
1
8.
The preliminary issue at bar is: What is the correct course of action that the Court of
Appeals should take when, in a criminal case properly appealed to it, that court
ACCORDINGLY, this Court directs that, henceforth, should the Court of Appeals be of
determines that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should
the opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should
be imposed instead of the lesser penalty imposed by the court a quo? Should it refrain
be imposed in any criminal case appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the trial
from rendering judgment and forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court? Or
court is less than reclusion perpetua the said Court, with a comprehensive written
should it render judgment imposingwhat it considers as the proper penalty (either life
analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law involved, render judgment
imprisonment or death) but refrain from entering judgment and thereafter certify the
expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as
case to the Supreme Court?
the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith certify the
case and elevate the entire record thereof to this Court for review.
At the center of scrutiny is the pertinent provision of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended, and the Identical statement in the second paragraph of section 12
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, both of which read:

Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division [of the

Court of Appeals] the said division should be of the opinion that
Separate Opinions the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, the
said court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall
forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final
AQUINO, J., concurring:
determination, as if the case had been brought before it on
appeal.
The phrase shall refrain from entering judgment thereon" found in section 12 of Rule
124 and in section 34 of the Judiciary Law means that the Court of Appeals should not
Justices Claudio Teehankee, Cecilia Munoz Palma and Ramon C. Aquino interpret the
decide the case. The Court of Appeals has been certifying to this Court criminal cases,
phrase "entering judgment" in the inhibitory clause "shall refrain from entering
wherein the imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua without rendering any
judgment" to mean "rendering judgment" or "pronouncing judgment," arguing that [t]his
judgment but merely expressing its opinion that the penalty imposed by the trial court
can be the only logical interpretation considering that the Court of Appeals is without
is erroneous and that the imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua. Invariably,
jurisdiction" to impose the penalties of death and life imprisonment. They thus opt to
this Court accepted those cases and decided the same. This Court's jurisdiction in
maintain the present practice1of requiring no more than a forwarding certification
criminal cases, as defined in the Constitution, cannot be diminished but it can be
(embodying findings of fact supporting the opinion that the penalty of death or life
enlarged.
imprisonment should be imposed) by the Court of Appeals for the purpose of placing
such case within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Appealed criminal cases may be divided into three classes: (1) those wherein the
lower court imposed the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua and which are within
this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction; (2) criminal cases wherein the trial court

235
For the reasons hereunder stated, we consider their interpretation unwarranted and
therefore reject the conclusion that it leads to.
2.
Section 34 of the amended Judiciary Act and the second paragraph of section 12 of
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court must be construed in the light of the unequivocal
phraseology of paragraph (d), subsection (2), section 5 of Article X of the Constitution,
which states:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferiors courts in —
xxx xxx xxx
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, life
imprisonment;
Varying the language of this provision only to the extent necessary to carry out its
intention, the first subdivision of the third paragraph of section 17 of the Judiciary Act
made exclusive the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in the following words:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal as the law or rules of
court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts
as herein provided in -
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty
imposed is death or life imprisonment: ...
The constitutional mandate, given due statutory acknowledgment, sets forth the
pertinent appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. We accord capital significance to
the phrases "final judgments and decrees of inferior courts and "the penalty imposed."
These phrases are crystal-clear. Read together with the remainder of the provision,
they state in precise and unmistakable terms the sole intended inescapable meaning
that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of inferior
courts in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. No
hermeneutic expertise or exercise can validly fashion some other meaning or
intention.
3.
The constitutionally determined nature of the criminal cases falling within the periphery
of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court fixes our perspective, defines and
delimits our judicial prerogative in the interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act,
and dictates the manner in which the law in question should be read and made
operative.
This being so, the clause enjoining the Court of Appeals to "refrain from entering
judgment" whenever it "should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed" cannot validly be interpreted as a bar to that
appellate court's "rendering judgment." If the meaning given to the law by the minority
should prevail and the case is forwarded, as this case before us was, to the Supreme
Court on a bare certification by the Court of Appeals, then we have the unacceptable
happenstance of an ordinary legislative act upstaging the fundamental law, since,
plainly, the Supreme Court will be constrained to exercise its power to "review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal" in criminal cases where NO "final judgment" in
which "the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment" has been rendered or
pronounced.
The minority view would thus result not only in an unconstitutional imposition on the
Supreme Court of assumption of jurisdiction over a case that is beyond its original
appellate competence but would also compel abandonment by the Court of Appeals of
appellate jurisdiction legally and duly vested in and acquired by it.
4.
Because sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act does not and cannot have primacy or
ascendancy over the Constitution, we assert that the Court of appeals is legally
empowered to impose the penalties of death and life imprisonment. Four basic and
compelling considerations underlie our view.
First: There is no law — no law at all — that states such prohibition in categorical
terms. The minority view rests solely on the strained interpretation foisted on the very
law under consideration — and this interpretation, as we have said, is entirely
unwarranted.
Second: In the case at hand, the Court of appeals duly and legally assumed appellate
jurisdiction over the accused Amado Daniel's appeal from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Baguio sentencing him to suffer a penalty less than life imprisonment.
This cannot be debated since section 29 of the Judiciary Act specifically places such
appeal within the Court of Appeals' jurisdictional ambit with the statement that
The Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all cases, actions, and proceedings, not enumerated i
section seventeen of this Act, properly brought to it.
236
Thus, absent any constitutional or legal constraints, the Court of Appeals should have
rendered the proper judgment in the case. For, verily, judicial jurisdiction is "the power
with which judges are invested for administering Justice — that is, for trying civil or
criminal cases, or both, and deciding them and rendering judgment, ..., 2 (emphasis
supplied)
Third: Harking back to the Constitution, the Court of Appeals, by unmistakable
constitutional categorization, is an "inferior court." And it is its judgments as such
inferior court which, so the Constitution plainly states, are the subject of the Supreme
Court's plenary power of review, revision, reversal, modification or affirmance.
Fourth: Absurdity and incongruity should not be read into the law so as to support the
view that a panel of three Justices of the Court of Appeals is denied the power to
impose the penalties of life imprisonment and death at the same time that such power
is recognized in a single judge of a lower court of admittedly lesser category,
5.
The resulting conclusion that the Court of Appeals must impose the proper penalty
does not justify the apprehension that the Supreme Court will be hampered in the
exercise of its jurisdiction because the findings of fact made by the inferior appellate
court "will have to be respected." This stated procedural practice has never been
honored in the absolute. The ultimate function of the Supreme Court is to render
justice. And we need not elaborate on or belabor the numerous occasions when, to
attain this objective, the Court shunted aside technicalities to bare wide open the
controversy and inquire into each and every aspect, be it legal or factual or a mixture
of both.
And this is one perfect instance where the avowed ends of justice must override
practice and procedure, for, no less than human life is at stake. And this would not be
a novelty. When a trial court's judgment imposing the death penalty is elevated to this
Court en consulta, we strip the case into minutiae: fact by fact, detail by detail, facet by
facet. We see no reason why, when a decision imposing the penalty of death or life
imprisonment is rendered by the Court of Appeals, the same manner of meticulous
inquiry should not be resorted to by the Supreme Court. A sentence imposing death or
life imprisonment is of the self-same gravity, whichever is the sentencing tribunal.3
6.
It is rather obvious that the phrase "entering judgment" is completely disparate from
the term "rendering judgment." There is no need to perambulate and meander the
provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of court need merely be read to
perceive the strikingly sharp antithesis between the two phrases. These sections read:
Section 1. Rendition of judgments. — All judgments determining
the merits of cases shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it [sic] is based, signed by him, and filed with the
clerk of the court.
Section 2. Entry of judgments and orders.— If no appeal or
motion for new trial is filed within the time provided in these rules,
the judgment or order shall be entered by the clerk. The recording
of the judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments shall
constitute its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of
the judgment or order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a
certificate that such judgment or order has become final and
executory.
The word "enter" (which undeniably is the root of "entering") with reference to
judgments has acquired a definite meaning in our procedure. There simply exists no
ambiguity to warrant embroiled interpretation. We need not hammer out meaning from
the word "entered." It is there. Section 2, Rule 36 chisels out the legal import of the
word.4 To repeat and stress the Rule, "[t]he recording of the judgment or order in the
book of entries of judgments shall constitute its entry. Upon the other hand, the
rendition of judgment is the judicial act of the writing by the judge of the decision and
the filing thereof with the clerk of court. 5
Such being the precise acceptations of the terms "entering judgment" and "rendering
judgment," we see no cogent reason why our indisputably learned lawmakers should
have written in the former when they meant the latter. If, as the minority would have it,
the intention was just that, why then has not section 34 of the Judiciary Act been
accordingly amended, considering that the said Act has been amended no less than
ninety (90) times 6 since its enactment thirty years ago in 1948?
The conclusion is thus ineluctable that section 34 of the Judiciary Act means exactly
what it says. (And its intendment cannot and should not be altered through tile
expedient of palpably tortuous and torturous statutory interpretation.) This rightly
projects the limited character of the said section — a procedural device designed to
effect and make effective the jurisdictions of both the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals. Read as written, this section neither imposes nor curtails constitutionally and
legally established jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals canand must render a decision
and impose the proper penalty of death or life imprisonment, and, to effect the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, refrain from entering its judgment, and forthwith
certify tile case to the Supreme Court.
7.
Aside from according the respect that is due to the Constitution and setting aright the
import of section 34 of tile Judiciary Act, our reading of the law will obviate
unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases between the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. We advert to that portion of
the Ramos 7decision, cited with approval by Justice Muñoz Palma, which states:
237
 We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like TORRES, J.:
this, the Court of Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state
its findings of fact necessary to support its conclusion that the
Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while Juan
penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment or death. While
Igual, a Spaniard, was seated on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store in Cotabato,
this Court will not review the findings of fact, it will pass upon the
Moro Province, he suddenly received a wound on the head delivered from behind and
correctness of the legal conclusions derived thereof And if this
inflicted with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in the said store, who was standing
Court finds the conclusions to be correct, it will assume
behind the counter, upon hearing the noise and the cry of the wounded man, ran to his
jurisdiction. If it finds then to be wrong the case will be returned to
assistance and found him lying on the ground. Meanwhile the aggressor, the Moro
the Court of Appeals. (emphasis supplied)
Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named Choa, who was passing along the street,
and just as the latter was putting down his load in front of the door of a store and was
We particularly and especially object to the return of the ease to the Court of Appeals about to enter, attacked him with the same weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the
if the Supreme Court "finds" the legal conclusions in the certification "to be wrong." left shoulder, on account of which he fell to the ground. The Moro, who came from the
This incident will never come to pass if section 34 is correctly construed — that is, as rancheria of Dupit and had entered the town carrying his weapon wrapped up in
we construe it — for, the Supreme Court will acquire jurisdiction over the case from banana leaves, in the meantime escaped by running away from the town. Both
the very inception and can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to the hospital, where the
completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case. former died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the wound inflicted on
the Spaniard Juan Igual.
8.
In view of the above a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the district court
charging Manalinde with the crime of murder, and proceedings having been instituted,
ACCORDINGLY, this Court directs that, henceforth, should the Court of Appeals be of
the trial judge, in view of the evidence adduced, rendered judgment on the 5th of
the opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should
February of said year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to indemnify
be imposed in any criminal case appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the trial
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has
court is less than reclusion perpetua the said Court, with a comprehensive written
been submitted to this court for review.
analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law involved, render judgment
expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as
the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith certify the From the above facts fully substantiated in this case, it appears beyond doubt that the
case and elevate the entire record thereof to this Court for review. crime of murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, was
committed on the person of the Chinaman Choa, in that the deceased was
unexpectedly and suddenly attacked, receiving a deep cut on the left shoulder at the
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
moment when he had just put down the load that he was carrying and was about to
start for the door of the store in front of which he stopped for the purpose of entering
Republic of the Philippines therein. As a result of the tremendous wound inflicted upon him by the heavy and
SUPREME COURT unexpected blow, he was unable, not only to defend himself, apart from the fact that
Manila he was unarmed, but even to flee from the danger, and falling to the ground, died in
an hour's time. It is unquestionable that by the means and form employed in the attack
the violent death of the said Chinaman was consummated with deceit and treachery
EN BANC
(alevosia), one of the five qualifying circumstances enumerated in the aforesaid article
as calling for the greatest punishment.
G.R. L-No. 5292 August 28, 1909
When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff, perpetrated the crime herein mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one
vs. hundred days before and that he had come from his home in Catumaldu by order of
THE MORO MANALINDE, defendant. the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had directed him to go juramentado in Cotabato in
order to kill somebody, because the said Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge
against a lieutenant and a sergeant, the said datto further stating that if he, Manalinde,
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff. was successful in the matter, he would give him a pretty woman on his return, but that
Ramon Diokno for defendant. in case he was captured he was to say that he performed the killing by order of
Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal and Inug. In order to carry out his intention to kill two

238
persons in the town of Cotabato he provided himself with a kris, which he concealed in
banana leaves, and, traveling for a day and a night from his home, upon reaching the
town, attacked from behind a Spaniard who was seated in front of a store and,
wounding him, immediately after attacked a Chinaman, who was close by, just as the
latter was placing a tin that he was carrying on the ground and he was about to enter a
store near by, cutting him on the left shoulder and fleeing at once; he further stated
that he had no quarrel with the assaulted persons.
From the statements made by the accused his culpability as the sole-confessed and
self-convicted author of the crime in question has been unquestionably established,
nor can his allegation that he acted by order of Datto Mupuck and that therefore he
was not responsible exculpate him, because it was not a matter of proper obedience.
The excuse that he went juramentado by order of the said datto and on that account
killed only two persons, whereas if he had taken the oath of his own volition he would
have killed many more, because it is the barbarous and savage custom of
a juramentado to kill anyone without any motive or reason whatever, can not under
any consideration be accepted or considered under the laws of civilized nations; such
exhibitions of ferocity and savagery must be restrained, especially as the very people
who up to the present time have been practicing such acts are well aware that the
established authorities in this country can never allow them to go unpunished, and as
has happened a number of times in towns where juramentados are in the habit of
appearing, the punishment of the author has followed every crime so committed.
In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating circumstances
3 and 7 of article 10 of the Penal Code should be taken into consideration in that
promise of reward and premeditation are present, which in the present case are held
to be generic, since the crime has already been qualified as committed with the
treachery, because the accused confessed that he voluntarily obeyed the order given
him by Datto Mupuck to go juramentadoand kill some one in the town of Cotabato,
with the promise that if he escaped punishment he would be rewarded with a pretty
woman. Upon complying with the order the accused undoubtedly acted of his own
volition and with the knowledge that he would inflict irreparable injury on some of his
fellow-beings, depriving them of life without any reason whatever, well knowing that he
was about to commit a most serious deed which the laws in force in this country and
the constituted authorities could by no means permit. Datto Mupuck, who ordered and
induced him to commit the crimes, as well as the accused knew perfectly well that he
might be caught and punished in the act of committing them.
As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon
accepting the order and undertaking the journey in order to comply therewith,
deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the nature and
the consequences of the acts which, under orders received from the said datto, he
was about to carry out, and to that end provided himself with a weapon, concealing it
by wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and a night for the sole purpose of
taking the life of two unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and with whom he
had never had any trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to a certain extent,
might warrant his perverse deed. The fact that the arrangement between the instigator
and the tool considered the killing of unknown persons, the first encountered, does not
bar the consideration of the circumstance of premeditation. The nature and the
circumstances which characterize the crime, the perversity of the culprit, and the
material and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was not
predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime. The person having
been deprived of his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent, the crime is
considered a premeditated one as the firm and persistent intention of the accused
from the moment, before said death, when he received the order until the crime was
committed in manifestly evident. Even though in a crime committed upon offer of
money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not being
inherent in the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the two,
premeditation can not necessarily be considered as included merely because an offer
of money, reward or promise was made, for the latter might have existed without the
former, the one being independent of the other. In the present case there can be no
doubt that after the crime was agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the
criminal by his subsequent conduct showed a persistency and firm intent in his plan to
carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it being immaterial
whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once Manalinde obeyed the
inducement and voluntarily executed it.
The facts in this case are quite different from those in the proceedings instituted by
the United States vs. Caranto et al., wherein the decision on page 256 of Volume IV of
the Philippine Reports was rendered, as may be seen from the mere perusal of the
statement of facts. It is also different from the case where a criminal who has made up
his mind to kill a certain individual kills a person other than the object of his criminal
intent. On going to Cotabato the Moro Manalinde intended to and did kill the first two
persons he encountered, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not
alter the nature, conditions, or circumstances of the crime, for the reason that to cause
the violent death of a human being without any reasonable motive is always
punishable with a more or less grave penalty according to the nature of the concurrent
circumstances.
For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no mitigating circumstance is
present to neutralize the effects of the aggravating ones, it is our opinion that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs provided however, that the
penalty imposed on the culprit shall be executed in accordance with the provisions of
Acts. Nos. 451 and 1577, and that in the event of a pardon being granted he shall
likewise be sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties imposed by article 53 of the
Penal Code. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 105961. October 22, 1996]
239
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PACIFICO SUMAOY, JOHN
DOE, PETER DOE and RICHARD DOE, accused. PACIFICO
SUMAOY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Tagum, Davao in Criminal Case No. 7245, finding accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy
guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Zandro Vargas, in the sum of P30,000.00 and to
pay the costs.
Accused-appellant was convicted for the killing on July 9, 1988 of Zandro
Vargas, a boy 16 years of age, in Tagum, Davao. Wilbert Vargas, the victims brother,
and Patricio Jacobe, Jr. identified accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy as the
assailant, together with three others who have remained unidentified and at large.
The prosecution presented four witnesses: Wilbert Vargas, Patricio Jacobe, Jr.,
Enriqueta Vargas and Dr. Jose Lopez.
Patricio Jacobe, Jr. testified that he worked as a pin boy in a billiard hall
on Roxas Street, Tagum, Davao. At 5:45 p.m. of July 9, 1988, he left the billiard hall to
have some beer at the Pacings Carinderia on Sobrecary Street. Afterward, he went
back to the billiard hall, passing by the J Spot Carinderia at the corner of Roxas and
Sobrecary Streets, where he saw the deceased Zandro Vargas talking to accused-
appellant Pacifico Sumaoy. Three other men were with them but Jacobe did not
recognize the three.
Upon reaching the billiard hall, Patricio Jacobe, Jr. piled some billiard balls, then
went out and stood on the sidewalk. He was startled by the sound of a gunshot. When
he turned to find out where the sound came from, he saw Zandro Vargas running
towards Roxas Street with his right arm bleeding. Zandro Vargas tried to seek refuge
at the Try Me beauty parlor, but he was overtaken by accused-appellant who dragged
him towards a waiting tricycle. Accused-appellant had a gun. The accused-appellant
and three other men then boarded the tricycle taking Zandro Vargas with
them. Jacobe allegedly heard one of accused-appellants companion say that they
were taking Zandro to the hospital. Later that evening Jacobe learned that Zandro was
found dead in a kangkong field near the Davao Visayan Village.
The other prosecution witness, Wilbert Vargas, is the brother of the
deceased. Wilbert testified that at 6:00 p.m., on July 9, 1988, while he was talking to a
friend on Roxas Street near the public market, he was told that his brother Zandro was
being beaten up in a carinderia at the corner of Roxas and Sobrecary Streets. Wilbert
immediately proceeded to the J Spot Carinderia. He saw accused-appellant aiming his
gun at Zandro as the latter was running away. Accused-appellant shot Zandro Vargas,
hitting the latter in the forearm, and causing him to fall on his knees. Zandro Vargas
was then dragged by accused-appellant and three unidentified men towards a
tricycle. Wilbert Vargas saw his brother loaded onto the tricycle like a pig, with
Zandros feet hanging out. Wilbert tried to come to the aid of his brother but accused-
appellant pointed his gun at him, causing him to run home in fear.
Wilbert Vargas told his parents what had happened to his brother. They
searched for Zandro. They went to Mangga, Davao and there learned from Jose
Montilla, the driver of the tricycle which accused-appellant Sumaoy and his
companions hailed, that Zandro had been killed and that his body had been dumped
in a kangkong field in Visayan Village, Tagum, Davao. Wilbert and his parents
proceeded to the place indicated and there found Zandros dead body.
Wilbert Vargas identified Pacifico Sumaoy as one of the assailants. Wilbert
testified that he recognized Sumaoy because the latter was assigned to the military
detachment in the Diwalwal mining area where Wilbert used to work. Dr. Jose Lopez,
Municipal Health Officer of Tagum, who examined the body of Zandro Vargas, issued
a death certificate. Under questioning by the prosecutor, Dr. Lopez testified as follows:
Q You said you placed your findings in the certificate of death, please
read the findings, Doctor.
A (Reading) I hereby certify that I have this 10th day of July 1988
performed an autopsy upon the body of the deceased Zandro Rinia
Vargas and that the cause of death was as follows: Shock,
irreversible, due to gunshot wounds located at (1) right frontal into
cranial cavity exiting at right upper occipital; (2) right eyebrow
exiting at left lower occipital; (3) left temporal (no exit); (4) right arm
lateral going out at medical and going into right axillary into thoracic
cavity (no exit).
Q: Will you explain your findings to us, Doctor?
A: There were four (4) gunshot wounds found on the body of the victim
No. 1 was at the right frontal (witness pointing at his middle
forehead) going into the cranial cavity going outside (witness
pointing at the back of his head); No. 2, at the right eyebrow
(witness pointing at the middle of the right eyebrow) going out to the
left lower occipital ( witness pointing at the back of his head, left
side near the ear); No. 3 wound is found at the temporal without exit
(witness pointing at the left side of his head, a little above the left
ear); and the No. 4 wound is found at the right arm lateral (witness
pointing at his right-upper arm, outside) going at medial aspect then
same bullet passed into the axillary region into the thoracic cavity,
no more exit, the right-upper arm as entrance and exit inside of the
right-upper arm and then going into the right chest (witness pointing
at the right side of his body just about 3 inches below the armpit). [2]
Accused-appellant denies participation in the killing of Zandro Vargas. He
claims that the whole day of July 9, 1988 he was on duty as an enlisted personnel of
the 1103rd Criminal Investigation Services (CIS) in Tagum, Davao. Accused-appellant
identified a document signed by Technical Sergeant Ricardo Go called Duty Detail
showing that accused-appellant was on duty from 8:00 a.m. of July 9, 1988 to 8:00
a.m. of July 10, 1988. Ricardo Go, Technical Sergeant, Philippine Constabulary and
240
Team Leader of the Criminal Investigation service Command, Tagum, Davao, and
Patrolman Narciso Vismanos, corroborated the accused-appellants alibi.
On June 6, 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao rendered a decision
finding accused-appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The trial court noted
that accused-appellant Sumaoy shot Zandro while the latter was running away and
held that the three bullet wounds sustained by Zandro in the head showed that he was
shot while in a helpless and defenseless condition. The trial court appreciated the
ordinary aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position against
accused-appellant Sumaoy.
Accused-appellant Sumaoy has appealed from this decision of the trial court. He
contends that the prosecution evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty
necessary to support a judgment of conviction. He points out that no proof was
presented as to the type of weapon used in the shooting of Zandro Vargas, and he
challenges the testimony and credibility of witnesses Wilbert Vargas and Patricio
Jacobe, Jr.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General, in representation of the prosecution,
argues that the circumstances established by the prosecution, when taken together,
constitute an unbroken chain leading to the inevitable conclusion that accused-
appellant shot and killed Zandro Vargas. While there is no direct evidence showing
that it was indeed accused-appellant who shot Zandro in the head, the Solicitor
General claims that the testimonies of Wilbert Vargas and Patricio Jacobe that Zandro
was last seen alive with accused-appellant and three other men clearly prove that no
other person could have shot and killed Zandro Vargas than accused-appellant
Pacifico Sumaoy.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the circumstantial evidence in this case
establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant shot and killed Zandro
Vargas. These circumstances, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, are the
following:
(a) Zandro was being mauled by appellant and his companions (p. 5,
TSN, June 28, 1990);
(b) As Zandro was attempting to run, appellant drew his pistol and shot
Zandro (pp. 5-6, Ibid);
(c) Zandro was hit on the arm (p. 6, TSN, Ibid and p. 8 TSN, July 13,
1990);
(d) Zandro fell on his knees (p. 6, TSN, June 28, 1990);
(e) Zandro was dragged towards a motorized pedicab by appellant (p. 6,
TSN, June 28, 1990 and p. 8, TSN, July 13, 1990);
(f) Zandro was loaded on the motorized pedicab and appellant and his
companions boarded the same pedicab (pp. 6-7, TSN, June 28, 1990
and pp. 8-10, TSN, July 13, 1990);
(g) Zandro was found dead (p. 11, TSN, June 28, 1990).[3]
Together these circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one
fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty of the killing of Zandro
Vargas.
It was established by positive testimony that accused-appellant Sumaoy shot
the deceased in the arm and thereafter took the victim with him to an undisclosed
location with the help of three other men. Only the accused-appellant was seen with a
firearm. Less than 24 hours later, the victim was found dead. Not only was accused-
appellant identified as the person with whom Zandro Vargas was last seen alive, he
was also positively identified as the person who shot Zandro Vargas in the arm. There
is thus proof of aggression on the part of the accused which, taken with the other
circumstances, shows he had the intent to inflict injury upon the victim.
In the case of People v. Fulinara,[4] the accused were convicted of kidnapping
with murder based upon positive testimony that the victim was last seen alive when he
was forcibly abducted by two armed men in army fatigues who were later identified as
the accused. After the victim was abducted by the accused he was later found
dead. As in the case before us, there was no eyewitness at the precise moment the
victim was killed.
Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted without the
presentation of the gun in evidence. He alleges that the prosecutions failure to match
the slugs recovered from the body of Zandro Vargas with accused-appellants own
firearm precludes his conviction. This contention has no merit. The presentation and
identification of the weapon used are not indispensable to prove the guilt of the
accused.[5] The time which elapsed from the moment the victim was last seen alive
and the moment his body was found narrows the possibility that another agent caused
his death,[6] especially where an aggression was established against the victim before
he disappeared with the accused.
The accused-appellant tries to discredit the testimonies of the principal
prosecution witnesses. He points out that Patricio Jacobe, Jr. testified that Zandro was
shot in the right arm, while Wilbert Vargas said Zandro was shot in the left. This is,
however, an inconsistency concerning a minor matter which does not impair credibility
of the witnesses. The inconsistency negates any suspicion that the testimonies were
perjured or rehearsed.[7] Moreover, findings of fact of trial courts, particularly with
respect to the credibility of witnesses who personally appeared and testified before
them, must be respected on appeal.[8]
Accused-appellants defense of alibi is of no moment. Not only was accused-
appellant positively identified as the person who had shot and taken Zandro Vargas to
an undisclosed placed. It is also settled that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough that
accused-appellant prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed. He must demonstrate that he could not have been physically present at
the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The
testimony of accused-appellant. T/Sgt. Go and Pat. Narciso Vismanos failed to show
that it was impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime. The CIS office
was only one kilometer away from the scene of the crime. In addition, Vismanos
admitted that he was so absorbed in his work that he did not really know whether
accused-appellant was in the office premises the entire day of the latters duty.[9]
241
 While the evidence in this case sufficiently establishes the guilt of the accused-
appellant for the killing of victim Zandro Vargas, we think he cannot be held liable for
murder because of the absence of evidence as to the manner of the actual
killing. Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was
made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, it
cannot be established from mere suppositions that the accused perpetrated the killing
with treachery.[10] The evidence shows that the aggression against the victim began
when he was still at the J Spot Carinderia. As a matter of fact, according to Patricio
Jacobe, Jr., the deceased was trying to flee from the accused-appellant when the
latter shot him, thus indicating that the victim had been forewarned of a greater
aggression against him. The assault on the victim cannot be said to have been made
in a sudden or unexpected manner so as to justify a finding of treachery. [11]
The trial court also erred in finding the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of official position in the commission of the offense. This circumstance
requires that the accused, as a public officer, used the influence or reputation of his
position for the purpose of committing the crime. If the accused could have
perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then there is no abuse of public
position. In the case before us, no evidence was adduced to show that the killing of
Zandro vargas was in any way facilitated by the accused-appellants public position. It
was not even shown whether the accused-appellant wore his uniform or used his
service firearm when he committed the crime.[12]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is MODIFIED, finding
accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy guilty of homicide, and SENTENCING him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Zandro
Vargas in the increased sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26170 December 6, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. TEODORO
LUCHICO, Defendant-Appellant.
M. H. de Joya for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Teodoro Luchico appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, convicting him of the crime of rape, and sentencing him, without taking into
consideration any circumstance modifying his criminal liability, to suffer fourteen years,
eight months and one day reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to
pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In support of his appeal the appellant assigns the following supposed errors as
committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit: (1) The trial court erred in giving
more weight to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution than that given by
the accused and appellant and the other witnesses for the defense; (2) the lower court
erred in finding the herein accused and appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The prosecution attempted to prove the following facts:chanrobles virtual law library
That at about 6 o'clock in the evening of March 3, 1923, the offended party, Inocencia
Salva, a girl of 13 years of age, being in the kitchen of the house of the herein
accused, Teodoro Luchicho, as a servant of the latter, preparing a decoction of senna
leaves, her master approached her and said: "Inocencia, do not make an outcry when
I am in the place where you are lying down;" "Why?" asked the girl, and the accused
replied: "Because I love you very much." "That cannot be," answered Inocencia,
"because I look upon you as my father while I am here." The accused then caught her
by her face and imprinted a kiss upon her left cheek. Inocencia Salva ran to the parlor,
secured a pen knife and opened it. Upon seeing the knife in her hand, the accused
snatched it and went into the room where his wife, Catalina de Jesus, was. The
offended party went downstairs pursued by the accused. Upon reaching the municipal
president's pharmacy, she saw Benito Bugnay seated at the gate of a house and
addressing him, inquired: "Listen, will you permit me to step in here for a moment?"
"Why, are you tired? " asked the man. "Because Teodoro Luchico has pursued me,"
replied the girl. The man further asked her: "And now what do you want?" and the girl
replied: "I want to go to the municipal building to make a complaint against Teodoro
Luchico for what he did to me." "You need not do anything more," answered the man,
"the president is over there on the opposite side and you can go over there and
present your complaint." She then went to the pharmacy, which was on the opposite
side, and there she met the accused Teodoro Luchico who called her: "Come here I
want to treat your wounded hand." She replied: "I don't want you to treat it; first of all I
want to complain of what you did to me." While she was telling the president what had
occurred, the accused interrupted and said: "do not believe that, my friend, because
she is every young and had been ill with typhoid fever." The municipal president paid
no attention to her and after having applied some medicine to her wound, said to her:
"You can go home." The accused told the girl to come along with him and upon relying
that she would not, he said to her: "If you don't go with me I will break your feet," and
taking hold of her right arm, led her towards his house. Upon passing by a place
242
where the houses are somewhat distant and upon reaching a "camachile" tree, he
threw her to the ground, caught hold of her knees, covered her mouth and mounted
her, and taking out his genital organ, wet it with saliva and introduced it, with difficulty
and great suffering of the girl, into her private parts, and although, on account of the
pain, she attempted to call for help, she could not do so because her mouth was
covered by the accused. After consummating the carnal act the accused picked the
girl up in his arms and carried her to Placida Javier's house, which was close by. This
happened at about 7 o'clock at night, and although it was moonlight the place was
dark as there was a pathway shaded by many trees. Upon arriving at Placida Javier's
house, the accused sent her niece Maria to his house to get a chemise for Inocencia
because the one she was wearing was soiled with blood which oozed from the girl's
genital organ as a result of rape. After the accused had changed her dress, he took
the stained one. Upon orders from the accused the girl went from Placida Javier's
house to the house of Isidro Luchico, the accused brother, where she spent the night.
At dawn on the following day Inocencia Salva made an effort to reach the accused's
house under the pretext that she was going to mass. Instead of going to mass she
went to the house of the ex-municipal president, Mr. Arsenio Roldan, to present her
complaint as the present municipal president would not listen to her. After hearing her
story, Mr. Arsenio Roldan sent her to the house of Lieutenant Selga of the
Constabulary in Caloocan. When Lieutenant Selga arrived at the barracks in the
afternoon of the same day, which was Sunday, he accompanied her to the accused's
house where she secured her blood-stained dress and torn chemise from underneath
an aparador.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the morning of March 5, 1923, Dr. Emiliano Panis of the Constabulary made a
physical examination of the girl and found an inflammation or congestion of the small
and large lips of the genital organ, an irritation of the vaginal canal with small
hemorrhages under the mucose membrane and inflammation, pus and a bloody
excretion of a foul odor, and a disappearance of the hymen. The inflammation or
congestion was due to the introduction of a hard body out of proportion with the girl's
vaginal cavity, which produced a traumatism in the vaginal canal. Dr. Emiliano Panis
also found a small wound about 2 or 3 inches long on the thumb of her left hand and
another superficial wound on the left leg.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
The defense attempted to prove that the offended party, Inocencia Salva, had been ill
with typhoid fever before she entered the service of Teodoro Luchico in January,
1923, being brought by Natalia de Jesus for whom she had been working before; and
as a result of said illness the girl's hair was short and she at times would cry without
any cause and would wonder about; that in February of the same year, the girl had
some difficulty in micturating; that Dr. Lucio Santos was consulted and he advised the
use of a catheter the nurse, who was attending the accused's wife, to look after her,
and who applied a rubber catheter once, and at another time a metal catheter; that on
March 3, 1923, Inocencia Salva spoke to the herein accused and his wife Catalina de
Jesus asking permission to work in a candy factory in the same municipality in
company with some other women; that as she was not permitted to leave, she
became angry and said she would go to another house so that she might go with her
companion; that Catalina de Jesus then told her to wait until the following day
inasmuch as she wanted to communicate with Natalia de Jesus in Manila to find out
who would be responsible for her debt; hat on the afternoon of the same day
Inocencia Salva said that she had found another employer and that she wanted to go
to the latter's house and requested that they say nothing to Natalia de Jesus; that
Catalina de Jesus replied that she had to inform the said Natalia de Jesus; that from
then on the girl was angry and asked for her penknife which was in the possession of
her employers; that the accused handed her the penknife; that while talking with some
people who were visiting him, Teodoro Luchico heard some children, who were in the
yard, say that Inocencia Salva's hand was bleeding; that he asked her how she had
wounded her hand and she replied: "If you advise Manila before I leave, I prefer to
die;" that after saying this the girl ran downstairs with the open penknife in her hand;
that while Teodor Luchico was holding his little baby in his arms he requested some of
his visitors to pursue, the girl; that not having over taken her, his wife told him to leave
the baby, go to the municipal president and ask the police to catch her; that it was
then between 5 and 6 o'clock in the afternoon, and at the moment when the accused
was leaving the president's pharmacy with a policeman, he saw Inocencia Salva
running and pointed her out to the president, saying: "There is the girl whom I
intended to ask the police to catch." The municipal president said to him: "You had
better call her; let us see if the girl will come; " that the accused did so and when the
girl approached they saw that the front of her dress was stained with blood; that the
accused ordered the persons who were there to search her in order to see if she still
carried the penknife; the girl replied that wasn't necessary because she had lost it
while running; that when the girl said she had a wound in her thumb, the accused
asked the municipal president, who was a physician, to treat it; that she did not want
to let him treat it saying that she wanted to die; as the municipal president was very
busy, he told the accused that he might take the girl, who was disposed, to go with
him; that while on the road to his house, she asked permission of the accused to look
for her penknife and handkerchief which contained some money; that upon arriving
near Placida Javier's house she complained of pain in her wound and the accuse took
her to said house where they bathed it in sublimate and water; that between 6 and 7
o'clock in the evening the accused and the offended party left Placida Javier's house
and returned to the said accused's house, passing through a vegetable garden; that
when they arrived at the accused's house the mother of the latter told her that she
should eat supper and sleep in the house of her other son named Isidro Luchico, for
fear that the accused's wife might suffer a relapse; that at midnight Isidro Luchico went
to the accused's house to tell him that the girl had disappeared; that the girl returned
to the house very early the following morning to change her dress and said that she
would go to mass; that she afterwards appeared accompanied by Lieut. Selga and a
sergeant of the Constabulary that after the investigation of the accused the
Constabulary officers left taking the girl with them, and in a few days presented a
complaint against him for rape; that on April 6, 1923, while the accused was going on
board a banca to return to his house he saw the girl, who called to him; that he then
brought the banca to the river bank and asked her what she wanted; that she replied
that she tried to find him the day before in order to ask him to accompany her to the
house of the justice of the peace, as she wished to withdraw her complaint; that the
accused asked her why and she answered that the complaint did not state the truth
and that one Bartolome Sianjo had induced her to present it; that Bartolome Sianjo
was angry with the accused because the latter, with other associates, had filed a
complaint with a petition for an attachment against him; that Attorney Roldan was
angry with the accused on account of politics; that when they reached the house of the
justice of the peace the girl said that she wanted to be at peace with her master and
243
for that reason she wished to withdraw her complaint; that the girl was later operated
upon in the General Hospital for bladder trouble; that when she had already been
discharged, they transferred her to San Lazaro Hospital, because she was suffering
from constitutional hysteria, making her very impressionable and forgetful and in a
mental state bordering on insanity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The accused, testifying as a witness in his own behalf, denied everything that the
offended party had testified to against him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The offended party, upon cross-examination by the attorney for the defense, testified
that she had not been induced by anyone to present the complaint against the
accused; that on April 6, 1923, the accused arrived in a banca at Jose Dimla's house
where she lived, and said: "Inocencia, the judge orders me to take you to him,
because he wishes to know if you are agreeable to the arrangement," that she replied:
"I cannot go with you because my master Jose is not here:" that the accused then took
hold of her hand and pushed her and she fell on the floor near the wall; that she wept
and intended to scream, but the accused said to her: "Don't scream, because if you do
I will kill you; If you attempt to scream, this will be your last day;" that he afterwards
took hold of her hand and carried her by force to his banca where he made her lie
down, covering her with a basket which he carried; that when they reached the house
of the justice of the peace, Teodoro Luchico said to him; "Your Honor, Inocencia is
agreeable to the withdrawal of the complaint;" that the justice of the peace asked her;
"What do you say Inocencia, are you agreeable to the withdrawal of the complaint?"
that she answered in the negative.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The result of the physical examination to which the offended party submitted two days
after the outrage, which gave rise to the complaint presented to Lieutenant Selga of
the Constabulary against the herein accused, leaves no room for doubt that she has
been raped.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As will be seen, the evidence of the defense tends to establish the theory that
Inocencia Salva being impressionable due to suffering from constitutional hysteria, his
enemies took advantage of the trouble she had with her former masters and used her
as an instrument for their revenge, and to that end induced her to file a complaint
against the herein accused in order that she might be able to leave their services
without having to pay her debt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
While the evidence of the prosecution leaves much to be desired and certain
testimony of the witnesses for the defense has not been contradicted, yet with all the
evidence of the defense it has not been able to destroy the probatory value of the
testimony of the offended party, corroborated by her physical examination. Admitting
for the moment - although it was denied by the offended party - that Bartolome Sianjo
and Attorney Arsenio Roldan did induce her to present the complaint against the
accused, it is not possible to believe that they would go to the extreme of advising her
to irritate her genital organ until it bled to give her the appearance of having been
raped. It has not been proven that at the time of presenting her complaint to
Lieutenant Selga of the Constabulary which was the day after the outrage, any
abnormal mental symptoms were noticed. While eminent medical criminologists have
verified from experience that some hysterics, tormented by the genital instinct, have
filed a false accusations for crimes against chastity, yet, not a single case has been
found in which the hysteric accuser has gone to the extreme of causing herself
traumatism and injuries in the sexual organ in order to lend the appearance of truth to
her false accusation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the above, we think that the evidence of the prosecution has established
beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Attorney-General is of the opinion that in imposing the penalty the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and abuse of confidence should be taken into
consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The crime of the rape committed by the accused upon the offended party was the
result of a succession of acts which took place within the period of two hours,
commencing at 5 o'clock in the afternoon and ending at 7 o'clock in the evening,
without a moment's interruption in which it can be said that nighttime, being the most
favorable occasion for committing the crime, occurred to the accused. In order that the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity may be taken into consideration, it is
necessary that the same be sought and that it be taken advantage of, which does not
appear to be clearly proven in the present case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In order to take into consideration the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
confidence, it is essential that the confidence be a means of facilitating the
commission of a crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belief that
the former would not abuse said confidence. When the accused raped the offended
party she had already lost confidence in him from the moment that he took the liberty
of making an indecent proposal to her and of offending her with a kiss, which
compelled her to arm herself with a penknife; and in the present case it cannot be said
that the fact of the accused being the offended party's master facilitated the attainment
of his lustful purpose.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The crime of rape committed by the accused carries with it the obligations to indemnify
the offended party when the latter is a widow or single, to acknowledge the offspring if
the character of its origin does not prevent it and to support the same. In the present
case, it is only necessary to sentence the accused, by way of indemnity to endow the
offended party she being single. He cannot be ordered to support and acknowledge
the offspring which she might have, because it has been proven that she did not
conceive, and even though she might have conceived, the character of its origin would
have prevented it on account of the accused being
married.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
244
In view of the foregoing and with the sole modification that the accused is further jeepney, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob,
sentenced to endow the offended party in the sum of P500, the judgment appealed and carry away the following, to wit:
from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
From:

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ.,
RODRIGO CONDE — One (1) wallet, black, valued
concur.
— at P35.00 with 1 -dollar bill;
BERNABE POYUAON — Cash money of P50.00;
SUPREME COURT ANNABELE JAVIER — Wallet, wristwatch and
Manila necklace valued not less than
P5.00;
WONG NGAW Seiko Wallet, valued at
THIRD DIVISION
P25.00; with SSS ID card and
other papers and cash money
G.R. No. L-66848 December 20, 1991 of P200.00 and
PERPETUO AQUINO — Cash Money of Pl0.00.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. or all in the total amount of P325.00, more or less, belonging to the
RUBEN LEE y AMOSO, QUIRINO VIRAY, JR. y COLLADO, and JUAN LAROSA y aforesaid driver and passengers of the said jeepney, against their will, to the
GONZALES, defendants-appellants. damage and prejudice of the said owners, in the aforesaid amount of
P325.00, more or less, Philippine Currency; that by reason or on the
occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling the said
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
accused to take, rob, and carry away the said amount, in pursuance of their
Blesila O. Quintillan for defendants-appellants. conspiracy, the said accused with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attacked, assaulted and used personal violence upon the
passengers of the said jeepney, by then and there taking possession of the
steering wheel and driving the vehicle away, firing shots at the crew of the
mobile patrol car who (sic) gave chase of the said accused, and hitting, as a
consequence, the following hold-up victims, to wit: LEOPOLDO
ESPELLEGO, who sustained mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct
DAVIDE, JR., J.: and immediate cause of his death thereafter; GINA SALVADOR, who
sustained a gunshot wound at the back, thereby inflicting upon her serious
In an Information filed with the then Criminal Circuit Court of Manila on 8 July 1981, physical injuries which required and will require medical attendance for a
accused Ruben Lee y Amoso, Quirino Viray, Jr. y Collado, and Juan Larosa y period of more than thirty days and incapacitated and will incapacitate the
Gonzales, were charged with the crime of Robbery in Band with Homicide and said Gina Salvador from performing her customary labor during the said
Multiple Physical Injuries, committed as follows: period of time; and WONG NGAW and PERPETUO AQUINO, both of whom
sustained physical injuries which have (sic) required medical attendance for
a period of not less than one day but not more than nine days and
That on or about June 22, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said incapacitated the said Wong Ngaw and Perpetuo Aquino from performing
accused, conspiring and confederating together with one GERONIMO their customary labor during the same period of time.
GERDAD (deceased) and others whose whereabouts and identities are still
unknown, and helping one another, all armed with unknown caliber firearms
and bladed weapons, by employment of craft, that is, pretending to be CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
bonifide (sic) passengers of a jeepney, bearing plate No. 632 CS, PUJ,
driven by BERNABE POYUAON, and at nighttime purposely sought to
better accomplish their objectives, with intent of (sic) gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation upon persons, to wit: by then and there
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-49 (81).
simultaneously announcing it was a hold-up and pointing their respective
weapons, guns and knives, to the driver and other passengers of the said

245

Each of the accused entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment on 7 September 1981. 2
At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Gina Salvador and Rodrigo Conde, two (2) of the jeepney
passengers; Pfc. Florentino Bagallon, the investigating policeman; and Drs. Marcial C. Cenido and Narciso Adraneda, Jr., the examining
physicians. The defense presented the three (3) accused. Thereafter, on 26 August 1983, the trial court (now Branch XLVI, Regional Trial
Court of Manila) promulgated its decision 3
finding the accused guilty of the crime charged and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads in full as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Ruben Lee y Amoso, Quirino
Viray, Jr. y Collado and Juan Larosa y Gonzales, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery in band with homicide and multiple physical
injuries which is aggravated further by craft and nighttime and
hereby sentences them to suffer the Penalty of DEATH; to pay, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the deceased Leopoldo Espellego the sum of
P12,000.00 for the death of the latter, and to the robbery victims, the
following sums: Rodrigo Conde, P35.00; Wong Ngaw, P225.00; and
Perpetuo Aquino, P10.00 all of which were not recovered. They are also
ordered to pay their proportionate shares of the costs of suit.
The .45 caliber paltik, Exhibit W, and the .32 caliber Sentinel revolver,
Exhibit W-1, which bears Serial No. P 5803, are hereby confiscated in favor
of the government and the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to cause
delivery of the same to the Firearms and Explosives Section, Philippine
Constabulary, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Atty. Fernando Mangubat is hereby awarded the sum of P500.00 as
attorney's fees.
Pursuant to the governing law then in force, 4 the case was elevated to this Court for
automatic review.
The conviction is based on the following findings of fact of the trial court:
June 22, 1981, at about 2:30 o'clock a.m., a passenger jeepney with Plate
No. 632 CS, PUJ, driven by Bernabe Poyuaon, was on its way from Rizal
Avenue, Manila to Baclaran, Metro Manila. In the jeepney as passengers
while it was already nearing the Philippine General Hospital along Taft
Avenue were some 13 persons who were seated as follows: On the left seat
(which is directly behind the driver) were a male passenger immediately
behind the driver, Leopoldo Espellego, Annabele Javier, Gina Salvador, and
a male passenger who was seated just at the entrance of the jeepney, in
that order. On the right seat beginning from the entrance of the jeepney
were a male passenger, Maria Lourdes Javier, Rodrigo Conde, Perpetuo
Aquino and Wong Ngaw, also in that order. Beside the driver were two male
passengers.
xxx xxx xxx
The jeepney was travelling southward along Taft Avenue when the
passenger seated last on the left seated near the entrance of the jeepney
and who turned out to be the accused, Ruben Lee, drew out a gun and first
poked it at Gina Salvador who was to his left and then waived (sic) said gun
at the other passengers, at the same time announcing a hold-up as follows:
"Mga putang ina ninyo, huag kayong sisigaw, hold-up ito" (Sons of bitches,
don't shout. This is a hold-up). Simultaneously, the passenger seated in
front of Ruben Lee who turned out to be Quirino Viray, Jr. drew out a knife
and poked it at Maria Lourdes Javier who was to his right; the passenger
seated just behind the driver who turned out to be Geronimo Gerdad drew
out a gun and pointed it at the driver; and the passenger seated further from
the driver drew out and poked a knife at the driver.
The announcement of the hold-up frightened the passengers and Ruben
Lee ordered them to hand over their wallets, watches and other valuables.
He ordered Geronimo Gerdad to collect the things of the passengers near
him. Gina Salvador gave the following to Ruben Lee: her Seiko 5 Men's
watch worth P500.00; her Chinese gold necklace worth P200.00; cash
amounting to P800.00; and her handbag worth P15.00. From Rodrigo
Conde was taken a wallet worth P35.00 and containing one Australian
dollar, From the others, including that of the driver, were taken cash which
were (sic) handed over to Geronimo Gerdad.
When approaching Pedro Gil Street, Ruben Lee ordered the driver to turn
right towards Roxas Boulevard and upon reaching Mabini Street, the
jeepney was noticed by the crew of Police Mobile Patrol Car No. 221 as
Pedro Gil is a one-way street Patrol Car No. 221 tailed the jeepney and
signalled it to a stop. Upon orders of Ruben Lee, the jeepney driver stepped
down to talk nicely to the policemen (who stopped their car about seven
meters behind) by telling the latter that they entered the street by accident.
At the same time, Ruben Lee warned the passengers to keep quiet,
otherwise he will shoot them.
Once the jeepney driver left to talk to the policemen, Ruben Lee also
stepped down, placed his gun on his seat and ordered Quirino Viray, Jr. to
take hold of it, and proceeded to the driver's seat, started the jeepney and
drove off towards Roxas Boulevard, turned left and sped towards Baclaran.
Mobile Patrol Car No. 221 (with the jeepney driver on board) followed suit
with its sirens blowing and at the same time alerting other patrol cars
through its radio. The jeepney, with Ruben Lee on the wheels, turned left
towards the airport and on reaching a dark roard, turned back. At this
juncture, Ruben Lee ordered one of the passengers thrown out in order to
distract the attention of the pursuers. So that the passenger beside him was
246
 Said resolution became final on 17 June 1988 and Entry of Judgment was correspondingly made.
thrown out. However, said passenger was not hurt; instead he ran away
after hitting (sic) ground. With the mobile patrol car in pursuit, the jeepney
sped back to Roxas Boulevard and towards the Luneta with the holduppers This review should then be limited to the case of accused Juan Larosa.
taking potshots at the pursuers. And because the passengers heard shots
coming from behind, they were either down on the floor or were stooping
from their seats, for fear that the policemen might shot (sic) directly at them.
The jeepney finally stopped at Marvex Drive in Balintawak, Quezon City.
The hold-uppers jumped out of the jeepney and engaged the pursuing In the Appellant's Brief, accused Juan Larosa assigns the following errors: 11
policemen in a shoot out. Ruben Lee pointed a gun at Gina Salvador's back
and fired. When the firing subsided, one of the hold-uppers, Geronimo
Gerdad, was found seriously wounded and a .22 caliber revolver (Exhibit W-
1) was found near his body. One of the passenger victims, Leopoldo
Espellego, was seriously wounded while three others were wounded, I
namely: Gina Salvador who suffered a gunshot wound; Wong Ngaw, with
lacerations and abrasions (see Exhibit F); and Perpetuo Aquino, with a
lacerated wound (See Exhibit G). One patrol car brought Gerdad and THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED LAROSA IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND

Espellego to the Chinese Memorial Hospital where both were pronounced REASONABLE DOUBT WHEN HE WAS NOT PROPERLY AND CREDIBLY IDENTIFIED AS PARTICIPANT (SIC) IN

dead on arrival. Gina Salvador, Wong Ngaw and Perpetuo Aquino were THE CRIME;

brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where they were treated. 5
II
Through their counsel de oficio appointed by this Court, accused-appellants filed their Brief 6
on 22 March 1985.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED;

The People, through the Solicitor General, filed the Appellee's Brief 7 on 12 September
1985. III

Pursuant to Section 19(l), Article III of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY
Philippines which provides that any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced SURRENDER BY ACCUSED.
to reclusion perpetua, this Court, in a letter to the accused dated 20 April 1988, asked
them whether they still wished to continue with their case considering that the death
penalty is no longer imposable and their death sentences had been automatically We shall take them up in the order they are presented.

commuted to reclusion perpetua. 8

A. In support of the first assigned error, Larosa claims that the two (2) alleged eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution, namely, Gina
In their letter to this Court dated 2 May 1988, accused Ruben Lee and Quirino Viray manifested their willingness to accept the sentence Salvador and Rodrigo Conde, were not able to identify him.
of Reclusion Perpetua. 9
Accused Juan Larosa, however, in a letter to this Court dated 29 April
1988, manifested that he wanted to continue with his appeal. 10

Indeed, as correctly pointed out by Larosa, Gina failed to mention him. While she was very specific as to the role and participation of
accused Ruben Lee and Quirino Viray, she candidly admitted that she "could no longer recall the hold-upper who was sitted (sic) in front
In view of the foregoing, this Court promulgated on 25 May 1988 the following resolution: (sic) of the jeep." 12
However, prosecution witness Conde positively identified Larosa as the
holdupper sitting on the front seat of the jeep. On direct examination, he testified as
G.R. No. 66848 (People vs. Ruben Lee, et. al.)—Considering the pleadings filed in this case, the Court Resolved to follows:
NOTE: (a) the letter of compliance filed by accused-appellants Ruben Lee and Quirino Viray signed in the presence of
witnesses, dated May 2, 1 988, stating that they are willing to accept the sentence of reclusion perpetua in consonance
Fiscal Belmonte:
with the provision of Section 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution; and (b) the letter of compliance filed by accused-
appellant Juan Larosa dated April 29, 1988 stating that he wants to continue his case as an appealed case.
Q When you boarded the jeep, were there passengers?

247
 Fiscal Belmonte:
A Yes, Sir.

Q Do you know if there was any passenger of that jeep fell (sic) down?
Q When you boarded the jeep, were these three already there?

A Yes, Sir.
A Yes, Sir.

Q Where was that passenger sitted (sic) at the time that he was fell (sic) down?
Q What happened next?

A We were on our way to MIA when that passenger fell down, Sir.
A When the jeep reached at the PGH, the three drew guns, Sir.

Q Why did he fall down?

Q Did thev say anything?

A Because he was pushed by one of the holduper (sic), Sir.

A Yes, Sir, they said, this is a hold-up.

Q Do you know who was that holduper?

Court:

Q Who among the three drew a gun?

A Larosa, Sir. 14
A Ruben Lee, Your Honor.

Q Who else?

On cross-examination, this witness immediately aborted the defense counsel's attempt to show that the light of the jeep was put off,
A The other one sitting near the driver, Sir.
hence, it was impossible for him to see the holduppers clearly. Thus:

Fiscal Belmonte:

Q Is that other one in this Courtroom?

Atty. Mangubat:
A Yes, Sir.
Q By the way when these holduper (sic) announced that it was hold-up, did they order the driver to put out the light?
Court:

Q Point to him?
A No, Sir. 15
A Larosa, Your Honor. 13

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

248

Subsequent attempts on the part of the cross-examiner to discredit Conde proved futile. His testimony was given full faith and credit by the
trial court and We find no reason to overturn such a finding. Well-entrenched is the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the
factual findings of the trial court since the latter are in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless it is found that the trial courts have plainly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 16
Equally settled is the rule that conviction may be based on the lone testimony of an eyewitness, when the testimony is credible. 17
B. In respect to his second assigned error, Larosa would have Us believe that at 2:00 a.m. of 22 June 1981, he was at his house sleeping
with his family. 18
However, accused relies merely on his own testimony and his alibi is not
corroborated by anybody else.
We have ruled time and again that alibi is a weak defense for it is easy to concoct and
fabricate. 19 Alibi cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive
identification by credible witnesses that the accused perpetrated the crime. 20 In the
case at bar, We find no reason to depart from this doctrine for the prosecution has
sufficiently established the guilt of the accused Larosa.
C. In his last assigned error, Larosa claims that he voluntarily submitted to the custody
of the police and offered no resistance when the police accosted him. We agree with
the Appellee that this contention has no basis. Before Larosa and the other
holduppers could even be apprehended, they engaged the pursuing police authorities
in a shootout and only gave up upon realizing that they were already surrounded by
residents and tanod members in the vicinity. 21
For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and should show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities, either: (1) because he acknowledges his guilt, or (2) because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily
included for his search and capture. 22
In the absence of these two (2) reasons, and in the event that
the only reason for accused's supposed surrender is to insure his safety, his arrest
being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and hence, not voluntary. 23
The trial court correctly appreciated against the accused the generic aggravating circumstances of band and craft. Nighttime, however,
was erroneously taken against him.
A crime is committed by a band whenever more than three (3) armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an
offense. 24
In the case at bar, commission by a band was properly appreciated as it has
been shown that when the holdup was staged, Ruben Lee, Quirino Viray, Geronimo
Gerdad (deceased), and accused Larosa were all armed with guns and knives.
Craft is likewise present herein since the accused and his cohorts pretended to
be bona fide passengers of the jeep in order not to arouse suspicion. However, once
inside the jeep, they robbed the driver and the other passengers. 25
As to nighttime, there is no showing that it was purposely sought for or taken
advantage of to facilitate the commission of the offense or for the purpose of
impunity. 26 There's no proof that they waited for the night to commit the crime.
Besides, as testified to by Rodrigo Conde, the light of the jeep was not put off.
Obviously, they did not seek the darkness of the night and were not afraid of the light.
The robbery and the resulting deaths of Leopoldo Espellego and Geronimo Gerdad
(holdupper) and physical injuries of Gina Salvador, Wong Ngaw, and Perpetuo Aquino
are included in one (1) special complex crime of robbery with homicide and physical
injuries, defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, it being
evident that the deaths and injuries occurred by reason of or on occasion of the
robbery. 27 The penalty provided for therein is reclusion perpetua to death.
Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstances of band and craft or
disguise, the greater penalty, which is death, shall be applied. 28 However, in view of
the provisions of the 1987 Constitution abolishing the death penalty, 29 accused
Larosa is entitled to the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Finally, conformably with the new policy of this Court, 30 the civil indemnity of
P12,000.00 is increased to P50,000.00. However, considering that the judgment
against Ruben Lee and Quirino Viray, the other convicted holduppers herein, had
become final and executory as of 7 June 1988, they are solidarily liable with Juan
Larosa up to the amount of P12,000.00 only. Anything in excess of said amount is the
sole liability of accused Larosa.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-49 (81)
finding the accused, Juan Larosa and his co-accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries, as defined and penalized
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects,
except as above modified. As modified, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and the civil indemnity for the death of Leopoldo
Espellego is hereby increased to P50,000.00, the first P12,000.00 of which the
accused Juan Larosa shall be jointly and severally liable with his co-accused, and for
the remaining P38,000.00 he shall be solely liable.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.
249

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 89418-19. November 21, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODOLFO ASPILI,
ERNESTO MAGBANUA, EDUARDO MENDOZA, RODOLFO SALES, ROBERT
AGUIRRE and PACIFICO REBUTIDO, Accused-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Enrique A. Javier, Sr. counsel de oficio for Accused-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIMES; SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY
WITH HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED WITH RAPE, COMMITTED IN THE CASE AT BAR;
PENALTY THEREOF; SAID CRIME NOW DESIGNATED AS PIRACY IN PHILIPPINE
WATERS. — The Court finds, at the outset, that the trial judge erred in designating the
offense committed by the appellants as rape with homicide aggravated by robbery in
band. For one, neither in law nor in jurisprudence is there an aggravating
circumstance as robbery in band. More importantly, the evidence shows that what was
committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by rape.
The overwhelming evidence reveals that the original design of the malefactors was to
commit robbery in order to facilitate their escape from the penal colony. Their original
intent did not comprehend the commission of rape. Hence, the crime of rape cannot
be regarded as the principal offense. In this case, since it attended the commission of
robbery with homicide, the rape is deemed to aggravate the crime but damages or
indemnification for the victim may be awarded. (See People v. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136
[1958]; People v. Tapales, 93 SCRA 134 [1979]). Instead of ignominy, it is the rape
itself that aggravates the crime (People v. Mongado, 28 SCRA 642 [1969]). With
respect to the deaths of Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque, the appellants are clearly
liable therefor since, as held by this Court in People v. Mangulabnan, (99 Phil. 992
[1956]) it is immaterial that the death of a person supervened by mere accident,
provided that the homicide is produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery. Since
rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, the offense committed by
the appellants is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, aggravated by
rape, punishable under Paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
It does not matter if the technical name assigned to the offense is rape with homicide
and with robbery in band, for the real nature of the crime charged is determined not by
the title of the complaint, nor by the specification of the provision of the law alleged to
have been violated, but by the facts recited in the complaint or information. (See
People v. Oliviera, 67 Phil. 427 [1939]) As the acts constituting robbery with homicide
were clearly set forth in the complaint and proven during trial, then the appellants may
be held liable for such crime, regardless of the erroneous designation of the offense.
In passing, it may be mentioned that the crimes committed by appellants are now
denominated as piracy in Philippine waters, punishable under Presidential Decree No.
532. We find it unnecessary to retroactively apply the provisions thereof in favor of the
appellants because the acts committed by them are likewise punishable therein
by reclusion perpetua.
2. ID.; AGGRAVATIG CIRCUMSTANCES; RECIDIVISM, IN BAND AND ABUSE OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH, ALSO ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR;
NOCTURNITY AND CRAFT, NOT CONSIDERED. — We find no merit in the
appellants’ contention that the lower court erred in considering recidivism as an
aggravating circumstance. All the appellants are recidivists. They were serving
sentence at the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony by virtue of a final judgment of conviction
when they committed the above-mentioned offenses. Rodolfo Aspili, Ernesto
Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza and Pacifico Rebutido have previously been convicted
of the crimes of frustrated homicide, serious physical injuries, theft, and murder and
trespass to dwelling, respectively. Both Rodolfo Sales and Roberto Aguirre have
previously been convicted of robbery in band. We likewise uphold the trial court’s
finding that the crime was aggravated because it was committed by a band. All the six
appellants were armed when they boarded the vessel and perpetrated their dastardly
acts. There is also abuse of superior strength, since most of the victims were women
and children ranging from 2 to 9 years old. However, the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and craft should not have been considered by the lower court. There was
no showing that the appellants purposely sought the cover of night when they
committed the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Neither did the
appellants employ craft, since they had already boarded the vessel when they
pretended to buy Tanduay Rum in exchange for the dried fish and chicken they were
carrying. Even without such pretense, they could nonetheless have carried out their
unlawful scheme.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS; REQUIREMETS
AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF RIGHT TO
COUNSEL HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT AND DO NOT APPLY TO
CONFESSIONS TAKEN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973. — The interlocking
extrajudicial confessions executed by the appellants are admissible even if they were
not informed of their right to counsel. These confessions were all taken in January
1970, long before the 1973 Constitution took effect. Article III Section 20 of the 1973
Constitution, for the first time, concretized the present right of persons under custodial
investigation to counsel, how to be informed of such right and the effect of non-
compliance. The requirements and restrictions surrounding this constitutional
guarantee, however, have no retroactive effect and do not apply to confessions taken
before January 17, 1973, the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. (See Magtoto
v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 [1975])
DECISION
250
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: likewise jumped into the sea (TSN 2-20-70, pp. 183-193; 3-17-70, pp. 196-197).
Among the passengers who jumped overboard were Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda
Arque.
The appellants seek a reversal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Palawan, 4th Judicial Region, Branch 48, finding them guilty of the crime of rape with Only five persons were left in the launch who did not jump overboard. Josie Gonzales
homicide, with the aggravating circumstances of robbery in band, taking advantage of tried to jump overboard but Ernesto Magbanua, one of the accused, prevented her by
nighttime, recidivism, abuse of superior strength and craft. holding both arms. Magbanua pulled and dragged her. Josie struggled to free herself
but to no avail. Magbanua succeeded in dragging her over the cargoes where he
The facts for the prosecution are summarized by the Solicitor General, as pinned her down. While in that lying position he forcibly raped her for about five to ten
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph minutes. At that time, Magbanua was pointing a gun at Josie’s head. After Magbanua
was through, Rodolfo Sales approached her, took off his pants and laid on top of her
"On December 28, 1969, the M/L Elsa left Puerto Princesa City for Dumaran, for about 3 to 5 minutes. At the time Sales was raping Josie, Magbanua was still
Palawan. On board were Catalino Nadayao, the patron of the vessel; Pepito Severino holding her and pointing a gun at her. After Sales, Pacifico Rebutido approached her
and two other crew members; and thirteen (13) passengers among whom were and likewise raped her. Josie tried to evade but she was already weak and only felt
Narcisa Batayola, Daisy Gonzales, Josie Gonzales, Yolanda Arque, Wenifredo pain (TSN, 8-26-70, pp. 458-463; 8-27-90, pp. 1-23).
Magallanes, a certain Bunag and several children ranging from two (2) to nine (9)
years of age. All in all, 17 persons were on board M/L Elsa with some cargoes On the other hand, Narcisa Batayola likewise attempted to jump but Magbanua also
consisting of liquor like tanduay, beer, coke, etc. The vessel left Puerto Princesa at held her at the back portion of her dress and told her to return to the place where she
3:00 o’clock in the morning, navigating towards the lighthouse but due to big waves and the other children were originally hiding. She saw the accused ransacking the
and strong winds, the launch was forced to seek shelter at Balon, Sta. Lucia, Puerto cargoes and taking the contents thereof. Moments later, Roberto Aguirre then with a
Princesa City, arriving thereat about 6 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning where they were pistol held Narcisa on the shoulders while Eduardo Mendoza held her legs and
stranded because of the bad weather and the damaged rudder of the launch (TSN, 2- wrestled her down. Aguirre had sexual intercourse with her followed by Mendoza.
18-70, pp. 169-176). Thereafter, Rodolfo Aspili brought her out toward a sawali and right there and then
made her lay down in a slanting position. When Aspili was having sexual intercourse
While at the aforementioned place, near the site of the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony, in the with her, nobody was holding her but she could no longer resist as she was already
afternoon between one and three o’clock, two persons went aboard the M/L Elsa. exhausted and weak (TSN, 11-16-70, pp. 147-167).
They were identified by Josie Gonzales as Pacifico Rebutido and Rodolfo Aspili, and
after Pepito Severino handed to them the liquor they left the launch (TSN, 8-26-70, pp. Subsequently, the six accused left the launch and boarded their banca. Thereafter,
437-442). Josie and Narcisa together with the children jumped into the water and swam to the
bakawan to hide. They were rescued by the ‘Baracuda Launch.’ In the process, the
It was later established that said two accused together with the other four, namely: dead bodies of Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque were found.
Ernesto Magbanua, Rodolfo Sales, Roberto Aguirre and Eduardo Mendoza, all
convicts — colonists of Sta. Lucia Penal Colony, had been drinking liquor (tanduay) Necropsy examination on the cadavers of Daisy and Yolanda showed that both died of
since the morning of December 28, 1969 even as they hatched the plan to escape suffocation by drowning as blood was coming out from their nose, mouth and opening
from the Penal Colony with the use of M/L Elsa. The buying of the tanduay served of both ears due to rapture of tempanic membrane (TSN, 2-17-70, pp. 109-124).
also the purpose of acquainting the herein accused that the crew and passengers of
M/L Elsa were innocent, peaceful and unarmed (TSN, 11-26-40, pp. 307-312). Dr. Dueñas, the examining physician, likewise found that Josie Gonzales and Narcisa
Batayola both had undergone sexual penetration recently.
Between 7 and 8 o’clock in the evening of the same day, the six accused carried out
their agreed plan to escape and, fully armed with pistols and boloes, they boarded the Subsequently, both Josie Gonzales and Narcisa Batayola filed separate complaints
launch bringing with them chicken and dried fish. Upon boarding the launch, they charging the herein, six accused with the crimes of Rape with Homicide and Robbery
placed themselves in strategic positions. Magbanua talked to the patron of the launch in Band." (Brief for the plaintiff-appellee, pp, 2-8, Rollo, p. 334)
who ordered the engine operator, Pepito Severino, to fetch four bottles of tanduay.
While in the act of handing the tanduay to Magbanua, the latter suddenly thrust his On the basis of the above-mentioned alleged acts committed by the accused, the
bolo at Severino’s abdomen, at the same time pointing a pistol at him shouting following criminal cases were filed:cralawnad
‘walang kikilos’ (nobody moves). This prompted Severino to jump into the sea, after
seeing also the rest of the accused draw their bolos. Witnessing all these hostile acts 1. Criminal Case No. 3
and having evaded a stab by Rodolfo Sales who nevertheless chased him, Catalino
Nadayao was constrained to jump overboard. Some passengers and the rest of the for
crew who were frightened by the shouting of Magbanua and the ensuing commotion

251
Rape with Homicide and with Robbery in Band
COMPLAINT
"The undersigned complainants, after having been duly sworn to oath in accordance
with law, accuse RODOLFO ASPILI, ERNESTO MAGBANUA, EDUARDO
MENDOZA, RODOLFO SALES, ROBERTO AGUIRRE and PACIFICO REBUTIDO, of
the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND WITH ROBBERY IN BAND, committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘That on or about the 28th day of December, 1969, in Sitio Balon, Sta. Lucia Sub-
Colony, Municipality of Puerto Princesa, Province of Palawan, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who are all serving
sentence by virtue of a final judgment in the Iwahig Penal Colony, Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, forcibly
boarded the motor launch named ‘M/L ELSA’ which was then at anchor seeking
shelter in the vicinity due to bad weather and while on board the said vessel the
accused Ernesto Magbanua, Rodolfo Sales, and Pacifico Rebutido, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with deliberate intent and lewd designs and by
means of force, violence and intimidations using guns and boloes for the purpose, had
sexual intercourse one after the other with the herein complainant JOSIE GONZALES,
a minor 13 years of age, against her will, she being one of the 17 passengers aboard
the said vessel while the rest of the accused were either having carnal knowledge with
another victim NARCISA BATAYOLA, likewise a minor 15 years of age, by means of
force and intimidation and against her will; while the others were ransacking the
baggages of the passengers and on the occasion of such acts of the accused, panic
took place aboard the said vessel thus forcing the other passengers to jump
overboard for fear of bodily harm, and as a consequence thereof, DAISY GONZALES
age 15, and YOLANDA ARQUE, age 9, both passengers of the said vessel were
drowned; and further on the occasion thereof, all the accused took and carried away,
unlawfully and feloniously and against the will of the owners thereof, cash amount of
money, personal belongings and cargoes aboard the vessel amounting to no less than
TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.’"
Rape with Homicide and with Robbery in Band
COMPLAINT
"That on or about the 28th day of December, 1969, in Sitio Balon, Sta. Lucia Sub-
Colony, Municipality of Puerto Princesa, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who are all serving
sentence by virtue of a final judgment in the Iwahig Penal Colony, Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, forcibly boarded
the motor launch named ‘M/L ELSA’ which was then at anchor seeking shelter in the
vicinity due to bad weather and while on board the said vessel, the accused Roberto
Aguirre, Eduardo Mendoza and Rodolfo Aspili, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and with deliberate intent and lewd designs and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, using guns and boloes for the purpose had sexual
intercourse, one after the other, with herein complainant, Narcisa Batayola, a minor 15
years of age, against her will, she being one of the 17 passengers aboard the same
vessel while the rest of the accused were either having carnal knowledge with another
victim, Josie Gonzales, likewise a minor 13 years of age, by means of force and
intimidation and against her will; while the others were ransacking the baggages of the
passengers and on the occasion of such acts of the accused, panic took place aboard
the said vessel, thus forcing the other passengers to jump over board for fear of bodily
harm, and as a consequence thereof, Daisy Gonzales age 15 and Yolanda Arque, age
9, both passengers of the said vessel were drowned; and further on the occasion
thereof, all the accused took and carried away unlawfully and feloniously and against
the will of the owners thereof, cash amount of money, personal belongings and
cargoes of the vessel amounting to no less than P2,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"Contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstances of night time, by an armed
band in an uninhabited place, recidivism and/or reiteration, with evident premeditation,
superior strength and with the use of craft, fraud or disguise, and penalized under Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4111 in relation to Art. 160
of the same Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by an Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Philippines, January 7, 1970
armed band, in an uninhabited place, recidivism and or reiteration, with evident
premeditation, superior strength and with the use of craft, fraud or disguise, and (SGD.) CRISTITO ARQUE (SGD.) NARCISA BATAYOLA Y ARQUE Guardian-Uncle-
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Complainant Complainant"
No. 4111 in relation to Article 160 of the same Code." chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library (Rollo, pp. 179-180)

SGD. PABLO GONZALES SGD. JOSIE GONZALES The facts for the defense are summarized by their counsel as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Father-Complainant Complainant
"The true facts of the cases are those testified to by Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo
(Rollo, pp. 15-16) Mendoza, Roberto Aguirre, Rodolfo Sales and Manolo Espino stated briefly hereunder
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
2. Criminal Case No. 4
At about 9:00 o’clock in the morning of December 28, 1969, Ernesto Magbanua and
for Roberto Aguirre left their nipa hut at Santa Lucia Penal Colony and went to the Prison

252
Brigade of the said colony to get their dirty clothes. At the brigade they met three (3)
private persons, passengers or crews of Motor Launch ‘Elsa’. They were eating
‘Camote Cassava’ with the Capataz of the colony on duty, a certain person called
Rudy.
From the brigade, Magbanua and Aguirre proceeded to the hut of Pacifico Rebutido.
There they saw Pacifico Rebutido, Rodolfo Aspili, Rodolfo Sales and Eduardo
Mendoza drinking tanduay which were brought to Rebutido’s hut by the three (3)
private persons from the Motor Launch ‘Elsa’.
At about 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same date, Ernesto Magbanua and his
companions returned to the colony brigade for the usual daily checking and counting
of prisoners. After the checking-up, the group returned to the nipa hut of Pacifico
Rebutido and there planned to escape from the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony situated in
Puerto Princesa, Palawan. They agreed to hire the Motor Launch ‘Elsa’ anchored
about ten (10) arms length from the wharf of Sta. Lucia Penal Colony in Balon, Puerto
Princesa, Palawan with money, chickens and dried fish.
At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of that date the group, defendants-appellants
herein, went to the Motor Launch ‘Elsa’ using the banca of the colony and bringing
with them money, chickens and dried fish. Ernesto Magbanua boarded the launch
ahead of the rest, talked to the patron of the launch to bring them to liberty and offered
money, chickens and dried fish for their fares. His companions likewise boarded the
motor launch, Rebutido being the last to board the same at the time when the patron
of the launch was still thinking and considering the offer of Magbanua. But when
Rebutido reached the deck of the launch, he stepped on a loose board and fell inside
the engine room. The impact of his fall was so loud that the patron jumped overboard
into the sea shouting to his crews and passengers to likewise jump into the sea. Only
two women, a man and small children remained in the launch. Magbanua told the
remaining persons on board the launch not to jump overboard because they did not
have bad intentions.
Magbanua and his companions then searched for those who jumped into the sea for
anyone who may not know how to swim in order to save him. And they found a small
boy about nine (9) years of age struggling to swim. They saved him by using a pole
and pulling him towards the launch. When asked why he jumped overboard, the boy
said that he jumped because he heard the Captain of the launch shouting to them to
jump into the sea.
When the herein appellants found no more persons on the sea around the launch,
Rodolfo Aspili and Eduardo Mendoza went down to the engine room with one male
passenger of the launch and tried to start the engine. It was at that moment when
Magbanua who remained on the deck saw Josie Gonzales at the prow of the launch.
He asked her to accomodate him for a sexual intercourse, but Josie pointed him
instead to Narcisa Batayola saying that Batayola is the one having experience on the
matter. When told that he (Magbanua) did not like Batayola, Josie agreed to a sexual
intercourse if Magbanua will not harm her. She undressed herself when told to
undress. Then Magbanua opened the zipper of his pants and let Josie hold his penis.
While Josie was holding his penis, Magbanua made her lie down. He inserted his
penis inside the vagina of Josie who complained of pains. It took Magbanua about five
(5) minutes to insert only two inches of his penis inside the vagina of Josie Gonzales.
At that same moment, Rodolfo Sales and Pacifico Rebutido pulled Magbanua up from
Josie Gonzales reminding Magbanua that their agreement was only to escape and
what he was doing to Josie Gonzales was not part of their agreement.
At about the same time that Magbanua was having sexual intercourse with Josie
Gonzales, Roberto Aguirre was also having sexual intercourse with Narcisa Batayola.
Before the intercourse, Aguirre saw Batayola about to jump into the sea. He prevented
her from jumping overboard by holding her. Then he went around the deck of the
launch to see if there were still persons swimming on the water, leaving Batayola at
the prow of the launch. Seeing none, he returned to Batayola and asked her to have
sexual intercourse with him. At first Batayola refused. But later she undressed herself
when told to undress. Aguirre made her lie down and he inserted his penis inside the
vagina of Narcisa Batayola without any difficulty. He made two successive sexual
intercourse with Narcisa Batayola, after which they both dressed up. They were in that
situation when Rodolfo Sales and Pacifico Rebotido arrived, pulled Aguirre away and
they boarded their banca because they saw someone flashlighting the premises at the
shore. Magbanua also called Aspili and Eduardo Mendoza at the engine room and
they likewise boarded their banca and proceeded to the mangrove swamp to escape.
On the way, they noticed that Aspili was left behind." (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 3-6)
The two cases were consolidated and, after hearing, the lower court rendered
judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape with homicide. The dispositive
portion of the decision is set forth below:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, haloed by the illuminating light of all aforegoing facts, laws,
jurisprudence and arguments, this Court finds all the herein accused, namely: Rodolfo
Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza, Jr., Rodolfo Sales, Roberto Aguirre and
Pacifico Rebutido guilty of the crimes of Rape with Homicide, with the aggravating
circumstances of Robbery in Band, taking advantage of nighttime, recidivism, abuse of
superior strength and craft, in the above-entitled Criminal Case No. 3, beyond
reasonable doubt, and sentences all of them to Reclusion Perpetua, and all, likewise,
guilty of the same but separate crime with all the same aforementioned aggravating
circumstances, in the above-entitled Criminal Case No. 4, beyond reasonable doubt
and imposes upon all of them, another separate penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, both
penalties to be served successively, with all its accessory penalties too in both cases,
further, all same six (6) herein accused are sentenced and ordered to pay actual
damages jointly and solidarily as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. P265.00 — to Josie Gonzales;
2. 24.00 — to Narcisa Batayola;
3. 36.00 — to Pepito Severino and
4. P1,675.00 — to Catalino Nadayao, for and the other passengers, named by him to
have suffered losses, in an amount corresponding to each, respectively,
and furthermore, the same six (6) aforenamed accused are sentenced and ordered to
pay, jointly and solidarily, moral damages, in the amount of P25,000.00 to each of
253
Josie Gonzales and Narcisa Batayola, their heirs and assigns respectively, as moral
damages, and ultimately to indemnify in the same manner, the parents, their heirs and
assigns of deceased Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque, the amount of P30,000.00
for each and every death of the said two (2) deceased, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in all the aforecited civil liabilities. It is further
directed that an alias warrant of arrest be issued against Rodolfo Sales and Pacifico
Rebutido and not to be returned until they were in the custody of the law." (Rollo, pp.
290-291)
We agree with the trial court that the prosecution correctly presented the facts of the
case.
The appellants raise the following assignments of errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
I homicide and with robbery in band, for the real nature of the crime charged is
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY
THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS HEREIN ARE RAPE WITH HOMICIDE WITH
THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF ROBBERY IN BAND, NIGHTTIME,
SUPERIOR STRENGTH, RECIDIVISM, AND CRAFT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
HEREIN CONSPIRED TO COMMIT THE OFFENSES OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE
AND CONVICTING ALL OF THEM OF THE SAID CRIMES." (Rollo, pp. 326-327)
The Court finds, at the outset, that the trial judge erred in designating the offense
committed by the appellants as rape with homicide aggravated by robbery in band.
For one, neither in law nor in jurisprudence is there an aggravating circumstance as
robbery in band. More importantly, the evidence shows that what was committed is the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by rape.
The records disclose that the appellants took control of the vessel M/L Elsa by
threatening the crew and passengers with their boloes and pistols. (TSN, pp. 452-459,
August 26, 1970; pp. 137-148, November 16, 1970) Narcisa Batayola, a prosecution
witness, testified that after the commotion that ensued when appellants wielded their
weapons, some of the appellants immediately started ransacking the cargoes and
taking the contents thereof (TSN, p. 148, November 16, 1970) These acts of the
appellants therefore manifest an unlawful intent to gain, through violence and
intimidation of persons, by taking the vessel and personal property of the crew and
passengers, which comprises the crime of robbery.
The overwhelming evidence reveals that the original design of the malefactors was to
commit robbery in order to facilitate their escape from the penal colony. Their original
intent did not comprehend the commission of rape. Hence, the crime of rape cannot
be regarded as the principal offense. In this case, since it attended the commission of
robbery with homicide, the rape is deemed to aggravate the crime but damages or
indemnification for the victim may be awarded. (See People v. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136
[1958]; People v. Tapales, 93 SCRA 134 [1979]). Instead of ignominy, it is the rape
itself that aggravates the crime (People v. Mongado, 28 SCRA 642 [1969]).
With respect to the deaths of Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque, the appellants are
clearly liable therefor since, as held by this Court in People v. Mangulabnan, (99 Phil.
992 [1956]) it is immaterial that the death of a person supervened by mere accident,
provided that the homicide is produced by reason or on occasion of the
robbery.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Since rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, the offense committed
by the appellants is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, aggravated
by rape, punishable under Paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). It does not matter if the technical name assigned to the offense is rape with
determined not by the title of the complaint, nor by the specification of the provision of
the law alleged to have been violated, but by the facts recited in the complaint or
information. (See People v. Oliviera, 67 Phil. 427 [1939]) As the acts constituting
robbery with homicide were clearly set forth in the complaint and proven during trial,
then the appellants may be held liable for such crime, regardless of the erroneous
designation of the offense.
With the foregoing pronouncements, the Court no longer deems it necessary to deal
with the appellants’ argument in their first assignment of error that assuming arguendo
that they are guilty of committing rape, the crimes of rape and homicide should be
viewed as separate and distinct offenses. We have already ruled that the crime
committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, the rape being
considered merely as an aggravating circumstance.
We find no merit in the appellants’ contention that the lower court erred in considering
recidivism as an aggravating circumstance. All the appellants are recidivists. They
were serving sentence at the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony by virtue of a final judgment of
conviction when they committed the above-mentioned offenses. Rodolfo Aspili,
Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza and Pacifico Rebutido have previously been
convicted of the crimes of frustrated homicide, serious physical injuries, theft, and
murder and trespass to dwelling, respectively. Both Rodolfo Sales and Roberto
Aguirre have previously been convicted of robbery in band.
We likewise uphold the trial court’s finding that the crime was aggravated because it
was committed by a band. All the six appellants were armed when they boarded the
vessel and perpetrated their dastardly acts. There is also abuse of superior strength,
since most of the victims were women and children ranging from 2 to 9 years
old.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
However, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and craft should not have been
considered by the lower court. There was no showing that the appellants purposely
sought the cover of night when they committed the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide. Neither did the appellants employ craft, since they had already boarded
the vessel when they pretended to buy Tanduay Rum in exchange for the dried fish
254
and chicken they were carrying. Even without such pretense, they could nonetheless is urged to read the records of the case before acting on the applications.
have carried out their unlawful scheme.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 3 and 4 is AFFIRMED
With respect to the second assignment of error, the appellants’ contention that there but MODIFIED. The appellants are found guilty of the special complex crime of
was no conspiracy in the commission of rape becomes immaterial in view of the fact robbery with homicide with the aggravating circumstances of rape, recidivism, in band
that all of them directly participated in its commission. Appellants Magbanua, Sales and abuse of superior strength and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
and Rebutido took turns in raping Josie Gonzales, while appellants Aguirre, Mendoza of reclusion perpetua. The award of actual damages is hereby affirmed. The awards
and Aspili ravished Narcisa Batayola. The Court accords more weight and credence to representing indemnity for the deaths are increased to P50,000.00 for each victim
the testimonies of complainants Gonzales and Batayola. These two girls, 13 and 15 while the moral damages for the rapes are increased to P30,000.00 for each victim.
years old respectively, would not subject themselves to the rigors of a public trial if
they were not motivated by an honest desire to punish their assailants. Moreover, their SO ORDERED.
narrations were corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Juanito Duenas who physically
examined Gonzales and Batayola and found that both indeed had just undergone Fernan, C.J. and Bidin, J., concur.
sexual penetration.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
The interlocking extrajudicial confessions executed by the appellants are admissible
even if they were not informed of their right to counsel. These confessions were all
Republic of the Philippines
taken in January 1970, long before the 1973 Constitution took effect. Article III Section
SUPREME COURT
20 of the 1973 Constitution, for the first time, concretized the present right of persons
Manila
under custodial investigation to counsel, how to be informed of such right and the
effect of non-compliance. The requirements and restrictions surrounding this
constitutional guarantee, however, have no retroactive effect and do not apply to EN BANC
confessions taken before January 17, 1973, the date of effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. (See Magtoto v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 [1975])
G.R. No. L-34785 July 30, 1979
At any rate, even without considering these extrajudicial confessions, the Court is
convinced that the guilt of appellants has been incontrovertibly established beyond THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
reasonable doubt by the prosecution. vs.
RENATO BARRIOS Y ALMOGUERA and RICO NAZARIO Y IBAÑ;EZ, accused.
The Court, however, finds that the trial judge erred in imposing upon the appellants
two separate penalties of reclusion perpetua, both penalties to be served
successively. The basis for this imposition by the lower court is its finding that the Renato L. Ramos, for accused Renato Barrios.
appellants are guilty of two crimes of rape with homicide, one for the rape of Josie
Gonzales and the other for the rape of Narcisa Batayola. We have already Cristobal A. Cantor (Counsel de Oficio) for accused Rico Nazario.
pronounced, though, that the rape committed is merely an aggravating circumstance.
Since the appellants are found guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide aggravated by rape, recidivism, in band and abuse of superior strength, Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T.
then, applying Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, only one penalty Limcaoco and Solicitor Carlos N. Orrega for appellee.
of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed.cralawnad

In passing, it may be mentioned that the crimes committed by appellants are now
denominated as piracy in Philippine waters, punishable under Presidential Decree No.
532. We find it unnecessary to retroactively apply the provisions thereof in favor of the
appellants because the acts committed by them are likewise punishable therein
by reclusion perpetua.
Considering the perversity accompanying the crime, the heinous nature not only of the
offense but its manner of commission, and the refusal of the accused to learn from
their earlier convictions, the Court strongly feels that the sentences herein imposed
must be fully served. Any official who goes over any applications for pardon or parole
FERNANDEZ, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
This is an automatic review of the amended decision dated January 13, 1972 of the
Circuit Criminal Court of Manila in CCC-VI-733 (71) entitled "The People of the
Philippines versus Renato Barrios and Rico Nazario" finding the two accused guilty of
the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing each one of them to death and to
jointly and severally pay the heirs of the victim Teodoro Castillo y Molina the sum of
P12,000.00 for the death of said victim and the sums of P10,000.00 as moral

255
damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P7.00 representing the amount
taken from the deceased and to pay the costs. 1 C
.
The two accused, Renato Barrios y Almoguera and Rico Nazario v Ibañ;ez were
C
charged in September 1971 with the crime of robbery with homicide in the
A
following. têñ.£îhqwâ£
S
A
INFORMATION S

A
The undersigned accuses Renato Barrios y Almoguera and Rico s
Nazario y Ibañ;ez of the crime of robbery with homicide, s
committed as follows:
i
s
That on or about August 28, 1971, in the City of Manila, t
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with a
one another whose Identity and whereabouts are still unknown n
and helping one another. did then and there wilfully, unlawfully t
and feloniously, by means of force and violence, and with intent to
gain, take away from Teodoro Castillo y Molina, a taxi driver, the F
latter's earnings of undetermined amount, to the damage and i
prejudice of the said Teodoro Castillo y Molina in the said s
undetermined amount; that on the occasion of the said robbery c
and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry a
away the aforesaid earning of Teodoro Castillo y Molina, the l
herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, I hereby certify that an ex-parte investigation in this case has
assault and use personal violence upon the said Teodoro Castillo been conducted by me in accordance with law; that there is
y Molina, by then and there stabbing him with a bladed reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has been
instrument, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
were the direct cause of his death thereafter.

Manila, Sept. 13, 1971. 2

Contrary to law. têñ.£îhqwâ£

The facts, as found by the trial court, are:

(
S
G A careful study of the evidence presented, shows the fact that
D victim Teodoro Castillo y Molina, a taxi driver, was killed and
. robbed of his earnings has never been disputed. The only issue in
) this case, therefore, is the criminal participation of the accused.

R
The corroborating statements of both accused (Exhibit "F",
O
statement of Nazario and Exhibit "G", statement of Barrios)
D
indubitably show that said accused, together with one Arthur, who
O
is still at large, conspired, confederated with and helped one
L
another in killing and robbing the victim. Nazario admitted in his
F
statement (Exhibit "F") that he invited Barrios to stage a hold-up in
O
Perlita Street. Thereupon, a taxi passed by and he stopped it.

256
 They boarded the same and he sat in the front seat while Barrios
and Arthur sat at the back with Arthur immediately behind the
driver of the taxi. Thereafter, Barrios poked the balisong on the
taxi driver. Then they pulled said taxi driver to the rear seat in
order to frisk him but the driver shouted for help. Fearing that they
might be heard and the driver would create a scandal, Barrios
immediately stabbed the driver 3 times. Thereafter, he and his
companions filed. Nazario further declared that Barrios also
stabbed the taxi driver because he fought back.
Barrios likewise admitted in his statement (Exhibit "G") that they actually stopped the
taxi at the corner of Perlita and Estrada Streets and got the money of the driver but the
driver fought back and for which reason he stabbed him with a kitchen knife. After that,
he and his two companions fled. He cannot remember the number of times he
stabbed the taxi driver because he was then drunk. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The fact that both accused confessed to the truth is strongly
.shown by the corroborating testimony of Generoso Quimpo, Jr.,
who Testified in a spontaneous, categorical, logical and
straightforward manner with marked fluency and ease that
between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m. of August 28, 1971, while he was still
half-awake, he heard a commotion consisting of a sound of a
sound of a car, a radio and the struggle of some men. He even
heard a shout "iwanan mo na iyan" and the slamming of tile door
of the taxi. He looked out of the window and saw a taxi at
standstill, around 9 to 10 meters away, but with the engine on.
Inside the taxi, he saw two men at the rear seat struggling. Then
the driver (he said he is the driver because he was the one who
shouted "magnanakaw") came out and started running towards
Perlita Street shouting "magnanakaw, magnanakaw" The man
who was inside, at the rear of the taxi, also went out and ran on
the opposite direction towards Estrada. In other words, the
testimony of Quimpo, Jr. that he saw two men struggling in the
rear seat of the taxi, one of whom he believes to be the taxi driver
because he was the one shouting "magnanakaw," corroborates
the admission of Nazario that they pulled the taxi driver from the
front to the rear seat in order to frisk him of his money (Exhibit "F",
answer to question No. 6): the testimony of Quimpo, Jr. that the
taxi driver went out of his Taxi and shouted corroborates also a
portion of the answer of Nazario to question No. 6 (Exhibit "F")
that the taxi driver got out of his taxi and shouted; and the
testimony of Quimpo, Jr. that he saw two men struggling at the
back of the taxi also corroborates the statements of Nazario and
Barrios that Barrios stabbed the taxi driver because the latter
fought back. The crediblity of Quimpo, Jr. Cannot be doubted for
in the absence of evidence showing improper motive actuating
the principal prosecution witnesses tends to sustain the
conclusion that no such improper motive existed and their
testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit (People versus
Amiscua, L-31238, February 27, 1971). 3
The two accused maintained that they were maltreated into giving their statements
admitting their participation in the commission of the crime charged in the information.
This ,contention has no merit.
The statements in question were subscribed and sworn to before Assistant Fiscal
Avelino Concepcion of Manila. There is no showing that the two accused refused or
even hesitated to sign and swear to said statements. They did not complain to his
fiscal that they were maltreated by the police officers. these circumstances, the
statements are considered to have been voluntarily given. 4
The assertion of the accused Rico Nazario that he did not to the fiscal before whom he
subscribed and swore to, the statement because he was afraid of the police officers is
not Considering the gravity of the offense, it. is logical to ;assume that the fiscal
examined thoroughly the two accused on the voluntariness of their statements. if the
two accuses were really maltreated they should have complained because he
probable penalty of death for the crime charged is more awesome than the feared
reprisal of the police. Moreover, there is no evidence of the alleged maltreatment other
than the bare assertion of the accused.
The statements of the two accused contain details of which could only have been
furnished by them. The allegation of Nazario that they drink first beer or liquor in the
railroad track in Perlita Street; that he was the one who sat in front of the taxicab while
the other accused sat on the rear seat: that Barrios was the one who poked a knife at
the taxi driver: that the driver was pulled to the rear seat of the taxicab so that he could
be frisked of his money: that the driver shouted "saklolo, tulungan ninyo ako"; and that
the driver was stabbed because he fought back are details that could not have been
concocted by the police investigators,
The accused, Renato Barrios, narrated in his statement that the driver fought back
when the former took his money; that q-aid accused stabbed the driver with a kitchen
knife; that before the robbery, he and the other accused first drank liquor by the bridge
going to the railroad track; that he knows Col. Quimpo who lives at the corner of
Estrada and Perlita Streets; that it is true that he went to Col. Quimpo three (3) days
after the incident and asked what said accused should do as he is one of those being
suspected in the killing and robbing of the driver as reported in a newspaper; and that
he read in the Daily Star that he is a suspect and Col. Quimpo is a witness. These
details could not having been known to the police investigators.
It is a settled rule that where the statement of the accused mentions details which only
the declarant could have furnished and could not have been concocted by the
investigator, the confession is considered to have been voluntarily given. 5
Moreover, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that the
police officers who investigated the accused performed their official duties regularly. 6
257
The defense interposed by the accused that on August 28, 1971 they were narrating
stories in the house at 2473 Perlita Street, the residence of Renato Barrios, is not
credible, Alibi is a defense that can very easily be concocted. For this reason, alibi to
be sustained as a defense must be supported by strong evidence. The evidence of the
accused in support of their alibi is weak. It is strange that the accused and their
companions should be conversing up to 2:30 o'clock in the morning. This is contrary to
the ordinary course of things. Besides, Virginia Siscon, a witness of the accused,
declared that she conversed with the accused and other persons only up to 10:00
o'clock in the evening of that date. The place where the accused and other persons
allegedly told stories was at 2473 Perlita Street which was near the scene of the
crime. The crime was committed on the same street. There was every possibility for
the two accused to have been present at the scene of the crime although earlier that
evening they were conversing with other people in the house at 2473 Perlita Street.
It has been held that for alibi to prosper, the evidence must show that the accused
was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the
crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 7
The evidence of the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the
two accused committed the crime charged in the information.
It is clear from the foregoing testimony that when Generoso M. Quimpo, Jr. looked out
of the window from his house, the taxicab was already at a standstill and that only two
men were struggling at the rear seat of the taxicab, the driver of the taxicab and one
man. This testimony of the prosecution witness also rules out the existence of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Only one man was struggling
with 'The taxi driver at the rear seat of the taxicab and the witness saw only one man
coming out of the rear of the taxicab running towards the opposite direction going to
Estrada Street.
It is settled that an aggravating circumstance should be proven as fully as the crime
itself in order to aggravate the, penalty. 8
In view of the foregoing, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of death. The
crime was committed without the presence of any aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the decision under automatic- review is hereby affirmed, with the sole
modification that the penalty imposed on the two accused is reclusion perpetua, with
costs against said accused.

SO ORDERED.
The trial court imposed the death penalty on both accused because of the finding that
the commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of craft
and abuse of superior strength without any mitigating circumstance. The evidence of Fernando C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero,
the prosecution has not established the aggravating circumstances of craft and abuse De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
of superior strength.
Aquino, J., concur in the result.
Craft is a circumstance characterized by trickery or cunning resorted to by the
accused to carry out his design.
Santos * and Abad Santos, * JJ., is on leave.

The trial court found that craft was present because the two accused stopped the
taxicab by pretending to be passengers. There is no evidence that the two accused
pretended to be passengers. In fact, it is not clear how the taxicab was stopped. The
only eyewitness for the prosecution, Generoso M. Quimpo, Jr., declared that between
2:00 and 2:30 o'clock in the morning of August 28, 1971, he was half-awake when
there occurred a commotion outside his house consisting of a sound of a car, radio
and the struggling of some men; that upon looking out of the window, he saw a taxicab
at a standstill about 9 or 10 feet away from the window; that he was in the second floor
of the house; that the engine of the car was running; that before looking outside, the
witness heard a man shouting "Iwanan mo na yan."; that when he heard the slamming
of the door of the taxicab and he peeped out immediately, he saw the taxicab already
parked outside; that he saw two men struggling inside the taxicab at the rear seat; that
the taxi driver came out and ran towards Perlita Street shouting "magnanakaw, SECOND DIVISION
magnanakaw.": that a few seconds after the taxi driver had run out, the man inside the
taxicab at the rear also ran towards the opposite direction going to Estrada Street; and [G.R. No. 84714. October 5, 1990.]
that the two persons struggling at the rear of the taxicab were the taxi driver and a
man. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
JANUARIO DELA CRUZ y HURADO, Accused-Appellant.

258

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Reynaldo C . Tarongoy for Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J.:
The accused contests the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, 1 finding him guilty of murder and sentencing him to
suffer reclusion perpetua plus actual damages.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
The evidence for the prosecution reveals the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On August 3, 1987 at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening,
Reynaldo Pascasio, a tricycle driver, was on his motorized
tricycle parked infront of the "Big Foot" Bar located at East
Dirita, San Antonio, Zambales, near the crossroad of the
National Highway and the road leading to the U.S. Naval
Communication Station at San Miguel, San Antonio,
Zambales. While there, Accused Januario dela Cruz, who
crossed the road approached him and told him "Maykadtoy ta
adda ibelleng", which in English is "Come here, we shall
throw something." Responding, he went with the accused
Januario dela Cruz infront of the gate of the Guerrero
Compound where the latter’s companions were. From where
Reynaldo Pascasio was parked infront of the "Big Foot" Bar,
the accused’s companions were about eight (8) meters away
across the street. Then, three (3) male persons, as well as
accused Januario dela Cruz boarded the tricycle. The three
(3) companions of Januario dela Cruz rode inside the sidecar
of the tricycle, while accused Januario dela Cruz rode in
tandem with Reynaldo Pascasio on the motorcycle of the
tricycle. Of his four (4) passengers, only accused Januario
dela Cruz was known to Reynaldo Pascasio, having known
him for the past three (3) years. After boarding the tricycle,
the persons inside the sidecar told Reynaldo Pascasio to
bring them to the terminal at Olongapo City. However, he was
later told to proceed to San Narciso, Zambales (p. 21, t.s.n.,
November 17, 1987). While on the way to San Narciso,
Zambales, near the Elementary School of Barangay
Beddeng, San Narciso, Zambales, Reynaldo Pascasio heard
the shout in the vernacular, "Array" and blood spurted from
the sidecar and landed on his forearm, as well as on the
steering bar of his motorcycle (p. 30, Ibid). Upon hearing this,
Reynaldo Pascasio stopped his tricycle and one of the
passengers in the sidecar, who was bloodied, was brought
out from the tricycle by the other two (2) passengers in the
sidecar. Once on the ground, the two (2) passengers mauled
the bloodied passenger. Later, they threw him by the
roadside. While this was going on, Accused Januario dela
Cruz was standing behind Reynaldo Pascasio. Afterwards,
the accused Januario dela Cruz and the two (2) unidentified
persons boarded the tricycle and Januario dela Cruz directed
Reynaldo Pascasio to bring them to his (Januario dela Cruz’)
place (p. 26, Ibid), leaving behind the bloodied person, whom
the two (2) unidentified companions of Januario dela Cruz
threw away by the roadside infront of the Beddeng
Elementary School.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
In going to the house of accused Januario dela
Cruz, Accused Januario dela Cruz directed Reynaldo
Pascasio to pass through the alley behind the Mini Mart,
instead of passing through the checkpoint at the road leading
to the U.S. Naval Communication Station, and exited into the
road going to the Base (p. 28, t.s.n., November 17, 1987).
Upon arrival at the house of accused Januario dela Cruz, the
two (2) unidentified passengers alighted from the tricycle and
accused Januario dela Cruz washed away the blood from the
steering bar and inside the sidecar with water in a pail, using
a rag, which he got from his neighbor (p. 30, Ibid). And while
accused Januario dela Cruz was washing the tricycle, the two
(2) persons went behind the house of accused Januario dela
Cruz where the wound of one of them was treated by them (p.
33, t.s.n., supra).
Later, after washing the tricycle, Accused Januario dela Cruz
gave Reynaldo Pascasio the amount of P7.00 and the latter
went home. Because he was afraid, he did not report the
incident to the police. However, five (5) days later, he was
arrested by the police and was investigated. He gave his
statement to the police narrating the incident that occurred in
the evening of August 3, 1987 (Exhibit "C"): And it was after
his arrest that he learned from the father of the slain man that
the latter’s name was Jerry Pamoleras.
The following morning at 6:00 o’clock on August 4, 1987,
Barangay Captain Ricardo Abinsay of Barangay Beddeng,
San Narciso, Zambales reported to the Station Commander
of the police station of San Narciso, Zambales his discovery
of the dead body. In turn, the Station Commander P/Lt.
Manuel Tejada, dispatched Pat. Arsenio Agawin and Pat.
Salvador Wagma, to the place where the body was found.
259
Taking the mini-bus, the two (2) peace officers arrived at the
scene infront of the Beddeng-Mabangcal Elementary School
at Barangay Beddeng, San Narciso, Zambales at about 6:30
a.m. where they came upon P/Lt. Amado Fariñas viewing the
dead body of a person, who was wearing a red undershirt
(sando and a white pant, bloodied and lying flat on his
stomach on the ground. Lt. Fariñas then gave the wallet,
which he took from the pocket of the dead person’s pants, to
Pat. Agawin, which contained an I.D. with a name "Jerry
Reyes" (p. 7, t.s.n., January 12, 1988). Thereafter, the body
was transported to the police station of San Narciso,
Zambales. On the same date in the morning, Dr. Jaime
Braga, the Rural Health Physician of the San Narciso Rural
Health Unit performed a post-mortem examination of the
cadaver found infront of Beddeng-Mabangcal Elementary
School and found the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"lacerated wound proximal 3rd arm posterior aspect (L)
— Incised wound palmar surface
— Stab wound 2 cm length neck lateral
— Stab wound 2 cm length medical scapular
— Stab wound 2 cm length vertebral area posterior
— Lacerated wound 3 cm knee
which injuries caused the cardiorespiratory arrest, and
consequently, caused the death of said person, identified
through his wallet as "Jerry Reyes" (Exhibit "B"). Dr. Braga
issued a death certificate (Exhibit "A").
In the meantime, Rodolfo Pamoleras, who last saw his son at
his house in Olongapo City on August 3, 1987 was informed
by his wife that his father who lives at Iba, Zambales, has told
her that their son had been missing for three (3) days already.
But, somehow, on August 6, 1987, by a stroke of Fate,
Rodolfo Pamoleras’ brother-in-law, a tricycle driver, was told
by a woman traveller from San Narciso, Zambales that a
dead body was found in San Narciso (p. 20, Ibid). Reacting to
this information, he and his wife went to San Narciso at about
7:00 p.m. on August 6, 1987 (p. 20, Ibid) and talked to the
Chief of Police (Station Commander) of the San Narciso INP.
Because the cadaver of their son was already buried, they
and the police chief were able to identify the deceased as
their son, through the latter’s picture they brought (Exhibit "E-
1") and the wallet, which contained an ID card showing the
name "Jerry Reyes." The deceased was using the family
name of his mother, "Reyes", because Pamoleras is long and
cannot be contained in the identification card.
Upon learning that their son was already buried, Rodolfo
Pamoleras, Sr. talked to his wife and they agreed that the
body of their son should be exhumed to determine if it was
really their son’s body that was buried by the police. So, on
August 7, 1987, witnessed by the policemen of San Narciso,
Zambales, the security men of the Martin Funeral Parlor,
Rodolfo Pamoleras, Sr. exhumed the body of his son, Rodolfo
Pamoleras Jr. alias "Jerry R. Reyes." When the coffin was
opened, he identified the body as that of his son through the
growth at the tip of the ear, the rotten front teeth, the Red T-
shirt his son was wearing when he saw him for the last time
and the shoes his son was wearing, which belonged to him.
He also identified the body in the coffin because of the
similarity of his and that of his son’s facial features. Then, a
photograph of the dead body of his son inside the coffin was
taken (Exhibit "E").
(L)
Because the sister of Rodolfo Pamoleras’ wife was buried at
(R) Subic, Zambales, and his wife wanted their son buried there,
the remains of his son was re-buried at Subic, Zambales. For
(R) the burial services, he spent P3,000.00 (Exhibit "C") and
P3,000.00 for expenses in the exhumation and for the nine
(9) days prayer which are not supported by receipts. 2
(L)" The version of the accused, on the other hand, is as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On the other hand, as claimed by accused Januario dela
Cruz, he knows prosecution witness Reynaldo Pascasio and
are friends (p. 8, t.s.n., April 5, 1988) and Reynaldo Pascasio
drives a tricycle whose route is from the town proper of San
Antonio, Zambales to the gate of the U.S. Naval
Communications Facility at San Miguel, San Antonio,
Zambales; that at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening on
August 3, 1987, he was standing infront of his cousin’s store
located at the intersection of the National Highway and the
road leading to the U.S. Naval Communication Facility, known
locally as "crossing." He was there because he paid his
indebtedness.
While standing infront of his cousin’s store at West Dirita, a
man, who came from the direction of the Holiday Inn (p. 14,
Ibid) approached him and offered him a bottle of beer, he was
holding, but, he refused. He then asked for his name and the
man gave his name as Doming Lachingco. Thereafter,
Doming Lachingco asked him if he knew somebody who
could bring someone to San Narciso. And he replied he knew
260
a driver named Reynaldo Pascasio, whose tricycle was
parked across the street infront of the "Big Foot" Bar and he
called Reynaldo Pascasio, telling him he had a passenger
(pp. 10-11, t.s.n., April 5, 1988). After calling Reynaldo
Pascasio, the latter and Domingo Lachingco talked to each
other. Afterwards, Reynaldo Pascasio asked him to
accompany him in bringing his passengers to San Narciso
and he acceded. When Domingo Lachingco talked to him, he
was alone and did not know he had companions. But, when
Doming Lachingco boarded the tricycle, two (2) others also
boarded the tricycle (p. 24, Ibid). Of the three (3) passengers,
two were tall. Domingo Lachingco was the tallest, while the
third passenger was the smallest. The latter wore short pants
and a red T-shirt.
On the way to San Narciso, Zambales, a commotion among
passengers ensued inside the sidecar of the tricycle.
Reynaldo Pascasio, the driver, then stopped his tricycle and
the three (3) passengers, including Doming Lachingco inside
the sidecar alighted. Then, the three (3) passengers had a
free-for-all fight on the ground. He noticed that Doming
Lachingco was already bloodied but the deceased was not
yet bloodied. Then, all of a sudden, he saw Doming
Lachingco holding a glittering object, swinging it towards the
shortest man in the group and the latter fell on the right side
of the road just infront of the Beddeng-Mabangcal Elementary
School about four (4) meters from the tricycle. He then told
the tricycle driver, Reynaldo Pascasio, to leave the
passengers. And, the tricycle driver maneuvered his tricycle
in order to leave his passengers in the sidecar, but Doming
Lachingco and his companion held the baggage rack (parilla)
of the tricycle and boarded the tricycle.
After coming from San Narciso, Reynaldo Pascasio drove the
tricycle to his (Januario dela Cruz) house at West Dirita,
which is about one (1) kilometer from the National Highway,
because Reynaldo Pascasio told him, after coming from San
Narciso, that he would bring him home. And, instead of
passing through the access road leading to the U.S. Naval
Communication Facility and the checkpoint, they passed
behind the Mini-Mart and exited into the road going to the
Base. Upon arrival infront of the house of accused Januario
dela Cruz, Doming Lachingco asked Januario dela Cruz if he
could wash his hands at his gate. And after Doming
Lachingco and his companion had finished washing the
tricycle of Reynaldo Pascasio, they left (p. 21, t.s.n., April 5,
1988). Then, he went inside his house; that he did not
voluntarily wash the blood from the sidecar of the tricycle of
Reynaldo Pascasio and he was threatened with death by
Doming Lachingco if he would report the incident. That was
why he did not report the incident (p. 12, t.s.n., April 5, 1988).
To corroborate the claim of Januario dela Cruz that he did not
wash the tricycle of Reynaldo Pascasio, Mercy de Guzman, a
neighbor of accused Januario dela Cruz at Purok 5, West
Dirita, San Antonio, Zambales, declared that between 10:00
and 11:00 o’clock in the evening on August 3, 1987, she was
then at the balcony of her house having some fresh air when
accused Januario dela Cruz alighted from a tricycle. After
alighting therefrom, she saw him go inside his house. 3
In returning its verdict, the lower court relied on the testimony
of Reynaldo Pascasio, who drove the tricycle in which the
stabbing occurred, who narrated in detail the tragic trip from
East Dirita, San Antonio, Zambales to San Narciso,
Zambales, and who implicated dela Cruz as one of the men
who went on that journey.
Dela Cruz assigns a lone error committed supposedly by the
trial court, that is, that it was mistaken in holding him liable as
a co-conspirator in the killing of Rodolfo Pamoleras, Jr.
As the trial court noted, there is no dispute as to the corpus
delicti. Neither is it questioned that Januario dela Cruz did not
personally inflict any injury on the deceased, other than the
fact that at the time the latter died, he was in the scene of the
crime. What is apparent is that it was either Doming
Lachingco 4 (who has since remained at large and hence,
beyond judicial jurisdiction), or the "Doe" accused, who
actually knifed the victim. The issue then is whether or not
dela Cruz may be held responsible on the theory of
conspiracy.
The issue hangs on credibility of witnesses, and in this
connection, this Court has time and time again held that
"credibility" is the sole province of the trial court. 5
Apart from that, the records themselves amply show that
Januario dela Cruz was indeed, a co-conspirator in the
murder of Rodolfo Pamoleras.
Reynaldo Pascasio’s testimony was candid and
straightforward, and more importantly, dela Cruz has shown
no improper motive on Pascasio’s part that may have led him
(Pascasio) to lie on the stand.
Dela Cruz’s version that he had all along been but a chance
passenger in Pascasio’s tricycle and that he had merely
accompanied Lachingco, Et Al., and that on their way, a free-
for-all had broken out leading to the fatal stabbing, is hardly
261
believable. First, according to him, Lachingco was a total Republic of the Philippines
stranger who had merely asked him a favor (to look for a ride SUPREME COURT
to San Narciso). If this were so, there was no need to go with Manila
him on that ride. As common experience suggests, one does
not simply hang around with perfect strangers. Second, he
EN BANC
did nothing after Lachingco had disposed of the victim’s
remains (laid by the roadside), and subsequently, after they
had all gone home. His own evidence does not indicate that G.R. No. L-1292 May 24, 1948
he had indeed, thereafter sought to alert the authorities about
the murder he had witnessed, or at the very least, have
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Pascasio come forward to acquit him. His behavior certainly
does not speak his innocence. vs.
DOMINGO MOBE (alias DOMING), ET AL., defendants.
DOMINGO MOBE (alias DOMING), appellants.
On the testimony alone of Reynaldo Pascasio, this Court is
convinced that Januario dela Cruz was a co-conspirator in the
murder of Rodolfo Pamoleras, Jr., and must be held as a co- Rodolfo M. Medina for appellant.
principal along with the actual killers. A conspiracy exists Assistant Solicitor-General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Antonio A. Torres for
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning appellee.
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 6 While
proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, the
agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the TUASON, J.:
parties, disclosing a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense. 7 Pascasio’s recital This is an appeal by Domingo Mobe from a sentence of "imprisonment for life" for
that dela Cruz was one of Lachingco’s gang, one of whom murder. The appellant was also sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased P2,000 as
thrust a fatal stab wound on the deceased and threw his indemnity, jointly and severally with Leonardo Camoro, and the costs. With the
cadaver by the roadside, after which dela Cruz instructed him, appellant, Camoro was prosecuted for the same crime but was found guilty only as an
Pascasio, to take another route, and that he, dela Cruz, later accomplice and given a lesser penalty. He did not appeal.
washed the dead’s blood off the vehicle, are an eloquent
testimony of a conspiracy in the murder of Rodolfo
Pamoleras, Jr. It is also proof of treachery, in which the Wenceslao Robles, a policeman, testified that on the night of June 10, at about 12
malefactors, without warning and with no risk to themselves, o'clock, he and Catalino Tibon, another policeman, heard reports of the firearms. As it
did away with Pamoleras. On this score, however, this Court was raining hard they did not move from where they sought shelter from the rain. At
can not appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying about 2 o'clock, when the rain had subsided, someone told them that there was a
circumstance, because in evident premeditation, the time wounded man behind the drugstore of Dr. Alonso crying for help. They rushed to that
intervening between the plan to slay the victim and the actual place and found Emilio Deiparine dead and Juan Salco lying on the ground and
slaying must be shown. 8 As to "use of motor vehicle," the groaning in a small alley behind the said drug store. When they asked Juan Saldo,
evidence indeed shows that dela Cruz, Et. Al. had after the latter has given his name, what was the matter, Saldo said he was wounded.
deliberately availed themselves of a tricycle in order to Saldo went on to say that he and four others had intended to rob the drug store; that
consummate their dastardly act and to use it as cover to when he saw the watchman (Deiparine) with a carbine he grasped him to wrest his
facilitate it. 9 gun; that Domingo Mobe then shot the watchman hitting him in the abdomen. (Saldo
was wounded by another shot unintentionally and died three days later in the
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. No hospital.)
Costs.
Simplicio Samson testified that in June, 1946 he was a member of the secret service
SO ORDERED. of Cebu City. At about 1:00 o'clock a.m. of June 11, while on patrol duty with four
other detectives, and after investigating another shooting , he met Robles and Tibon
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur. who told him and his companions that there was a wounded man on T. Padilla Street.
When they reached that place, Juan Saldo was already inside the store of Dr. Alonso
Paras, J., On leave. and the watchman lay dead behind the store. At about 2:40 or 3 o'clock, he
questioned Saldo because he was willing to make ante-mortem confession. Saldo's

262
condition was then very serious. Saldo related that his companions were Domingo
Mobe, Camoro, Tantoy and Longing. When asked Saldo where his companions were
he said they could be found in the house of Candido Caliso and Crispin, which was
700 or 800 meters away. Proceeding to the house indicated, Samson and his fellow
officers saw Domingo Mobe in the act of jumping from the rear window of the house,
with his feet muddy, and arrested him. Samson asked Mobe the whereabouts of his
companion and Mobe pointed the place where they might find Leonardo Camoro.
They caught the latter defendant at the corner of P. del Rosario and D. Pedro Cui
Streets spattered with mud and gasping.
When, after Domingo Mobe and Leonardo Camoro were arrested, they questioned
them, the two defendants said that Domingo Mobe and Longing (who was still at large
at the time of the trial), were the ones who had killed the watchman.
Camoro made a written statement which he later subscribed and swore to before the
municipal judge. He declared that he was taken along by his four companions to rob
the house on T. Padilla Street; that Longing, Owat and Doming carried a pistol each at
Tantoy a hunting knife; that he (Camoro) was unarmed; that upon arrival at the house
which they were spied by the watchman who followed them; that they took cover and
forthwith Owat (Juan Saldo) grasped Deiparine; that Longing and Mobe opened fire
wounding Owat as well as the watchman; that frightened he fled to the house of
Crispin where he lived.
The appellant's evidence consists of a brief testimony of his own. He said he was
asleep in the house of Crispin at the time the killing was said to have occurred, having
gone to bed at about 9 o'clock. He denied he knew Leonardo Camoro before they
were thrown together in the city jail. He said he din not know why he was arrested. "I
was just sleeping and they just asked my name," he said. He also denied he admitted
to the police that he had a gun and hid it among banana plants at Calle Jonquera, as
one of the witnesses for the prosecution testified.
The parties have discussed with commendable ability and earnestness the question of
the admissability and competence against the appellant of Saldo's and Camoro's
declarations. There is no need, however on our part to decide the nice points of law
and fact so ably argued. For outside of the controversial confessions there is enough
evidence to satisfy us beyond rational doubt that the appellant was one of the authors
of the crime.
It has heretofore been seen that when the police authorities closed in upon the house
indicated by Saldo at the wee hours of the morning, Mobe made an attempt to flee, his
feet still covered with mud. It was through his indication that Camoro, who is now
serving his sentence, was apprehended at an unusual hour and where he had no
legitimate business to be. The two defendants lived or had been staying in the same
house. And after both were safely in the hands of the police they confessed their
participation in the crime, although only Camoro's statement was reduced to writing. it
has also been seen that by their admission Mobe and Longing fired the fatal shots.
Mobe further admitted tot he police that he had concealed his pistol or revolver, so he
was accompanied by one of the detectives to the place he mentioned, although the
arm was no longer there when Bacus and Mobe arrived. Surely these details were no
fabrication.
Charged with a capital offense, the accused made a perfunctory denial of policeman
Roble's and detective Samson's testimony. His evidence on his alibi is very weak and
is likewise conspicuous for its brevity. He did not present any witness, which he could
have done very easily if the defense is good, to corroborate his testimony that he went
to bed early and was asleep until awakened by the police. His statement that he did
not know Saldo and only knew Camoro after their arrest is manifestly false and only
serves to bring into relief his disregard for truth.
The crime committed was properly held by the trial court to the murder. It is qualified
by treachery. Even though at the inception of the aggression the deceased carried a
carbine and was at liberty to defend himself against the possible attacks by the
malefactors, it is a fact that at the time the fatal wounds were inflicted he was
defenseless. His freedom of movement was being restrained by one of the culprits
when the appellant and one of his companions fired at the victim. (See U.S. vs.
Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385) The fact that one of the accused held fast the deceased from
behind and the other assaulted him while in his position constitutes a form of
aggression tending to insure its execution without any risk to the aggressors arising
from any defense which the deceased might make. In other words, this assault is
treacherous as defined by this paragraph. (U.S. vs. Valdez, 40 Phil., 876.)
The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, that of the
crime having been committed by a band of more than three armed people, and that "of
(accused) taking advantage in employing means to weaken the defense." But in spite
of this findings and the lack of the mitigating circumstances to upset the aggravating
circumstances said to have been proven, Mobe was sentenced only to "imprisonment
for life." Yet the judgment is correct. We believe with the Solicitor General that the
aggravating circumstance of band has not been clearly established, as only three of
the malefactors have been shown positively to have been armed. As for nocturnity,
this circumstance is embraced in treachery and can not be considered separately from
the latter. (U.S. vs. Salgado, 11 Phil., 56; People vs. Bumanglag, 56 Phil., 10; people
vs. Madrid, G.R. No. 41976, Nov. 4, 1934.) Like nighttime, the circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength is inherent in, and comprehended by, the circumstance
of treachery. When treachery is taken into account as a qualifying circumstance in
murder, it is improper again to consider in addition to that circumstance the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, since the latter is necessarily
included in the former. (U.S. vs. Estopia, 28 Phil., 97; U.S vs. Oro, 19 Phil., 548; U.S.
vs. Vitug, 17 Phil., 1.)
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, the judgment of
the court, below is correct in its result, except that the "imprisonment for life" should be
changed to reclusion perpetua. It is best to employ the legal terminology in the
imposition of a penalty, for the different kinds of incarceration — reclusion prision,
imprisonment, etc. — have their corresponding legal accessories and effects.
263
Within this modification, the appealed decision is affirmed with costs of the appeal Simplicio Samson testified that in June, 1946 he was a member of the secret service
against the appellant. of Cebu City. At about 1:00 o'clock a.m. of June 11, while on patrol duty with four
other detectives, and after investigating another shooting , he met Robles and Tibon
who told him and his companions that there was a wounded man on T. Padilla Street.
Paras, Feria, Perfecto and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
When they reached that place, Juan Saldo was already inside the store of Dr. Alonso
and the watchman lay dead behind the store. At about 2:40 or 3 o'clock, he
Republic of the Philippines questioned Saldo because he was willing to make ante-mortem confession. Saldo's
SUPREME COURT condition was then very serious. Saldo related that his companions were Domingo
Manila Mobe, Camoro, Tantoy and Longing. When asked Saldo where his companions were
he said they could be found in the house of Candido Caliso and Crispin, which was
700 or 800 meters away. Proceeding to the house indicated, Samson and his fellow
EN BANC officers saw Domingo Mobe in the act of jumping from the rear window of the house,
with his feet muddy, and arrested him. Samson asked Mobe the whereabouts of his
G.R. No. L-1292 May 24, 1948 companion and Mobe pointed the place where they might find Leonardo Camoro.
They caught the latter defendant at the corner of P. del Rosario and D. Pedro Cui
Streets spattered with mud and gasping.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO MOBE (alias DOMING), ET AL., defendants. When, after Domingo Mobe and Leonardo Camoro were arrested, they questioned
DOMINGO MOBE (alias DOMING), appellants. them, the two defendants said that Domingo Mobe and Longing (who was still at large
at the time of the trial), were the ones who had killed the watchman.
Rodolfo M. Medina for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor-General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Antonio A. Torres for Camoro made a written statement which he later subscribed and swore to before the
appellee. municipal judge. He declared that he was taken along by his four companions to rob
the house on T. Padilla Street; that Longing, Owat and Doming carried a pistol each at
Tantoy a hunting knife; that he (Camoro) was unarmed; that upon arrival at the house
TUASON, J.: which they were spied by the watchman who followed them; that they took cover and
forthwith Owat (Juan Saldo) grasped Deiparine; that Longing and Mobe opened fire
This is an appeal by Domingo Mobe from a sentence of "imprisonment for life" for wounding Owat as well as the watchman; that frightened he fled to the house of
murder. The appellant was also sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased P2,000 as Crispin where he lived.
indemnity, jointly and severally with Leonardo Camoro, and the costs. With the
appellant, Camoro was prosecuted for the same crime but was found guilty only as an The appellant's evidence consists of a brief testimony of his own. He said he was
accomplice and given a lesser penalty. He did not appeal. asleep in the house of Crispin at the time the killing was said to have occurred, having
gone to bed at about 9 o'clock. He denied he knew Leonardo Camoro before they
Wenceslao Robles, a policeman, testified that on the night of June 10, at about 12 were thrown together in the city jail. He said he din not know why he was arrested. "I
o'clock, he and Catalino Tibon, another policeman, heard reports of the firearms. As it was just sleeping and they just asked my name," he said. He also denied he admitted
was raining hard they did not move from where they sought shelter from the rain. At to the police that he had a gun and hid it among banana plants at Calle Jonquera, as
about 2 o'clock, when the rain had subsided, someone told them that there was a one of the witnesses for the prosecution testified.
wounded man behind the drugstore of Dr. Alonso crying for help. They rushed to that
place and found Emilio Deiparine dead and Juan Salco lying on the ground and The parties have discussed with commendable ability and earnestness the question of
groaning in a small alley behind the said drug store. When they asked Juan Saldo, the admissability and competence against the appellant of Saldo's and Camoro's
after the latter has given his name, what was the matter, Saldo said he was wounded. declarations. There is no need, however on our part to decide the nice points of law
Saldo went on to say that he and four others had intended to rob the drug store; that and fact so ably argued. For outside of the controversial confessions there is enough
when he saw the watchman (Deiparine) with a carbine he grasped him to wrest his evidence to satisfy us beyond rational doubt that the appellant was one of the authors
gun; that Domingo Mobe then shot the watchman hitting him in the abdomen. (Saldo of the crime.
was wounded by another shot unintentionally and died three days later in the
hospital.)
It has heretofore been seen that when the police authorities closed in upon the house
indicated by Saldo at the wee hours of the morning, Mobe made an attempt to flee, his
feet still covered with mud. It was through his indication that Camoro, who is now

264
serving his sentence, was apprehended at an unusual hour and where he had no
legitimate business to be. The two defendants lived or had been staying in the same
house. And after both were safely in the hands of the police they confessed their
participation in the crime, although only Camoro's statement was reduced to writing. it
has also been seen that by their admission Mobe and Longing fired the fatal shots.
Mobe further admitted tot he police that he had concealed his pistol or revolver, so he
was accompanied by one of the detectives to the place he mentioned, although the
arm was no longer there when Bacus and Mobe arrived. Surely these details were no
fabrication.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, the judgment of
the court, below is correct in its result, except that the "imprisonment for life" should be
changed to reclusion perpetua. It is best to employ the legal terminology in the
imposition of a penalty, for the different kinds of incarceration — reclusion prision,
imprisonment, etc. — have their corresponding legal accessories and effects.
Within this modification, the appealed decision is affirmed with costs of the appeal
against the appellant.

Paras, Feria, Perfecto and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Charged with a capital offense, the accused made a perfunctory denial of policeman
Roble's and detective Samson's testimony. His evidence on his alibi is very weak and
is likewise conspicuous for its brevity. He did not present any witness, which he could Republic of the Philippines
have done very easily if the defense is good, to corroborate his testimony that he went SUPREME COURT
to bed early and was asleep until awakened by the police. His statement that he did Manila
not know Saldo and only knew Camoro after their arrest is manifestly false and only
serves to bring into relief his disregard for truth.
SECOND DIVISION

The crime committed was properly held by the trial court to the murder. It is qualified
G.R. No. L-32914 August 30, 1974
by treachery. Even though at the inception of the aggression the deceased carried a
carbine and was at liberty to defend himself against the possible attacks by the
malefactors, it is a fact that at the time the fatal wounds were inflicted he was THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
defenseless. His freedom of movement was being restrained by one of the culprits vs.
when the appellant and one of his companions fired at the victim. (See U.S. vs. LAUREANO SANGALANG, accused-appellant.
Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385) The fact that one of the accused held fast the deceased from
behind and the other assaulted him while in his position constitutes a form of
aggression tending to insure its execution without any risk to the aggressors arising Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R.
from any defense which the deceased might make. In other words, this assault is Ramirez and Solicitor Ma. Rosario Quetulio Losa for plaintiff-appellee.
treacherous as defined by this paragraph. (U.S. vs. Valdez, 40 Phil., 876.)
Narciso V. Cruz, Jr. for accused-appellant.
The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, that of the
crime having been committed by a band of more than three armed people, and that "of
(accused) taking advantage in employing means to weaken the defense." But in spite
of this findings and the lack of the mitigating circumstances to upset the aggravating
circumstances said to have been proven, Mobe was sentenced only to "imprisonment AQUINO, J.:p
for life." Yet the judgment is correct. We believe with the Solicitor General that the
aggravating circumstance of band has not been clearly established, as only three of This is a murder case. The testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses disclose
the malefactors have been shown positively to have been armed. As for nocturnity, that at around six o'clock in the morning of June 9, 1968 Ricardo Cortez left his nipa
this circumstance is embraced in treachery and can not be considered separately from hut located at Sitio Adlas, Barrio Biluso, Silang, Cavite to gather tuba from a coconut
the latter. (U.S. vs. Salgado, 11 Phil., 56; People vs. Bumanglag, 56 Phil., 10; people tree nearby. Flora Sarno, his wife, was left inside the hut. While he was on top of the
vs. Madrid, G.R. No. 41976, Nov. 4, 1934.) Like nighttime, the circumstance of taking tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a volley of shots. He fell to the ground at the
advantage of superior strength is inherent in, and comprehended by, the circumstance base of the coconut tree.
of treachery. When treachery is taken into account as a qualifying circumstance in
murder, it is improper again to consider in addition to that circumstance the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, since the latter is necessarily His wife Flora heard three successive shot coming south of the hut. She went outside
included in the former. (U.S. vs. Estopia, 28 Phil., 97; U.S vs. Oro, 19 Phil., 548; U.S. the hut. From a distance of about twenty-five meters, she saw five men, each armed
vs. Vitug, 17 Phil., 1.) with a long firearm, firing at her husband. He was already wounded and was lying on
the ground at the foot of the coconut tree. His assailants were about five meters away
from him.

265
She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five armed men who were firing at
her husband. She and her brother Ricardo had known Sangalang since their
childhood. She also recognized Conrado Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and
Eleuterio Cuyom as the other malefactors.
Flora ran towards the place where her husband had fallen. She shouted, "Bakit ninyo
pinagbabaril ang aking asawa". The five persons fired at her. She was then about
twenty meters away from them. She retreated to the hut for cover. She heard some
more shots. After the lapse of about five minutes, Laureano Sangalang and his
companions left the place. When Flora returned to the spot where her husband was
prostrate, he was already dead.
On the occasion already described, Ricardo Sarno, twenty-seven years old, a brother
of Flora, was inside his own nipa hut which was about ten meters away from Flora's
hut. He was drinking coffee. His wife and children were eating breakfast. He heard
several shots. He came out of his hut. He saw his brother-in-law being shot by
Laureano Sangalang, Eleuterio Cuyom, Perino Canuel, Irineo Canuel and Conrado
Gonzales. He saw Sangalang using a Garand carbine in shooting his brother-in-law.
The latter fell from the top of the coconut tree after he was shot (10 tsn). His sister
Flora was trying to approach her husband but she had to flee to her hut when
Sangalang and his companions fired at her. He wanted to join her but he was likewise
fired upon by the five men. So, he retired and took refuge in his own hut.
Later, Sarno saw his sister Flora, sitting inside her hut. He followed her after she left
the hut and went to see her dead husband, who was lying on the ground, face up, at
the base of the coconut tree. When he noticed that his brother-in-law was already
dead, he gathered his children and brought them to Sitio Biga, which was more or less
thirty meters away from his hut in Sitio Adlas. Ricardo reported the killing to the chief
of police who went to the scene of the crime with some policemen and
Constabularymen.
The necropsy report shows that the twenty-five-year-old Cortez sustained twenty-three
gunshot wounds on the different parts of the body, fourteen of which were entrance-
wounds, and nine were exit-wounds (Exh. A and B). He died due to the multiple
gunshot wounds (Exh. C).
On June 10, 1968 or on the day following the killing, Flora and Ricardo were
interrogated by the Silang police. They executed sworn statements before the
Municipal Judge pointing to Laureano Sangalang, Conrado Gonzales, Irineo Canuel,
Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the assassins of Ricardo Cortez. Flora said in
her statement that she knew those persons because from time to time they used to
pass by her place. They resided at Barrio Capitula, Dasmariñas, which is near Barrio
Adlas. On the basis of those statements, the police filed on June 10 in the Municipal
Court a complaint for murder against the five aforenamed persons. Sangalang was
arrested. He posted bail in the sum of P50,000 on June 13. He waived the second
stage of the preliminary investigation. The other accused have not been apprehended.
On August 8, 1968 the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for murder against
Sangalang.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Tagaytay City Branch, rendered a
judgment convicting Sangalang of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to pay the heirs of Ricardo Cortez an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos
and to pay his widow moral damages in the sum of ten thousand pesos (Criminal
Case No. TG-162). Sangalang appealed.
The appellant, a fifty-six-year old farmer, admitted that he knew Cortez and that he
knows his wife, Flora Sarno. He pleaded an alibi. He declared that in the afternoon of
June 8, 1968 he and Crispulo Mendoza went to the house of Julian Gatdula at Dapitan
Street, Sampaloc, Manila. He arrived at Gatdula's place at six o'clock. He wanted to
borrow money from Gatdula to defray the matriculation fees of his children.
As Gatdula had no money at that time, he advised Sangalang to wait until morning. He
would try to raise the sum of two hundred pesos which Sangalang desired to borrow.
Sangalang and Mendoza agreed. They allegedly slept in Gatdula's house on the night
of June 8th. The next morning, they breakfasted in that house. At about ten o'clock on
June 9, Gatdula delivered the two hundred pesos to Sangalang. He and Mendoza
then went to the Central Market in Manila and then to Quiapo. They returned to Cavite
and arrived at seven o'clock in the evening of June 9 in Barrio Capdula. Gatdula and
Mendoza corroborated Sangalang's alibi.
In this appeal Sangalang insists on his alibi and impugns the credibility of the
prosecution eyewitnesses, Mrs. Cortez and the victim's brother-in-law, Ricardo Sarno.
The basic issue is whether their eyewitness-testimony that they saw appellant
Sangalang as one of the five armed persons, who riddled Cortez with fourteen
gunshot wounds of entry, is sufficient to overcome his alibi. In essence, the case
projects the ever recurring conflict in criminal jurisprudence between positive
identification and alibi.
The trial court rejected appellant's alibi. It noted that although his witnesses, Mendoza
and Gatdula, learned of his arrest, and Mendoza even visited him in the municipal jail,
Sangalang and his witnesses did not interpose the defense of alibi when he was
investigated by the police and when he was summoned at the preliminary
investigation.
Sangalang points to certain discrepancies in the declarations of Mrs. Cortez and her
brother Ricardo Sarno. Those inconsistencies, which are not glaring, strengthen their
credibility and show that their testimonies were not coached nor rehearsed. The
discrepancies may be attributed to deficiencies in observation and recollection, or
misapprehension of the misleading and confusing questions during cross-examination,
or to the defective translation of the questions and answers but they do not
necessarily indicate a wilful attempt to commit falsehood (People vs. Selfaison, 110
Phil. 839; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 350).
The controlling fact is that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno clearly and consistently testified that
they saw Sangalang, a person already well-known to them, among the five armed
266
persons who shot Ricardo Cortez. That unwavering identification negates appellant's The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
alibi.
Federico Y. Alikpala, Jr., for accused-appellant.
The prosecution did not prove the motive for the killing. On the other hand, Sangalang
did not show that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno were impelled by a malicious desire to falsely
incriminate him. .

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Counsel de oficio meticulously examined the contradictions and deficiencies in the
evidence for the prosecution. He made a spirited defense of the appellant. However,
his efforts failed to cast any reasonable doubt on Sangalang's complicity in the killing.
The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He was
unarmed and defenseless. He was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not give any
immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise attack shows that Sangalang and his
companions employed a mode of execution which insured the killing without any risk
to them arising from any defense which the victim could have made. The qualifying
circumstance of treachery (alevosia), which was alleged in the information, was duly
established (See art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). Hence, the killing can be
categorized as murder (See People vs. Sedenio, 94 Phil. 1046). Treachery absorbs
the aggravating circumstance of band(U. S. vs. Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568). Evident
premeditation, which was alleged in the information, was not proven.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Sangalang (Arts.
64[1] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
Finding no error in its judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental in Criminal Case No. 52-M which imposed the death penalty.
RAFAEL SAYLAN was accused of the crime of rape in the sworn complaint of
Eutropia Agno said to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of January, 1972, at more or less
7:00 o'clock in the evening, at Sitio Craser, Malinao, Jingo City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, with deliberate intent to have sexual
intercourse, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
with the use of a dagger, force and intimidate Eutropia Agno y
Arcay, to remove her pantie and to lay down on the ground and
with the use of a dagger, force and intimidation succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with Eutropia Agno y Arcay, a woman
of good reputation and against her will. That the commission of
the foregoing offense was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of: abuse of superior strength, nighttime,
uninhabited place, ignominy and reiteracion. (Expediente, p. 27.)
The accused entered a plea of "not guilty" and after trial the court rendered the
following judgment:

Antonio, J., took no take part. WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, penalized under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
Republic of the Philippines
4111, and the commission of the offense having been attended by
SUPREME COURT
three aggravating without any mitigating circumstance, hereby
Manila
sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of Six Thousand
EN BANC Pesos (P6,000.00), and to pay the costs. In view of the fact that
the offended party is a married woman, aside from the fact that
she has not become pregnant as a result of the commission of the
G.R. No. L-36941 June 29, 1984
rape, the Court makes no pronouncement as to acknowledgment
and support of offspring. (Id., p. 64.)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. The factual version of the prosecution is summarized in the People's brief as follows:
RAFAEL SAYLAN alias PAEL, accused-appellant.

267
The complaining witness, Eutropia A. Agno, a married woman
and a resident of Barrio Malinao, Gingoog City, was a classroom
teacher of the Malinao Elementary School (pp. 2, 3, tsn., Feb. 22,
1973).
In the afternoon of January 23, 1971, Eutropia went to the public
market in Gingoog City to buy foodstuffs for her family and
thereafter, she proceeded to the store of her mother to fetch her
five-year old daughter Nilsonita (p. 4, tsn., Id.). On their way
home, Eutropia and Nilsonita boarded a passenger jeepney and
while inside the vehicle she (Eutropia) noticed that the other
passengers were Rudy Gonzales, a grade I pupil of the Malinao
Elementary School, the appellant, Rafael Saylan, and a couple
whom she did not know (pp, 5, 6, tsn., Id.). The jeepney went only
as far as Malinas citrus farm because the road to Barrio Malinao
was not passable by vehicles (p. 5, tsn., Id.). It was almost 6:30
o'clock in the evening when the jeepney arrived at the Malinas
citrus farm and so all the passengers alighted and had to walk all
the way to Barrio Malinao which was about three and a half
kilometers away (p. 5, tsn., Id.). After walking some distance and
upon reaching a junction, the couple separated from the group
and took the road leading to their house while Eutropia's group
took the opposite road (p. 9, tsn., Id.).lwphl@itç The appellant,
however, joined the group of Eutropia and when they reached the
place where the road was plain, appellant who was then walking
side by side with Eutropia suddenly pulled out a dagger about
eight inches long and pointing it at the latter said, "Do not shout,
Nang, I will kill you!" (pp. 11, 12, tsn., Id.). At this juncture,
appellant placed his right arm around the neck of Eutropia with
the dagger pointed at her left breast (p. 12, tsn., Id.), after which
he dragged Eutropia at some distance. When they reached the
junction of the trail for men and a trail for carabaos, he ordered
everybody to stop and told the children (Nilsonita and Rudy
Gonzales) to stay behind and threatened to kill them if they
persisted in following them (pp. 17, 18, tsn., Id.). Thereafter,
appellant again dragged Eutropia by her hand and brought her
towards a creek near a coconut tree which was about five meters
away from where Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales were (pp. 14, 15,
16, tsn., Id.).lwphl@itç The appellant then ordered Eutropia to
remove her panty which she refused at first, but appellant
threatened to kill her, so she removed her panty after which
appellant ordered her to lie down (pp. 18, 19, tsn., Id.).
Subsequently, appellant placed himself on top of the victim and
inserted his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her by moving his buttocks up and down (pp.
20,21, tsn., Id.).
After the first sexual act, appellant ordered Eutropia to standup
which the latter helplessly and grudgingly followed (p. 23,
tsn., Id.). Appellant again inserted his penis into her vagina and
then performed a push and puli movement (pp. 23, 24, 25, tsn.,
Id.). Not satisfied with the second intercourse, appellant ordered
Eutropia to lie down again preparatory to a third intercourse (p.
26, tsn., Id.). Appellant again performed the sexual act with her
(pp. 26, 27, tsn., Id.).
After the third intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to stand up
and then he bent her body downwards with her hands and knees
resting on the ground (p. 28, tsn., Id.). When the latter was
already in this position, appellant then placed himself behind her,
inserted his penis into her vagina and executed a push and puli
movement in the dog's way of sexual intercourse (pp. 27, 28,
tsn., Id.)
After performing this uncommon way of sexual intercourse,
appellant ordered Eutropia to he down again which the latter
reluctantly obeyed because appellant's dagger was always
pointed at her and thereafter he had carnal knowledge of her for
the fifth time (pp. 29, 30, tsn., Id.).
After the fifth intercourse, and after satisfying his sexual lust,
appellant asked Eutropia if she will tell her husband what he did to
her and the latter answered, "I will not tell" (p. 31, tsn., Id.). But
she only said this so that appellant would let her go home (p. 33,
tsn., Id.).
Afterwards, Eutropia and appellant returned to the place where
the children were left and upon arriving thereat, they found
Nilsonita (Eutropia's daughter) asleep with Rudy seated dozing
beside her (pp. 32, 33, tsn., Id.). Nilsonita who was sleeping was
carried by the appellant and then they all proceeded to Malinao
(pp. 33, 34, tsn., Id.).
After walking some distance, Eutropia saw the house of her friend
"Ben" and upon approaching the said house, she shouted, "Ben,
Ben, please give me hot water" (p. 34, tsn., Id.). Upon hearing her
voice, Ben, who was still awake at the time, opened the door of
his house and allowed Eutropia to come up (p. 34, tsn., Id.).
Eutropia immediately went upstairs and went straight to the room
of Ben as she was feeling very bad (p. 34, tsn., Id.). Appellant,
who was then carrying Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales, were also
allowed to go upstairs (p. 35, tsn., Id.). Meanwhile, Eutropia
requested Ben to fetch her husband (p. 35, tsn., Id.).
When Eutropia woke up between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock that
evening, her husband was already there (p. 36, tsn., Id.). She
268
then asked him whether the appellant was stin around, and in he and the appellant left the house of Mang Ben and then they
reply, he told her that appellant had already left (p. 37, tsn., Id.). proceeded to his house at Malinao where both of them slept (pp.
Eutropia then told her husband that she was raped by the 7, 21, tsn., Id.). (At pp. 2-8.)
appellant (p. 37, tsn., Id.). Upon learning of the dastardly act
committed by the appellant, he advised his wife to submit herself
The accused did not deny having had sexual intercourse with Mrs. Agno; in fact he
to a medical examination (p. 37, tsn., Id.).
admitted that he copulated with her for three successive times in the early evening of
January 23, 1972, but he claimed that it was with her consent. Accordingly, he now
The following morning, the offended party was brought to the claims that:
office of the City Health Department of Gingoog City where she
was examined by Dr. Ireneo O. Pascual who after conducting a
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SEXUAL
thorough physical examination, issued a medical certificate with
INTERCOURSE HAD BEEN COMMITTED AGAINST THE WILL
the following findings, to wit:
AND CONSENT OF THE COMPLAINANT.

(1) Multiparous.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES HAD ACCOMPANIED THE
(2) Presence of viscid whitish secretions at COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE. (Brief, p. 5.)
vaginal fornix
The appeal must fail for the reasons stated hereunder.
(3) Microscopic examination of secretions
reveals epithelial cells, but no spermatozoa
This is a typical rape case. Only the participants could directly testify on the alleged
Identified.
sexual abuse and the accused alleges consent on the part of the complainant. The
question of credibility arises and under the circumstances We have to rely heavily on
(pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Feb. 24, 1973; Exh. "A"). the determination made by the trial judge who observed the demeanor of the
witnesses while before Us is only the cold transcript of what they said.
Rudy Gonzales, a grade I pupil of the Malinao Elementary School
and one of the witnesses for the prosecution, testified that he met We accept the conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court that the complainant
Mrs. Eutropia Agno in the afternoon of January 23, 1972 at the was in fact raped by the appellant. There is no fact or circumstance in the record
public market of Gingoog City buying foodstuffs for her family (pp. which will justify a different action.
2, 3, tsn., Feb. 26, 1973). On their way back to Barrio Malinao,
they boarded a passenger jeepney and while he was inside the
The claim of the appellant that the sexual intercourse was mutually agreed is utterly
vehicle, he noticed that the other passengers aside from Mrs.
incredible. If it were true that Mrs. Agno consented to have coitus with the appellant,
Agno, her daughter, and himself were the appellant and a couple
her conduct thereafter defies understanding because it is contrary to reason and it has
whose names he did not know ( p. 4, tsn., Id.). The jeepney,
not been shown that Mrs. Agno, a school teacher, was bereft of common sense. For if
however, could only travel up to the Marinas Citrus farm and so
it was true that the sexual act was indeed mutually desired and performed why did she
they had to walk all the way to Barrio Malinao (p. 4, tsn., Id.) After
complain not only to her husband but also to the authorities? An affair such as that
was some distance and upon reaching a trail for carabaos, the
claimed by the appellant is carried out in a discreet manier. On the other hand, the
appellant suddenly pulled a dagger and placed his arms around
version of the complainant has indicia of credibility. For her version bared her shame
the neck of Mrs. Agno and then dragged her towards the carabao
to a small community and her exposure was necessary only because she had to
trail (pp. 4, 5, tsn., Id.). Meanwhile, he and Nilsonita were left
reveal the truth. No, We simply cannot believe the appellant's version.
behind and they fell asleep because it took a long time for the
appellant and Mrs. Agno to come back for them (p. 5, tsn., Id.).
When Mrs. Agno and the appellant returned, he was already We have said above that the findings and conclusions of the trial court are entitled to
awake while Nilsonita was still asleep and so appellant had to great respect. In finding the appellant guilty, this is what the court a quo said in part:
carry her in going home to Man (p. 6, tsn., Id.).lwphl@itç After
was some distance, Mrs. Agno saw the house of Mang Ben and
The testimony of the accused is incredible. When he told his love
because she was feeling bad, they all went to the house of Mang
Ben where Mrs. Agno spent the night (p. 7, tsn., Id.). Afterwards, to the offended party for the first time, they were only two in the
latter's house. He had more time with her then. She refuse him

269
 because she is married. He tried for the second time. He was
again refused because she is married. It is unthinkable and highly
improbable that on the evening of January 23, 1972, after only
three minutes, the offended party would rush to accept his love
and go to the extent of thanking him for his considering her
daughter as his own, unless she was coerced, threatened, forced
and intimidated.
It is highly improbable for a school teacher with several children to
exchange her husband only 40 years old and with a good means
of livelihood for one whom she does not know and whom she has
observed as doing nothing except to play basketball. It is
subversive of the traits, character and nature of Filipino women to
say that the offended party, a school teacher and a girl scout
accepted the love of a man who is good for nothing and
surrendered her whole body and virtue to him after an accidental
courtship of only three minutes. The offended party is an
unsophisticated and conservative woman, fixing her hair the old
fashion way. She does not apply make-up on her face, and her
dress is up to her knees. This makes the pretensions of the
accused all the more incredible. (Expediente, p. 59.)
The trial court also held that "there is no reiteracion because one of the offenses,
namely Robbery in Band, for which the accused has been penal was committed after
the commission of this rape case, and the penalty imposed on the other offense of
Frustrated Homicide, is lighter than the penalty for rape." (Id, P. 63.)
Although not alleged in the complaint, the trial court stated that the offense was
aggravated by disregard of rank because it was a fact knowm to the appellant that
Mrs. Agno was a school teacher. The appellant claims that this circumstance cannot
be assigned to him because there was no deliberate intent to offend or insult the rank
of Mrs. Agno. The Solicitor General agrees with the appellant for the same reason.
The judgment of the trial court is in accordance with the facts and the law but it cannot
be affirmed completely because of the lack of the necessary number of votes.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is modified in the sense that the appellant
shall suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua instead of death and the indemnity to be
paid to the offended party is increased to P20,000.00. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Plana, Escolin, Relova,
The complaint alleges the following aggravating circumstances: abuse of superior
strength, nocturnity, despoblado,ignominy, and reiteracion. Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., took no part.

The trial court disregarded superiority because it "is inherent in the crime of rape or is
absorbed in the element of force." It also did not consider nocturnity "there being no
evidence that the accused purposely sought it to facilitate the commission of this Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
rape." (Id, p. 63.)
Republic of the Philippines
Despoblado was present according to the trial court because: "The accused dragged SUPREME COURT
the offended party, at the point of a dagger, to the carabao trail, about 10 meters from Manila
the junction, but 40 to 50 meters below to better attain his purpose without
interference, and to better secure himself from detection and punishment (U.S. vs.
Vitug, 17 Phil. 1). Even the junction where the two children were left is already 400 THIRD DIVISION
meters from the nearest house. While there maybe occasional passersby, this does
not destroy its being an uninhabited place. (People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 87)." (Id, p.
62.) We hold that the trial court for the reasons stated correctly held that the crime was
committed in an uninhabited place.
G.R. No. L-69666 January 23, 1992

The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the
missionary position, i.e. male supenor female inferior, but also "The same position as THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
dogs do" i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was no ignominy because vs.
"The studies of many experts in the matter have shown that this 'position' is not novel GUMERCINDO QUILATON y EBAROLA, defendant-appellant.
and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation.
(Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
but not otherwise.

270
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant
FELICIANO, J.:
Appellant Gumercindo Quilaton was found guilty of murder and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and required to pay the heirs of the offended party
various amounts of money.
Appellant was tried and convicted under the following information:
That on or about the 16th day of August, 1983, in the municipality
of San Simon, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
GUMERCINDO QUILATON y EBAROLA alias "ROBERTO
SANDOVAL" armed with a knife (balisong), with deliberate intent
to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and wound ROLANDO S. MANAHAN, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and fatal injuries, which directly caused the
death of the said Rolando S. Manahan.
All contrary to law. 1
Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment and the case proceeded to trial. In time,
the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds the
accused GUMERCINDO QUILATON y ERABOLA, also known as
Roberto Sandoval guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
The Court further sentences him to indemnify the heirs of Rolando
S. Manahan the sum of One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, for the death of
Rolando S. Manahan, the sum of Twenty Six Thousand Four
Hundred Forty Five (P26,445.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, for
actual damages incurred for burial and other expenses of the
deceased, the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P250,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, for moral damages.
The Court further orders the accused to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 2
Appellant has assigned the following errors in his brief:
1. The court a quo gravely erred in not finding that the victim was
armed with a bladed weapon and was the aggressor.
2. The court a quo gravely erred in finding that the killing of the
victim was qualified by treachery.
3. The court a quo gravely erred in not finding that the accused-
appellant acted in self-defense. 3
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that the appellant was a laborer in the
Bureau of Forest Development assigned at the PROFEM Nursery in San Agustin, San
Simon, Pampanga until 3 June 1983 when his services were terminated. While still a
laborer and occasionally after his termination, appellant would spend the night in one
of the rooms of the PROFEM office. The PROFEM office, it seemed, was converted
by appellant into sleeping quarters during the night.
On 16 August 1983, between the hours of 6:00 and 9:00 o'clock in the evening,
Rolando Manahan, then officer-in-charge of the PROFEM, called for appellant to see
Manahan at the latter's office. Appellant, who was around the PROFEM office at that
time, refused to see Manahan at his office. Rolando Manahan came out of his office
and proceeded to admonish appellant to discontinue his practice of sleeping inside the
office, sometimes with women brought from the town. Appellant was reported to have
replied: "yes, sir, and from now on I will not bring girls inside the office." A heated
exchange of words then ensued between Rolando Manahan and appellant.
Appellant who remained outside the office later requested Lamberto Abugan, an
employee of the PROFEM, to give him his (appellant's) bag of clothes which had been
left inside the room. Lamberto Abugan initially refused, but on instructions of Rolando
Manahan, complied. With his bag of clothes, appellant left the office.
Rolando Manahan, however, decided to follow appellant, apparently to make certain
that appellant would in fact leave the premises of the Nursery. Lamberto Abugan, who
had noticed Rolando Manahan leave the office, also went out to look after them.
Lamberto Abugan caught up with the two (2) at the provincial road where he saw
Rolando Manahan kick appellant's shoes which were lying on the road; the heated
altercation between the two (2) continued. Moments later, appellant pulled a fan knife
(balisong) from his right hip and told Rolando Manahan: "this time I am going to kill
you, I shall not forgive you." Rolando Manahan started to run away; appellant chased
him.
Lamberto Abugan also ran from the scene to seek help. He proceeded to the police
headquarters in San Simon, Pampanga and from there returned to the provincial road
aboard a tricycle in the company of Pfc. Nicolas Yambao. They saw Rolando
Manahan lying on the road, already dead. Appellant, upon the other hand, was found
271
in Sampaloc, Apalit, Pampanga where he was arrested and searched. A fan knife and Commander in San Simon, Pampanga that appellant had two (2) pending cases in
a bloodstained shirt were recovered from the possession of appellant. 4 Dalaguete, Cebu. One of those cases was for murder and the other for double murder.
Certified true copies of the alias warrants for the arrest of appellant in both cases were
also marked in evidence by the prosecution. 9 Appellant had denied the pendency of
A post mortem examination of the cadaver of Rolando Manahan was conducted by
the cases. On cross-examination, he testified as follows:
Dra. Maria Theresa Santos, Municipal Health Officer of San Simon, Pampanga. Dra.
Santos' report indicated that Rolando Manahan sustained seven (7) wounds, two (2)
of which, located in the chest, were fatal. 5 Q Mr. Quilaton, in your town in Dalaguete,
Cebu your Mayor is Paz Wong?
Appellant submitted a different version of the facts. He alleged that on the night of 16
August 1983 when he left the PROFEM office, he became alarmed upon noting that A I do not know her, sir.
Rolando Manahan was following him. Appellant quickened his steps but because the
road was slippery, he fell on the ground with the bag he was carrying, and his shoes
Q And who is the mayor whom you know in
spilled onto the road. Rolando Manahan kicked his shoes away and continued
your town?
walking. As Rolando Manahan came nearer, appellant ran away only to be stopped in
a fenced area. Rolando Manahan there attacked him with a bladed weapon but
appellant was able to wrest possession of the bladed weapon. Appellant then A Legaspi, sir.
instinctively stabbed Rolando Manahan until the latter died. Appellant claims that after
the incident, he walked towards Apalit, Pampanga to surrender as he did not know
where the municipal building of San Simon, Pampanga was. He was on his way to Q Who was your Station Commander when
you left Dalaguete, Cebu?
surrender when the police authorities arrested him. 6

The principal contention of appellant is that he had acted in self-defense when he A I do not know his name, sir.
stabbed Rolando Manahan to death. He imputes unlawful aggression to Rolando
Manahan who, he claims, deeply resented him as a cumulative result of antecedent Q Mr. Quilaton, is it not a fact that you have a
events namely: (1) Rolando Manahan had been reprimanded for his inaction on the pending case of double murder in the
report that had reached the Central Office that appellant was bringing girls during the Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete, Cebu
night inside the PROFEM office; and (2) Rolando Manahan, as officer-in-charge of the docketed as Crim. Case No. 3032 before the
PROFEM, was humiliated by appellant's lack of respect in refusing to see the former Honorable Judge Buenconsejo?
at his office. Thus, according to appellant, Rolando Manahan pursued him even as he
had left the PROFEM office during the night of 16 August 1983.
A I do not know that, sir.

By invoking self-defense as a justifying circumstance, appellant in effect admitted that

he had indeed killed Rolando Manahan. In order that he may be relieved of criminal Q You do not also know that there is also
liability, he is obliged to establish the presence of the following requisites: (1) unlawful another pending murder case docketed as
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Crim. Case No. 2710 before the Hon.
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 7 In Dominador Tumulak?
so doing, appellant must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution for even if the prosecution's evidence were weak, A I do not know that, sir.
it cannot be disbelieved after appellant has admitted the killing. 8
Q Will you deny that you have also another
The evidence of appellant on his claim of self-defense consisted solely of his own pending case before the RTC, Branch 26 of
testimony. The trial court rejected that testimony, firstly, because it was not supported Ardaos, Cebu?
by convincing corroborative evidence and, secondly, because the trial court had
perceived appellant to be a liar.
A None, sir.

During trial of the case, the prosecution had marked and offered in evidence the letter
of the INP Station Commander in Dalaguete, Cebu informing the INP Station Q You mean you have no pending case in
Cebu?

272
 A None, sir.
Q Is it not a fact Mr. Quilaton that you were a
convict-escapee in the Provincial Jail of
Cebu?
A No, sir.
Q Since you left Cebu, have you returned to
Cebu?
A Not yet, sir. 10
The trial court instead gave credence to the testimony of Lamberto Abugan who had
seen appellant initiate a deadly assault on the victim Roland Manahan by drawing a
fan knife from his right hip and by announcing his intention to kill Manahan. The
ordinary rule is that findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect considering that the trial court was in a position to evaluate
the deportment of witnesses while testifying. 11 The Court does not see any
compelling reason to depart from the general rule.
This Court, however, agrees with the Solicitor General that appellant should be
convicted of homicide only. The information here filed specified treachery and evident
premeditation as qualifying circumstances. The trial court disregarded evident
premeditation, holding that the prosecution had not adequately established the
presence of that circumstance. But it considered appellant's act of stabbing the
unarmed Rolando Manahan as treachery and took this into account in convicting
appellant of murder.
Treachery cannot be appreciated in the absence of evidence of the mode of
attack; 12 it cannot be presumed but must be proven positively. 13 This is so because
treachery exists only "when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any
defense which the offended party might make." 14
The sole eyewitness to the incident which started inside the PROFEM Nursery and
ended on the provincial road was Lamberto Abugan. Lamberto Abugan had testified
about a "falling out" or quarrel between Rolando Manahan and appellant after the
former confronted appellant and told him to desist from sleeping inside the PROFEM
office and from bringing women sleeping companions therein. This culminated in a
heated argument that led appellant to leave the office in haste and anger. The verbal
dispute continued up to the provincial road where Rolando Manahan had followed
appellant. Lamberto Abugan, however, did not witness the actual stabbing by
appellant of Rolando Manahan as he ran away just then to seek help.
The testimony of Lamberto Abugan offers no sufficient basis for reasonably inferring
that treachery attended the commission of the crime. On the contrary, considering that
the attack was preceded by a heated argument, it cannot be fairly regarded as sudden
and unexpected. The tense and hostile atmosphere should have sufficiently put
Rolando Manahan on guard against physical violence; Rolando Manahan should have
been aware that he was in effect inviting trouble in following appellant into the
provincial road and kicking the latter's shoes that had fallen to the ground.
The trial court had ordered appellant to pay the heirs of Rolando Manahan P26,445.00
as actual damages, representing interment and related expenses incurred by the heirs
of Rolando Manahan. The brother of Rolando Manahan testified on this matter and
submitted various receipts in support of their claim for actual damages; appellant did
not controvert this claim nor the amount thereof.
The amount of P100,000.00 awarded to the heirs of Rolando Manahan as indemnity
for death must, however, be reduced to P50,000.00 conformably with prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter. 15 The propriety of the award of P250,000.00 by the trial
court in concept of moral damages needs some analysis.
The monetary liabilities of a person accused and convicted of a crime are specified in
Article 2206 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though
there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had
no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to
the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to
be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouses, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants may demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased. (Emphasis supplied)
Aside, therefore, from the ordinary indemnity for death which is currently set by case
law at P50,000.00, appellant is obliged: (1) to compensate the heirs of Rolando
273
Manahan for the latter's loss of earning capacity; (2) to give support in the form of
expenses for education to the sisters of Rolando Manahan who had been dependent
on him therefor; and (3) to pay the heirs of Rolando Manahan moral damages for the
mental anguish suffered by them. 16 In the instant case, the trial court lumped these
monetary obligations into what it called "moral damages."
Finally, the Court in the exercise of its discretion, considers it appropriate and
reasonable to award the amount of P20,000.00 to the heirs of Rolando Manahan by
way of moral damages. Ruben Manahan, brother of Rolando Manahan, testified that
their mother suffered a mild stroke upon learning of Rolando Manahan's slaying; this
eventually resulted in the mother's semi-paralysis. 24

The more important variables taken into account in determining the compensable WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Macabebe,
amount of lost earnings are: (1) the number of years for which the victim would Pampanga is hereby SET ASIDE; the Court instead finds appellant Gumercindo
otherwise have lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the Quilaton guilty of HOMICIDE. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant is
deceased. 17 In Villa Rey-Transit, Inc. v. Court of-Appeals (supra), the Court hereby SENTENCED to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from
computed the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age ten (10) years as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as maximum.
at death) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the actuarial Appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Rolando Manahan the following amounts:
Combined Experience Table of Mortality. That formula was followed by the Court in
cases subsequent to Villa Rey Transit, e.g. Philippine Airlines v. Court of
1. P50,000.00 as indemnity for death;
Appeals; 18 People v. Daniel (supra); and Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals. 19 The Court notes that the formula used in Villa Rey Transit was based on
a table derived from actuarial experience prior to 1970 when the decision in Villa Rey 2. P26,445.00 as actual damages;
Transitwas promulgated. Actuarial experience subsequent to 1970 has, however,
changed and indicates a longer life expectancy in the Philippines due to conditions
3. P114,000.00 by way of lost earnings;
including, among other things, advances in medical science, improved nutrition and
food supply, diet consciousness and health maintenance. The 1970 mortality table
was updated in 1980 to reflect the changes of conditions. 20 4. P10,000.00 by way of educational assistance to Rolando Manahan's two (2) sisters;
and
Considering that Rolando Manahan was 26 years of age at the time of death, he was
expected to live for another 46 years. This is derived by using the generally accepted 5. P20,000.00 as moral damages.
formula in computing for life expectancy, based on the 1980 CSO table:
Costs against appellant.
S (Lx + 1, Lx + 2, . . ., Lx + n), where n = 100 - x
SO ORDERED.
——————————— x = age upon death
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concu
Lx L = number of people in
public of the Philippines
sample surviving after x number of years SUPREME COURT
Manila
But a man does not normally continue working to earn money up to the final month or
year of his life; hence 46 years could be reasonably reduced to 39 years. 21 Besides, THIRD DIVISION
Rolando Manahan was a government employee who is expected to retire at the age of
65. If there are 261 working days in a year 22 and Rolando Manahan was receiving
P23.00 a day, 23 Rolando Manahan's gross earnings would be approximately G.R. No. 76338-39 February 26, 1990
P234,000.00. A reasonable amount must be deducted therefrom that would represent
Rolando Manahan's necessary expenses had he been living, in this case PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
P120,000.00. The net or compensable earnings lost by reason of Rolando Manahan's vs.
death is, accordingly, P114,000.00. RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, accused-appellant.

The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

274
Amadeo D. Seno for accused-appellant. which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 1, paragraph

2 of the Presidential Decree No. 1866. 1
FELICIANO, J.:

On 11 January 1985, an amended information 2 for murder was also filed against
Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
appellant reading as follows:
Tagbilaran City, convicting him of qualified illegal possession of a firearm and
ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007 and of murder in Criminal Case No. 4012 and
imposing upon him the penalty of death in both cases. That, on or about the 14th day of December, 1984 in the City of
Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any
On 18 December 1984, appellant was charged with violation of Section 1, paragraph
justifiable cause and with intent to kill, evident pre-meditation
(2), of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
treachery, while acting under the influence of drugs, with cruelty
and deliberately augmenting the suffering of the victim, did then
That, on or about the 14th day of December 1984, in the City of and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
Tagbilaran Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this shot one Francis Ernest Escano with the use of an unlicensed
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while acting under SMITH & WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver with Serial
the influence of drugs and without any license or permit from the Number 359323 hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following
proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and gunshot wounds or injuries, to wit:
feloniously have ill his possession, custody and control an
unlicensed firearm, a SMITH & WESSON Airweight caliber .38
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS — Head
revolver with Serial Number 359323 with Five (5) spent shells and
and Chest (Through & Through);
Five (5) live ammunitions and without any justifiable cause and
with intent to kill, used the said firearm and ammunitions to shoot
one Francis Ernest Escano III hitting and inflicting upon the latter Head Entrance — 14 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-
the following gunshot wounds or injuries, to wit: temporal Area; Port — l.3 x 0.3 cm., Right
Cheek, 3.5 cm., above the right external
meatus;
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS — Head &
Chest (through and through);
Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm. — right
Infrascapular Area at the level of the 7th
Head Entrance — 1.4 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-
Inter-Costal Rib (back); exit — 0.3 cm. dia;
Temporal Area; Port — 1.3 x 0.3 cm.; Right
above the right nipple
Cheek. 3.5 cm. above the right external
meatus;
Y-shape laceration, cheek at the angle of the
mouth, Right
Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm. — Right
Infrascapular Area at the level of the 7th
Intercostal Rib (Back); Exist — 0.3 cm. dia; Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8.
above the right nipple;
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the
Y-shape laceration, check at the right angle damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased namely:
of the mouth, Right Judge & Mrs. Francisco Rey H. Escano, in the amount to be
proved during the trial of the case.
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8

275
 Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 17 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 179, with the qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, treachery and acting under the influence of
dangerous drugs and cruelty.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. The two (2) criminal cases were
consolidated upon motion of the prosecution and tried jointly. On 31 July 1986, the
trial court rendered a decision 3 convicting appellant under both informations. The
dispositive portion of the decision read as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, decision is
hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 4007 finding the accused
Renato Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions qualified with
Murder under Section 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 and hereby sentences said Renato Tac-an y
Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH. Further, decision is also
rendered in Criminal Case No. 4012 finding the same accused
Renato Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 and P.D. 1866. Appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation (treachery
used to qualify the crime to murder) and the special aggravating
circumstances of acting while under the influence of dangerous
drugs and with the use of an unlicensed firearm and with insult to
a person in authority and there being no mitigating circumstance
to offset them, and sentences the said Renato Tac-an y Hipos to
suffer the penalty of DEATH. The accused is likewise ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Francis Ernest Escano in the
amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00); to pay
actual compensatory damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TEN PESOS
(P108,310.00); to pay moral damages to Judge Francisco
Escano, Jr., the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00) and to Mrs. Lydia Escano the sum of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) for the mental
anguish and suffering each experienced because of the death of
Francis Ernest. All such amount shall earn legal interest from the
time this decision shall become final and executory until fully
satisfied. The accused shall also pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Immediately after promulgation of the decision, appellant signified his intention to
appeal to this Court, although the same was subject to automatic review by this Court.
In his brief, appellant assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:
I. The lower court erred in believing the prosecution's version of
the case instead of according full faith and credence to the
defendant's version.
II. The trial court erred in not holding that Renato Tac-an was
justified in shooting the deceased.
III. The trial court erred in not holding that in (sic) the least the
defendant acted in incomplete self-defense in shooting the
deceased.
IV. The trial court erred in not holding that P.D. 1866 is
inapplicable to the defendant inasmuch as said decree was
enforceable only during the existence of the Martial Law Regime.
V. The trial court erred in not holding that the defendant was
placed twice in jeopardy for having been prosecuted for violation
of P.D. 1866 despite his being prosecuted for murder in an
information which alleges that the accused used an unlicensed
firearm in killing the deceased.
VI. The trial court erred in not adjudging the defendant innocent of
murder.
From the record, the facts may be collated and summarized as follows:
Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months of age, and
the deceased Francis Ernest Escano III, fifteen (15) years old, were classmates in the
third year of high school of the Divine Word College in Tagbilaran City. They were
close friends, being not only classmates but also members of the same gang, the
Bronx gang. Renato had been to the house where Francis and his parents lived, on
one or two occasions. On those occasions, Francis' mother noticed that Renato had a
handgun with him. Francis was then advised by his mother to distance himself from
Renato. 4
Francis withdrew from the Bronx gang. The relationship between Renato and Francis
turned sour. Sometime in September 1984, Renato and Francis quarrelled with each
other, on which occasion Francis bodily lifted Arnold Romelde from the ground. Arnold
was friend and companion to Renato. The quarrel resulted in Renato and Francis
being brought to the high school principal's office. The strained relationship between
the two (2) erstwhile friends was aggravated in late November 1984 when Francis
teamed that Renato, together with other members of the Bronx gang, was looking for
him, apparently with the intention of beating him up. Further deterioration of their
276
relationship occurred sometime in the first week of December 1984, when graffiti
appeared on the wall of the third year high school classroom and on the armrest of a
chair in that classroom, deprecating the Bronx gang and describing Renato as
"bayot" (homosexual) 5 Renato attributed the graffiti to Francis.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 December 1984, Renato entered Room 15
of the high school building to attend his English III class. Renato placed his scrapbook
prepared for their Mathematics class on his chair, and approached the teacher, Mrs.
Liliosa Baluma, to raise a question. Upon returning to his chair, he found Francis
sitting there, on the scrapbook. Renato was angered by what he saw and promptly
kicked the chair on which Francis was seated. Francis, however, explained that he
had not intentionally sat down on Renato's scrapbook. A fistfight would have ensued
but some classmates and two (2) teachers, Mrs. Baluma and Mr. Damaso Pasilbas,
intervened and prevented them from assaulting each other. After the two (2) had
quieted down and apparently shaken hands at the instance of Mrs. Baluma, the latter
resumed her English III class. Francis sat on the last row to the extreme right of the
teacher while Renato was seated on the same last row at the extreme left of the
teacher. While the English III class was still going on, Renato slipped out of the
classroom and went home to get a gun. He was back at the classroom approximately
fifteen (15) minutes later. 6
The Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas scheduled for 3:00 p.m. had just
started in Room 15 when Renato suddenly burst into the room, shut the door and with
both hands raised, holding a revolver, shouted "Where is Francis?" Upon sighting
Francis seated behind and to the light of student Ruel Ungab, Renato fired at Francis,
hitting a notebook, a geometry book and the armrest of Ruel's chair. Francis and Ruel
jumped up and with several of their classmates rushed forward towards the teacher's
platform to seek protection from their teacher. Renato fired a second time, this time
hitting the blackboard in front of the class. Francis and the other students rushed back
towards the rear of the room. Renato walked towards the center of the classroom and
fired a third time at Francis, hitting the concrete wall of the classroom. Francis and a
number of his classmates rushed towards the door, the only door to and from Room
15. Renato proceeded to the teacher, s platform nearest the door and for the fourth
time fired at Francis as the latter was rushing towards the door. This time, Francis was
hit on the head and he fell on the back of Ruel and both fell to the floor. Ruel was
pulled out of the room by a friend; Francis remained sprawled on the floor bleeding
profusely. 7
Renato then went out of Room 15, and paced between Rooms 14 and 15. A teacher,
Mr. Pablo Baluma, apparently unaware that it was Renato who had gunned down
Francis, approached Renato and asked him to help Francis as the latter was still alive
inside the room. Renato thereupon re-entered Room 15, closed the door behind him,
saying: "So, he is still alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face
down on the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once
more. The bullet entered Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited on his
front chest just above the right nipple. 8
Renato then left with two (2) remaining students and locked Francis alone inside
Room 15. Renato proceeded to the ground floor and entered the faculty room. There,
he found some teachers and students and ordered them to lock the door and close the
windows, in effect holding them as hostages. He also reloaded his gun with five (5)
bullets. After some time, a team of Philippine Constabulary troopers led by Capt.
Larino Lazo arrived and surrounded the faculty room. With a hand-held public address
device, Capt. Lazo called upon Renato to surrender himself Renato did not respond to
this call. Renato's brother approached Capt. Lazo and volunteered to persuade his
brother to give up. Renato's father who, by this time had also arrived, pleaded with
Renato to surrender himself Renato then turned over his gun to his brother through an
opening in the balustrade of the faculty room. Capt. Lazo took the gun from Renato's
brother, went to the door of the faculty room, entered and placed Renato under
arrest. 9
Meantime, as soon as Renato left Room 15, some teachers and students came to
rescue Francis but could not open the door which Renato had locked behind him. One
of the students entered the room by climbing up the second floor on the outside and
through the window and opened the door from the inside. The teachers and students
brought Francis down to the ground floor from whence the PC soldiers rushed him to
the Celestino Gallares Memorial Hospital. 10 Francis died before reaching the hospital.
Capt. Lazo brought Renato to the PC Headquarters at Camp Dagohoy, Tagbilaran
City. The officer deposited the revolver recovered from Renato which was an
Airweight Smith and Wesson .38 caliber revolver, with Serial No. 359323, as well as
the five (5) live bullets removed from the said revolver, and the five (5) empty
cartridges which Renato had turned over to him. Ballistic examination conducted by
Supervising Ballistician, Artemio Panganiban, National Bureau of Investigation, Cebu,
showed that the empty cartridge cases had been fired from the revolver recovered
from Renato. 11
Appellant at the outset assails the trial court for having believed the prosecution's
version of the facts instead of the version offered by the appellant. The trial court took
into account, inter alia, the positive and direct testimony of:
1. Mrs. Liliosa Baluma who testified as to, among other things, the
events which took place inside her English III classroom
immediately before the shooting;
2. Ruel Ungab — a fifteen (15) year old classmate of Renato and
Francis, who had fallen on the floor with Francis when the latter
was finally hit by Renato;
3. Damaso Pasilbas — the Mathematics teacher who was holding
his class when Renato had burst into Room 15 and started firing
at Francis; and
277
 4. Napoleon Jumauan — another sixteen (16) year old, classmate
of Renato and Francis who was inside the classroom when
Renato had started firing at Francis and who was only about a
foot away from the head of Francis when Renato, having re-
entered Room 15, had fired at Francis as the latter was sprawled
on the floor of the classroom.
After careful examination of the record, we find no reason to disagree with the
conclusion of the trial court that Renato had indeed shot and killed Francis under the
circumstances and in the manner described by these witnesses.
1. The claim of self-defense.
Renato claimed that he was acting in self-defense, or at least in incomplete self-
defense, when he shot Francis. For a claim of self-defense to be sustained, the
claimant must show by clear and convincing evidence that the following requisites
existed:
a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused
to repel the aggression; and
12
c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.
Testifying in his own behalf, Renato said that a few minutes before the end of Mrs.
Baluma's English III class, Francis had approached him:
(Atty. Seno, Defense Counsel)
Q: How did it happened (sic) that you had a
conversation with Francis?
(Renato)
A: While the class was going on, Mrs.
Baluma was writing on the blackboard.
Q: Then what happened?
A: While our teacher was writing on the
blackboard Francis suddenly got near me.
Q: And what happened when Francis
approached you?
A: He said, 'So you are brave now you had a
(sic) guts to fight against me.'
Q: And what else did he say?
A: He said, 'Go home, get your firearm
because I will go home to get a gun.'
Q: Was that all that he told you?
A: He further said, 'You go home get your
firearm, if you won't go home and get a gun, I
will go to your place and kill you including
your parents, brothers and sisters.'
Q: And after that where did Francis go?
13
A: Before the bell rang he went ahead.
(Emphasis supplied)
We note at the outset that there was no evidence before the Court, except Renato's
own testimony, that Francis had uttered the above statements attributed to him by
Renato. Although there had been about twenty-five (25) other students, and the
teacher, in the classroom at the time, no corroborating testimony was offered by the
defense. In the second place, assuming (arguendo merely) that Francis had indeed
made those statements, such utterances cannot be regarded as the unlawful
aggression which is the first and most fundamental requirement of self-defense.
Allegedly uttered in a high school classroom by an obviously unarmed Francis, such
statements could not reasonably inspire the "well grounded and reasonable belief"
claimed by Renato that "he was in imminent danger of death or bodily
harm." 14 Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or
materialized or at the very least is clearly imminent: it cannot consist in oral threats or
a merely threatening stance or posture. 15Further as pointed out by the Solicitor
General, Francis was obviously without a firearm or other weapon when Renato
returned and burst into Room 15 demanding to know where Francis was and forthwith
firing at him repeatedly, without the slightest regard for the safety of his other
classmates and of the teacher. There being no unlawful aggression, there simply
could not be self-defense whether complete or incomplete, 16 and there is accordingly
no need to refer to the other requirements of lawful self-defense.
2. The claim that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable.
278
As pointed out at the outset, appellant was charged with unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm, a Smith and Wesson Airweight.38 caliber revolver with five (5)
spent bullets and five (5) live ones and with having used such firearm and ammunition
to shoot to death Francis Ernest Escano III, in violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 provides, in relevant part, that:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose,
or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Appellant urges that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable to him "considering that the reason
for its [P.D. No. 1866] issuance no longer exists." He argues that P.D. No. 1866 was
enforceable only during the existence of martial law, and that when martial law was
"lifted in 1979," the reason for the "existence" of P.D. No. 1866 faded away, with the
result that the "original law on firearms, that is, Section 2692 of the [Revised]
Administrative Code, together with its pre-martial law amendments, came into effect
again thereby replacing P.D. No. 1866." 17
There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 (which was promulgated on 29 June 1983) which
suggests that it was intended to remain in effect only for the duration of the martial law
imposed upon the country by former President Marcos. Neither does the statute
contain any provision that so prescribes its lapsing into non-enforceability upon the
termination of the state or period of martial law. On the contrary, P.D. No. 1866 by its
own terms purported to "consolidate, codify and integrate" all prior laws and decrees
penalizing illegal possession and manufacture of firearms, ammunition and explosives
in order "to harmonize their provisions as well as to update and revise certain
provisions and prior statutes "in order to more effectively deter violators of the law on
firearms, ammunitions and explosives." 18 Appellant's contention is thus without basis
in fact.
3. The claim of double jeopardy.
It is also contended by appellant that because he had already been charged with
illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007, aggravated
by the use of such unlicensed firearm to commit a homicide or murder, he was
unconstitutionally placed in jeopardy of punishment for the second time when he was
charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 with murder "with the use of an unlicensed
[firearm]," in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section
17 of B.P. Blg. 179.
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one
against a second or later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the
subsequent information charges another and different offense, although arising from
the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at bar,
it appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that
of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute,
while the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished
under the Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2)
offenses in themselves are quite different one from the other, such that in principle,
the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having
placed appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.
We note that the information in Criminal Case No. 4007 after charging appellant with
unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, went on to state that
said firearm and ammunition had been used to shoot to death Francis Ernest Escaño
III. We note also that the amended information in Criminal Case No. 4012 after
charging appellant with the unlawful killing of Francis Ernest Escaño III, stated that the
killing had been done with the use of an unlicensed firearm. We believe these
additional allegations in the two (2) informations did not have the effect of charging
appellant with having committed the same offense more than once.
However, in sentencing Renato to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of murder,
the trial court did take into account as a "special aggravating circumstance" the fact
that the killing of Francis had been done "with the use of an unlicensed firearm." In so
doing, we believe and so hold, the trial court committed error. There is no law which
renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in homicide
or murder. Under an information charging homicide or murder, the fact that the death
weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the penalty for the
second offense of homicide or murder to death (or reclusion perpetua under the 1987
Constitution). The essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition of the
instrument used in destroying human life or committing some other crime, is not
included in the inventory of aggravating circumstances set out in Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code. 19
In contrast, under an information for unlawful possession (or manufacture, dealing in,
acquisition or disposition) of a firearm or ammunition, P.D. No. 1866 authorizes the
increase of the imposable penalty for unlawful possession or manufacture, etc. of the
unlicensed firearm where such firearm was used to destroy human life. Although the
circumstance that human life was destroyed with the use of the unlicensed firearm is
not an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may
still be taken into account to increase the penalty to death (reclusion perpetua, under
the 1987 Constitution) because of the explicit provisions of P.D. No. 1866. As noted
earlier, the unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition is an offense
punished under a special law and not under the Revised Penal Code.
279
 4. The claim that there was no treachery.
Appellant contends that there was no treachery present because before any shot was
fired, Renato had shouted "where is Francis?" Appellant in effect suggests his opening
statement was a warning to Francis and that the first three (3) shots he had fired at
Francis were merely warning shots. Moreover, building upon his own testimony about
the alleged threat that Francis had uttered before he (Renato) left his English III class
to go home and get a gun, appellant argues that Francis must have anticipated his
return and thus had sufficient time to prepare for the coming of the
appellant. 20 Appellant's contention, while ingenious, must be rejected. The trial court
made a finding of treachery taking explicit account of the following factors:
1. Room 15 of the Divine Word College High School Department
Tagbilaran City, is situated in the second floor of the building. It is
a corner room and it has only one (1) door which is the only
means of entry and exit;
2. At the time of the attack, the deceased was seated on his chair
inside his classroom and was writing on the armrest of his chair
and also talking to Ruel Ungab and while their teacher, Mr.
Damaso Pasilbas was checking the attendance. The deceased
was not aware of any impending assault neither did he have any
means to defend himself;
3. The accused used an airweight Smith & Wesson .38 caliber
revolver in shooting to death the defenseless and helpless
Francis Ernest Escaño;
4. The attack was so sudden and so unexpected. the accused
consciously conceived that mode of attack;
5. The accused fired at Francis again and again and did not give
him a chance to defend himself. After the deceased was hit on the
head and fell to the floor while he was already sprawled and
completely defenseless the accused fired at him again and the
deceased was hit on the chest;
6. The deceased was not armed. He was totally defenseless. He
was absolutely not aware of any coming attack. 21
The Court also pointed out that Renato must have known that Francis while inside
Room 15 had no means of escape there being only one (1) door and Room 15 being
on the second floor of the building. Renato in effect blocked the only exit open to
Francis as he stood on the teacher's platform closest to the door and fired as Francis
and Ruel sought to dash through the door. Renato's question "where is Francis?"
cannot reasonably be regarded as an effort to warn Francis for he shot at Francis the
instant he sighted the latter, seated and talking to Ruel Ungab. That Renato fired three
(3) shots before hitting Francis with the fourth shot, can only be ascribed to the
indifferent markmanship of Renato and to the fact that Francis and the other students
were scurrying from one part of the room to the other in an effort to evade the shots
fired by Renato. The cumulative effect of the circumstances underscored by the trial
court was that the attack upon Francis had been carried out in a manner which
disabled Francis from defending himself or retaliating against Renato. Finally, the
circumstance that Renato, having been informed that Francis was still alive, re-
entered Room 15 and fired again at Francis who lay on the floor and bathed with his
own blood, manifested Renato's conscious choice of means of execution which
directly and especially ensured the death of his victim without risk to himself. 22 We are
compelled to agree with the trial court that treachery was here present and that,
therefore, the killing of Francis Ernest Escaño III was murder.
5. The claim that there was no evident premeditation.
The trial court also found the presence of evident premeditation and appreciated the
same as a generic aggravating circumstance. Here, it is the urging of the appellant
that the requisites of evident premeditation had not been sufficiently shown. In order
that evident premeditation may be taken into account, there must be proof of (a) the
time when the offender formed his intent to commit the crime; (b) an action manifestly
indicating that the offender had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (c)
of the passage of a sufficient interval of time between the determination of the
offender to commit the crime and the actual execution thereof, to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. 23 The defense pointed out that barely fifteen (15)
minutes had elapsed from the time Renato left his English III class and the time he
returned with a gun. While there was testimony to the fact that before that fatal day of
14 December 1984, anger and resentment had welled up between Francis and
Renato, there was no evidence adequately showing when Renato had formed the
intention and determination to take the life of Francis. Accordingly, we must discard
evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance.
6. The claim that the killing was not done under the influence of a
dangerous drug.
Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179 which was promulgated on 2 March 1982 provides as
follows:
SEC. 17. The provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, when a crime is committed by an offender who is
under the influence of dangerous drugs, such state shall be
considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the
definition of a crime and the application of the penalty provided for
in the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court found that Francis was killed by Renato while the later was under the
influence of a dangerous drug, specifically marijuana, and took that into account as a
280
"special aggravating circumstance". No medical evidence had been submitted by the
prosecution to show that Renato had smoked marijuana before gunning down Francis.
Fourteen (14) days had elapsed after December 14, 1984 before Renato was
medically examined for possible traces of marijuana; the results of the examination
were negative. Defense witness Dr. Rogelio Ascona testified that in order to have a
medically valid basis for determining the presence of marijuana in the human system,
the patient must be examined within twenty-four (24) hours from the time he is
supposed to have smoked marijuana. 24 The prosecution had presented Orlando
Balaba, a student at the Divine Word College, High School Department, who testified
that he found Renato and one Jaime Racho inside the men's room of the High School
Department sucking smoke from a hand-rolled thing that look like a cigarette, that he
had asked Renato what that was and that Renato had
replied damo (marijuana). 25 While the testimony of Orlando Balaba was corroborated
by two (2) other prosecution witnesses, we believe that Orlando Balaba's testimony
was incompetent to show that what Renato and Jaime Racho were smoking inside the
men's room was indeed marijuana. It was pointed out by apellant that Orlando Balaba
had never smoked nor smelled marijuana.
In the absence of medical evidence, the Court took into account certain detailed
factors as circumstantial evidence supporting the testimony of Orlando Balaba. These
circumstances were:
The circumstance of place where the killing was committed, the
circumstance of the manner of the attack, the circumstance of
holding hostage some teachers and students inside the faculty
room, the circumstance of terrifying an entire school, the
circumstance that sitting on a scrapbook is too insignificant as to
arouse passion strong enough to motivate a killing, are
circumstantial evidences that gave the court no room for doubt
that prosecution witnesses Orlando Balaba, Benjamin Amper and
Allan de la Serna truthfully told the court that they saw the
accused smoking marijuana inside the comfort room at 1:45 in the
afternoon of December 14, 1984. ... . 26
The above circumstances pointed to by the trial court may be indicative of passionate
anger on the part of Renato; we do not believe that they necessarily show that Renato
had smoked marijuana before entering his English III class. In the absence of
competent medical or other direct evidence of ingestion of a dangerous drug, courts
may be wary and critical of indirect evidence, considering the severe consequences
for the accused of a finding that he had acted while under the influence of a prohibited
drug. The Court considers that the evidence presented on this point was simply
inadequate to support the ruling of the trial court that Renato had shot and killed
Francis while under the influence of a prohibited drug.
7. The claim that appellant had voluntarily surrendered.
Appellant contends that he had voluntarily surrendered and that the trial court should
have considered that mitigating circumstance in his favor. The trial court did not, and
we consider that it correctly refused to do so. Firstly, Renato surrendered his gun, not
himself, 27 by handing over the weapon through the balustrade of the faculty room.
Secondly, he surrendered the gun to his brother, who was not in any case a person in
authority nor an agent of a person in authority. 28 Thirdly, Renato did not surrender
himself he was arrested by Capt. Lazo. The fact that he did not resist arrest, did not
constitute voluntary surrender. 29 Finally, if it be assumed that Renato had surrendered
himself, such surrender cannot be regarded as voluntary and spontaneous. Renato
was holed up in the faculty room, in effect holding some teachers and students as
hostages. The faculty room was surrounded by Philippine Constabulary soldiers and
there was no escape open to him. He was not entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender.
8. Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with
insult to the public authorities.
The trial court held that the shooting to death of Francis had been done "in contempt
of or with insult to the public authorities:
Under Republic Act 1978, as amended, a teacher of a public or
private school is considered a person in authority. The fact that
Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, the teacher in mathematics, was already
checking the attendance did not deter the accused from pursuing
his evil act, The accused ignored his teacher's presence and
pleas. Not yet satisfied with the crime and terror he had done to
Francis and the entire school, the accused entered the faculty
room and held hostage the teachers and students who were
inside that room. To the court, this act of the accused was an
insult to his teachers and to the school, an act of callus disregard
of other's feelings and safety and completely reprehensible. 30
We believe the trial court erred in so finding the presence of a generic aggravating
circumstance. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 1978 and Presidential Decree No. 299, provides as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority.
— Who shall be deemed as such. — In applying the provisions of
the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly
vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member
of some court or government corporation, board, or
commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio
captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person
in authority.
A person who by direct provision of law or by election or by
appointment by competent authority, is charged with the
maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life
and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio policeman and
281
 barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons
in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code,
teachers, professors and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges
and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their
professional duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall
be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by P.D. No. 299,
September 19, 1973 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12,
1985).
Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or
professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in
authority," such teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of
Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and
disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person) of the Revised
Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not identify
specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the application of which any person
"directly vested with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority." Because a
penal statute is not to be given a longer reach and broader scope than is called for by
the ordinary meaning of the ordinary words used by such statute, to the disadvantage
of an accused, we do not believe that a teacher or professor of a public or recognized
private school may be regarded as a "public authority" within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, 31 the provision the trial court
applied in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 31 July 1986 is hereby
MODIFIED in the following manner and to the following extent only:
1. In Criminal Case No. 4007, appellant shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua;
2. In Criminal Case No. 4012 — (a) the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and of having acted with
contempt of or insult to the public authorities shall be DELETED
and not taken into account; and (b) the special aggravating
circumstanc
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 34917 September 7, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUA CHU and UY SE TIENG, defendants-appellants.
Gibbs and McDonough, Gullas, Lopez and Tuaño, H. Alo and Manuel G. Briones for
appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu convicting them of the illegal importation of opium, and
sentencing them each to four years' imprisonment, a fine of P10,000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty,
and to pay the proportional costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assigned the following alleged errors as
committed by the court below in its judgment to wit:
The lower court erred:
1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance of the Insular
Collector of Customs to exhibit in court the record of the administrative
investigation against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and
Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, both of
whom have since been dismissed from service.
2. In holding it as a fact that "no doubt many times opium consignments
have passed thru the customhouse without the knowledge of the customs
secret service."
3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan Samson in
denouncing the accused was actuated by a desire to protect himself and to
injure ex-collector Joaquin Natividad, his bitter enemy, who was partly
instrumental in the dismissal of Samson from the service.
4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed chief customs
secret service agent of Cebu, is above reproach and utterly irreconcilable
with the corrupt motives attributed to him by the accused.
5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to remain in the
court room while other prosecution witnesses were testifying, despite the
previous order of the court excluding the Government witnesses from the
court room, and in refusing to allow the defense to inquire from Insular
282
 Collector of Customs Aldanese regarding the official conduct of Juan
Samson as supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu.
6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson.
7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the defendant Uy Se Tieng
to order the opium from Hongkong.
8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct transcript of the
conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant Uy Se Tieng.
9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of the
conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant Lua Chu.
10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua Chu guilty of the
crime of illegal importation of opium, and in sentencing each to suffer four
years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs, despite the
presumption of innocence which has not been overcome, despite the
unlawful inducement, despite the inherent weakness of the evidence
presented by the prosecution, emanating from a spirit of revenge and from a
contaminated, polluted source.
The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial:
About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy Se Tieng wrote to
his correspondent in Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium.
About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs secret service of Cebu, Juan
Samson, had returned from a vacation in Europe, he called upon the then collector of
customs for the Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at his office, and the latter, after a
short conversation, asked him how much his trip had cost him. When the chief of the
secret service told him he had spent P2,500, the said collector of customs took from a
drawer in his table, the amount of P300, in paper money, and handed it to him, saying:
"This is for you, and a shipment will arrive shortly, and you will soon be able to recoup
your travelling expenses." Juan Samson took the money, left, and put it into the safe
in his office to be kept until he delivered it to the provincial treasurer of Cebu. A week
later, Natividad called Samson and told him that the shipment he had referred to
consisted of opium, that it was not about to arrive, and that the owner would go to
Samson's house to see him. That very night Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house
and told him he had come by order of Natividad to talk to him about the opium. The
said accused informed Samson that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and
that he had agreed to pay Natividad P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and that the opium had been
in Hongkong since the beginning of October awaiting a ship that would go direct to
Cebu.
At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one Nam Tai loaded on the
steamship Kolambugan, which the Naviera Filipina — a shipping company in Cebu
had had built in Hongkong, 38 cases consigned to Uy Seheng and marked "U.L.H."
About the same date Natividad informed Samson that the opium had already been put
on board the steamship Kolambugan, and it was agreed between them that Samson
would receive P2,000, Natividad P2,000, and the remaining P2,000 would be
distributed among certain employees in the customhouse.
Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with Samson. Towards the end of
November, Natividad informed the latter that the Kolambugan had returned to
Hongkong on account of certain engine trouble, and remained there until December
7th. In view of this, the shipper several times attempted to unload the shipment, but he
was told each time by the captain, who needed the cargo for ballast, that the ship was
about to sail, and the 30 cases remained on board.
The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14, 1929. While he
was examining the manifests, Samson detailed one of his men to watch the ship. After
conferring with Natividad, the latter instructed him to do everything possible to have
the cargo unloaded, and to require Uy Se Tieng to pay over the P6,000. On the
morning of November 16, 1929, Natividad told Samson that Uy Se Tieng already had
the papers ready to withdraw the cases marked "U.L.H." from the customhouse.
Samson then told Natividad it would be better for Uy Se Tieng to go to his house to
have a talk with him. Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house that night and was told that
he must pay over the P6,000 before taking the opium out of the customhouse. Uy Se
Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading and on leaving said: "I will tell the owner, and
we see whether we can take the money to you tomorrow." The following day Samson
informed Colonel Francisco of the Constabulary, of all that had taken place, and the
said colonel instructed the provincial commander, Captain Buenconsejo, to discuss
the capture of the opium owners with Samson. Buenconsejo and Samson agreed to
meet at the latter's house that same night. That afternoon Samson went to the office
of the provincial fiscal, reported the case to the fiscal, and asked for a stenographer to
take down the conversation he would have with Uy Se Tieng that night in the presence
of Captain Buenconsejo. As the fiscal did not have a good stenographer available,
Samson got one Jumapao, of the law firm of Rodriguez & Zacarias, on the
recommendation of the court stenographer. On the evening of December 17, 1929, as
agreed, Captain Buenconsejo, Lieutenant Fernando; and the stenographer went to
Samson's house and concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood
which hung from the window overlooking the entrance to the house on the ground
floor. As soon as the accused Uy Se Tieng arrived, Samson asked him if he had
brought the money. He replied that he had not, saying that the owner of the opium,
who was Lua Chu, was afraid of him. Samson then hold him to tell Lua Chu not to be
afraid, and that he might come to Samson's house. After pointing out to Uy Se Tieng a
back door entrance into the garden, he asked him where the opium was, and Uy Se
Tieng answered that it was in the cases numbered 11 to 18, and that there were 3,252
tins. Uy Se Tieng returned at about 10 o'clock that night accompanied by his
codefendant Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole owner of the opium, but that a
man from Manila, named Tan, and another in Amoy were also owners. Samson then
asked Lua Chu when he was going to get the opium, and the latter answered that Uy
Se Tieng would take charge of that. On being asked if he had brought the P6,000, Lua
283
Chu answered, no, but promised to deliver it when the opium was in Uy Se Tieng's
warehouse. After this conversation, which was taken down in shorthand, Samson took
the accused Lua Chu aside and asked him: "I say, old fellow, why didn't you tell me
about this before bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu answered: "Impossible, sir; you
were not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by Samson how he
had come to bring in the opium, Lua Chu answered: "I was in a cockpit one Sunday
when the collector called me aside and said there was good business, because opium
brought a good price, and he needed money." All this conversation was overheard by
Captain Buenconsejo. It was then agreed that Uy Se Tieng should take the papers
with him at 10 o'clock next morning. At the appointed hour, Uy Se Tieng and one Uy
Ay arrived at Samson's house, and as Uy Se Tieng was handing certain papers over
to his companion, Uy Ay, Captain Buenconsejo, who had been hiding, appeared and
arrested the two Chinamen, taking the aforementioned papers, which consisted of bills
of lading (Exhibits B and B-1), and in invoice written in Chinese characters, and
relating to the articles described in Exhibit B. After having taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy
Ay to the Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Captain Buenconsejo and
Samson went to Lua Chu's home to search it and arrest him. In the pocket of a coat
hanging on a wall, which Lua Chu said belonged to him, they found five letters written
in Chinese characters relating to the opium (Exhibits G to K). Captain Buenconsejo
and Samson also took Lua Chu to the Constabulary headquarters, and then went to
the customhouse to examine the cases marked "U.L.H." In the cases marked Nos. 11
to 18, they found 3,252 opium tins hidden away in a quantity to dry fish. The value of
the opium confiscated amounted to P50,000.
In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo approached Lua Chu
and asked him to tell the truth as to who was the owner of the opium. Lua Chu
answered as follows: "Captain, it is useless to ask me any questions, for I am not
going to answer to them. The only thing I will say is that whoever the owner of this
contraband may be, he is not such a fool as to bring it in here without the knowledge
of those — " pointing towards the customhouse.
The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had obtained a loan of P200
from Uy Se Tieng, he induced him to order the opium from Hongkong saying that it
only cost from P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from P18 to P20, and that he
could make a good deal of money by bringing in a shipment of that drug; that Samson
told Uy Se Tieng, furthermore, that there would be no danger, because he and the
collector of customs would protect him; that Uy Se Tieng went to see Natividad, who
told him he had no objection, if Samson agreed; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his
correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after he had ordered it, Samson
went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in the name of Natividad, and demanded the payment of
P6,000; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent cancelling the
order, but the latter answered that the opium had already been loaded and the captain
of the Kolambugan refused to let him unload it; that when the opium arrived, Samson
insisted upon the payment of the P6,000; that as Uy Se Tieng did not have that
amount, he went to Lua Chu on the night of December 14th, and proposed that he
participate; that at first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy Se Tieng's proposition, but
he finally agreed to pay P6,000 when the opium had passed the customhouse; that
Lua Chu went to Samson's house on the night of December 17th, because Samson at
last agreed to deliver the opium without first receiving the P6,000, provided Lua Chu
personally promised to pay him that amount.
The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed by the trial court in its
judgment. Some refer to the refusal of the trial judge to permit the presentation of
certain documentary evidence, and to the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal
witness for the Government, from the court room during the hearing; others refer to
the admission of the alleged statements of the accused taken in shorthand; and the
others to the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the
defendants beyond a reasonable doubt.
With respect to the presentation of the record of the administrative proceedings
against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson,
supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, who were dismissed from the
service, the trial court did not err in not permitting it, for, whatever the result of those
proceedings, they cannot serve to impeach the witness Juan Samson, for it is not one
of the means prescribed in section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure to that end.
With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion of Juan Samson, the
principal witness of the Government, from the court room during the hearing, it is
within the power of said judge to do so or not, and it does not appear that he has
abused his discretion (16 Corpus Juris, 842).
Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence the transcript of
stenographic notes of the defendants' statements, since they contain admissions
made by themselves, and the person who took them in shorthand attested at the trial
that they were faithfully taken down. Besides the contents are corroborated by
unimpeached witnesses who heard the statements.
As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish the facts alleged in the
information, we find that the testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution
should be believed, because the officers of the Constabulary and the chief of the
customs secret service, who gave it, only did their duty. Aside from this, the
defendants do not deny their participation in the illegal importation of the opium,
though the accused Lua Chu pretends that he was only a guarantor to secure the
payment of the gratuity which the former collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad, had
asked of him for Juan Samson and certain customs employees. This assertion,
however, is contradicted by his own statement made to Juan Samson and overheard
by Captain Buenconsejo, that he was one of the owners of the opium that had been
unlawfully imported.
But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to
import the opium in question. Juan Samson denies this, and his conduct in connection
with the introduction of the prohibited drug into the port of Cebu, bears him out. A
public official who induces a person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not
take the steps necessary to seize the instruments of the crime and to arrest the
offender, before having obtained the profit he had in mind. It is true that Juan Samson
284
smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drug, but that was after the opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the
accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug, leaving only its latter.
introduction into the country through the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and he
did not do so to help them carry their plan to a successful issue, but rather to assure
By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby
the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.
affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to commit crime,
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez, and Imperial,
as laid down by the courts of the United States, are summarized in 16 Corpus Juris,
JJ., concur.
page 88, section 57, as follows:

Republic of the Philippines

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the
SUPREME COURT
practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting
Manila
criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has
sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, EN BANC
the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that
facilitates for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the
G.R. No. L-8578 November 17, 1913
criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to
expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were
present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, vs.
and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere ANSELMO DIRIS, EUSTAQUIO SIAGA, and TOMAS OLEA, defendants.
deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was ANSELMO DIRIS and EUSTAQUIO SIAGA, appellants.
committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective.
The fact that an agent of an owner acts as supposed confederate of a thief
is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original Godofredo Reyes, for appellants.
design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public
authorities, and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in
carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally
held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the
purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there
are cases holding the contrary. CARSON, J.:

As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-
appellants to import the opium in question, as the latter contend, but pretended to
have an understanding with the collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad — who had
promised them that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise so
far as the customhouse was concerned — not to gain the P2,000 intended for him out
of the transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug
and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in this
or against the public good which should prevent the Government from prosecuting and
punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is induced to
commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to catch a criminal.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief of the
customs secret service pretended to agree a plan for smuggling illegally imported
opium through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of said
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas
convicting the defendants of the crime of robbery.
During the pendency of the proceedings in this court the defendant Tomas Olea
withdrew his appeal and the judgment of the lower court is therefore final as to him.
The only question now presented for our consideration is the appeal of the defendants
Anselmo Diris and Eustaquio Siaga.
We are of opinion that the evidence of record fully sustains the contentions of the
prosecution and the findings of the lower court as to the facts. It will not therefore be
necessary to review the evidence in detail.
It appears that Fulgencio Seal, who lived in the pueblo of Calauag, Province of
Tayabas, received from the railroad company on July 7, 1912, more than P400 in

285
payment of certain land expropriated by that company, and that the defendant Tomas
Olea, a nephew of Fugencio Seal, was present when the money was counted and
paid over to his uncle. The record shows that the money was deposited in a trunk and
that this fact was also known to Olea, who had free access to his uncle's house and
was accustomed to come and go at will.
On the morning of July 12, following the date of the receipt of the money from the
railroad company, Fulgencio Seal left the house between 8 and 9 o'clock in the
morning, leaving his wife in charge of their tienda. A short time thereafter the three
defendants appeared at the tienda and Eustaquio Siaga engaged the woman in
conversation while the other two defendants went upstairs, broke open the trunk, and
took the money, amounting to P353, and a receipt for P100. The record shows that at
the time of the robbery part of the money received from the railroad company had
been paid out and that the balance in the trunk was only P353.
The woman was somewhat deaf and had no knowledge of what was taking place
upstairs. She stated that she saw the two defendants go up into the house, but as
Tomas Olea was her husband's nephew and accustomed to come to the house she
thought nothing of it. Upon the return of Fulgencio Seal later in the morning the
robbery was discovered, and when his wife reported who had been there he
immediately went in search of his nephew. The nephew when found admitted the theft
of the money and promised that if the uncle would not make any trouble about it he
would try and recover it from the other defendants. Together with Olea the uncle then
went in search of Diris. The uncle was told to wait at a certain place until the nephew
should return, and when he failed to come back the uncle went in search of him and
after found him and Diris in a barber shop in the municipality of Lopez. The matter was
reported to the justice of the peace of that municipality and the two defendants were
arrested. On the person of Tomas Olea were found two bank notes of the
denomination of P10 each, P3 in half-peso denominations, and P4 in 10-centavo
pieces.
Fulgencio Seal testified that the money in the trunk consisted of one bank notes of the
value of P200, P100 in the bank note of the value of 10 pesos each, and the
remainder in currency in P1, 50-centavo, and 10-centavo denominations, there being
P23 in 10-centavo pieces. It appears that by some error on the part of the justice of
the peace the money was returned to Olea; however, there can hardly be any doubt
that it was a part of the money which his uncle had in the trunk. At the trial the
defendants denied that they were the authors of the crime; Olea and Diris denied that
they were present at the house on the morning in question; and Eustaquio Siaga,
while admitting that he was at the tienda stated that he went there alone. The
presence of the defendants at the house on the morning in question is not only
established by the wife of Fulgencio Seal, but her testimony on this point is
corroborated by that of Conrado Fernandez, a neighbor. In view of all the facts of
record the statements of the defendants cannot be credited. Their guilt is conclusively
established.
Olea having withdrawn his appeal and the other evidence of record being sufficient in
itself to sustain the conviction of all the appellants, it is not necessary for us to discuss
the objections set forth in their brief as to the admission of the alleged confession of
guilt of Olea.lawph!1.net
It has been suggested by counsel, that the defendant Eustaquio Siaga, who remained
below in the tienda and engaged the woman in conversation while the other
defendants went up into the house, should only be held as a complice (accessary
before the fact) as defined in the Penal Code, and not as a principal. In support of this
view we are cited to Viada (Vol. I, p. 370), as follows: "The persons who entertains the
owner of a house while robbers are assaulting it, so that he will not return thereto until
after the robbery has been consummated, is also an accomplice in the crime,
inasmuch as he cooperated therein by a simultaneous act, although not an
indispensable one for its accomplishment."
It will be seen however that the case supposed by the noted commentator clearly
implies that the owner of the house was entertained at some distance from the place
where the robbery was committed; it does not appear how far away, but apparently
not anywhere in the immediate neighborhood. The present case offers a different
situation. The defendant Siaga acted concurrently with the other defendants, and must
be held to have been present with them aiding and abetting them in the commission of
the crime by remaining below and talking with the woman in order to distract her
attention from what was going on upstairs. In doing so he was evidently serving as a
guard to warn his companions in case there should arise any necessity for giving an
alarm. When the other defendants came down out of the house he went away with
them.
This court has repeatedly held that one who shares the guilty purpose and aids and
abets the commission of a crime by his presence at the time of its perpetration, even
though he may not have taken an active part in its material execution, is guilty as a
principal. We have also held that one who stands as guard near the place where a
crime is committed to keep others away or to warn his companions and fellow
conspirators of danger of discovery, takes a direct part in the commission of the crime
and is therefore guilty as a principal under article 13 of the Penal Code (U. S. vs.
Reogilon and Dingle, 22 Phil. Rep., 127; U. S. vs. Balisacan, 4 Phil. Rep., 545; U. S.
vs. Ramos, 4 Phil. Rep., 555.)
Under all the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that Siaga was properly
convicted as a principal.
It appears that the trial court treated the stolen receipts for P100 as being of that
value. The actual money stolen amounted to only P353.
While we have held that checks, warrants and similar instrument, payable to order an
evidencing an obligation to pay money, may under certain circumstances be treated
as worth their face value in fixing the value of the stolen property for the purpose of
grading the crime and the penalty to be imposed on conviction, in cases wherein the
penalty prescribed in the Code is made to depend on the value of the property taken
(U. S. vs. Raboy, 25 Phil. Rep., 1; U. S. vs. Wickersham, 20 Phil. Rep., 440), we are
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of opinion that a mere receipt such as that under consideration, especially in the accused, who was at the time lying upon a bed in the room. This was about 4:30 in the
absence of any proof as to its value, cannot be held to have anything more than a afternoon. Sariol remained there with his hands tied behind his back until night, when
mere nominal value in fixing the penalty and assessing the civil indemnity to be the accused, in the presence of several witnesses, ordered Sariol to be taken to the
imposed on one convicted of its theft. Chinese cemetery and there killed, the accused asserting at the time that he had an
order to that effect from the governor. He gave strict orders to Akiran that he should be
present at the time that Sariol was killed, and that he should aid in killing him. To make
The record further shows that Anselmo Diris is a recidivist, having been previously
sure of the work being well done, the accused ordered Akiran to take his (the
convicted of the crime of robbery by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas in the case
accused's) bolo with which to assist in the killing. Sariol was taken to the cemetery, in
of the United States vs. Anselmo Diris, on April 12, 1904, which judgment of conviction
an isolated spot a considerable distance from the road and about 200 yards from the
was affirmed by this Court on May 9, 1905 (4 Phil. Rep., 498).
nearest house, and there killed. Kalyakan struck the first blow with his bolo, while
Akiran joined in and assisted thereafter. The deceased at the time he was killed had
The judgment of the trial court should be modified, in so far as it affects these his hands tied behind his back. On returning to the house of the accused after the
appellants, by reducing the amount of the civil indemnification from P453 to P353 and death of Sariol, Unding told the accused that Sariol had been killed, whereupon the
by substituting the words presidio mayor for the words prision mayor in the dispositive accused said that it was all right and appeared to be very much pleased.
part thereof, and thus modified the judgment convicting and sentencing the appellants
Diris and Siaga should be and is hereby affirmed, with a proportionate share of the
The proofs demonstrate beyond question that the accused was the recognized
costs of this instance against each of the appellants.
headman of Parang, and it appears from the testimony of the witnesses, Kalyakan,
Suhuri, and Akiran, that he had a very powerful influence over them, hence this power
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur. over them was such that any order issued by him had the force and efficacy of
physical coercion. One of the witnesses testified: "He (the accused) knows what is
good and what is bad, and he is the headman of the governor. He is headman of
Republic of the Philippines Parang." And in answer to the question, "He is the biggest chief in the Parang ward?"
SUPREME COURT
replied: "There is none, only himself." He further said: "The people do not hesitate to
Manila take his orders because he is the headman of the governor." Later, in reply to the
question, "If he were to get angry with the people, what would he do to them?" this
EN BANC witnesses answered: "I do not know; might kill them." Another witness, answering the
question as to why he did not run away instead of going to the Chinese cemetery as
the accused ordered him, answered: "The reason why I did not run away, well, take
G.R. No. L-8187 January 29, 1913 the same thing as the Government soldiers. They are told to do a thing and they do it."
Prior to this time the same witness had said: "If a chief says anything to a man like me
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, and tells me it is by order of the governor and that he has a warrant there, well, a man
vs. like me does what he tells me." Another witness declared: "I am afraid of him. I did not
PANGLIMA INDANAN, defendant-appellant. believe that he would make me do anything unjust." The same witness afterwards
testified in answer to the question: "Would you have killed this man if any other person
besides Panglima, the headman, had ordered you to ?" "I would not." Another witness
Leo T. Gibbons, for appellant. declared: "Well, he was the headman. It was the headman's orders, and if we did not
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee. do it, he would get angry with us." This witness, answering the question, "Did
Panglima make you think that he was acting under the orders of the Government in
MORELAND, J.: causing this man to be killed?" testified: "He said, 'I have a warrant here.' To the
question, "And you thought that it was a legal execution, did you?" answered, "Yes,
because he (the accused) is not afraid of the governor."
An appeal from a judgment convicting the appellant of the crime of murder, and
sentencing him to be hanged.
We are of the opinion that the domination of the accused over the persons who, at his
orders, killed the deceased was such as to make him responsible for whatever they
The accused was at the time of the commission of the crime, the headman of Parang. did in obedience to such orders.
He is alleged to have committed the murder by inducement. The proofs tend to
demonstrate that on the 24th day of March, 1912, the accused sent Induk to bring to
the house of the accused one Sariol. The following day, Induk, in obedience to the Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code declares those to be principals in a crime
orders, brought Sariol to the house, whereupon the accused ordered the witnesses, "who directly force or induce others to commit it."
Akiran and Suhuri, to tie Sariol. They obeyed the order in the presence of the

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Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada says: who acts; it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful
as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself.
They force another to commit a crime who physically by actual force or
grave fear, for example, with a pistol in hand or by any other threatening The following decisions of the supreme court of Spain illustrate the principles involved
means, oblige another to commit the crime. In our commentary on and their application to particular cases:
paragraph 9 of article 8 (page 28), we have already said that he who suffers
violence acts without will and against his will, is no more than an instrument,
It was held by that court on the 14th day of April, 1871, that one who, during a riot in
and therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real culprits in such case, the only
which a person was killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not
guilty persons, are those who use the violence, those who force the other to
appearing that he did anything more than say these words except to be present at the
commit the crime.
fight, was not guilty of the crime of homicide by inducement, the court saying that,
"considering that, although the phrases pronounced were imprudent and even
One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for culpable, they were not so to the extent that they may be considered the principal and
a consideration, or by any other similar act which constitutes the real and moving cause of the effect produced; direct inducement cannot be inferred from such
moving cause of the crime and which was done for the purpose of inducing phrases, as inducement must precede the act induced and must be so influential in
such criminal act and was sufficient for that purpose. We have already seen producing the criminal act that without it the act would not have been performed."
in our commentary on paragraph 12 of article 8 that the one who physically
commits the crime may escape criminal responsibility by showing that he
In a decision rendered on the 10th of July, 1877, the principle was laid down that "a
acted with due obedience to an order; in such case the criminal
person who advised a married woman whose husband was very stingy and treated
responsibility falls entirely upon the one who orders, that is, upon him who
her badly that the only thing for her to do was to rob him, was not guilty of the crime of
by his commands has directly induced the other to commit the act. But in
robbery by inducement, for the reason that imprudent and ill-conceived advice is not
case the obedience of the inferior is not due to the superior and therefore
sufficient."
not necessary, and does not, therefore, exempt him from criminal
responsibility as the physical author of the crime, he who thus, by his
command, directly induced him to the criminal act is considered by the law In a decision of the 22nd of December, 1883, it was held that a father who simply said
also as principal in the crime. to his son who was at the time engaged in combat with another, "Hit him! Hit him!",
was not responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was given, under the
facts presented. The court said: "It being held in mind that the inducement to the
The pacto by virtue of which one purchases for a consideration the hand
commission of the crime by means of which a person may be considered a principal in
which commits the crime makes him who gives, promises, or offers the
the same manner as he who executes the act itself can only be founded in
consideration the principal in the crime by direct inducement, because
commands, sometimes in advice, in considerations, or by inducement so powerful that
without such offer or promise the criminal act would never have been
it alone produces the criminal act. None of these characteristics pertain to the words of
committed. But this does not mean that the one who actually commits the
Miguel Perez, inasmuch as the circumstances which surrounded the event at the time
crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward is exempted from
do not appear in sufficient detail to show with clearness the effects which the words
criminal responsibility; on the contrary, we have already seen in our
produced, or the relative situation of the deceased and of the one who killed him, or
comments on paragraph 3 of article 10 that such circumstance constitutes
the point to which the fight had progressed at the time the words were spoken.
an aggravation of his crime.
Moreover, the decision of the court below does not show sufficient facts upon which to
affirm that Miguel foresaw the use of the firearm on the part of his son when he spoke
We have heretofore said that in addition to the precepto and the pacto there the words referred to, or, for that reason, that he thereby induced him to use said
are similar means by which another may be induced to commit a crime weapon."
which also make the one who offers the inducement the principal in the
crime by virtue of the provisions of article 13, paragraph 2. But it must be
In a decision of the 19th of December, 1896, the court held that the fact "of having
borne in mind that these actsof inducement do not consist in
proposed to other persons the abstraction of the tickets which were the subject matter
simple advice or counsel given before the act is committed, or in
of the robbery, at the same time telling them the place where they were to be found,
simple words uttered at the time the act was committed. Such advice and
does not constitute inducement to commit the robbery because the proposal to commit
such words constitute undoubtedly an evil act, an inducement condemned
the robbery was not sufficiently efficacious to be the cause of the crime, as the crime,
by the moral law; but in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such
under the facts, could have been committed without it; nor was the indication of the
act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or
place where the money was to be found a sufficient motive to induce the robbery."
such words have a great dominance and great influence over the person

288
The foregoing decisions have been presented for the purpose of showing concrete
cases in which the acts of the accused were not sufficient, as a matter of law, to
constitute inducement. They not only lay down the legal principles which govern in
prosecutions of this character, but they also illustrate in the most valuable way the
application of those principles to actual cases.
The following decisions of the same court present instances in which the acts of the
accused constitute inducement under the law and illustrate the application of the
principles to concrete cases.
In a decision of the 14th of April, 1871, the facts as stated by the court were: "It
appeared that Lulu, who was living with Joe and Zozo (a married couple) in the town
of X, gave birth to a child on the morning of the 28th of March, the offspring of her illicit
relations with William. It had been previously agreed upon by the first three named to
deliver the child to William as soon as it was born, with instructions to deposit it in
some frequented place so that it might be found and taken up; but Joe changed his
mind and handed the child over to the father, telling him, 'Here is your child, do with it
whatever you please; throw it into the sea if you choose to,' which the latter actually
did." Under the facts the accused was held guilty by inducement.
In a judgment pronounced on the 22nd of January, 1873, it was held that "a woman
who, living with a man in scandalous concubinage in the presence of a daughter who
continually manifested her disgust and repugnance for such conduct, conceived
against the daughter the most profound hatred and conceived the purpose of killing
her by most insidious methods, obtaining for that purpose poison and various deadly
weapons, and contriving that she and her family and all of the tenants in the house
should go to the theater on an evening during which the daughter was sick and
obliged to remain at home, in order that her lover might be entirely undisturbed in
killing the daughter and that he might not be surprised in the act, such woman is the
author and principal of the crime the same as her lover who actually committed the
deed."
In a decision of the 6th of July, 1881, the court held that "one who takes advantage of
his position as an inspector for the maintenance of public peace and proposes to a
private citizen the perpetration of a robbery, with the threat that unless he did commit
the robbery he would be arrested as an escaped prisoner, at the same time offering to
withdraw the officers from the vicinity of the place to be robbed, and who after the
robbery received a part of the booty, was guilty of the crime as principal, although he
did not take personal part therein."
In a decision of the 12th of April, 1882, it was said that "an alcalde of a barrio who,
accompanied by a number of peace officers, ordered them to stop certain music that
was being played in the public street, and after the order had been obeyed and the
music stopped one of the persons expressed his resentment against the act
whereupon the alcalde ordered the peace officers to attack the man, which they did,
inflicting upon him various wounds, was guilty of the crime of lesiones graves by
inducement."
In a decision of the 21st of June, 1882, it was stated that "a father who from the
balcony of his house cried out in a loud voice to his sons who were fighting with others
to kill those with whom they were fighting before they were killed themselves, because
they might as well go to jail for a big thing as a little, was guilty of the crime of lesiones
gravesby inducement by reason of the injuries inflicted under such orders."
In a decision of the 22nd day of December, 1883, the court said, "that the inducement
and the commission of a crime whereby the inducer becomes a principal to the same
extent and effect as if he had physically committed the crime exist merely in acts of
command, sometimes of advice, or agreement for a consideration, or through
influence so effective that it alone determines the commission of the crime."
In a decision of the 11th of November, 1884, the court laid down the proposition that
the secretary of the ayuntamiento who induced a certain persons to form new lists
of compromisarios five days prior to the election of senators was guilty as principal of
the crime against the election lists, saying: "It appearing and it being a fact proved that
the secretary of the ayuntamiento of Jalom, Miguel Antonio Dura, induced the
members of the council to commit the act stated, his participation as principal in the
commission of the act is well established according to the provisions of paragraph 2,
article 13, of the Penal Code, because such inducement coming from a person of such
influence as the secretary of the ayuntamiento in a small village must be considered
sufficiently dominant to turn the mind of those induced."
In a decision rendered on the 28th of December, 1886, it was held that a woman who
was at enmity with an uncle for having refused to renounce in her favor a donation
which a relative had given to him, who made frequent threats to kill the uncle and who
finally offered a third person a certain sum of money together with the land involved in
the donation if he would kill the uncle, and who told her son that, if they were unable to
get anybody else to kill the uncle, he must do it himself as he would thus inherit
15,000 pesetas with which they could flee abroad, and in case he refused to do it he
must leave the house because he was a coward, was guilty as principal of the crime of
murder committed by the son under such inducement. The court said: "It being borne
in mind that the suggestions with which the mother moved the mind of her son to kill
the uncle had the force of a real inducement and inclined and decided the will of the
son by means of the relations which she bore to him as well as the reward which she
held up before him."
In a decision of the 26th of January, 1888, it was held that finding as principal in a
crime, him who, "by direct and influential means and taking advantage of the
inexperience of a boy of tender age," induces him to commit a crime, was warranted
by law, the court saying that "in view of the fact that the inducement exercised by Juan
Santiso with regard to the boy, Ramon Carballo, to steal the jewels in question from
his grandmother's house shows such a direct and inducing cause of the criminal act
that without such inducement the crime would not have been committed."
In a decision of the 9th of April, 1882, the court held "that the inducement referred to in
paragraph 2, article 13, of the Penal Code exists whenever the act performed by the
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physical author of the crime is determined by the influence of the inducer over the
mind of him who commits the act, whatever be the source of such influence."
In a decision of the 3rd of February, 1897, it was declared that one was the "principal
by inducement in five different larcenies, it having been proved that the inducer,
knowing that the oil which was brought to her for sale was stolen by the persons who
were seeking to sell it to her, advised them thereupon to continue stealing oil and
furnished them vessels in which to carry it and contributed on five different occasions
to the realization of the larcenies, it appearing that the physical authors of the crime
were boys under 15 years of age and that they acted upon the suggestions of the
inducer without discernment or judgment of their own," the court saying that in view of
the fact that she knew that the oil which she first purchased from the boys was stolen
oil, that the boys were less than 15 years of age, and therefore easily led, that she
furnished the vessels in which to carry the stolen property — all indicate conclusively
that the five crimes were committed by the influence exercised by the woman, which
inducement was not merely that of favoring the execution of the crime but was that
which determined its commission."
In a decision of the 31st of May, 1898, it was laid down "that the command of a master
to his servant, by reason of the special relations which exist between them, contains
the elements of inducement which makes the master who orders such servant to cut
wood belonging to a third person, in order that he might benefit thereby, the principal
of the crime committed by such servant," the court saying that "in view of the fact that
the command of the master to the servant, made within the sphere and under the
ordinary conditions of domestic life, when they relate to acts simple and apparently
legitimate, contains the necessary elements, directly and sufficiently efficacious, of
inducement according to the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code,
it appearing that the master, taking advantage of the ascendency and authority which
he naturally must exercise over his servant or inferior, ordered him to cut and carry
away wood from land which he knew did not belong to him, without disclosing to the
servant that circumstance, which concealment gave rise to the influence which the
master exercised over the servant in that particular act."
The following decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands apply the
foregoing principles to particular cases.
In the case of the United States vs. Galuran (12 Phil. Rep., 339) it appeared that one
of the defendants conceived the idea of the robbery of a warehouse and assisted in
procuring false keys with which to open it. He took no immediate part in the act of
robbery itself. The court in its opinion said:
These facts, which we hold to have been proven, clearly show the guilt of
the appellant, Sy-Yoc, as the instigator of the crime herein prosecuted.
From him came the initiative in the robbery; he was the first to conceive the
idea of its commission, and, being unable or unwilling to carry it out himself,
he employed Galuran, impelling him to the material execution of the crime
by a promise to pay him P16 for each case of whisky that he was able to
steal. The better to induce him to commit the offense, he clearly
demonstrated how easily it could be accomplished, instructed him as to the
best means of carrying it out, and offered him money to pay for the false
key. He thus removed all the difficulties in the way of determination to
execute, and the actual execution of the robbery in question. These acts
constitute a real inducement made directly for the commission of the said
robbery, and place the appellant, Sy-Yoc, in the position of principal in
accordance with paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code.
In the case of the United States vs. Ancheta (15 Phil. Rep., 470) it appeared that the
accused induced certain Igorrotes to kill a third person by holding up before them the
fact that by such act they would be able to obtain P40 which was then in the house of
the victim, as well as the carabao which he owned, saying to them, "If you go to work
you only make a little; it is better to kill this man and take his carabao and the P40
which was received from the sale of the house in town." They having made an
unsuccessful attempt upon the life of the proposed victim and having returned and
explained why they had not been able to kill them, the accused said to them: "Why did
you eat my chickens if you are not going to do what I told you to do. I came here to
spend the night in Cambaguio because I thought you were going to kill them." The
Igorrotes then spent three days clearing some land for another person from whom
they received P2.25. About noon of the third day of their work, the defendant went to
them and said: "Now you must repeat what I told you to do, and comply with our
agreement; I am going to Ululing to-day, and I wish you to kill Tiburcio to-night. You go
to the bushes and conceal yourselves in the same place you were concealed before."
The murder was committed as proposed. Upon these facts and inducer of the crime,
and that he was liable as principal. (Supreme court of Spain, 20th of October, 1881,
7th of January, 1887, 12th of January, 1889.)
In the case of the United States vs. Empinado (17 Phil. Rep., 230) it appeared that the
accused had a conversation with Serapio Tapic, a laborer, in which the accused asked
him if he knew Antonio Gavato and his associates, to which he replied in the negative.
The defendant then said: "I wish to confer upon you a commission, which is as
follows: Order must be disturbed in the cockpit of Gavato, and when you arrive there
wound any person." It seems that Tapic was reluctant to obey this order, but
defendant gave him something to eat and drink until he became intoxicated, and then
he gave him a bolo and P10 and said: "Comply with what I have ordered and in case
you incur any responsibility I will be responsible to the court, and as soon as you
wound any person or persons, return to me and I will defend you." The court held that
these facts constituted sufficient inducement to bring the accused within the provisions
of article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.
In the case of the United States vs. Gamao (23 Phil. Rep., 81) the court said:
Mauricio Gamao, nephew of Gil Gamao, was a poor, ignorant fisherman,
and more or less dependent upon his uncle for subsistence. On the other
hand, Capt. Gil Gamao was, when this crime was committed, a man of great
influence in Escalante. He had a great number of people working for him,
one of whom was his nephew Mauricio. He was the local political leader of
his party. One of his nephews was president of the town. He had two
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 brothers-in-law in the municipal council. Of his nephews, one was chief of
police and two others were members of the police force. He had acquired,
as we have said, a bitter hatred toward the Roman Catholic Church and the
Spanish friars and priests. He called a meeting in his own house on the
afternoon of May 15, where the question of murdering the priest was
discussed. He was the prime mover in this meeting. He dominated all who
were present. He selected his nephew Mauricio to commit the crime and
directed him to do it. Mauricio, immediately after murdering the priest,
returned to the house of his uncle Gil and reported the fact. The influence
exercised by Gil Gamao over his nephew was so great and powerful that
the latter, through fear, could not resist it. That Mauricio was directly
induced to murder the priest by his uncle Gil we think there can be no
question.
In the case of the United States vs. Chan Guy Juan (23 Phil. Rep., 105) it was held
that the "one who employs an innocent agent to commit a crime is liable as a principal,
although he does nothing himself in the actual commission of the crime."
In the case of the United States vs. Alcontin (10 Off. Gaz., 1888) it appeared that "a
married woman suggested to her paramour, with whom she had been maintaining
illicit relations that he kill her husband in order that thereafter they might live together
freely. The paramour acting upon these suggestions and actuated by a desire to
possess the woman for himself without the interference of the husband, killed him.
The guilty pair immediately thereafter made their escape and lived together as man
and wife until the time of ] their arrest." Upon these facts the court said:
We think that the direct inducement to the commission of the crime is fully
established por pacto (for a consideration); that is to say, on the
understanding that the woman would live in illicit relations with the murderer
after the death of her husband; and por precepto (by precept) which
constituted "a real, intentional, direct and efficacious exciting inducement
(excitacion) to commit the crime." The propositions and suggestions of the
woman constituted something more than mere counsel or advice which her
co-defendant was entirely free to accept or not, in that they were coupled
with a consideration which, in view of the relations existing between them,
furnished a motive strong enough to induce the man to take the life of her
husband; and for the further reason that due to these illicit relations she had
required such an influence over her co-defendant that her insistent
suggestions that he commit the crime had a marked and controlling
influence upon his mind.
In the case of the United States vs. Matinong (22 Phil. rep., 439) it appeared that the
accused proposed to his companions an assault upon the house of Francisco Tolosa;
that armed with a talibon he accompanied them during the assault; that, while the
assault was being made, he stood watch at the foot of the stairs of said house so that
his companions would not be caught, and that, finally, he accompanied them to the
place where the deceased was killed. These facts were held by the court to be
sufficient to make the accused a principal by inducement as well as by direct
participation.
In the case at bar, the words and acts of the accused had the effect of a command.
There does not seem to have existed, however, any official relation between the
accused and the persons whom he induced to kill Sariol. While he appears to have
been the headman of Parang, those whom he induced held no official position under
him and owed him, legally speaking, no obedience. According to tradition and custom,
however, the headman seems to have been a person whose word was law and whose
commands were to be obeyed. Moreover, the accused represented to those who
physically committed the crime that he had a warrant from the governor authorizing, if
not requiring, the acts committed, and urged upon them, in effect, that all must obey
the commands of the Government. This representation was false, but it produced the
same effect as if it had been true. It cannot be doubted that the accused knew the
representation was false and purposely and intentionally made it as an additional
factor going to insure obedience to his orders.
Even if there should happen to be lacking any element sufficient to bring the acts of
the accused within the definition of inducement by command, and we do not believe
there is, there would still remain all of the elements necessary to qualify the crime as
murder by inducement. From the authorities heretofore cited and the principles laid
down therein as those which must govern in the determination of whether or not the
acts of an accused constitute inducement under the law, it may be stated as a general
proposition that, where the inducement offered by the accused is of such a nature and
made in such a way that it becomes the determining cause of the crime, and such
inducement was offered with the intention of producing that result, then the accused is
guilty by inducement of the crime committed by the person so induced. The
inducement to the crime must be intentional on the part of the inducer and must be
made directly for the purpose in view.
The verb "induce" is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to cover cases where there
exists on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent
effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the
person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation, as well as words or acts
which are merely the result of indiscretion or lack of reflection and which carry with
them, inherently, almost nothing of inducement or temptation. A chance word spoken
without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless
act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for
some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or
performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any
real intention that it produce a result. In such case, while the expression was
imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he would not be guilty of the
crime committed. Therefore, in applying the principles laid down to concrete cases it is
necessary to remember only that the inducement must be made directly with the
intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement must be
the determining cause of the crime.
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In the case before us, as we have seen, the accused falsely represented to the
persons who actually committed the crime that he had an order from the Government
requiring the death of Sariol and that they were under obligation to carry out that
order. It is clear from the evidence that this inducement was offered by the accused
directly to the persons interested with the intention of moving them to do his bidding,
and that such representation was the moving cause of the fatal act. While it may be
said, and is true, that the personal commands of the accused were entirely sufficient
to produce the effects which actually resulted and that such commands may be
considered the moving cause of the crime, still there is no doubt, under the evidence,
that the representation that the accused had in his possession an order from the
Government commanding the death of Sariol was also of material influence in
effecting the death; and where two fundamental causes work together for the
production of a single result and one of those causes would lead to a conviction upon
one theory and the other upon another, a conviction is sustainable upon either theory.
There was present premeditation, qualifying the crime as murder. There were present,
also, the aggravating circumstances of desplobado and nocturnity.
We are of the firm conviction that the judgment of the court below is well founded, and
we accordingly affirm the same, with costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-67948 May 31, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NAPOLEON MONTEALEGRE, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the conviction of the accused, who is
constitutionally presumed innocent, depends upon the strength of the prosecution and
not the weakness of the defense. Unfortunately for the accused in this case, his
prosecution for murder with assault upon a person in authority, undoubtedly already
strong, was made even stronger by the defense itself.
As the trial court * which convicted him saw it, the crime imputed to Napoleon
Montealegre was committed as follows:
At about 11:30 in the evening of March 11, 1983, while Edmundo Abadilia was eating
at the Meding's Restaurant in Cavite City, he detected the smell of marijuana smoke
coming from a nearby table. Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went outside and
saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue in his car whom he hailed to report the matter. After
parking his vehicle, Camantigue joined Abadilla in the restaurant and soon thereafter
the two smelled marijuana smoke from the table occupied by Vicente Capalad and the
accused-appellant. Camantigue then approached the two and collared both of them,
saying "Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?' Forcing them up, he asked the waitress ff she
knew them but the waitress said she did not. 1 Then the mayhem began.
While Camantigue was holding the two, Montealegre with this right hand and Capalad
with his left hand, Capalad suddenly and surreptitiously pulled out a knife from a
scabbard tucked in the right side of his waist and started stabbed Camantigue in the
back. 2 Camantigue let loose Montealegre to draw the gun from his holster but
Montealegre, thus released, restrained Camantigue's hand to prevent the latter from
defending himself Montealegre used both his hands for his purpose 3 as Capalad
continued stabbing the Victim. 4 While they were thus grappling, the three fen to the
floor and Capalad, freed from Camantigue's grip, rose and scampered toward the
door. Camantigue fired and, continuing the pursuit outside, fired again. 5 Capalad fled
into a dark alley. Camantigue abandoned the chase and asked to be brought to a
hospital. Capalad was later found slumped in the alley with a bullet wound in Ms
chest. Neither Camantigue nor Capalad survived, both expiring the following day. 6
The accused-appellant, for his part, escaped during the confusion. 7 Having been
informed of the incident, Capt. Cipriano Gilera of the Cavite police immediately
organized a team that went to look for him that very night. 8 They did not find him in
his house then but he was apprehended in the morning of March 12,1983, on board a
vehicle bound for Baclaran. He gave his name as Alegre but later admitted he was the
fugitive being sought. 9
Dr. Regalado Sosa, reporting on the autopsy of the Camantigue's body, testified that
death was caused by shock due to massive internal hemorrhage caused by seven
stab wounds affecting the heart, lungs, liver, stomach, pancreas, and
diaphragm.10 The weapon used was 6" in length and about 2 to 2.5 cm. in width and
the blood found on it was analyzed as human.11 The stabbing incident was narrated in
detail at the trial by Abadilla, 12 who was corroborated by Generoso San Juan. 13
292
On direct examination, Abadilla testified that Montealegre prevented Camantigue from Q. With what hand?
drawing his pistol while he was being stabbed by Capalad, demonstrating with the aid
of court personnel the relative positions of the three during the incident. 14
A. Both hands, sir.

On cross-examination, he reiterated his previous declaration even more emphatically,

Q. And was Camantigue able to pull out from
thus:
his waist the gun?

Q. When accused Montealegre held the hand

A. No. sir.
of Pfc. Camantigue upon drawing his gun,
what happened to Camantigue?
Q. Why?
A. He could not move, sir. He could not make
any defense because he was being held by A. Because Montealegre was holding his
Montealegre and he was being stabbed at hand, Your Honor.
the back. 15
Q. With both hands?
He replied as follows to questions on re-direct to stress the participation of the
accused-appellant —
A. Yes, sir.

Q. When accused Capalad started stabbing

Pfc. Camantigue at the back, accused Q. Montealegre was holding with both hands
Montealegre was being held by Pfc. rights hand of Camantigue?
Camantigue at that time?
A. Yes, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And at this moment when Montealegre
Q And in fact Montealegre was very close to was holding with both hands the hand of
the right of Camantigue at that time? Camantigue, what was Capalad doing?

A. Yes sir. A. Capalad was still stabbing Camantigue,

Your Honor. 17

Q And Montealegre was aware that Capalad

was stabbing Pfc. Camantigue? San Juan was equally categorical in his testimony, saying on direct examination.

16 Q. When Camantigue was being stabbed,

A. Yes, sir, he knew.
where was Montealegre?

In answer to clarificatory questions from the court, he declared:

A. He was on the right side.

Q. And when Montealegre saw that

Camantigue was about to draw gun, Q. What was he doing at that time?
Montealegre grabbed the hand of
Camantigue? A. When Camantigue was being stabbed, he
tried to pull his gun but Montealegre held his
A. Yes, sir. hand.

293
 Q. Was Camantigue able to draw his gun? Q. What happened after that?

A. No. sir. A. Nothing, I did not see anymore what

happened. 21
Q. What happened when Camantigue failed
to draw his gun? They slammed down on the xxx xxx xxx
floor and when they were already on the
floor, I ran away because I was already
A. I cannot say anything about that. I did not
figures lightened. 18
see what really happened.

The cause of the defense did not improve when on cross-examination, he insisted:
Q. Did you see Capalad stabbing Pfc.
Camantigue?
A. When Camantigue was about to draw his
gun, Montealegre suddenly held the hand of
A. I did not see. 22
Camantigue.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And when Montealegre suddenly held the
hand of Camantigue, what happened to
Camantigue?
A. He could not draw his gun because while
Montealegre was holding his hand, Capalad
was stabbing him at the back. 19
And to the court, the witness maintained his testimony as follows:
Q. So Camantigue was hit many times by
Capalad while Montealegre was holding the
right hand of the policeman to prevent him
from drawing his gun?
A. Yes, sir. 20
The accused-appellant, testifying on his behalf, only succeeded in confinning his own
guilt. He claimed he ran away before the stabbing but his testimony, consisting of
denials, evasions, contradictions, claims of ignorance and forgetfulness and
protestations of innocence, does not have the ring of truth. The following excerpts are
reflective of the kind of defense he offered to exculpate himself from the charge
established against him by the prosecution.
Q. From whom did you come to know that
Pfb. Camantigue shot and killed Vicente
Capalad?
A. From the witness Abadilla. I have heard
from him that Camantigue killed Capalad. 23
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Mr. Montealegre, did you notice while
Pfc.Camantigue was holding both of you, did
you notice that Vicente Capalad stabbed Pfc.
Camantigue?
A. I did not see anything. 24
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And you were standing on the right side of
Pfc. Camantigue while Capalad was on the
left side?

Q. Now, while Pfc. Camantigue was arresting

Vicente Capalad, what happened if any? A. I am not sure whether I was standing at
the right or at the left.

A. Camantigue pulled his gun.

294
 Q. But the fact is that you were standing on
the right side of Camantigue?
A. I am not sure if that is the right side.
As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: "(1) participating in the
criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and
(2) cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without
which it would not have been accomplished.

Q. But you were standing on the side where

his gun and holster were placed?
A. I cannot remember. 25
The prosecution contends that although there was no evidence correspondence of a
prior agreement between Capalad and Montealegre, their subsequent acts should
prove the presence of such conspiracy. The Court sustains this view, which conforms
to our consistent holding on this matter:

It is simply unbelievable that the accused-appellant did not know what was happening
on that evening of March 11, 1983. As one of the principal figures of the stabbing
incident, he could not have not known, nor could he later not remember, that startling
event that even more onlookers could not forget. The evidence has established that
the accused-appellant was directly and personally involved and was in fact one of the
two persons held by the victim when he was stabbed. Yet Montealegre would now
insist, quite incredibly, that he was unaware of what had transpired that night.
Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can be
inferred from the acts of the appellants. It is enough that, at the
time the offense was committed, participants had the same
purpose and were united in its execution; as may be inferred from
the attendant circiumstances. 29
xxx xxx xxx

If it is true, as he says, that he ran away before the stabbing, there would have been
We agree that there is no evidence to show a previous plan to kill
less likelihood of Capalad's attack as Camantigue's attention would have been fully
Regino Bautista. The whole incident happened because the
concentrated on his lone captive. Moreover, there would have been nothing to restrain
accused came upon Bautista and Mallabo fishing within or near
the policeman from drawing his pistol and defending himself against Capalad if the
the fishpond enclosure of Carlo Aquino which was under the care
accused-appellant had, by his own account, already escaped before the stabbing.
of Vicente Cercano.

It is also worth noting that, instead of reporting to the authorities, what the accused-
But for a collective responsibility among the herein accused to be
appellant did was attempt to hide, only to be found the following morning on board a
established, it is not necessary or essential that there be a
bus bound for outside Cavite City. When apprehended, he first gave a false name
previous plan or agreement to commit the assault; it is sufficient
before he finally admitted his Identity, thus beginning the mesh of contradictions,
that at the time of the aggression all the accused by their acts
admissions and denials, in which he would enshare himself.
manifested a common intent or desire to attack Bautista and
Mallabo, so that the act of one accused became the act of all. 30
The Court accepts the evidence established by the prosecution that at the time of the
stabbing, the victim was in uniform and, therefore, could easily be recognized as a
xxx xxx xxx
person in authority. Several witnesses testified as to his attire when he was
killed. 26 And even assuming that the victim was in civilian clothes on that tragic night,
the record shows that no less than the accused-appellant himself, replying to If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
questions put to him by the prosecution, declared twice that he knew the victim to be a towards accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing
policeman. 27 a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in
fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy
The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having collaborated
may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert
with Capalad in the killing of the police officer. The two acted in concert, with Capalad
is proven. A conspiracy only be entered into after the
actually stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accused-appellant holding on to
commencement of overt acts leading to the consummation of the
the victim's hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending himself. While
crime. 31
it is true that the accused- appellant did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was
nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue from resisting the
attack against him. The accused-appellant was a principal by indispensable As for the second requirement, the Court has held that:
cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code.

295
 There can be no question that appellant's act in holding the victim
from behind when the latter was stabbed by his collaborated FIRST DIVISION
Victor Buduan, was a positive act towards the realization of a
common criminal intent, although the intent can be classified as [G.R. No. L-39401. September 30, 1982.]
instantaneous. It can be safely assumed that had not appellant
held both arms of the victim from behind, the latter could have THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERTO SIMBRA and
partied the thrust or even run away from his assailant. By SERGIO TOLIBAS, Accused. SERGIO TOLIBAS, Accused-Appellant.
immobilizing the two hands of the victim from behind, and
although there was no anterior conspiracy , the two cousins The Solicitor General for Accused-Appellant.
showed unity of criminal purpose and intent immediateIy before
the actual stabbing. 32 Manuel V. Montilla for Accused-Appellant.

SYNOPSIS
xxx xxx xxx

It has been sufficiently established that appellant Cabiles seized
the running decedent in such a manner that the latter could not
even move or tum around. This enabled the pursuing Labis, who
was armed with a drawn bolo and was barely five meters away
from the decedent, to finally overtake him and stab him at the
back with hardly any risk at all. Cabiles therefore performed
another act-holding the decedent—without which the crime would
not have been accomplished. This makes him a principal by
indispensable cooperation. 33
The above requisites having been established, the accused-appellant was correctly
convicted of the complex crime of murder, as qualified by treachery, with assault upon
a person in authority. Accordingly, he must suffer the penalty imposed upon him, to
wit, reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, plus
the civil indemnity, which is hereby increased to P30,000.00, and the actual, mectical
and fimeral expenses in the sum of P37,380.00 as proved at the trial.
Gresilda Gonzales left her house to fetch water from the well. Several meters away
from her house, appellant and Berto Simbra accosted her. Simbra grabbed her arms
and appellant covered her mouth and the two dragged her to a pile of sawdust
surrounded by high grasses and big trees.Once there, Simbra threw Gresilda to the
ground and forcibly removed her pants and panties. Complainant vigorously struggled
but the two accused succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her a total of five times.
When Simbra and appellant were finished, they instructed the complainant not to tell
anyone of the incident or they would kill her. Simbra and appellant then took the
complainant to the house of appellant’s sister and kept her there until complainant’s
aunt and a policeman fetched her. Complainant’s mother brought her to the doctor
who upon medical examination concluded that complainant had sexual intercourse
with more than one man. A complaint was filed charging appellant of rape. Simbra fled
and was at large until the time of the trial. Appellant contended Simbra anf himself had
sexual intercourse with the complainant but with her consent. He pointed out that if
they had raped her, the doctor would have found abrasions and contusions on her
body but there were no such findings. The lower court convicted the appellant of rape
and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.Hence, this appeal.

Pfc. Renato Camantigue was only 34 years old when he died in line of duty while
enforcing the law against the abuse of dangerous drugs. He was struck down with no
less than seven vicious stabs by a man who, by his own admission, was at the time of
the incident "burned" on marijuana. The kiner also eventually succumbed, and that
made the second life needlessly lost to the wickedness of drug addiction. There was
another Iife also ruined, this time of the 28 year-old accused-appellant himself,
although, fortunately for him, his loss is not irretrievable nor is his future forever
foreclosed. In the somber shadows of the prison bars, as he ponders the wrong he
has done, he may yet find his ultimate redemption in rehabilitation and remorse.
The Supreme Court MODIFIED the trial court’s decision by sentencing the appellant
twice to reclusion perpetua, as principal by direct participation and as principal through
indispensable cooperation of rape. The Court found the appellant’s version
unbelievable as the complainant would not fabricate such a hideous story since she
was not a woman of loose morals and that the absence of injuries on complainant’s
body was due to the fact that only force, not violence was employed on her.
SYLLABUS

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED as above modified, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY; RAPE; FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION DOES NOT NECESSARILY INCLUDE VIOLENCE. — While it is true
that Dr. Tupas found no injuries on her body. except the lacerations on her hymen, the
fact is, the rapist did not really employ violence upon her but only used force by
holding her arms covering her mouth, dragging and throwing her to the ground and
pinning her down. She was not boxed, beaten or injured in any way. The force coming

296
as it did from two big men and applied on a 15 year old girl was enough to overcome
whatever resistance there was, without necessity for violence.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS. — The version of the
appellant is hard to believe. Complainant was not a woman of loose morals that after
her alleged sweetheart had satisfied himself she consented to have sexual intercourse
with appellant and with the blessings of Simbra. Even a woman of loose morals would
not agree to allow two men to successively take advantage of her in the presence of
the other.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE; PRINCIPAL THROUGH
DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND THROUGH INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION. —
Considering that appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant against her will by
employing force and intimidation, the crinme committed is rape through direct
participation. And, when he aided Berto Simbra and made it possible for the latter to
have carnal knowledge of complainant also against her will and through force and
intimidation, appellant committed another crime of rape through indispensable
cooperation. Thus, appellant is guilty of two crimes of consummated rape.
DECISION
RELOVA, J.:
Charged with rape committed according to the information, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That in or about the evening of May 24, 1972, in Langihan, Butuan City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually, helping one another by means of
force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, and forcibly feloniously and
successively have carnal knowledge with the complainant, one Gresilda Gonzales, a
girl 16 years old."cralaw virtua1aw library
Sergio Tolibas was found guilty and sentenced "to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with all the accessories of the law; to indemnify the offended party, Gresilda
Gonzales, in the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00), without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. In the service of
his sentence, the accused shall be credited with the period of his preventive detention
conformably to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended I Rep. Act 6127, it
appearing that on 6 June 1972 he signed a voluntary agreement to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners."cralaw virtua1aw library
Quoting from appellee’s brief, the crime was committed follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"At about 7:30 p.m. on May 24, 1972, complainant Gresilda Gonzales left her house in
Langihan, Butuan City, to fetch water from the artesian well located in the public
market. She carried a pail and a hose. About 36 meters away from her house, along
an unlighted portion of the road leading to the public market, appellant and Berto
(Roberto) Simbra, strongly smelling of ‘tuba’, Accused her. Berto Simbra grabbed her
by the arms. She struck him with the hose she was holding and shouted for help.
Appellant quickly covered her mouth with a handkerchief. Helping each other,
appellant and Berto Simbra dragged her to the ‘serin’ (as spelled in appellant’s Brief;
also spelled ‘siren’ and ‘seren’ in the transcript of stenographic notes). The ‘serin’ is a
pile of sawdust surrounded by breast-high grasses and big trees, near the public
market. (pp. 48-53, 68-69, 71-75, November 22, 1972; pp. 6, 9-10, TSN, February 6,
1973).
"At the ‘serin’, Berto Simbra threw complainant to the ground and, with appellant
holding her arms and covering her mouth, forcibly removed the men’s pants and
panties that she was wearing. Then he brought out his penis and went on top of her.
She kicked and struggled vigorously but he nevertheless succeeded in inserting his
penis into her vagina and having carnal knowledge of her. She felt pain and wanted to
shout but she could not do so because appellant covered her mouth. After a while,
Berto Simbra stood up and went to urinate. When he came back, he had another
sexual intercourse with her. (pp. 53-56, 75-81, TSN, November 22, 1972.)
"With Berto Simbra also holding complainant, appellant also had carnal knowledge of
her although she resisted vigorously and kicked him. He was able to do so three
times. (pp. 56-57, 80-82, TSN, November 22, 1972).
"When Berto Simbra and appellant were finished, complainant noticed a wet
substance and plenty of blood in her genitals. (pp. 4-5, TSN, December 11, 1972)
"Before leaving the ‘serin’, appellant and Berto Simbra instructed complainant not to
reveal what happened on pain of being killed. Appellant emphasized the threat by
pretending to choke her. (p. 57, TSN, November 22, 1972; p. 12, TSN, December 11,
1972)
"Berto Simbra and appellant brought complainant to the house of Ernanita Jusay,
sister of appellant, which was about 250 meters distant from the ‘serin’. Although her
house was in the same community, complainant told Ernanita Jusay that she came
from Buenavista because that was the instruction of appellant and Berto Simbra.
Complainant stayed in the house of Ernanita Jusay until 9:00 p.m. of May 25, 1972
when her aunt, Alicia Pepito, who lived nearby, and Langihan policeman Domingo
Macuno, Jr. fetched her. She could not leave until she was fetched because appellant
and Berto Simbra were guarding her. (pp. 58-60, 81-86, TSN, November 22, 1972).
"Complainant was brought to Alicia Pepito’s house, then to her house and finally to the
police station where she was interrogated. She and her mother gave sworn
statements (Exhibits C and 2) to the police. (pp. 19-22, 60 62, 86, TSN, November 22,
1972; pp. 6-7, TSN, December 11, 1972).
"Dr. Angelus R. Tupaz, Medico-Legal Officer of the Butuan City Police Department,
examined complainant at 2:30 p.m. on May 27, 1972. He found still fresh lacerations
of her hymen at 3:00 and 6:00 o’clock positions which he said were probably caused
by sexual intercourse. He also found a shiny white substance at the cul-de-sac of
Douglas of complainant’s genitals. The substance turned out to be spermatozoa upon
297
examination. The spermatozoa was about one (1) cc., indicating that it may have
come from more than one man. (pp. 67, 11, TSN, November 22, 1972). He prepared a
medical report containing his findings. (Exhibit A/Exhibit 1)
"After the incident, Berto Simbra absconded. He left his house at Langihan; Butuan
City, and was nowhere to be found at the time of the trial. (p. 14, TSN, February 6,
1973) Thus, the trial was only against appellant."cralaw virtua1aw library
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that about 8:30 in the evening of May 24, 1972,
he and Berto Simbra went to the dance hall at the Emilio Compound in Butuan City to
dance. They met Gresilda Gonzales, the sweetheart of Simbra, and upon invitation of
Simbra the three of them went to the "serin" (pile of sawdust) at about nine o’clock. In
going to the "serin" they passed through a street where there were many people.
Simbra and complainant were conversing with other as they walked side by side, while
he (appellant) was about twelve (12) feet behind them. Upon reaching the "serin" he
(appellant) remained at a place about thirty-five meters away to watch for people who
might come around. After a while he saw complainant taking off her pants and panties,
spread them on the "serin" and then lay down on them. Berto Simbra went on top of
her and they had sexual intercourse twice within one hour. After Simbra was through,
he approached appellant and told him to go to her as she was still lying down on the
"serin." He did go to where complainant was and asked her if he could also lie down
with her. She consented and three times he had sexual intercourse with
her.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
About 12:00 midnight, the three of them (Simbra, complainant and appellant) went to
the house of Ernanita Tolibas Jusay (appellant’s elder sister). He introduced
complainant to Ernanita as his sweetheart from Buenavista. However, Simbra told
Ernanita that he and appellant had just had sexual intercourse with complainant.
Appellant and complainant spent the night in that house while Simbra went home to
his own house which was about 150 meters away. The following morning, complainant
spent the whole day in Ernanita’s house doing nothing except sat in the sala, ate and
slept. At about 8:30 in the evening, complainant was fetched by her aunt and a
policeman.
Thus, appellant admits that he had carnal knowledge with complainant but claims that
he did so with her consent.
The testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by his sister Ernanita
Tolibas Jusay.
The issue in this case is whether appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant
against the will of the latter and through the use of force and intimidation. Appellant
claims that the court erred "in giving too much credence to the testimony of the
offended party Gresilda Gonzales."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above pretentions of appellant are not true. Complainant did not for a moment
tolerate the indecent acts of appellant and Simbra. She was going to the artesian well
at the public market in Langihan, Butuan City, to fetch water, when she was seized by
Berto Simbra and appellant. Simbra held her arms and dragged her towards the
"serin." Her mouth was covered with a handkerchief by appellant. She struggled and
even kicked Berto Simbra and appellant. Upon reaching the "serin," Simbra threw
complainant on the ground while appellant held her arms as Simbra forcibly took-off
her pants and panties and had sexual intercourse with her, twice. Thereafter, Simbra
also held complainant when appellant had sexual intercourse with her, thrice.
After she was raped, complainant was threatened by Simbra and appellant with death
if she would reveal what happened to her. Appellant emphasized the threat by
pretending to choke her.
Appellant contends that if violence was employed upon complainant, there would be
abrasions and contusions on her body. While it is true that Dr. Tupaz found no injuries
on her body, except the lacerations on her hymen, the fact is, the rapists did not really
employ violence upon her but only used force by holding her arms, covering her
mouth, dragging and throwing her to the ground and pinning her down. She was not
boxed, beaten or injured in any way. The force coming as it did from two big men and
applied on a 15-year old girl was enough to overcome whatever resistance there was,
without necessity for violence. This explains the lack of contusions, hematoma, and
other injuries on complainant’s body, except the lacerations on her hymen.
Further, complainant denied the truth of the testimony of appellant that she was the
girlfriend of Simbra. She has seen her rapists passing her house before the date of the
incident but the fact is, she came to know their names at the Police Station only when
she was investigated.chanrobles law library
The version of the appellant is hard to believe. Complainant was not a woman of loose
morals that after her alleged sweetheart had satisfied himself she consented to have
sexual intercourse with appellant and with the blessings of Simbra. Even a woman of
loose morals would not agree to allow two men to successively take advantage of her
in the presence of the other. In the case of People v. Soriano, 35 SCRA 633, this
Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To begin with, their version is inherently incredible. Indeed, no woman would have
consented to have sexual intercourse with two men-or-three, according to Antonio
Gallardo — in the presence of each other, unless she were a prostitute or as morally
debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us contains no indication that Farmacita,
a 14-year old, first-year high school student, can be so characterized. On the contrary,
her testimony in court evinced the simplicity and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact,
appellants could not even suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute to
them the commission of the crime charged."cralaw virtua1aw library
Considering that appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant against her will by
employing force and intimidation, the crime committed is rape through direct
participation. And, when he aided Berto Simbra and made it possible for the latter to
have carnal knowledge of complainant also against her will and through force and
intimidation, appellant committed another crime of rape through indispensable
cooperation. Thus, appellant is guilty of two crimes of consummated rape.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED but modified in the sense
that appellant Sergio Tolibas is hereby sentenced twice to the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. With costs against Appellant.
298
 Rizal. "Their mission: to rob the Navotas Branch of the Prudential
SO ORDERED. Bank and Trust Company. Once in Navotas and taking advantage
of the darkness of the night, eight (8) men disembarked from the
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, banca and proceeded to the beach in the direction of the branch
Jr., JJ., concur. bank. Within a few minutes, shots were heard throwing the people
around in panic. As confusion reigned, the people ran in different
directions scampering for safety. As time went on, the shots grew
Republic of the Philippines
in intensity. As the commotion died down, the eight men returned
SUPREME COURT
to their banca, still fully armed and some of them carrying what
Manila
looked like "bayongs". "They boarded the waiting motor banca
and sped away. As a result of the shooting, many people got
EN BANC killed and some injured. Among those who were killed were
agents of the law, like Sgt. Alejandro Alcala of the Philippine
Constabulary, Sgt. Eugenio Aguilos and Cpl. Teofilo Evangelista
G.R. No. L-30028 May 3l, 1982
of the Navotas Police Department. Dominador Estrella, a market
collector, was also killed. 'Those who were injured were Pat.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Armando Ocampo, Exequiel Manalus Jose Fabian, Rosalina
vs. Fuerten and Pedro de la Cruz.
CRESENCIO DOBLE, ET AL defendants, CRESENCIO DOBLE, SIMEON DOBLE
and ANTONIO ROMAQUIN, defendants-appellants.
The Prudential Bank and Trust Company branch office located at
the North hay Boulevard, Navotas, Rizal, the object of the bloody
mission, has an unusual banking hours. It opens at midnight and
closes at 8:00 in the morning. The bank has ten employees, more
or less, including a security guard. It has two cages or
DE CASTRO, J.: compartments for tellers. One cage was under the care of Melvin
Domingo and the other one under the care of Alejandro San Juan.
This case refers to a bank robbery committed in band, with multiple homicide, multiple At around 12:30 a.m. of June 14, 1966, Cesar Reyes, assistant
frustrated homicide and assault upon agents of persons in authority, on June 14, cashier of the bank, was near the cage of Domingo when two
1966, in Navotas, Rizal. Only five of ten accused were brought to trial, the other five men entered the bank asking that their money be changed.
named only as "John Does" in the information having remained at large. Two of the Domingo refused, saying that they had no small denominations.
five accused who stood trial, Mateo Raga and Celso Aquino were acquitted, while the Suddenly, three men armed with long guns barged in and fired at
trial court, the Court of first Instance of Rizal, imposed the death penalty on the the ceiling and the wall of the bank. They ordered the employees
appellants herein, Cresencio Doble, Simeon Doble and Antonio Romaquin The to lie down, face downward and then demanded the key to the
decision of the trial court is now before Us for review for having imposed the death vault. When Reyes answered that they do not have the key, the
penalty. armed men aimed their guns at the vault and fired upon it until its
doors were opened. They entered the vault and found that they
could not get anything as the compartments inside the said vault
Both the de •ficio counsel for appellants and the then Solicitor General, Hon. Felix Q. were locked. Not being able to get anything from the vault, the
Antonio, a retired Justice of this Court, agree that as so narrated in the appealed armed men went to the two teller cages and took whatever they
decision, and as quoted in appellants' brief, the relevant and material facts accurately could lay their hands on. Not long afterwards, the men left,
reflect the evidence presented, except only as to the fact that there were eight carrying with them the sum of P10,439.95.
malefactors, with respect to which appellants are not in full conformity (p. 2,
Appellants' Brief).
Just beside the bank was a police outpost. On the night in
question, Pat. Nicolas Antonio was in the outpost, together with
As stated in the decision under review, the crime was committed as follows: Sgt. Aguilos, Pats. Pangan, Burgos, Rosal Ocampo and Cpl.
Evangelists. were on duty watching the fish landing. Suddenly,
Late in the night of June 13, 1966, ten (10) men, almost all of Antonio said, at around 1:30 a.m., he heard a burst which he
them heavily armed with pistols, carbines and Thompsons, left the believed came from a Thompson. He said he saw a man pointing
shores of Manila in a motor banca and proceeded to Navotas, a Thompson upwards while he was in front of the banca

299
 Afterwards, Antonio said, he heard another burst coming from the
same direction. Antonio and his companions then went to the
middle of the road and again they heard shots, and this time they
were successive, coming from their left. Antonio could not see
who was firing the shots. Suddenly, he said, he saw one of this
companions Cpl. Evangelista topple down. He saw also
Dominador Estrella sitting down folding his stomach. They were
both felled by the shots coming from the left side of the bank.
Antonio told Ocampo to go beside the outpost and held Sgt.
Aguilos by the arm. Sgt. Aguilos, however, collapsed and fell
down. He was hit. Later on, Antonio said, he went to the outpost
and told Pat. Ocampo to go too. He said that from the outpost he
heard some more shots. Then he saw Ocampo hit in the thigh.
After the firing ceased, Antonio saw his wounded companions
placed in a vehicle, together with Evangelista and Aguilos who
were already dead. Later on, he said he saw Sgt. Alcala, a
member of the PC, lying prostrate in the ground already dead.
(pp. 83-85, Rollo).
It is noteworthy that from the above narration as to how the robbery and the killing that
followed in its wake were actually committed, the three appellants had no participation.
It is not surprising that the Solicitor General has recommended the acquittal of one of
the appellants, Simeon Doble. With this recommendation, it might be well to take up
the case of this appellant ahead of the other two, appellants Antonio Romaquin and
Cresencio Doble.
In recommending Simeon Doble's acquittal, the Solicitor General made the following
observation:
As to appellant Simeon, the evidence shows only that the
malefactors met in his house to discuss the plan to rob the
Prudential Bank This circumstance, standing alone, does not
conclude his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The facts do not
show that he performed any act tending to the perpetration of the
robbery, nor that he took a direct part therein or induced other
persons to commit, or that he cooperated in its consummation by
some act without which it would not have been committed. It
could be that Simeon was present at the meeting held in his
house and entered no opposition to the nefarious scheme but,
aside from this, he did not cooperate in the commission of the
robbery perpetrated by the others. At most, his act amounted to
joining in a conspiracy which is not punishable. Mere knowledge,
acquiescence, or approval of the act, without cooperation or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to
a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose (15 CJS 1062).
We are, therefore, unable to agree with the finding of the lower
court that Simeon was a principal both by agreement and
encouragement, despite his non-participation in the commission
of the crime. Nor was it clearly proved that Simeon received a part
of the looted money as to make him an accessory. Romaquin's
testimony that the day after the robbery he gave P2.00 to Simeon
who had asked for cigarettes (p. 5, t.s.n., May 25, 1967) could
hardly be considered as the latter's share of the loot. It is
significant that in his statement he claimed he had not yet
received his share. (pp. 10-11, Appellee's Brief; p. 146, Rollo).
A review of the evidence of record shows the foregoing observation of the Solicitor
General to be with convincing rationality it is only that portion in which is cited
Simeon's statement made before the Navotas Police Department (Exh. I pp. 28-29,
Folder of Exhibits) that "he has not yet received his share" that detracts from the
solidity of the Solicitor General's recommendation, for it gives the impression that
Simeon had given material or moral support or encouragement to the malefactors
(referring to those still at large as the principal culprits) as to entitle him to a share in
the loot. However, a reading of his whole extra-judicial statement would erase that
impression, and reveals the true import of that statement as intended only to show that
Simeon had nothing to do with commission of the crime and therefore did not receive
any share of the fruits thereof. Thus, to quote pertinent portions Of his statement. on
custodial investigation:
3. T — Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto?
S — Dahil po sa aking pagkakasangkot sa
holdapan dito sa isang Bangko sa Navotas,
Rizal at ako ay hinuli ng mga tauhan ng M. P.
D.
4. T — Kailan ka hinuli?
S — Noon pong Miyerkules ng madaling
araw, hindi ko alam ang petsa pero nito pong
buwan na ito.
5. T — Mayroon ka bang nalalaman tungkol
sa pagkakaholdap ng isang bangko dito sa
Navotas?
S — Ang nalalaman ko po ay doon
nagpulong sa aming bahay ang mga taong
nangholdap dito sa Navotas.
300
6. T — Sino-sino o ilang tao ang mga
nagpulong sa inyong bahay?
S — Pirmero po ay walo (8), pagkatapos ay
may dumating na dalawa pa at ang mga
kilala ko lamang po ay sina Tony na may an
ng bangka, si Joe Rondina Cresencio Doble
at narinig kong may tinawag pang Erning.
lyon pong iba ay hindi ko alam ang pangalan
pero makikilala ko Pag aking nakitang muli.
7. T — Gaano katagal na nagpulong sa
inyong bahay ang mga taong ito?
S — Mahigit pong mga isang (1) oras pero
hatinggabi na nong Lunes ng gabi (June 13,
1966).
8. T — Ano ang mga bagay na
pinagpulongan sa inyong bahay?
S — Tungkol sa kanilang lakad na pagpunta
sa isang bangko sa Navotas,
9. T — Sino ang nangunguna sa pulong na
iyon?
S — Iyan po (witness pointing to the picture
of Rodolfo Dizon, after being shown five (5)
other pictures).
10. T — Ano-ano ang mga narinig mong
pinagpulongan?
S — Tungkol po doon sa gagawing
pagnanakaw sa isang Bangko sa Navotas,
Rizal.
11. T — Samantalang sila ay nagpupulong,
ano ang iyong ginagawa?
S — Wala po, hindi ko sila sinasaway at hindi
ako kumikibo bastat ako ay nakikinig lamang.
12. T — Bukod sa narinig mong
magnanakaw sa bangko na usapan, ano pa
ang iba mong mga narinig?
S — Sinabi nito (witness pointing to the
picture of Rodolfo Dizon) at ni Jose Rondina
na "MALAKING KUARTA TO, PERO
MASYADONG MAPANGANIB, AT
KAILANGAN AY HANDA TAYO."
13. T — Ano pa ang sumunod?
S — Nagbubulong-bulongan ang iba tungkol
doon sa gagawing paglaban.
14. T — Ano pa ang nangyari?
S — Maya-maya po ay lumakad na sila, hindi
ako sumama.
15. T — Pagkatapos?
S — Makaraan po ang mahigit na isang (1)
oras ay nagbalik silang lahat.
16. T — Ano ang nangyari ng magbalik na
sila?
S — Matapos po silang bumaba doon sa
malapit sa aming bahay ay nagmamadali na
silang umalis dahil sa may tama ang isa sa
kanila. At noon pong umaga ng araw na iyon
ay nagpunta ako kay Tony (Antonio
Romaquin at kumuha ng dalawang piso
(P2.00) dahil iyong aking parte ay hindi pa
naibibigay sa akin. Pagkatapos po ay umuwi
na ako sa amin.
17. T — Ano pa ang iyong masasabi kaugnay
ng pangyayaring ito. Ikaw ba ay mayroong
nais na alisin o dili kaya ay baguhin sa
salaysay mong ito?
S — Mayroon pa po akong ibig na sabihin.
301
 18. T — Ano pa ang ibig mong sabihin?
S — Bago po tuluyang umalis sila sa aking
bahay ay nag-usap-usap silang lahat at ako
ay sumama sa kanilang pag-uusap at
nakapagbigay pa ako ng mungkahi na ako na
lamang ang maghihintay sa kanila dahil sa
ako ay may pinsala sa paa at maaaring hindi
ako makatakbo at qqqmahuh lamang.
19. T — Iyan bang pinsala mo sa kaliwang
paa ay matagal na?
S — Opo, may limang (5) taon na.
20. T — Samantalang nag-uusap sa loob ng
bahay mo, nasaan ka?
S — Kasama po sa loob ng aking bahay.
21. T — Ano pa ang masasabi mo?
S — Wala na po.
The only link between Simeon and the crime is his house having been used as the
meeting place of the malefactors for their final conference before proceeding to
Navotas to rob the Prudential Bank branch thereat. He did not join them because of a
qqq5yeat old foot injury which would make him only a liability, not one who can help in
the devilish venture. To the malefactors he was most unwanted to join them. If they
met at his house it was only because it was near the landing place of the banca, and
so he invited them to his house while waiting for the banca to arrive. His mere
presence in his house where the conspirators met, and for merely telling them that he
could not join them because of his foot injury, and will just wait for them; evidently as a
mere gesture of politeness in not being able to join them in their criminal purpose, for
he could not be of any help in the attainment thereof, and also to avoid being
suspected that he was against their vicious plan for which they may harm him, Simeon
is by no means a co-conspirator, not having even taken active part in the talks among
the malefactors in his house.
Like the Solicitor General, We, therefore, find no culpable participation of Simeon
Doble in the commission of the crime, for, indeed, by his physical condition alone, he
could not in any way be of help to the malefactors in the pursuit of their criminal
design, nor could he have been desired by the latter to be one of them.
Taking up next the case of appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble, their
main contention is that their extrajudicial statements upon which their conviction was
principally made to rest, are inadmissible for having been allegedly obtained by force
and intimidation, and in violation of basic constitutional rights to counsel and against
self-incrimination. In support of this contention, appellants have only their own self-
serving testimony to rely upon.
Thus, Cresencio Doble testified that while at the Navotas police department someone
he could not name boxed him on the chest, while one Sgt. Lacson hit him on the left
side with the butt of a gun causing him to lose consciousness; that he was made to lie
on a narrow table and peppery liquid was poured over his face, his eyesight then
becoming dim, and it was then that he was made to sign a piece of paper which he
could not read because of his blurred eyesight.
Romaquin gave a similar story of torture and maltreatment in order to force him to
admit culpable participation in the heist. The inquiry must, accordingly, be whether the
claim of violence and involuntariness of their statements is true as to render said
statements inadmissible in evidence.
Disputing the allegation of maltreatment in the execution of the custodial statements
(Exhibits E, F, F-1, G, H-1), the Solicitor General argues that the same is negated by
how the details as given by both appellants in their respective statements fit into each
other, at least as to the part played by each from the time Cresencio went to
Romaquin's place to procure the latter's banca up to their get-away from the scene of
the crime. Thus, while Romaquin claimed in his statement that although he wanted to
escape from the scene after his passengers have disembarked for their evil mission,
he could not do so because Cresencio had a gun pointed at him to prevent his
escape, as was the order given Cresencio by the rest of the gang. The latter denied
this allegation when he testified that he returned the gun given him because he did not
know how to use or manipulate it, although in his extra- judicial statement (Exhibit M,
p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he stated that he accepted the gun.
The statement of Romaquin as just cited in an attempt to exculpate himself which is
generally taken as an indication of lack of undue pressure exerted on one while giving
his statement on custodial interrogation. (People vs. Palencia, 71 SCRA 679).
The Solicitor General also observed, in disputing the claim of violent maltreatment to
which appellant's were subjected to, that neither one of the appellants presented
medical certificate to attest to the injuries allegedly inflicted (p. 3, Appellee's Brief)
which disproves the claim (People vs. Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249; People vs. Dela Cruz, 88
Phil. 79). He also points to the fact that in his extrajudicial statement (Exhibit M, p. 35,
Record of Exhibits), Celso Aquino, one of the accused, made no admission of his
participation in the bold bank robbery, and in his testimony in court, he admitted that
no violence was applied to him when he gave his statement (p. 12, t.s.n., July 12,
1967; p. 4, Appellee's Brief). 'This is evidence enough that the appellants could not
have been dealt with differently as their co-accused Aquino who was allowed to give
his statement freely without the employment of force or intimidation upon him. The
evidence also disclosed a note (Exhibit E) of Cresencio addressed to Romaquin
302
asking the latter not to reveal the names of their companions. This means that the
names of the members of the band led by Joe Intsik must have been known to both
appellants. That the Identity of five of those charged in this case has remained only as
"John Does" indicate the non-employment of any coercive means with which to force
them into revealing the names of their companions in the robbery, again negating the
claim of torture and violence.
It is, likewise, to be noted that appellants Romaquin and Cresencio virtually confirmed
their extra-judicial statements when they testified in court. By all the proofs as cited,
persuasive enough to show the voluntariness of their custodial statements plus the
positive denial of Sgt. Lacson, the only one named among the alleged torturers, that
any violence was practiced by the investigators, specifically, the alleged delivery of fist
blows on Cresencio. (pp. 3, 6, 7, 18, t.s.n., October 27, 1967) the alleged
involuntariness of the extra-judicial statements is fully discredited.
It is hinted that the killing of suspect Rodolfo Dizon while allegedly attempting to
escape could have instilled fear in the minds of the appellants which affected their
freedom of will in giving their own statements (p. 12, Appellant's Brief). This is a far-
fetched argument to prove involuntariness in the giving of the statements, the killing
having taken place after their interrogation. In his supplemental statement dated July
5, 1966 Exhibits F-2, p. 20, Record of Exhibits), Romaquin pointed to the person of
Rodolfo Dizon. His death therefore, took place long after appellants have given their
main statements, all in mid June, 1966. If counsel de oficio had only bothered to check
the dates of the main statements of both appellants which were given not later than
just past the middle of June, 1966, and that of the supplementary statement of
Romaquin which is July 5, 1966, he would not have probably come forth with this
argument.
Counsel de oficio, invoking a ruling in an American case, Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L.
Ed. 2nd. 694, harps on the inadmissibility of appellants' custodial statements, for their
having been unaided by counsel, nor informed of their right thereto during the
interrogation. 'There might be merit in this contention were the right to counsel during
custodial interrogation one of constitutional grant as is provided in our 1973
Constitution, before which the right was given only to an accused, not to a mere
suspect during in-custody police interrogation (Magtoto vs. Manguera 63 SCRA 4;
People vs. Dumdum Jr. G. R. No. L-35279, July 30, 1979). At the time of their
custodial interrogation in 1966, however, the requisite of assistance of counsel was
not yet made a matter of constitutional right, as it has been granted only by the new
1973 Constitution.
The right against self-incrimination, as invoked by appellants, can neither be
appreciated to impair the admissibility of their extra-judicial statements. It is the
voluntariness of an admission or confession that determines its admissibility, for no
principle of law or constitutional precept should stand on the way of allowing voluntary
admission of one's guilt, the only requisite justly demanded being that ample
safeguard be taken against involuntary confessions. Once the element of
voluntariness is convincingly established, which, incidentally, is even presumed, the
admissibility of an extra-judicial confession, admission or statement becomes
unquestionable. 1
The extra-judicial statements of appellants, however, when evaluated with the
testimony they gave in court, would convince Us that their liability is less than that of a
co-principal by conspiracy or by actual participation, as as was the holding of the trial
court. The most damaging admission made in the extra-judicial statements of
Cresencio is that he was asked by Joe Intsik, the gang leader, at 8:00 o'clock in the
evening of June 13, 1966, if he could procure a banca for his use, and that Joe Intsik,
on being asked by Cresencio, allegedly told him that the banca would be used for
robbery. Cresencio gave an affirmative answer to Joe Intsik's query, having in mind
Tony Romaquin who had a banca. Cresencio accompanied Joe Intsik to Romaquin at
12:00 in the evening. In Romaquin's statement (Exh. C also Exh. 1, Romaquin, p. 15,
Record of Exhibits), Cresencio allegedly asked him to bring his friends in his banca, to
board a launch for a trip to Palawan. The discrepancy between the statements of
Cresencio and Romaquin as to the intended use of the banca is at once apparent, for
while according to the former, it was for the commission of robbery, according to the
latter, it was to bring Cresencio's friends to board a launch for a trip to Palawan. What
is demonstrated thereby is the full freedom with which both appellants were allowed to
give their respective statements while in custodial interrogation.
Cresencio's consenting to look for a banca, however, did not necessarily make him a
co-conspirator. Neither would it appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft Cresencio into
his band of malefactors that would commit the robbery more than just asking his help
to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had enough men all with arms and weapons to
perpetrate the crime, the commission of which needed planning and men to execute
the plan with full mutual confidence of each other, which is not shown with respect to
appellants by the way they were asked to look and provide for a banca just a few
hours before the actual robbery.
Romaquin, for his part, appears not to be known to the principal malefactors still at
large, to be asked to join actively in the conspiracy. The amount received by
Romaquin who alone was given money by the malefactors in the sum of P441.00,
indicate that the latter did not consider appellant as their confederate in the same
character as those constituting the band of robbers. The sum given to Romaquin could
very well represent only the rental of his banca, and for the cooperation he extended
to the malefactors, which, by no means, is an indispensable one. Cresencio, on the
other hand, was not given any part of the loot. It was only Romaquin who gave him P4
1.00, clearly not what should represent his share if he were a full-fledged ally or
confederate.
The apprehension of the malefactors that upon realizing the full impact of their vicious
misdeeds, Romaquin might speed away from the scene in fear of being implicated, as
shown by the measure they had taken to prevent his escape, is further proof that
Romaquin was not considered a co-conspirator, who is one who should not be looked
upon with mistrust. For his part, Cresencio testified that while he was given a gun with
which to cover Romaquin who might escape, he returned the gun because he did not
know how to use it, and so one of the malefactors was left near the beach to prevent
303
appellants fleeing from the scene of the crime with banca. In his statement, however,
(Exh. M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he refused to accept the gun, but they gave it just
the same, and he received it.
The circumstances pointed out would not make appellants liable as co-principals in
the crime charged. At the most their liability would be that of mere accomplices. They
joined in the criminal design when Cresencio consented to look for a banca and
Romaquin provided it when asked by the gang leader Joe Intsik, and then brought the
malefactors to the scene of the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil purpose for
which the banca was to be used. It was the banca that brought the malefactors to the
bank to be robbed and carried them away from the scene after the robbery to prevent
their apprehension. Appellants thus cooperated but not in an indispensable manner.
Even without appellants providing the banca, the robbery could have been committed,
specially with the boldness and determination shown by the robbers in committing the
crime.
The complicity of appellant Cresencio is further shown by his note (Exhibit "H", p. 26,
Record of Exhibits) addressed to Romaquin asking him not to reveal to the police the
names of their companions. He went to Romaquin and asked for money which the
latter gave in the sum of P41.00, as if to show that he had helped in some material
way to deserve a share in the loot.
As to Romaquin, while he testified that the malefactors gave a gun to Cresencio with
which the latter would prevent Romaquin from fleeing away from the scene, evidently
to show that he never joined in the criminal purpose, and that all his acts were in fear
of bodily harm and therefore, not voluntary, the measure taken by the malefactors to
prevent his escape, could have been just an extra precaution, lest he would be
stricken with fear in the course of the commission of the crime specially if attended by
shootings as it was really so. If it is true that he never voluntarily made the trip with
knowledge of the planned robbery, and with Cresencio saying that he returned the gun
given him with which to prevent Romaquin from speeding away, Romaquin could have
tried a get-away, as should have been his natural impulse had he not joined in the
criminal design. His act of hiding the money he received from the malefactors, and
repainting his boat, all attest to his guilty conscience arising from the act of
cooperation he knowingly extended to the principal culprit to achieve their criminal
purpose.
An accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in Article 17 of the Revised
Penal Code, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts (Art. 18, Revised Penal Code). There must be a Community of unlawful purpose
between the principal and accomplice and assistance knowingly and intentionally
given (U.S. vs. Belco 11 Phil. 526), to supply material and moral aid in the
consummation of the offense and in as efficacious way (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil.
38). In this case, appellants' cooperation is like that of a driver of a car used for
abduction which makes the driver a mere accomplice, as held in People vs.
Batalan 45 Phil. 573, citing the case of U.S. vs. Lagmay, G.R. No. L-15009.
It is however, not established by the evidence that in the meeting held in the house of
Simeon Doble, the malefactors had agreed to kill, if necessary to carry out
successfully the plan to rob. What appellants may be said to have joined is the
criminal design to rob, which makes them accomplices. Their complicity must,
accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not with the killing. Having been left in the
banca, they could not have tried to prevent the killing, as is required of one seeking
relief from liability for assaults committed during the robbery (Art. 296. Revised Penal
Code). 2
The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too lenient
considering the gravity and viciousness of the offense with which they were charged.
The evidence, however, fails to establish their complicity by a previous conspiracy with
the real malefactors who actually robbed the bank and killed and injured several
persons, including peace officers. The failure to bring to justice the real and actual
culprits of so heinous a crime should not bring the wrath of the victims nor of the
outraged public, upon the heads of appellants whose participation has not been
shown to be as abominable as those who had gone into hiding. The desire to bring
extreme punishment to the real culprits should not blind Us in meting out a penalty to
appellants more than what they justly deserve, and as the evidence warrants.
Accordingly, We find appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, but only as accomplices for the crime of robbery in band. 3 As
discussed earlier, appellant Simeon Doble is entitled to acquittal as so recommended
by the Solicitor General who finds no sufficient evidence, to which We agree, to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The penalty imposable upon appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin, as
accomplices for the crime of robbery in band is prision mayor minimum which has a
range of 6 years, 1 day to 8 years as provided ill Article 295 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Article 294, paragraph 5 of the same code. The commission of the
crime was aggravated by nighttime and the use of a motorized banca. There being no
mitigating circumstance, both appellants should each be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years, four (4) months, twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased in the sum of 1112,000.00 not P6,000.00
as imposed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed
in all other respects. The immediate release of Simeon Doble who is hereby acquitted
is ordered, unless he should be continued in confinement for some other legal cause.
Proportionate costs against Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Vasquez, and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Aquino and Escolin, JJ., took no part.
304
 principal malefactors were each fully armed; the arms consisted of pistols, carbines
and Thompson sub-machine guns, This fact was known to the appellants. In fact the
principal malefactors has so many guns that one was given to Cresencio with which to
cover Antonio in case he tried to escape. This shows that the principal malefactors
were prepared to kill even an accomplice so that they could accomplish their criminal
Separate Opinions objective. How then can it be said that there was no criminal design to kill but only to
rob among the principal malefactors as suggested in the main opinion. And I cannot
believe that under the circumstances the appellants were unaware of the criminal
design to kill and that they gave their cooperation — albeit not indispensable — only
— to the robbery. Accordingly, I believe that the appellants should be held guilty as
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting: accomplices in the crime of robbery with homicide.

Giving to Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin the benefit of a lenient attitude, I Fernando, J., I concur with the separate opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos.
can agree that they were not principals but merely accomplices as stated in the main
opinion. However, I cannot persuade myself that their complicity must be limited to the Concepcion, Jr., J., previously voted to concur with the main opinion.
robbery only and should not include the killing. For it must be remembered that the
principal malefactors were each fully armed; the arms consisted of pistols, carbines
and Thompson sub-machine guns, This fact was known to the appellants. In fact the Republic of the Philippines
principal malefactors has so many guns that one was given to Cresencio with which to SUPREME COURT
cover Antonio in case he tried to escape. This shows that the principal malefactors Manila
were prepared to kill even an accomplice so that they could accomplish their criminal
objective. How then can it be said that there was no criminal design to kill but only to
FIRST DIVISION
rob among the principal malefactors as suggested in the main opinion. And I cannot
believe that under the circumstances the appellants were unaware of the criminal
design to kill and that they gave their cooperation — albeit not indispensable — only G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989
— to the robbery. Accordingly, I believe that the appellants should be held guilty as
accomplices in the crime of robbery with homicide.
LITO VINO, petitioner,
vs.
Fernando, J., I concur with the separate opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Concepcion, Jr., J., previously voted to concur with the main opinion. Frisco T. Lilagan for petitioner.

Relova, J., I concur in the dissent of Justice Abad Santos. RESOLUTION

GANCAYCO, J.:

Separate Opinions The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the resolution of
this Court dated January 18, 1989 denying the herein petition is whether or not a
finding of guilt as an accessory to murder can stand in the light of the acquittal of the
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
alleged principal in a separate proceeding.

Giving to Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin the benefit of a lenient attitude, I
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their
can agree that they were not principals but merely accomplices as stated in the main
house at Burgos Street, Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro
opinion. However, I cannot persuade myself that their complicity must be limited to the
Salazar to watch television. At around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the father of
robbery only and should not include the killing. For it must be remembered that the

305
Roberto, was resting, he heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in
a loud voice saying that he had been shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so
he switched on the lights of their house. Aside from Ernesto and his wife, his children
Ermalyn and Julius were also in the house. They went down to meet Roberto who was
crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbor responded by turning
on their lights and the street lights and coming down from their houses. After meeting
Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle coming
from the south. Vino was the one driving the bicycle while Salazar was carrying an
armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar
pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.
Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo
Cacananta took his ante-mortemstatement. In the said statement which the victim
signed with his own blood, Jessie Salazar was Identified as his assailant.
The autopsy report of his body shows the following-
Gunshot wound
POE Sub Scapular-5-6-ICA. Pal
1 & 2 cm. diameter left
Slug found sub cutaneously,
2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Tension Hemathorax 1
Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC
Sgt. Ernesto N. Ordono in the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan.
However, on March 22, 1985, the municipal court indorsed the case of Salazar to the
Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of the
military, while the case against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office who then
filed an information charging Vino of the crime of murder in the Regional Trial Court of
Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then
commenced with the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead of
presenting evidence in his own behalf, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence to which the prosecutor filed an answer. On January 21,
1986, 2 a decision was rendered by the trial court finding Vino guilty as an accessory
to the crime of murder and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of 4 Years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision
mayor as maximum. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
sum of P10,000.00 being a mere accessory to the crime and to pay the costs.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having been denied, he
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. In due course, a Decision was rendered
affirming the judgment of the lower court. 3
Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following grounds are invoked:
1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN
ACCESSORY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER FOR HAVING
AIDED IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL IF SAID
ACCUSED IS BEING CHARGED SOLELY IN THE
INFORMATION AS PRINCIPAL FOR THE SIMPLE REASON
THAT THE CRIME PROVED IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CRIME
CHARGED.
2. THAT "AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL" TO BE
CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO CONVICT AN
ACCUSED UNDER ARTICLE 19, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS
TO DECEIVE THE VIGILANCE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES OF THE STATE AND THAT THE "ESCAPE" MUST
BE ACTUAL;
3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE
TRIAL OF THE PRINCIPAL VIOLATES PROCEDURAL
ORDERLINESS. 4
During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the case against Salazar
in the JAGO was remanded to the civil court as he was discharged from the military
service. He was later charged with murder in the same Regional Trial Court of
Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. 2027-A. In a supplemental pleading dated
November 14, 1988, petitioner informed this Court that Jessie Salazar was acquitted
by the trial court in a decision that was rendered on August 29, 1988.
The respondents were required to comment on the petition. The comment was
submitted by the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents. On January 18, 1989, the
Court resolved to deny the petition for failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that
respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment.
Hence, the present motion for reconsideration to which the respondents were again
required to comment. The required comment having been submitted, the motion is
now due for resolution.
306
The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the
information as a principal for the crime of murder, can he thereafter be convicted as an
accessory? The answer is in the affirmative.
Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under
Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of the persons
responsible for the commission of the same offense are the accomplice and the
accessory. There is no doubt that the crime of murder had been committed and that
the evidence tended to show that Jessie Salazar was the assailant. That the petitioner
was present during its commission or must have known its commission is the only
logical conclusion considering that immediately thereafter, he was seen driving a
bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together when they left shortly
thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto and Julius Tejada, attested to these facts. It
is thus clear that petitioner actively assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioner's liability
is that of an accessory.
This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved
or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, in which case the defendant shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense
charged included in that which is proved. 5
In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has begun, it appears that
there was a mistake in charging the proper offense, and the defendant cannot be
convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein,
in which case the defendant must not be discharged if there appears to be a good
cause to detain him in custody, so that he can be charged and made to answer for the
proper offense. 6
the offense can be duly established in evidence the determination of the liability of the
accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.
The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case was
acquitted can the conviction of the petitioner as an accessory be maintained?
In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 7 a case involving the crime of theft, this
Court ruled that notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting
circumstance of minority or insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory
may nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact established.
Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, 8 where this Court held in an arson
case that the acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the
accessory where it was shown that no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire was
the result of an accident. Hence, there was no basis for the conviction of the
accessory.
In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of
the petitioner as an accessory was established. By the same token there is no doubt
that the commission of the same offense had been proven in the separate case
against Salazar who was charged as principal. However, he was acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt by the same judge who convicted Vino as an accessory.
The trial court held that the identity of the assailant was not clearly established. It
observed that only Julius Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on the
bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony is uncorroborated, and that two other
witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian who were listed in the information,
who can corroborate the testimony of Julius Tejada, were not presented by the
prosecution.

In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The
The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying declaration of the victim
commission of the said crime was established by the evidence. There is no variance
pinpointing Salazar as his assailant on the ground that it was not shown the victim
as to the offense committed. The variance is in the participation or complicity of the
revealed the identity of Salazar to his father and brother who came to his aid
petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the
immediately after the shooting. The court a quo also deplored the failure of the
information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely
prosecution and law enforcement agencies to subject to ballistic examinations the
that of an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An
bullet slug recovered from the body of the victim and the two empty armalite bullet
accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information
empty shells recovered at the crime scene and to compare it with samples taken from
charging him as a principal.
the service rifle of Salazar. Thus, the trial court made the following observation:

At the onset, the prosecution should have charged the petitioner as an accessory right
There appears to be a miscarriage of justice in this case due to
then and there. The degree of responsibility of petitioner was apparent from the
the ineptitude of the law enforcement agencies to gather material
evidence. At any rate, this lapse did not violate the substantial rights of petitioner.
and important evidence and the seeming lack of concern of the
public prosecutor to direct the production of such evidence for the
The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can successful prosecution of the case. 9
proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal. The
answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal,
Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the failure of
accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of
the prosecution to adduce the quantum of evidence required to generate a conviction

307
as he was not positively identified as the person who was seen holding a rifle
escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino.
A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an
unidentified person as passenger holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the crime
immediately after the commission of the crime of murder. The commission of the crime
and the participation of the principal or assailant, although not identified, was
established. In such case, the Court holds that the accessory can be prosecuted and
held liable independently of the assailant.
We may visualize another situation as when the principal died or escaped before he
could be tried and sentenced. Should the accessory be acquitted thereby even if the
commission of the offense and the responsibility of the accused as an accessory was
duly proven? The answer is no, he should be held criminally liable as an accessory.
Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant
was Salazar, as two witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino,
in the separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above discussed, he was acquitted as
the trial court was not persuaded that he was positively identified to be the man with
the gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against Vino,
wherein he did not even adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an
accessory was established beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape
of the assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no
material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the
assailant can not be identified the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied and this denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I agree with the proposition in the ponencia that a person may be held liable as an
accessory for helping in the escape of the principal even if the latter is himself found
not guilty. The examples given are quite convincing. However, I do not think they
apply in the case at bar, which is sui generis and not covered by the general principle.
As Justice Aquino points out, Vino was convicted of having aided Jessie Salazar, who
was named as the principal at Vino's trial. At his own trial, the same Salazar was
acquitted for lack of sufficient Identification. Vino was convicted of helping in the
escape not of an unnamed principal but, specifically, of Jessie Salazar. As Salazar
himself has been exonerated, the effect is that Vino is now being held liable for
helping an innocent man, which is not a crime. Vino's conviction should therefore be
reversed.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I regret to have to disagree with the ponente's opinion.
There are three (3) kinds of accessories under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having
knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having
participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by
the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the
effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of
his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other
crime.
An accessory who falls under paragraph 1 may be convicted even if the principal is
acquitted, as where the principal was found to be a minor (U.S. vs. Villaluz and
Palermo 32 Phil. 377) or the son of the offended party (Cristobal vs. People, 84 Phil.
473).
An accessory under paragraph 2 who allegedly concealed or destroyed the body of
the crime or the effects or instruments may be convicted if the commission of the
308
crime has been proven, even if the principal has not been apprehended and
convicted.
But an accessory under paragraph 3 who allegedly harbored, concealed the principal
or assisted in his escape, may not be convicted unless the principal, whom he
allegedly harbored, concealed, or assisted in escaping, has been identified and
convicted.
I cannot see how the conviction of Vino as an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article
19 of the Rev. Penal Code, for allegedly having assisted in the escape of Sgt. Jessie
Salazar, the alleged killer of Roberto Tejada, can stand since Salazar (who faced trial
separately and subsequently) was acquitted, ironically by the same court that
convicted Vino earlier. The basis for Vino's conviction as accessory in the crime of
murder was his having driven the alleged killer Salazar in his tricycle after Tejada was
killed. Since the trial court acquitted Salazar, holding that the prosecution failed to
prove that he was the killer of Tejada, then Vino's having driven him in his tricycle did
not constitute the act of assisting in the escape of a killer.
The cases of U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil. 377 and U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23
Phil. 194 cited in the ponencia are not in point. In the Villaluz case the charge against
accused as an accessory to theft was brought under paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code, for having concealed the effects of the crime by receiving and
concealing a stolen watch. Although the principal, a young housegirl, was acquitted on
account of her tender age and lack of discernment, the accessory was nevertheless
convicted.
In the Mendoza case, the accused barrio captain who was charged as an accessory
under paragraph 2 for not reporting the fire to the authorities, was acquitted because
the crime of arson was not proven, the fire being accidental.
The criminal liability of an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 is directly linked
to and inseparable from that of the principal. Even if as in this case, the crime (murder)
was proven but the identity of the murderer was not (for the principal accused was
acquitted by the trial court), the petitioner tricycle-driver who allegedly drove him in his
tricycle to escape from the scene of the crime, may not be convicted as an accessory
to the murder, for, as it turned out, the said passenger was not proven to be the
murderer. The accessory may not be convicted under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code if the alleged principal is acquitted for, in this instance, the
principle that "the accessory follows the principal" appropriately applies.
I therefore vote to acquit the petitioner.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I agree with the proposition in the ponencia that a person may be held liable as an
accessory for helping in the escape of the principal even if the latter is himself found
not guilty. The examples given are quite convincing. However, I do not think they
apply in the case at bar, which is sui generis and not covered by the general principle.
As Justice Aquino points out, Vino was convicted of having aided Jessie Salazar, who
was named as the principal at Vino's trial. At his own trial, the same Salazar was
acquitted for lack of sufficient Identification. Vino was convicted of helping in the
escape not of an unnamed principal but, specifically, of Jessie Salazar. As Salazar
himself has been exonerated, the effect is that Vino is now being held liable for
helping an innocent man, which is not a crime. Vino's conviction should therefore be
reversed.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I regret to have to disagree with the ponente's opinion.
There are three (3) kinds of accessories under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having
knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having
participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by
the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the
effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of
his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other
crime.
An accessory who falls under paragraph 1 may be convicted even if the principal is
acquitted, as where the principal was found to be a minor (U.S. vs. Villaluz and
Palermo 32 Phil. 377) or the son of the offended party (Cristobal vs. People, 84 Phil.
473).
309
An accessory under paragraph 2 who allegedly concealed or destroyed the body of PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1829
the crime or the effects or instruments may be convicted if the commission of the
crime has been proven, even if the principal has not been apprehended and
PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF
convicted.
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS

But an accessory under paragraph 3 who allegedly harbored, concealed the principal
WHEREAS, crime and violence continue to proliferate despite the sustained vigorous
or assisted in his escape, may not be convicted unless the principal, whom he
efforts of the government to effectively contain them;
allegedly harbored, concealed, or assisted in escaping, has been identified and
convicted.
WHEREAS, to discourage public indifference or apathy towards the apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenders, it is necessary to penalize acts which obstruct or
I cannot see how the conviction of Vino as an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article
frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution
19 of the Rev. Penal Code, for allegedly having assisted in the escape of Sgt. Jessie
of criminal offenders;
Salazar, the alleged killer of Roberto Tejada, can stand since Salazar (who faced trial
separately and subsequently) was acquitted, ironically by the same court that
convicted Vino earlier. The basis for Vino's conviction as accessory in the crime of NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND, E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
murder was his having driven the alleged killer Salazar in his tricycle after Tejada was virtue of the powers vested in me by law do hereby decree and order the following:
killed. Since the trial court acquitted Salazar, holding that the prosecution failed to
prove that he was the killer of Tejada, then Vino's having driven him in his tricycle did
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging
not constitute the act of assisting in the escape of a killer.
from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly
or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and
The cases of U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil. 377 and U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following
Phil. 194 cited in the ponencia are not in point. In the Villaluz case the charge against acts:
accused as an accessory to theft was brought under paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code, for having concealed the effects of the crime by receiving and
concealing a stolen watch. Although the principal, a young housegirl, was acquitted on (a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from
reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by
account of her tender age and lack of discernment, the accessory was nevertheless
convicted. means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;

(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record,

In the Mendoza case, the accused barrio captain who was charged as an accessory
under paragraph 2 for not reporting the fire to the authorities, was acquitted because
the crime of arson was not proven, the fire being accidental.
The criminal liability of an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 is directly linked
to and inseparable from that of the principal. Even if as in this case, the crime (murder)
was proven but the Identity of the murderer was not (for the principal accused was
acquitted by the trial court), the petitioner tricycle-driver who allegedly drove him in his
tricycle to escape from the scene of the crime, may not be convicted as an accessory
to the murder, for, as it turned out, the said passenger was not proven to be the
murderer. The accessory may not be convicted under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code if the alleged principal is acquitted for, in this instance, the
principle that "the accessory follows the principal" appropriately applies.
I therefore vote to acquit the petitioner.
MALACAÑANG
Manila
document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility,
availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official
proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or
official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he
knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any
offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution
and conviction;
(d) publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime,
evading prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true
name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes;
(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of
process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in
Tanodbayan, or in the courts;

310
 (f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with
knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of
abstaining from, discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal
offender;
(h) threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong
upon his person, honor or property or that of any immediate member or
members of his family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a
condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from
appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(i) giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law
enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or from protecting
the life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data
gathered in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of
background information and not for publication and publishing or
disseminating the same to mislead the investigator or to the court.
If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher penalty,
the higher penalty shall be imposed.
Section 2. If any of the foregoing acts is committed by a public official or employee,
he shall in addition to the penalties provided thereunder, suffer perpetual
disqualification from holding public office.
Section 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 16th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty-one.
MALACAÑANG
Manila
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1612
ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979
WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies reveal that there is rampant
robbery and thievery of government and private properties;
WHEREAS, such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the
lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as
fence, of stolen properties;lawphil.net
WHEREAS, under existing law, a fence can be prosecuted only as an accessory after
the fact and punished lightly;
WHEREAS, is imperative to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the
effects of the crimes of robbery and theft.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as
part of the law of the land the following:
Section 1. Title. This decree shall be known as the Anti-Fencing Law.
Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean as follows:
(a) "Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article,
item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to
him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft.
(b) "Fence" includes any person, firm, association corporation or partnership
or other organization who/which commits the act of fencing.
Section 3. Penalties. Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder
indicated:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more
than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such
property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall
be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal
and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal
Code shall also be imposed.
(b) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
if the value of the property robbed or stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but
not exceeding 12,000 pesos.
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 (c) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if
the value of the property involved is more than 200 pesos but not exceeding
6,000 pesos.
(d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional
in its minimum period, if the value of the property involved is over 50 pesos
but not exceeding 200 pesos.
(e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such value is over
five (5) pesos but not exceeding 50 pesos.
(f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such value does not
exceed 5 pesos.
Section 4. Liability of Officials of Juridical Persons. If the fence is a partnership, firm,
corporation or association, the president or the manager or any officer thereof who
knows or should have known the commission of the offense shall be liable.
Section 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item,
object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be
prima facie evidence of fencing.
Section 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Second Hand Articles. For purposes of this
Act, all stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buy and sell of any good,
article item, object of anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier
thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary
clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in
the town or city where such store, establishment or entity is located. The Chief of
Constabulary/Director General, Integrated National Police shall promulgate such rules
and regulations to carry out the provisions of this section. Any person who fails to
secure the clearance or permit required by this section or who violates any of the
provisions of the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall upon conviction
be punished as a fence. lawphi1.net
Section 7. Repealing Clause. All laws or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-nine.
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 6
OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1612, KNOWN AS THE ANTI-FENCING LAW.
Pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1612, known as the Anti-Fencing
Law, the following rules and regulations are hereby promulgated to govern the
issuance of clearances/permits to sell used secondhand articles obtained from an
unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof:
I. Definition of Terms
1. "Used secondhand article" shall refer to any goods, article, item, object or
anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier, regardless
of whether the same has actually or in fact been used.
2. "Unlicensed dealer/supplier" shall refer to any persons, partnership, firm,
corporation, association or any other entity or establishment not licensed by
the government to engage in the business of dealing in or of supplying the
articles defined in the preceding paragraph.
3. "Store", "establishment" or "entity" shall be construed to include any
individual dealing in the buying and selling used secondhand articles, as
defined in paragraph hereof.
4. "Buy and Sell" refer to the transaction whereby one purchases used
secondhand articles for the purpose of resale to third persons.
5. "Station Commander" shall refer to the Station Commander of the
Integrated National Police within the territorial limits of the town or city
district where the store, establishment or entity dealing in the buying and
selling of used secondhand articles is located.
II. Duty to Procure Clearance or Permit
1. No person shall sell or offer to sell to the public any used secondhand
article as defined herein without first securing a clearance or permit for the
purpose from the proper Station Commander of the Integrated National
Police.
2. If the person seeking the clearance or permit is a partnership, firm,
corporation, or association or group of individuals, the clearance or permit
shall be obtained by or in the name of the president, manager or other
responsible officer-in-charge thereof.
3. If a store, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other
establishment or entity has a branch or subsidiary and the used
secondhand article is acquired by such branch or subsidiary for sale to the
public, the said branch or subsidiary shall secure the required clearance or
permit.
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 4. Any goods, article, item, or object or anything of value acquired from any
source for which no receipt or equivalent document evidencing the legality
of its acquisition could be presented by the present possessor or holder
thereof, or the covering receipt, or equivalent document, of which is fake,
falsified or irregularly obtained, shall be presumed as having been acquired
from an unlicensed dealer or supplier and the possessor or holder thereof
must secure the required clearance or permit before the same can be sold
or offered for sale to the public.
III. Procedure for Procurement of Clearances or Permits
1. The Station Commanders concerned shall require the owner of a store or
the president, manager or responsible officer-in-charge of a firm,
establishment or other entity located within their respective jurisdictions and
in possession of or having in stock used secondhand articles as defined
herein, to submit an initial affidavit within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice for the purpose thereof and subsequent affidavits once every fifteen
(15) days within five (5) days after the period covered, which shall contain:
(a) A complete inventory of such articles acquired daily from
whatever source and the names and addresses of the persons
from whom such articles were acquired.
(b) A full list of articles to be sold or offered for sale as well as the
place where the date when the sale or offer for sale shall
commence.
(c) The place where the articles are presently deposited or kept in
stock.
The Station Commander may, at his discretion when the circumstances of
each case warrant, require that the affidavit submitted be accompanied by
other documents showing proof of legitimacy of the acquisition of the
articles.
2. A party required to secure a clearance or permit under these rules and
regulations shall file an application therefor with the Station Commander
concerned. The application shall state:
(a) The name, address and other pertinent circumstances of the
persons, in case of an individual or, in the case of a firm,
corporation, association, partnership or other entity, the name,
address and other pertinent circumstances of the president,
manager or officer-in-charge.
(b) The article to be sold or offered for sale to the public and the
name and address of the unlicensed dealer or supplier from
whom such article was acquired.
In support of the application, there shall be attached to it the corresponding
receipt or other equivalent document to show proof of the legitimacy of
acquisition of the article.
3. The Station Commander shall examine the documents attached to the
application and may require the presentation of other additional documents,
if necessary, to show satisfactory proof of the legitimacy of acquisition of the
article, subject to the following conditions:
(a) If the legitimacy of acquisition of any article from an unlicensed
source cannot be satisfactorily established by the documents
presented, the Station Commander shall, upon approval of the
INP Superintendent in the district and at the expense of the party
seeking the clearance/permit, cause the publication of a notice in
a newspaper of general circulation for two (2) successive days
enumerating therein the articles acquired from an unlicensed
dealer or supplier, the names and addresses of the persons from
whom they were acquired and shall state that such articles are to
be sold or offered for sale to the public at the address of the store,
establishment or other entity seeking the clearance/permit. In
places where no newspapers are in general circulation, the party
seeking the clearance or permit shall, instead, post a notice daily
for one week on the bulletin board of the municipal building of the
town where the store, firm, establishment or entity concerned is
located or, in the case of an individual, where the articles in his
possession are to be sold or offered for sale.
(b) If after 15 days, upon expiration of the period of publication or
of the notice referred to in the preceding paragraph, no claim is
made with respect to any of the articles enumerated in the notice,
the Station Commander shall issue the clearance or permit
sought.
(c) If, before expiration of the same period for publication of the
notice or its posting, it shall appear that any of the articles in
question is stolen property, the Station Commander shall hold the
article in restraint as evidence in any appropriate case to be filed.
Articles held in restraint shall be kept and disposed of as the
circumstances of each case permit, taking into account all
considerations of right and justice in the case. In any case where
any article is held in restraint, it shall be the duty of the Station
Commander concerned to advise/notify the Commission on Audit
of the case and comply with such procedure as may be proper
under applicable existing laws, rules and regulations.
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 4. The Station Commander concerned shall, within seventy-two (72) hours
from receipt of the application, act thereon by either issuing the
clearance/permit requested or denying the same. Denial of an application
shall be in writing and shall state in brief the reason/s therefor.
5. The application, clearance/permit or the denial thereof, including such
other documents as may be pertinent in the implementation of Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1612 shall be in the forms prescribed in Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D",
and "E" hereof, which are made integral parts of these rules and
regulations.
6. For the issuance of clearances/permit required under Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1612, no fee shall be charged.
IV. Appeals
Any party aggrieved by the action taken by the Station Commander may elevate the
decision taken in the case to the proper INP District Superintendent and, if he is still
dissatisfied therewith may take the same on appeal to the INP Director. The decision
of the INP Director may also be appealed to the INP Director-General whose decision
may likewise be appealed to the Minister of National Defense. The decision of the
Minister of National Defense on the case shall be final. The appeal against the
decision taken by a Commander lower than the INP Director-General should be filed
to the next higher Commander within ten (10) days from receipt of notice of the
decision. The decision of the INP Director-General should be appealed within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of notice of the decision.
V. Penalties
1. Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by
Section 6 of P.D. 1612 or who violates any of the provisions of these rules
and regulations shall upon conviction be punished as a fence.
2. The INP Director-General shall recommend to the proper authority the
cancellation of the business license of the erring individual, store,
establishment or the entity concerned.
3. Articles obtained from unlicensed sources for sale or offered for sale
without prior compliance with the provisions of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612
and with these rules and regulations shall be held in restraint until
satisfactory evidence or legitimacy of acquisition has been established.
4. Articles for which no satisfactory evidence of legitimacy of acquisition is
established and which are found to be stolen property shall likewise be held
under restraint and shall, furthermore, be subject to confiscation as
evidence in the appropriate case to be filed. If, upon termination of the case,
the same is not claimed by their legitimate owners, the article/s shall be
forfeited in favor of the government and made subject to disposition as the
circumstances warrant in accordance with applicable existing laws, rules
and regulations. The Commission on Audit shall, in all cases, be notified.
5. Any personnel of the Integrated National Police found violating the
provisions of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 or any of its implementing rules
and regulations or who, in any manner whatsoever, connives with or
through his negligence or inaction makes possible the commission of such
violations by any party required to comply with the law and its implementing
rules and regulations, shall be prosecuted criminally without prejudice to the
imposition of administrative penalties.
VI. Visitorial Power
It shall be the duty of the owner of the store or of the president, manager or
responsible officer-in-charge of any firm, establishment or other entity or of an
individual having in his premises articles to be sold or offered for sale to the public to
allow the Station Commander or his authorized representative to exercise visitorial
powers. For this purpose, however, the power to conduct visitations shall be exercise
only during office or business hours and upon authority in writing from and by the INP
Superintendent in the district and for the sole purpose of determining whether articles
are kept in possession or stock contrary to the intents of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612
and of these rules and regulations.
VII. Other Duties Imposed Upon Station Commanders and INP District Superintendent
and Directors Following Action on Applications for Clearances or Permits
1. At the end of each month, it shall be the duty of the Station Commander
concerned to:
(a) Make and maintain a file in his office of all clearances/permit
issued by him.
(b) Submit a full report to the INP District Superintendent on the
number of applications for clearances or permits processed by his
office, indicating therein the number of clearances/permits issued
and the number of applications denied. The report shall state the
reasons for denial of an application and the corresponding follow-
up actions taken and shall be accompanied by an inventory of the
articles to be sold or offered for sale in his jurisdiction.
2. The INP District Superintendent shall, on the basis of the reports
submitted by the Station Commander, in turn submit quarterly reports to the
appropriate INP Director containing a consolidation of the information stated
in the reports of Station Commanders in his jurisdiction.
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 3. Reports from INP District Superintendent shall serve as basis for a
consolidated report to be submitted semi-annually by INP Directors to the
Director-General, Integrated National Police.

4. In all cases, reports emanating from the different levels of the Integrated
National Police shall be accompanied with full and accurate inventories of
the articles acquired from unlicensed dealers or suppliers and proposed to
be sold or offered for sale in the jurisdictions covered by the report.

These implementing rules and regulations, having been published in a newspaper of

national circulation, shall take effect on June 15, 1979.

FOR THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY DIRECTOR-GENERAL, INP:

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