Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy

Author(s): Daniel W. Drezner

Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Oct., 2000), pp. 733-749
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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 Politics,
Ideas,Bureaucratic and
ofForeign
theCrafting Policy
DanielW.Drezner University
ofChicago
There are several mechanisms
throughwhichideas are supposed to
influencepreferencesand outcomes,
but one ofthe most important is that
ideas are embedded intoinstitutions.
This presumes thatonce idea-infused
institutionsare created, theywillsur-
vive and thrive.Bureaucraticpolitics
suggests thisoutcome is farfrom
certain.This articletakes a firstcut at
examininghow idea-infused,or 'mis-
sionary"institutions,surviveand
thrivein a worldof bureaucraticpoli-
tics. Itsuggests thatmissionaryinsti-
tutionsface a tradeoffbetween sur-
vivingand thriving. Agencies thatare
insulatedfromotherbureaucracies
have a betterchance of surviving,but
are unlikelyto influencethe broad
contoursof policy.The reverse is also
true;embedded agencies have a
much lowerchance of keeping their
ideationalmissionintact,but ifthey
do survive,theirodds ofthriving are
greater.These hypotheses are exam-
ined by comparingthe evolutionof
the Peace Corps and the State De-
partmentBureau of Human Rights
and HumanitarianAffairs.
J deashavetakenon a renewed
tionsliterature.
prominence rela-
in theinternational
Thereareseveralmechanismsthroughwhichideas are
supposedto influencepreferences and outcomes,but one ofthemost
important is thattheyareimplantedintoinstitutions. Scholarsthatempha-
size constructivism (Finnemore1996; Checkel1997), epistemiccommu-
nities (Hall 1989; Haas 1992), or other approaches (Goldstein 1993;
Goldsteinand Keohane 1993) have highlighted the role of institutionsin
pursuingideationalagendas.
Whilethisis a plausibleexplanationforhow ideas persistand deter-
mine foreignpolicy,it is incomplete.Nothingis said about the strategies
theseinstitutions mustpursuein orderto surviveand thrivein a worldof
competingideas and institutions. Such an explanationassumesthatonce
idea-infusedinstitutions are created,the storyis over.The bureaucratic-
politicsparadigmsuggeststhatthestoryis just starting. Bloomfieldnotes,
"Foritis thenthatan idea,howevermorallypowerfuland howeverauthen-
ticallygroundedin thenationalpoliticalepistemology, encountersthein-
struments, theforces,and thefallible(or obstreperous)humanbeingswho
implement(or thwart)... foreignpolicyprograms"(1982,2).
How do idea-infusedinstitutions surviveand thrive?How successful
aretheyat promotingtheirideasaftertheirpoliticalsponsorspass fromthe
scene?This articlewill arguethattheplacementof institutions in thefor-
eign-policystructure helpsto determinetheirabilityto surviveand thrive,
but in contradictory ways.Idea-infusedor "missionary"institutions pos-
sessingstructural insulationfromtheinfluenceof otherorganizationsare
morelikelyto survivein a mannerconsistent withtheirfoundingideas.In-
the
sulationpermits agency to develop an organizational culturededicated
to the foundingidea, preventing the introductionof competingideas or
tactics.However,thisinsulationalso lessensthemissionary in-
institution's
fluenceoverthe craftingof foreignpolicy.Preexisting bureaucracieswill
automatically resisttheintroductionof newactorsintothepolicymixand
DanielW.DreznerisAssistant
Professor ofChicago,5828
ofPoliticalScience,University
Avenue,Chicago,IL 60637(ddrezner@uchicago.edu).
SouthUniversity
Previousversionsofthisarticlewerepresented at the1999InternationalStudiesAsso-
ciationannualmeeting,Washington, D.C. and at thePIPES workshopat theUniversity
ofChicago.I am gratefulto JennyKehland especiallyMelanieKayAndersonfortheir
research I thankDelia Boylan,Don Moon,RolandParis,James
assistance. M. Scott,Amy
Searight,SvenSteinmo,Alexander Wendt,GregCaldeira,andthreeanonymous referees
fortheircomments andsuggestions.Theusualcaveatapplies.
American
Journal Vol.44,No. 4, October2000,Pp. 733-749
ofPoliticalScience,
?2000 bytheMidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation
733
734 DANIEL W. DREZNER

impose constraints. The developmentof a strongorga- will meet cognitiveresistancefromlong-heldbeliefs

nizationalculturewillpreventthenew missionaryinsti- (Jervis1976;Lebow 1981). One of theissuesthisarticle
tutionfromcompromisingwithotheragencies.An in- can addressis how missionaryinstitutionssurvivein a
sulated institutionwill be hard-pressedto overcome bureaucratic junglewhereotheractorswillresistthein-
bureaucratic divisionsin spreadingitsideas. jectionofnewideas.
In contrast,idea-infused institutionsembedded This articlealso fillsseveralgaps in thebureaucratic
withina morepowerfulbureaucracyhave a lowerprob- politicsliterature.SinceAllison's(1971) EssenceofDeci-
abilityof survivalin theiroriginalform.Theymustcope sion,thestudyof bureaucraticpoliticsliterature has fo-
withgreaterpressuresthan insulatedagenciesand are cusedon thedescriptionof organizationalinteraction as
preventedfromdevelopinga strongorganizationalcul- a separatelevel of analysis(Welch 1992; Hudson and
ture.Embeddedinstitutions arelessimmuneto compet- Vose 1995;Sternand Verbeek1998) ratherthandevelop-
ing ideas. However,iftheydo survive,embeddedinsti- ing positivetheoriesof action. The resulthas been an
tutions have a greaterchance of thrivingover time. endlessseriesof debatesabout the salienceof bureau-
Close interactionwithotherbureaucraciescan lead to craticpoliticsin contrastto thepowerof sharedimages
an increasein sharedideas and sharedunderstandings. (Krasner 1972; Art 1973; Khong 1992; Rhodes 1994),
This may alterthe goals of the institution,but it also presidential dominance, (Moe 1985; Bendor and
transforms the identityof the otherbureaucraticunits Hammond 1992), legislativedominance(Weingastand
by convertingthemto theirfoundingidea. Ideational Moran 1983),or all of theabove (Hammond and Knott
entrepreneurs thusfacea tradeoffin establishinginsti- 1996).The modifiedideationalapproachdevelopedhere
tutionsthatembodydearlyheldideas.Theycan increase is nota generaltheoryofbureaucraticpolitics.However,
the odds forsurvivalat the cost of greaterinfluence,or it does suggestthe originsof bureaucraticpreferences,
theycan gamble at enhancingtheirinfluencebut risk strategiesto maximizeorganizationalutility, and likely
extinction. outcomes.In particular,the abilityof bureaucraciesto
To testthismodifiedideationalapproach,I develop use organizationalcultureas a means of propagating
twocase studiesof missionary institutionswithdifferentideas is crucialto determining outcomes.The approach
placementsin thefederalgovernment. Bothinstitutions used hereis consistentwithrecentrationalist(Bendor,
are imbued witha set of ideas distinctfromthe restof Taylor,and Van Gaalen 1987; Brehmand Gates 1997)
the foreignpolicybureaucracy:the UnitedStatesPeace and constructivist work(Legro 1996) emphasizingthe
Corps and the State Department'sBureau of Human role of organizationalcultureas an importantfactorin
Rightsand HumanitarianAffairs (HA).' bureaucratic politics.
This articleis intendedto contributeand critique The casespresentedherealso correctsomeempirical
boththeideasand thebureaucratic and
politicsliterature deficiencies.The bureaucraticpoliticsapproachhas fo-
to begina dialoguebetweenthetwo.The ideas literature cused exclusivelyon crisisdecision makingin security
has been unable to disentanglethe effectof ideas from bureaucracies(Allison1971;Lebow 1981) at theexpense
theeffect of materialinterests(Jacobsen1995). Previous of longitudinalanalyses of "routine" foreignpolicy,
studiesof foreignpolicyideas,such as thecultof theof- whichis odd sincethisis thepolicycategorythatbureau-
fensive (Van Evera 1984) or strategictrade theory craticpoliticsshould mattermost (Rosati 1981). Other
(Goldstein 1993), have been unable to separatethe in- foreignpolicyagencieshavebeen neglected.Expanding
trinsiceffectof new ideas fromtheinfluenceof interest the rangeof cases can help to broaden the explanatory
groupsthatmateriallybenefitedfromthose ideas. The powerofbureaucratic politicsin foreignpolicy.
casespresentedhereareselectedto separatethoseeffects. The restof thisarticleis organizedas follows.The
Anotherproblemwiththeideas literature has been nextsectionsurveystheobstaclesmissionary institutions
itsfailureto examinehow foreignpolicyis craftedwhen facein pursuingtheiragendas.Sectiontwo developshy-
competingideascoexist.Too oftenin thisliterature, casespotheseson thelikelihoodoftheseinstitutions surviving
are presentedwherepowerfulideas simplyoverwhelm and thriving. The thirdsectionmotivatesthecase selec-
preexisting beliefsor values,leadingto a changein policy tionof thePeace Corps and theHA Bureau.The fourth
(Rohrlich1987). Commonsensesuggeststhatnewideas sectionlooksat theperformance ofthePeace Corpsfrom
its originsin the Kennedyadministration to the end of
the Ford administration. The followingsectionlooks at
'In 1994theHA bureauwas renamedtheBureauofDemocracy,
theClintonadministration's theHA's performance
HumanRights,and Laborto reflect underthe Carterand Reaganad-
expandeddefinition
ofhumanrights. ministrations. The finalsectionconcludes.
IDEAS, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND THE CRAFTING OF FOREIGN POLICY 735

Ideas,Bureaucratic
Politics, cal organizations,the bureaucraticpoliticsparadigm,
andForeignPolicy and studiesof organizationalculturesuggestthatthein-
sertionof ideas intoinstitutions is notthatsimple.4
An ideational approach to foreignpolicy argues that Scholars of political organizations note the diffi-
ideas intoinstitutions. Agenciesthat
ideas can be sustainedthroughtheirinstitutionalization cultyof embedding
prefer the status quo or fearlosingpowerwill resistthe
and the organizationalculturebred withinthe institu-
introductionof anynew ideas into the policymix and
tion.Once established, missionary institutionsarean im-
portantcausal mechanismforthe conversionof ideas use any means at theirdisposal to avoid unpalatable
ideas.These meanscould includeagendamanipulation,
into policies. Sikkinkobserves:"Rarelydo new ideas
withholdinginformation, excludingnew agenciesfrom
thrivein themodernworldoutsideof institutional net-
consultation, or psychological pressure to conform.
works.Ideas withinan institution become embodiedin
Politicians will oftenstructure organizationsso thatthey
its statementof purpose,its self-definition, and its re-
can retaintheirinfluenceeven afterlosingoffice(Moe
or
search trainingprogram, which in turn tends to per-
1990). Establishedbureaucraciesmaysabotagethe new
petuate and extend the ideas" (1991, 2). (See also
institutions by lobbyingovertlypoliticalagents,such as
Goldsteinand Keohane 1993,13.)
legislators or interestgroups.A bureaucracywithmany
All institutionshave some foundingidea or ideas.
However,the"missionary"institutions describedin the masters could findit difficultto carryout its mission
ideationalliteratureare distinctin twoways.First,mis- without outside interference.
In foreignaffairs, bureaucratic politicsis particularly
sionaryinstitutionshave a coherentset of preferences
salientfortworeasons.First,actorsimportantto domes-
overmeansand ends.In a missionary institution,thereis
littledisagreementwithinthe agencyover the desired tic politicshave less powerand influencein foreignaf-
goal or thewaysin whichthatgoal is achieved.2Second, fairs. Foreignpolicy is a thin interest-group environ-
ment. While interestgroupsare an importantactorin
missionary tryto preventtheintroduction
institutions of
additionalnormativeor materialgoals in orderto avoid mostmodels of domesticpolicymaking,foreignpolicy
interestgroupsare smaller,less organized,less wealthy,
value conflictsor tradeoffs(Bendor, Taylor,and Van
Gaalen 1987).Thisallowsmembersofa missionary insti- and byextensionlessinfluential (Zegart1999,chapter1).
Similarly, Congress and congressmen havelittleelectoral
tutionto maintaintheirintensityof preferencesover
incentiveto takean interestin foreignaffairsand have
means and ends; it also preventsthe organizationfrom
less informationand fewtools withwhichto influence
engagingin tradeoffs overcompetinggoals.3
most arenasof foreignaffairs.This raisestheprofileof
Implicitin the ideas literatureare the reasonsmis-
otheractors,includingotherbureaucracies.Second,in
sionaryinstitutions arelikelyto surviveand thrive.Pow-
contrast to manyarenasof domesticpolicymaking,for-
erfulideas can createa setof compellingbeliefsthatfuse
eign policy institutionsrarelyhave monopolycontrol
together thepreferences ofmanagers(agencyheads) and
overan issue.Agenciesmustcooperatewitheach otherin
operators(lower-levelbureaucrats).If these ideas are
orderto implementpolicy(Zegart1999). Classicworks
embracedby operators,thepreferences of thisgroupof
on bureaucraticpolitics (Allison 1971; Destler 1972;
individualswill more closelymatchthoseof managers,
Allisonand Halperin1972;Halperin1974) havemodeled
reducingthe need formonitoring.Idea-infusedorgani-
zationsdevelopa uniquesenseoforganizational foreignpolicyas theoutcomeofbargainingamongmul-
mission,
difficul- tipleorganizations
withdifferent agendas.Anynew mis-
overcomingintraorganizational principal-agent
sionaryinstitutionmustnegotiatewithpreexisting bu-
ties(Wilson 1989).
reaucraticactors.
Whileintuitively appealing,thiscausalmechanismis
Establishedagencieshave an advantageovernewly
highlyproblematicwhen applied to foreign-policy bu-
createdinstitutions. Olderagencieswillpossessmorere-
reaucracies.The new institutionalist approachto politi-
sources,information, skill,and expertisein thebureau-
2 This distinguishes fromorganizations cratictrenches.
missionaryinstitutions Newlyestablishedmissionary institutions
liketheCentralIntelligence forexample,
Agency, whichis an insti- will certainlypossess a strongsense of organizational
tutionthathas a clearlydefinedend (to acquireas muchsignifi-
cantinformation aboutothercountriesas possible)butmultiple
methodsofachieving thatend.
but
theideationalapproach,
4Structuralrealismhas also critiqued
3I am talking em-
hereaboutidealtypes.Allpoliticalinstitutions thesecritiquesaresomewhattangential to thecasesdiscussedin
bodythismissionary and as willbe shown,all
zealto someextent, thisarticle.See Posen (1984) and Krasner(1993) fortherealist
missionary mustcopewiththeprospectofnewideas.
institutions take.
736 DANIEL W. DREZNER

mission,but maylack the otherresourcesnecessaryto was dissolvedon thefirstdayof theClintonadministra-

achievetheirpolicies.When created,theseinstitutions tion.A missionaryinstitutionthrives ifthe agency'ses-
mighthavethebackingof morepowerfulactorsthatcan poused normsand principlescloselycorrelatewiththe
shepherdthebureaucratic unitthroughitsinfancy. How-state'sobservedpolicyoutcomes.5For example,in the
ever,as politicalfortunes change,theseprotectors late fortiesthe StateDepartment'sPolicyPlanningStaff
can fall
frompower. effectively pushed U.S. foreignpolicytowardsa grand
The existenceof strongorganizationalculturescan strategy of containment. Bothsurvivingand thriving are
further impede the implementationof ideas in foreign continuousvariables.An agencycan partiallysurviveifit
policy.Foreign-policy agenciesare likelyto have strong
retainsitsorganizational formbuthas some ofitsfound-
organizationalculturesbecause theyfallinto the cat- ingideasalteredovertime.
egoryof"procedural"organizations(Wilson 1989,164), Thereare multiplecauses of survivingand thriving,
in whichoutputscan be observedbut outcomescannot. includingthe balance of materialinterests, the prefer-
In thesetypesof bureaucracies,strongorganizational encesofpoliticalleaders,and feedbackbyexternalactors
culturesfocusless on ends and moreon means.In for- to policyoutcomes.However,theplacementof mission-
eign affairs,the link between the outputs of foreign aryinstitutionsalso mattersbecause it constrainsthe
policyagencies-demarches,treaties,sanctions,induce- strategyset of the new agency.Missionaryinstitutions
ments,diplomaticentreaties,and so on-and the out- can be createdas autonomousagenciesthatarehorizon-
comesthoseoutputsaredesignedto influenceis vagueor tallyequivalentto establishedinstitutions. Such agencies
indirect.Frequently theoutcomeis not evenobservable. have independentaccess to resourcessuch as staffand
Strongorganizationalcultureshave been observedin equipment.These institutions developtheirown hierar-
diplomaticcorps (Destler1972) as well as theU.S. mili- chicalstructureas well as criteriaforpromotionwithin
tary(Wilson 1989). theranks.The U.S. TradeRepresentative is an exampleof
Proceduralorganizationsproduceculturesthatso- thiskindof placement.New missionaryinstitutions can
ciallyconstructan ethosfocusingon methodslinkedto also be establishedas a subunitof a largerorganization.
foundingideals.Iftheseorganizations areconstrained Theseagencieshavea clearmissionbutrelyon thelarger
by
newtasksthatrequiredifferent bureaucracyforrulesand resources.As such,theseinsti-
skills,an existingculture
can be dilutedwiththe influxof new personnelor new tutionshavelesschoiceoverpersonnel,promotioncrite-
tasks.Establishedorganizationalcultureswill resistor ria,and hierarchicalstructure.An exampleofthiskindof
subvertnew tasksthatare assignedthem,forfearthat agencyis theBureauof RefugeeAffairs, whichis located
theywill lose their cohesion and abilityto function withinthelargerorganizational unitoftheStateDepart-
(Derthick1990). This problemwillbe particularly ment.I willcalltheformerinsulatedagenciesand thelat-
acute
withforeign-policy bureaucracies. terembeddedagencies.6
The politicsof bureaucraticstructurecan bluntthe At firstglance,it would appearthatinsulatedagen-
abilityof an institutionto propagateits foundingidea. cies would have a higherprobabilityof survivingand
However,the ideationalentrepreneurs thatcreateand thriving.Insulatedagencieshave the advantagesof au-
staffnew missionaryinstitutionsare not oblivious to tonomyand resourceallocation.An insulatedagencyhas
thesepitfalls.Whatstrategies can theleadersof mission- greatercontroloveritsown staffand budget,preventing
aryinstitutions use to surviveand thrive? otheragenciesfrommanipulatingthoseresources.This
increasesthe abilityof a missionaryinstitutionto fend
offeffortsto constrainitsactivities.
The mostimportantadvantageto an insulatedmis-
sionaryinstitution is theagencyhead's abilityto use the
WhenWillMissionary Institutions foundingideas to generatea strongand cohesiveorgani-
SurviveandThrive? zationculture.Organizationalculture,as definedin the
rationalchoiceliterature (Kreps1990;Miller1992),con-
For thepurposesof thisarticle,a missionaryinstitution sists of the method throughwhich desired ends and
survivesif it maintainsits organizationalintegrity
and
continuesto advanceitsinitialset of ideas evenafterits 5Thisdoesnotmeanthatthepolicysucceeds, justthatitis imple-
politicalpatronslose power.Forexample,theU.S. Coun- mented.Thisgoesto thedistinctionbetweenpolicyoutputsand
cil on Competitiveness,createdbytheBush administra- outcomes.
tion to advance the goal of governmentpromotionof correspondcloselyto Kaarbo's(1998) termi-
6 Thesedefinitions

high-techsectorsof theU.S. economy,did not survive;it nologyofverticalagenciesandhorizontal

agencies.
IDEAS, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND THE CRAFTING OF FOREIGN
means are communicatedfrommanagersto operators
and outsiders.Establishinga clear set of decisionrules
empowersbureaucratsto act underuncertainty. Under
such conditions,ideas can providea road map to solu-
tions (Garrettand Weingast1993). Furthermore, estab-
lishingan organizationalculturebased upon founding
ideas makesit easierto solveadverseselectionproblems
in hiring.New hiresarequickerto conformto thenorms
and practicesof the restof the bureaucracyif thereis
littlevariationamongthepreferences of individualop-
erators (Brehm and Gates 1997; Carpenter 1998).
Foundingideashelpto narrowthatvariance.Cultureen-
suresthatthedesiredprinciplesand causalbeliefssustain
themselves overtime.
Despitetheseapparentadvantages, thereare reasons
to believethatinsulatedagenciesfacetougherodds of
thriving. The verystrategies thatincreasethelikelihood
of survivingreducethe chancesof thriving.Insulation
and theconcomitantdevelopmentof a strongorganiza-
tionalculturelimitthe influenceof new ideas upon the
otherbureaucraticactorsin foreignpolicy.Insulationis
analogous to quarantine;it makesit difficult forother
ideas to "infect"a missionaryinstitution,but it also
makesit moredifficult forthe missionaryinstitution to
its
spread ideas to otheragencies. The existenceof dif-
ferentorganizationalcultureswill furtherimpede the
exchangeof different ideas. Justas separatepoliticalen-
titieswill quicklyestablishwithin-groupand without-
group identities,so will bureaucratic units (Mercer
1995; Kaarbo and Gruenfeld1998). Sufficientdiffer-
ences in bureaucraticculturelead agenciesto distrust
the abilityof otherinstitutionsto make any contribu-
tion to foreignpolicy.It also encourages existingbu-
reaucraciesto act likecompetitors, providingalternative
policy outputs as a way of limitingthe missionary
institution'sinfluence.7
A missionary institution's
organizational culturealso
makeslogrolling difficult.
Compromiseimpliestheaccep-
tanceof otherbeliefsand values,whichcan proveanath-
ema to bureaucrats who genuinely believethattheirideas
aresuperior. Agencyheadsmustweighthebenefits ofany
policycompromiseagainstthecoststo moraleifsuch a
compromiseviolatestheagency'snormsand beliefs.Op-
eratorsmayshirkand/orsabotagecompromisestheydis-
like(Brehmand Gates1997).The distrust betweenagen-
cies with differentorganizationalculturesraises the
transaction costsofreachinga compromise, impairing in-
sulatedagencies'abilityto logroll.The developmentof a
unifying organizationalculturecan increasean insulated
andVanGaalen(1987) on theeffect
7SeeBendor,Taylor, ofoutside
on bureaucratic
competition outcomes.
POLICY 737
agency'schancesforsurvivalwhiledecreasingitschances
ofthriving.8
Embeddedagenciespossessa different set of disad-
vantagesand advantagesin propagatingideas. Embed-
ded agenciesarelocatedwithina largerand morepower-
fulbureaucracy. This typeof agencyshould,potentially,
have greateraccess to theinformationand resourcesof
thelargerentity. A new agencycan manipulateagendas
and routinesto harnessthepowerofthewholeorganiza-
tion by introducingnew practices and procedures.
Kaarbo (1998,81) notesthatifa minority factioncan se-
cure a decision rule of unanimityinstead of majority
rule,it can use itsvetopowerto blockinitiatives.
The most importanttool of an embedded agency,
however, is itsabilityto proselytize
itsnormsand values,
initiating othersin thelargerorganizationto itspointof
viewovertime.This is perhapsthemostdistinctadvan-
tageof an idea-basedbureaucracyoveran interest-based
bureaucracy. Interest-basedbureaucraciescan pushtheir
endsthroughbargainingand theaccumulationofpower.
Idea-based bureaucraciescan push theirends through
thepersuasionofothergroupsto theirprincipledbeliefs,
particularly iftheycommunicatethepsychicor material
benefitsof usingtheirideas.Bothconstructivists and ra-
tional-choice theorists
argue thatifstaffers
are capableof
expressingtheirprincipledbeliefsin a waythatis con-
ceptuallyamenableto otherindividuals'rolesand beliefs,
theirabilityto minglewithotherbureaucratsencourages
a broadershiftin preferences(Brehmand Gates 1997;
Johnston1999). In Rhodes' (1994) studyof the U.S.
Navy,he foundthatAlfredThayerMahan'sideas ofnaval
warfaretrumpedthenarrowerparochialinterests among
thesubmariners, airmen,and surfacesailorsin explain-
ing weapons procurement.Ideas that resonate with
broadervaluesor goalscan spreadacrossthelargerorga-
nizationalentity.
Of course,embeddedagenciesalso facesignificant
problemsin theirabilityto spreadtheirideas.Unlikean
insulatedagency,embeddedagenciesare unableto fash-
ion a separateorganizationalculture.They mustdraw
theirpersonnelfromthelargerorganizational one
entity,
thathas a previouslyestablishedbureaucraticculture.
This putsthenew missionaryinstitution at a significant
disadvantage;agencyheads cannot createan organiza-
tional cultureconsistentwiththeirfoundingideas if a
strongculturealreadyexistswithinthe largerbureau-
cracy.The absenceof a distinctive organizationalculture
increasesthelikelihoodofan embeddedagencythriving,
willoftenserveto strengthen
conflict
thisexternal
8Ironically, in-
tra-groupcohesionthrougha reinforced organizationalculture.
See't Hart(1994).
738
but it simultaneouslyreducesthechancesof the agency
surviving skirmisheswithothersubunits.
Embeddedagenciesmustalso cope withless control
over resourcesthan insulatedagencies. Superiorscan
choose to denymaterial,informational,or human re-
sourcesto thenewagency,cutit out fromorganizational
decisionmaking,or simplycoercebureaucratsintocon-
formingwiththe organizations'statusquo ante goals.
Embedded agenciesalso face an acute problemof ad-
verseselection;theycannotbe sureif new staffwill act
in a mannerconsistentwiththe foundingideas. Over
time,thiscan lead to an absorptioninto the largeren-
tity,extinguishing(or at the veryleast,mutating)the
foundingideas.
Insulated and embedded agencies face a tradeoff.
Embeddedagencieshavethebetterchanceof spreading
theirideas overtimeacross a significant sectionof the
foreignpolicybureaucracy,but theyalso have a better
chanceof beingideologicallyabsorbedby thelargeror-
ganizationalunit.Insulatedagencieshavea betterchance
of implementingtheirdesired policies,but over time
mustcope withcountervailingpolicies establishedby
otheragenciesand hostileexecutives.
Giventhesetradeoffs, how should missionaryinsti-
tutionsbe expectedto perform? Insulatedagenciesthat
maximizethe advantagesof autonomyensuresurvival.
This means establishinga strongbureaucraticculture
thatcan sustainthefoundingidealsof theinstitution. A Because of thedifficulty in quantifyingtheindependent
strongculturecan also thwarthostileexecutivesor legis-
latures. Although politicians can weaken agencies
throughbudgetcuts and personnelshifts,a strongbu-
reaucraticculturecan encourage operatorsto pursue
goalsthatmightruncontraryto a hostilemonitor.Such
a strongculturewill also makeit moredifficult forthat
agencyto convertotherpartsof the foreignpolicyma-
chineryto itssetof principledbeliefs,or to logrollother
bureaucracies. Thus,an insulatedagencyshouldsucceed
in implanting strongnormswithinitsstaff, sustainingits
organizationalmission.On theotherhand,it shouldbe
expectedto havelessinfluenceoverthebroadercontours
offoreignpolicy,and itspolicyoutputswillbe dilutedby
thepoliciesofotheragencies.
Embeddedagenciesfacea different setof incentives
to propagatetheirideas.Theywillbe unableto developa
strongorganizationalculture,makingthemmorevulner-
able to absorptionby the largerorganizationalentity.
Theseagenciesfacean immediatethreatto theirsurvival
fromhostilebureaucratsand superiors.Theiroverriding
goal mustbe to encouragepracticesand routinesthat
spreadideas to the restof thelargerorganization.This
couldbe donethroughtraining regimens or newstandard
operatingproceduresthatexposeothersto theideas the
DANIEL W. DREZNER
missionaryinstitutionis supposed to encourage.Only
whentheseprincipledbeliefsare acceptedby thelarger
organizationalunit does the embedded agencyhave a
chanceof influencing thelargercontoursof policy.The
problem,of course,is thatthe act of persuasiontakes
time,duringwhichan embeddedagencycould faceex-
tinction.Evenifsuccessful,theresultis likelyto be a hy-
bridof theentrenched ideas of thepreexisting organiza-
tionand thenewideas ofthemissionary institution.
Table1 summarizesthecontrast betweenthesuccess-
and outcomespursuedbythedifferent
fulstrategies types
ofmissionary The placementofthemission-
institutions.
aryinstitutionwithinthelargerbureaucracyis theinde-
pendentvariable,becauseit strongly affects theinterven-
ingvariable,organizationalstrategy.It shouldbe stressed
thatthismodifiedideationalapproachis farfroma com-
pletetheoryof ideas and bureaucraticpolitics;it ignores
theroleofmaterialinterestsas wellas otherfactors. How-
ever,itsparsimonyhas advantages. As Lijphart(1971) ob-
serves,parsimonioustheoriespermitscholarsto draw
fromfewerobservations.
causal inferences The nextsec-
tionexplainsthecase selectionand testingmethodology.
Case SelectionandPrediction
and dependentvariables,case studieswill be used. The
subsequent sections conduct a plausibility probe
(Eckstein1974) of thehypothesesdelineatedin thepre-
vious sectionby examiningthe Peace Corps underthe
Kennedy/Johnson and Nixon/Fordadministrations, and
theStateDepartmentBureauof Human Rightsand Hu-
manitarianAffairs(HA) underthe Carterand Reagan
administrations. These cases wereselectedon theinde-
pendentvariableto allowvariationin agencyplacement.9
Such an approach reducesthe chance of selectionbias
that is ever present in qualitative research (King,
Keohane,and Verba1994,chapter4).
The Peace Corps is nominallyunderthe controlof
the StateDepartment,but it has much greaterinstitu-
tionalautonomythantheHA Bureau.The Corps'budget
is a separatelineitemfromtheStateDepartment;itsstaff
does not come fromthe Foreign Service. The Peace
CorpsActof 1961explicitly statedthatitsoperatorswere
not obligatedto agreewithor defendU.S. foreignpolicy
(Schwartz1991, 19). It meetsthe definitionof an insu-
9Sincethemodified ideationalapproachhasonlyoneindependent
variable,twocasesgeneratessufficient to pre-
degreesoffreedom
ventunderdetermination.
IDEAS, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND THE CRAFTING OF FOREIGN POLICY 739

TABLE I A Comparisonof Insulatedand EmbeddedAgencies

Typeof Resourcesat PredictedOrganizational

Agency Disposal Strategy PredictedOutcome
Insulated Controlover Generationofa strong Survivallikely;not
agency personnel,budget, organizational
cultureto likelytothrive
promotioncriteria ensuresurvival
Embedded Greateraccess to Attemptto change practices Survivalless likely;
agency otherbureaucracies and proceduresto persuade ifsurvival,
then
otherbureaucrats thriving
likely

lated agency.The HumanitarianAffairs Bureau,in con-
trast,was establishedwithinthe StateDepartmentbu-
reaucracy. Nonpoliticalstaffcame fromtheForeignSer-
vice. The head of HA was an AssistantSecretaryin the
StateDepartmentbureaucracy.In contrastto the Peace
Corps,HA had to operatewithintheconfinesofa preex-
istingbureaucracyand organizationalculture.It meets
thedefinition of an embeddedagency.
The cases havetheadded advantageof holdingcon-
stantvariables importantin alternativeexplanations.
First,theeffectof materialinterests on policyoutcomes
is controlledforin thatno domesticinterests materially
benefitedfromeitherthePeace Corpsor theHA bureau.
Historiesof theseorganizationsdemonstratethatthese
agenciesembodyprincipledbeliefs-ideas thatdeter-
mine whichpolicyends are rightand whichare wrong
(Goldsteinand Keohane 1993).10Althoughit is impos-
sible (and undesirable)to separatecompletelytheeffect
of ideas fromthe effectof interests, thesetwo agencies
comeveryclose.
Second,the internationaldistributionof powerre-
mainedreasonablyconstantthroughout thetimeperiod
studied. Systemictheorists(Waltz 1979) argue that
changesin theexternalpolicyenvironment are theprin-
cipal cause of anychangesin foreignpolicy.The bipolar-
ity of the Cold War remained essentiallyunchanged
throughoutboth cases. Structuralrealismwould there-
forebe unable to explain anyvariationin U.S. foreign
policy towardsglobal developmentor human rights.
Thus,bothsystemic and pluralistapproacheswouldpre-
dictthatthenew missionary institutions
shouldhaveno
effect on foreignpolicy.Anyobservedvariationin policy
outputswouldhaveto come fromtheconsciouseffort of
theseinstitutions.
Fromthe argumentsmade in the previoussection,
we shouldexpectto see thePeace Corps successfully de-
velopa strongorganizational culturein orderto resistef-
"0ForHA, see Bloomfield(1982), Drew (1977), and Sikkink
(1993); on thePeaceCorps,see Hoopes 1965,Rice(1985),Reeves
(1988),and Schwartz(1991).
fortsto controlor alterits mission.At the same time,
however,theideas thatpromptedits creationshouldbe
limitedin theireffecton Americanforeignpolicy.With
theHA bureau,we shouldexpectanyattemptto forgea
separatebureaucraticculturefail,due to the inevitable
clash withthebureaucraticcultureof the ForeignSer-
vice.Overtime,however, one would expectto see HA ei-
therco-optedbytheStateDepartment,or,ifit survives,
converting theForeignServiceto itsfoundingideas.
Althoughthecaseselectioncontrolsforsomealterna-
tiveexplanations, otherapproacheswould producea set
of predictionscontrasting withthe modifiedideational
approach,as Table2 demonstrates. A presidentialdomi-
nanceapproach(Moe 1985;Bendorand Hammond1992,
313-317) arguesthatthe chiefexecutive,throughap-
pointment and selectiveincentives,can overcomeanybu-
reaucraticresistanceto his preferred outcomes.This ap-
proach would predict the missionaryinstitutionsto
surviveand thrivein supportiveadministrations, but
witherand die in unfriendly administrations. In bothof
the cases, an administrationwithideologies hostileto
theseinstitutions' foundingideas came to powerwithin
tenyearsof theircreation.Furthermore, boththeNixon
and Reaganadministrations placeda greatdeal ofempha-
sison politicalcontroloverthebureaucracy andwerethus
quiteconsciousoftheneedto controlorganizations with
views antitheticalto theirideas (Reeves 1988; Nathan
1983).11 Predicting outcomesbased solelyon materialre-
sourceallocationswould predicta betterchanceforthe
Peace Corpsto surviveand thrivethantheHA bureau,as
itsinitialstaffsize (250 to 20 initialstaffers)
and budget
weremuchlarger.
1"Anapproachbasedon theindividual presidentialstyleofman-
agement(Rosati1981;Hermannand Preston1994)wouldpredict
neitheragencyto surviveor thrivein all periods.The missionary
institutions
wouldfacethedifficulties ofbeingminority voicesin
administrations(Johnsonand Carter)thatvaluedbureaucratic
consensus.Withpresidentsthatpreferred morecentralizedde-
cision-making(Nixonand Reagan),theywouldlose outbecause
they were promotingideas that differedfrompresidential
preferences.
740 DANIEL W. DREZNER

TABLE 2 Predicted
Outcomes
Predicted
performance Predicted
performance Predicted
performance Predicted
performance
ofPeaceCorpsunder ofPeaceCorps ofHA ofHA
Approach Kennedy/Johnson underNixon underCarter underReagan
Modified Highprobability
of Highprobability
of Lowprobability
of Lowprobability
of
ideational surviving;
lowprobabilitysurviving;
lowprobabilitysurviving
andthriving surviving;
ifsurvival,
ofthriving ofthriving of
highprobability
thriving
Presidential Highprobability
of Lowprobability
of Highprobability
of Lowprobability
of
dominance surviving
andthriving orthriving
surviving surviving
andthriving orthriving
surviving
Material Highprobability
of Highprobability
of Lowprobability
of Lowprobability
of
resources surviving
andthriving surviving
andthriving surviving
orthriving surviving
orthriving

Becauseoftheacuteinterest in boththePeace Corps velopmentand in theprocesscreatealliesamongthemass

and humanrightsin general,I relyon secondarysources
in buildingthecase studies.Thisinevitablyleadsto ques-
tionsof codingreliabilityof qualitativevariables.Space
constraintspreventan exhaustivedetailingof minute
disagreements amongthesourcesabouttheoutcomesin
eachcase.However,a reviewoftheliterature has revealed
a surprisingdegreeof consensuson most of the points
coveredin thecase studies.In each case,plausiblealter-
nativeexplanationsare discussed,and significantdis-
agreements amongsecondarysourcesarealso noted.
ThePeace Corps:1961-1976
Thereweretwofoundingideas of thePeace Corps.First,
thewayto alleviatepovertyand promotedevelopment
was throughthedirectactionof thePeace CorpsVolun-
teers(PCVs). This was the qualitythroughwhich the
PeaceCorpsdistinguished itselffrommoretechnicalU.S.
aid organizationssuch as theAgencyforInternational
Developmentor PointFour.Unlikethoseagencies,which
dispatchedaid,thePeace Corpswas designedto puta hu-
manfaceto thataid (Anderson1998;Shriver1964,71-72;
Ashabranner 1971,44-45).One quasi-officialguideto the
Peace Corps observedin 1965:"thePeace Corps saysto
theworldas no privateagencyor technicalassistanceor-
ganizationcould sayit,thattheAmericanpeople them-
selveswantto help the people of the emergingnations
fightthe poverty,disease,and ignorancewhichare the
greatestobstaclesto progress....Thisconceptofthedoer,
as opposedto theadvisoror teacher, is thedistinguishing
featureofthePeace Corps"(Hoopes 1965,82, 100).
Second,thePeaceCorpswas designedto reorient U.S.
foreignpolicyin thethirdworldtowardsproblemsofde-
of newlydecolonized states.Memos betweenKennedy
and thefirstPeace Corps director, R. SargentShriver,in
1961 stressedthe foreign-policy advantagesthatwould
accrueto theUnitedStatesfromthegoodwillgenerated
bythePeace Corps,particularly withrespectto theCold
Warcompetition withtheSovietUnion (Cobbs 1996,90-
94; CobbsHoffman1998,29).Shriver's first
tripabroadto
sellthePeace Corpsto hostcountriesspecifically targeted
strategicthird-world countries,includingNigeria,India,
Pakistan,and the Philippines(Amin 1992,40).12 How-
ever,thePeace Corps'creatorswerealso awareof thefact
thattheonlywayto obtainthatadvantagewas to denude
U.S. policyofblatantanti-communism, sincethiswould
conflictwiththe revolutionaryideology of these new
countries.In short,thefoundersofthePeace Corpshad a
causal beliefthatby focusingon development,theU.S.
would build up goodwillamong thedecolonizedstates.
Throughsuch idealpolitik,theUnitedStateswould help
stemcommunism(Shriver1964,72).
DespitepressurefromAID to placethenewmission-
aryinstitutionwithinitsorganizational purview, Kennedy
establishedthePeace Corpsas an insulatedagency.'3The
firstPeace Corps stafferswereconscious thattheirau-
tonomousstatuspermitteda strongorganizationalcul-
turethatwould perpetuatethe foundingideals.Shriver
observed,"The organizationalchartswould havelooked
betterif we had become a box in a single foreignaid
agency.Butthethrustofa newidea wouldhavebeenlost.
a June1961tripto Guinea,Shriver
'2After wrotein a memoran-
dum:"Herewe havean opportunity to movea countryfroman
oreven
to a positionofneutrality
clearBlocorientation
apparently
to theWest.Thisis thefirst
one oforientation I
suchopportunity
knowofin thedeveloping world"(quotedinAmin1992,44).
(1971,44-47) formoreon thisdecision.
"3SeeAshabranner
IDEAS, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND THE CRAFTING OF FOREIGN
The newwineneededa newbottle"(1964,15).VicePresi-
dentJohnsonwarnedShriver, "thistownis fullof folks
who believethe onlywayto do somethingis theirway.
That'sespeciallytruein diplomacyand thingslikethat,
becausetheyworkwithforeigngovernments.... You put
thePeace Corps intotheForeignServiceand they'llput
stripedpantson yourpeople"(quotedin Rice 1985,67).
The staffand volunteersquicklyacquiredtheculture
of a missionaryinstitution. The numberof applications
to be Peace Corps Volunteers(PCVs) in 1961 outnum-
beredapplicationsto all otherdepartments ofthefederal
government. The firstfewcohortsofPCVs consistedpri-
marilyof BA generalistswho signed up because of
Kennedy'scall forservice.Once placed in thefield,they
establisheda strongsubculturethatreflected thefound-
ing ideals of the agency:independencefromotherfor-
eignpolicyagencies,a sensitivity to othercultures,and a
desireto be "doers."'14The organizationalculturewas so
strongthatlongitudinalstudiesof PCVs indicatethat
theircareerpathsweredramatically bytheirser-
affected
vicein thePeace Corps (Starr1994).
The exceptionalespritde corpsof the Peace Corps
administrators has also been documentedin organiza-
tionalhistories(Ashabranner1971;Rice 1985; Schwartz
1991; Cobbs Hoffman1998). The amount of overtime
hourstheywerewillingto devoteto the cause reflected
theircommitmentto the mission of the Peace Corps.
The forty-hour workweekdid not existforthestaffany
more than it did forthe volunteersin the field(Clute
1962, 165). Ashabrannerobserved:"Almosteveryone
who servesforanylengthof timein thePeace Corps ...
developsan emotionalattachment to thePeace Corps,or
at leastto thePeace Corpsidea,thatI cannotconceiveof
anyonedevelopingforthe CommerceDepartment,the
BureauofStandards,or theAgencyforInternational De-
velopment"(1971,3).15
The Peace Corps'emphasison fostering a strongor-
ganizationalcultureled to some foreign-policy successes
in thesixties.Shriverand hisstaffdecidedat theoutsetto
place as manyvolunteersas possible in the field.The
growthof the programwas impressive.In 1961 there
were750 PCVs; by 1966 therewere15,556in morethan
fiftycountries,includingnationstraditionallyaligned
with the Soviet Union such as Tanzania and India.
Shriver'ssuccessat creatinga large,insulatedagencyalso
14See in particularSchwartz(1991), chapterone; Rice (1985),
chapterten.
15 Thisdoes notmeanthatthere werenotconflicts withintheor-
ganization.
Ricenotes"Onceoverseas,theVolunteers formed their
ownexclusive 'subculture'
andmostpreferred tohaveas littletodo
withPeaceCorps/Washington as possible"(1985,221-222).
POLICY 741
led to thespreadof thefoundingideas of development,
directaction,and person-to-person diplomacy.More fa-
vorableattitudestowardstheU.S. by third-world elites
werereportedthroughoutAfricaand Asia (Amin 1992,
163-178;Cobbs Hoffman1998,157-182;Rice 1985,280;
Searles1997,12).
The Peace Corpswas also successfulin encouraging
policyemulationamong othercountriesin theWest.In
October 1962, the Peace Corps held an "International
Conferenceon Middle-LevelManpower"in PuertoRico
to encourage other countriesin the west to establish
Peace-Corps-typeprograms.At the conference,twelve
countriesannouncedplansto establishsimilarprograms,
and thenumberincreasedin theyearsthereafter. By1965,
sixteenwesterncountriesincludingFrance,Germany, and
GreatBritainhad startedsimilarvolunteerprograms.
These initialsuccessesoccurredwithoutmuchsup-
port fromthe restof the foreign-policy bureaucracy.
Therewererepeatedclasheswiththe StateDepartment.
Relationsbetweenthe Peace Corps and AID were de-
scribedas "dismal."RelationswiththeDepartmentofthe
Interior"nearlyregressed intoa brawl"(Carey1970,180-
185). The Civil Service Commission was reluctantto
workwiththenewmissionary institution.As a wayofex-
ertingpower,otherforeignpolicybureaucratsrefrained
fromtransmitting information to thePeace Corps Staff.
Rice quotes one officialcomplaining,"Can anyoneex-
plainto mewhywe neverappearto see StateorAID mes-
sagesinvolving majordecisionson issuesinvolving coun-
triesin whichwe haveprograms?" (1985, 130).
Partofthistensionwas due to differences in organi-
zationalculturethatdevelopedbetweenthePeace Corps
and otherorganizations.More establisheddepartments
thoughtthePCVs werenaive,untrained, and an impedi-
mentto theconductof foreignpolicy.Wofford quotes a
careerdiplomatin the Statedepartmentdisparagingly
describing thePeace Corpsmottoas: "Yoo-hoo,yoo-hoo.
Let'sgo out and wreaksome good on thenatives"(1980,
274). The Peace Corps was partlyresponsibleforthese
conflictsbecauseoftheirstrategy ofdevelopinga distinct
organizationalculture.In one memorandum, Shriveror-
deredthatPCVs refrainfromspendingtimeat U.S. em-
bassycompoundsor consortwiththeembassystaff.He
noted,"Separatenessfromotheroverseasoperationsof
the U.S. is importantto achievingthe desiredimage"
(Rice 1985,130;see also Carey1970,chapternine).
The differencesin organizationalculturewereexac-
erbatedbytheperceivedloss of powerfeltby otherfor-
eignpolicyagencies.Rice quotes Bill Moyersobserving:
"The old-lineemployeesof Stateand AID covetedthe
Peace Corpsgreedily.Itwas a naturalinstinct; established
bureaucraciesdo notlikecompetitionfromnew people"
742 DANIEL W. DREZNER

(1985, 61). Searlesquotes a USAID bureaucratgrousing mous niche,but as a resultit had littleto no influence
to a Peace Corps volunteer,"Peace Corps is afraidthat overotherforeign-policy agencies.
someone else mightgeta littlecreditfortryingto help The Peace Corps faceda hostilePresidentin Rich-
people,too" (1997,98). In one interagency meeting,State ard Nixon.Nixon embraceda realpolitik foreignpolicy.
departmentofficialsexpressedbitterness withthePeace The ideals and the independence of the Peace Corps
Corpsformusclingin on educationalaid policies.Other clashed with Nixon's preferenceson foreignpolicy.
officialsat State felt that Shriver needed "a gentle Cobbs Hoffmannotes,"Richard Nixon ... saw little
straightening out" so thatthe Peace Corps could better place in his plans fora warm and fuzzyPeace Corps
serveState.Theyopposed the 1962 international confer- spreadinggoodwillthroughout theworld.If it could not
enceheldbythePeace Corps,fearingthatShriverwould fulfilla specificforeignpolicyfunctionthatgainedthe
unwittinglydeliver the Soviets a propaganda coup United Statesan advantagein the world,it should be
(Cobbs 1996). There was particularresentmentthat 'chopped"' (1998, 222-223). This was also emblematic
Shriverrefusedto send PCVs to unstablebut strategic of HenryKissinger,Nixon's national securityadvisor
countriessuch as Vietnamor Algeria (Schwartz1991, and foreignpolicyarchitect.
74). Despite thisantagonism,the Peace Corps partially Afterconsultationswithhis staff, Nixon concluded
thrivedduringthe Kennedy/Johnson years.Its statusas thatabolishingtheagencyoutrightwould be too politi-
PresidentKennedy'spetprojectprotectedit fromthreats callycostly.He decidedinsteadon a stealthcampaignto
to itssurvival,lendingsome supportto thepresidential- destroyit.In March 1970,a WhiteHouse staffmemo to
dominancethesis. JohnErlichmanand HenryKissingerarguedfor"a quiet
Afterits promisingstart,otheroutputsof U.S. for- phasingout ofthePeace Corps,"throughappropriations
eign policybegan to overwhelmthe Peace Corps' suc- cuts (Schwartz1991, 161). In Julyof thatyear,Nixon's
cesses.Shriver'sstrategy of focusingon developmentin chiefof staff,H. R. Halderman,recordedin his diary
orderto woo third-world countrieswas overshadowed by thatthepresidentwantedto cutthePeace Corpsbudget,
the policy externalitiesof Vietnam.The stridentanti- "farenoughto decimatethem"(Halderman1994,191).
communismofthewareffort led severalcountriesto ex- He was reasonablysuccessfulin this goal, as Table 3
pel thePeace Corps;some nationsclaimeditwas simply demonstrates.
a coverforU.S. intelligence (Schwartz1991). Differences JosephBlatchford, Nixon'sfirstPeace Corpsdirector,
in organizationalculturemade anyattemptto influence launcheda set of policies,called New Directions,which
otheragenciesfutile.Ricenotes,"thepowerbrokerssur- placedgreateremphasison meetingthespecificdevelop-
roundingKennedyregardedthePeace Corps'leadersas' mentneedsof thehostcountries(Blatchford1970). The
boy scouts,'and thegeopoliticiansof theNationalSecu-
rityCouncilviewedthemand thePeace Corpsas periph-
eral at best" (1985, 302). Simplyput,the Peace Corps' TABLE3 and Staffof
Appropriations
abilityto promotetheideas of developmentand cultural thePeace Corps
exchangewas drownedout bytheforeign-policy impli-
cationsofVietnam. Appropriations NumberofPeaceCorps
It could be arguedthatthePeace Corps was simply Year (in1963dollars) Volunteers
andTrainees
too small and narrowan institutionto affectVietnam. 1963 59,000,000 6,646
However,theevidencesuggeststhatthePeace Corpswas 1964 94,552,000 10,078
also unableto alterU.S. policyon developmentalaid,an 1965 100,596,000 13,248
1966 107,116,000 15,556
issue area firmlywithinits bailiwick. In the firstten
1967 100,159,000 14,698
yearsofthePeace Corps'existence, developmentaid was 1968 93,810,000 13,823
uncorrelatedwith the degree of povertyin recipient 1969 85,012,000 12,131
countries,a prime considerationforthe Peace Corps 1970 77,907,000 9,513
(Lumsdaine1993,91-92). This occurredat a timewhen 1971 67,711,000 7,066
demandoutstrippedsupplyin extremely 1972 52,325,000 6,894
poor countries
1973 55,346,000 7,341
forPeace Corps education programs(Rice 1981, 13). 1974 48,278,000 8,044
Furthermore, thegeneraltrendwas one ofprofessionali- 1975 44,519,000 7,015
zationof aid provision,eschewingthephilosophyof di- 1976 43,999,000 5,752
rectaction embodied by the Peace Corps (Lumsdaine 2000 51,850,000 7,000
1993,232). Consistentwiththe theorydevelopedhere, Source:CobbsHoffman
(1998,262);http://www.peacecorps.gov/about/
thePeace Corpswas able to carveout a separateautono- facts/index.
html.
IDEAS, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND THE CRAFTING
main thrustof New Directions was the recruitingof
older,moreskilledpersonnelas opposed to theBA gen-
eraliststhatdominatedthe Peace Corps duringthesix-
ties.Therewereintrinsically sound reasonsforthisshift,
but Blatchfordjustifiedit in a memo to HenryKissinger
by sayingthatthesenew personnelwould "emphasize
technicalassistancemorethansimplygood will"(quoted
in Cobbs Hoffman1998,222-223). This emphasiscon-
tradictedthefoundingidealsofthePeace Corps,clashing
withthe causal beliefsof directaction and movingthe
Peace Corps missioncloserto AID. Severalstaffers con-
cluded thatBlatchford's actionsweredesignedto trans-
formthePeace Corps froma missionaryinstitution to a
juniorUSAID (Schwartz1991;Reeves1988).
Blatchfordtook otherstepsto altertheagency'sor-
ganizationalculture.He cut theamountof trainingand
indoctrination PCVs receivedbeforegoingintothefield,
reducingthesocializationcomponentofthePeace Corps
(Cobbs Hoffman1998,223). He also alteredthe mix of
rolesPCVs playedin the field.In the Kennedy/Johnson
years,25 percentof all PCVs weredevotedto "commu-
nitydevelopment" as a wayofplacingvolunteersdirectly
intocommunities.Blatchfordphased thisout; by 1972,
only4.2 percentof PCVs engagedin communitydevel-
opment.Instead,largenumbersof PCVs wereplaceddi-
rectlyin hostcountrybureaucracies,anothermove that
triedto push the Peace Corps towardstheAID format.
However,his mostseriousorganizationalmovewas the
strictenforcement ofthe"five-year rule."Thisbarredany
Peace Corps stafferfromservingin theagencyformore
than fiveyears.16In 1971, Blatchfordused this rule to
flushout 10 percentof theWashington and 49 per-
staff,
centof the overseascountrydirectors(Schwartz1991;
Cobbs Hoffman1998).
Thesestepswereinsufficient forNixon,and he soon
took more drasticaction. In 1971,Nixon consolidated
the Peace Corps and othervolunteeragencies into a
singlebureaucraticunitcalledACTION. As partof the
bureaucraticshake-up,thePeace Corps was renamed;it
was now the InternationalOperationsDivision of AC-
TION. To head theagency,Nixontoldhischiefofstaffhe
wanteda "toughguy"who would could clamp down on
the agency.FindingBlatchfordunsatisfactory, in 1972
NixonappointedMichaelBalzano to be thehead ofAC-
TION.17 Balzano was publicly quoted as vowing to
changethedirectionof thePeace Corps and otheragen-
cies withinACTION, even if it meant"bringingtanks
rightup to theagency'sfrontdoor" (Searles1997,168).
16Ironically,Shriver
proposedthis1965amendment to thePeace
CorpsActas a wayofpreventing bureaucratic
sclerosis.
'7Balzano'spreviouspositionwasas an aideto CharlesColson.
OF FOREIGN POLICY 743 -
Balzano took stepsto alterthe organizationalcul-
ture.He removedthe Peace Corps' recruitment bureau
and placed it in ACTION. He was determinedto eradi-
cate the Peace Corps' cultureof directaction; he de-
scribedtheexistingPeace Corpsprogramming as "totally
inadequate"(Balzano 1978,3). To changeit,he setup six
programminginstitutesdesigned to convince Peace
Corps staffers thatcommunityactionwas outdatedand
different methodshad to be promulgated. Attendanceat
theseinstitutes was mandatoryforstaffers.
DespiteNixon'spreferences, thebudgetcuts,thebu-
reaucraticshake-up,and the Balzano appointment,the
foundingideasofthePeaceCorpsdid notdisappear.Sur-
veystakenof staffers beforeand afterBalzano'sprogram-
minginstitutes showedno realchangein theideasheldby
PeaceCorpsstaffers. Bureaucratswho triedto implement
thenew programsfoundthemselves ostracized(Balzano
1977, 12-22; Reeves1988,83-85). Balzano'sinabilityto
alterthefoundingidealsoftheinstitution was largelydue
to therobustorganizationalcultureof thePeace Corps.
All of thePeace Corps directorsunderBalzano wereso-
cializedintothe agency'scultureand refusedto alterit.
For example,JohnDellenback,who became the Peace
Corps directorin 1975,commented:"I helpedwritethe
legislationthatcreatedACTION ... whenI becamePeace
Corps DirectorI changedmymind and concludedthat
we ... had made a legislativemistake.... I becameabso-
lutelyconvincedof the uniquenessof the Peace Corps'
mission" (Searles 1997, 166). Balzano, ratherbitterly,
came to the same conclusion:"There are manypeople
employedby thePeace Corps at presentwho havebeen
withthePeace Corps sinceitsinception.Such revolving-
dooremployment fosters
intellectual
in-breeding:all new
ideasarejuxtaposedagainstthestandardofthepast.This
is perhapsat therootofPeaceCorpsprogramming inflex-
ibility"(1978, 16).
The ideals implantedin 1961 remainedfirmlyin
placein 1976;thePeaceCorpssurvived. As Table3 shows,
budgetaryauthority and manpowerhave risenfromthe
mid-seventies nadir.President Clintonexpresseda goalor
raisingthe numberof PCVs to 10,000,a levelnot seen
sincethesixties.However,thePeace Corpsdid notthrive;
as an insulatedagency,it could not influenceotheragen-
cies craftingforeignpolicyor eventhesubsetof foreign
policydealingwithdevelopmentissues.
TheHABureau,1976-1988
In October1977,theBureauof Human Rightsand Hu-
was established.Createdby congres-
manitarianAffairs
744
sionalmandate,thenewbureauwas embracedby Presi-
dentCarter,who had pledgedin his inauguraladdress:
"Our commitmentto human rightsmustbe absolute."
Carter'spolitical appointeesto the bureau came from
civil rightsbackgrounds;the nonpolitical appointees
wereForeignServiceOfficers(FSOs). The firstassistant
secretary of stateforhumanrightsand humanitarian af-
fairs,PatriciaDerian,was thefounderof theMississippi
Civil LibertiesUnion. Derian triedto fostera bureau-
craticculturethatvalued human rightsabove standard
diplomatic practices (Warshawsky 1980, 198-205;
Morrison1987,82; Drezner1999,88-89).
HA's relationshipswith the other bureaus of the
StateDepartmentwerehighlyconflictual. The strainwas
causedbytwofactors.First,FSOs bitterly resistedthein-
troductionof a new and inherently confrontational mis-
sion. Confronting stateson theirhumanrightspractices
cut againstthe grainof an organizationalculturethat
stressedthesmoothingoverof conflict.Second,Carter's
political appointees, coming from civil rightsback-
grounds,were used to organizationalculturesof con-
frontation and publicprotest.Derianwas unsuccessful in
implantingthisculturein HA, as it was alien to a State
Departmentbureaucracythatvalued comity(Morrison
1987,54).
FSOs in the regionalbureaus reactedto the intro-
ductionof HA byprotecting theirturf.The regionalbu-
reaus possessedsignificant assets,in the formof infor-
mation,controloverpromotion,and accessto overseas
staff.Theyused theircontroloverresourcesto blockany
HA initiative.Cable trafficand classifiedinformation
were withheldfromHumanitarianAffairs(Maynard
1989,187).Wheninformation was transmitted, itwas of-
ten distorted. The East Asian bureau downplayed
Indonesia'sabuses in East Timor despitereputablere-
portsto thecontrary. The Near East bureauexaggerated
theShah'sprogramofliberalization in Iran(Cohen 1982,
261-262). The inabilityof FSO's servingin Humanitar-
ian Affairsto receivepromotionsdroveawaycapablebu-
reaucratsworriedabout theircareers.The denial of re-
sourcesand elitebureaucratsled to a viciouscircle.One
regionalbureaudeskofficer describedtheproblem:"It's
[HA] notdirectly in thepolicyloop,so theydon'tgetthe
best people, and the factthat theydon't get the best
people means thatthe worktheydo isn'ttop notchei-
ther,whichmeans thattheyare less in the policyloop
whichmeansthattheygetless good people" (quoted in
Morrison1987,76).
HumanitarianAffairshad fewweapons to combat
thiskindof bureaucraticconflict.In 1979,twoyearsaf-
terits creation,HA was stilltinyby StateDepartment
standards, withonlytwentypeople on itsstaff. Its Office
DANIEL W. DREZNER
of Human Rightshad onlythirteenFSOs, and each bu-
reaucrathad both regionaland functionalduties.There
was onlyone officialin chargeof all HA policytowards
bilateraland multilateraleconomicassistance,in addi-
tion to the Latin American region.HA faced chronic
manpowershortagesand highturnoverrates(Maynard
1989,182,193).
The bestwayto measurewhetherHA's ideas thrived
would be whethergovernmentaid was withheldfrom
countriesthoughtto be human rightsviolators,as this
was mandated by HA's enactinglegislation (Drezner
1999,88). An interagency groupon Human Rightsand
ForeignAssistance(called the ChristopherCommittee
becauseitwas headedbyDeputySecretary of StateWar-
ren Christopher)consisted of participantsfromHu-
manitarianAffairs, the regionalbureaus,AID, the Ex-
port-ImportBank,Treasury, Defense,and the National
SecurityCouncil.Thiswas a venuewhereHA was able to
influenceforeignpolicy.
By all accounts,HA had minimalinfluencein the
ChristopherCommittee. The Carter administration
neverdeclaredanyonea grossviolatorof humanrights,
whichwould have mandatedsanctions.Otherbureau-
craticactors,includingtheAgriculture Departmentand
theExport-Import Bank,succeededin gettingtheirpro-
gramsexemptedfromanyaid cutoff. The biggestconflict
withintheChristopher Committeewas betweenHA and
theotherStatedepartment bureaus,in particularthere-
gionaldesks.Drew quotesone StateDepartmentofficial
on the decision-makingprocess:"What happened was
thatif anyone,includingone of the regionalAssistant
Secretaries... put up a strongargumentagainstzapping
anyofthesecountries, he won"(1977,43).18 The Under-
secretaryof StateforSecurityAssistancethreatenedto
resignunless militaryaid and othersecuritysupport
wereexemptedfromhumanrightssanctions.The threat
succeeded.Multipleeconometricstudiesshowno corre-
lation betweenAmericanaid and the human rightsre-
gimes in recipientcountriesduringthis time period
(Hofrenning 1990; Poe 1991; Stohl, Carleton, and
Johnson1984;Apodaca and Stohl1999).Expectationsof
survivalpast 1980wereminimal.
The Reaganadministration came intopowertrum-
peting a differentset of ideas regardingtherelationship
betweenhuman rightsand foreignpolicy (Kirkpatrick
1979). Reagan'sapproachto humanrightswas predomi-
nantlyshaped by the Cold War strugglebetweenthe
United Statesand the Soviet Union; he expectedU.S.
policy on human rightsto be subordinatedto that
struggle.
18See also Cohen(1982) and Mower(1987,72-82,103-106).
IDEAS, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND THE CRAFTING OF FOREIGN
Reagan took a numberof stepsto weakenthe HA
bureauand modifyitsfoundingideas to suithis foreign
policypreferences. Reagan'sfirstnomineeto head HA,
ErnestLefever,had previouslyargued thatthe human
rightsreportsbe eliminatedand thatall legislationtying
aid to human rightsbe revoked.The Senate rejected
Lefever'snomination,but the signalof disdain forHA
was evident. Until Elliot Abrams was nominated in
Lefever'splace,HA was lookedat as the"laughingstock"
ofState,accordingto one FSO (Maynard1989,182-183).
Secretary ofStateAlexanderHaig pointedlyexcludedthe
actingHA directorfromstaffmeetings.
The Reaganadministration successfullyalteredthe
definition ofhumanrightsestablishedunderCarter.The
previousadministration had establishedthreebroadcat-
egoriesofhumanrights:freedomfromtortureand other
personalviolations,civiland politicalliberties,and eco-
nomic rightsto food, shelter,and health care. Under
Reagan,theStatedepartment harmonizedthedefinition
to be consistentwithoverallforeignpolicyby eliminat-
ingtheeconomicrightscategory.Communistcountries
had used theeconomiccomponentofthedefinition as a
wayof deflecting criticism.This changepermittedusing
thehumanrightsagendaagainstcommunistcountries.19
Finally,therewereseveralhighprofilecases,such as
El Salvador,wherethe Reagan administrationignored
blatanthuman rightsviolations and increasedaid; by
1982,El Salvadorwas receiving27 percentof all U.S. bi-
lateral aid to Latin America (Donnelly 1998, 99;
Cingranelli and Pasquarello1985,544). Mostcommenta-
torsthenand now declaredthathumanrightsconcerns
were moribundunder the Reagan administration,in
largepartbecause "HA has been co-optedintothe bu-
reaucraticmilieu of the StateDepartment"(Morrison
1987,219).
HA mightnothavesurvivedin itsoriginalform,but
thereis significant
evidencethatit thrivedin theReagan
years.First,therewas a noticeableshiftin humanrights
rhetoricafterReagan'sfirstyearin office.In 1981,U.N.
ambassadorJeaneKirkpatrick, wrote,"not onlyshould
humanrightsplaya centralrolein U.S. foreignpolicy,no
U.S. foreignpolicycan possiblesucceedthatdoes notac-
cord thema major role" (1981, 42). Haig also reversed
course,declaringhumanrightswouldbe a "majorfocus"
ofReagan'sforeignpolicy(Maynard1989,183).20
19Forexample,theCarteradministration used humanrightsto
voteagainstmultilateral
developmentassistance
toleftist
countries
34 percentof thetimeand rightistcountries31 percentof the
time.The Reaganadministrationfigureswere31 percentand 4
percent,
respectively
(Maynard1989,214).
20Seealso Mower(1987,33-37).
POLICY 745
Second, under the Reagan administrationseveral
studieshave founda statisticalcorrelationbetweenthe
amount of U.S. aid and the human rightsconditions
withinthepotentialrecipientcountries(Cingranelliand
Pasquarello 1985; Poe and Sirirangsi1993). Indeed,the
majorityofthesestudiesfindthatthesignificance ofthe
statisticalrelationshipincreasedfromCarterto Reagan
(Hofrenning1990; Poe 1991, 1992; Apodaca and Stohl
1999). Buttressing thestatisticalfindingsare clearcases,
such as Haiti or Chile,wherethe Statedepartmentin-
sistedon includinghumanrightson theagendain deal-
ing witha particularcountry(Shultz 1993, 621, 971).
Furthermore, thesame humanrightsexpertsthatargue
HA was tamedunderReaganalso acknowledged thatthe
quality of the annual humanrightsreportssignificantly
improvedwitheach passingyearof the administration.
Indeed,statisticaltestscomparingtheStateDepartment's
human rightsreportswiththose of AmnestyInterna-
tionaland FreedomHouse founda highdegreeof corre-
lation (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Innes de
Neufville1986).
One possibleexplanationforthisturnaroundwould
be a sea change in Americanpublic opinion towards
placing human rightsat the top of the foreign-policy
agenda. Commentatorsat the time suggestedthatthe
Reaganadministration changedcoursebecause of rising
public supportforhuman rights(Jacoby1986). How-
ever,pollingdata showsno increasein thesalienceofhu-
man rightsfrom1976 onwardsand littlechangein pub-
lic supportforemphasizinghuman rightsin bilateral
relations(Geyerand Shapiro 1988,392-393).21 Analyz-
ing the data, Geyerand Shapiro conclude: "There has
been littleindicationof changein publicopiniontoward
human rightsas a foreignpolicygoal duringthe Carter
and Reaganyears"(1988,387).
Thereare threereasonsforReagan'sreversal.First,
the Assistant Secretaries for Human Rights under
Reagan,ElliottAbramsand thenRichardSchifter, were
betterat playingthe game of bureaucraticpoliticsthan
Derian and in so doing furthered HA's agenda.Abrams
ensuredthatForeignServiceofficers assignedto HA were
not slightedforpromotionsin thefuture. As a result,the
caliberof FSOs willingto workin HA improved,a fact
acknowledged bytheotherbureaus(Morrison1987,89).
Second, the proceduresof the Reagan administra-
tion'sinteragency workinggroupdiffered fromtheChris-
topherCommittee.UnderCarter,the different bureaus
21Theexception
to unchanging waspublicopinionabout
attitudes
apartheidin SouthAfrica(Geyerand Shapiro1988,387). Thisex-
ceptionprovestherule,however; anychangeinhis
Reaganresisted
policyof constructiveengagement untilCongressoverrodehis
vetoofthe1986Anti-Apartheid Act.
746
arguedthecase out in thegroup;underReagan,theState
Departmenthashedout a commonpositionpriorto the
workinggroup meeting.Statedepartmentbureaucrats
dislikedairingintradepartmental disputesin frontof
otherdepartments,in part because such an approach
clashedwithState'sorganizationalcultureof comity.By
workingout a commonpositionbeforehand, HA did not
alwaysgetitsway,but whenit did,it had thebackingof
the entireStatedepartment(Maynard1989,212-215).
Underthe CartersystemHA was a persistentbut small
advocate.Underthe Reagan system,HA's voice was less
frequently heardbutwas considerably louder.
Third,as the clash of culturesdiminished,FSO's
provedmorereceptiveto theidea of humanrights.The
primarymechanismthroughwhichthisidea was trans-
mittedwas thehumanrightsreports.The annualexercise
to gaugehumanrightsconditionsforcedembassystaffs
to assignhumanrightsofficers to writethereports.To do
this,theFSOs establishedcontactsand networksamong
human rightsactivistsin theircountry.The act of data
collectionand reportwritingsocializedFSOs outsideHA
intotheimportanceof humanrightsideals.Bytheearly
eighties,a surveyof FSO's in foreignpostingsrevealed
surprisinglystrongsupportforthereporting exercise.As
thereportscirculatedwiththe Statedepartment, aware-
nessof humanrightsincreasedin official Washingtonas
well (Innes de Neufville1986,689-693). Participantsin
theprocesshave confirmedthiseffect. RichardSchifter,
Reagan'ssecondAssistantSecretaryforHuman Rights,
notedafterleavingoffice:
Diplomatsareusedto reporting promptly on devel-
opmentsin theareasoftheirresponsibility, and hu-
manrightsofficers werenotexceptions to thisgen-
eral rule.Thus, once embassieshad been staffed
with human rightsofficers, a flowof messages
startednotifying ofhumanrightscon-
Washington
ditionsinproblemcountries.
Thesemessages began,
in thefirst to informtheState
instance, Department
ofhumanrights
problems.... Thus,onceWashing-
ton becameawareof thedetailsof humanrights
webegantothinkofwaysofdealingwith
violations,
thoseissues.(1992,47-48)
The Reaganadministration madesignificantchanges
to the HumanitarianAffairsbureau. These changesal-
teredthefoundingideas of theHA bureau,changingthe
verydefinitionofhumanrights.In thisalteredform,how-
ever,theideas promotedby HA spreadto therestof the
Statedepartment Bytheend ofReagan'ssec-
bureaucracy.
ond term,human rightswereacceptedas an important
componentoftheAmlerican nationalinterest.
DANIEL W. DREZNER
Conclusions
The international relationsliteraturehas failedto exam-
ine thecausal mechanismsthroughwhichideas are con-
vertedintopolicies.It has been unclearhow missionary
institutionssurviveand thrivein a worldofbureaucratic
politics.Thisarti'clearguesthattheplacementofthemis-
sionaryinstitution vis-a-vistherestof theforeignpolicy
organizations determines theabilityof theseinstitutions
to surviveand thrive.Insulatedagenciescan createorga-
nizationalculturesweddedto theirfoundingideas.This
makesinsulatedagenciesrobustto challengesfromother
organizationsand increasestheodds of survival.Such a
strongculturedecreases its abilityto influenceother
agencies,restricting itsabilityto manipulatethebroader
foreign-policyagenda. Embedded agencies are con-
strainedfromcrafting a separateorganizationalculture,
makingthemmorevulnerableto manipulationby the
largerbureaucracy. If theydo survive,however,theyare
morelikelyto thrive.Alteringroutinesand practicesbe-
comesa wayofspreadingtheirideasto thelargerorgani-
zation.ComparingtheabilityofthePeace Corpsand the
StateDepartment'sHumanitarianAffairs bureauto sus-
taintheirideationalagendastestedthishypothesis.
Thereare severallimitations to thisstudy.The cases
wereselectedusinga "most-similar systems" (Przeworski
and Teune 1970) in orderto show the existenceof the
causal mechanisms.These cases controlledfortheeffect
of materialinterestsand the structuraldistributionof
power.Most missionaryinstitutions willhavesincereor
strategicsupportfrommaterialinterests; therelationship
betweenthetwoneedsto be exploredfurther. Laterwork
needsto use a most-different systemsapproachin order
to estimatetherelativeexplanatorypowerof themodi-
fiedideational approach. Other empiricalavenues in-
clude potentiallydisconfirming cases, such as the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,and non-
Americancases.
Theoretically, the resultssuggesta need forthebu-
reaucraticpoliticsparadigmto movebeyonddescription
towardspositivetheoriesof action.Organizationaltheo-
riescan borrowfromtheideas approachin formulating
the originsof bureaucraticpreferences, as well as the
strategysetavailableto organizations. Similarly,bureau-
craticpolitics is a crucial interveningvariable forthe
ideas approach and should be integratedinto thatre-
searchprogram.The resultsalso suggestthefruitfulness
of combiningrationalistand constructivistmodes of
analysis.The cases demonstratethe effectof organiza-
tionalnormsas wellas thestrategic calculationsmade by
actorsto spreadthosenorms.
IDEAS, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND THE CRAFTING OF FOREIGN
Finally,thisarticlesuggeststhatideationalentrepre-
neursfacea tradeoff in institutionalizing
ideas.An insu-
latedagencyhas theadvantageof makingan immediate
effect, butovertimethateffect is muchlesslikelyto grow.
An embeddedagencyis much less likelyto havean im-
mediateimpactand overtimemightnothaveanyimpact
at all. However,it mightalso acquiremuch moreinflu-
encethana horizontally autonomousagency.How entre-
preneursmake thisdecision is a subject forfuturere-
search.
ManuscriptsubmittedJune16,1999.
Final manuscript
received
April17,2000.
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