Discourse, Ideology and

Specialized Communication
Linguistic Insights
Studies in Language and Communication

Edited by Maurizio Gotti,

University of Bergamo

Volume 33

PETER LANG
Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • Frankfurt am Main • New York • Oxford • Wien
 Giuliana Garzone & Srikant Sarangi (eds)

Discourse, Ideology
and Specialized
Communication

Norms and Practices in Genre

An Intercultural Perspective

PETER LANG
Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • Frankfurt am Main • New York • Oxford • Wien
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Discourse, ideology and specialized communication / Giuliana Garzone & Srikant Sarangi
(eds).
p. cm. -- (Linguistic insights ; v. 33)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-3-03910-888-6 (alk. paper)
1. Discourse analysis--Social aspects. 2. Ideology. 3. Sublanguage.
I. Garzone, G. (Giuliana) II. Sarangi, Srikant, 1956-
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Published with a grant from the Italian Ministry of University and Research
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Contents

GIULIANA GARZONE / SRIKANT SARANGI

Discourse, Ideology and Specialized Communication: a Critical
Introduction ....................................................................................... 9

Reflective and Critical Framings

SRIKANT SARANGI
Other-orientation in Patient-centred Healthcare Communication:
Unveiled Ideology or Discoursal Ecology? ....................................... 39

GIUSEPPINA CORTESE
The Right To Be Just Other Children: Protectionist and
Liberationist Ideologies in the Discourse of Children’s Rights......... 73

DONELLA ANTELMI
Manifest Ideology and Hidden Ideology in Legal Language:
Definitions and Terms .................................................................... 101

CHIARA DEGANO
‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Subjects: Ideology in Social Research ................119

MARC SILVER
Rethinking ‘Ideology’: A Critical Analysis of
How Historians Read and Respond to Ideology...............................141

JAMES ARCHIBALD
Responsible Mediation or Communicating
the True Message across the Cultural Divide ...................................165
Extensions and Applications

FRANCESCA BARGIELA-CHIAPPINI / ELISA TURRA

Organizational Change from Old to New Economy:
Exploring Consensus and Conflict in Business Meetings ................181

GINA PONCINI / LORENE HIRIS

When (Un)ethical Behavior is an Issue for the Industry:
An Examination of CEO Letters of Securities Brokerage Firms......207

SYLVAIN DIELTJENS / PRISCILLA HEYNDERICKX

Strategic Uses of the Pronoun We in Business Communication.......233

ESTRELLA MONTOLÍO DURÁN

Advising without Committing: the Use of Argumentative
Reservation in Texts Written by Consultants ...................................251

JOHN DOUTHWAITE
Gender and Ideology in Advertising.................................................277

ROBIN ANDERSON
Genre Bending in Economic Journalism: an Analysis
of the Lex Column in the Financial Times .......................................311

MARIA FREDDI
Ideology and Ethics in the Discourse of Designers:
a Corpus Study..................................................................................335

PAOLA CATENACCIO
De-humanising the Alien: the Construction
of Migrants’ Rights in EU Legislation .............................................355

DAVIDE MAZZI
The Rhetoric of Judicial Texts: the Interplay of Reported
Argumentation and The Judge’s Argumentative Voice....................379
LIDIA DE MICHELIS
“A Forward-looking Country”: Britain™ and the Unbearable
Lightness of ‘Corporate’ National Identity.......................................401

ANTONIO PINNA
Evaluation and Ideology in Political Discourse:
the Use of Modal Verbs in G. W. Bush’s Presidential Speeches .....433

ALISON DUGUID
Men at Work: how Those at Number 10
Construct their Working Identity......................................................453

Notes on Contributors.......................................................................485
DONELLA ANTELMI

Manifest Ideology and Hidden Ideology

in Legal Language: Definitions and Terms

1. Introduction

The recent shift from text to discourse in language and communication

studies has given context a prominent position in text production and
interpretation (Danet 1984). The very notion of discourse comprises
not only linguistic but also psychological, cognitive and social
aspects. In this perspective, discourse is conceived as a social practice
(Fairclough 1992), which involves people and their activities, and not
only reflects, but also determines social functions and relationships.
As a consequence, if language use is a social practice, it is a
form of action that is socially shaped and socially constitutive:
according to Fairclough (1992), any text is constitutive of: a) social
identities, b) social relations, c) systems of knowledge and beliefs.
With reference to the variety of specialized language which is
analysed in this paper, i.e. legal discourse, it is therefore necessary to
abandon the traditional interpretation of legal language as a system of
signs – each of them having its unambiguous meaning – which only
need to be interpreted according to the legislator’s will to decide a
particular case (lex ante casum). Rather, the possibility of recognising
legal rights depends on a dynamic process of interpretation of legal
texts that have to be considered within the communicative and social
context which has generated them (Gavazzi 1956/1994). Therefore,
legislative texts must be analysed not only as language instances
which convey meanings to be decoded, but also as forms of discourse,
which apart from pursuing their own ends, also reflect cognitive atti-
tudes and power roles in society (Gibbons 1994; Turkel 1996; Müller
1997; Conley/O’Barr 1998; Shuy 2001).
102 Donella Antelmi

Among the linguistic features revealing those attitudes, defini-

tions play a particularly important role, as all definitions – as well as
non-definitions – always have ideological implications (Tiersma
1993).
The very nature of law, which implies the issue of regulations
aimed at governing the coexistence of citizens, has led to a contami-
nation between ordinary language and special terminology which is
unusual in other LSPs. Many linguists (Dardano 1994; Cortelazzo
2000; Mortara Garavelli 2001, among others) have observed that legal
language is not separated from ordinary language, even if it uses
special terms as well as common terms with special meaning. In the
latter case, in order to avoid confusion between different meanings
(often charged with emotional implications), jurists have to resort to
‘re-definition’ of common words.
An example of re-definition is the following:

‘Operator’ means a natural or legal person who places a product on the market
or who receives a product that has been placed on the market in the Commu-
nity, either from a Member State or from a third country, at any stage of the
production and distribution chain, but does not include the final consumer.1

However, this policy has not been constantly adopted: in the course of
history the attitude of legislators towards definitions has changed, and
the alternative between defining and non-defining words in legal texts
has given rise to opposite decisions, revealing that the choice basically
depends on cultural assumptions typical of a certain period (Lantella
1979: 191). From an ideological point of view, the first obvious
consequence of the omission of definitions is the fact that it leaves
more room for interpretation, and vice versa. But defining or non-
defining has other important ideological implications, which are
closely linked with the adoption of a system of values and beliefs and
a certain representation of the world.

1 Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council

of 22 September 2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically
modified organisms and the traceability of food and feed products from
genetically modified organisms and amending Directive 2001/18/EC.
Manifest Ideology and Hidden Ideology in Legal Language 103

The aim of this paper is to investigate some of these aspects,

through the analysis of recent legislation concerning crucial topics of
human life (abortion, assisted procreation, euthanasia), in which defi-
nitions and non-definitions reveal the presence of a hidden form of
ideology.
The paper is organised as follows: after a brief discussion of the
different types of definitions and of the ideology they are loaded with,
some aspects of “hidden ideology” conveyed by means of non-defined
terms (i.e. qualifications and attributes) will be analysed (§ 2.). Then,
some examples from recent legislation will be discussed,2 which seem
to show an increasing predominance of science over ethics and relig-
ion (§ 3). Finally, the consequences that this prevailing scientific
ideology could have on the very meaning of law and its role in society
will be discussed (§ 4).

2. Definitions and ideology

The notion of ideology adopted here has no political connotations, but

refers to a way of living, or more precisely to a set of beliefs
concerning social life and the fundamentals of its organisation. As
pointed out by Mitchell, ideology is traditionally considered as a ‘false
consciousness’ functional to the establishment of a situation of power
and dominance. However, there is another meaning of ideology,
which “tends to identify it simply with the structure of the values and
interests that informs any representation of reality; this meaning
leaves untouched the question of whether the representation is false or
oppressive. In this formulation, there would be no such thing as a
position outside ideology” (Mitchell 1986: 3-4). At the same time,
several ideologies can co-exist and compete in a given society or
historical period.

2 Unless differently specified in a footnote, the English translation of the

examples is mine.
104 Donella Antelmi

Providing schemata for interpreting reality and establishing

attitudes towards it, ideology is a conceptual and moral system, which
is to a large extent unconscious. This system is however reflected in
discourse, which in turn reinforces and transmits its fundamental
structure.
Control over discourse implies the possibility to manipulate
individual mental models and social representations, so that there is a
great interdependence between ideology, society, cognition and
discourse (van Dijk 2001, 2004). Definitions offer a crucial insight on
how discourse may influence representations, given that a definition
not only reflects reality, but also – to some extent – contributes to
shaping it.
Within the framework of the Philosophy of Law, the traditional
distinction between real definitions and nominal definitions is gener-
ally adopted. The former are meant to answer the question “what is
this?”. This type of definition takes as definiens a set of characteristics
considered necessary and sufficient to explain the “essence” of the
thing to be defined (definiendum). According to Aristotle’s model, the
definiens has often the form of genus proximum plus differentia speci-
fica (e.g., “ice = frozen water”). The choice of the features indicated in
the definiens, however, is not neutral, on the contrary it is the result of
a preliminary selection which strongly depends on a view of the world
that cannot be but ideological (Belvedere 1979).
Traditionally, jurists have always been overtly hostile to this
type of definitions. According to Belvedere (1987/1994: 425), the
main reason for this attitude lies in the fact that real definitions imply
a high level of commitment on behalf of the legislator.
On the other hand, nominal definitions are intended to answer
the question “what is the meaning of this word?”, but in many cases
their structure also takes the form of genus plus differentia, hence
providing a list of qualities considered essential for giving an object a
certain name (Scarpelli 1958/1994: 318). Consequently, when the
definition takes the form of genus plus differentia, it is not possible to
distinguish between the two different types of definition, as – in spite
of the theoretical dichotomy ‘real vs. nominal’ – they both have simi-
lar cognitive effects.
Manifest Ideology and Hidden Ideology in Legal Language 105

From a critical point of view, it is therefore necessary to

consider nominal definitions not as mere explanations of the use of a
word, but rather as cognitive and argumentative instruments.
Actually, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958/1966) discuss
definitions within the framework of quasi-logic arguments. They
consider definitions as a form of identity between two notions, similar
to logic identity. However, they suggest that there is an important
distinction to be made on the basis of the context in which definitions
are formulated. Within a formal language, a definition maintains its
validity unaltered, while it is always susceptible to interpretation when
it is part of a theory that is applied to the real world, thus taking the
form of a quasi-logic argument (Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958/
1966: 223). Moreover, a definition can always be considered a form of
argumentation, since in its absence the notion it describes would be
understood differently, mainly on the basis of the meaning attributed
to words in everyday language. In other words, the very use of
definitions implies that the arguer aims to alter that basic meaning.
This frequently occurs in two different types of situations: firstly,
when the speaker emphasises the cognitive aspect, i.e. in scientific
discourse; secondly, when language is used for normative purposes,
i.e. in legal discourse. In the latter, the argumentative implications of
definitions become evident when terms are re-defined, thus allowing
the use of a common word with a specialised meaning (Scarpelli
1948/1994, 1958/1994). Actually, in legal language this is by far the
most frequent case. Despite this, the analysis of some recent, widely-
debated cases seems to show that the legislator has purposefully
avoided all forms of definition.
Whether re-defined or not, common words that enter legal
language are to be considered ‘terms’, similar to those specially
created for legal purposes – which in many cases have then started to
be used also in everyday language (as, for example, It. contratto,
testamento, donazione, etc.). The science of law actually distinguishes
between ‘technical legal terms’ and ‘terms borrowed from common
language’, but it is shared opinion that in both cases the words are
used with a specific technical meaning. Therefore, the legislator’s
decision to use common words without discussing their meaning
explicitly – as opposed to the possibility of re-defining them – seems
106 Donella Antelmi

ideologically marked. The option to avoid explicit re-definition is

usually preferred when the term belongs to a scientific or technical
sublanguage (e.g., medicine or biology), and has already been given a
rigorous definition in that context. In this case, however, two major
problems emerge. First, the non-defining option implies that the
arguer believes that language can mirror reality accurately, with no
need of explicit intervention on behalf of the speaker. As a conse-
quence, the role of those who interpret legal texts becomes more
important. Secondly, when there is no universal agreement on the
definition of scientific terms, the choice of one definition promotes
and reinforces a given scientific position, with evident ideological
consequences.
Apart from the general ideological effects of the defining (or
non-defining) approach considered so far, it is important to note that
ideology can be manifested in less evident forms, which can be
described as ‘disguised ideology. Some aspects of this phenomenon
will now be briefly discussed.
Whenever a definition is given, the very selection of what is
defined, i.e. the definiendum, has an ideological value, as it implies
that the arguer wants to give special relevance to the concept. The
attitude is revealed in the way particular situations are highlighted, as
well as in the technique of splitting a unitary concept, giving special
emphasis to one or more of its parts. For example, in the Italian
Criminal Law (Codice Penale), the presence of a different heading for
each article allows the legislator to identify a certain behaviour as a
particular offence, instead of considering it a sub-case of another
crime. For example, Art. 578, “Infanticidio in condizioni di abban-
dono morale e materiale” (Infanticide in conditions of moral and
material abandonment) keeps this crime distinct from other types of
murder, and assigns it a less severe penalty.
Therefore, the selection of a definiendum, cutting out a
phenomenon from the flow of human experience, is actually a covert
way of selecting facts and giving them particular emphasis. Moreover,
the choice of the word to be used to describe a phenomenon is usually
conditioned by the historical and social context. A well-known case,
discussed by Lantella (1979), is Art. 1470 of the Italian Civil Code,
which in its heading contains the word ‘vendita’ (sale), considered as
Manifest Ideology and Hidden Ideology in Legal Language 107

a form of contract. The type of factual relationship implied by the

word would have allowed the use of ‘compravendita’ (lit. purchase-
sale transaction) or ‘compera’ (purchase), but the choice of ‘vendita’
is closely linked to the historical and social context generating the law,
which was based on trade rather than rural economy.
Beliefs and attitudes are also manifested in linguistic descrip-
tions through explicit forms of evaluation. Several linguistic elements
are functional to the expression of evaluation: adjectives, adverbs,
nouns. Some examples taken from Italian legislation show with
particular evidence how linguistic forms can be loaded with ideology:
Art. 2598 of the Civil Code, defining ‘concorrenza sleale’ (unfair
competition), implies that the normal, legal relationships among entre-
preneurs comply with ethical principles, even against the background
of heavy competition.
The phrase ‘illegittima relazione carnale’ (illegitimate sexual
intercourse), contained in Art. 587 of the Criminal Law (Codice pe-
nale), refers to sexual intercourse outside marriage and considers it
‘illegitimate’, thus displaying evident moral evaluation.
Furthermore, the mere connotations of the terms used can influ-
ence the meaning of a text, as in the following example concerning the
sexual exploitation of children:

CONSIGLIO DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

DECISIONE QUADRO 2004/68/GAI del Consiglio del 22 dicembre 2003
RELATIVA ALLA LOTTA CONTRO LO SFRUTTAMENTO SESSUALE
DEI BAMBINI E LA PORNOGRAFIA INFANTILE3
[…]
Art. 1
Definizioni
Ai fini della presente decisione quadro s'intende per:

(a) «bambino»: una persona d'età inferiore ai diciotto anni;

(b) […]

3 Gazzetta Ufficiale dell’Unione europea, L 13, volume 47, 20.1.2004 (<http://

www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/it>).
108 Donella Antelmi

(COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION 2004/68/JHA of 22 December 2003 on

combating the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography4
[…]
Art. 1
Definitions
For the purposes of this framework Decision:
(a) ‘child’ shall mean any person below the age of 18 years;
(b) […] )

Even if the Italian standard expression in legal texts is the term

‘minore’ (minor), in this case the word ‘bambino’ (child) is used to
refer to people under 18. The lexical choice probably contributes to
evoking an atmosphere of respect and protection towards the very
young, and talking about children makes the crime considered here
even more horrifying.
Finally, an ideological attitude can be conveyed even in absence
of explicit markers of evaluation, simply through a process of
‘naming’. To give a name to a phenomenon means to insert it in a
class, or to qualify it. This is obviously inherent in language use, as
every concept must correspond to a linguistic form, but in most cases
the choice of a name – or qualification – has an ideological motiva-
tion, and therefore represents an important element in argumentation
(Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958/1966: 134). In this respect, three
aspects are particularly important: first of all, the very choice of nam-
ing (“qualification”, according to Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca) implies
that a particular phenomenon is selected and is considered relevant as
compared to others (as in the case of infanticidio discussed above);
secondly, the type of qualification always implies a choice (Horestes
can be his mother’s murderer or his father’s revenger); finally, the
words used to qualify may have positive or negative connotations
which extend to the qualified notion (i.e. ‘murderer’ vs ‘revenger’).
Therefore, the process of qualification or naming is by no means
neutral. It involves – in a hidden but effective way – ideological atti-
tudes towards reality. When the norm concerns topics of general inter-
est, whose ethical implications are remarkable, the use of qualification

4 Official Journal of the European Union, 13/47, 20.1.2004 (<http://www.europa.

eu.int/eur-lex/en>).
Manifest Ideology and Hidden Ideology in Legal Language 109

instead of explicit definition is particularly significant. Legislation on

themes like euthanasia, abortion, assisted procreation – both in Italy
and in other European countries – offers interesting points to discuss.

3. Some examples

3.1. Euthanasia

Notwithstanding the etymology of ‘euthanasia’, which implies a posi-

tive evaluation of the act of dying (eu = well, thanatos = death), the
term is commonly assigned a negative meaning, both for the circum-
stances that can lead to perform euthanasia and for ethic and religious
reasons, according to which an act intentionally aimed to put an end to
human life is to be considered illegal. For this reason in legislation
which has recently been approved in some European countries eutha-
nasia is explicitly distinguished from murder.
The Dutch legislation on euthanasia – the first approved in the
European Union (2001) – describes the matter as “Review procedures
of termination of life on request and assisted suicide”.5 The decision
of using a complex periphrasis to label the action is not meaningless,
given that in the Dutch Penal Code the term euthanasia already
described a punishable offence. The new label has a twofold effect:
first, the legal conflict with the previous use of the term euthanasia is
avoided; second, the negative connotations of the term are neutralized,
because the same denotatum is given a different linguistic form.
The fundamental article in the Act is Art. 2:

5 Law 2000-2001 26.691, n. 137. Dutch version on the Official site of the
Parliament (Eerste Kamer) (<http://www.eerstekamer.nl>). English version on
the Official website of The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<http://
www.minbuza.nl>).
110 Donella Antelmi

Chapter II. Requirements of Due Care

Article 2
1. The requirements of due care, referred to in Article 293 second para-
graph Penal Code mean that the physician:
a. holds the conviction that the request by the patient was voluntary
and well-considered,
b. holds the conviction that the patient's suffering was lasting and
unbearable,
c. has informed the patient about the situation he was in and about
his prospects,
d. and the patient holds the conviction that there was no other
reasonable solution for the situation he was in,
e. has consulted at least one other, independent physician who has
seen the patient and has given his written opinion on the require-
ments of due care, referred to in parts a - d, and
f. has terminated a life or assisted in a suicide with due care.

In this article the medical intervention aimed at causing the death of a

patient is described as an action performed with “due care”, a concept
which falls within the realm of treatment, not of crime. Though this
semantic shift does not lead to legalize the action (the offence of
euthanasia still exists), it makes it possible to consider it non-punish-
able when physicians meet the substantive requirements (actually, the
same Act contains an amendment to existing criminal legislation,
according to which euthanasia cannot be prosecuted when it is
performed within the framework of a “due care” procedure).
The nature of the requirements deserves some comment, as it
effectively reflects the ideological background against which the
legislation is issued. For example, to guarantee careful medical action,
it is necessary that:
a) The patient suffers without any hope of recovering (point b);
b) The patient holds the conviction that there is no other reasonable
solution for the situation he is in (point d).
These criteria show a shift from a religious value (life per se, as
it is God’s gift) to a secular one (i.e. the contemporary idea of ‘quality
of life’).
Manifest Ideology and Hidden Ideology in Legal Language 111

There is a further hidden ideological aspect, which is tied to

legal discourse as a whole. The very fact that the law takes into
account aspects of social life so intimately linked to its inherently
human components, implies an extension of the sphere of the so-
called ‘individual rights’ to include a ‘right to die’, which had never
been accepted in European legislation so far. The recognition of these
rights – which concern the final phase of human life as well as its
initial development – is the juridical counterpart of modern individu-
alism, which has its greatest manifestation in the American right of
privacy. Therefore, the expansion of personal rights through legisla-
tion dealing with the very concept of human life can be considered the
most significant – though accurately concealed – manifestation of
ideology in contemporary legal discourse.

3.2. Abortion and assisted procreation

The recognition of new forms of individual rights also emerges in

legislation regulating abortion and assisted procreation, which offers
at the same time interesting examples of definitions. For instance, the
French legislation on assisted procreation (1994) presents a significant
reformulation from “medically assisted procreation”6 to “medical
assistance to procreation.”7 This change emphasises the actual nature
of the regulated matter: obviously, the law cannot regulate a physio-
logical process (procreation), but can only indicate which kind of
assistance can better protect it. Moreover, the previous definition
“medically assisted procreation” dissociates a unitary concept
(procreation) into two different notions (i.e. a ‘natural’ one and an
‘assisted’ one), leading to a different evaluation of the two, while the

6 “Décret n. 95-560 du mai 1995 rélatif aux activités d’assistance médicale à la

procréation et modifiant le Code de Santé Publique”, Journal Officiel du
7.5.1995, p. 7366. Article 7 says: “Abrogation du décret n. 88-327 du 8 avril
1988 rélatif aux activités de procréation médicalement assistées”.
7 “Loi n. 94-654 du 29 Juillet 1994 modifiée relative au don et à l’utilisation des
éléments et produits du corps humain, à l’assistance médicale à la procréation
et au diagnostic prénatal” (Bulletin Officiel du CNRS: <http://www.dsi.cnrs.fr>).
112 Donella Antelmi

new definition (medical assistance to procreation) does not imply that

in vitro fertilization should be considered a less valuable process.
Both in the case of abortion and in that of assisted procreation
legislators have to decide when human life exactly begins. The diffi-
culty of this task is proved by the variety of terms used to mention the
‘being’ that has not yet been born, and by the subtle distinctions
among the various terms – and concepts – adopted (as, for example, It.
individuo, persona, concepito, embrione, etc.), which are often used
without being defined.
The Italian legislation on abortion affirms that human life
should be protected from its beginning (art.1), but does not explicitly
mention when it actually begins, if at the moment of conception or at
birth. In the text of the Act regulating abortion, however, there is a
significant expression “vita autonoma del feto” (autonomous life of
the foetus) (art.7.3), which seems to shift the emphasis from the life vs
non-life opposition to that of autonomous life vs non-autonomous life.
This implies – though in the absence of explicit definition – that also
‘non-autonomous existence’ is a form of life.
Among the other terms used in legislation aimed to protect
human rights, special attention must be devoted to the Italian
‘individuo’. Art. 32 of the Italian Constitution describes “health” as a
“fundamental right of the individual” (diritto fondamentale
dell’individuo). ‘Individuo’ is a hapax in the Italian Constitution and
is not defined as a specialized term, though it has a vague meaning in
everyday use. It is to be noted, however, that the word acquires
precise and specialized meaning in the language of biology, where it is
a term borrowed from ordinary language.
This is by no means an isolated phenomenon, as there are many
cases of scientific terms borrowed in legal language without re-
definition. In the legislation of several Western countries, for example,
the juridical and ethical status of the creature that grows in the
mother’s womb often depends on assumptions stemming from other
fields of research. The different denominations adopted to indicate the
‘being’ that has not yet been born show that the authority to divide
intrauterine life into discrete periods is often left to science. So,
embryo refers to the ovule within 35 days from fertilization, while
foetus applies only when the embryo assumes the characteristics of its
Manifest Ideology and Hidden Ideology in Legal Language 113

species. These distinctions are functional to the application of norms

which concern different aspects of conception, pregnancy and birth,
from abortion to the possibility of using supernumerary embryos for
scientific purposes.
The examples mentioned so far show that scientific terminology
is absorbed in legal language without re-definition, in order to single
out discrete phases in a continuous process spanning from conception
to death. The discrete concepts thus obtained acquire an autonomous
meaning, which is by no means objective and actually results from an
arbitrary process of segmentation, though it is imposed as the obvious
solution borrowed from biological research. This apparent scientific
objectivity, however, hides the social implications of the choice,
which are tantamount to the extension of the dominating scientific
paradigm to the juridical sphere.
In some cases pseudo-scientific terms are even created, in order
to support social decisions. This occurs for example with ‘pre-
embryo’, a term which is not accepted by biologists, but used in
legislative texts on assisted procreation in England and Spain, in order
to enhance in-vitro experimentation (see Warnock Report 1984). More
recently, other scientific terminology has been borrowed to support
the use of embryos for research purposes, as for example It. pre-
zigote, ootide (in a Bill submitted to the Italian Parliament in 2004).
The fact that legislators in different countries omit definition or
re-definition of terms referring to fundamental and delicate matters,
and rather adopt bio-medical terminology, can be seen as the
consequence of a widespread form of ideology which gives science
the power (once a privilege of religion) to take crucial decisions
concerning ethic, social and environmental problems. As pointed out
by Borsellino (1999: 194), experts in bio-ethics have noticed that
legislation in this sector provides for the technical norms that meet the
needs of scientists and biologists, while jurists are mostly unaware of
the risks stemming from the passive adoption of scientific concepts
(see also Busnelli 2001). Yet biotechnologies could even eliminate
basic distinctions in fundamental categories of the law, such as the
opposition person vs. thing, man vs. woman, life vs. death. Thus, what
seems to be an exquisitely linguistic problem in actual fact reflects an
ideological stance.
114 Donella Antelmi

4. Conclusions

The discussion of the theoretical premises and the illustration of some

examples have made it possible to single out two different courses of
action emerging in legal texts: on the one hand, the precise definition
of terms, and, on the other, the borrowing of scientific terms without
definition. The high frequency of the latter option in legislation
dealing with matters that concern the very nature of human life can be
considered the symptom of a loss of authority of legal discourse.
The flood of technical terminologies and scientific taxonomies
into legal texts generates a form of ‘multilingualism’ – much more
pervasive than in the past – which threatens the homogeneity and
coherence of legal discourse. In this perspective it is particularly
significant to point out the risk that jurists may lose control of the
linguistic aspects of the law. According to Zaccaria (2003), this could
lead to the chaotic accumulation of norms and regulations and
generate a kind of discourse that has lost its traditional stability and
coherence, as jurists give up the control of terminological resources.
As a consequence, the very nature of law could change and become
“precarious, variable and short-lived”, while the authority to regulate
crucial matters is given to subjects who do have command of the
required technical jargon, but are experts in topics which have nothing
to do with the law.
In a wider perspective, it is possible to interpret the profound
changes in legal discourse outlined here from a different point of
view. As a matter of fact, the loss of specificity and coherence of legal
discourse can be considered the effect of a more general shift in the
dominating ideological paradigm. In a world where the interests and
needs of a multiethnic society are constantly and rapidly changing,
certainties traditionally represented by religious and ethical principles
fade away, and the scientific bio-technological paradigm seems to
offer a more stable background. Thus, new values can emerge and
possibly survive for longer periods within the framework of a new
leading ideology.
Manifest Ideology and Hidden Ideology in Legal Language 115

In this paper it has been shown that ideology can manifest itself
through explicit definitions, in which the redefinition of words and
concepts from ordinary language leads to take a stance with regard to
reality. But it has also been shown that ideology can be concealed
thanks to the use of terms belonging to technical-scientific fields,
when they are not redefined. In such cases, one scientific position is
selected among others so that the ensuing formulation reproduces
evaluations or more simply scientific beliefs which can be partial or
not neutral.
Modern European and Italian legislation offers several
examples of law facing themes involving ethical decisions in which
the plurality of subcodes, far from guaranteeing an objective stance, is
particularly insidious from the ideological point of view. The
increasing predominance of scientific ideology in society can
therefore alter the ‘legal order of discourse’, modifying the very
nature of the ultimate goals of the law.

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