G.R. Nos. L-71998-99 June 2, 1993 Thereafter, the two cases were consolidated.

Thereafter, the two cases were consolidated. On November 11, 1982, the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss both cases on the
following grounds: (a) with respect to Civil Case No. 46800, the pendency of Civil Case No. 46801 which involved the same parties and cause
EMILIANO R. DE LOS SANTOS, SPOUSES NORMA A. PADILLA and ISIDORO L. PADILLA and the HEIRS OF FRANCISCO DAYRIT, of action; (b) both cases were in reality suits against the state which could not be maintained without the State's consent; and (c) lack of cause
petitioners, of action.
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. JUDGE CICERRO C. JURADO and EDILBERTO CADIENTE, respondents. Consequently, the lower court issued the aforequoted Order of December 1, 1982. Their motion for the reconsideration of said Order having
been denied, petitioners elevated (to) the cases to this Court through an "appeal by certiorari" which was docketed as G. R. No. 63610. The
Isidoro L. Padilla for petitioners. Second Division of this Court, however, referred the cases to the then Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to Sec. 16 of the Interim Rules. 4
In due course, the Appellate court rendered a Decision on May 22, 1985 which disposed of the cases thus:
Joaquin G. Mendoza for E. Cadiente.
Accordingly, the two actions cannot be maintained. They are in reality suits against the state which has not given its consent to be sued
(Minister [sic] vs. CFI, 40 SCRA 464; Isberto vs. Raquiza, 67 SCRA 116; Begosa v. Chairman, PVA, 32 SCRA 466). Appellants' remedy lies
elsewhere.
ROMERO, J.:
Appellants assert that the taking of their property in the manner alleged in these two cases was without due process of law. This is not correct.
The appealed order has not closed the door to appellants right, if any, to just compensation for the alleged area of their land which was
Questioned in the instant petition for review on certiorari is the Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court 1 affirming the December 1,
expropriated. The court below dismissed the cases for lack of consent on the part of the state to be sued herein. We repeat appellants' remedy
1982 order of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII at Pasig 2 in civil Cases Nos. 46800 which states in toto:
for just compensation lies elsewhere.
It appearing that the construction of the road and creek in question was a project undertaken under the authority of the Minister of Public
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is in full accord with the evidence and the law and is hereby therefore affirmed in all its parts. Costs
Works, the funding of which was the responsibility of the National Government and that the defendants impleaded herein are Edilberto
against appellants.
Cadiente and Nestor Agustin and not the Republic of the Philippines which cannot be sued without its consent, this court hereby resolves to
dismiss these two (2) cases without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, petitioners elevated the cases to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari. The petition is anchored on the ruling of
the Court in Amigable v. Cuenca 6 which states: ". . . . where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use
Civil Cases Nos. 46800 and 46801 were both filed on July 13, 1982 by petitioners who are co-owners under TCT No. 329945 of a parcel of
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale," a suit may properly be maintained against the government.
land located in Barrio Wawa, Binangonan, Rizal with an area of nineteen thousand sixty-one (19,061) square meters. In Civil Case No. 46800,
petitioners alleged in the petition for prohibition that in October 1981, without their knowledge or consent, Lorenzo Cadiente, a private
We hold for the petitioners.
contractor and the Provincial Engineer of Rizal constructed a road nine (9) meters wide and one hundred twenty-eight meters and seventy
centimeters (128.70) long occupying a total area of one thousand one hundred sixty-five (1,165) square meters of their land.
That the principle of state immunity from suit cannot be invoked to defeat petitioners' claim has long been settled. In Ministerio v. Court of First
Instance of Cebu, 7 the Court held:
Petitioners added that aside from the road, the said respondents also constructed, without their knowledge and consent, an artificial creek
twenty three meters and twenty centimeters (23.20) wide and one hundred twenty-eight meters and sixty-nine centimeters long (128.69)
. . . . The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the
occupying an area of two thousand nine hundred six (2,906) square meters of their property. Constructed in a zig-zag manner, the creek
government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment
meandered through their property.
of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to
enter in and upon the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment. If there were an observance of
Alleging that it completed, the road and the creek would "serve no public profitable and practicable purpose but for respondents' personal
procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the said plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure
profit, to the great damage and prejudice of the taxpayers and the petitioners," the same petitioners invoked their rights under Art. IV Secs. 1
to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal
and 2, of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution and prayed for the issuance of restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to stop
norms on the part of the officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any
the construction. They also prayed that after hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered: (1) declaring illegal the construction of the road and
property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it
artificial creek which was made without their knowledge and consent, "without due process and without just compensation and in violation of
submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
the provision of statute law and of the Philippine Constitution;" (2) issuing a permanent prohibition; (3) ordering respondents to pay petitioners
"jointly and collectively" P15,00.00 as attorney's fees and P600.00 for each appearance, and (4) ordering the respondents to pay the costs of
We find the facts of the Ministerio case on all fours with the instant cases insofar as the fact that the respondent government officials executed
the suit. 3
a shortcut in appropriating petitioners' property for public use is concerned. As in the Amigable case, no expropriation proceedings were
initiated before construction of the projects began. In like manner, nowhere in his pleadings in the cases at bar does the Solicitor General
An action for damages, Civil Case No. 46801 on the other hand, was founded on Art. 32, paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Civil Code and the
mention that the fact that expropriation proceedings had in fact been undertaken before the road and artificial creek were constructed. Thus,
constitutional provisions on the right against deprivation of property without due process of law and without just compensation.
quoting the answer of the defendants in Civil Case No. 46801, the Solicitor General summarized the facts which defendants considered as
constituting justification for the construction as follows:
1
 public respondents, including the other officials involved in the construction, performed their functions by exercising even the ordinary diligence
10. The construction of the road and creek in question on the property which at the time was said to be public property, was initiated, expected of them as public officials, they would not have failed to note that the property is a private one. A public infrastructure losses its
and construction effected, through the usual and ordinary course, as shown by the following: laudability if, in the process of undertaking it, private rights are disregarded. In this connection, the Court said in Republic v. Sandiganbayan: 9

a. November 5, 1979 — Engr. Data who was the incumbent District Engineer submitted (thru channels) plans, program of works and It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary
detailed estimates for approval of higher authorities, thru the initiation of Mayor Ynares and Assemblyman Gilberto Duavit; rights of jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where private property has been taken in expropriation without just
compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owner.
b. February 18, 1980 — Regional Director Eduardo L. Lagunilla, MPW Region IV, EDSA, Quezon City endorsed said request to the
Minister of Public Works;. Public respondents' assertion that the project had been completed on May 21, 1982 meets strong opposition from the petitioners who insist
that the project "until now is not yet finished." 10 This factual issue needs determination which only the trial court can undertake. Thus, the
c. February 13, 1981 — Assemblyman Gilberto Duavit sent a hand-written follow-up note regarding the project; need for a full blown trial on the merits. We do not subscribe to the appellate court's suggestion that the remedy of the petitioners "lies
elsewhere."
d. June 17, 1981 — The undersigned defendant Nestor Agustin was designated Chief Civil Engineer of the Rizal Engineer District,
Vice Engr. Cresencio Data who reached his compulsory retirement age; The filing of another case to determine just compensation is superfluous. The issue may be threshed out below for practical reasons in the
event that it is shown later that it is no longer possible to prohibit the public respondents from continuing with the public work. As held in the
e. September 23, 1981 — Funds in the amount of P588,000.00 was released for partial implementation of the project. The total Amigable case, damages may be awarded the petitioners in the form of legal interest on the price of the land to be reckoned from the time of
amount requested was P1,200,000. 00; the unlawful taking.

f. October 19, 1981 — The undersigned submitted a request to the MPWH Central Office seeking authority to effect implementation WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and Civil Cases Nos. 46800 and 46801 shall be REMANDED to the lower court for trial on
of the project; the merits after the Republic of the Philippines shall have been impleaded as defendant in both cases.
[G.R. No. 107916. February 20, 1997.]
g. October 29, 1981 — The Regional Director approved the plans and program of works for the project in the amount of
P588,000.00; PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S.
YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, respondents.
h. November 11, 1981 — The Honorable Minister Jesus S. Hipolito granted the request to undertake the implementation of the
project; Roldan L. Torralba, for petitioners.

i. November 25, 1981 — Project implementation was started; Estanislao G. Ebarle, Jr. for public respondent Municipality of Bunawan.

j. March 3, 1982 — Construction of rock bulkhead was completed; SYLLABUS

k. November 23, 1982 — P249,000.00 was released for improvement (deepening and diverting of flow) of Binangonan River which
was a complimentary structure of Binangonan port system;
l. April 9, 1982 — Implementation was started. Contract for this project was approved by the Regional Director in favor of
EDILBERTO CADIENTE CONSTRUCTION;
m. May 21, 1982 — Deepening slightly of the adjacent portion of the rock bulkhead was completed.
11. The construction of the structures was done in good faith;
The construction of the roadway and deepening of the creek was designated to generate for the municipality of Binangonan, Rizal more
benefits in the form of substantial revenue from fishing industry, parking area, market rentals, development site, and road system
improvements. The area covered by said public improvements is part of the Laguna Lake area which is submerged in water even during dry
season. The municipal mayor of Binangonan, Rizal stated that said area is public property. 8
Public respondents' belief that the property involved is public, even if buttressed by statements of other public officials, is no reason for the
unjust taking of petitioners' property. As TCT No. 329945 shows, the property was registered under the Torrens system in the names of
"Emiliano R. de los Santos, married to Corazon Dayrit; and Norma Alabastro, married to Isidro L. Padilla" as early as March 29, 1971. Had the
POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (B.P. 337); POWER OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN TO REVIEW
ORDINANCES, RESOLUTIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS PROMULGATED BY THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR; DECLARATION OF
INVALIDITY MUST BE ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT IT IS BEYOND THE POWER OF THE SANGGUNIAN BAYAN OR MAYOR TO ISSUE
THE RESOLUTION, ORDINANCE OR ORDER UNDER REVIEW. — The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution
No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. BLG. 337,
grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the
Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining, the
Court's pronouncements in Velazco vs. Blas, where we cited significant early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar. "The only ground
upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is
'beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.' Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly
legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (board's)
disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is
outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the
municipal council or president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority." Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without
the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of
eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg.
2
337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of
petitioners' property.
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
The main issue presented in this case is whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was
disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision and resolution, promulgated on
July 15, 1992 and October 22, 1992 respectively, 1 and a declaration that Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 of the Bunawan Sangguniang
Bayan is null and void.
On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the
Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned
by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." 2
In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for its approval On September 11, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the
comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government
center." 3
The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a Petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday
before the Regional Trial Court at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. 4 The complaint was later amended to include the registered owners, Percival
Moday's parents, Zotico and Leonora Moday, as party defendants.
On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating
that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court and that it would be in the government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property.
Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the Regional Trial Court granted respondent municipality's motion to take
possession of the land. The lower court held that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It
added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan
under Section 208 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337, old Local Government Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts
enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. 5 The dispositive portion of the lower court's Order
dated July 2, 1991 reads:
"WHEREFORE, it appearing that the amount of P632.39 had been deposited as per Official Receipt No. 5379647 on December 12, 1989
which this Court now determines as the provisional value of the land, the Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of the Property filed by
petitioner through counsel is hereby GRANTED. The Sheriff of this Court is ordered to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property
involved.
Let the hearing be set on August 9, 1991 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning for the purpose of ascertaining the just compensation or fair market
value of the property sought to be taken, with notice to all the parties concerned.
SO ORDERED." 6
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on October 31, 1991.
Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court but the same was
dismissed by respondent appellate court on July 15, 1992. 7 The Court of Appeals held that the public purpose for the expropriation is clear
from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid,
expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. cdasia
Respondent appellate court also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on October 22, 1992. 8
Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall,
the Municipal Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of concrete.
In the instant petition for review filed on November 23, 1992, petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals and a declaration that Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawan is null and void.
On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining and restraining public respondent Judge Evangeline Yuipco
from enforcing her July 2, 1991 Order and respondent municipality from using and occupying all the buildings constructed and from further
constructing any building on the land subject of this petition. 9
Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of Restraining Order and for Contempt, the Court issued a Resolution on March 15,
1995, citing incumbent municipal mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo for contempt, ordering him to pay the fine and to demolish the "blocktiendas"
which were built in violation of the restraining order. 10
Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and manifested that he lost in the May 8, 1995 election. 11 The incumbent Mayor Leonardo
Barrios, filed a Manifestation, Motion to Resolve "Urgent Motion for Immediate Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining Order" and
Memorandum on June 11, 1996 for the Municipality of Bunawan. 12
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the legality of the condemnation proceedings initiated by the municipality.
According to petitioners, the expropriation was politically motivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, there being other municipal properties available for the purpose. Petitioners also pray that the former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo
be ordered to pay damages for insisting on the enforcement of a void municipal resolution.
The Court of Appeals declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for disapproving the resolution "could be baseless, because it
failed to point out which and where are 'those available lots."' Respondent court also concluded that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan did
not declare the municipal board's resolution as invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. 13
The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable
from sovereignty. 14 It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose. 15 Inherently possessed by the national legislature the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments,
other public entities and public utilities. 16 For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use
and there must be just compensation. 17
The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337, the Local Government Code 18 in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states:
3
"Section 9. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise
the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose."
What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved
Resolution No. 43-89.
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:
"Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. — (1) Within thirty days after receiving copies of approved ordinances, resolutions and
executive orders promulgated by the municipal mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the
provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the .provincial fiscal, who shall examine them promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in
writing of any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein and make such comments or recommendations as shall appear to him
proper.
(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance, resolution or executive order is beyond the power conferred upon
the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in part, entering its
actions upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to annul the ordinance,
resolution or executive order in question in whole or in part. The action of the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final.
xxx xxx xxx." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null
and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal
resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a
similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining, the Court's pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas, 19 where we cited significant
early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar.
"The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution,
ordinance, or order is 'beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.' Absolutely no other ground is recognized
by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The
provincial (board's) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution,
ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative
functions of the municipal council or president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority." 20
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan
clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant
to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce; it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used. as lawful
authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.
As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Percival Moday incurred the ire of then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo when he
refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor in previous elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor C. Bustillo used the
expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their land even if there were other properties belonging to the municipality and available for the
purpose. Specifically, they allege that the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a
sketch plan. 21
The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be
observed. 22 The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the taking and the public
use character or the purpose of the taking, 23 has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public
character. 24 Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary support for petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopy
of the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners' property suited to the
purpose of the expropriation. In the questioned decision, respondent appellate court similarly held that the pleadings and documents on record
have not pointed out any of respondent municipality's "other available properties available for the same purpose." 25 The accusations of
political reprisal are likewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the Court holds that petitioners' demand that the former
municipal mayor be personally liable for damages is without basis.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in the case of "Percival
Moday, et al. v. Municipality of Bunawan, et al." (CA G.R. SP No. 26712) are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Court on December 8, 1993 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 156093. February 2, 2007.]
NATIONAL POWER CORP., petitioner, vs. SPOUSES NORBERTO AND JOSEFINA DELA CRUZ, METROBANK, Dasmariñas, Cavite Branch,
REYNALDO FERRER, and S.K. DYNAMICS MANUFACTURER CORP., respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
The Case
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) seeks to annul and set aside
the November 18, 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67446, which affirmed the December 28, 1999 Order 2 of
the Imus, Cavite Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XX in Civil Case No. 1816-98, which fixed the fair market value of the expropriated lots at
PhP10,000.00 per square meter.
The Facts
Petitioner NAPOCOR is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, with the mandate
of developing hydroelectric power, producing transmission lines, and developing hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines. NAPOCOR
decided to acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of land within the areas of Dasmariñas and Imus, Cavite for the construction and
maintenance of the proposed Dasmariñas-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project. 3
On November 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint 4 for eminent domain and expropriation of an easement of right-of-way against
respondents as registered owners of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated, which were covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. T-313327, T-671864, and T-454278. The affected areas were 51.55, 18.25, and 14.625 square meters, respectively, or a total of 84.425
square meters.
After respondents filed their respective answers to petitioner's Complaint, petitioner deposited PhP5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of
the land in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. 5 Then, on February 25, 1999, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the trial court granted in its March 9, 1999 Order. The trial court issued a Writ of Possession
over the lots owned by respondents spouses de la Cruz and respondent Ferrer on March 10, 1999 and April 12, 1999, respectively.
4
However, the trial court dropped the Dela Cruz spouses and their mortgagee, Metrobank, as parties-defendants in its May 11, 1999 Order, 6 in Community centers such as, [sic] churches, public markets, shopping malls, banks and gasoline stations are easily accessible from the subject
view of the Motion to Intervene filed by respondent/intervenor Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimed ownership of the land sought to be expropriated real properties.
from respondents spouses Dela Cruz. HEDSIc
Convenience facilities such as electricity, telephone service as well as pipe potable water supply system are all available along Gen. Emilio
On June 24, 1999, the trial court terminated the pre-trial in so far as respondent Ferrer was concerned, considering that the sole issue was the Aguinaldo Highway. AaDSEC
amount of just compensation, and issued an Order directing the constitution of a Board of Commissioners with respect to the property of
respondent S.K. Dynamics. The trial court designated Mr. Lamberto C. Parra, Cavite Provincial Assessor, as chairman, while petitioner Public transportation consisting of passenger jeepneys and buses as well taxicabs are [sic] regularly available along Gen. E. Emilio Aguinaldo
nominated the Municipal Assessor of Dasmariñas, Mr. Regalado T. Andaya, as member. Respondent S.K. Dynamics did not nominate any Highway [sic].
commissioner.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the just compensation for the property of Saulog, successor-in-interest of the Dela Cruz spouses, the trial court ordered the latter and
petitioner to submit their compromise agreement. IV. HIGHEST AND MOST PROFITABLE USE

The commissioners conducted an ocular inspection of S.K. Dynamics' property, and on October 8, 1999, they submitted a report to the trial xxx xxx xxx
court, with the following pertinent findings:
The subject property is situated within the residential/commercial zone and considering the area affected and taking into consideration, their
In arriving our [sic] estimate of values our studies and analysis include the following: location, shape, lot topography, accessibility and the predominant uses of properties in the neighborhood, as well as the trend of land
developments in the vicinity, we are on the opinion that the highest and most profitable use of the property is good for residential and
I. PROPERTY LOCATION commercial purposes.

As shown to us on-site during our ocular inspection, the appraised property is land only, identified as the area affected by the construction of V. VALUATION OF LAND MARKET DATA
the National Power Corporation (NPC) Dasmariñas-Zapote 230KV Transmission Lines Project, located within Barangay Salitran, Dasmariñas,
Cavite registered in the name of S.K. Dynamic[s] Manufacture[r], Corp., under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-454278. xxx xxx xxx

II. NEIGHBORHOOD DESCRIPTION Based on the analysis of data gathered and making the proper adjustments with respect to the location, area, shape, accessibility, and the
highest and best use of the subject properties, it is the opinion of the herein commissioners that the fair market value of the subject real
The neighborhood particularly in the immediate vicinity is within a mixed residential and commercial area, situated in the northern section of properties is P10,000.00 per square meter, as of this date, October 05, 1999. 7
the Municipality of Dasmariñas which was transversed [sic] by Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo Highway [where] several residential subdivisions and
commercial establishment[s] are located. Thus, both commissioners recommended that the property of S.K. Dynamics to be expropriated by petitioner be valued at PhP10,000.00 per
square meter.
Considered as some of the important improvements [on] the vicinity are (within 1.5 radius)
The records show that the commissioners did not afford the parties the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor, nor did they conduct
Orchard Golf and Country Club hearings before them. In fact, the commissioners did not issue notices to the parties to attend hearings nor provide the concerned parties the
opportunity to argue their respective causes.
Golden City Subdivision
Upon the submission of the commissioners' report, petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing of it nor given any opportunity to file its
Southfield Subdivisions objections to it.

Arcontica Sports Complex On December 1, 1999, respondent Ferrer filed a motion adopting in toto the commissioners' report with respect to the valuation of his property.
8 On December 28, 1999, the trial court consequently issued the Order approving the commissioners' report, and granted respondent Ferrer's
Max's Restaurant motion to adopt the subject report. Subsequently, the just compensation for the disparate properties to be expropriated by petitioner for its
project was uniformly pegged at PhP10,000.00 per square meter.
Waltermart Shopping Mall
Incidentally, on February 11, 2000, respondent S.K. Dynamics filed a motion informing the trial court that in addition to the portion of its
UMC Medical Center property covered by TCT No. T-454278 sought to be expropriated by petitioner, the latter also took possession of an 8.55-square meter portion
of S.K. Dynamics' property covered by TCT No. 503484 for the same purpose — to acquire an easement of right-of-way for the construction
Several savings and Commercial Banks as well as several Gasoline stations. and maintenance of the proposed Dasmariñas-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project. Respondent S.K. Dynamics prayed that said portion
be included in the computation of the just compensation to be paid by petitioner.

5
On the same date, the Imus, Cavite RTC granted S.K. Dynamics' motion to have the 8.55-square meter portion of its property included in the
computation of just compensation. HCEcaT
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
As previously stated, in its December 28, 1999 Order, the trial court fixed the just compensation to be paid by petitioner at PhP10,000.00 per
square meter. The relevant portion of the said Order reads as follows:
On October 8, 1999, a Commissioner's Valuation Report was submitted in Court by the Provincial Assessor of Cavite and by the Municipal
Assessor of Dasmariñas, Cavite. Quoting from said Report, thus:
"Based on the analysis of data gathered and making the proper adjustments with respect to location, area, shape, accessibility, and the
highest and best use of the subject properties, it is the opinion of herein commissioners that the fair market value of the subject real properties
is P10,000.00 per square meter, as of this date, October 05, 1999."
Finding the opinion of the Commissioners to be in order, this Court approves the same. Accordingly, the Motion filed by [respondent] Reynaldo
Ferrer adopting said valuation report is granted.
SO ORDERED. 9
On January 20, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the abovementioned Order, but said motion was denied in the trial court's
March 23, 2000 Order, which states that:
The basis of [petitioner] in seeking to set aside the Order dated December 28, 1999 is its claim that the Commissioners' Report fixing the just
compensation at P10,000.00 per square meter is exorbitant, unjust and unreasonable. To support its contention, [petitioner] invoked Provincial
Appraisal Committee Report No. 08-95 dated October 25, 1995 which set the just compensation of lots along Gen. Aguinaldo Highway at
P3,000.00 per sq.m. only.
By way of opposition, [respondent] Dynamics countered that the valuation of a lot under expropriation is reckoned at the time of its taking by
the government. And since in the case at bar, the writ of possession was issued on March 10, 1999, the price or value for 1999 must be the
one to be considered.
We find for the defendant.
The PAR Resolution alluded to by [petitioner] was passed in 1995 or four (4) years [before] the lot in question was taken over by the
government. This explains why the price or cost of the land has considerably increased. Besides, the valuation of P10,000.00 per sq.m. was
the one recommended by the commissioner designated by [petitioner] itself and concurred in by the Provincial Assessor of Cavite.
Be that as it may, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED. 10
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Unsatisfied with the amount of just compensation, petitioner filed an appeal before the CA. In resolving the appeal, the CA made the following
findings:
We find nothing on record which would warrant the reversal of the Order dated December 28, 1999 of the court a quo.
[Petitioner] submits that the order of the court a quo adopting the Commissioners [sic] Valuation Report, fixing the just compensation for the
subject lots in the amount of P10,000.00 per square meter is exhorbitant [sic], highly speculative and without any basis. In support thereto,
[petitioner] presented before the court a quo the Provincial Appraisal Committee of Cavite Resolution No. 08-95 . . . which fixed the fair market
value of lots located along Gen. Aguinaldo Highway, Dasmariñas, Cavite, which incidentally includes the lots subject of this proceedings [sic],
in the amount of P3,000.00 per square meter. ISaCTE
We do not agree.
"The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the land owner."
(National Power Corporation vs. Henson, 300 SCRA 751-756).
The CA then cited Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 11 to explain why Resolution No. 08-95 could not "be used as [a]
basis for determining the just compensation of the subject lots, which by reason of the changed commercial conditions in the vicinity, could
have increased its value greater than its value three (3) years ago." The said resolution, which fixed the fair market value of the lots, including
that of the disputed lots along Gen. Aguinaldo Highway, was approved on October 25, 1995, while petitioner filed the Complaint for the
expropriation of the disputed lots on November 27, 1998, or more than three (3) years had elapsed after said resolution was approved.
Reflecting on the commissioners' report, the CA noted that since the property underwent important changes and improvements, "the highest
and most profitable use of the property is good for residential and commercial purposes."
As regards the commissioners' failure to conduct a hearing "to give the parties the opportunity to present their respective evidence," as alleged
by petitioner, the CA opined that "[t]he filing by [petitioner] of a motion for reconsideration accorded it ample opportunity to dispute the findings
of the commissioners, so that [petitioner] was as fully heard as there might have been hearing actually taken place . . . ."
The CA ultimately rendered its judgment, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order dated December 28, 1999 and
March 23, 2000 of the court a quo are hereby AFFIRMED by this Court.
SO ORDERED. 12
Significantly, petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA November 18, 2002 Decision, but it directly filed a petition for review
before us.
The Issues
In this petition for review, the issues are the following:
PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN IT WAS NOT ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THE REASONABLE VALUE OF
THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS.
THE VALUATION OF JUST COMPENSATION HEREIN WAS NOT BASED FROM THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND OTHER AUTHENTIC
DOCUMENTS. 13
The Court's Ruling
We find this petition meritorious.
It is beyond question that petitions for review may only raise questions of law which must be distinctly set forth; 14 thus, this Court is mandated
to only consider purely legal questions in this petition, unless called for by extraordinary circumstances.
6
In this case, petitioner raises the issue of denial of due process because it was allegedly deprived of the opportunity to present its evidence on
the just compensation of properties it wanted to expropriate, and the sufficiency of the legal basis or bases for the trial court's Order on the
matter of just compensation. Unquestionably, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the proper vehicle to raise the issues
in question before this Court. ITEcAD
In view of the significance of the issues raised in this petition, because this case involves the expenditure of public funds for a clear public
purpose, this Court will overlook the fact that petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA November 18, 2002 Decision, and
brush aside this technicality in favor of resolving this case on the merits.
The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in
expropriation cases. In the instant expropriation case, where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a hearing before the
commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. While it is true that the findings of
commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons,
that is, where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the
commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all." 15

First Issue: Petitioner was deprived of due process when it was not given the opportunity to present evidence before the commissioners
It is undisputed that the commissioners failed to afford the parties the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor, conduct hearings before
In this case, the fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to afford the parties the opportunity to present their own evidence should have
them, issue notices to the parties to attend hearings, and provide the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes. It is also
impelled the trial court to disregard the commissioners' findings. The absence of such trial or hearing constitutes reversible error on the part of
undisputed that petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing of the commissioners' report, and that petitioner was also not given any
the trial court because the parties' (in particular, petitioner's) right to due process was violated.
opportunity to file its objections to the said report.
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the petitioner was not deprived of due process when it was able to file a motion for reconsideration
A re-examination of the pertinent provisions on expropriation, under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, reveals the following:
In ruling that petitioner was not deprived of due process because it was able to file a Motion for Reconsideration, the CA had this to say:

SEC. 6. Proceedings by commissioners. — Before entering upon the performance of their duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe
[Petitioner], further, asserts that "the appointed commissioners failed to conduct a hearing to give the parties the opportunity to present their
an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case.
respective evidence. According to [petitioner], the Commissioners Valuation Report was submitted on October 8, 1999 in violation of the
Evidence may be introduced by either party before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and
appellant's right to due process as it was deprived of the opportunity to present evidence on the determination of the just compensation."
the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties to attend, view and examine the property
sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the
We are not persuaded.
case. The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential damages
the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the
The filing by [petitioner] of a motion for reconsideration accorded it ample opportunity to dispute the findings of the commissioners, so that
corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits
[petitioner] was as fully heard as there might have been hearing actually taken place. "Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked
assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.
by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration." (Vda. De Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 33, 50).
16
SEC. 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. — The court may order the commissioners to report when any particular portion of
the real estate shall have been passed upon by them, and may render judgment upon such partial report, and direct the commissioners to
In this respect, we are constrained to disagree with the CA ruling, and therefore, set it aside.
proceed with their work as to subsequent portions of the property sought to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such
property. The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and such proceedings shall not be
While it is true that there is jurisprudence supporting the rule that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration negates allegations of denial of due
effectual until the court shall have accepted their report and rendered judgment in accordance with their recommendations. Except as
process, it is equally true that there are very specific rules for expropriation cases that require the strict observance of procedural and
otherwise expressly ordered by the court, such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of their
substantive due process, 17 because expropriation cases involve the admittedly painful deprivation of private property for public purposes and
appointment, which time may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies
the disbursement of public funds as just compensation for the private property taken. Therefore, it is insufficient to hold that a Motion for
thereof on all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if
Reconsideration in an expropriation case cures the defect in due process.
they so desire.
As a corollary, the CA's ruling that "denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard
SEC. 8. Action upon commissioners' report. — Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even
on his motion for reconsideration," citing Vda. de Chua v. Court of Appeals, is not applicable to the instant case considering that the cited case
before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement
involved a lack of notice of the orders of the trial court in granting letters of administration. It was essentially a private dispute and therefore, no
therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit
public funds were involved. It is distinct from this expropriation case where grave consequences attached to the orders of the trial court when it
the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the
determined the just compensation. DHcTaE
report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to
the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken. STHAID
The Court takes this opportunity to elucidate the ruling that the opportunity to present evidence incidental to a Motion for Reconsideration will
suffice if there was no chance to do so during the trial. We find such situation to be the exception and not the general rule. The opportunity to
Based on these provisions, it is clear that in addition to the ocular inspection performed by the two (2) appointed commissioners in this case,
present evidence during the trial remains a vital requirement in the observance of due process. The trial is materially and substantially different
they are also required to conduct a hearing or hearings to determine just compensation; and to provide the parties the following: (1) notice of
from a hearing on a Motion for Reconsideration. At the trial stage, the party is usually allowed several hearing dates depending on the number
the said hearings and the opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor during the said hearings; and (3)
of witnesses who will be presented. At the hearing of said motion, the trial court may not be more accommodating with the grant of hearing
the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes during the said hearings.
dates even if the movant has many available witnesses. Before the decision is rendered, a trial court has an open mind on the merits of the

7
parties' positions. After the decision has been issued, the trial court's view of these positions might be inclined to the side of the winning party
and might treat the Motion for Reconsideration and the evidence adduced during the hearing of said motion perfunctorily and in a cavalier
fashion. The incident might not receive the evaluation and judgment of an impartial or neutral judge. In sum, the constitutional guarantee of
due process still requires that a party should be given the fullest and widest opportunity to adduce evidence during trial, and the availment of a
motion for reconsideration will not satisfy a party's right to procedural due process, unless his/her inability to adduce evidence during trial was
due to his/her own fault or negligence.
Second Issue: The legal basis for the determination of just compensation was insufficient
In this case, it is not disputed that the commissioners recommended that the just compensation be pegged at PhP10,000.00 per square meter.
The commissioners arrived at the figure in question after their ocular inspection of the property, wherein they considered the surrounding
structures, the property's location and, allegedly, the prices of the other, contiguous real properties in the area. Furthermore, based on the
commissioners' report, the recommended just compensation was determined as of the time of the preparation of said report on October 5,
1999.
In B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. The measure is not the taker's gain but
the owner's loss. The compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation would deprive
the owner of his property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public.
To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the property, to which should be added the
consequential damages after deducting therefrom the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the consequential
benefits exceed the consequential damages, these items should be disregarded altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid in
every case.
The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by parties willing but not compelled to enter into the contract of sale.
Not unlikely, a buyer desperate to acquire a piece of property would agree to pay more, and a seller in urgent need of funds would agree to
accept less, than what it is actually worth. . . .
Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like
properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon.
STECAc
It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of
the time of the filing of the complaint. 18
We note that in this case, the filing of the complaint for expropriation preceded the petitioner's entry into the property.
Therefore, it is clear that in this case, the sole basis for the determination of just compensation was the commissioners' ocular inspection of the
properties in question, as gleaned from the commissioners' October 5, 1999 report. The trial court's reliance on the said report is a serious
error considering that the recommended compensation was highly speculative and had no strong factual moorings. For one, the report did not
indicate the fair market value of the lots occupied by the Orchard Golf and Country Club, Golden City Subdivision, Arcontica Sports Complex,
and other business establishments cited. Also, the report did not show how convenience facilities, public transportation, and the residential and
commercial zoning could have added value to the lots being expropriated.
Moreover, the trial court did not amply explain the nature and application of the "highest and best use" method to determine the just
compensation in expropriation cases. No attempt was made to justify the recommended "just price" in the subject report through other
sufficient and reliable means such as the holding of a trial or hearing at which the parties could have had adequate opportunity to adduce their
own evidence, the testimony of realtors in the area concerned, the fair market value and tax declaration, actual sales of lots in the vicinity of
the lot being expropriated on or about the date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the pertinent zonal valuation derived from the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, among others.
More so, the commissioners did not take into account that the Asian financial crisis in the second semester of 1997 affected the fair market
value of the subject lots. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that after the crisis hit the real estate market, there was a downward trend in
the prices of real estate in the country.
Furthermore, the commissioners' report itself is flawed considering that its recommended just compensation was pegged as of October 5,
1999, or the date when the said report was issued, and not the just compensation as of the date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation,
or as of November 27, 1998. The period between the time of the filing of the complaint (when just compensation should have been
determined), and the time when the commissioners' report recommending the just compensation was issued (or almost one [1] year after the
filing of the complaint), may have distorted the correct amount of just compensation.
Clearly, the legal basis for the determination of just compensation in this case is insufficient as earlier enunciated. This being so, the trial
court's ruling in this respect should be set aside.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 28, 1999 and March 23, 2000 Orders of the Imus, Cavite RTC and the November 18,
2002 Decision of the CA are hereby SET ASIDE. This case is remanded to the said trial court for the proper determination of just
compensation in conformity with this Decision. No costs. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 146062. June 28, 2001.]
SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR., in his capacity as Project Manager of the National Irrigation Administration, petitioner, vs. CLARITA VDA. DE
ONORIO, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26,
Surallah, South Cotabato, ordering the National Irrigation Administration (NIA for brevity) to pay respondent the amount of P107,517.60 as just
compensation for the taking of the latter's property.
The facts are as follows:
Respondent Clarita Vda. de Enorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square
meters. The lot, known as Lot 1210-A-Pad-11-000586, is covered by TCT No. T-22121 of the Registry of Deeds, South Cotabato. On October
6, 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot,
affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. Respondent's husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid
by the government for the area taken after the processing of documents by the Commission on Audit.
Sometime in 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between respondent and the NIA (Exh. 1). The NIA then paid respondent the
amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. Respondent subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she
waived any compensation for damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as a result of the construction of a right-of-way on her
property (Exh. 2). The same year, petitioner offered respondent the sum of P35,000,00 by way of amicable settlement pursuant to Executive
Order No. 1035, §18, which provides in part that —
8

Financial assistance may also be given to owners of lands acquired under C.A. 141, as amended, for the area or portion subject to the
reservation under Section 12 thereof in such amounts as may be determined by the implementing agency/instrumentality concerned in
consultation with the Commission on Audit and the assessor's office concerned.
Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her property, but petitioner refused to pay. Accordingly, respondent filed on December 10,
1990 a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as
compensation for the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal constructed by the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, filed an Answer, in which he admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the
property of the plaintiff and that NIA paid a certain landowner whose property had been taken for irrigation purposes, but petitioner interposed
the defense that: (1) the government had not consented to be sued; (2) the total area used by the NIA for its irrigation canal was only 2.27
hectares, not 24,600 square meters; and (3) respondent was not entitled to compensation for the taking of her property considering that she
secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under C.A. No. 141.
At the pre-trial conference, the following facts were stipulated upon: (1) that the area taken was 24,660 square meters; (2) that it was a portion
of the land covered by TCT No. T-22121 in the name of respondent and her late husband (Exh. A); and (3) that this area had been taken by
the NIA for the construction of an irrigation canal. 2
On October 18, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In view of the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the defendant, National Irrigation
Administration, to pay to plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Seven Thousand Five Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Sixty Centavos
(P107,517.60) as just compensation for the questioned area of 24,660 square meters of land owned by plaintiff and taken by said defendant
NIA which used it for its main canal plus costs. 3
On November 15, 1993, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on October 31, 2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Hence this petition.
The issues in this case are:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION IS DISMISSIBLE FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF
THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT LAND GRANTED BY VIRTUE OF A HOMESTEAD PATENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY REGISTERED UNDER
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529 CEASES TO BE PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM
THE TIME OF THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION.
4. WHETHER THE AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND FEES EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT EXEMPTS PETITIONER FROM
MAKING PAYMENT TO THE FORMER.
We shall deal with these issues in the order they are stated.
First. Rule 7, §5 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides —
Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report
the fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but
shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing . . .
By reason of Rule 45, §4 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, in relation to Rule 42, §2 thereof, the requirement of a certificate of
non-forum shopping applies to the filing of petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Court of Appeals, such as the one filed by
petitioner.
As provided in Rule 45, §5, "The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding . . . the contents of the
document which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."
The requirement in Rule 7, §5 that the certification should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal means that counsel cannot sign the
certificate against forum-shopping. The reason for this is that the plaintiff or principal knows better than anyone else whether a petition has
previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same issues. Hence, a certification signed by counsel alone is defective and
constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition. 4
In this case, the petition for review was filed by Santiago Eslaban, Jr., in his capacity as Project Manager of the NIA. However, the verification
and certification against forum-shopping were signed by Cesar E. Gonzales, the administrator of the agency. The real party-in-interest is the
NIA, which is a body corporate. Without being duly authorized by resolution of the board of the corporation, neither Santiago Eslaban, Jr. nor
Cesar E. Gonzales could sign the certificate against forum-shopping accompanying the petition for review. Hence, on this ground alone, the
petition should be dismissed.
Second. Coming to the merits of the case, the land under litigation, as already stated, is covered by a transfer certificate of title registered in
the Registry Office of Koronadal, South Cotabato on May 13, 1976. This land was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (P-
25592) P-9800 which was issued pursuant to a homestead patent granted on February 18, 1960. We have held:
Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or conveyed to applicants thereof, and the deed grant or instrument of conveyance [sales
patent] registered with the Register of Deeds and the corresponding certificate and owner's duplicate of title issued, such lands are deemed
registered lands under the Torrens System and the certificate of title thus issued is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of
title issued to private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. 5
The Solicitor-General contends, however, that an encumbrance is imposed on the land in question in view of §39 of the Land Registration Act
(now P.D. No. 1529, §44) which provides:
Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who
takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate, and any
of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
Third. Any public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of
title does not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have been determined.
As this provision says, however, the only servitude which a private property owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is the
easement of a "public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title
9
does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined." This implies that the same should have been pre-existing at the time of
the registration of the land in order that the registered owner may be compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the easement is not pre-
existing and is sought to be imposed only after the land has been registered under the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings
should be had, and just compensation paid to the registered owner thereof. 6
In this case, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property was built only on October 6, 1981, several years after the
property had been registered on May 13, 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed and just compensation
paid to the owner thereof before it could be taken for public use. DHIcET
Indeed, the rule is that where private property is needed for conversion to some public use, the first thing obviously that the government should
do is to offer to buy it. 7 If the owner is willing to sell and the parties can agree on the price and the other conditions of the sale, a voluntary
transaction can then be concluded and the transfer effected without the necessity of a judicial action. Otherwise, the government will use its
power of eminent domain, subject to the payment of just compensation, to acquire private property in order to devote it to public use.
Third. With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the
market value which should be paid or "that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." 8 Further, just compensation means not only the correct
amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. 9 Nevertheless, as
noted in Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., 10 there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit,
in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.
Before its amendment in 1997, Rule 67, §4 provided:
Order of condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or when any party fails to defend as required by this rule, the court may enter an
order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. . .
It is now provided that —
SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. — If the objections to and the defense against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled,
or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not
prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the
court deems just and equitable. (Italics added)
Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever
came first." Even before the new rule, however, it was already held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos 11 that the price of the land
at the time of taking, not its value after the passage of time, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error
for the Court of Appeals to rule that the just compensation to be paid to respondent should be determined as of the filing of the complaint in
1990, and not the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and it was
respondent who filed the complaint. In the case of Burgos, 12 it was also the property owner who brought the action for compensation against
the government after 25 years since the taking of his property for the construction of a road. SEcITC
Indeed, the value of the land may be affected by many factors. It may be enhanced on account of its taking for public use, just as it may
depreciate. As observed in Republic v. Lara: 13
[W]here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for
which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or there may have been a natural
increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner
of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his
loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid
can be truly just, i.e., "just" not only to the individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to pay for it" . . .
In this case, the proper valuation for the property in question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level for 1982, based on the appraisal report
submitted by the commission (composed of the provincial treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato) constituted by the trial court to
make an assessment of the expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a per hectare basis. 14
Fourth. Petitioner finally contends that it is exempt from paying any amount to respondent because the latter executed an Affidavit of Waiver of
Rights and Fees of any compensation due in favor of the Municipal Treasurer of Barangay Sto. Nino, South Cotabato. However, as the Court
of Appeals correctly held:
[I]f NIA intended to bind the appellee to said affidavit, it would not even have bothered to give her any amount for damages caused on the
improvements/crops within the appellee's property. This, apparently was not the case, as can be gleaned from the disbursement voucher in
the amount of P4,180.00 (page 10 of the Folder of Exhibits in Civil Case 396) issued on September 17, 1983 in favor of the appellee, and the
letter from the Office of the Solicitor General recommending the giving of "financial assistance in the amount of P35,000.00" to the appellee.
Thus, We are inclined to give more credence to the appellee's explanation that the waiver of rights and fees "pertains only to improvements
and crops and not to the value of the land utilized by NIA for its main canal." 15
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the extent
that the just compensation for the contested property be paid to respondent in the amount of P16,047.61 per hectare, with interest at the legal
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of taking until full payment is made. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129998. December 29, 1998.]
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LOURDES HENSON, married to Eugenio Galvez; JOSEFINA HENSON, married to
Petronio Katigbak, JESUSA HENSON; CORAZON HENSON, married to Jose Ricafort; ALFREDO TANCHIATCO; BIENVENIDO DAVID;
MARIA BONDOC CAPILI, married to Romeo Capili; and MIGUEL MANOLOTO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J p:
The case is an appeal via certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga, in a special civil action for eminent domain, ordering the
10
National Power Corporation (NPC) to pay respondents landowners/claimants just compensation for the taking of their five (5) parcels of land,
with an area of 63,220 square meters at P400.00, per square meter, with legal interest from September 11, 1990, plus costs of the
proceedings. Cdpr
On March 21, 1990, the National Power Corporation (NPC) originally instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial District, Branch 46,
San Fernando, Pampanga a complaint 1 for eminent domain, later amended on October 11, 1990, for the taking for public use of five (5)
parcels of land, owned or claimed by respondents, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the expansion of the NPC Mexico
Sub-Station. 2
Respondents are the registered owners/claimants of the five (5) parcels of land sought to be expropriated, situated in San Jose Matulid,
Mexico Pampanga, more particularly described as follows:
"Parcel of rice land, being Lot 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the subdivision plan Psd-03-017121 (OLT) and being a portion of Lot 212 of Mexico
Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of San Jose Matulid, Municipality of Mexico, province of Pampanga, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the North
by Barangay Road Calle San Jose; on the East by Lot 6, Psd-03-017121 (OLT) owned by the National Power Corporation; on the South by Lot
101, Psd-03-017121 (OLT) being an irrigation ditch; on the West by Lot 100, Psd-03-0017121 (OLT) being an irrigation ditch and Barrio road,
containing an aggregate area of FIFTY EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED ELEVEN (58,311) square meters, which parcels of land are
broken down as follows with claimants;
1. Lot 1-A = 43,532 sq. m. — Henson Family
2. Lot 2-A = 6,823 sq. m. — Alfredo Tanchiatco,
encumbered with
Land Bank of the
Phil. (LBP)
3. Lot 3-A = 3,057 sq. m. — Bienvenido David,
Cadastre as surveyed for Josefina Katigbak, et al. Said five (5) parcels of land agricultural/riceland covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
of the Department of Agrarian Reform. 3
Petitioner needed the entire area of the five (5) parcels of land, comprising an aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the expansion of its
Mexico Subdivision. 4
On March 28, 1990, petitioner filed an urgent motion to fix the provisional value of the subject parcels of land. 3
On April 20, 1990, respondent filed a motion to dismiss. 4 They did not challenge petitioner's right to condemn their property, but declared that
the fair market value of their property was from P180.00 to P250.00 per square meter. 5
On July 10, 1990, the trial court denied respondents' motion to dismiss. The court did not declare that petitioner had a lawful right to take the
property sought to be expropriated. 6 However, the court fixed the provisional value of the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of
63,220 7 square meters of respondents' property, to be deposited with the Provisional Treasurer of Pampanga. Petitioner deposited the
amount on August 29, 1990. 8
On September 5, 1990, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor of petitioner, and, on September 11, 1990, the court's deputy sheriff
placed petitioner in possession of the subject land. 9
On November 22, 1990, and December 20, 1990, the trial court granted the motions of respondents to withdraw the deposit made by petitioner
of the provisional value of their property amounting to P5,831,100.00, with a balance of P690,900.00, remaining with the Provisional Treasurer
of Pampanga. 10
On April 5, 1991, the trial court issued an order appointing three (3) commissioners to aid the in the reception of evidence to determine just
compensation for the taking of subject property. After receiving the evidence and conducting an ocular inspection, the commissioners
submitted to the court their individual reports.
Commissioner Mariano C. Tiglao, in his report dated September 10, 1992, recommended that their fair market value of the entire 63,220
square meters property be fixed at P350.00 per square meter. Commissioner Arnold P. Atienza, in his report dated February 24, 1993,
recommended that the fair market value be fixed at P375.00 per square meter. Commissioner Victorino Oracio, in his report dated April 28,
1993, recommended that the fair market value be fixed at P170.00 per square meter. 11

encumbered with LBP However, the trial court did not conduct a hearing on any of the reports.

4. Lot 4-A = 1,438 sq. m. — Maria Bondoc On May 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just compensation to be paid by the petitioner for the taking of the
entire area of 63,220 squares meters at P400.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon computed from September 11, 1990, when
Capili, encumbered petitioner was placed in possession of the land, plus attorney's fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the proceedings. 12

with LBP In due time, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. 13

5. Lot 5-A = 3,461 sq. m. — Miguel Manoloto On July 23, 1997, the Court Appeals rendered decision affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, except that the award of P20,000.00 as
attorney's fees was deleted. 14
and Henson Family
Hence, this petition for review. 15
Total A = 58,311 sq. m."
By resolution adopted on October 8, 1997, the Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice. 16 On
and cover by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 557 in the name of Henson, et al.; Transfer Certificate of title No. 7131/Emancipation Patent No. January 7, 1998, respondents filed their comment thereon. 17
A-277216 in the name of Alfredo Tanchiatco; Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7111/Emancipation Patent No. A-278086 in the name of
Bienvenido David; Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7108/Emancipation Patent No. A-278089 in the name of Maria B. Capili; Certificate of Land By resolution adopted on February 2, 1998, the Court required petitioner to file a reply to the comment. 18 On August 25, 1990, petitioner filed
Transfer No. 4550 in the name of Miguel C. Manoloto, and Subdivision Plan Psd-03-017121 (OLT), which is a subdivision of Lot 212, Mexico a reply thereto. 19
11
We now resolve to give due course to the petition. We modify the appealed decision. cdphil a. Lot 1-A, with an area of 43,532 square meters belonging to Lourdes Henson, Josefina Henson, Jesusa Henson and Corazon Henson;

As respondents did not challenge petitioner's right to expropriate their property, the issue presented boils down to what is the just b. Lot 2-A, with an area of 6,823 square meters belonging to Alfredo Tanchiatco;
compensation for the taking of respondents' property for the expansion of the NPC's Mexico Sub-station, situated in San Jose Matulid, Mexico,
Pampanga. c. Lot 3-A, with an area of 3,057 square meters belonging to Bienvenido David (TCT No. 7111)

d. Lot 4-A, with an area of 1,438 square meters belonging to Maria Bondoc Capili (TCT No. 7108)

e. Lot 5-A, with an area of 3,461 square meters belonging to Miguel Manaloto (150 square meters), Certificate of Land Transfer No. 4550 and
The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any improvement. Except for
Henson Family (3,311 square meters),
the Henson family, all the other respondents were admittedly farmer beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. However, the land has been reclassified as residential. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal
deducting therefrom the amounts they had withdrawn from the deposit of petitioner for the provisional value of said parcels of land. 22
criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner. 20
2. With legal interest thereon at 6% per annum commencing on September 11, 1990, until the finality of this decision, and at 12% per annum
therefrom on the remaining unpaid amount until full payment.
In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals fixed the value of the land at P400.00 per square meter, which was the selling price of lots
in the adjacent fully developed subdivision, the Santo Domingo Village Subdivision. The land in question, however, was an undeveloped, idle
Let this decision be recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga.
land, principally agricultural in character, though reclassified as residential. Unfortunately, the trial court, after creating a board of
commissioners to help it determine the market value of the land did not conduct a hearing on the report of the commissioners. The trial court
No costs in all instances. SO ORDERED.
fixed the fair market value of subject land in an amount equal to the value of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision. This finds no
support in the evidence. The valuation was even higher than the recommendation of anyone of the commissioners. [G.R. No. 142971. May 7, 2002.]

On the other hand, Commissioner Atienza recommended a fair market value of P375.00 per square meter. This appears to be the closest THE CITY OF CEBU, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO, respondents.
valuation to the market value of lots in the adjoining fully developed subdivision. Considering that the subject parcels of land are undeveloped
raw land, the price of P375.00 per square meter would appear to the Court as the just compensation for the taking of such raw land. DECISION

Consequently, we agree with Commissioner Atienza's report that the fair market value of subject parcels of land be fixed at P375.00 per
square meter.
We also agree with petitioner that the area of the communal irrigation canal consisting of 4,809 square meters must be excluded from the land
to be expropriated. To begin with, it is excluded in the amended complaint. Hence, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in including
the same in the area to be taken.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J p:
In its petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner City of Cebu assails the decision of 11
October 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59204 1 affirming the judgment of 7 May 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13,
Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-14632, a case for eminent domain, which fixed the valuation of the land subject thereof on the basis of the
recommendation of the commissioners appointed by it.

The trial court erroneously ordered double payment for 3,611 square meters of lot 5 (portion) in the dispositive part of its decision, and, hence,
this must be deleted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly required petitioner to pay legal interest 21 on the compensation awarded from September 11,
1990, the date petitioner was placed in possession of the subject land, less the amount respondents had withdrawn from the deposit that
petitioner made with the Provincial Treasurer's Office.
The material operative facts are not disputed.
On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed in Civil Case No. CEB-14632 a complaint for eminent domain against respondents
spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the following parcels of land of respondents, to wit:
Lot No. 1527

We however, rule that petitioner is under its charter exempt from payment of costs of the proceedings. Area 1,146 square meters

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the trial court subject of the appeal are hereby MODIFIED. Tax Declaration 03472

We render judgment as follows: Title No. 31833

1. The Court fixes the amount of P375.00, per square meter, as the just compensation to be paid to respondents for the taking of their property Market value P240,660.00
consisting of five (5) parcels of land, with a total area of 58,311 square meters, described in and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
557, 7131, 7111, 7108 and Certificate of Land Transfer No. 4550, which parcels of land are broken down as follows: Assessed Value P72,200.00

12
 4. That the FIRST PARTY in the light of the issuance of the Writ of Possession Order dated September 21, 1994 issued by the Honorable
Lot No. 1528 Court, agreed to take possession over that portion of the lot sought to be expropriated where the house of the SECOND PARTY was located
only after fifteen (15) days upon the receipt of the SECOND PARTY of the amount of P1,786,400.00;
Area 793 square meters
5. That the SECOND PARTY upon receipt of the aforesaid provisional amount, shall turn over to the FIRST PARTY the title of the lot and
Area sought to be 478 square meters within the lapse of the fifteen (15) days grace period will voluntarily demolish their house and the other structure that may be located thereon at
their own expense;
expropriated

Tax Declaration 03450

6. That the FIRST PARTY and the SECOND PARTY jointly petition the Honorable Court to render judgment in said Civil Case No. CEB-14632
Title No. 31832
in accordance with this AGREEMENT;

Market value for the whole lot P1,666,530.00

7. That the judgment sought to be rendered under this agreement shall be followed by a supplemental judgment fixing the just compensation
for the property of the SECOND PARTY after the Commissioners appointed by this Honorable Court to determine the same shall have
Market value of the
rendered their report and approved by the court.

Area to be expropriated P100,380.00

Pursuant to said agreement, the trial court appointed three commissioners to determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be
expropriated. The commissioners were Palermo M. Lugo, who was nominated by petitioner and who was designated as Chairman; Alfredo
Assessed Value P49,960.00
Cisneros, who was nominated by respondents; and Herbert E. Buot, who was designated by the trial court. The parties agreed to their
for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the
appointment.
General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The lots are the most suitable site for the purpose.
The total area sought to be expropriated is 1,624 square meters with an assessed value of P1,786,400. Petitioner deposited with the
Thereafter, the commissioners submitted their report, which contained their respective assessments of and recommendation as to the
Philippine National Bank the amount of P51,156 representing 15% of the fair market value of the property to enable the petitioner to take
valuation of the property.
immediate possession of the property pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. 2
Respondents, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the purpose for which their property was to be expropriated was not for a public
On the basis of the commissioners' report and after due deliberation thereon, the trial court rendered its decision on 7 May 1996, 5 the decretal
purpose but for benefit of a single private entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc. Petitioner could simply buy directly from them the property at its fair
portion of which reads:
market value if it wanted to, just like what it did with the neighboring lots. Besides, the price offered was very low in light of the consideration of
P20,000 per square meter, more or less, which petitioner paid to the neighboring lots. Finally, respondents alleged that they have no other land
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in accordance with the report of the commissioners.
in Cebu City.
Plaintiff is directed to pay Spouses Apolonio S. Dedamo and Blasa Dedamo the sum of pesos: TWENTY FOUR MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
A pre-trial was thereafter had.
SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY (P24,865,930.00) representing the compensation mentioned in the Complaint.

On 23 August 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The motion was
Plaintiff and defendants are directed to pay the following commissioner's fee;
granted by the trial court on 21 September 1994. 3
1. To Palermo Lugo - P21,000.00
On 14 December 1994, the parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement 4 wherein they declared that they have partially
settled the case and in consideration thereof they agreed:
2. To Herbert Buot - P19,000.00

1. That the SECOND PARTY hereby conforms to the intention to [sic] the FIRST PARTY in expropriating their parcels of land in the above-
3. To Alfredo Cisneros - P19,000.00
cited case as for public purpose and for the benefit of the general public;
Without pronouncement as to cost.
2. That the SECOND PARTY agrees to part with the ownership of the subject parcels of land in favor of the FIRST PARTY provided the latter
will pay just compensation for the same in the amount determined by the court after due notice and hearing;
SO ORDERED.

3. That in the meantime the SECOND PARTY agrees to receive the amount of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the commissioners' report was inaccurate since it included an area which was
FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (1,786,400.00) as provisional payment for the subject parcels of land, without prejudice to the final valuation as
not subject to expropriation. More specifically, it contended that Lot No. 1528 contains 793 square meters but the actual area to be
may be determined by the court;

13
expropriated is only 478 square meters. The remaining 315 square meters is the subject of a separate expropriation proceeding in Civil Case
No. CEB-8348, then pending before Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
On 16 August 1996, the commissioners submitted an amended assessment for the 478 square meters of Lot No. 1528 and fixed it at
P12,824.10 per square meter, or in the amount of P20,826,339.50. The assessment was approved as the just compensation thereof by the
trial court in its Order of 27 December 1996. 6 Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the decision was amended to reflect the new valuation.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 59204. Petitioner alleged that the lower
court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market
price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals. In its decision of 11 October 1999, 7 the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court.
Still unsatisfied, petitioner filed with us the petition for review in the case at bar. It raises the sole issue of whether just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. It asserts that it should be, which in this case should be 17 September 1993 and not at
the time the property was actually taken in 1994, pursuant to the decision in "National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals." 8
In their Comment, respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision of the trial court because (1) the trial
court decided the case on the basis of the agreement of the parties that just compensation shall be fixed by commissioners appointed by the
court; (2) petitioner did not interpose any serious objection to the commissioners' report of 12 August 1996 fixing the just compensation of the
1,624-square meter lot at P20,826,339.50; hence, it was estopped from attacking the report on which the decision was based; and (3) the
determined just compensation fixed is even lower than the actual value of the property at the time of the actual taking in 1994.
Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is the Government's right to appropriate, in the nature of
a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. 9 However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just
compensation as consideration therefor.
In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160,
which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. The Section reads as follows:
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may
not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further,
That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined
by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. 10 We did not categorically rule in that case that just
compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining
just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception:
where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings."
Also, the trial court followed the then governing procedural law on the matter, which was Section 5 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which
provided as follows:
SEC. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. — Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3)
competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and
specify the time within which their report is to be filed with the court.
More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of
the commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between them and
should be complied with in good faith. Article 1159 and 1315 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:
Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November 1996, petitioner did not interpose a serious objection. 11 It is therefore too late for petitioner
to question the valuation now without violating the principle of equitable estoppel. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts,
representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces
another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is
permitted to deny the existence of such facts. 12 Records show that petitioner consented to conform with the valuation recommended by the
commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement now and assail correctness of the commissioner's assessment.
Finally, while Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall be determined at the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation, 13 such law cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a substantive law. 14
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59204, the petition in this case
is hereby DENIED. CcSTHI
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 161656. June 29, 2005.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL ROMEO ZULUETA, COMMODORE EDGARDO GALEOS, ANTONIO CABALUNA, DOROTEO
MANTOS & FLORENCIO BELOTINDOS, petitioners, vs. VICENTE G. LIM, respondent.
RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions. 1 When the state wields its power of eminent domain, there arises a correlative obligation on its
part to pay the owner of the expropriated property a just compensation. If it fails, there is a clear case of injustice that must be redressed. In
the present case fifty-seven (57) years have lapsed from the time the Decision in the subject expropriation proceedings became final, but still
the Republic of the Philippines, herein petitioner, has not compensated the owner of the property. To tolerate such prolonged inaction on its
part is to encourage distrust and resentment among our people — the very vices that corrode the ties of civility and tempt men to act in ways
they would otherwise shun.
A revisit of the pertinent facts in the instant case is imperative.
14
On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil action for expropriation with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the
purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921 with an area of 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia Denzon and covered by
TCT No. 12560 consisting of 13,164 square meters.
After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to the Order of the CFI dated October 19, 1938, the Republic took
possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of
P4,062.10 as just compensation.
The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5,
1948.
In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it
"denied knowledge of the matter." Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to the Office of then President Carlos Garcia who wrote the
Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite action on said claim. On September 6, 1961, Lt. Manuel
Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time. ETaSDc
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons' successors-in-interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and
Josefina Galeos-Panerio, 2 filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-7208.
In the interim or on November 9, 1961, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932 and 939 were issued in the names of Francisca
Valdehueza and Josefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated thereon was the phrase "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation
to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value."
On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained
their right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republic's failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation
proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. In
view of "the differences in money value from 1940 up to the present," the court adjusted the market value at P16,248.40, to be paid with 6%
interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full payment.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza and Panerio appealed from the CFI Decision, in view of the amount in
controversy, directly to this Court. The case was docketed as No. L-21032. 3 On May 19, 1966, this Court rendered its Decision affirming the
CFI Decision. It held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just
compensation by the Republic. Apparently, this Court found nothing in the records to show that the Republic paid the owners or their
successors-in-interest according to the CFI decision. While it deposited the amount of P9,500.00, and said deposit was allegedly disbursed,
however, the payees could not be ascertained.
Notwithstanding the above finding, this Court still ruled that Valdehueza and Panerio are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may
only demand the payment of their fair market value, ratiocinating as follows:
"Appellants would contend that: (1) possession of Lots 932 and 939 should be restored to them as owners of the same; (2) the Republic
should be ordered to pay rentals for the use of said lots, plus attorney's fees; and (3) the court a quo in the present suit had no power to fix the
value of the lots and order the execution of the deed of sale after payment.
It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having been a transfer of said lots in favor of the Government. The
records do not show that the Government paid the owners or their successors-in-interest according to the 1940 CFI decision although, as
stated, P9,500.00 was deposited by it, and said deposit had been disbursed. With the records lost, however, it cannot be known who received
the money (Exh. 14 says: 'It is further certified that the corresponding Vouchers and pertinent Journal and Cash Book were destroyed during
the last World War, and therefore the names of the payees concerned cannot be ascertained.') And the Government now admits that there is
no available record showing that payment for the value of the lots in question has been made (Stipulation of Facts, par. 9, Rec. on Appeal, p.
28). SacDIE
The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation
proceedings. By final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold
to the Government. In fact, the abovementioned title certificates secured by plaintiffs over said lots contained annotations of the right of the
National Airports Corporation (now CAA) to pay for and acquire them. It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the
expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated
lots — which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated — but only to demand the fair market value of the same."
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, 4 as security for their loans. For their
failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No. 23934 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
63894 was issued in his name.
On August 20, 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Cebu City, against
General Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as Commander of Naval
District V of the Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna, Doroteo Mantos and Florencio Belotindos, herein petitioners. Subsequently, he amended
the complaint to implead the Republic.
On May 4, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, thus:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Vicente Lim and against all defendants, public and private, declaring plaintiff
Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No. 932 with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. The
monetary claims in the complaint and in the counter claims contained in the answer of defendants are ordered Dismissed.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. CV No. 72915. In its Decision 5 dated September 18,
2003, the Appellate Court sustained the RTC Decision, thus:
"Obviously, defendant-appellant Republic evaded its duty of paying what was due to the landowners. The expropriation proceedings had
already become final in the late 1940's and yet, up to now, or more than fifty (50) years after, the Republic had not yet paid the compensation
fixed by the court while continuously reaping benefits from the expropriated property to the prejudice of the landowner. . . . This is contrary to
the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot
be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to
wait for a decade or more, in this case more than 50 years, before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss. To allow the
taking of the landowners' properties, and in the meantime leave them empty-handed by withholding payment of compensation while the
government speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse, for government to subsequently decide to abandon the
property and return it to the landowners, is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must never be sanctioned. (Land Bank
of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404).
xxx xxx xxx
An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential
for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property, which is the subject matter of the action. Also the
15
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy (Robles vs. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 97). In view of the foregoing discussion,
clearly, the claim of defendant-appellant Republic constitutes a cloud, doubt or uncertainty on the title of plaintiff-appellee Vicente Lim that can
be removed by an action to quiet title. ESDHCa
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the appealed May 4, 2001 Decision of Branch 9, Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-12701, the said decision is UPHELD AND AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
merit."
Undaunted, petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari alleging that the
Republic has remained the owner of Lot 932 as held by this Court in Valdehueza vs. Republic. 6
In our Resolution dated March 1, 2004, we denied the petition outright on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible
error. Petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration but we denied the same with finality in our Resolution of May 17, 2004.
On May 18, 2004, respondent filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an entry of judgment. We only noted the motion in our Resolution of
July 12, 2004.
On July 7, 2004, petitioners filed an urgent plea/motion for clarification, which is actually asecond motion for reconsideration. Thus, in our
Resolution of September 6, 2004, we simply noted without action the motion considering that the instant petition was already denied with
finality in our Resolution of May 17, 2004.
On October 29, 2004, petitioners filed a very urgent motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated September 6,
2004 (with prayer to refer the case to the En Banc). They maintain that the Republic's right of ownership has been settled in Valdehueza.
The basic issue for our resolution is whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondent's
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.
Initially, we must rule on the procedural obstacle.
While we commend the Republic for the zeal with which it pursues the present case, we reiterate that its urgent motion for clarification filed on
July 7, 2004 is actually a second motion for reconsideration. This motion is prohibited under Section 2, Rule 52, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which provides:
"Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. — No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall
be entertained."
Consequently, as mentioned earlier, we simply noted without action the motion since petitioners' petition was already denied with finality.
Considering the Republic's urgent and serious insistence that it is still the owner of Lot 932 and in the interest of justice, we take another hard
look at the controversial issue in order to determine the veracity of petitioner's stance.
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law;
and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for
public use. 7 Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation."
The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondent's predecessors-in-interest the just
compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The length of time and the manner with which it evaded payment demonstrate its arbitrary high-
handedness and confiscatory attitude. The final judgment in the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No. 781) was entered on April 5, 1948.
More than half of a century has passed, yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed. Undoubtedly, over 50
years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair. This is more so when such delay is accompanied by bureaucratic hassles.
Apparent from Valdehueza is the fact that respondent's predecessors-in-interest were given a "run around" by the Republic's officials and
agents. In 1950, despite the benefits it derived from the use of the two lots, the National Airports Corporation denied knowledge of the claim of
respondent's predecessors-in-interest. Even President Garcia, who sent a letter to the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of
National Defense to expedite the payment, failed in granting relief to them. And, on September 6, 1961, while the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots, nothing happened. aIcDCH
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic's delay is contrary to the rules of fair play, as "just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered 'just.'" In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated
property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be
treated as a trespasser ab initio. 8
Corollarily, in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya, 9 similar to the present case, this Court expressed its disgust over the
government's vexatious delay in the payment of just compensation, thus:
"The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to be paid for their land which was taken for use as a public high school. As a
matter of fair procedure, it is the duty of the Government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to supply all
required documentation and facilitate payment of just compensation. The imposition of unreasonable requirements and vexatious delays
before effecting payment is not only galling and arbitrary but a rich source of discontent with government. There should be some kind of swift
and effective recourse against unfeeling and uncaring acts of middle or lower level bureaucrats."
We feel the same way in the instant case.
More than anything else, however, it is the obstinacy of the Republic that prompted us to dismiss its petition outright. As early as May 19,
1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondent's predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16,248.40 as "reasonable
market value of the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court's
mandate. Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the rule of law, which we cannot countenance. It is
tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the
government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however, the Constitution guarantees that when
this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by compensation. 10 From the taking of private property by the
government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss. 11
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting
function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the
individual's rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and
liberally in favor of the property owner. 12
Ironically, in opposing respondent's claim, the Republic is invoking this Court's Decision in Valdehueza, a Decision it utterly defied. How could
the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years?
The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. In Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. et al., vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 13 thus:
"Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is
entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the
commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.
16
. . . Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the
owner until payment is actually made. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just
compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniform to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, it
was held that 'actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property
in the State' albeit 'not to the appropriation of it to public use.' In Rexford v. Knight, the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction
upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and
appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that 'both on principle and authority the rule is . . . that the right
to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but
that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, that:
'If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of
expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken
from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid . . .'" (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated,
the Republic's acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time. 14
Significantly, in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia 15 this Court ruled that the expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit:
". . . The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of
its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that
the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint" . . . ECDaTI
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. . . .
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment
Corporation, 16 we ruled that, "the process is not completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay
respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.
The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to recover possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of
its fair market value. Of course, we are aware of the doctrine that "non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does
not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots." This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 17 and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority. 18 However, the facts of the present case do not justify
its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation proceedings
and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republic's failure to pay just
compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the
courts held that recovery of possession may be had when property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act
under the power of eminent domain 19 or where a rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has
been assessed or agreed upon; 20 or fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed and paid. 21
The Republic also contends that where there have been constructions being used by the military, as in this case, public interest demands that
the present suit should not be sustained.
It must be emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived of his property for the public convenience. 22 In Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 23 we ruled:
"One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the
means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the
Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the
most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to
say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who
would deny him that right.
The right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the
owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation."
The Republic's assertion that the defense of the State will be in grave danger if we shall order the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an
overstatement. First, Lot 932 had ceased to operate as an airport. What remains in the site is just the National Historical Institute's marking
stating that Lot 932 is the "former location of Lahug Airport." And second, there are only thirteen (13) structures located on Lot 932, eight (8) of
which are residence apartments of military personnel. Only two (2) buildings are actually used as training centers. Thus, practically speaking,
the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent will only affect a handful of military personnel. It will not result to "irreparable damage" or "damage
beyond pecuniary estimation," as what the Republic vehemently claims. ETCcSa
We thus rule that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the
Republic. Unless this form of swift and effective relief is granted to him, the grave injustice committed against his predecessors-in-interest,
though no fault or negligence on their part, will be perpetuated. Let this case, therefore, serve as a wake-up call to the Republic that in the
exercise of its power of eminent domain, necessarily in derogation of private rights, it must comply with the Constitutional limitations. This
Court, as the guardian of the people's right, will not stand still in the face of the Republic's oppressive and confiscatory taking of private
property, as in this case.
At this point, it may be argued that respondent Vicente Lim acted in bad faith in entering into a contract of mortgage with Valdehueza and
Panerio despite the clear annotation in TCT No. 23934 that Lot 932 is "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation [to acquire
said parcels of land] . . . upon previous payment of a reasonable market value."
The issue of whether or not respondent acted in bad faith is immaterial considering that the Republic did not complete the expropriation
process. In short, it failed to perfect its title over Lot 932 by its failure to pay just compensation. The issue of bad faith would have assumed
relevance if the Republic actually acquired title over Lot 932. In such a case, even if respondent's title was registered first, it would be the
Republic's title or right of ownership that shall be upheld. But now, assuming that respondent was in bad faith can such fact vest upon the
Republic a better title over Lot 932? We believe not. This is because in the first place, the Republic has no title to speak of.
At any rate, assuming that respondent had indeed knowledge of the annotation, still nothing would have prevented him from entering into a
mortgage contract involving Lot 932 while the expropriation proceeding was pending. Any person who deals with a property subject of an
expropriation does so at his own risk, taking into account the ultimate possibility of losing the property in favor of the government. Here, the
annotation merely served as a caveat that the Republic had a preferential right to acquire Lot 932 upon its payment of a "reasonable market
value." It did not proscribe Valdehueza and Panerio from exercising their rights of ownership including their right to mortgage or even to
dispose of their property. In Republic vs. Salem Investment Corporation, 24 we recognized the owner's absolute right over his property
pending completion of the expropriation proceeding, thus:
17

"It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just
compensation that title over the property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and
terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights
pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through
expropriation.
It bears emphasis that when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to respondent in 1964, they were still the owners thereof and their
title had not yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never did. Such title or ownership was rendered conclusive when we categorically
ruled in Valdehueza that: "It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having been a transfer of said lots in favor
of the Government."
For respondent's part, it is reasonable to conclude that he entered into the contract of mortgage with Valdehueza and Panerio fully aware of
the extent of his right as a mortgagee. A mortgage is merely an accessory contract intended to secure the performance of the principal
obligation. One of its characteristics is that it is inseparable from the property. It adheres to the property regardless of who its owner may
subsequently be. 25 Respondent must have known that even if Lot 932 is ultimately expropriated by the Republic, still, his right as a
mortgagee is protected. In this regard, Article 2127 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 2127. The mortgage extends to the natural accessions, to the improvements, growing fruits, and the rents or income not yet received
when the obligation becomes due, and to the amount of the indemnity granted or owing to the proprietor from the insurers of the property
mortgaged, or in virtue of expropriation for public use, with the declarations, amplifications, and limitations established by law, whether the
estate remains in the possession of the mortgagor or it passes in the hands of a third person. HcSDIE
In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, 26 however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) 27 years from
the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property.
This is in consonance with the principle that "the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment." 28 To be sure, the five-
year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it
is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation.
In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, 29 we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
"just."
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72915 is AFFIRMED in toto.
The Republic's motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated March 1, 2004 is DENIED with FINALITY. No further pleadings will be
allowed.
Let an entry of judgment be made in this case. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 139495. November 27, 2000.]
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGINIA
CHIONGBIAN, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, Jp:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA G.R. CV No. 56495 entitled "Virginia
Chiongbian vs. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority" which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, 2 7th Judicial Region,
Branch 24, Cebu City.
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision based on the following facts:
"Subject of the action is Lot 941 consisting of 13,766 square meters located in Lahug, Cebu City, adjoining the then Lahug Airport and covered
by TCT No. 120366 of the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City, in the name of MCIAA.
During the liberation, the Lahug Airport was occupied by the United States Army. Then, in 1947, it was turned over to the Philippine
Government through the Surplus Property Commission. Subsequently, it was transferred to the Bureau of Aeronautics which was succeeded
by the National Airports Corporation. When the latter was dissolved, it was replaced by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA).
On April 16, 1952, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the CAA, filed an expropriation proceeding, Civil Case No. R-1881 (Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch), on several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which included Lot 941, for the expansion and
improvement of Lahug Airport.
In June 1953, appellee Virginia Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, Antonina Faborada, the original defendant in the
expropriation case, for P8,000.00. Subsequently, TCT No. 9919 was issued in her name (Exh. D).
Then, on December 29, 1961, judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the Republic of the Philippines which was made to
pay Virginia Chiongbian the amount of P34,415.00 for Lot 941, with legal interest computed from November 16, 1947, the date when the
government begun using it. Virginia Chiongbian did not appeal therefrom.
Thereafter, absolute title to Lot 941 was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. 27696 (Exhs. E and 2).
Then, in 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed by Congress creating the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority to which the assets of
the Lahug Airport was transferred. Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of MCIAA under TCT No. 120366 on May 8, 1992.
On July 24, 1995, Virginia Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 9, docketed
as Civil Case No. CEB-17650 alleging, that sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) ventured to expand the Cebu Lahug
Airport. As a consequence, it sought to acquire by expropriation or negotiated sale several parcels of lands adjoining the Lahug Airport, one of
which was Lot 941 owned by Virginia Chiongbian. Since she and other landowners could not agree with the NAC's offer for the compensation
of their lands, a suit for eminent domain was instituted on April 16, 1952, before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch III), against
forty-five (45) landowners, including Virginia Chiongbian, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881, entitled "Republic of the Philippine vs. Damian
Ouano, et al." It was finally decided on December 29, 1961 in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
Some of the defendants-landowners, namely, Milagros Urgello, Mamerto Escaño, Inc. and Ma. Atega Vda. de Deen, appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals under CA-G.R. No. 33045-R, which rendered a modified judgment allowing them to repurchase their expropriated
properties. Virginia Chiongbian, on the other hand, did not appeal and instead, accepted the compensation for Lot 941 in the amount of
P34,415, upon the assurance of the NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of reconveyance for the same price once the land
would no longer be used as (sic) airport.
Consequently, TCT No. 9919 of Virginia Chiongbian was cancelled and TCT No. 27696 was issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. Then, with the creation of the MCIAA, it was cancelled and TCT No. 120366 was issued in its name.
18
However, no expansion of the Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-interest. In fact, when Mactan International
Airport was opened for commercial flights, the Lahug Airport was closed at the end of 1991 and all its airport activities were undertaken at and
transferred to the Mactan International Airport. Thus, the purpose for which Lot 941 was taken ceased to exist." 3
On June 3, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Virginia Chiongbian (CHIONGBIAN) the dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Virginia Chiongbian and against the
defendant, Mactan Cebu International Authority (MCIAA), ordering the latter to restore to plaintiff the possession and ownership of the property
denominated as Lot No. 941 upon reimbursement of the expropriation price paid to plaintiff.
The Register of Deeds is therefore ordered to effect the Transfer of the Certificate Title from the defendant to the plaintiff on Lot No. 941,
cancelling Transfer Certificate of Title No. 120366 in the name of defendant MCIAA and to issue a new title on the same lot in the name of
Virginia Chiongbian.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED." 4
Aggrieved by the holding of the trial court, the petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC decision. Motion for Reconsideration was denied 5 hence this petition where MCIAA raises the
following grounds in support of its petition:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT THERE WAS A REPURCHASE AGREEMENT
AND IGNORING PETITIONER'S PROTESTATIONS THAT ADMISSION OF RESPONDENT'S ORAL EVIDENCE IS NOT ALLOWED UNDER
THE STATUE OF FRAUDS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN LIMBACO IS MATERIAL AND APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MODIFIED JUDGMENT IN CA-GR NO. 33045 SHOULD INURE TO THE
BENEFIT OF CHIONGBIAN EVEN IF SHE WAS NOT A PARTY IN SAID APPEALED CASE.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RIGHT OF VIRGINIA CHIONGBIAN TO REPURCHASE SHOULD BE UNDER
THE SAME TERMS AND CONDITIONS AS THE OTHER LANDOWNERS SUCH THAT HER REPURCHASE PRICE IS ONLY P34,415.00." 6
MCIAA contends that the Republic of the Philippines appropriated Lot No. 941 through expropriation proceedings in Civil Case No. R-1881.
The judgment rendered therein was unconditional and did not contain a stipulation that ownership thereof would revert to CHIONGBIAN nor
did it give CHIONGBIAN the right to repurchase the same in the event the lot was no longer used for the purpose it was expropriated.
Moreover, CHIONGBIAN's claim that there was a repurchase agreement is not supported by documentary evidence. The mere fact that twenty
six (26) other landowners repurchased their property located at the aforementioned Lahug airport is of no consequence considering that said
landowners were able to secure a rider in their contracts entitling them to repurchase their property.
MCIAA also argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that it did not object to the evidence presented by CHIONGBIAN to prove
the alleged repurchase agreement considering that the transcript of stenographic notes shows that it manifested its objections thereto for
being in violation of the Statute of Frauds.
MCIAA also faults the Court of Appeals for applying the ruling in the case of Limbaco vs. Court of Appeals. 7 It is the position of MCIAA that the
ruling in the case of Limbaco is not squarely in point with respect to the present case for the reason that the Limbaco case involved a contract
of sale of real property and not an expropriation.
Moreover, MCIAA alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the case of Escaño, et. al. vs. Republic 8 proves the existence of the
repurchase agreement. MCIAA claims that although the parties in said case were CHIONGBIAN's co-defendants in Civil Case No. R-1881,
CHIONGBIAN did not join in their appeal of the judgment of condemnation. The modified judgment in CA G.R. No. 33045-R should not
therefore redound to CHIONGBIAN's benefit who was no longer a party thereto or to the compromise agreement which Escaño et. al. entered
into with the Republic of the Philippines. TECcHA
Finally, assuming for the sake of argument that CHIONGBIAN has a right to repurchase Lot No. 941, MCIAA claims that the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that the right of CHIONGBIAN to purchase said lot should be under the same terms and conditions given to the other
landowners and not at the prevailing market price. Such ruling is grossly unfair and would result in unjustly enriching CHIONGBIAN for the
reason that she received just compensation for the property at the time of its taking by the government and that the property is now worth
several hundreds of millions of pesos due to the improvements introduced by MCIAA. 9
On the other hand, aside from praying that this Court affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, the private respondent CHIONGBIAN prays
that the petition be denied for the reason that it violates the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, more specifically the requirement of a certification
of non-forum shopping. CHIONGBIAN claims that the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping executed by the MCIAA on
September 13, 1999 was signed by a Colonel Marcelino A. Cordova whose appointment as Assistant General Manager of MCIAA was
disapproved by the Civil Service Commission as early as September 2, 1999. It is CHIONGBIAN's position that since his appointment was
disapproved, the Verification attached to the petition for review on certiorari cannot be considered as having been executed by the "plaintiff" or
"principal party" who under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court can validly make the certification in the instant petition. Consequently, the
petition should be considered as not being verified and as such should not be considered as having been filed at all.
After a careful consideration of the arguments presented by the parties, we resolve to grant the petition.
We first resolve the procedural issue.
We are not persuaded by CHIONGBIAN's claim that the Verification and Certification against forum shopping accompanying MCIAA's petition
was insufficient for allegedly having been signed by one who was not qualified to do so. As pointed out by the MCIAA, Colonel Cordova signed
the Verification and Certification against forum shopping as Acting General Manager of the MCIAA, pursuant to Office Order No. 5322-99
dated September 10, 1999 issued by the General Manager of MCIAA, Alfonso Allere. 10 Colonel Cordova did not sign the Verification and
Certification against forum shopping pursuant to his appointment as assistant General Manager of the MCIAA, which was later disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments. This fact has not been disputed by CHIONGBIAN.
We come now to the substantive aspects of the case wherein the issue to be resolved is whether the abandonment of the public use for which
Lot No. 941 was expropriated entitles CHIONGBIAN to reacquire it.
In Fery vs. Municipality of Cabanatuan, 11 this Court had occasion to rule on the same issue as follows:
19

"The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, a
municipality, or a corporation which has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent domain. If, for example, land is expropriated
for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of
course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If, for example, land is
expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course,
when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary. Many
other similar examples might be given. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of
course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the
non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings. DCATHS
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the
former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. 12
In the present case, evidence reveals that Lot No. 941 was appropriated by the Republic of the Philippines through expropriation proceedings
in Civil Case No. R-1881. The dispositive portion of the decision in said case reads insofar as pertinent as follows:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the expropriation of Lots Nos. 75, 76, 89, 90, 91, 105, 106, 107, 108, 104, 921-A, 88, 93, 913-B, 72, 77, 916, 777-A, 918, 919,
920, 764-A, 988, 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 752-A, 263-A, 941, 942, 740-A, 743, 985, 956, 976-A, 984, 989-A; and 947, including in the Lahug
Airport, Cebu City, justified and in lawful exercise of the right of eminent domain;
2. Declaring the fair market values of the lots thus taken and condemning the plaintiff to pay the same to the respective owners with legal
interest from the dates indicated therein, as follows: Lots Nos. 75, 76, 89, 90, 91, 92, 105, 106, 107, 108-P31, 977 (minus P10,639 or P21,278
as balance in favor of Mamerto Escaño, Inc., with legal interest from November 16, 1947 until fully paid; . . . Lot No. 941-P34,415.00 in favor of
Virginia Chiongbian, with legal interest from November 16, 1947 until fully paid; . . .
3. After the payment of the foregoing financial obligation to the landowners, directing the latter to deliver to the plaintiff the corresponding
Transfer Certificate of Title to their representative lots; and upon the presentation of the said titles to the Register of Deeds, ordering the latter
to cancel the same and to issue, in lieu thereof, new Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of the plaintiff.
NO COST.
SO ORDERED." 13 (Italics supplied)
The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was
no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the
purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug airport.
CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan Cebu International Airport vs. Court of Appeals 14 wherein the presentation of parol
evidence was allowed to prove the existence of a written agreement containing the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation
proceedings but a contract of sale. This Court consequently allowed the presentation of parol evidence to prove the existence of an agreement
allowing the right of repurchase based on the following ratiocination:
"Under the parol evidence rule, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon, and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in
his pleading, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties thereto. In the case at bench, the fact which private
respondents seek to establish by parol evidence consists of the agreement or representation made by the NAC that induced Inez Ouano to
execute the deed of sale; that the vendors and their heirs are given the right of repurchase should the government no longer need the
property. Where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the moving cause of the written contract, or where the parol agreement forms part
of the consideration of the written contract, and it appears that the written contract was executed on the faith of the parol contract or
representation, such evidence is admissible. It is recognized that proof is admissible of any collateral parol agreement that is not inconsistent
with the terms of the written contract though it may relate to the same subject matter. The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a
writing does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of existing evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements
between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such
collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity. aCIHcD
More importantly, no objection was made by petitioner when private respondents introduced evidence to show the right of repurchase granted
by the NAC to Inez Ouano. It has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission of any
evidence must be made at the proper time, and if not so made, it will be understood to have been waived." 15
This pronouncement is not applicable to the present case since the parol evidence rule which provides that "when the terms of a written
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be, between the parties and
their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement" applies to written agreements and
has no application to a judgment of a court. To permit CHIONGBIAN to prove the existence of a compromise settlement which she claims to
have entered into with the Republic of the Philippines prior to the rendition of judgment in the expropriation case would result in a modification
of the judgment of a court which has long become final and executory. IEHaSc
And even assuming for the sake of argument that CHIONGBIAN could prove the existence of the alleged written agreement acknowledging
her right to repurchase Lot No. 941 through parol evidence, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the evidence presented by
CHIONGBIAN was admissible.
Under 1403 of the Civil Code, a contract for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable unless the same, or some note or memorandum
thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore of the agreement cannot be received without
the writing or a secondary evidence of its contents.
Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the records reveal that MCIAA objected to the purpose for which the testimonies of
CHIONGBIAN 16 and Patrosinio Berceder 17 (BERCEDE) were offered, i.e. to prove the existence of the alleged written agreement evincing a
right to repurchase Lot No. 941 in favor of CHIONGBIAN, for being in violation of the Statute of Frauds. MCIAA also objected to the purpose
for which the testimony of Attorney Manuel Pastrana (PASTRANA) was offered, i.e. to prove the existence of the alleged written agreement
and an alleged deed of sale, on the same ground. 18 Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses are inadmissible under the Statute of
Frauds to prove the existence of the alleged sale.
Aside from being inadmissible under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, CHIONGBIAN's and BERCEDE's testimonies are also
inadmissible for being hearsay in nature. Evidence is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but
on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. 19 CHIONGBIAN, through deposition, testified that:
"ATTY. DUBLIN (To Witness)
Q: Mrs. Chiongbian, you said a while ago that there was an assurance by the government to return this property to you in case Lahug Airport
will be no longer used, is that correct?
20
WITNESS: Q: So, in effect, it was your lawyer, Atty. Pedro Calderon, who made the assurance to you that the property will be returned in case Lahug
Airport will be abandoned?
A: Yes, sir. That is true.
A: Yes, sir. 20
ATTY. DUBLIN: (To witness)
CHIONGBIAN's testimony shows that she had no personal knowledge of the alleged assurance made by the Republic of the Philippines that
Q: Can you recall when was this verbal assurance made? Lot No. 941 would be returned to her in the event that the Lahug Airport was closed. She stated that she only learned of the alleged assurance
of the Republic of the Philippines through her lawyer, Attorney Calderon, who was not presented as a witness.
A: I cannot remember anymore. BERCEDE's testimony regarding the alleged agreement is likewise inadmissible to prove the existence of the agreement for also being
hearsay in nature. Like CHIONGBIAN, BERCEDE did not have personal knowledge of the alleged assurance made by the Republic of the
Q: You cannot also remember the year in which the alleged assurance was made? Philippines to his father that their land would be returned should the Lahug Airport cease to operate for he only learned of the alleged
assurance through his father.
A: I cannot also remember because I'm very forgetful.
PASTRANA's testimony does little to help CHIONGBIAN's cause. He claims that subsequent to the execution of the alleged written agreement
Q: Now, can you tell us so far as you can remember who was that person or government authority or employee that made the alleged but prior to the rendition of judgment in the expropriation case, the Republic and CHIONGBIAN executed a Deed of Sale over Lot No. 941
assurance? wherein CHIONGBIAN sold the aforementioned lot to the Republic of the Philippines. However, CHIONGBIAN never mentioned the existence
of a deed of sale. 21 In fact, the records disclose that Lot No. 941 was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the judgment
A: The owner of the property. of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 which CHIONGBIAN herself enforced by filing a motion for withdrawal of the money after the
decision was rendered. 22 Moreover, since the very terms of the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 are silent regarding the alleged deed of
Q: Now, how many times was this assurance being made to you to return this property in case the Lahug Airport will no longer be used? sale or of the alleged written agreement acknowledging the right of CHIONGBIAN to repurchase Lot No. 941, the only logical conclusion is that
no sale in fact took place and that no compromise agreement was executed prior to the rendition of the judgment. Had CHIONGBIAN and the
A: 2 or 3, I cannot recall. Republic executed a contract of sale as claimed by PASTRANA, the Republic of the Philippines would not have needed to pursue the
expropriation case inasmuch as it would be duplicitous and would result in the Republic of the Philippines expropriating something it had
Q: You cannot also remember in what particular place or places was this assurance being made? already owned. Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or by the lack of agreement as to
the price. 23 Consequently, CHIONGBIAN cannot compel MCIAA to reconvey Lot No. 941 to her since she has no cause of action against
A: In my previous residence in Mabolo. MCIAA. caTESD

DEPOSITION OFFICER: Finally, CHIONGBIAN cannot invoke the modified judgment of the Court of Appeals in the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Escaño, et.
al. 24 where her co-defendants, Mamerto Escaño, Inc., Milagros Urgello and Maria Atega Vda. De Deen entered into separate and distinct
The assurance was made in my previous residence at Mabolo. compromise agreements with the Republic of the Philippines wherein they agreed to sell their land subject of the expropriation proceedings to
the latter subject to the resolutory condition that in the event the Republic of the Philippines no longer uses said property as an airport, title and
WITNESS: ownership of said property shall revert to its respective owners upon reimbursement of the price paid therefor without interest. MCIAA correctly
points out that since CHIONGBIAN did not appeal the judgment of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 and was not a party to the appeal of
A: I entrusted that to my lawyer, Atty. Pedro Calderon. IDSaEA her co-defendants, the judgment therein cannot redound to her benefit. And even assuming that CHIONGBIAN was a party to the appeal, she
was not a party to the compromise agreements entered into by her co-defendants. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making
ATTY. DUBLIN: (to witness) reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. 25 Essentially, it is a contract perfected by mere consent, the
latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. 26 A
Q: You mean the assurance was made personally to your lawyer at that time, Atty. Pedro Calderon? judicial compromise has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties 27 and it is not valid and binding on a party who did not sign
the same. 28 Since CHIONGBIAN was not a party to the compromise agreements, she cannot legally invoke the same.
A: Yes, sir.
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of Virginia Chiongbian against
Q: So you are now trying to tell us that that assurance was never made to you personally. Is that right, Mam? the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority for reconveyance of Lot No. 941 is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 137152. January 29, 2001.]
A: He assured me directly that the property will be returned to me.
CITY OF MANDALUYONG, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO N., FRANCISCO N., THELMA N., EUSEBIO N., RODOLFO N., all surnamed AGUILAR,
Q: When you said "he," are you referring to your lawyer at that time, Atty. Pedro Calderon respondents.
DECISION
A: Yes, sir.

21
PUNO, J p: purpose for petitioner's failure to present any evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are landless and homeless residents
of Mandaluyong. The court thus disposed of as follows:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Orders dated September 17, 1998 and December 29, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City 1 dismissing the petitioner's Amended Complaint in SCA No. 1427 for expropriation of two (2) "WHEREFORE, the Amended Complaint is hereby ordered dismissed without pronouncement as to cost.
parcels of land in Mandaluyong City.
SO ORDERED." 8
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 29, 1998, the court denied the motion. Hence this petition.
On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City a complaint for expropriation entitled "City of
Mandaluyong, plaintiff v. Antonio N., Francisco N., Thelma N., Eusebio N., Rodolfo N., all surnamed Aguilar, defendants." Petitioner sought to Petitioner claims that the trial court erred
expropriate three (3) adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square meters registered under Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 59780, 63766 and 63767 in the names of the defendants, herein respondents, located at 9 de Febrero Street, Barangay Mauwag, City of "IN UPHOLDING RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT THEY QUALIFY AS SMALL PROPERTY OWNERS AND ARE THUS EXEMPT
Mandaluyong; on a portion of the 3 lots, respondents constructed residential houses several decades ago which they had since leased out to FROM EXPROPRIATION." 9
tenants until the present; on the vacant portion of the lots, other families constructed residential structures which they likewise occupied; in
1983, the lots were classified by Resolution No. 125 of the Board of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council as an Area for Petitioner mainly claims that the size of the lots in litigation does not exempt the same from expropriation in view of the fact that the said lots
Priority Development for urban land reform under Proclamation Nos. 1967 and 2284 of then President Marcos; as a result of this classification, have been declared to be within the Area for Priority Development (APD) No. 5 of Mandaluyong by virtue of Proclamation No. 1967, as
the tenants and occupants of the lots offered to purchase the land from respondents, but the latter refused to sell; on November 7, 1996, the amended by Proclamation No. 2284 in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1517. 10 This declaration allegedly authorizes petitioner to
Sangguniang Panlungsod of petitioner, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and occupants of the subject land, adopted expropriate the property, ipso facto, regardless of the area of the land.
Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 authorizing Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the expropriation of the
subject lots and construction of a medium-rise condominium for qualified occupants of the land; on January 10, 1996, Mayor Abalos sent a Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act, was issued by then President Marcos in 1978. The decree adopted as a
letter to respondents offering to purchase the said property at P3,000.00 per square meter; respondents did not answer the letter. Petitioner State policy the liberation of human communities from blight, congestion and hazard, and promotion of their development and modernization,
thus prayed for the expropriation of the said lots and the fixing of just compensation at the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter. 2 the optimum use of land as a national resource for public welfare. 11 Pursuant to this law, Proclamation No. 1893 was issued in 1979 declaring
the entire Metro Manila as Urban Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban land reform. This was amended in 1980 by Proclamation No. 1967
and in 1983 by Proclamation No. 2284 which identified and specified 245 sites in Metro Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban
Land Reform Zones.
In their answer, respondents, except Eusebio N. Aguilar who died in 1995, denied having received a copy of Mayor Abalos' offer to purchase
In 1992, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 7279, the "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992." The law lays
their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; the subject lots are their
down as a policy that the state, in cooperation with the private sector, undertake a comprehensive and continuing Urban Development and
only real property and are too small for expropriation, while petitioner has several properties inventoried for socialized housing; the fair market
Housing Program; uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas and resettlement areas by making
value of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square
available to them decent housing at affordable cost, basic services and employment opportunities and provide for the rational use and
meter. As counterclaim, respondents prayed for damages of P21 million. 3
development of urban land to bring about, among others, equitable utilization of residential lands; encourage more effective people's
participation in the urban development process and improve the capability of local government units in undertaking urban development and
Respondents filed a "Motion for Preliminary Hearing" claiming that the defenses alleged in their Answer are valid grounds for dismissal of the
housing programs and projects. 12 Towards this end, all city and municipal governments are mandated to conduct an inventory of all lands
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendants and lack of cause of action. Respondents prayed that the affirmative
and improvements within their respective localities, and in coordination with the National Housing Authority, the Housing and Land Use
defenses be set for preliminary hearing and that the complaint be dismissed. 4 Petitioner replied.
Regulatory Board, the National Mapping Resource Information Authority, and the Land Management Bureau, identify lands for socialized
housing and resettlement areas for the immediate and future needs of the underprivileged and homeless in the urban areas, acquire the lands,
On November 5, 1997, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint and named as an additional defendant Virginia N. Aguilar and, at the same time,
and dispose of said lands to the beneficiaries of the program. 13
substituted Eusebio Aguilar with his heirs. Petitioner also excluded from expropriation TCT No. 59870 and thereby reduced the area sought to
be expropriated from three (3) parcels of land to two (2) parcels totalling 1,636 square meters under TCT Nos. 63766 and 63767. 5
The acquisition of lands for socialized housing is governed by several provisions in the law. Section 9 of R.A. 7279 provides:
The Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial court on December 18, 1997. Respondents, who, with the exception of Virginia Aguilar and
"SECTION 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. — Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order:
the Heirs of Eusebio Aguilar had yet to be served with summons and copies of the Amended Complaint, filed a "Manifestation and Motion"
adopting their "Answer with Counterclaim" and "Motion for Preliminary Hearing" as their answer to the Amended Complaint. 6
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
The motion was granted. At the hearing of February 25, 1998, respondents presented Antonio Aguilar who testified and identified several
documentary evidence. Petitioner did not present any evidence. Thereafter, both parties filed their respective memoranda. 7
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
On September 17, 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing the Amended Complaint after declaring respondents as "small property
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
owners" whose land is exempt from expropriation under Republic Act No. 7279. The court also found that the expropriation was not for a public

22
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement
Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS Sites which have not yet been acquired;
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not
apply. The local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands."
Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3)
unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program
(ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been
acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands.
There is no dispute that the two lots in litigation are privately-owned and therefore last in the order of priority acquisition. However, the law also
provides that lands within the declared APD's which have not yet been acquired by the government are fourth in the order of priority. According
to petitioner, since the subject lots lie within the declared APD, this fact mandates that the lots be given priority in acquisition. 14
Section 9, however, is not a single provision that can be read separate from the other provisions of the law. It must be read together with
Section 10 of R.A. 7279 which also provides:
"SECTION 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. — The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community
mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated
purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted: Provided, further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for
purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a
proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. 15
For the purposes of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties shall be acquired by the local government units, or by
the National Housing Authority primarily through negotiated purchase: Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the
land shall be given the right of first refusal."
Lands for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 are to be acquired in several modes. Among these modes are the following: (1) community
mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint venture
agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to
only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and (b) parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such
acquisition.
Section 9 of R.A. 7279 speaks of priorities in the acquisition of lands. It enumerates the type of lands to be acquired and the hierarchy in their
acquisition. Section 10 deals with the modes of land acquisition or the process of acquiring lands for socialized housing. These are two
different things. They mean that the type of lands that may be acquired in the order of priority in Section 9 are to be acquired only in the modes
authorized under Section 10. The acquisition of the lands in the priority list must be made subject to the modes and conditions set forth in the
next provision. In other words, land that lies within the APD, such as in the instant case, may be acquired only in the modes under, and subject
to the conditions of, Section 10. IcaHCS
Petitioner claims that it had faithfully observed the different modes of land acquisition for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 and adhered to
the priorities in the acquisition for socialized housing under said law. 16 It, however, did not state with particularity whether it exhausted the
other modes of acquisition in Section 9 of the law before it decided to expropriate the subject lots. The law states "expropriation shall be
resorted to when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted." Petitioner alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated
purchase. Petitioner, through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from respondents but the latter refused to sell. 17 As to the other modes
of acquisition, no mention has been made. Not even Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the
Mayor of Mandaluyong to effect the expropriation of the subject property states whether the city government tried to acquire the same by
community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the government, or joint venture agreement
under Section 9 of the law.
Section 9 also exempts from expropriation parcels of land owned by small property owners. 18 Petitioner argues that the exercise of the power
of eminent domain is not anymore conditioned on the size of the land sought to be expropriated. 19 By the expanded notion of public use,
present jurisprudence has established the concept that expropriation is not anymore confined to the vast tracts of land and landed estates, but
also covers small parcels of land. 20 That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its public
use character. 21 It simply is not possible to provide, in one instance, land and shelter for all who need them. 22
While we adhere to the expanded notion of public use, the passage of R.A. No. 7279, the "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992"
introduced a limitation on the size of the land sought to be expropriated for socialized housing. The law expressly exempted "small property
owners" from expropriation of their land for urban land reform. R.A. No. 7279 originated as Senate Bill No. 234 authored by Senator Joey Lina
23 and House Bill No. 34310. Senate Bill No. 234 then provided that one of those lands not covered by the urban land reform and housing
program was "land actually used by small property owners within the just and equitable retention limit as provided under this Act." 24 Small
property owners" were defined in Senate Bill No. 234 as:
"4. Small Property Owners — are those whose rights are protected under Section 9, Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, who own
small parcels of land within the fair and just retention limit provided under this Act and which are adequate to meet the reasonable needs of the
small property owner's family and their means of livelihood." 25
The exemption from expropriation of lands of small-property owners was never questioned on the Senate floor. 26 This exemption, although
with a modified definition, was actually retained in the consolidation of Senate Bill No. 234 and House Bill No. 34310 which became R.A. No.
7279. 27
The question now is whether respondents qualify as "small property owners" as defined in Section 3 (q) of R.A. 7279. Section 3 (q) provides:
"SECTION 3 . . . (q). "Small property owners" refers to those whose only real property consists of residential lands not exceeding three
hundred square meters (300 sq.m.) in highly urbanized cities and eight hundred square meters (800 sq.m.) in other urban areas."
"Small-property owners" are defined by two elements: (1) those owners of real property whose property consists of residential lands with an
area of not more than 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas; and (2) that they do not own
real property other than the same.
The case at bar involves two (2) residential lots in Mandaluyong City, a highly urbanized city. The lot under TCT No. 63766 is 687 square
meters in area and the second under TCT No. 63767 is 949 square meters, both totalling 1,636 square meters in area. TCT No. 63766 was
issued in the names of herein five (5) respondents, viz:
"FRANCISCO N. AGUILAR, widower; THELMA N. AGUILAR, single; EUSEBIO N. AGUILAR, JR., widower; RODOLFO N. AGUILAR, single
and ANTONIO N. AGUILAR, married to Teresita Puig; all of legal age, Filipinos." 28
TCT No. 63767 was issued in the names of the five (5) respondents plus Virginia Aguilar, thus:
"FRANCISCO N. AGUILAR, widower; THELMA N. AGUILAR, single; EUSEBIO N. AGUILAR, JR., widower; RODOLFO N. AGUILAR, single
and ANTONIO N. AGUILAR, married to Teresita Puig; and VIRGINIA N. AGUILAR, single, all of legal age, Filipinos." 29
23
 Upon partition, four (4) co-owners, namely, Francisco, Thelma, Rodolfo and Antonio Aguilar each had a share of 300 square meters under TCT
Respondent Antonio Aguilar testified that he and the other registered owners are all siblings who inherited the subject property by intestate Nos. 13849, 13852, 13850, 13851. 50 Eusebio Aguilar's share was 347 square meters under TCT No. 13853 51 while Virginia Aguilar's was
succession from their parents. 30 Their father died in 1945 and their mother in 1976. 31 Both TCT's were issued in the siblings' names on 89 square meters under TCT No. 13854. 52
September 2, 1987. 32 In 1986, however, the siblings agreed to extrajudicially partition the lots among themselves, but no action was taken by
them to this end. It was only eleven (11) years later, on November 28, 1997 that a survey of the two lots was made 33 and on February 10,
1998, a consolidation subdivision plan was approved by the Lands Management Service of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. 34 The co-owners signed a Partition Agreement on February 24, 1998 35 and on May 21, 1998, TCT Nos. 63766 and 63767 were
It is noted that Virginia Aguilar, although granted 89 square meters only of the subject lots, is, at the same time, the sole registered owner of
cancelled and new titles issued in the names of the individual owners pursuant to the Partition Agreement.
TCT No. 59780, one of the three (3) titles initially sought to be expropriated in the original complaint. TCT No. 59780, with a land area of 211
square meters, was dropped in the amended complaint. Eusebio Aguilar was granted 347 square meters, which is 47 square meters more
Petitioner argues that the consolidation of the subject lots and their partition was made more than six (6) months after the complaint for
than the maximum of 300 square meters set by R.A. 7279 for small property owners. In TCT No. 13853, Eusebio's title, however, appears the
expropriation was filed on August 4, 1997, hence, the partition was made in bad faith, for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of R.A.
following annotation:
7279. 36
". . . subject to . . . , and to the prov. of Sec. 4 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court with respect to the inheritance left by the deceased Eusebio N.
At the time of filing of the complaint for expropriation, the lots subject of this case were owned in common by respondents. Under a co-
Aguilar." 53
ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. 37 During the existence of the co-ownership, no individual
can claim title to any definite portion of the community property until the partition thereof; and prior to the partition, all that the co-owner has is
Eusebio died on March 23, 1995, 54 and, according to Antonio's testimony, the former was survived by five (5) children. 55 Where there are
an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing. 38 Article 493 of the Civil Code however provides that:
several co-owners, and some of them die, the heirs of those who die, with respect to that part belonging to the deceased, become also co-
owners of the property together with those who survive. 56 After Eusebio died, his five heirs became co-owners of his 347 square-meter
"ARTICLE 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
portion. Dividing the 347 square meters among the five entitled each heir to 69.4 square meters of the land subject of litigation.
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect
of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
Consequently, the share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 square meter limit set in R.A. 7279. The second question, however, is
termination of the co-ownership." 39
whether the subject property is the only real property of respondents for them to comply with the second requisite for small property owners.

Before partition in a co-ownership, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the common property. The co-owner
Antonio Aguilar testified that he and most of the original co-owners do not reside on the subject property but in their ancestral home in Paco,
is free to alienate, assign or mortgage his interest, except as to purely personal rights. 40 He may also validly lease his undivided interest to a
Manila. 57 Respondents therefore appear to own real property other than the lots in litigation. Nonetheless, the records do not show that the
third party independently of the other co-owners. 41 The effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon
ancestral home in Paco, Manila and the land on which it stands are owned by respondents or any one of them. Petitioner did not present any
the partition of the property. 42
title or proof of this fact despite Antonio Aguilar's testimony.
Article 493 therefore gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest. 43
The co-owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate a concrete specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because his right
On the other hand, respondents claim that the subject lots are their only real property 58 and that they, particularly two of the five heirs of
over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication. 44 If the co-owner sells a concrete portion, this,
Eusebio Aguilar, are merely renting their houses and therefore do not own any other real property in Metro Manila. 59 To prove this, they
nonetheless, does not render the sale void. Such a sale affects only his own share, subject to the results of the partition but not those of the
submitted certifications from the offices of the City and Municipal Assessors in Metro Manila attesting to the fact that they have no registered
other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. 45
real property declared for taxation purposes in the respective cities. Respondents were certified by the City Assessor of Manila; 60 Quezon
City; 61 Makati City; 62 Pasay City; 63 Parañaque; 64 Caloocan City; 65 Pasig City; 66 Muntinlupa; 67 Marikina; 68 and the then municipality
In the instant case, the titles to the subject lots were issued in respondents' names as co-owners in 1987—ten (10) years before the
of Las Piñas 69 and the municipality of San Juan del Monte 70 as having no real property registered for taxation in their individual names.
expropriation case was filed in 1997. As co-owners, all that the respondents had was an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the
lots. This, however, did not mean that they could not separately exercise any rights over the lots. Each respondent had the full ownership of
Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are now in the possession of respondents. Antonio Aguilar testified that he and the other co-
his undivided interest in the property. He could freely sell or dispose of his interest independently of the other co-owners. And this interest
owners filed ejectment cases against the occupants of the land before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong, Branches 59 and 60. Orders
could have even been attached by his creditors. 46 The partition in 1998, six (6) months after the filing of the expropriation case, terminated
of eviction were issued and executed on September 17, 1997 which resulted in the eviction of the tenants and other occupants from the land in
the co-ownership by converting into certain and definite parts the respective undivided shares of the co-owners. 47 The subject property is not
question. 71
a thing essentially indivisible. The rights of the co-owners to have the property partitioned and their share in the same delivered to them cannot
be questioned for "[n]o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." 48 The partition was merely a necessary incident of the co-
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the orders dated September 17, 1998 and December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
ownership; 49 and absent any evidence to the contrary, this partition is presumed to have been done in good faith.
Branch 168, Pasig City in SCA No. 1427 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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