Time-sensitive target (military)

time-sensitive target

A joint force commander designated target requiring immediate response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target

of opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces. Also called TST (JP 3-60)

Scope: DoD

Source: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (September 2007)

Overview

Joint force commanders (JFCs) require common joint targeting procedures

to deconflict targeting operations, prevent duplication of effort, and reduce
the potential for fratricide throughout the fluid, dynamic battlespace. This is
especially true when joint force components have areas of operations that
potentially overlap, as well as mutual interests and capabilities to strike
targets of common interest. The JFC or component commander may
designate these targets as time-critical, priority targets. Each component
has the ability to view the battlespace with a multitude of surveillance and
reconnaissance assets (organic, joint, and national). However, complicating
this problem is the fact that components lack common targeting references
for the battlespace. Few common targeting reference systems exist which
ensure all targets possess discrete reference numbers universally
recognized by all joint force components. One such system is the Basic
Encyclopedia (BE) number system. Although this system is normally limited
to fixed targets, BE numbers can be modified for mobile targets. Some
theaters have used locally produced BE numbers for tracking such targets.
However, presently, there is no standardized joint procedure to do this. The
National Military Target Intelligence Committee (MTIC) is currently working
solutions to standardize such procedures and developing concepts for
universal common target numbers (CTN). But until those concepts are
approved, the JFC presently has no common joint system for mobile
targets. Instead, individual component numbering systems dominate the
environment and are not translatable from one component to another.
Further complicating this problem is the fact that although current
component systems are robust and continue to grow rapidly, they are
considerably "stovepiped" and not interoperable. Currently, the components
cannot rapidly share common targeting information between one another.
Future systems (such as the Contingency Theater Automated Planning
System {CTAPS} linked with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data
System {AFATDS}) could correlate individual component target numbers
and communicate them simultaneously to all components. Those future
systems, combined with joint force targeting procedures, will facilitate
effective and efficient use of all attack assets.

Joint doctrine addresses the need for target coordination, deconfliction, and
synchronization between components. Unfortunately, it does not adequately
 explain "how" to rapidly conduct this coordination. Likewise, joint TTP does
not specifically outline joint targeting procedures. Instead, it defines overall
concepts without delineating TTP. As a result, each combatant commander
has developed procedures that are theater dependent targeting processes.
As an example, the procedures governing joint targeting coordination
boards (JTCBs) and guidance, apportionment, and targeting cells (GATs)
vary from theater to theater. While this may work for permanently assigned
CINC forces, it requires non-assigned units to adapt considerably to theater
specific procedures. Augmentees adapting to theater / CINC specific
procedures will spend time adapting to theater unique coordination
processes prior to executing time-critical missions.

Components must understand the joint targeting process to fulfill the JFC's
intent and objectives. Effective coordination, deconfliction, and
synchronization maximize force against the enemy while reducing the
potential for fratricide. Components must have effective
joint targeting procedures that ensures:

 Compliance with JFC guidance and objectives

 Coordination, synchronization and deconfliction of attacks
 Rapid response to surface TCTs
 Prevention of fratricide
 Minimal duplication of effort
 Control of taskings for mutually accessible targets
 Expeditious combat assessment
 A common perspective of all targeting efforts

Each component must understand the perspective and target priorities of

other component targeting efforts throughout the campaign. Component
targets may not necessarily be joint targets, and therefore
coordination requirements may seem minimal. However, there may be
situations where component organic weapons may be easily available, yet
not the most capable. In such cases, coordination with other components
may allow more efficient destruction of the target through the synchronized
use of other available assets. In almost every situation, if component
attacks affect the operations of another component, coordination,
synchronization, and deconfliction must occur. The only exception would be
those rare instances identified by the JFC where overriding concerns (such
as theater ballistic missiles {TBMs} equipped with weapons of mass
destruction) warrant bypassing normal coordination to affect immediate
response. The JFC should make such exceptions only after balancing the
threat with the potential for fratricide.

This publication first explains the fundamentals of the

joint targeting process and intelligence support to that process. Then, it
addresses the coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization of attacks
against surface time-critical targets. The connection is that the
joint targeting process and its intelligence support serve as the foundation
for the surface TCT targeting procedures described herein.

The Joint Targeting Process

Joint targeting fundamentals are the functions, steps, and actions
accomplished when conducting joint targeting operations.
Joint targeting fundamentals include the definition of a target, the
explanation of what joint targeting is as a whole, and the description of the
joint targeting process. Joint Publication 1-02 succinctly describes a target
as a geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or
destruction by military forces. However, targets also include the wide array
of mobile and stationary forces, equipment, capabilities, and functions that
an enemy commander can use to conduct operations. Joint targeting is
selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them to meet a
specified objective. The joint targeting process has six basic phases /
functions: COMMANDER'S OBJECTIVES AND GUIDANCE, TARGET
DEVELOPMENT, WEAPONEERING ASSESSMENT,
FORCE APPLICATION PLANNING, EXECUTION PLANNING/FORCE
EXECUTION, and COMBAT ASSESSMENT. Although commonly referred to as
a "cycle," the joint targeting process is really a continuous process of
overlapping functions independent of a particular sequence.
Joint targeting significantly affects the theater campaign as the JFC must
synchronize targeting efforts throughout the joint force to ensure the
effective accomplishment of theater campaign objectives. Further
complicating this is the fact that targeting occurs at all levels within a joint
force by all forces capable of attacking targets. It must therefore be
deconflicted, coordinated, and prioritized among components to ensure
success.

Organizing for the joint targeting process is extremely dependent on the

situation. JFCs may establish and task an organization within their staffs to
accomplish broadtargeting oversight functions or may delegate this
responsibility to a subordinate commander. The JFC may assign certain
responsibilities associated with targeting to agencies on the staff. In
addition, the JFC may appoint a JTCB. The JFC defines the role of the JTCB.
JTCB responsibilities and authority are defined by JFC directives and should
ensure fulfillment of JFC objectives and intent with respect to targeting.
Most importantly, the JFC should direct measures to coordinate
joint targetingefforts among components. Regardless of how the JFC
establishes procedures for joint targeting operations, the procedures must
follow the basic principles of the joint targeting process and be flexible
enough to respond to rapidly changing situations in the fast tempo of
modern warfare.

Surface Time-Critical Targets (TCTs)

A surface TCT is a lucrative, fleeting, land or sea target of such high priority
to friendly forces that the JFC or component commander designates it as
requiring immediate response. Surface TCTs require such immediate
response because they pose, or will pose, a significant threat capable of
inflicting casualties on friendly forces and civilians. Surface TCTs, left
unserviced, could significantly delay achievement of the JFC's theater
objectives. Surface TCTs are often characterized as lucrative, fleeting
targets. Surface TCTs can either be planned or immediate, requiring rapid
response by the joint force. Targets of opportunity (TOOs) are similar to
surface TCTs (that is, lucrative or fleeting) but they may or may not have
been designated a high priority by the JFC or component commander. For
example, an exposed, moving enemy command vehicle, spotted by a
passing friendly aircraft, could be defined as a target of opportunity.
Although the opportunity to attack it is fleeting, it is not technically a
surface TCT unless the JFC or component commander has designated
enemy command vehicles as high priority targets. The distinction is a small,
but important one. The key is JFC / component commander designation as
a priority. Otherwise, the joint force could not distinguish between TOOs
and surface TCTs.

Procedures and techniques assist the joint force in the conduct of warfare,
especially in regard to surface TCTs. Procedures dealing with surface TCTs
include JFC guidance, joint battlespace control and coordination measures,
"grid box" and "bullseye" techniques, and weapon specific procedures.
Additionally, the JFC must structure command and control as well as
interconnect battle management systems to ensure optimum conditions for
successful operations against surface TCTs.

Summary

The primary goal of joint targeting is to provide the most efficient use of
joint force assets and capitalize on their synergistic effects. Eliminating
duplication of effort and fratricide is an important part of that efficiency.
Likewise, eliminating the fog of war is critical to meeting the fratricide
challenge while increasing a joint force's operational tempo. The JFC must
ensure effective and efficient attacks against high priority surface TCTs, as
well as exercise due caution to avoid fratricide and duplication of effort.
Regardless of the threat, a joint force must be able to rapidly execute lethal
and non-lethal attacks against surface TCTs using the synergistic power that
components contribute; all the while considering that when components
work together, they each have responsibilities (functional and / or area)
that may intersect. Each must depend on and leverage the capabilities of
the others to be decisive in battle. Application of these capabilities is
enhanced through clear, concise joint targeting procedures allowing the JFC
and components to rapidly coordinate information, deconflict operations,
and synchronize attacks. Common target numbers, reference systems, and
common pictures of the battlespace are developing technologies that will
support joint targeting procedures in the future. This multiservice TTP offers
a procedural fix until those capabilities fully evolve.
Target of opportunity
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A target of opportunity is a target "visible to a surface or air sensor or observer, which is within
range of available weapons and against which fire has not been scheduled or
requested."[1] A target of opportunity comes in two forms; "unplanned and unanticipated".[2][clarification
needed]

Procedure[edit]
In preparation for most ordinary combat military operations, armed forces are given a series
of objectives that may include one or more primary targets.[3] During combat operations, additional
targets may be present. Provided any action to deal with those targets[4] would not compromise
outlined operational objectives, the military personnel may elect to attack additional targets if the
opportunity to do so arises.[5] Operational objectives and primary target allocation will generally
not be altered to account for a target of opportunity unless that target is reviewed by
a commanding officer and receives a higher target value designation; e.g. if identifiers reveal the
target to be a designated high-value target.

Examples[edit]
Prior to October 1940 the Royal Air Force instructed bomber crews to bring unexpended bombs
home. From 9 October 1940, they were instructed to attack any target of opportunity if they could
not locate their assigned targets.[6]
The United States Department of Defense and NATO defined a nuclear target of
opportunity as "a nuclear target detected observed or detected after an operation begins that
has previously not been considered, analyzed or planned for a nuclear strike. Generally fleeting in
nature, it should be attacked as soon as possible within the time limitations imposed for
coordination and warning of friendly troops and aircraft."[7]

target of opportunity
Also found in: Acronyms, Encyclopedia, Wikipedia.

target of opportunity
A target visible to a surface or air sensor or observer, which is within range of available weapons and against whic
h firehas not been scheduled or requested. See also target.

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Department of Defense 2005.

scheduled target
Also found in: Encyclopedia.

scheduled target
In artillery and naval gunfire support, a planned target on which fire is to be delivered at a specific time.

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Department of Defense 2005.

on-call target
on-call target
In artillery and naval gunfire support, a planned target other than a scheduled target on which fire is delivered whe
nrequested.

on-call target (nuclear)

on-call target (nuclear)
A planned nuclear target other than a scheduled nuclear target for which a need can be anticipated but which will
bedelivered upon request rather than at a specific time. Coordination and warning of friendly troops and aircraft ar
emandatory.

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Department of Defense 2005.

"unplanned immediate targets " Definition (US DoD)

Those immediate targets that are known to exist in an operational area but are
not detected, located, or selected for action in sufficient time to be included in
the normal targeting process. See also immediate targets; operational area;
target. (JP 3-60)

unplanned immediate targets

unplanned immediate targets
Those immediate targets that are known to exist in an operational area but are not detected, located, or selected f
oraction in sufficient time to be included in the normal targeting process. See also immediate targets; operational
area;target.

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Department of Defense 2005.

immediate targets
Related to immediate targets: Intermediate Target

immediate targets
Targets that have been identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in the normal targeting
process,and therefore have not been scheduled. Immediate targets have two subcategories: unplanned and unan
ticipated. Seealso target.

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Department of Defense 2005.

 Nuclear utilization target selection
Nuclear utilization target selection (NUTS) is a hypothesis regarding the use of nuclear
weapons often contrasted with mutually assured destruction (MAD).[1] NUTS theory at its most
basic level asserts that it is possible for a limited nuclear exchange to occur and that nuclear
weapons are simply one more rung on the ladder of escalation pioneered by Herman
Kahn.[2][3] This leads to a number of other conclusions regarding the potential uses of and
responses to nuclear weapons.

 1Counterforce strikes
 2Limited countervalue strikes
 3Missile defense
 4NUTS and US nuclear strategy
 5See also
 6References
 7External links

Counterforce strikes[edit]
A counterforce strike consists of an attack on enemy nuclear weapons meant to destroy them
before they can be used. A viable first strike capability would require the ability to launch a 100-
percent-effective (or nearly so) counterforce attack. Such an attack is made more difficult by
systems such as early warning radars which allow the possibility for rapid recognition and
response to a nuclear attack and by systems such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles or
road-mobile nuclear missiles (such as the Soviet SS-20) which make nuclear weapons harder to
locate and target.
Since a limited nuclear war is a viable option for a NUTS theorist, the power to unleash such
attacks holds a great deal of appeal. However, establishing such a capability is very expensive.
A counterforce weapon requires a much more accurate warhead than a countervalue weapon, as
it must be guaranteed to detonate very close to its target, which drastically increases relative
costs.

Limited countervalue strikes[edit]

Some NUTS theorists hold that a mutually assured destruction-type deterrent is not credible in
cases of a small attack, such as one carried out on a single city, as it is suicidal. In such a case,
an overwhelming nuclear response would destroy every enemy city and thus every potential
hostage which could be used to influence the attacker's behavior. This would free up the attacker
to launch further attacks with and remove any chance for the attacked nation to bargain. A
country adhering to a NUTS-style war plan would likely respond to such an attack with a limited
attack on one or several enemy cities.

Missile defense[edit]
Since NUTS theory assumes the possibility of a winnable nuclear war, the contention of many
MAD theorists that missile defense systems should be abandoned as a destabilizing influence is
generally not accepted by NUTS theorists. For NUTS theorists, a missile defence system would
be a positive force in that it would protect against a limited nuclear attack. Additionally, such a
system would increase the odds of success for a counterforce attack by assuring that if some
targets escaped the initial attack, the incoming missiles could be intercepted. But protection
against a limited attack means that the opponent has incentive to launch a larger scale attack,
against which the defence is likely to be ineffective. Additionally, increased possibility of success
of counterforce attacks means that the opponent has the incentive to act preemptively, which
increases the risk of a large scale response to misinterpreted signals.
NUTS and US nuclear strategy[edit]
NUTS theory can be seen in the US adoption of a number of first-strike weapons, such as
the Trident II and Minuteman III nuclear missiles, which both have an extremely low circular error
probable (CEP) of about 90 meters for the former and 120 meters for the latter.[4] These weapons
are accurate enough to almost certainly destroy a missile silo if it is targeted.
Additionally, the US has proceeded with a number of programs which improve its strategic
situation in a nuclear confrontation. The Stealth bomber has the capacity to carry a large number
of stealthy cruise missiles, which could be nuclear-tipped, and due to its low probability of
detection and long range would be an excellent weapon with which to deliver a first strike.[5]
During the late 1970s and the 1980s, the Pentagon began to adopt strategies for limited nuclear
options to make it possible to control escalation and reduce the risk of all-out nuclear war, hence
accepting NUTS. In 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed Presidential Directive 59 which
endorsed the NUTS strategic posture committed to fight and win a nuclear war, and accepted
escalation dominance and flexible response.[6] The Soviets, however, were skeptical of limited
options or the possibility of controlling escalation. While Soviet deterrence doctrine posited
massive responses to any nuclear use ("all against any"), military officials considered the
possibility of proportionate responses to a limited US attack, although they "doubted that nuclear
war could remain limited for long."[7]
Like several other nuclear powers, but unlike China, India and North Korea, the United States has
never made a "no first use" pledge, maintaining that pledging not to use nuclear weapons before
an opponent would undermine their deterrent.[8] NATO plans for war with the USSR called for the
use of tactical nuclear weapons in order to counter Soviet numerical superiority.
Rather than making extensive preparations for battlefield nuclear combat in Central Europe, the
Soviet General Staff emphasized conventional military operations and believing that they had an
advantage there. "The Soviet military leadership believed that conventional superiority provided
the Warsaw Pact with the means to approximate the effects of nuclear weapons and achieve
victory in Europe without resort to those weapons."[7]
In criticising US policy on nuclear weapons as contradictory, Slavoj Zizek has suggest that NUTS
is the policy of the US with respect to Iran and North Korea while its policy with respect
to Russia and China is one of mutual assured destruction (MAD).[9]

See also[edit]
 Nuclear strategy
 Nuclear warfare
 Ryszard Kukliński
 Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)
 CARVER matrix

References[edit]
1. Jump up^ Amadae, S.M. (2016). Prisoners of Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 79–
93. ISBN 9 781107 064034.
2. Jump up^ "Magellan's Log: Herman Kahn: Escalation Ladder". Archived from the original on 13 January
2013.
3. Jump up^ Morehead, Joe (1986). Essays on Public Documents and Government Policies. Haworth Press.
p. 100. ISBN 0-86656-248-6.
4. Jump up^ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2008-07-08. Retrieved 2008-06-30.
5. Jump up^ "Peace Magazine v06n3p24: Hidden Capabilities of B-2 Stealth Bomber Threaten START
Talks". archive.peacemagazine.org. Retrieved 2016-10-03.
6. Jump up^ Amadae, S.M. (2016). Prisoners of Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 105–
111. ISBN 9 781107 064034.
7. ^ Jump up to:a b "Candid Interviews with Former Soviet Officials Reveal U.S. Strategic Intelligence Failure
Over Decades". www.gwu.edu. Retrieved 2016-10-03.
8. Jump up^ Amadae, S.M. (2016). Prisoners of Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 21. ISBN 9
781107 064034.
9. Jump up^ http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/trump-america-north-korea-kim-jong-un-nuclear-war-
contradictory-strategies-zizek-a8131176.html

2.Nuclear utilization target selection

3. Nuclear utilization target selection (NUTS) was a strategy developed during
the Cold War as a means for one world nuclear power to achieve victory against
another world nuclear power. To be victorious, the attacker had to destroy the target
country's nuclear arsenal in a massive first strike. This would then have given the
attacker superiority in the nuclear arms race and relieve them from the threat
of mutual assured destruction (MAD).
4. The strategy was first mentioned in the 1970s when the technology involving inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) allowed a nuclear payload to be delivered with
exceptional accuracy to any location on the planet.
5. However, because nuclear missiles were able to be launched
from submarines (SLBMs) or mobile installations (the Soviet SS-20s), the idea of
targetting fixed installations that the NUTS theory entails would not have been
successful. Additionally, early warning systems would make it especially difficult to
guarantee that an attacker would actually be able to achieve first strike capability.
6. The acronym itself is probably constructed as a joke on the insanity of nuclear war
and the opposing strategy "MAD", called a backronym.