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    Robbie Chan
    cognitive theory

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    797402 | ILLiad TN: RAPID onvssiy Borrower: RAPID:AZS. Journal Title: Music and emotion Volume: Issue: Month/Year: 2001Pages: 341.360 Article Author: Leonard Meyer Article Title: Music and Emotion: Distinctions and Uncertainties ILL Number: -12679961 {NTN Not accessibie _ Your initials: Printed: 12/27/2017 10:34:16 AM Call#: ML3830 1965 2001 Location: HBL stack Lending String: Patron: Charge Maxcost: Shipping Address: Arizona State University (AZS| Email: ILL@asu edu Your initials: Total pages scanned: Date: _ CHAPTER 15 MUSIC AND EMOTION: DISTINCTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES LEONARD B. MEYER have the gall to divide this chapter into only two parts!‘Distinctions'and Uncertainty’ ‘The first section considers conceptual/terminological problems having to do with ‘music and emotion, and provides the background and terminology for the matters considered in the second part. The distinctions made in Section 15.1 do not pretend to constitute a coherent argument but are connected by the succession of topics discussed, Section 15.2, the core of the chapter is concerned with the role of uncertainty in human experience generally, and in musical/aesthetic experience in particular. 15.1 Distinctions begin by proposing a number of distinctions because, despite its empirical outlook and methodology, the psychological analysis of human emotional experiences—causes and responses—as well as humanistic theory have lacked conceptual specificity and pre- cision. This is evident in the range of behavioural states considered ‘emotional: To take a representative example, Klaus Scherer (1994, p. 31) writes that some terms for emo- tions ‘highlight the physiological, as in the case of “aroused” or “tired.” Some are quite cognitive like “bewildered” or “curious”? It seems curious, however, to consider ‘curious’ or ‘tired’ as being emotions. Such ‘states of being’—of awareness (eg, "that’s an interesting idea’) or of feeling (e.g.‘I'm hhungry’)—are not generally classed as emotions.” But are not feclings of sadness, joy, anger etc, which are considered emotions, similarly states of being? So the question is: what ate the necessary and sufficient psychological and/or physiological conditions for considering a state of being—a feeling—an emotion?? "Sina my roles supposed tobe tha ofthe’ resident humanist Ihave taken the liberty of plyilypat= phrasing the first sentence of Caesar's Gc wars‘ Gauls divided into thee pars 2 tiednes is disturbed or curiosity thwarted, emotion may be evoked but the ‘evoking agent isthe Inthe course of thinking about these matters, 2 posible distinction occurced to me: namely that sates of being such 2 curiosity; hunger, atigee, cold, et depend upon conditions intemal a individual while love and hat, fear and ange, etaso inci conditions external oan individual, 342 MUSIC AND EMOTION ‘Though, to the best of my knowledge, there has been no satisfactory answer to that question, we go on using the concept of emotion and distinguishing different kinds: love and hate, fear and courage, ete, We conceptualize and classify our experiences of the inner as well asthe outer world because envisaging and choosing, which lie at the heart of human behaviour, occur primarily in terms of such classes rather than individ ual instances. So this part of the chapter attempts to distinguish some of the kinds of relationships involved in the interaction between music and emotion, 15.1.1 Emotional states versus emotional processes States Delineation andassocition statistical parameters. Asatule,the termsusedto characterize emotions denote what I will call emotional ‘states: When listeners or ertis describe musics sad, happy: angry elated and soon, they are referring to sich states. In music, ch states are essentially delineated by the action of what Ihave called the statist parameters. These aspects of sound vary in amount or degree—for example, register (ower-higher), dynamic level (louder-softer), speed (faster-slower), continuity (gradual-abrupt), and so forth. Although the configuration of parameters delineating an emotional state fuctuats,state-defining parameters such as register, speed, and dynamic evel remain relatively constant over moderate-szed segments of music. nd it is this constancy that makes naming possible. Indeed, when subjects in psychological experiments identity emotions their answers are, forthe most part, based onthe dispo- sition of statistical parameters. Put negatively, one cannot imagine sadness being portrayed by a fast forte tune played ina high register, or a playful child being depicted bya solemnity of trombones. The identification and naming of states is a result of the association of different dis- positions of statistical parameters with felingscharactristically evoked in natural ot cultural circumstances Tat is, we deem a passage to portray love or ‘ange’ or jealousy” not because of knowledge of physiological responses o psychological constraints, but because of awareness of and often empathy with, the feelings and behaviours that occur in particular sociocultural contexts. Thus we recognize the sadness expresse Machett’s "Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow’ speech because we know the cie- ‘cumstance in which itis dlivered—that is, Macbeth’s learning of his wife's death In addition, ofcourse, his feelings are communicated bythe repetition of the word'tomor- row; which inthis context signifies sadness and depression, by his performance (slow, soft tone of voice, ec), and his physical behaviour and facial expression If this view ‘This calls attention toa methodological question: namely, when listeners record their responses to "nus by. , pressing buttons or naming emotions, or when prchologst messue the physilog cal changes (in blood pressure, pulse rate, et.) of listeners, what do the Results’ represent” Often it seems unclear whether the answers area result ofthe eubject’ rian of the'tate' linet by the muse or of their own affective response tothe masiesl patterning? In this connection, see Sloboda (1992) ® Though over behaviour maybe the result ofan innate response, behaviour usuallyinftuenced by cul tural convention, This ithe eae because behaviour almost always acts 884 sign that is implicate MUSIC AND EMOTION: DISTINCTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES 343 hhas merit, then observed behavioural circumstances play an important rol tification and classification of emotional states. the iden- Classification. It's sometimes supposed that our understanding of the world begins with the peculiarities of the indvidual—person, work of art, landscape, and soon. Bt, though experiences of phenomena may be peculiar, the peclir is almost aways quali fied by, and comprehended in terms of, a conceptual class. This is one of the reasons why understanding and responding to different styles of music depends on learning For itis largely learning that enables composers, performers, and steers to internalize the norms governing musical relationships and, consequently, to comprehend the implications of patterning, and experience deviations from stylistic norms. Tustas we clay the phenomenal word into physical and biological reams, styles of ‘music int classic and romantic, folk and jazz, and phrase relationships int antecedent consequent 50 we classify emotions. n most cases, the clasifcations are fury. They ae so because the classe are abstractions from individual, though similar, relationships and experiences. And one of the problems with abstractions isthe tendency to treat them as though they possessed a set of objective properties independent of context and culture. But unlike tuberculosis, the biological nature of what we conceptualize ss emo- tional experience has not been ascertained ‘Nevertheles we easly emotions, We do so forthe same reasons that we lasify and categorize the word in general: because to choose eectively itis necessary to imagine the probability of coming events (whether the behaviour of people or of musical pat- terns), and such imagining invariably entails classification. One manifestation of the need to clasts our proclivity to give to airy nothing/A local habitation ands name (Shakespeare, A midsummer night's dream, Vi, emphasis added) Put prossically— because they threaten our sense of predictive power, nameless phenomena ate highly disturbing “Awarencs of, and responding to, the lass of some phenomenon need not, however, involve conscious coneeptalzation or naming ut rather recognizing andesperencing the telationships presented—that is, knowing how the kind of patterning works. The point is important because, as mentioned above, conscious classification and explicit, hhaming tend to undermine uncertainty and weaken emotional response, Something takin to the suspension of disbele (discussed below) seems at work here. That is, because enjoying music isa matter of experiencing the tension of syntactic and native processes a wel asthe fluctuations of statistical parameters, listeners generally avoid (oth tothe individual and to others) of probable subsequent behaviour. Pt in evolutionary terms, emotional bchaviour was evidently preadapted for communication. There isa need for careful crass: ‘ultra studies of emotional representation, Are the emotional states clasifed and represented in ‘Wester culture difereatisted and recognized in non-Western clare? Ifso,arethey sary repre seated? ‘The fundamental importance of ateporization (classification) was the subject of studies that ppearedin Science (Vl. 23,12 January 2001 after this esay was written. The result elevant for {his essays summarized in the section, "This week science Categories re the fundamental build {ng blocks of near ll higher eve cognitive Functions (P.207) 344 MUSIC AND EMOTION ‘consciously classifying and naming kinds of relationships, techniques, or strategies. Just 1 a reader enjoys a poem not by ‘watching the metaphors go by, but by responding to the relationships implicit in the comparisons, so experienced listeners respond to the implicative tension of a gap-fill melody or an antecedent-consequent phrase without conceptualizing its relational class. “Mapping versus relating. The conceptualization of feelings as phenomena independent of experiential context has led to a search for the neurological basis of emotion. Hovever, although the areas of the brain that respond to some order of stimuli have been located and mapped, neurologists have yet to explain the nature of relationships within or between such areas. ‘The situation is not unlike that ofthe astronomers of ancient Greece who were able ‘to map the heavens with considerable precision, but could not explain the relationships between the stats, planets, and the lke. Neurological studies seem in a comparable posi- tion with respect to the mind. The brain has been mapped, and the areas that respond to different kinds of stimuli have been located; and, as with the Greeks, various areas have been given appropriate names. But while the parts of the brain that respond to specific musical stimuli have been identified, the neurological nature of the relation- ships between such stimuli remains a mystery. For example, the places in the brain that respond to the pitch A (440) and the C# above it, and those stimulated by the pitch E (660) and the Ge above it, can be identified; but why both intervals are perceived as. belonging to the same relational class (.e. major third) remains to be explained. Processes: native and syntactic As observed above, emotional states fluctuate in intensity; and human empathy with the action of the music begets analogous feelings in listeners But like other fuctuations (eg. in temperature, energy, or the stock market) changes in intensity or amount donot ive rise to processes—that is, to changes involving functionally differentiated relaion- ‘ships And, as argued in Section 15.2 below, crucial facets of the emotional experience of muscle in the realm of processes rather than that of states. Two kinds of musical processes, ‘native’ ones and ‘syntactic’ ones, need to be distin- guished. Both are subject tothe cognitive constraints ofthe mind and the physical ones a the body. Syntactic processes however, also involve learning the norms ofa particular 7 Some emotional states require more contextual specification than others. For instance, musical repre sentations of grief and jysanxity and calm ate rudy recognized by competent listeners (se for ‘example, Gabrieson & Lindstrém, this volume; Js, this volume); but because thee recognition ‘ismorecontex- dependent, emotions such as jealousy and disgust are more ifclt to represen in ‘musicalone. Consequently, thee representation i, Lsuspec, relatively uncommon and when it ‘occurs it tends tobe accompanied bya text—a vocal port or «programme In Sil and muse (Meyer 1985), I emphaszed the diferent eles of syntactic and statistical parame ter in cresting musica elationships As wil be else fom what follows, though Im keeping the term satitcal parameters now want to wie the concep of process in connection with syntactic and native relationships Although implicit in myealer work, the implicaton-raliztion relation- ship was fist made expiitin Explaining music (Meyer 1973), Chapters VI-VIL The relationship hatsince been thoughtilyanslyaed extended, and modelled by Engene Narmou (1990) MUSIC AND EMOTION: DISTINCTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES 343 rusia style. Asa result native and syntactic proceses almost always complement one another in the shaping of musical experience. Those based on the syntax of a syle tend to be quite specific but are historically and culturally circumscribed, Native processes, on the other hand, are es specific. Bu, as limitations common to humankind they are essentially universal? The very existence of sound entails the use of the statistical parameters. Consequenty, native and syntactic processes are invariably coordinate with, and qualified by, the action of statistical parameters. Responses to these parameters are also native, rather than leened. But because they are essentially matters of amount, statistical means do not give rise to functional differentiation. Rather what they involv isthe continuation ofprevalent action. There i, however, an important exception: when amounts —whether of information or redundancy, of speed or intensity of stimulation—become excessive in relation to hhuman cognitive capabilites, the native implication i change eather than continuation. ‘The question isto what? Because relationships of amount are without specific implica- tions, the probability ofthe what is uncertain, And when uncertainty i strong, almost any kind of change is welcome. A prolonged crescendo may end in silence ora jazzy fox trot ina soft tremolo ora trumpet fanfare. Whatever the case, the proper term for such termination is indeed ‘end, not close Processes, on the other hand, are functionally differentiated. For instance the parts of the first phrase of Harold Arlen's Somewhere Over the Rainbow’ perform different functions. The melody begins with an upward skip of an octave, gap (native process), ‘whose physical effort implies the relaxation ofthe following conjunct descent, the ‘fill, whose specific pitches are governed by tonal syntax. The fill als involves gradual reduc: tion in physical tension through diminished motor emphasis, lower volume, increased rhythmic egularty and simplification of texture. Tis‘abaterent” implies ending. And ina tonal piece such as Arlen’, syntax transforms an end into a clos. In addition, to “make assurance double sue(Shakespeare, Macbeth IV), the final pitch ofthe fil con- sttutesa return to the first structural tone of the melo. Like the gap-fill pattern just discussed, many native processes are manifestations of the gestalt principles of patern perception: fo example, once begun processes tend to continue to a point of stability oF clear articulation; the mind tends to improve shapes, ‘making them simpler—more regular and complete. Cognitive constraints also result in other native processes: for example, rapid note-suecession is associated with high regis tersand sna size long, slow note-sucession i associated with low registers and larger sizes! as mentioned earlier, very high levels either of redundancy or of information imply changes and, as discussed below, forceful motor emphasis tends to weaken the effet of syntactic process. * Preocapie with the evident individuality of diferent cultures, ethnomusicologits have t seems to ‘ne nepleted the influence of shared native’ constraints onthe development and organization of the muses of ferent culture. "The interrelation among sz, speed, and place scems a universal in al realms of bing the physical ‘oop soci, nd perceptual In this connection see Schmid et (2000, 346 MUSIC AND EMOTION Although syntactic and native processes often complement one another in shaping, musical experience, they are essentially independent variables. Thus, while an abate- ‘ment process generally implies closure, closure could easily be thwarted by syntax—for instance, by an open-ended rhythmic pattern or a non-closural harmony. Or to take a converse case, potential syntactic closure can be undermined by a process whose regu- larity natively implies continuation. The need to weaken the momentum of a marked continuity process explains why, when a perfect cadence is preceded by regular motion by fourths and fifths, the chord on the second step of the scale is usually inverted (vi-ii6-V-1), Strong syntactic closure is possible because the ‘native’ continuity process is broken by the frst inversion rather than a root-position ii chord.!" In other cases, though not congruent, processes may work together to shape exper ence. Such complementary interaction is evident in the duet of Aida and Radames,'O. terra, addio’ atthe end of Verdi’ Aida. Because the initial gap (native) of a major sev- enth (G, to F) strongly implies fill, the following rise to G, functions not only as a poignant, yet delightful, resolution to the tonic (syntactic), but also as an escape tone that descends to Dj, which begins the fill (native). While syntactic and native processes may complement one another, the relationship of process to amounts is not complementary. Though the statistical aspect of music is a necessary condition for both kinds of processes, its action is inversely related to theirs. That is, the more compelling the action of statistical parameters, the less effective the processes which, as we shall see, shape emotional experience. When, however, syntactic and native processes are primary, statistical parameters tend to be subservient 15.1.2 Implication ‘The distinctions between emotional states and emotional processes suggest that differ- cent kinds of relationships evoke and shape different facets of musical experience. The parameters beget the physical-somatic conditions which, through empathy, ‘emotional states in the primal present, Syntactic and native processes not only beget physical empathy with music, but generate mental arousal that, directing attention t0 what is still to come, gives rise to implication. Implication versus causation Both syntactic and native processes generate implications—guesses (feelings) about hhow present patterns will be continued and perhaps reach closure. But because ‘What's tocome is still unsure’ (Shakespeare, Twelfth night, IL. ii)? implications are never more "The desire to enhance closure also account for why, instead of continuing directly tothe toni, a ‘descending melodic line (eg. from the ith of the sal) often moves From th second to the third step ofthe sal befor closing onthe tonic 2 Lhave wsed quotations fom, and references to, Shakespeare's writings throughout this essay not only ‘because I happen to know his works quit well, but because thei variety and pertinence 20 often ilstrate(with Kite qualification) pote [want to make. MUSIC AND EMOTION: DISTINCTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES 347 than probable. Consequently, itis important to distinguish implication from causation. As I put the point in Style arid music (Meyer 1989, p. 96): The possiblity of alternative consequences ... may help to account forthe difference between implication and causation. For though both involve if-then' relationships, causation is 2 special case in which the antecedent (cause) is a sufficient condition for the consequent (effect). Consequently, alternatives are not possible. The difference in our understanding of the two concepts is reflected in ordinary language. Though it seems entirely proper to assert that “X implied ¥, but ¥ did not occu it would seem illogical to asert that "X caused Y, but ¥ did not occu! Implication: native and syntactic proceses Native as well as syntactic processes can give rise to implications. As observed earlier the implication created by agap such as the one that begins Somewhere Over the Rainbow is the result of a native process. At the beginning of Mozart’s Piano Sonata in A Major (K. 331), however, a learned syntactic process generates the implications that lnk the antecedent to the consequent phrase. Similarly, an antecedent ‘when clause, such as begins Shakespeare's Sonnet ‘When tothe sessions of sweet silent thought, implies a consequent closure: But the eile think on thes der fend Allloses are restored and sorrows end, Notice that in both music and language, the ‘suspense’ created by syntactic or native processes is short range, as compared with ‘referential’ suspense—for example, about finding the culprit in, say,a detective story. Thus, while the implications ofthe deceptive cadence at the beginning of Beethoven's Piano Sonata in E Flat, Opus 81a (‘Les Adieux’) are reactivated during the movement, suspense is experienced locally. And this is also true of language. One cannot, for instance, imagine the implicative tension (suspense) ‘of a‘when’ clause at the beginning ofa chapter lasting until its close. ‘Not all implications arise from the presence of orderly processes. As discussed in Section 15.2, some result from the human antipathy to disorder. For instance, whether resulting from unpredictable change or incomprehensible redundancy, uncertainty leads listeners to anticipate the advent of stability and order. Thus insistent repetition (coupled with harmonic instability and a gradual crescendo), such as occurs early in the development section of the first movement of Beethoven's Sixth Symphony (mm, 151ff), leads listeners to anticipate change. The question is to what extent the expectation of change is a result of culturally acquired goal-directed proclivities after all, marked beat redundancy does not seem to imply change in contemporary popular 15.1.3 Emotional expression and emotional experience ‘The nature of emotional expression versus emotional experiences (and related matters) hhas been widely discussed in the psychological literature. Accordingly, [ have chosen: (a) to offer an early instance (c. 1604) of the distinction between expression and experiences and (b) to call attention to a kind of emotional response seldom considered in the psychological literature. 348 MUSIC AND EMOTION Expression versus experience Seems, madam! Nay it is [know not ‘seems? “Tisnot alone my inky cloak, ood mother, Nor the customaty suits of solemn black, Nor the windy suspration of forcid breath, No, or the fetal siver inthe eye, Nor the dejected havior ofthe visage, Together with ll forms, moods, shovs of grief, That can denote me truly. These indeed seem, For they ae actions that a man might play Bat | have that within which passeth show, These but the trappings and the suits of woe (Shakespeare, Hamlet, Li) Connotations and recollections ‘What is usually meantby an emotional response to music isa response made by accultur~ ated listeners othe relationships that shape auditory experience. But,asis well known, an ‘emotional response may be evoked not primarily by the sound patterns presented, but by allusions that those patterns are understood to make to other compositions e.g.a Bach chorale) to musicassociated witha cultural activity (eg.a waltz ora funeral march),orto sounds in nature (eg, of the wind or of an animal).In these cases,itisnotthe patterning of the music persethat evokes emotion, but the connotationsthat ithas for different listeners. A related kind of response, which I call ‘nostalgia’ emotion, is not the result ofa cul turally shared reference. Rather, depending on the experience and susceptibility of a particular listener (coupled with the specific circumstance), emotion may be evoked by any sound whatsoever—from the soft sound of waves on the shore, to the singing of birds in the trees, tothe rather crude music of ‘The Old Grey Mate, she ain't what she used to be many long years ago, to which I marched during basic training ‘many long years ago’ (in 1943).!3 15.2 Uncertainty: ‘puzzles the will” 1521 Evolution, choice, and culture Evolution and choice'* Although evolution unquestionably influenced human behaviour through the direct action of biological constraints, what most significantly shaped human behaviour and "ieisimportan to recognize that emotional responses to the' remembrance of things past is depend ‘enton the context ofthe at of eemermbering. Mae that moves us inthe concert al a 3 memo- Fal service wil probably be witbout fect in an elevator ora supermarket. ™Tegin the fst part of Section 152 with paraphrase of the end of the lst chapter of The spheres of ‘musi (Meyer 2000). have included it not only because it constitutes the context for my concern With uncertainty, but becuse I believe offers an acount of how evolution affected human cultures thats signitianty different fom those proposed by neuropsychologists and socabilogiss MUSIC AND EMOTION ISTINCTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES 349) gave rise to human cultures was not the presence but the absence of adequate innate constraints.'* It is because evolution resulted in such an animal that human cultures became indispensable. This aspect of evolution is summarized by biologist Francois Jacob (1982, p.61): In ower organisms behavior isstrctly determined bythe genetic program. tn complex metazoa the genetic program becomes less constraining, more‘open’... This opennes ofthe genetic pro. gram increases with evolution and culminates in mankind. It seems reasonable to suggest that the growth of cognitive capacity was coordinate with the development of consciousness. And consciousness is aroused when choice is required. Indeed, it seems possible that the growth of consciousness was partly a result of the increased importance of choice. That is, as animal intelligence increased so did the apprehension of differences—of kinds and relationships—in the phenomenal world. This change may well have been accompanied by a diminution of the role of, instinct in animal behaviour 1° Increased apprehension of kinds and relationships led to the invention and produc tion of usables (from cradles to coffins) to a concomitant increase in the number of conceptual categories, and to a burgeoning of behavioural options. The consequences of these developments were momentous because the proliferation of conceptual cate- gories and behavioural possiblities makes choosing at once inescapable and burden- some. In philosopher Peter Singer’s wordst ‘Our ability to be a participant in a decision-making process, to reflect and to choose, is as much a fact about human nature as the effect ofthe limbic system on our emotions’ (1981, p. 42). ‘The necessity of choice isa universal that lies atthe very heart of the human condi- tion. It constitutes a basis for both ethical and aesthetic judgments. In ethics, asin the laws, individuals are culpable only ifthe behaviour in question can be shown to be a result of choice. In the arts, forgeries ae banished to the basement because the relation ships reproduced were not created—not chosen—by the forger.!? Choice A number of interrelated conditions combine to facilitate effective, propitious choos ing: the presence of constraints limiting options; the ability to envisage the conse- {quences of alternative choices concepts of hierarchical structuring; and the power to realize one’s choices." Constraints. Without controls limiting the number and ordering the priority of alterna: tive behavioural possibilities, human beings would be caught in distressing indecision— ° Since writing this passage, discovered that Clifford Geertz (1973, pp. 45-6) made much the sme point in Te interpretation of cultures. Put the other way around a he power of instinct waned choice became the main bass for human behaviour, nd with the neces of choice came the burden of uncertainty. ° See‘Forgenyand the anthropology of ain Musi th arts, and dens (Meyer 1994), Chapter 4. ° Because it sot involve i the proces of choosing, but ia the realization of choices, power isnot alloted a separate heading under Choice; but is considered below—especialy in Section 15.2 350 MUSIC AND EMOTION an uncertainty that is not only time-consuming, but a source of unwelcome psycho- logical tension. Growing out of and complementing innate constraints, cultures provide the learned, behavioural controls without which human beings could not choose, func- tion, o indeed, survive. ‘Asingle example from the history of muse serves to ilusrate this point. The aban donment of common. practice tonality by some early twentieth-century composers spawned so many compositional options that limitations were necessary to make choosing feasible. From this point of view, the invention of the twelve-tone method was a response to the need for constraints limiting options. This was the necessary condi- tion for the advent of serialism; the sufficient condition for the constraints actually devised was largely a result of nurtare—specifcally ofthe cultural belief that similarity begets unity." Put succinctly, if too simply: the native need for compositional con- straints created the ‘problem’ cultural concepts provided a solution’ Envizaging culture, and stability. In order o choose intelligently, the variousoptionsavil- ableina particular natural or cultural context must be comprehended and the probable consequencesof each envisaged 2° The need toenvisageinorderto choose sevidentevery- ‘wherein human culture—fom soothsayer to scientist, rom astrological imaginingsto the interpretation of dreams, from pol-akingto fortune-telling, from economic forecast- ingto thepostlation of predictable historical processes. Similarly faithin theexistenceof an established, unchanging order or, alternatively, in change that occurs in an orderly ‘way is appealing because it seems to assure the possibilty of successful envisaging! Indeed, all our institutions, laws and customs, as wells styles of art, serve o stabilize the conceptual-behavioural environment forthe sake of effective envisaging and suc- cessful choosing, And the same is true not only of theories (including even those about chaos) but of styles of behaviour, whether inte arts or in culture generally. Conversely, the insane are institutionalized because we are uncertain about how to act inthe face of “jrrational’—tha is, frighteningly unpredictable—behaviour. Hierarchies: functional versus continuous. One mode of conceptualization that serves 0 stabilize our understanding of relationships in the realms of both nurture and natue is that of hierarchi structuring, Because the term ‘hierarchy’ has been used to refer to in this connection, se the Webern and Krenck quotations in Musi the rts and ideas (Meyer 198, '.263),Thenatue of aesthetic unity hasbeen an enduring concern of artist and aestheticians since Grek times. But thefatensty ofthat concern andthe nature of its conceptualiation are culture ‘ependent Thus, the belie tht similarity produces unity appealed to romantic compoters, because ‘heicepudiation of conventional constraint ed oa significant incresce in the mamber of eraiabie Eavisaging entails makinginferences (based onbothnativeandleernedconstrsints) aboutthe implica- tionsofs particular patterningor about the probable course of events inaspecifiset of icumstances, 2" Ths, despite manifest ferences in elef and method, science and religion have a common gosh ‘namely stabilize the perceptual/conitve world forthe sake of explaining, envisaging, nd choos ing. In other word, both realms re ultimtely ways of minimizing unwanted uncertainty. MUSIC AND EMOTION: DISTINCTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES 351 different kinds of relationships, it seems important to distinguish between two basic types: (a) functionally differentiated hierarchies; and (b) continuous (functionally undifferentiated) ones? Because their functional differentiation specifies relational processes, biological organisms (plants as well animals), cultural institutions (governmental, educational, industrial), most temporal art works (novels and dramas, sonata forms and rondos), and man-made machines (submarines to spaceships) tend to enhance the stability of the behavioural environment. Wealth, power, and celebrity; geological, bilogieal, and technological change; and the fluctuations of climate and populations, all form contin- uous hierarchies whose elements are related to one another notin terms of function, but of amount—for example, of wealth or power: stength, speed, or intensity? In the absence of functional constraints, it seems doubsful whether statistical hierarchies foster stability and enhance the ability to envisage and choose successfully. 15.2.2 Uncertainty Acrtical corollary of the imperative of choice isthe human abhorrence of uncertainty— for instance, the uncertainty surrounding death, which is undoubtedly a crucial reason for the prevalence of religion and for the correlative belief in an afterlife. These are the focus of lines from Hamlet's famous'To be, oF not to be’ soliloquy: the dread of someting afte death, The undiscover'd country from whose hour No traveler returns, puzzles the will ‘And makes us rather bear those ills we have Than My to others that we know not of (Shakespeare, Hamlet, ILi) 2 The diffrence between functionally difeentintd and continuous hieratchies i analogous to that between the functioning of sytacticnatve proceses andthe ation of statistical parameters. This Aitferenc is exemplified by that between the closure crested by functionally diferente syntactic progression (eg from subdominant to dominant to tonic) and that created by ‘tonal centring’ ‘rough the repetition ofa pitch, et. (fr insane, i the fst movement of Bela Bar6ks Piano Sonata). After this ection was written, one of the readers called my attention to Lawrence bikowsi's (1997) eeay on“ Conceptual models and crows domain mapping’ That esay also distin- tuished between two kinds of hierarchy. The ist, chains of beings comparable to my ‘continuous hierarchies but his second type doesnt seem to consider the rle of functional diferentaton 2 Whether hierarchy is functional or continuous doesnot depend on the kind of phenomenon, but ‘on the level Being scrutinized. For instance, although socal history constitutes a continuous hierar chy om the highest level of change, change on lower levels (eg ofa particular politcal event) may be governed by funetional constraints and the same cam be ido sy the history of sonata form versus ‘he fom of a particular sonataform movement. This oes mot gainsay the fact that statistical change may seemimmplicative:foriastance,the gradual intensification of dynamics increaein frequency and shortening of duration maybe understood to implyartivalatsomekindof goal. utswhateverarval (articulation) occurs necessarily inolveseither significant petition ofthe tonicied pitch see note 22) ra significant change in oterparameters— for instance, lengthening of the final sound, change in orchestration, dynamic level, of reste. 352. MUSIC AND EMOTION Here an apparent paradox arises. On the one hand, uncertainty is anathema to humankind.2® For this reason, as noted above, we devise ways of reducing uncertainty both in the ‘out-there’ world and in our personal lives. On the other hand, in the arts and in other ‘playful activities such as sports, games, and gambling, we actualy relish and cultivate a considerable amount of uncertainty. Belief empathy, and aesthetic experience ‘The paradox is possible not only because of what Coleridge called ‘the willing suspension of disbelief? but more importantly because of a postive belief in the competence, integrity,and creativity oftheatist and, above ll, in the significance of works of art. Such positive beliefs indispensable for man-made aesthetic experience (as distinguished from the experience of beauty in the natural world), because itis a necessary condition for the ‘empathy on which perceptual engagement and affective response depend.” ‘The importance of such belie is evident in the ability of criticism to affect the responses of listeners. For instance, the negative reception of avant-garde music was, at least in part, a result of critiques that undermined audience empathy by suggesting that the choices of composers were the result of system-based calculation or of random chance, rather than of ‘inspiration’ and ‘inner feeling: On the other side, consider this stunning, if preposterous, instance of the power of positive belief to produce a favourable response in an audience. Ina book reviews, Fascinating rhythm; David Hajdu ‘writes ‘In 1971, Ravi Shankar, the Indian virtuoso, performed at New York's Madison Square Garden. After hearing a few minutes of Shankar's ensemble, the audience of some 20 000 roared in approval. “Thank you,” Shankar replied. “If you appreciate the tuning so much, I hope you will enjoy the playing more.”® The empathy that belief begets is not solely cognitive. Almost always it involves phys- ical behavious—an inner performative empathy, a kind of imitative identification, with the qualities and patterns of the music Lack of motor empathy, for example, seems to ® Uncertainty isevidently aso anathema to ater animals lisbeth Pennisi (2000,p.577).for example, ‘writes that Although baboons are considered quite aggressive primates by nature, violence tends tobe much more prevalent when the troop’ structreis unstable... the roop members dont know one another, orif the hierarchy is disturbed, say, by the los ofthe top male, the rash to establish rank results in sculls that subside when everyone knows his or her place” In shor, instability. ack of Samia disturbance of social steueturing—all create uncertainty which, in tra, begets violence ographia lteraria, Chapter 14. The" willing suspension ofdsbeli” i an important factor inthe ahilty of audiences to re-experiene implcative relationships-to make belie that they are expe riencng anew. 2 Inaddition to being source of esthetic enjoyment, music has since is heginings served to foster Social cohesion —through the evocation of empathic sharing religious and secular ceremonies, tending to or participating in theatres performances, and matching or dancing together. 2 New York Review of Books Vol 47, No. 12 (20 July 200). Many years ago (Meyer 1956, Largued that bli was essential for the succes of music therapy More recently studies described inthe Harvard Men's Health Watch (September 1997; p.6) have demonstrated the importance of belie for longevity and more general well-being. In addition, it cms likely tat bei plays significant ol in the placebo elect (see Ensernk 198). MUSIC AND EMOTION: DISTINCTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES 353 have played a significant role inthe negative aesthetic and hence emotional response to avant-garde music, while motoricaly accessible musics (from Bach to rock) have found ardent audiences. Indeed, I suspect that often contemporary music has failed to find favour with concert audiences, not primarily because it tends to be dissonant, but because itis difficult to empathize with and experience motorically—not just the lack of rhythmic regularity, but such motor-related problems as the prevalence of large descending skips and intervals such as augmented fourths. The roles of belief and empathy (physica a well as cognitive) help to explain why the uncertainty experienced in relation to works of art, games, and sports differs signifi " Axtimes, implications are relied remotely and may, a result be recognized lage in retospect ‘That we didnot experience uncertainty when the patter was presented eae, but reaizesubse- quently that we might have done so 21 suspect that the neglect of uncertainty was, roncallya result ofthe psychologic ‘caving forthe contol that naming (separate emotions) provides. 2» This account represents a mosfcation ofthat given in Meer (1956a,p. 16 cultural 354 Music AND EMOTION observed earlier although being ‘curious’ i not in itself an emotional experience it may become so if the behavioural inclinations (the needs or goals) associated with it are thwarted, And this appears to be the case with other goal-directed needs—from the need for food tothe need to choose. Qua felings, they ae stats of being, They become emotional experiences or responses when thwarting creates uncertainty about appro- priate courses of action. Seen thus, uncertainty is the result of ignorance—ignorance about how past and present patterns will be continued, eventually reaching stability and closure. In other words, uncertainty is always more or less goal-directed, implying (perhaps uncon- sciously) resolution tothe security of knowing, Since uncertainty i function of the amount of information the ming is required to process, if theres so lite information that patterning isimpossible, the result isa sense of powerlessness and hope-based uncertainty is abandoned, Perhaps this is why during the Vietnam War it was found that, deprived of any stimolation whatsoever, prisoners, became mentally deranged. Stimulus overload (too much information), which may bea ‘attr either of amount, or speed, or both is almost as disturbing as stimulus deprva- tion. Hence audiences tend to be alienated, when (what for them is) an excessive amount of information in a piece of contemporary music precludes patterning and, consequenty,a sense of control Atthe end of Emotion and meaning in music (Meyer 1956a) and subsequently in Explaining music (Meyer 1973), 1 grappled with the problem of accounting forthe suc cession of emotional states presented ina piece of musi. Much later, in‘A universe of universal’ (Meyee 2000, 1 argued that no necessary, inherent order governs the suces- sion of emotional states or referential subjects presented ina piece of music. We accept such successions because the uncertainty and lack of cognitive control created by intervening instability make the retura to mentally manageable patterns satisfying. In short itis the uncertainty-resolution (or, correlatively the implication-reaizaion) process, not similarity of melodie, chythmic, or tonal pattern, that unifies the succession of emotional states presented in a piece of musie® As emphasized in Section 15.1, we conceptualize and understand phenomena notin terms of individual instances, but in terms of clases. And classification plays a critical role in our sense of cognitive control and power. ° 1rtheamount of informations inordinately increased, he results Kind of cognitive white noise 2 & prtcularsucession may, of course, be the result of prograrume concsved by the compote, of

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