Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 50

EN BANC only to the filling up of vacant lawyer positions on or after February 9, 1981, the date said

Executive Order took effect."[3] A fortiori, since private respondent Garcia had been holding the
G.R. No. 84301, April 07, 1993 position of Deputy Register of Deeds II from 1977 to September 1984, she should not be
affected by the operation on February 1, 1981 of Executive Order No. 649.
NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION,
PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND VIOLETA L. GARCIA, Petitioner NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail the validity of the above Resolution of
RESPONDENTS. the Civil Service Commission. It contends that Sections 8 and 10 of Executive Order No.
649 abolished all existing positions in the LRC and transferred their functions to the
DECISION appropriate new offices created by said Executive Order, which newly created offices required the
issuance of new appointments to qualified office holders. Verily, Executive Order No. 649 applies
to private respondent Garcia, and not being a member of the Bar, she cannot be reinstated to her
CAMPOS, JR., J.: former position as Deputy Register of Deeds II.

The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether or not membership in the Bar, which We find merit in the petition.
is the qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to the position of Deputy Register of
Deeds under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration or Executive Order No. 649 authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration Commission
NALTDRA) should be required of and/or applied only to new applicants and not to (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). It
those who were already in the service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the abolished all the positions in the now defunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued
issuance and implementation of the abovesaid Executive Order. to all employees of the NALTDRA.

The facts, as succinctly stated in the Resolution** of the Civil Service Commission, are as follows: The question of whether or not a law abolishes an office is one of legislative intent about which
there can be no controversy whatsoever if there is an explicit declaration in the law itself.[4] A
closer examination of Executive Order No. 649 which authorized the reorganization of the Land
"The records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a first grade Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said Administration (NALTDRA), reveals that said law in express terms, provided for the abolition of
position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which existing positions, to wit:
position, petitioner was also appointed under permanent status up to September 1984. She was
for two years, more or less, designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan,
Bulacan. By virtue of Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981) Sec. 8. Abolition of Existing Positions in the Land Registration Commission. x x x
which authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National Land Titles All structural units in the Land Registration Commission and in the registries of deeds, and all
and Deeds Registration Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein, positions therein shall cease to exist from the date specified in the implementing order to be
petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, issued by the President pursuant to the preceding paragraph. Their pertinent functions, applicable
under temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine Bar. She appealed to the appropriations, records, equipment and property shall be transferred to the appropriate staff or
Secretary of Justice but her request was denied. Petitioner Garcia moved for reconsideration but offices therein created. (Underscoring Supplied.).
her motion remained unacted. On October 23, 1984, petitioner Garcia was administratively
charged with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. While said case was pending Thus, without need of any interpretation, the law mandates
decision, her temporary appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a Memorandum dated that from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in the Land Registration
October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified petitioner Garcia of the Commission are deemed non-existent. This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of a
termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground that she was "receiving position does not involve or mean removal for the reason that removal implies that the post
bribe money". Said Memorandum of Termination which took effect on February 9, 1987, was the subsists and that one is merely separated therefrom.[5] After abolition, there is in law no occupant.
subject of an appeal to the Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn referred the appeal to Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that from the standpoint of strict law,
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.[6]
In its Order dated July 6, 1987, the MSPB dropped the appeal of petitioner Garcia on the ground
that since the termination of her services was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment, Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a
her separation is in order. Her motion for reconsideration was denied on similar ground."[1] legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Two questions therefore arise: (1)
was the abolition carried out by a legitimate body?; and (2) was it done in good faith?
However, in its Resolution[2] dated June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission directed that
private respondent Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or its There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a valid reorganization in any branch or agency
equivalent in the NALTDRA. It held that "under the vested right theory the new requirement of of the Government. Under Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, the applicable law at
BAR membership to qualify for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher that time:
as mandated under said Executive Order, would not apply to her (private respondent Garcia) but
Sec. 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines
shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President of
the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the Prime
Minister shall vacate their respective offices upon the appointment and qualifications of their
successors.

The power to reorganize is, however, not absolute. We have held in Dario vs. Mison[7] that
reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good
faith. This court has pronounced[8] that if the newly created office has substantially new, different
or additional functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office different
from the one abolished, even though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will
be considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of a new or different one. The same is
true if one office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing
officer or office.

Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the
operation of the Land Registration Commission.[9] A reorganization is carried out in good faith if
it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.[10] To this
end, the requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA was
imposed to meet the changing circumstances and new development of the times.[11] Private
respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds did not have such
qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NALTDRA. The
additional qualification was not intended to remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion
imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.

A final word, on the "vested right theory" advanced by respondent Civil Service Commission.
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to
hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.[12] None of the
exceptions to this rule are obtaining in this case.

To reiterate, the position which private respondent Garcia would like to occupy anew was
abolished pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a valid reorganization measure. There
is no vested property right to be re-employed in a reorganized office. Not being a member of the
Bar, the minimum requirement to qualify under the reorganization law for permanent
appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she cannot be reinstated to her former position
without violating the express mandate of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the
questioned Resolution of the Civil Service Commission reinstating private respondent to her
former position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration.
EN BANC After trial, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to reopen the hearing in the lower
court for the purpose of enabling petitioner to present Department Order No. 97-1025. In an
G.R. No. 138200, February 27, 2002 Order dated 18 February 1997, the lower court granted the motion.

On 03 April 1997, respondent filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition assailing the
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND validity of Department Order No. 97-1025. On 14 May 1997, the OSG presented Department
COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), PETITIONER, VS. ROBERTO MABALOT, Order No. 97-1025 after which petitioner filed a formal offer of exhibits.
RESPONDENT.
In an Order dated 09 June 1997, the lower court admitted petitioner’s documentary exhibits over
DECISION the objection of respondent. Likewise, the lower court admitted the supplemental petition filed by
respondent to which petitioner filed an answer thereto.
BUENA, J.:
On 31 March 1999, the lower court rendered a decision the decretal portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Memorandum Order Nos. 96-
At the core of controversy in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is the validity of
733[3] dated February 19, 1996 and 97-1025 dated January 27, 1997 of the respondent DOTC
Memorandum Order No. 96-735, dated 19 February 1996, and Department Order No. 97-1025,
Secretary null and void and without any legal effect as being violative of the provision of the
dated 29 January 1997, both issued by the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Constitution against encroachment on the powers of the legislative department and also of the
Communications (DOTC).
provision enjoining appointive officials from holding any other office or employment in the
Government.
The facts are uncontested.
“The preliminary injunction issued on May 13, 1996 is hereby made permanent.
On 19 February 1996, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr., issued Memorandum Order
No. 96-735 addressed to Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman
“No pronouncement as to costs.
Dante Lantin, viz:
“In the interest of the service, you are hereby directed to effect the transfer of regional functions
“It is so ordered.”
of that office to the DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending the creation of a regular Regional
Hence, the instant petition where this Court is tasked in the main to resolve the issue of validity of
Franchising and Regulatory Office thereat, pursuant to Section 7 of Executive Order No. 202.
the subject administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary.
“Organic personnel of DOTC-CAR shall perform the LTFRB functions on a concurrent capacity
In his Memorandum[4], respondent Mabalot principally argues that “a transfer of the powers and
subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office.”
functions of the LTFRB Regional Office to a DOTC Regional Office or the establishment of the latter as an
On 13 March 1996, herein respondent Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and
LTFRB Regional Office is unconstitutional” for being “an undue exercise of legislative power.” To this end,
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order,[1] against petitioner
respondent quoted heavily the lower court’s rationale on this matter, to wit:
and LTFRB Chairman Lantin, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
“With the restoration of Congress as the legislative body, the transfer of powers and functions,
81,[2] praying among others that Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared “illegal and without
specially those quasi-judicial (in) nature, could only be effected through legislative fiat. Not even
effect.”
the President of the Philippines can do so. And much less by the DOTC Secretary who is
only a mere extension of the Presidency. Among the powers of the LTFRB are to issue
On 20 March 1996, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from
injunctions, whether prohibitory (or) mandatory, punish for contempt and to issue subpoena and
implementing Memorandum Order No. 96-735. On 08 April 1996, the lower court, upon filing of
subpoena duces tecum. These powers devolve by extension on the LTFRB regional offices
a bond by respondent, issued a writ of preliminary injunction. On 25 April 1996, then DOTC
in the performance of their functions. They cannot be transferred to another agency of
Secretary Amado Lagdameo, Jr. filed his answer to the petition.
government without congressional approval embodied in a duty enacted law.” (Emphasis
ours)
Thereafter, on 29 January 1997, Secretary Lagdameo issued the assailed Department Order No.
We do not agree. Accordingly, in the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory
97-1025, to wit:
infirmity attending the issuance of the challenged orders, this Court upholds Memorandum Order
“Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36, dated September 23, 1987, and for purposes of
No. 96-735 and Department Order No. 97-1025 as legal and valid administrative issuances by the
economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera
DOTC Secretary. Contrary to the opinion of the lower court, the President - through his duly
Administrative Region (CAR), the DOTC-CAR Regional Office, created by virtue of Executive
constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the present case - may legally and
Order No. 220 dated July 15, 1987, is hereby established as the Regional Office of the LTFRB
validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-
and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct
CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the
supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office.
concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a
regional office of the LTFRB.
“The budgetary requirement for this purpose shall come from the Department until such time
that its appropriate budget is included in the General Appropriations Act.”
At this point, it is apropos to reiterate the elementary rule in administrative law and the law on
public officers that a public office may be created through any of the following modes, to wit,
either (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or (3) by Thus, their acts, “performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
authority of law.[5] disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.”
Verily, Congress can delegate the power to create positions. This has been settled by decisions of
the Court upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President to create, Applying the foregoing, it is then clear that the lower court’s pronouncement - that the transfer of
abolish or merge offices in the executive department.[6] Thus, at various times, Congress has powers and functions and in effect, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional O
vested power in the President to reorganize executive agencies and redistribute functions, and ffice, may not be validly made by the Chief Executive, much less by his mere alter ago and could
particular transfers under such statutes have been held to be within the authority of the only be properly effected through a law enacted by Congress -is to say the least, erroneous.
President.[7]
In Larin vs. Executive Secretary,[14] this Court through the ponencia of Mr. Justice Justo
In the instant case, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made Torres, inked an extensive disquisition on the continuing authority of the President to reorganize
pursuant to the third mode - by authority of law, which could be decreed for instance, through the National Government, which power includes the creation, alteration or abolition of public
an Executive Order (E.O.) issued by the President or an order of an administrative agency such as offices. Thus in Larin, we held that Section 62 of Republic Act 7645 (General Appropriations Act
the Civil Service Commission[8]pursuant to Section 17, Book V of E.O. 292, otherwise known as [G.A.A.] for FY 1993) “evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect
The Administrative Code of 1987. In the case before us, the DOTC Secretary issued the assailed organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency
Memorandum and Department Orders pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36 of the concerned”:
President,[9] dated 23 September 1987, Section 1 of which explicitly provides: “Section 62. Unauthorized organizational changes.- Unless otherwise created by law or
“Section 1. Establishment of Regional Offices in the CAR- The various departments and directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in
other agencies of the National Government that are currently authorized to maintain regional any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures and be
offices are hereby directed to establish forthwith their respective regional offices In the funded from appropriations by this act.”
Cordillera Administrative Region with territorial coverage as defined under Section 2 of Petitioner’s contention in Larin that Sections 48 and 62 of R.A. 7645 were riders, deserved scant
Executive Order No. 220 dated July 15, 1987, with regional headquarters at Baguio City.” consideration from the Court, Well settled is the rule that every law has in its favor the
Emphatically the President, through Administrative Order No. 36, did not merely authorize presumption of constitutionality. Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared
but directed, in no uncertain terms, the various departments and agencies of government to invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes.[15]
immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their regional offices in the CAR. To us,
Administrative Order No. 36 is a clear and unequivocal directive and mandate - no less than from Worthy to note is that R.A. 8174 (G.A.A for FY 1996) contains similar provisions as embodied in
the Chief Executive - ordering the heads of government departments and bureaus to effect the Section 72 (General Provisions) of said law entitled “Organizational Changes” and Section 73
establishment of their respective regional offices in the CAR. (General Provisions) thereof entitled “Implementation of Reorganization.” Likewise, R.A.
8250 (G.A.A. for FY 1997) has Section 76 (General Provisions) entitled “Organizational
By the Chief Executive’s unequivocal act of issuing Administrative Order No. 36 ordering Changes” and Section 77 (General Provisions) entitled “ Implementation of Reorganization.”
his alter ego - the DOTC Secretary in the present case - to effectuate the creation of Regional
Offices in the CAR, the President, in effect, deemed it fit and proper under the circumstances to In the same vein, Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
act and exercise his authority, albeit through the various Department Secretaries, so as to put into Code of 1987, provides a strong legal basis for the Chief Executive’s authority to reorganize the
place the organizational structure and set-up in the CAR and so as not to compromise in any National Government, viz:
significant way the performance of public functions and delivery of basic government services in “Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall
the Cordillera Administrative Region. exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for
under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by
Simply stated, it is as if the President himself carried out the creation and establishment of the President in accordance with law.” (Emphasis ours)
LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, This Court, in Larin, had occasion to rule that:
directly and merely sought to implement the Chief Executive’s Administrative Order. This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then
gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended
To this end, Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution mandates: Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the
“The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to
By definition, control is “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that
the former for that of the latter.”[10] It includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a “all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive
subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a power directly vested in him by law.[11] issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked.”[16] So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.”
From the purely legal standpoint, the members of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
disposition of the President since they are merely his alter ego.[12] As this Court enunciated 1772, reads:
in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior,[13] “without minimizing the importance of the heads of “1. The President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.” National Government. In exercising this authority, the President shall be guided by generally
acceptable principles of good government and responsive national development, including but Regional Office is subject to review by the DOTC-CAR Regional Office.
not limited to the following guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and
development-oriented governmental framework: As to the issue regarding Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution, we hold that the
assailed Orders of the DOTC Secretary do not violate the aforementioned constitutional
“xxx provisions considering that in the case of Memorandum Order No. 96-735, the organic personnel
of the DOTC-CAR were, in effect, merely designated to perform the additional duties and
“b) Abolish departments, offices, agencies or functions which may not be necessary, or create functions of an LTFRB Regional Office subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB
those which are necessary, for the efficient conduct of government functions, services and Central Office, pending the creation of a regular LTFRB Regional Office.
activities;
As held in Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees:[27]
“c) Transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, properties, records and personnel from “To designate a public officer to another position may mean to vest him with additional duties
one department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality to another; while he performs the functions of his permanent office. Or in some cases, a public officer may
be designated to a position in an acting capacity as when an undersecretary is designated to
“d) Create, classify, combine, split, and abolish positions; discharge the functions of a Secretary pending the appointment of a permanent Secretary.”
Assuming arguendo that the appointive officials and employees of DOTC-CAR shall be
“e) Standardize salaries, materials, and equipment; holding more than one office or employment at the same time as a result of the establishment of
such agency as the LTFRB-CAR pursuant to Department Order No. 97-1025, this Court is of the
“f) Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge or integrate entities, agencies, firm view that such fact still does not constitute a breach or violation of Section 7, Article IX-B of
instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, as well as expand, amend, the Constitution. On this matter, it must be stressed that under the aforementioned constitutional
change, or otherwise modify their powers, functions, and authorities, including, with provision, an office or employment held in the exercise of the primary functions of one’s principal
respect to government-owned or controlled corporations, their corporate life, office is an exception to, or not within the contemplation, of the prohibition embodied in Section
capitalization, and other relevant aspects of their charters. (As added by P.D. 1772) 7, Article IX-B.

“g) Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives Equally significant is that no evidence was adduced and presented to clearly establish that the
of this decree. (As added by P.D. 1772) (Emphasis supplied.) appointive officials and employees of DOTC-CAR shall receive any additional, double or indirect
In fine, the “designation”[17] and subsequent establishment[18] of DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office compensation, in violation of Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution. In the absence of any
of LTFRB in the Cordillera Administrative Region and the concomitant exercise and performance clear and convincing evidence to show any breach or violation of said constitutional prohibitions,
of functions by the former as the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, fall within the scope of the this Court finds no cogent reason to declare the invalidity of the challenged orders.
continuing authority of the President to effectively reorganize the Department of Transportation
and Communications. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated 31 March 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
Beyond this, it must be emphasized that the reorganization in the instant case was decreed “in the City-Branch 81 in Special Civil Action Case No. Q-96-26868 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
interest of the service”[19] and “for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC functions in
the Cordillera Administrative Region.”[20] In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid
provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith
if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.[21] To our mind, the reorganization
pursued in the case at bar bears the earmark of good faith. As petitioner points out, [22] “tapping
the DOTC-CAR pending the eventual creation of the LTFRB Regional Office is economical in
terms of manpower and resource requirements, thus, reducing expenses from the limited
resources of the government.”

Furthermore, under Section 18, Chapter 5, Title XV, Book IV of E.O. 292[23] and Section 4 of
E.O. 202,[24] the Secretary of Transportation and Communications, through his duly designated
Undersecretary, shall exercise administrative supervision and control[25] over the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (Board).

Worthy of mention too is that by express provision of Department Order No. 97-1025, the
LTFRB-CAR Regional Office is subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central
Office. Under the law,[26] the decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Franchising and
Regulatory Offices shall be appealable to the Board within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
decision; the decision, order or resolution of the Board shall be appealable to the DOTC
Secretary. With this appellate set-up and mode of appeal clearly established and in place, no
conflict or absurd circumstance would arise in such manner that a decision of the LTFRB-CAR
EN BANC BELENO, ANTONIO B. BERNARDO, ROMEO D. BERNAS, MARCIANO S.
BOHOL, AUXILIADOR G. BRAVO, VICTOR M. BULEG, BALILIS R. CALNEA,
G.R. No. 81954, August 08, 1989 MERCEDES M. CALVO, HONESTO G. CAMACHO, CARLOS V. CAMPOS,
RODOLFO C. CAPULONG, RODRIGO G. CARINGAL, GRACIA Z. CARLOS,
LORENZO B. CARRANTO, FIDEL U. CARUNGCONG, ALFREDO M. CASTRO,
CESAR Z. DARIO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. PATRICIA J. CATELO, ROGELIO B. CATURLA, MANUEL B. CENIZAL, JOSEFINA
VICENTE JAYME AND HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., IN THEIR F. CINCO, LUISITO CONDE, JOSE C., JR. CORCUERA, FIDEL S. CORNETA,
RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, SECRETARY OF VICENTE S. CORONADO, RICARDO S. CRUZ, EDUARDO S. CRUZ, EDILBERTO
FINANCE, AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, RESPONDENTS. A. CRUZ, EFIGENIA B. CRUZADO, MARCIAL C. CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M.
DABON, NORMA M. DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D. DANDAL, EDEN F.
G.R. No. 81967 DATUHARON, SATA A. DAZO, GODOFREDO L. DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA DE
GUZMAN, ANTONIO A. DE GUZMAN, RENATO E. DE LA CRUZ, AMADO A., JR.
VICENTE A. FERIA, JR., PETITIONER, HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. DE LA CRUZ, FRANCISCO C. DE LA PESA, LEONARDO. DEL CAMPO,
VICENTE JAYME; VS. AND HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., IN THEIR ORLANDO DEL RIO, MAMERTO P., JR. DEMESA, WILHELMINA T. DIMAKUTA,
RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, SECRETARY OF SALIC L. DIZON, FELICITAS A. DOCTOR, HEIDY M. DOLAR, GLICERIO R.
FINANCE, AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, RESPONDENTS. DOMINGO, NICANOR J. DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR. DUAY, JUANA G.
DYSANGCO, RENATO F. EDILLOR, ALFREDO P. ELEVAZO, LEONARDO A.
G.R. No. 82023 ESCUYOS, MANUEL M., JR. ESMERIA, ANTONIO E. ESPALDON, MA. LOURDES
H. ESPINA, FRANCO A. ESTURCO, RODOLFO C. EVANGELINO, FERMIN I.
ADOLFO CASARENO, PACIFICO LAGLEVA, JULIAN C. ESPIRITU, DENNIS A. FELIX, ERNESTO G. FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M. FERRAREN, ANTONIO C.
AZARRAGA, RENATO DE JESUS, NICASIO C. GAMBOA, CORAZON RALLOS FERRERA, WENCESLAO A. FRANCISCO, PELAGIOS., JR. FUENTES, RUDY L.
NIEVES, FELICITACION R. GELUZ, LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA, SUBAER GAGALANG, RENATO V. GALANG, EDGARDO R. GAMBOA, ANTONIO C. GAN,
PACASUM, ZENAIDA LANARIA, JOSE B. ORTIZ, GLICERIO R. DOLAR, ALBERTO R. GARCIA, GILBERT M. GARCIA, EDNA V. GARCIA, JUAN L.
CORNELIO NAPA, PABLO B. SANTOS, FERMIN RODRIGUEZ, DALISAY GAVIOLA, LILIAN V. GEMPARO, SEGUNDINA G. GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ
BAUTISTA, LEONARDO JOSE, ALBERTO LONTOK, PORFIRIO TABINO, JOSE B. GRATE, FREDERICK R. GREGORIO, LAURO P. GUARTICO, AMMON H.
BARREDO, ROBERTO ARNALDO, ESTER TAN PEDRO BAKAL, ROSARIO GUIANG, MYRNA N. GUINTO, DELFIN C. HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A.
DAVID, RODOLFO AFUANG, LORENZO CATRE, LEONCIA CATRE, ROBERTO HONRALES, LORETO N. HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H. MULAR, LANNYROSS E.
ABADA, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSIONER SALVADOR M. MISON, IBAÑEZ. ESTER C. ILAGAN, HONORATO C. INFANTE, REYNALDO C. ISAIS,
COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT. RAY C. ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B. JANOLO, VIRGILIO M. JAVIER, AMADOR L.
JAVIER, ROBERTO S. JAVIER, WILLIAM R. JOVEN, MEMIA A. JULIAN,
G.R. No. 83737 REYNALDO V. JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A. JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F. KAINDOY,
PASCUAL B., JR. KOH, NANIE G. LABILLES, ERNESTO S. LABRADOR,
BENEDICTO L. AMASA AND WILLIAM S. DIONISIO, PETITIONERS, VS. WILFREDO M. LAGA, BIENVENIDO M. LAGLEVA, PACIFICO Z. LAGMAN,
PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, IN HER CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL EVANGELINE G. LAMPONG, WILFREDO G. LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A.
SERVICE COMMISSION AND SALVADOR MISON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS LAPITAN, CAMILO M. LAURENTE, REYNALDO A. LICARTE, EVARISTO R.
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENTS. LIPIO, VICTOR O. LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z. LOPEZ, MELENCIO L. LUMBA,
OLIVIA R. MACAISA, BENITO T. MACAISA, ERLINDA C. MAGAT, ELPIDIO
G.R. No. 85310 MAGLAYA, FERNANDO P. MALABANAN, ALFREDO C. MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D.
MALIJAN, LAZARO V. MALLI, JAVIER M. MANAHAN, RAMON S. MANUEL,
SALVADOR M. MISON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, ELPIDIO R. MARAVILLA, GIL B. MARCELO, GIL C. MARIÑAS, RODOLFO V.
PETITIONER. VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ABACA, SISINIO T. ABAD, MAROKET, JESUS C. MARTIN, NEMENCIO A. MARTINEZ, ROMEO M.
ROGELIO C. ABADIANO, JOSE P, ABCEDE, NEMECIO C. ABIOG, ELY F. MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M. MATIBAG, ANGELINA G. MATUGAS, ERNESTO T.
ABLAZA, AURORA M. AGBAYANI, NELSON I. AGRES, ANICETO AGUILAR, MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T. MAYUGA, PORTIA E. MEDINA, NESTOR M.
FLOR AGUILUCHO, MA. TERESA R. AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T. ALANO, ALEX P. MEDINA, ROLANDO S. MENDAVIA, AVELINO I. MENDOZA, POTENCIANO G.
ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR. ALBANO, ROBERT B. ALCANTARA, JOSE G. ALMARIO, MIL, RAY M. MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L. MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR. G.
RODOLFO F. ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R. AMISTAD, RUDY M. AMOS, FRANCIS F. MONTANO, ERNESTO F. MONTERO, JUAN M. III MORALDE, ESMERALDO B.,
ANDRES, RODRIGO V. ANGELES, RICARDO S. ANOLIN, MILAGROS H. JR. MORALES, CONCHITA D.L. MORALES, NESTOR P. MORALES, SHIRLEY S.
AQUINO, PASCASIO E. ARABE, MELINDA M. ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN S., JR. MUNAR, JUANITA L. MUÑOZ, VICENTE R. MURILLO, MANUEL M. NACION,
ARPON, ULPIANO U., JR. ARREZA, ARTEMIO M. JR., ARROJO, ANTONIO P. PEDRO R. NAGAL, HENRY N. NAPA, CORNELIO B. NAVARRO, HENRY L.
ARVISU, ALEXANDER S. ASCAÑO, ANTONIO T. ASLAHON, JOLAHON P. NEJAL, FREDRICK E. NICOLAS, REYNALDO S. NIEVES, RUFINO A. OLAIVAR,
ASUNCION, VICTOR R. ATANGAN, LORNA S. ATIENZA, ALEXANDER R. SEBASTIAN T. OLEGARIO, LEO Q. ORTEGA, ARLENE R. ORTEGA, JESUS R.
BACAL, URSULINO C. BAÑAGA. MARLOWE Z. BANTA, ALBERTO T. BARREDO, OSORIO, ABNER S. PAPIO, FLORENTINO T. II PASCUA, ARNULFO A. PASTOR,
JOSE B. BARROS, VICTOR C. BARTOLOME. FELIPE A. BAYSAC, REYNALDO S. ROSARIO PELAYO, ROSARIO L. PEÑA, AIDA C. PEREZ, ESPERIDION B. PEREZ,
JESUS BAYANI M. PRE, ISIDRO A. PRUDENCIADO. EULOGIA S. PUNZALAN, The Court writes finis to this controversy that has raged bitterly for the past several months. It
LAMBERTO N. PURA, ARNOLD T. QUINONES, EDGARDO I. QUINTOS, does so out of a legitimate presentiment of more suits reaching it as a consequence of the
AMADEO C., JR. QUIRAY, NICOLAS C. RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P. RAÑADA, government reorganization and the instability it has wrought on the performance and efficiency of
RODRIGO C. RARAS, ANTONIO A. RAVAL, VIOLETA V. RAZAL, BETTY R. the bureaucracy. The Court is apprehensive that unless the final word is given and the ground
RBGMA, PONCE F. REYES, LIBERATO R. REYES, MANUEL E. REYES, NORMA rules are settled, the issue will fester, and likely foment a constitutional crisis for the nation, itself
Z. REYES, TELESFORO F. RIVERA, ROSITA L. ROCES. ROBERTO V. ROQUE, beset with grave and serious problems.
TERESITA S. ROSANES, MARILOU M. ROSETE, ADAN I. RUANTO, REY CRISTO
C. , JR. SABLADA, PASCASIO G. SALAZAR, SILVERIA S. SALAZAR, VICTORIA A. The facts are not in dispute.
SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C. SALMINGO, LOURDES M. SANTIAGO, EMELITA B..
SATIMA, PORFIRIO C. SEKITO, COSME B., JR. SIMON, RAMON P. SINGSON, On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3,
MELECIO C. SORIANO, ANGELO L. SORIANO, MAGDALENA R. SUMULONG, "DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED
ISIDORO L., JR. SUNICO, ABELARDO T. TABIJE, EMMA B, TAN, RUDY BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A
GOROSPE TAN, ESTER S. TAN, JULITA S. TECSON, BEATRIZ B, TOLENTINO, PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY
BENIGNO A. TURINGAN, ENRICO T., JR. UMPA, ALI A. VALIC, LUCIO E. TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION." Among other
VASQUEZ, WICANOR B. VELARDE, EDGARDO C. VERA, AVELINO A. VERAME, things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
OSCAR E. VIADO, LILIAN T. VIERNES, NAPOLEON K. VILLALON, DENNIS A.
VILLAR, LUZ L. VILLALUZ, EMELITO V. ZATA, ANGEL A., JR. ACHARON, SECTION 1. ...
CRISTETO, ALBA, RENATO B. AMON. JULITA C. AUSTRIA, ERNESTO C. CALO,
RAYMUNDO M. CENTENO, BENJAMIN R. DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA C. DONATO, The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:
ESTELITA P. DONATO, FELIPE S. FLORES, PEDRITO S. GALAROSA, RENATO,
MALAWI, MAUYAG, MONTENEGRO, FRANCISCO M. OMEGA, PETRONILO T., (a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all
SANTOS, GUILLERMO F., TEMPLO, CELSO, VALDERAMA, JAIME B., AND iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime;[1]. . .
VALDEZ, NORA M., RESPONDENTS.
Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:
G.R. No. 85335
SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be given to measures to
FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, ADAN I. ROSETE FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS MA. J. promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and corruption.
ANGELINA G. MATIBAG LEODEGARDIO H. FLORESCA LEONARDO A. DELA
PEÑA ABELARDO T. SUNICO MELENCIO L. LOPEZ NEMENCIO A. MARTIN SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution
RUDY M. AMISTAD ERNESTO T. MATUGAS SILVERIA S. SALAZAR LILLIAN V. shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
GAVIOLA MILAGROS ANOLIN JOSE B. ORTIZ ARTEMIO ARREZA, JR. appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year
GILVERTO M. GARCIA ANTONIO A. RARAS FLORDELINA B. GOBENCIONG from February 25, 1986.
ANICETO AGRES EDGAR Y. QUINONES MANUEL B. CATURLA ELY F. ABIOG
RODRIGO C. RANADA LAURO GREGORIO ALBERTO I. GAN, EDGARDO SECTION 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of the
GALANG RAY C. ISAIS, NICANOR B. VASQUEZ MANUEL ESCUYOS, JR., organization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws then in force,
ANTONIO B. BELENO ELPIO R. MANUEL AUXILIADOR C. BOHOL receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder.
LEONARDO ELEVAZO VICENTE S. CORNETA, PETITIONERS, VS. COM.
SALVADOR M. MISON BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND THE CIVIL SERVICE SECTION 4. The records, equipment, buildings, facilities and other properties of all government
COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS. offices shall be carefully preserved. In case any office or body is abolished or reorganized
pursuant to this Proclamation, its funds and properties shall be transferred to the office or body
G. R. No. 81954 to which its powers, functions and responsibilities substantially pertain.[2]

SALVADOR M. MISON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the President, in
PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, SENEN S. DIMAGUILA, her first act in office, called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy
ROMEO P. ARABE, BERNARDO S. QUINTONG, GREGORIO P. REYES, AND resignation(s) beginning with the members of the Supreme Court."[3] Later on, she abolished the
ROMULO C. BADILLO, RESPONDENTS. Batasang Pambansa[4] and the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet [5] under the 1973
Constitution.
DECISION
Since then, the President has issued a number of executive orders and directives reorganizing
SARMIENTO, J.: various other government offices, a number of which with respect to elected local officials, has
been challenged in this Court,[6] and two of which, with respect to appointed functionaries, have
likewise been questioned herein.[7]
On May 28, 1986. the President enacted Executive Order No. 17 "PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE In this connection, we regret to inform you that your services are hereby terminated as of
FREEDOM CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety February 28, 1988. Subject to the normal clearances, you may receive the retirement benefits to
and demoralization among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government which you may be entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations.
reorganization had generated, and prescribed as "grounds for the separation/replacement of
personnel," the following: In the meantime, your name will be included in the consolidated list compiled by the Civil Service
Commission so that you may be given priority for future employment with the Government as
SECTION 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation/replacement of personnel: the need arises.

1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd) SALVADOR M. MISON
2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as
Commissioner[15]
determined by the Ministry Head concerned;
As far as the records will yield, the following were recipients of these notices:
3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
1. CESAR DARIO … 310.
4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
Cesar Dario is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81954; Vicente Feria, Jr. is the petitioner in G.R. No.
81967; Messrs. Adolfo Caserano, Pacifico Lagleva, Julian C. Espiritu, Dennis A. Azarraga, Renato
5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his
de Jesus, Nicasio C. Gamboa, Mesdames Corazon Rallos Nievas and Felicitacion R. Geluz,
separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.[8]
Messrs. Leodegario H. Floresca, Subaer Pacasum, Ms. Zenaida Lanaria, Mr. Jose D. Ortiz, Ms.
Gliceria R. Dolar, Ms. Cornelia Mapa, Pablo D. Santos, Fermin Rodriguez, Ms. Dalisay Bautista,
On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING
Messrs. Leonardo Jose, Alberto Lontok, Porfirio Tabino, Jose Barredo, Roberto Arnaldo, Ms.
THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE".[9] Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided
Ester Tan, Messrs. Pedro Bakal, Rosario David, Rodolfo Afuang, Lorenzo Catre, Ms. Leonora
for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs[10] and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
Catre, and Roberto Abada, are the petitioners in G.R. No. 82023; the last 279[16] individuals issued
are the private respondents in G.R. No. 85310.
Three days later, on February 2. 1987,[11] the Filipino People adopted the new Constitution.
As far as the records will likewise counsel,[17] a total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a
of Customs were given individual notices of separation. A number supposedly sought
Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive
reinstatement with the Reorganization Appeals Board while others went to the Civil Service
Orders,"[12] prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. It also provided:
Commission. The first thirty-one mentioned above came directly to this Court.
1. By February 28, 1988, all employees covered by executive Order 627 and the grace period
On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement
extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President of the Philippines on reorganization shall be:
of the 279 employees, the 279 private respondents in G.R. No. 85310, the dispositive portion of
a) informed of their re-appointment, or
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:
b) offered another position in the same department or agency, or

c) informed of their termination.[13] 1. Appellants be immediately re appointed to positions of comparable or equivalent rank
On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged in the, Bureau of Customs without loss of seniority rights;
with adjudicating appeals from removals under the above Memorandum.[14] On January 26, 1988,
Commissioner Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials, in the tenor as 2. Appellants be paid their back salaries reckoned from the dates of their illegal
follows: termination based on the rates under the approved, new staffing pattern but not lower
than their former salaries.
Sir:

Please be informed that the, Bureau is now in the process of implementing the Reorganization This action of the Commission should not, however, be interpreted as an exoneration of the
Program under Executive Order No. 127. appellants from any accusation of wrongdoing and, therefore, their reappointments are without
prejudice to:
Pursuant to Section 59 of the same Executive Order, all officers and employees of the
Department of Finance, or the Bureau of Customs in particular, shall continue to perform their 1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with pending administrative cases, and
respective duties and responsibilities in a hold-over capacity, and that those incumbents whose where investigations have been finished, to promptly render the appropriate decisions;
positions are not carried in the new reorganization, pattern, or who are not re-appointed, shall be
deemed separated from the service.
2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints against appellants with derogatory the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be: Provided, That application for
reports or information if evidence so warrants. clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been made by the corresponding department
or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a separation gratuity in the
SO ORDERED.[18] amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Such separation pay and
On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a motion for retirement benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings of the department or agency
reconsideration. Acting on the motion, the Civil Service Commission, on September 20, 1988, concerned.[23]
denied reconsideration.[19] On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and William Dionisio, customs examiners appointed by
Commissioner Mison pursuant to the ostensible reorganization subject of this controversy,
On October 20, 1988, Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings with this Court, petitioned the Court to contest the validity of the statute. The petition is docketed as G.R. No.
docketed, as above-stated, as G.R. No. 85310 of this Court. 83737.

On November 16, 1988, the Civil Service Commission further disposed the appeal (from the On October 21, 1988, thirty-five more Customs officials whom the Civil Service Commission had
resolution of the Reorganization Appeals Board of five more employees, holding as follows: ordered reinstated by its June 30, 1988 Resolution filed their own petition to compel the
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that: Commissioner of Customs to comply with the said Resolution. The petition is docketed as
G.R.No. 85335.

1. Appellants be immediately reappointed to positions of comparable or equivalent rank On November 29, 1988, we resolved to consolidate all seven petitions.
in the Bureau of Customs without loss of seniority rights; and
On the same date, we resolved to set the matter for hearing on January 12, 1989. At the said
2. Appellants be paid their back salaries to be reckoned from the date of their illegal hearing, the parties, represented by their counsels (a) retired Justice Ruperto Martin; (b) retired
termination based on the rates under the approved new staffing pattern but not lower Justice Lino Patajo; (c) former Dean Froilan Bacungan; (d) Atty. Lester Escobar; (e) Atty.
than their former salaries. Faustino Tugade; and (f) Atty. Alexander Padilla, presented their arguments. Solicitor General
Francisco Chavez argued on behalf of the Commissioner of Customs (except in G.R. 85335, in
which he represented the Bureau of Customs and the Civil Service Commission). Former Senator
This action of the Commission Should not, however, be interpreted as an exoneration of the Ambrosio Padilla also appeared and argued as amicus curiae. Thereafter, we resolved to require
Herein appellants from any accusation of any wrongdoing and therefore, their reappointments are the parties to submit their respective memoranda which they did in due time.
without prejudice to:
There is no question that the administration may validly carry out a government reorganization --
1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with pending administrative cases, if any, insofar as these cases are concerned, the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs — by mandate
and where investigations have been finished, to promptly, render the appropriate not only of the Provisional Constitution, Supra, but also of the various Executive Orders decreed
decisions; and by the Chief Executive in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the 1986-1987
revolutionary government. It should also be noted that under the present Constitution, there is a
recognition, albeit implied, that a government reorganization may be legitimately undertaken,
2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints against appellant with derogatory
subject to certain conditions.[24]
reports or information, if any, and if evidence so warrants.
The Court understands that the parties are agreed on the validity of a reorganization per se, the
SO ORDERED.[20] only question being, as shall be later seen: What is the nature and extent of this government
On January 6, 1989, Commissioner Mison challenged the Civil Service Commission's Resolution reorganization?
in this Court; his petition has been docketed herein as G.R. No. 86241. The employees ordered to
be reinstated are Senen Dimaguila, Romeo Arabe, Bernardo Quintong, Gregorio Reyes, and The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure, failure to exhaust administrative
Romulo Badillo.[21] remedies, the standing of certain parties to sue,[25] and other technical objections, for two reasons,
[b]ecause of the demands of public interest including the need for stability in the public
On June 10, 1986, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF service,” [26] and because of the serious implications of these cases on the administration of the
TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE Philippine civil service and the rights of public servants.
IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION,"[22] was signed into law.
Under Section 7, thereof: The urgings in (G.R. Nos. 85335 and 85310, that the Civil Service Commission' s Resolution
Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been dated June 30, 1988 had attained a character of finality for failure of Commissioner Mison to
separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as apply for judicial review or ask for reconsideration seasonably under Presidential Decree No.
the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the period of 807,[27] or under Republic Act No. 6656,[28] or Under the Constitution,[29] are likewise rejected.
separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees, including casuals and The records show that the Bureau of Customs had until July 15, 1988 to ask for reconsideration
temporary employees, who have been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled or come to this Court pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 807. The records
thereto, be, paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and other benefits under existing likewise show that the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration on July 15, 1988.[30] the
laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their separation or from the date of Civil Service Commission issued its Resolution denying reconsideration on September 20, 1988; a
copy of this Resolution was received by the Bureau on September 23, 1988.[31] Hence, the Bureau appeal.[41]
had until October 23, 1988 to elevate the matter on certiorari to this Court.[32] since the Bureau's
petition was filed on October 20, 1988, it was filed on time. Accordingly, we accept Commissioner Mison's petition (G.R. No. 85310) which clearly charges
the Civil Service Commission with grave abuse of discretion, a proper subject of certiorari although
We reject, finally, contentions that the Bureau's petition (in G.R. 85310) raises no jurisdictional it may not have so stated in terms.
questions, and is therefore bereft of any basis as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.[33] We find that the questions raised in Commissioner Mison's petition (in G.R. 85310) As to charges that the said petition has been filed out of time, we reiterate that it has beefs filed
are, indeed, proper for certiorari, if by "jurisdictional questions" we mean questions having to do seasonably. It is to be stressed that the Solicitor General had thirty days from September 23, 1988
with "an, indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, or omission to weigh pertinent (the date the Resolution, dated September 20, 1988, of the Civil Service Commission, denying
considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation,"[34] as distinguished from reconsideration, was received) to commence the instant certiorari proceedings. As we stated, under
questions that require "digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment" [35] which is the the Constitution, an aggrieved party has thirty days within which to challenge "any decision, order,
office, on the other hand, of review under Rule 45 of the said Rules: What cannot be denied is the or ruling"[42] of the Commission. To say that the period should be counted from the Solicitor's
fact that the act of the Civil Service Commission of reinstating hundreds of Customs employees receipt of the main Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, is to say that he should not have asked for
Commissioner Mison had separated, has implications not only on the entire reorganization reconsideration. But to say that is to deny him the right to contest (by a motion for
process decreed no less than by the Provisional Constitution, but on the Philippine bureaucracy in reconsideration) any ruling, other than the main decision, when, precisely, the Constitution gives
general; these implications are of such a magnitude that it cannot be said that -- assuming that the him such a right. That is also to place him at a "no-win" situation because if he did not move for a
Civil Service Commission erred --- the Commission committed a plain "error of judgment" that reconsideration, he would have been faulted for demanding certiorari too early, under the general
Aratuc says cannot be corrected by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or any special civil action. rule that a motion for reconsideration should preface a resort to a special, civil action.[43] Hence,
We reaffirm the teaching of Aratuc --- as regards recourse to this Court with respect to rulings of we must reckon the thirty-day period from receipt of the order of denial.
the Civil Service Commission --- which is that judgments of the Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court through certiorari alone, under rule 65 of the Rules of Court. To come to the merits of these cases.

In Aratuc, we declared: G.R. Nos. 81954, 81967,


82023, and 85335
It is once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite
tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the independent
The Case for the Employees
constitutional body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections. The
framers of the new Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge of what it means
The petitioner in G.R. No. 81954, Cesar Dario, was one of the Deputy Commissioners of the
to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the Supreme
Bureau of Customs until his relief on orders of Commissioner Mison on January 26, 1988. In
Court". And since instead of maintaining that, provision intact, it ordained that the Commission's
essence, he questions the legality of his dismissal, which he alleges was upon the authority of
actuations be instead "brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari". We cannot insist that there was
Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, Supra, herein below reproduced as follows:
no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari,
SEC- 59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers and
compared to a review," is well known in remedial law.[36]
employees of the Ministry shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties
and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in the meantime
We observe no fundamental difference between the Commission on Elections and the Civil
they are separated from government service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or Article
Service Commission (or the Commission on Audit for that matter) in terms of the constitutional
III of the Freedom Constitution.
intent to leave the constitutional bodies alone in the enforcement of laws relative to elections,
with respect to the former, and the civil service, with respect to the latter (or the audit of
The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry shall be approved and prescribed
government accounts, with respect to the Commission on Audit, As the poll body is the "sole
by the Minister within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Executive Order
Judge"[37] of all election cases, so is the Civil Service Commission the single arbiter of all
and the authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular appointments by him or
controversies pertaining to the civil service.
by the President, as the case may be. Those incumbents whose positions are not included therein
or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service. Those separated from the
It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the 1973 Charter, "any decision,
service shall receive the retirement benefits to which they may be entitled under existing laws,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
rules and regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid the equivalent of one month basic salary for
on certiorari",[38] which, as Aratuc tells us, "technically connotes something less than saying that the
every year of service, or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of
same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court,'"[39] which in turn suggests an appeal by
highest salary received but in no case shall such payment exceed the equivalent of 12 months
petition for review under Rule 45. Therefore, our jurisdiction ever cases emanating from the Civil
salary.
Service Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under Rule
No court or administrative body shall issue any writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order
65.
to enjoin the separation/replacement of any officer or employee effected under this Executive
Order.[44]
While Republic Act No. 6656 states that judgments of the Commission are "final and
executory"[40] and hence, unappealable under Rule 65, certiorari precisely lies in the absence of an
a provision he claims the Commissioner could not have legally invoked. He avers that he could under Section 59 incumbents are considered on holdover status, "which means that all those
not have been legally deemed to be an "[incumbent] whose [position] [is] not included therein or positions were considered vacant."[57] The Solicitor General denies the applicability of Palma-
who [is] not reappointed"[45] to justify his separation from the service. He contends that neither Fernandez v. De la Paz[58] because that case supposedly involves a mere transfer and not a
the Executive Order (under the second paragraph of the section) nor the staffing pattern separation. He rejects, finally, the force and effect of Executive Order Nos. 17 and 39 for the
proposed by the Secretary of Finance[46] abolished the office of Deputy Commissioner of reason that Executive Order No. 167, which was meant to implement the Provisional
Customs, but, rather, increased it to three.[47] Nor can it be said, so he further maintains that he Constitution[59] had ceased to have force and effect upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
had not been "reappointed"[48] under the second paragraph of the section) because and that, under Executive Order No. 39, the dismissal is contemplated were "for cause" while the
"(r)eappointment therein presupposes that the position to which at refers is a new one in lieu of separations now under question were "not for cause" and were a result of government
that which has been abolished or although an existing one, has absorbed that which has been reorganization decrees by Executive Order No. 127. Anent Republic Act No. 6656, he express
abolished."[49] He claims, finally, that under the Provisional Constitution, the power to dismiss doubts on the constitutionality of the grant of retroactivity therein (as regards the reinforcement
public officials without cause ended on February 25, 1987,[50] and that thereafter, public officials of security of tenure) since the new Constitution clearly allows reorganization after its effectivity.
enjoyed security of tenure under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.[51]
G.R. Nos. 85310 and
Like Dario, Vicente Feria, the petitioner in G.R. No. 81967, was a Deputy Commissioner at the 86241
Bureau until his separation directed by Commissioner Mison. And like Dario, he claims that under
the 1987 Constitution, he has acquired security of tenure and that he cannot be said to be covered
The Position of Commissioner Mison
by Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, having been appointed on April 22, 1986 -- during the
effectivity of the Provisional Constitution. He adds that under Executive Order No. 39,
Commissioner's twin petitions are direct challenges to three rulings of the Civil Service
"ENLARGING THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
Commission: (1) the Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, reinstating the 206 customs employees
CUSTOMS."[52] the Commissioner of Customs has the power "(t)o appoint all Bureau personnel,
above-stated; (2) the Resolution, dated September 20, 1988, denying reconsideration; and (3) the
except those appointed by the President,"[53] and that his position, which is that of a Presidential
Resolution, dated November 16, 1988, reinstating five employees. The Commissioner's arguments
appointee, is beyond the control of Commissioner Mison for purposes of reorganization.
are as follows:
The petitioners in G.R. No. 82023, collectors and examiners in various ports of the Philippines,
say, on the other hand, that the purpose of reorganization is to end corruption at the Bureau of 1. The ongoing government reorganization is in the nature of a
Customs and that since there is no finding that they are guilty of corruption, they cannot be "progressive"[60] reorganization "impelled by the need to overhaul the entire
validly dismissed from the service. government bureaucracy"[61] following the people power revolution of 1986;

The Case for Commissioner Mison 2. There was faithful compliance by the Bureau of the various guidelines issued by the
President, in particular, as to deliberation, and selection of personnel for appointment
In his comments, the Commissioner relies on this Court's resolution in Jose v. Arroyo,[54] in which under the new staffing pattern;
the following statement appears in the last paragraph thereof:
3. The separated employees have been, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, on
The contention of petitioner that Executive Order No. 127 is violative of the provision of the mere holdover standing, "which means that all positions are declared vacant;"[62]
1987 Constitution guaranteeing career civil service employees security of tenure Overlooks the
provisions of Section 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorize the
removal of career civil service employees "not for cause but as a result of the reorganization 4. Jose v. Arroyo has declared the validity of Executive Order No. 127 under the
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution;
ratification of this Constitution". By virtue of said provision, the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the ratification of the 5. Republic Act No. 6656 is of doubtful constitutionality.
Constitution, and career civil service employees may be separated from the service without cause
as a result of such reorganization.[55]
The Ruling of the Civil Service Commission
For this reason, Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no defense. He
further states that the deadline prescribed by the Provisional Constitution (February 25, 1987) has The position of the Civil Service Commission is as follows:
been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, specifically, the transitory provisions thereof,[56] which
allows a reorganization thereafter (after February 25, 1987) as this very Court has so declared in 1. Reorganizations occur where there has been a reduction in personnel or redundancy of
Jose v. Arroyo. Mison submits that contrary to the employees' argument, Section 59 of Executive functions; there is no showing that the reorganization in question has been carried out
Order No. 127 is applicable (in particular, to Dario and Feria) in the sense that retention in the for either purpose -- on the contrary, the dismissals now disputed were carried out by
Bureau, under the Executive Order, depends on either retention of the position in the new mere service of notices;
staffing pattern or reappointment of the incumbent, and since the dismissed employees had not
been reappointed, they had been considered legally separated. Moreover, Mison proffers that
2. The current Customs reorganization has not been made according to Malacañang Section 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the
guidelines; information on file with the Commission shows that Commissioner Mison Philippines shall continue in office until otherwise provided by the law or decreed by the
has been appointing unqualified personnel; incumbent President of the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by this
Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective offices upon the
appointment and qualification of their successors.[66]
3. Jose v. Arroyo, in validating Executive Order No. 127, did not countenance illegal
removals;
The freedom Constitution is, as earlier seen, couched in Similar language:

4. Republic Act No. 6656 protects security of tenure in the course of reorganizations. SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in Office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year
The Court's Ruling from February 25, 1986.[67]

Reorganization, Fundamental Principles of. — Other than references to "reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution," there is
no provision for "automatic" vacancies under the 1987 Constitution.

I. Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are
dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution free from the
The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution. We "fetters" of due process and security of tenure.
quote:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result of At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of office (not
the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to
following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case the Government is obliged to prove good
retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at faith.[68] In case of removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit, constitutional
the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may he mandates, the Government is not hard put to prove anything, plainly and simply because the
considered for employment in the government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or Constitution allows it.
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This
provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is
policy, had been accepted.[63] a grant of a license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have validly
The Court considered the above provision critical for two reasons: (1) it is the only provision -- done under an "automatic"-vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.
insofar as it mentions removals not for cause -- that would arguably support the challenged
dismissal by mere notice, and (2) it is the single existing law on reorganization after the ratification As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for
of the 1987 Charter, except Republic Act No. 6656, which came much later, on June 10, 1988. "automatic" vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a restraint
[Nota bone: Executive Orders Nos. 116 (covering the Ministry of Agriculture & Food), 117 upon the Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.
(Ministry of Education, Culture & Sports), 119 (Health), 128 (Tourism), 123 (Social Welfare &
Development), 174 (Public Works & Highways), 125 (Transportation & Communication), 126 What is indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present Charter envisioned an "automatic" vacancy,
(Labor & Employment), 127 (Finance), 128 (Science & Technology), 129 (Agrarian Reform), 131 it should have said so in clearer terms, as its 1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts had so stated.
(Natural Resources), 132 (Foreign Affairs), and 133 (Trade & Industry) were all promulgated on
January 30, 1987, prior to the adoption of the Constitution on February 2, 1987.[64] The constitutional "lapse" means either one of two things: (1) The Constitution meant to
continue the reorganization under the prior Charter (of the Revolutionary Government), in the
It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power to effect reorganizations under the past sense that the latter provides for "automatic" vacancies, or (2) It meant to put a stop to those
Constitutions, the above provision comes as a mere recognition of the right of the Government "automatic" vacancies. By itself, however, it is ambiguous, referring as it does to two stages of
to reorganize its offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section 4; Article XVI, of the 1935 reorganization — the first, to its conferment or authorization under Proclamation No. 3
Constitution: (Freedom Charter) and the second, to its implementation on its effectivity date (February 2,
1987). But as we asserted, if the intent of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
Section 4. All officers and employees in the existing Government of the Philippine Islands shall were to extend the effects of reorganization under the Freedom Constitution, it should have said
continue in office until the Congress shall provide otherwise, but all officers whose appointments so in clear terms. It is illogical why it should talk of two phases of reorganization when it could
are by this Constitution vested in the President shall vacate their respective office(s) upon the have simply acknowledged the continuing effect of the first reorganization.
appointment and qualifications of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of
one year from the date of the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.[65] Second, plainly the concern of Section 16 is to ensure compensation for "victims" of
constitutional revamps --whether under the Freedom or existing Constitution -- and only
Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Charter: secondarily and impliedly, to allow reorganization. We turn to the records of the Constitutional
Commission:
specifically of the Provisional Constitution. For then, the power to remove government
INQUIRY OF MR. PADILLA employees would have been truly wide-ranging and limitless, not only because Proclamation No. 3
permitted it, but because of the nature of revolutionary authority itself, its totalitarian tendencies,
On the query of Mr. Padilla whether there is a need for a specific reference to Proclamation No. 3 and the monopoly of power in the men and women who wield it.
and not merely state "result of the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution".
Mr. Suarez, on behalf of the Committee, replied that it is necessary, inasmuch as there are two What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolutionary powers,
stages of reorganization covered by the Section. the President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule: This is apparent from Executive Order
No. 17, which established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless propensity that
Mr. Padilla pointed out that since the proposals of the Commission on Government accompanies reorganizations --- notwithstanding the fact that removals arising therefrom were
Reorganization have not been implemented yet. It would be better to use the phrase "not for cause," and in spite of the fact that such removals would have been valid and
"reorganization" before or after the ratification of the Constitution" to simplify the Section. Mr. unquestionable. Despite that, the Chief Executive saw, as we said, the "unnecessary anxiety and
Suarez instead suggested the phrase "as a result of the reorganization effected before or after the demoralization" in the government, rank and file that reorganization was causing, and prescribed
ratification of the Constitution" on the understanding that the provision would apply to guidelines for personnel action. Specifically, she said on May 28, 1986:
employees terminated because of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 and even
those affected by the reorganization during the Marcos regime. Additionally, Mr. Suarez pointed WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving
out that it is also for this reason that the Committee specified the two Constitutions – the officials and employees, particularly in the career civil service, it is necessary to prescribe the rules
Freedom Constitution and the 1986 (1987) Constitution.[69] and regulations for implementing the said constitutional provision to protect career civil servants
whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of service demanded by the New
Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service. And the Government, and to ensure that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are
separation contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization pursuant to separated from the government service;[71]
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February 2, 1987, and (3)
the resignations of career officers tendered in line with the existing policy and which resignations Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be made on
have been accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is clearly and primarily exclusionary, to exclude the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service.[*]
those career civil service employees separated for cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to
the benefits granted under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, The President's Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore be considered. We quote,
one negative and the other positive, must concur, to wit: in part:

1. the separation must not be for cause, and Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have ordered that
there will be no further lay-offs this year of personnel reorganization.[72]

2. the separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above. Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removal "not for cause" in a manner that would
have been permissible in a revolutionary setting as Commissioner Mison so purports, it would
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on seem that the Commissioner would have been powerless, in any event, to order dismissals at the
February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987.[70] It can only mean, then, that Customs Bureau left and right. Hence even we accepted his "progressive" reorganization theory,
whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and he would still have to come to terms with the Chief Executive's subsequent directives moderating
necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it can not be legitimately the revolutionary authority's plenary power to separate government officials and employees.
stated that we are merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary
Government had started. We are through with reorganization under Freedom Constitution -- the Reorganization under the 1987
first stage. We are on the second stage -- that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of Article Constitution, Nature, Extent,
XVIII of the permanent basic document. and Limitations of; Jose v.
Arroyo, clarified.-
This is confirmed not only by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Supra, but is
apparent from the Charter's own words. It also warrants our holding in Esguerra and Palma- The controversy seems to be that we have, ourselves, supposedly extended the effects of
Fernandez, in which we categorically declared that after February 2, 1987, incumbent officials and government reorganization under the Provisional Constitution to the regime of the 1987
employees have acquired security of tenure, which is not 'a deterrent against separation by Constitution. Jose v. Arroyo[73] is said to be the authority for this argument. Evidently, if Arroyo
reorganization under the quondam fundamental law. indeed so ruled, Arroyo would be inconsistent with the earlier pronouncement of Esguerra and the
later holding of Palma-Fernandez. The question, however, is: Did Arroyo, in fact, extend the effects
Finally, there is the concern of the State to ensure that this reorganization is no "purge" like the of reorganization under the revolutionary Charter to the era of the new Constitution?
execrated reorganizations under martial rule. And, of course, we also have the democratic
character of the Charter itself. There are a few points about Arroyo that have to be explained. First, the opinion expressed
therein that "[b]y virtue of said provision the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under
Commissioner Mison would have had a point, insofar as he contends that the reorganization is Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the ratification of this constitution and career
open-ended ("progressive"), had it been a reorganization under the revolutionary authority, civil service employees may be separated from the service without cause as a result of such
reorganization"[74] is in the nature of an obiter dictum. We dismissed Jose's petition[75] primarily positions,[82] or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.[83]
because it was "clearly premature, speculative, and purely anticipatory, based merely oh newspaper
reports which do not show any direct or threatened injury,"[76] it appearing that the reorganization It is to be stresses that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we are not,
of the Bureau of Customs had not been, then, set in motion. Jose therefore had no cause for as a consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course of a
complaint, which was enough basis to dismiss the petition. The remark anent separation "without reorganization in good faith is still removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we refer to "grounds" or
cause" was therefore not necessary for the disposition of the case. In Morales v. Paredes, [77] it was condition that call for disciplinary action.*
held that an obiter dictum "lacks the force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be
regarded as such."[78] Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from the
facts of each case. However, under Republic Act No. 6656, we are told:
Secondly, "Arroyo is an unsigned resolution while Palma-Fernandez is a full-blown decision,
although both are en banc cases. While a resolution of the Court is no less forceful than a SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and
decision the latter has a special weight. after due notice, and hearing, A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge,
Thirdly, Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz comes as a later doctrine. (Jose v. Arroyo was promulgated divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful
on August 11, 1987 while Palma-Fernandez was decided on August 31, 1987.) It is well- causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following
established that a later judgment supersedes a prior one in case of an inconsistency. circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of
reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a)
As we have suggested, the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution allude to two stages of Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
the reorganization, the first stage being the reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 -- which had department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is abolished and another performing
already been consummated -- the second stage being that adverted to in the transitory provisions substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less
themselves -- which is underway. Hence, when we spoke, in Arroyo, of reorganization after the qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) Where there is a
effectivity of the new Constitution, we referred to the second stage of the reorganization. reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices
Accordingly, we cannot be said to have carried over reorganization under the Freedom perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the
Constitution to its 1987 counterpart. order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.[84]

Finally, Arroyo is not necessarily incompatible with Palma-Fernandez (or Esguerra) It is in light hereof that we take up questions about Commissioner Mison's good faith, or lack of
it.
As we have demonstrated; reorganization under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution is not as stern
as reorganization under the prior Charter. Whereas the latter, sans the President's subsequently Reorganization of the Bureau of Customs, Lack of Good Faith in. -
imposed constraints, envisioned a purgation, the same cannot be said of the reorganization
inferred under the new Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution seeks to usher in a The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs hierarchy
democratic regime. But even if we concede ex gratia argumenti that Section 16 is an exception to — except for the change of personnel -- has occurred, which would have justified (all things being
due process and no-removal- "except for cause provided by law" principles enshrined in the very equal) the contested dismissals. The contention that the staffing pattern at the Bureau (which
same 1987 Constitution,[79] which may possibly justify removal not for cause," there is no would have furnished a justification for a personnel movement) is the same staffing pattern
contradiction in terms here because, while the former Constitution left the axe to fall where it prescribed by Section 34 of Executive Order No. 127 already prevailing when Commissioner
might, the present organic act requires that removals " not for cause" must be as a result of Mison took over the Customs helm, has not been successfully contradicted.[85] There is no
reorganization. As we observed, the Constitution does not provide for "automatic" vacancies. It showing that legitimate structural changes have been made --- or a reorganization actually
must also pass the test of good faith -- a deed not obviously required under the revolutionary undertaken, for that matter --- at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed office, which
government formerly prevailing, but a test well-established in democratic societies and in this would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees. There can therefore be no actual
government under a democratic Charter. reorganization to speak of, in the sense, say, of reduction of personnel consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions, but a revamp of personnel
When, therefore, Arroyo permitted a reorganization under Executive Order No. 127 after the pure and simple.
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, Arroyo permitted a reorganization provided that it is done in
good faith. Otherwise, security of tenure would be an insuperable impediment.[80] The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel but
replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988.[86] This betrays a clear intent to "pack" the Bureau
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good of Customs. He did so, furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to halt further lay-offs
faith.[81] As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of as a consequence of reorganization.[87] Finally, he was aware that lay-offs should observe the
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal procedure laid down by Executive Order No. 17.
or separation actually occurs become the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security
of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else We are not, of course, striking down Executive Order No. 127 for repugnancy to the
but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, Constitution. While the act is valid, still and all the means with which it, was implemented is
or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, not.[88]
is ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of
Executive Order No. 127, G.R. No. 83737
Specific Case of.
This disposition also resolves G.R. No. 83737. As we have, indicated. G.R. No. 83737 is a
With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that under Section 59 challenge to the validity of Republic Act No. 6656. In brief, it is argued that the Act, insofar as it
thereof, [t]hose incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not reappointed strengthens security of tenured[91] and as far as it provides for a retroactive effect,[92] runs counter
shall be deemed separated from the service." He submits that because the 394 removed personnel to the transitory provisions of the new Constitution on removals not for cause.
have not been "reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin with, the Commissioner's
appointing power is subject to the provisions of Executive Order No. 39. Under Executive Order It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it provides for reinstatement of employees separated
No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may "appoint all Bureau personnel, except those without "a valid cause and after due notice and hearing"[93] is not contrary to the transitory
appointed by the President.[89] provisions of the new Constitution. The Court reiterates that although the Charter's transitory
provisions mention separations "not for cause," separations thereunder must nevertheless be on
Accordingly, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr., account of a valid reorganization and which do not come about automatically. Otherwise, security
Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated them, they being Presidential appointees. of tenure may be invoked. Moreover, it can be seen that the statute itself recognizes removals
without cause. However, it also acknowledges the possibility of the leadership using the artifice of
Secondly, and as we have asserted, Section 59 has been rendered inoperative according to our reorganization to frustrate security of tenure. For this reason, it has installed safeguards. There is
holding in Palma-Fernandez. nothing unconstitutional about the Act.

That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 had been on a mere We recognize the injury Commissioner Mison's replacements would sustain. We also commiserate
holdover status cannot mean that the positions held by them had become vacant. In Palma- with, them. But our concern is the greater wrong inflicted on the dismissed employees on account
Fernandez, we said in no uncertain terms: of their illegal separation from the civil service.

The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January WHEREFORE, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DATED
1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a hold-over capacity and JUNE 30, 1988, SEPTEMBER 20. 1988, NOVEMBER 16, 1988, INVOLVED IN G.R. NOS.
could be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal rights, is untenable. The 85310, 85335, AND 86241, AND MAY 8, 1989, INVOLVED IN G.R. NO. 85310, ARE
occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and AFFIRMED.
would have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to
February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon, et al. vs. Hon. THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 81954, 81967, 82023, AND 85335 ARE GRANTED. THE
Benjamin B. Esquerra, et al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987). After the said date the provisions PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 83737, 85310 AND 86241 ARE DISMISSED.
of the latter on security of tenure govern.[90]
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS ORDERED TO REINSTATE THE
It should be seen, finally, that we are not barring Commissioner Mison from carrying out a EMPLOYEES SEPARATED AS A RESULT OF HIS NOTICES DATED JANUARY 26,
reorganization under the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution. But such a reorganization 1988.
should be subject to the criterion of good faith.
THE EMPLOYEES WHOM COMMISSIONER MISON MAY HAVE APPOINTED AS
Resume. REPLACEMENTS ARE ORDERED TO VACATE THEIR POSTS SUBJECT TO THE
PAYMENT OF WHATEVER BENEFITS THAT MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
In resume, we restate as follows:
NO COSTS.
1. The President could have validly removed government employees, elected or
appointed, without cause but only before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on IT IS SO ORDERED.
February 2, 1987 (De Leon v. Esguerra, Supra; Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz. Supra); in
this connection, Section 59 (on non-reappointment of incumbents) of Executive Order Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur
No. 127 cannot be a basis for termination; Fernan C.J., Narvasa, and Feliciano and Regalado, JJ., joins Justice Melencio-Herrera in her dissenting
opinion.
Melencio-Herrera, J., please see attached dissent.
2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation and retirement benefits or Cruz, J., see separate concurrence.
upon their option be given reemployment opportunities (CONST. [1987], art. XVIII, sec. Padilla, J., no part, related to counsel for respondent Abaca in G.R. No. 85310.
16; Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9);

3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the right to reorganize the Government
resulting in the separation of career civil service employees [CONST. (1987), Supra] CONCURRING OPINION
provided, that such a reorganization is made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656. Supra.)
This notwithstanding, the power to reorganize is not unlimited. It is essential that it be based on a
CRUZ, J.: valid purpose, such as the promotion of efficiency and economy in the government through a
pruning of offices or the streamlining of their functions. (Cervantes v. Auditor-General, 91 Phil.
I concur with the majority view so ably presented by Mr. Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento. While 359.) Normally, a reorganization cannot be validly undertaken as a means of purging the
additional comments may seem superfluous in view of the exhaustiveness of his ponencia, I undesirables for this would be a removal in disguise undertaken en masse to circumvent the
nevertheless offer the following brief observations for whatever they may be worth. constitutional requirement of legal cause. (Eradication of graft and corruption was one of the
expressed purposes of the revolutionary organization, but this was authorized by the Freedom
Emphasizing Article XVII, Section 16 of the Constitution, the dissenting opinion considers the Constitution itself.) In short, a reorganization, to be valid, must be done in good faith. (Urgelio v.
ongoing government reorganization valid because it is merely a continuation of the reorganization Osmeña, 9 SCRA 317; Cuneta v. Court of Appeals, 1 SCRA 663; Cariño v. ACCFA, 18 SCRA
begun during the transition period. The reason for this conclusion is the phrase "and the 183.)
reorganization following the ratification of the Constitution," that is to say, after February 2, 1987,
appearing in the said provision. The consequence (and I hope I have not misread it) is that the A mere recitation - no matter how lengthy - of the directives, guidelines, memoranda, etc. issued
present reorganization may still be undertaken with the same "absoluteness" that was allowed the by the government and the action purportedly taken thereunder does not by itself prove good
revolutionary reorganization although the Freedom Constitution is no longer in force. faith. We know only too well that these instructions, for all their noble and sterile purposes, are
rarely followed in their actual implementation. The reality in this case, as the majority opinion has
Reorganization of the government may be required by the legislature even independently of pointed out and as clearly established in the hearing we held, is that the supposed reorganization
specific constitutional authorization, as in the case, for example, of R.A. No. 51 and B.P. No. 129. was undertaken with an eye not to achieving the avowed objectives but to accommodating new
Being revolutionary in nature, the reorganization decreed by Article III of the Freedom appointees at the expense of the dislodged petitioners. That was also the finding of the Civil
Constitution was unlimited as to its method except only as it was later restricted by President Service Commission, to which we must accord a becoming respect as the constitutional office
Aquino herself through various issuances, particularly E.O. No. 17. But this reorganization, for all charged with the protection of the civil service from the evils of the spoils system.
its permitted summariness, was not indefinite. Under Section 3 of the said Article III, it was
allowed only up to February 25, 1987 (which we advanced to February 2, 1987, when the new The present administration deserves full support in its desire to improve the civil service, but this
Constitution became effective). objective must be pursued in a manner consistent with the Constitution. This praiseworthy
purpose cannot be accomplished by an indiscriminate reorganization that will sweep in its wake
The clear implication is that any government reorganization that may be undertaken thereafter the innocent along with the redundant and inept, for the benefit of the current favorites.
must be authorized by the legislature only and may not be allowed the special liberties and
protection enjoyed by the revolutionary reorganization. Otherwise, there would have been no
necessity at all for the time limitation expressly prescribed by the Freedom Constitution.

I cannot accept the view that Section 16 is an authorization for the open-ended reorganization of
DISSENTING OPINION
the government "following the ratification of the Constitution." I read the provision as merely
conferring benefits - deservedly or not - on persons separated from the government as a result of
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
the reorganization of the government, whether undertaken during the transition period or as a
result of a law passed thereafter. What the provision grants is privileges to the retirees, not power
The historical underpinnings of Government efforts at reorganization hark back to the people
to the government. It is axiomatic that grants of power are not lightly inferred, especially if these
power phenomenon of 22-24 February 1986, and Proclamation No. 1 of President Corazon C.
impinge on individual rights, and I do not see why we should depart from this rule.
Aquino, issued on 25 February 1986, stating in no uncertain terms that "the people expect a
reorganization of government.” In its wake followed Executive Order No. 5, issued on 12 March
To hold that the present reorganization is a continuation of the one begun during the transition
1986, "Creating a Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization," with the following
period is to recognize the theory of the public respondent that all officers and employees not
relevant provisions:
separated earlier remain in a hold-over capacity only and so may be replaced at any time even
"WHEREAS, there is need to effect the necessary and proper changes in the organizational and
without cause. That is a dangerous proposition that threatens the security and stability of every
functional structures of the national and local governments, its agencies and instrumentalities,
civil servant in the executive department. What is worse is that this situation may continue
including government-owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, in order to promote
indefinitely as the claimed "progressive" reorganization has no limitation as to time.
economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services
xxxxxxxxx
Removal imports the forcible separation of the incumbent before the expiration of his term and
"Section 2. The functional jurisdiction of the PCGR shall encompass, as necessary,
can be done only for cause as provided by law. Contrary to common belief, a reorganization does
the reorganization of the national and local governments, its agencies and instrumentalities including
not result in removal but in a different mode of terminating official relations known as abolition
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
of the office (and the security of tenure attached thereto.) The erstwhile holder of the abolished
office cannot claim he has been removed without cause in violation of his constitutional security
of tenure. The reason is that the right itself has disappeared with the abolished office as an x x x x x x" (underscoring supplied)
accessory following the principal. (Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, 51 O.G. 147; De la Llana v. Alba,
112 SCRA 294; Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903.) Succeeding it was Proclamation No. 3, dated 25 March 1986, also known as the Freedom
Constitution, declaring, in part, in its Preamble as follows:
of such notice, either personally by the official or employee concerned or on his behalf by a
"WHEREAS, the direct mandate of the people as manifested by their extraordinary action person of sufficient discretion.
demands the complete reorganization of the government, x x x " (Emphasis supplied)
"Section 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation/replacement of personnel:
and pertinently providing:
1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service
"ARTICLE II Law;
"Section 1
2. Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act
"x x x as determined by the Ministry Head concerned;

"The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to: 3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
“(a) Completely reorganize the government and eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all
iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime;" (Emphasis supplied) 4. Misuse of Public office for partisan political purposes;

xxxxxx 5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the
service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service."
"ARTICLE III - GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

"Section 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall "Section 11. This Executive Order shall not apply to elective officials or those designated to replace
continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment them, presidential appointees, casual and contractual employees, or officials and employees
and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. removed pursuant to disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law and rules, and to those
laid off as a result of the reorganization undertaken pursuant to Executive Order No. 5." (Underscoring
"Section 3. Any public office or employee separated from the service as a result of the supplied)
reorganization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws then in force,
receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder." (Emphasis ours) On 6 August 1986, Executive Order No. 39 was issued by the President "Enlarging the Powers
and Functions of the Commissioner of Customs", as follows:
On 28 May 1986, Executive Order No. 17 was issued "Prescribing Rules and Regulations for the
Implementation of Section 2, Article III of the Freedom Constitution" providing, inter alia, as “x x x x x x
follows:
"SECTION 1. In addition to the powers and functions of the Commissioner of Customs, he is
"Section 1. In the course of implementing Article III, Section 2 of the Freedom Constitution, the hereby authorized, subject to the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations:
Head of each Ministry shall see to it that the separation or replacement of officers and employees
is made only for justifiable reasons, to prevent indiscriminate dismissals of personnel in the career civil service
whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of public service of the New a) To appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President;
Government.
To discipline, suspend, dismiss or otherwise penalize erring Bureau officers and
b)
employees;
"x x x x x x

“The Ministry concerned shall adopt its own rules and procedures for the review and assessment To act on all matters pertaining to promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment,
of its own personnel, including the identification of sensitive positions which require more rigid c) reinstatement, reemployment and other personnel action, involving officers and
assessment of the incumbents, and shall complete such review/assessment as expeditiously as employees of the Bureau of Customs.
possible but not later than February 24, 1987 to prevent undue demoralization in the public
service. x x x x x x"

"Section 2. The Ministry Head concerned, on the basis of such review and assessment shall On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 127 was issued "Reorganizing the Ministry of
determine who shall be separated from the service. Thereafter, he shall issue to the official or Finance." Similar Orders, approximately thirteen (13) in all,[1]were issued in respect of the other
employee concerned a notice of separation which shall indicate therein the reason/s or ground/s for such executive departments. The relevant provisions relative to the Bureau of Customs read:
separation and the fact that the separated official or employee has the right to file a petition for
reconsideration pursuant to this Order. Separation from the service shall be effective upon receipt "RECALLING that the reorganization of the government is mandated expressly in Article II,
Section 1(a) and Article III of the Freedom Constitution;
On 2 February 1987, the present Constitution took effect (De Leon, et al., vs. Esguerra, G.R. No.
"HAVING IN MIND that pursuant to Executive Order No. 5 (1986), it is directed that the necessary 78059, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 602). Reorganization in the Government service pursuant to
and proper changes in the organizational and functional structures of the government, its agencies Proclamation No. 3, supra, was provided for in its Section 16, Article XVIII entitled Transitory
and instrumentalities, be effected in order to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery Provisions, reading:
of public services;
"Section 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result
"BELIEVING that it is necessary to reorganize the Ministry of Finance to make it more capable of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the
and responsive, organizationally and functionally, in its primary mandate of judiciously generating reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to appropriate
and efficiently managing the financial resources of the Government, its subdivisions and separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general
instrumentalities in order to attain the socio-economic objectives of the national development application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees,
programs. they may be considered for employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with
“x x x x x x"
the existing policy, has been accepted.”
“SEC. 2. Reorganization. - The Ministry of Finance, hereinafter referred to as Ministry, is hereby
On 24 May 1987 the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander A. Padilla, transmitted to the
reorganized, structurally and functionally, in accordance with the provisions of this Executive Order."
Department of Finance for approval the proposed "position structure and staffing pattern" of the
Bureau of Customs. Said Department gave its imprimatur. Thereafter, the staffing pattern was
"SEC. 33. Bureau of Customs.
transmitted to and approved by the Department of Budget and Management on 7 September
1987 for implementation. Under the old staffing pattern there were 7,302 positions while under
"x x x Executive Order No. 39 dated 6 August 1986 which grants autonomy to the Commissioner of
the new staffing pattern, there are 6,530 positions (CSC Resolution in CSC Case No. 1, dated 20
Customs in matters of appointment and discipline of Customs personnel shall remain in effect."
September 1988, pp. 3-4).
"SEC. 55. Abolition of Units Integral to Ministry. - All units not included in the structural organization
On 22 September 1987, Salvador M. Mison assumed office as Commissioner of Customs.
as herein provided and all positions thereof are hereby deemed abolished. x x x Their personnel shall be
entitled to the benefits provided in the second paragraph of Section 59 hereof."
On 2 October 1987 "Malacanang Memorandum Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders" was issued reading, in so far as relevant to these cases, as
"SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. – Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers and
follows:
employees of the Ministry shall, in a holdover capacity,continue to perform their respective duties
and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in the meantime they are
"It is my concern that ongoing process of government reorganization be conducted in a manner
separated from government service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or Article III of the Freedom
that is expeditious, as well as sensitive to the dislocating consequences arising from specific
Constitution.
personnel decisions.
"The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry shall be approved and prescribed
"The entire process of reorganization, and in particular the process of separation from service,
by the Minister within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Executive Order
must be carried out in the most humane manner possible.
and the authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular appointments by him or
by the President, as the case may be. Those incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are
"For this purpose, the following guidelines shall be strictly followed:
not reappointed shall be deemd separated from the service. Those separated from the service shall receive
the retirement benefits to which they may be entitled under the existing laws, rules and
regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid the equivalent of one month basic salary for every year By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive Orders for each agency on
of service or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of highest 1.
reorganization shall be:
salary received, but in no case shall such payment exceed the equivalent of 12 months salary.
a. informed of their reappointment or
"No court or administrative body shall issue any writ or preliminary injunction or restraining
order to enjoin the separation/replacement of any officer or employee affected under this
b. offered another position in the same department/agency, or
Executive Order."

"Section 67 - All laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent c. informed of their termination
with this Executive order, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
2. In the event of an offer for a lower position, there will be no reduction in the salary.
"x x x x x x" (Emphasis ours) xxxxxx
4. Each department/agency shall constitute a Reorganization Appeals Board at the central a. be included in a consolidated list compiled by the Civil Service Commission. All
office, on or before October 21, 1987, to review or reconsider appeals or complaints departments who are recruiting shall give preference to the employees in the list;
relative to reorganization. All cases submitted to the Boards shall be resolved subject to and
the following guidelines:
b. continue to receive salary and benefits until February 28, 1988, and
publication or posting of the appeal procedure promulgated by the Department
a.
Secretary; c. be guaranteed the release of separation benefits within 45 days from termination
and in no case later than June 15, 1988.
b. adherence to due process;
x x x” (Underlining supplied)
c. disposition within 30 days from submission of the case;
It is to be noted that paragraph 1 above and its sub-sections reproduced verbatim the Malacanang
d. written notification of the action taken and the grounds thereof. Guidelines of 2 October 1987 in that the employees concerned were merely to be informed of
their termination.
Action by the Appeals Review Board does not preclude appeal to the Civil Service On 28 January 1988 Commissioner Mison addressed identical letters of termination to Bureau of
Commission. Customs officers and employees effective on 28 February 1988.

5. Placement in the new staffing pattern of incumbent personnel shall be completed prior As of 18 August 1988, Commissioner Mison appointed five hundred twenty-two (522) officials
to the hiring of new personnel, if any. and employees of the Bureau of Customs (CSC Resolution in CSC Case No. 1, dated 20
September 1988, p. 6). In fact, in a letter dated 27 January 1988, Commissioner Mison
x x x x x x" (Emphasis ours) recommended Jose M. Balde for appointment to President Aquino as one of three (3) Deputy
On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison wrote the President requesting a grace period until Commissioners under Executive Order No. 127.
the end of February 1988 within which to completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau
of Customs pursuant to Executive Order No. 127 dated 30 January 1987. Said request was In the interim, during the pendency of these Petitions, Republic Act No. 6656, entitled "An Act
granted in a letter-reply by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., dated 22 December 1987. to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation
of Government Reorganization" was passed by Congress on 9 June 1988. The President signed it
On 6 January 1988, within the extended period requested, Bureau of Customs Memorandum "Re: into law on 10 June 1988 and the statute took effect on 29 June 1988.
Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders" was issued in the same
tenor as the Malacanang Memorandum of 2 October 1987, providing inter alia: On 20 June 1988 Motions were filed, in these cases pending before this Court, invoking the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6656. The relevant provisions thereof read:
"To effectively implement the reorganization at the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the
selection and placement of personnel, and insure that the best qualified and most competent "SECTION 1. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to protect the security of tenure of civil
personnel in the career service are retained, the following guidelines are hereby prescribed for the service officers and employees in the reorganization of the various agencies of the National
guidance of all concerned government x x x .

"SECTION 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due
1. By February 28, 1988 all employees covered by Executive Order No. 127 and the grace
notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a
period extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President of the Philippines on position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or
reorganization shall be: consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed
by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be
a. informed of their reappointment, or considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise
to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
b. offered another position in the same department or agency, or
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
c. informed of their termination. the department or agency concerned;

2. In the event of termination, the employee shall: (b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is
created;

(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;
and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution x x x" (paragraphing
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the supplied).
reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices;
To our minds, SECTION 16 clearly recognizes (1) the reorganization authorized by Proclamation
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. No. 3; (2) that such separation is NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of the reorganization
pursuant to said Proclamation; and (3) that the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3
may be continued even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution during the transition period.
xxxxxx
Separation NOT FOR CAUSE
"SECTION. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to
have been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or
The canon for the removal or suspension of a civil service officer or employee is that it must be
reappointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the
FOR CAUSE. That means "a guarantee of both procedural and substantive due process.
period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees, including casuals
Basically, procedural due process would require that suspension or dismissal come only after
and temporary employees, who have been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled
notice and hearing. Substantive due process would require that suspension or dismissal be 'for
thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and other benefits under existing
cause'." (Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, First Edition,
laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their separation or from the date of
1988, p. 334).
the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be: Provided, That application for
clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been made by the corresponding department
The guarantee of removal FOR CAUSE is enshrined in Article IX-B, Section 2(3) of the 1987
or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a separation gratuity in the
Constitution, which states that "No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or
amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Such separation pay and
suspended except FOR CAUSE provided by law."
retirement benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings of the department or agency
concerned.
There can be no question then as to the meaning of the phrase FOR CAUSE. It simply means the
observance of both procedural and substantive due process in cases of removal of officers or
xxxxxx employees of the civil service. When SECTION 16 speaks, therefore, of separation from the
service NOT FOR CAUSE, it can only mean the diametrical opposite. The constitutional intent
"SECTION 11. The executive branch of the government shall implement reorganization schemes to exempt the separation of civil service employees pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 from the
within a specified period of time authorized by law. operation of Article IX-B, Section 2(3), becomes readily apparent. A distinction is explicitly made
between removal FOR CAUSE, which as aforestated, requires due process, and dismissal NOT
"In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all departments and agencies FOR CAUSE, which implies that the latter is not bound by the "fetters" of due process.
which are authorized by executive orders promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have
ninety (90) days from the approval of this Act within which to implement their respective It is obviously for that reason that Section 16 grants separation pay and retirement benefits to
reorganization plans in accordance with the provisions of this Act. those separated NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of the reorganization precisely to soften the
impact of the non-observance of due process. "What is envisioned in Section 16 is not a remedy
for arbitrary removal of civil servants enjoying security of tenure but some form of relief for
xxxxxx
members of the career civil service who may have been or may be legally but involuntarily
‘reorganized out’ of the service or may have voluntarily resigned pursuant to the reorganization
"SECTION 13. All laws, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. The rights and benefits under this Act policy" (ibid., p. 615).
shall be retroactive as of June 30, 1987.
Reorganization Pursuant
to Proclamation No. 3 to Continue
x x x " (Underlining ours) Transitorily Even After Ratification

Given the foregoing statutory backdrop, the issues can now be addressed. By its very context, SECTION 16 envisages the continuance of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 even after ratification of the Constitution and during the transition period.
Scope of Section 16, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution The two [2] stages contemplated, namely, (1) the stage before and (2) after ratification, refer to the
same nature of separation "NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of Proclamation No. 3." No valid
Crucial to the present controversy is the construction to be given to the abovementioned reason has been advanced for a different treatment after ratification as the majority opines, i.e.,
Constitutional provision (SECTION 16, for brevity), which speaks of: that separation NOT FOR CAUSE is allowed before ratification but that, thereafter, separation
can only be FOR CAUSE.
"Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause
A fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is to assure the realization of the purpose
but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 of the framers of the organic law and of the people who adopted it.
That the reorganization commenced pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 was envisioned to continue Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the ratification of this
even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, at least transitorily, is evident from the intent Constitution and career civil service employees may be separated from the service without cause
of its authors discoverable from their deliberations held on 3 October 1986 and evincing their as a result of such reorganization." (Underlining ours)
awareness that such reorganization had not as yet been fully implemented. Thus: With due respect to the majority, we disagree with its conclusion that the foregoing
"Mr. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer, on lines 2 to 5 is the clause ‘pursuant to the provisions of pronouncement is mere "obiter dictum."
Article III of Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1986, and the reorganization.’ Are those "An obiter dictum or dictum has been defined as a remark or opinion uttered, by the way. It is a
words necessary? Can we not just say ‘result of the reorganization following the ratification of this statement of the court concerning a question which was not directly before it (In re Hess, 23 A.
Constitution’? In other words, must we make specific reference to Proclamation No. 3? 2d. 298, 301, 20 N.J. Misc. 12). It is language unnecessary to a decision, (a) ruling on an issue not
raised, or (an) opinion of a judge which does not embody the resolution or determination of the
"Mr. SUAREZ. Yes. I think the committee feels that is necessary, because in truth there has been court, and is made without argument or full consideration of the point (Lawson v. US, 176 F2d
a reorganization by virtue of Proclamation No. 3. In other words, there are two stages of 49, 51, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 167). It is an expression of opinion by the court or judge on a collateral
reorganization covered by this section. question not directly involved, (Crescent Ring Co. v. Traveler's Indemnity Co. 132 A. 106, 107,
102 N.J. Law 85) or not necessary for the decision (Du Bell v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 29, So.
"Mr. PADILLA. I understand there is a reorganization committee headed by a minister? 2d 709, 712; 211 La. 167)."
In the case at bar, however, directly involved and squarely before the Court was the issue of
"Mr. SUAREZ. Philippine Commission on Government Reorganization. whether “EO 127 violates Section 2(3) of Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution against removal
of civil service employees except for cause.” Petitioner batted for the affirmative of the
"Mr. PADILLA. But whether that has already been implemented or not, I do not believe in it. proposition, while respondents contended that "removal of civil service employees without cause
There has been a plan, but I do not think it has been implemented. If we want to include any is allowed not only under the Provisional Constitution but also under the 1987 Constitution if the
previous reorganization after or before the ratification, why do we not just say ‘reorganization same is made pursuant to a reorganization after the ratification of the Constitution."
before or after the ratification’ to simplify the provision and eliminate two-and-a-half sentences
that may not be necessary? And as a result of the reorganization, if the committee feels there has It may be that the Court dismissed that Petition for being "premature, speculative and purely
been reorganization before ratification and there be reorganization after, we just say ‘before or anticipatory" inasmuch as petitioner therein had "not received any communication terminating or
after the ratification of this Constitution.’ threatening to terminate his services." But that was only one consideration. The Court still
proceeded to decide all the issues adversatively contested by the parties, namely "1) that the
Mr. SUAREZ. Something like this: ‘as a result of the reorganization effected before or after the expiration date of February 25, 1987 fixed by Section 2 of Proclamation No. 3 on which said
ratification of the Constitution’ on the understanding, with the statement into the records, that Executive order is based had already lapsed; 2) that the Executive Order has not been published
this would be applicable to those reorganized out pursuant to the Freedom Constitution also. in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code; and 3) that its enforcement violates Section 2(3) of Article IX-B of the 1987
"Mr. PADILLA. That is understood if there has been a reorganization before the ratification or a Constitution against removal of civil service employees except for cause."
reorganization after the ratification." (RECORDS of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 5, p.
416) (Underlining provided) The ruling of the Court, therefore, on the Constitutional issues presented, particularly, the lapse of
It should also be recalled that the deadline for the reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 was the period mandated by Proclamation No. 3, and the validity of EO 127, cannot be said to be
"one year from February 25, 1986" (Article III, Section 2), or up to February 24, 1987. Executive mere "obiter." They were ultimate issues directly before the Court, expressly decided in the course
Order No. 17 itself provided that the review/assessment of personnel be completed "not later of the consideration of the case, so that any resolution thereon must be considered as
than February 24, 1987.” But, confronted with the realilty of the ratification of the Constitution authoritative precedent, and not a mere dictum (See Valli v. US, 94 F. 2d 687 certiorari granted 58
before that deadline without reorganization having been completed, there was need for a S. Ct. 760, 303 U.S. 82 L. Ed. 1092; See also Weedin v. Tayokichi Yamada 4 F. (2d) 455). Such
provision allowing for its continuance even after ratification and until completed. It was also to resolution would not lose its value as a precedent just because the disposition of the case was also
beat that deadline that EO 127 and similar issuances, providing for the reorganization of made on some other ground.
departments of government, were all dated 30 January 1987 or prior to the plebiscite held on 2 x x x And this rule applies as to all pertinent questions although only incidentally involved, which
February 1987. The intent to continue and complete the reorganizations started is self-evident in are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and lead up to
SECTION 16. the final conclusion (Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Baker, D.C. Wash., 3 F. Suppl. 1; See also Wisconsin
Power and Light Co. v. City of Beloit, 254 NW 119; Chase v. American Cartage Co. 186 N. W. 598: City
In Jose vs. Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 78435, August 11, 1987), which was a Petition for Certiorari and of Detroit, et al. v. Public Utilities Comm. 286 N.W. 368). Accordingly, a point expressly decided does
Prohibition to enjoin the implementation of Executive Order No. 127, we recognized that the not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is made on some other
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 as mandated by SECTION 16, was to continue ground. (Wagner v. Corn Products Refining Co. D.C. N. J. 28 F 2d 617.) Where a case presents two or
even after ratification when we stated: more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually
"The contention of petitioner that EO No. 127 is violative of the provision of the 1987 decides all such points, the case is an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none
Constitution guaranteeing career civil service employees security of tenure overlooks the of such points can be regarded as having merely the status of a dictum (See U.S. v. Title Insurance
provision of Section 16, Art. XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorizes the and Trust Co., Cal., 44 S. Ct. 621, 265 U.S. 472, 68 L. Ed. 1110; Van Dyke v. Parker 83 F. (2d) 35)
removal of career civil service employees not for cause but as a result of the reorganization and one point should not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the and more fully argued and considered. (Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. U.S. 48 S. Ct. 194, 275
ratification of the Constitution. By virtue of said provision, the reorganization of the Bureau of U.S. 331, 72 L. Ed. 303)”
It is true that in Palma-Fernandez vs. de la Paz (G.R. No. 78946, April 15, 1986, 160 SCRA 751), we On 2 October 1987 "Malacanang Memorandum Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of
had stated: Reorganization Executive Orders" provided:
"By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive orders for each agency on
“The argument that, on the basis of this provision (Section 26 of Executive order No. 119, or the reorganization shall be:
‘Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health’), petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January
1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a hold-over capacity and a. informed of their reappointment, or
could be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal rights, is untenable. The
occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and b. offered another position in the same department or agency, or
would have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to 2
February 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon, et al., vs. Hon. Esguerra, et c. informed of their termination." (Underlining supplied)
al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987, 153 SCRA 602). After the said date the provisions of the On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison asked for and was granted by the President an
latter on security of tenure govern." extension up to February 1988 within which to completely undertake the reorganization of the
Bureau of Customs.
The factual situation in the two cases, however, radically differ. In the cited case, Dra. Palma-
Fernandez, the petitioner, had already been extended a permanent appointment as Assistant On 6 January 1988, he issued Bureau of Customs Memorandum "Re Guidelines on the
Director for Professional Services of the East Avenue Medical Center but was still being Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders" reiterating the above-quoted portion of the
transferred by the Medical Center Chief to the Research Office against her consent. Separation Malacanang Memorandum of 2 October 1987. Pursuant thereto, on 28 January 1988,
from the service as a result of reorganization was not involved. The question then arose as to Commissioner Mison addressed uniform letters of termination to the employees listed on pages
whether the latter official had the authority to transfer or whether the power to appoint and 15, 16 and 17 of the majority opinion, effective on 28 February 1988, within the extended period
remove subordinate officers and employees was lodged in the Secretary of Health. Related to that granted.
issue was the vital one of whether or not her transfer, effected on 29 May 1987, was tantamount
to a removal without cause. Significant, too, is the fact that the transfer was basically made "in the The records further show that upon Commissioner Mison's official inquiry, Secretary of Justice
interest of the service" pursuant to Section 24(c) of PD No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree, and Sedfrey A. Ordonez, rendered the following Opinion:
not because she was being reorganized out by virtue of EO 119 or the "Reorganization Act of the "x x x It is believed that customs employees who are reorganized out in the course of the
Ministry of Health," although the said Act was invoked after the fact. And so it was that implementation of E.O. No. 127 (reorganizing the Department of Finance) need not be informed
SECTION 16 was never mentioned, much less invoked in the Palma-Fernandez case. of the nature and cause of their separation from the service. It is enough that they be ‘informed of
their termination’ pursuant to section 1(c) of the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 of
Finally, on this point, it is inaccurate for the majority to state that there were no reorganization President Aquino, which reads:
orders after ratification. There were, namely, EO 181 (Reorganization Act of the Civil Service
Commission), June 1, 1987; EO 193 (Reorganization Act of the Office of Energy Affairs), June “1. By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive orders for each agency on
10, 1987; EO 230 (Reorganization Act of NEDA), July 22, 1987; EO 262 (Reorganization Act of reorganization shall be:
the Department of Local Government), July 25, 1987; EO 297 (Reorganization Act of the Office
of the Press Secretary), July 25, 1987.
xxxxxx
The Element of Good Faith
"c) Informed of their terminations.
The majority concedes that reorganization can be undertaken provided it be in good faith but
"The constitutional mandate that ‘no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
concludes that Commissioner Mison was not in good faith.
cause as provided by law’ (Sec. 2(4) (sic), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution) does not apply to employees who
are separated from office as a result of the reorganization of that Bureau as directed in Executive Order No. 127.
The aforesaid conclusion is contradicted by the records.

Executive Order No. 127, dated 30 January 1987, specifically authorized the reorganization of the xxxxxx
Bureau of Customs "structurally and functionally" and provided for the abolition of all units and
positions thereof not included in the structural organization (Section 55). "Regarding your (third) query, the issue as to the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 127 is
set at rest, after the Supreme Court resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari questioning its
As stated heretofore, it was the former Commissioner of Customs, Alexander A. Padilla who, on enforceability, for lack of merit (see Jose vs. Arroyo, et al., supra)." (Opinion No. 41, s. 1988, March
24 May 1987, transmitted to the Department of Finance for approval the proposed "position 3, 1988) (Emphasis supplied)
structure and staffing pattern" of the Bureau of Customs. This was approved by the Department The former Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Celerina G. Gotladera, likewise
of Finance. Thereafter, it was transmitted to and approved by the Department of Budget and periodically consulted by Commissioner Mison, also expressed the opinion that "it is not a pre-
Management on 7 September 1987 for implementation. Under the old staffing pattern, there were requisite prior to the separation of an employee pursuant to reorganization that he be
7,302 positions while under the new staffing pattern, there are 6,530 positions. administratively charged." (Annex 16, p. 411, Rollo, G.R. No. 85310)

Moreover, the records show that the final selection and placement of personnel was done by a
Placement Committee, one of whose members is the Head of the Civil Service Commission Field reason of the "complete reorganization of the government" pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 may
Office, namely, Mrs. Purificacion Cuerdo. The appointment of employees made by Commissioner be separated NOT FOR CAUSE. And yet, RA 6656 requires the exact opposite - separation FOR
Mison was based on the list approved by said Placement Committee. CAUSE. It would not be remiss to quote the provision again:
"SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause
But the majority further faults Mison for defying the President's directive to halt further lay-offs and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
as a consequence of reorganization, citing OP Memo of 14 October 1987, reading: reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge,
divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful
"Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have ordered that causes allowed by the Civil Service law. The existence of any or some of the following
there will be no further lay-offs this year of personnel as a result of the government circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of
reorganization." (p. 45, Decision) reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a)
Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
The foregoing, however, must be deemed superseded by later developments, namely, the grant to department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is abolished and another performing
Commissioner Mison by the President on 22 December 1987 of a grace period until the end of substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less
February 1988 within which to completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) Where there is a
Customs, which was, in fact, accomplished by 28 February 1988. reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices
perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the
To further show lack of good faith, the majority states that Commissioner Mison failed to observe order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. (Republic Act No. 6156)
the procedure laid down by EO 17, supra, directing inter alia that a notice of separation be issued The standards laid down are the "traditional" criteria for removal of employees from the career
to an employee to be terminated indicating therein the reason/s or ground/s for such separation. service, e.g. valid cause, due notice and hearing, abolition of, or redundancy of offices.
That requirement, however, does not appear in Section 59 of EO 127, which provides on the Proclamation No. 3, on the other hand, effectuates the "progressive" type of reorganization
contrary "that those incumbents whose positions are not included in the new position structure dictated by the exigencies of the historical and political upheaval at the time. The "traditional"
and staffing pattern of the Ministry or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from type is limited in scope. It is concerned with the individual approach where the particular
the service." The right granted by EO 17 to an employee to be informed of the ground for his employee involved is charged administratively and where the requisites of notice and hearing have
separation must be deemed to have been revoked by the repealing clause of EO 127 (Section 67) to be observed. The "progressive" kind of reorganization, on the other hand, is the collective way.
providing that "all laws, ordinances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive It is wider in scope, and is the reorganization contemplated under SECTION 16.
Order, are hereby repealed and modified accordingly."
2) By providing for reinstatement in its Section 9, RA 6656 adds a benefit not included in
Moreover, Section 11 of EO 17 explicitly excepts from its coverage a reorganization pursuant to SECTION 16. The benefits granted by the latter provision to employees separated NOT FOR
EO 5. Thus CAUSE but as a consequence of reorganization are "separation pay, retirement, and other
"The Executive Order shall not apply to elective officials or those designated to replace them, benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their
presidential appointees, casual and contractual employees, or officials and employees removed separation." The benefit of reinstatement is not included. RA 6656, however, allows
pursuant to disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service law and rules, and to those laid off as a reinstatement. That it cannot do because under SECTION 16, it is not one of the laws "in force
result of reorganization undertaken pursuant to Executive Order No. 5." (Emphasis ours) at the time of their separation."
That EO 127 was issued pursuant to or in implementation of EO 5, is shown by its introductory
portion reading: The Constitution is the paramount law to which all laws must conform. It is from the
Constitution that all statutes must derive their bearings. The legislative authority of the State must
"Recalling that the reorganization of the government is mandated expressly by Article II, Section yield to the expression of the sovereign will. No statutory enactment can disregard the Charter
1 (a) and Article III of the Freedom Constitution; from which it draws its own existence (Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Collector of Internal
"Having in mind that pursuant to Executive Order No. 5 (1986), it is directed that the necessary and Revenue, 90 Phil. 674 [1952]. But, that is exactly what RA 6656 does in providing for retroactivity –
proper changes in the organizational and functional structures of the government, its agencies and it disregards and contravenes a Constitutional imperative. To save it, it should be applied and
instrumentalities, be effected in order to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of construed prospectively and not retroactively notwithstanding its explicit provision. Then, and
public service;" (Underscoring supplied) only then, would it make good law.
Constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 6656 Effects of Reorganization

The majority also relies on Republic Act No. 6656 entitled an "Act to Protect the Security of To be sure, the reorganization could affect the tenure of members of the career service as defined
Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government in Section 5, Article IV of Presidential Decree No. 807, and may even result in the separation
Reorganization," particularly Section 2 thereof, to test the good faith of Commissioner Mison. from the office of some meritorious employees. But even then, the greater good of the greatest
number and the right of the citizenry to a good government, and as they themselves have
We are of the view, however, that in providing for retroactivity in its Section 13, RA 6656 clashes mandated through the vehicle of Proclamation No. 3, provide the justification for the said injury
frontally with SECTION 16. to the individual. In terms of values, the interest of an employee to security of tenure must yield
to the interest of the entire populace and to an efficient and honest government.
1) SECTION 16 clearly recognizes that career service employees separated from the service by
But a reorganized employee is not without rights. His right lies in his past services, the entitlement
to which must be provided for by law. EO 127 provides for the same in its Section 59, and so
does SECTION 16 when the latter specified that career civil service employees separated from
the service not for cause:
"shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to
them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof,
at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the Government or in
any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose
resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, has been accepted."
This is a reward for the employee's past service to the Government. But this is all. There is no
vested property right to be re-employed in a reorganized office.
"The right to an office or to employment with government or any of its agencies is not a vested
property right, and removal therefrom will not support the question of due process" (Yantsin v.
Aberdeen, 54 Wash 2d 787, 345 P 2d 178). A civil service employee does not have a constitutionally
protected right to his position, which position is in the nature of a public office, political in
character and held by way of grant or privilege extended by government; generally he has been
held to have no property right or vested interest to which due process guaranties extend
(See Taylor v. Beckham 178 U.S. 548, 44 L Ed. 1187; Angilly v. US (CA2 NY) 199 F 2d 642; People
ex. rel. Baker v. Wilson, 39 111 App 2d 443, 189 NE 2d 1; Kelliheller v. NY State Civil Service Com., 21
Misc 2d 1034, 194 NYS 2d 89).
To ensure, however, that no meritorious employee has been separated from the service, there
would be no harm, in fact, it could do a lot of good, if the Commissioner of Customs reviews the
evaluation and placements he has so far made and sees to it that those terminated are included in
a consolidated list to be given preference by departments who are recruiting (Section 2(a), BOC
Memorandum, January 6, 1988).

Conclusion

Premises considered, and subject to the observation hereinabove made, ‘it is our considered view
that the separation from the service "NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of the reorganization
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986" of the affected officers and employees of
the Bureau of Customs should be UPHELD, and the Resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission, dated 30 June 1988, 20 September 1988, and 16 November 1988 should be SET
ASIDE for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.

Republic Act No. 6656, in so far as it provides for retroactivity, should be declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being repugnant to the letter and spirit of Section 16, Article XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution.
EN BANC In its Resolution No. 95-1218 dated 10 January 1995[2] the CSC recalled and revoked the
appointment of TABERNILLA; thus:
G.R. No. 130214, August 09, 1999 After a careful review of the records, the Commission finds the appointment issued to Tabernilla
not in order.
ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR., PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, The requirements prescribed by the qualification standard for the position of Engineer V are as
RESPONDENT. follows:
DECISION EDUCATION: Bachelor's degree in Engineering relevant to the job.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: EXPERIENCE: 4 years in position/s involving management and supervision.

The records clearly show that Tabernilla has not obtained any bachelor's degree in engineering.
Petitioner Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. (hereafter MATHAY), Mayor of Quezon City, seeks the
This is even reflected in the evaluation sheet for the position of Engineer V, which was submitted
nullification of the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) recalling his appointment
by Mayor Mathay. It appears in said evaluation sheet that Tabernilla is only a graduate of
of Olegario S. Tabernilla (hereafter TABERNILLA) as Electrical Engineer V in the city
Associate in Electrical Engineering. Thus, he was not qualified for appointment to the position of
government; and consequently, the reversal of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals of (1) 16
Electrical Engineer V.
July 1997 denying due course and dismissing the petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. No.
44431, and (2) 12 August 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the approval of the appointment of Olegario S. Tabernilla as Engineer V dated
August 22, 1994, is hereby recalled and revoked.
The antecedent facts follow:
Ligaya Caya, Acting Field Officer is hereby directed to explain in writing within five (5) days from
On 26 November 1992, the Quezon City Council enacted City Ordinance No. SP-33, S. 92,
receipt hereof why she approved Tabernilla's appointment under permanent status although he
creating an Electrical Division under the Engineering Department with thirty-six new plantilla
does not meet the qualification requirements.
positions to complement the staffing requirements. One of those newly created positions was
MATHAY moved for the reconsideration[3] of the said Resolution, alleging that the Ordinance
Electrical Engineer V, which required a Professional Electrical Engineer to fill it up and which
which was the law that created the office unequivocally specified a Professional Electrical
became the subject of a heated competition by two licensed professional electrical engineers,
Engineer as its only requirement; hence, the appointee needed only to comply therewith. While
TABERNILLA and Jose I. Enriquez (hereafter ENRIQUEZ). The former was an Engineer II,
conceding that the appointment in local government units are subject to civil service laws, rules
and the latter was an Electrical Engineer III of the existing Electrical Division under the City Fire
and regulations, MATHAY averred that such truism cannot override the right of the appointing
Department, which was previously part of the Quezon City Government but which was later
power to choose his appointee, considering that the power of appointment is essentially
transferred to the Bureau of Fire Protection, Quezon City Fire Station. Conformably to the long
discretionary.[4] MATHAY further argued that TABERNILLA's title to the office became
existing city policy of providing preferential consideration to Quezon City residents in the filling
complete with the confirmation by the CSC Regional Field Office of TABERNILLA's
up of positions in the city office, the Personnel Selection Board of the city government
appointment and his subsequent taking of the oath of office and assumption of duties.
recommended the appointment of TABERNILLA, who had in his favor the advantage of being a
TABERNILLA then acquired a legal right which could not be taken away from him either by
Quezon City resident.
revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and
hearing.[5] MATHAY then intimated that TABERNILLA was not notified of the protest, nor was
On 22 August 1994, MATHAY extended to TABERNILLA a permanent appointment, which
a hearing conducted thereon.
was approved on 15 September 1994 by the CSC Regional Field Office Acting Director II, Ligaya
I. Caya.[1] TABERNILLA thereafter took his oath of office and assumed the duties of his new
MATHAY thereafter filed a supplemental motion manifesting that under Republic Act. No.
position.
184,[6] the educational requirement for admission to the Electrical Engineering Board
Examinations is only two years of resident collegiate engineering training. Since TABERNILLA
ENRIQUEZ disputed the "promotional" appointment before the CSC, claiming it was issued in
completed the two-year Associate in Electrical Engineering course and passed the board
clear violation of CSC MC No. 42, s. 1991, which prescribes a Bachelor's Degree in Engineering
examinations, he was qualified for the contested position.
as the educational requirement for the service-wide position of Engineer V. TABERNILLA, a
mere Associate Electrical Engineer and not a holder of a Bachelor's Degree, clearly failed to meet
In Resolution 95-1743[7] dated 9 March 1995, the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration. It
the qualifications of the position and, therefore, could not be validly appointed thereto.
elucidated that under Sections 76, 77 and 78 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, the CSC has the power to determine the qualification standards for
Requested to comment on the protest, MATHAY maintained that TABERNILLA's assumption
the various positions in the local government and review whether the appointments meet these
of the position effective 1 October 1994 mooted the protest, adding that his appointee met the
standards. The qualification standards for new offices, which local governments have the
minimum requirements of the position as specified in the City Ordinance and existing hiring
authority to create, must not be lower than those prescribed by the CSC. Under existing civil
policies.
service laws and rules, an appointee to Engineer V must possess a Bachelor's Degree in
Engineering. TABERNILLA certainly failed to qualify for the position. The fact that he met all
the requirements for admission to Electrical Engineering Board Examination as provided for
under R.A. No. 184, and passed the said examination does not mean compliance with the TABERNILLA's qualification. The CSC now proposes that the Quezon City ordinance was
prescribed qualification standards. an ultra vires act, considering that the same prescribed a qualification standard lower than that set
for the position, and, hence, fell short of the injunction of Section 78 of R.A. No. 7160 that all
On 7 September 1995, TABERNILLA filed his own "petition" praying for the review of, and matters pertinent to human resources and development in local government units should be
"second hard look" on, Resolutions Nos. 95-0218 and 95-1743. governed by civil service laws.

On 13 June 1996, the CSC issued Resolution No. 963779[8] denying the "petition," which it The instant petition must fail.
treated as a motion for reconsideration. It ratiocinated that TABERNILLA had no legal
personality to file such a pleading because under MC 38, s. 93, Part I(3), a "[r]equest for It must be recalled that in its Resolution of 9 March 1995 the CSC denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of action taken by the CSC Office on appointments shall always be made by the the reconsideration of its Resolution of 10 January 1995 revoking the appointment of
appointing officer." Besides, the allegations in the said "petition" were not meritorious. TABERNILLA. Petitioner received a copy of the former Resolution on 4 April 1995. At the time,
judgments or final orders of the CSC were unappealable.[12] It was only on 1 June 1995 that
On 25 July 1996, MATHAY filed a "petition" with the CSC praying for the "review and Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 took effect. That Circular provides that judgments or
reconsideration" of the three adverse Resolutions thus far issued, and reiterating therein the final orders of quasi-judicial agencies, like the CSC, may be appealed to the Court of Appeals
arguments adduced in the first motion for reconsideration. within fifteen days from notice thereof. Hence, before that date, judgments or final orders of the
CSC were subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.[13] Section 7, Subdivision A,
The "petition" obtained a similar unpropitious fate with the CSC's denial of the same per Article IX of the Constitution provides:
Resolution No. 972545[9] dated 14 April 1997 on the grounds that (1) the "petition" was in the Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
nature of a second motion for reconsideration, which was not allowed pursuant to Section 9 of Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court bycertiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
the Uniform Rules of Procedures in the Conduct of Administrative Investigations, as "only one days from receipt of a copy thereof.
motion for reconsideration [could] be entertained"; and (2) it was filed late. The remedy, therefore, of petitioner was to file with this Court a special civil action
for certiorari within thirty days from 4 April 1995. But he failed to do so; thus, the challenged
Undaunted, MATHAY filed before the Court of Appeals on 17 June 1997 a petition resolutions became final.
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court contending that the CSC acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of Notwithstanding the finality of the aforementioned resolutions, TABERNILLA filed on 7
jurisdiction in issuing Resolution Nos. 95-0218, 95-1743, 96-3779, and 97-2545. September 1995 a petition before the CSC for the review of said resolutions. As correctly held by
the CSC, the said petition, which was in fact a motion for reconsideration, would not prosper
The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition in a Resolution[10] promulgated on 16 July because under Part I(3) of Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993, only the appointing
1997 "for being the wrong remedy and for being time-barred." It ruled that the petition officer, in this case MATHAY, can request reconsideration of actions taken by the CSC on
for certiorari filed nineteen days after receipt of Resolution No. 97-2545 could not be a substitute appointments. Besides, the said petition was filed long after the resolutions sought to be
for a lost appeal. reconsidered became final.

In his motion for reconsideration, MATHAY argued that "what was brought to fore" in his But still, on 25 July 1996, or more than a month after the issuance of the resolution denying
petition for certiorari was an error of jurisdiction in that the CSC had no jurisdiction or authority to TABERNILLA's motion for reconsideration, MATHAY filed with the CSC a petition for the
revoke or cancel an approved and completed appointment to a civil service position. Hence, Rule review and reconsideration of the three resolutions thus far issued. This petition was correctly
65 of the Rules of Court, not Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. I-95, applied. treated by the CSC as a second motion for reconsideration, it having been filed with the same
body that issued the assailed resolutions, coupled with the fact that it was a rehash of the
Unimpressed, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in a arguments raised in the first motion for reconsideration. As such, the same could not be
Resolution[11] promulgated on 12 August 1997, adverting to the same reasons relied upon in considered because under Section 9 of the Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of
dismissing the petition. Furthermore, it held that MATHAY was precluded from raising the Administrative Investigations, which is applicable to protests or questions involving the issuance
question of jurisdiction, since he failed to submit the same as an issue in the proceedings before of appointments, "only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained." Section 17, Rule VI
the CSC. of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent
Civil Service Laws also provides: "In all instances, only one petition for reconsideration shall be
MATHAY now posits in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of entertained." Even assuming that a second motion for reconsideration was allowed by the Rules,
Civil Procedure that the Court of Appeals committed gross errors of law in holding that (1) his MATHAY's "petition" would still be met with denial because it was filed more than a year after
petition for certiorari was not the proper remedy and could not be a substitute for appeal; (2) said his receipt of the resolution denying his first motion for reconsideration.
petition was time-barred; (3) the CSC had jurisdiction to recall and revoke a completed
appointment; and (4) petitioner did not raise the question of jurisdiction in the proceedings before As earlier discussed, the Resolutions of 10 January and 9 March 1995 had already attained finality.
the CSC such that he was guilty of laches and estoppel. This Court, therefore, finds no necessity to pass upon the timeliness or propriety of the petition
for certiorari filed by MATHAY before the Court of Appeals on 17 June 1997, or after more than
The CSC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, remains steadfast in its view that it two years from the date the said resolutions became final.
committed no error of jurisdiction, as it was merely enforcing its revisory power over a
subordinate when it reversed the erroneous determination by the Regional Field Office of Nevertheless, even granting for the sake of argument that the questioned resolutions were not yet
final and that MATHAY's second motion for reconsideration was allowed and seasonably filed, Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigations, specifically provides that in case the
the petition for certiorari instituted before the Court of Appeals had to be dismissed just the same. protest is finally resolved against the protestee, his appointment shall become ineffective and he
The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie only if there is no shall be reverted to his former position.
appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[14] In this case, after
the denial of MATHAY's second motion for reconsideration, appeal was available as a remedy. As WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED. The challenged resolutions of the Civil
earlier mentioned, Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which took effect on 1 June 1995, Service Commission are hereby AFFIRMED.
provides for an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the judgments, final orders or resolutions of
the Civil Service Commission. And Section 4 thereof mandates that the appeal be taken within
fifteen days from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration duly filed in accordance
with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Here, MATHAY filed his petition before the
Court of Appeals on 17 June 1997, or nineteen days after his receipt of the resolution denying his
second motion for reconsideration. As held in cases too numerous to mention, a special civil
action for certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of appeal.[15]

The petitioner asseverates, however, that the said resolutions were void and were issued in
violation of due process; hence, they could never become final, and they could be attacked
directly or collaterally even after the time of appeal or review has lapsed. According to him, the
CSC had no jurisdiction or authority to revoke or cancel an appointment to a civil service position
after its Regional Office had approved the same and the appointee had assumed the new position.

We cannot subscribe to petitioner's theory. Under Section 12 (11) of Book V of Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," the CSC has the power to
"[h]ear and decide administrative cases instituted before it directly or on appeal, including contested
appointments, and review decisions and actions of its agencies and of the agencies attached to it." Moreover,
Section 20, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws provides that notwithstanding the initial approval of an
appointment, the same may be recalled for "[v]iolation of other existing Civil Service laws, rules
and regulations." As held in Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission,[16] the CSC is empowered to take
appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel actions and that such power "includes
the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of applicable provisions of
Civil Service law and regulations."

Accordingly, it cannot be said that the CSC did not have jurisdiction or gravely abused its
discretion in recalling the appointment of TABERNILLA, which was issued in violation of
existing civil service rules prescribing a Bachelor's Degree in Engineering as one of the minimum
qualifications for the questioned position.

Anent petitioner's imputation to the CSC of violation of due process, the same does not hold
water. What was lodged before the Commission was not a disciplinary case wherein petitioner or
TABERNILLA should have been afforded an opportunity to be heard. As ruled
in Debulgado,[17] the CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, "only examines the
conformity of the appointment with applicable provisions of law and whether the appointee
possesses the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualifications." At any rate, petitioner
was requested to comment on the protest; and he did file comment and, later, a motion for
reconsideration of the revocation of the initially approved appointment.

Finally, petitioner fears that if the CSC resolution recalling the appointment made by MATHAY is
upheld, it would "throw out of job a civil service employee who had rendered more than forty
years of satisfactory service for the Government, all because he relied on the presumption that the
Acting Regional Director regularly performed her official duty."

Petitioner's apprehension is without basis. Section 19, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, as well as Sections 43 and 48 of the Uniform Rules of
FIRST DIVISION Institute (ITDI), a component of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) employed
Petitioner under a written contract of services as Project Manager to supervise the construction of
G.R. No. 111091, August 21, 1995 the ITDI-CMD (JICA) Building at the DOST Compound in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila.[3]

The contract was to remain in effect from October 1, 1989 up to the end of the construction
ENGINEER CLARO J. PRECLARO, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND period unless sooner terminated.[4] Petitioner was to be paid a monthly salary drawn from
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. counter-part funds duly financed by foreign-assisted projects and government funds duly released
by the Department of Budget and Management.[5]
DECISION
In November 1989, to build the aforementioned CMD Structure, DOST contracted the services
KAPUNAN, J.: of the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction Company with Engr. Alexander Resoso, as the company's
project engineer.[6]
On 14 June 1990, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Sec. 3(b) of
How petitioner committed a violation of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act is narrated in the
R.A. No. 3019 as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Comment of the Solicitor General and amply supported by the records. The material portions are
information against him read as follows:
hereunder reproduced:
That on or about June 8, 1990, or sometime prior thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then xxx xxx xxx.
the Project Manager/Consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division, Industrial Technology
Development Institute, Department of Science and Technology, a component of the Industrial 3. In the month of May, 1990, Alexander Resoso, Project Engineer of the Sta. Maria Construction
Development Institute (ITDI for brevity) which is an agency of the Department of Science and Company, was in the process of evaluating a Change Order for some electricals in the building
Technology (DOST for brevity), wherein the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction undertook the construction when petitioner approached him at the project site (p. 11, 25, Ibid.).
construction of the building in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, with a total cost of SEVENTEEN
MILLION SIX HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P17,695,000.00) jointly 4. Unexpectedly, petitioner made some overtures that expenses in the Change Order will be
funded by the Philippine and Japanese Governments, and while the said construction has not yet deductive (meaning, charged to the contractor by deducting from the contract price), instead of
been finally completed, accused either directly requested and/or demanded for himself or for additive (meaning, charged to the owner). Petitioner intimated that he can forget about the
another, the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), claimed as part of deductive provided he gets P200,000.00, a chunk of the contractor's profit which he roughly
the expected profit of FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P460,000.00) in estimated to be around P460,000.00 (pp. 12-13, 22, Ibid.).
connection with the construction of that government building wherein the accused had to
intervene under the law in his capacity as Project Manager/Consultant of said construction - said 5. Having conveyed the proposal to Jaime Sta. Maria, Sr., the owner of Sta. Maria Construction
offense having been committed in relation to the performance of his official duties. Company, Resoso thereafter asked petitioner if he wanted a rendezvous for him to receive the
money. Petitioner chose Wendy's Restaurant, corner E. Delos Santos Avenue and Camias Street,
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1] on June 6, 1990 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening (p. 14, Ibid.).

On 20 July 1990, during arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charges against him. 6. However, Sta. Maria, Sr. asked for two (2) more days or until the 8th of June, perceiving
financial constraints (Ibid.).
On 30 June 1993, after trial on the merits, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan rendered
judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion reads as 7. Petitioner relented, saying "O.K. lang with me because we are not in a hurry." (P. 15, Ibid.)
follows: Petitioner was thereafter asked to bring along the result of the punch list (meaning, the list of
defective or correctible works to be done by the contractor) (p. 15, Ibid.; p. 10, TSN, 18 Oct.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Claro Preclaro y Jambalos 1991).
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and he is 8. On 7 June 1990, Sta. Maria, Sr. and Resoso proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) (NBI) to report the incident (p. 15, 35, Ibid.).
MONTH, as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as the maximum, perpetual
disqualification from public office and to pay the costs of this action. 9. The NBI suggested an entrapment plan to which Sta. Maria, Sr. signified his conformity (p. 16,
TSN, 12 Oct. 1990). Accordingly, Sta. Maria, Sr. was requested to produce the amount of
SO ORDERED.[2] P50,000.00 in P500.00 denomination to represent the grease money (p. 37, TSN, 6 Sept. 1990).

The antecedent facts are largely undisputed. 10. The next day, or on 8 June 1990, Resoso delivered the money to the NBI. Thereafter, the
money was dusted with flourescent powder and placed inside an attache case (pp. 16-17,
On 1 October 1989, the Chemical Mineral Division of the Industrial Technology Development Ibid.). Resoso got the attache case and was instructed not to open it. Similarly, he was advised to
proceed at the Wendy's Restaurant earlier than the designated time where a group of NBI men
awaited him and his companion, Sta. Maria, Jr. (pp. 17-18, Ibid.). And then Dave Preclaro told, "Puede" and he asked Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. if there is
express teller and could he deposit during night time but Engineer Sta. Maria, Jr.
11. Hence, from the NBI, Resoso passed by the Jade Valley Restaurant in Timog, Quezon City, to told him, "I do not have any knowledge or I do not have any express teller you can
fetch Sta. Maria, Jr. (Ibid.). deposit. I only know credit card."
12. At around 7:35 p.m., Resoso and Sta. Maria, Jr. arrived at the Wendy's Restaurant. They were
led by the NBI men to a table previously reserved by them which was similarly adjacent to a table PROS. CAOILI:
occupied by them (pp. 18-19, Ibid.).
q. When Engr. Sta. Maria intervened and interviewed him that way, was there
13. Twenty minutes later, petitioner arrived. Supposedly, the following conversation took place, anything that happened?
to wit:
a. Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. handed two envelopes to Preclaro.
JUSTICE BALAJADIA:
q. Did Claro Preclaro receive these two envelopes from Engineer Sta. Maria?
q. When Dave Preclaro arrived, what did he do?
a. Yes, sir. (Pp. 19-21, Ibid., See also pp. 13-14, TSN, 29 Oct. 1990.)
a. We asked him his order and we talked about the punch list.
14. From the moment petitioner received the two envelopes with his right hand, thereafter
placing them under his left armpit, he was accosted by the NBI men (p. 22, TSN, 12 Oct. 1990).
q. What was his comment about the punch list?
15. A camera flashed to record the event. Petitioner instinctively docked to avoid the taking of
a. He told us that it is harder to produce small items than big ones. pictures. In such manner, the two envelopes fell (p. 23, Ibid.).

q. How long did you converse with Engr. Claro Preclaro? 16. The NBI men directed petitioner to pick up the two envelopes. Petitioner refused. Hence,
one of the NBI men picked up the envelopes and placed them inside a big brown envelope (p.
a. I think thirty minutes or so. 27, Ibid.).

q. Was Preclaro alone when he came? 17. Petitioner was thenceforth brought to the NBI for examination (p. 28, Ibid.).

18. At the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section, petitioner's right palmar hand was tested positive of
a. Yes, Your Honor. flourescent powder. The same fluorescent powder, however, cannot be detected in petitioner's T-
shirt and pants (p. 5, TSN, 29 Oct. 1990).[7]
xxx xxx xxx.

PROS. CAOILI: xxx xxx xxx.

Thus, as brought out at the outset, an information was filed against petitioner which, after due
q. When you talk[ed] about his punch list, did you talk about anything else? hearing, resulted in his conviction by the Sandiganbayan. Not satisfied with the decision,
petitioner instituted the present petition for review, ascribing to the Sandiganbayan the following
a. Engineer Sta. Maria, Jr., they were conversing with Dave Preclaro and he told [him], errors:
"O, paano na."
1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE,
JUSTICE ESCAREAL: INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, THE [PETITIONER]
NOT BEING A PUBLIC OFFICER; and
q. Who said "Paano na?"
2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT NOT ALL THE
a. Engineer Sta. Maria, [Jr.]. And then Preclaro told [him], "Paano, How will the money ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND
be arranged and can I bring it?" he said. REASONABLE DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE GUILT OF THE [PETITIONER] HAS
NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
And then Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. told him it was arranged on two bundles on two We find the petition unmeritorious.
envelopes.
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that he is not a public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of the did not take an oath of office became unessential considerations in view of the above-mentioned
Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019 as amended), because he was neither elected provision of law clearly including petitioner within the definition of a public officer.
nor appointed to a public office. Rather, petitioner maintains that he is merely a private individual
hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a particular project and for a specified period[8] as Similarly, petitioner's averment that he could not be prosecuted under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
evidenced by the contract of services[9] he entered into with the ITDI. Petitioner, to further Practices Act because his intervention "was not required by law but in the performance of a
support his "theory," alleged that he was not issued any appointment paper separate from the contract of services entered into by him as a private individual contractor,"[15] is erroneous. As
abovementioned contract. He was not required to use the bundy clock to record his hours of discussed above, petitioner falls within the definition of a public officer and as such, his duties
work and neither did he take an oath of office.[10] delineated in Annex "B" of the contract of services[16] are subsumed under the phrase "wherein
the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law."[17] Petitioner's allegation,
We are not convinced by Petitioner's arguments. to borrow a cliche, is nothing but a mere splitting of hairs.

Petitioner miscontrues the definition of "public officer" in R.A. No. 3019 which, according to Among petitioner's duties as project manager is to evaluate the contractor's accomplishment
Sec. 2(b) thereof "includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or reports/billings[18] hence, as correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan he has the "privilege and
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, authority to make a favorable recommendation and act favorably in behalf of the government,"
even nominal, from the government...." signing acceptance papers and approving deductives and additives are some examples.[19] All of
the elements of Sec. 3(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act are, therefore, present.
The word "includes" used in defining a public officer in Sec. 2(b) indicates that the definition is
not restrictive. The terms "classified, unclassified or exemption service" were the old categories Anent the second issue, we likewise find Petitioner's allegations completely bereft of merit.
of positions in the civil service which have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career
Service[11] by PD 807 providing for the organization of the Civil Service Commission[12] and by Petitioner insists that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
the Administrative Code of 1987.[13] that the charges against him should be rejected for being improbable, unbelievable and contrary to
human nature.
Non-career service in particular is characterized by -
We disagree.
(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career
service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean that which produces absolute certainty. Only
that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a moral certainty is required or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
particular project for which purpose employment was made. mind."[20] We have extensively reviewed the records of this case and we find no reason to
overturn the findings of the Sandiganbayan.
The Non-Career Service shall include:
Petitioner enumerates the alleged improbabilities and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff; prosecution witnesses. We shall examine the testimonies referred to with meticulousness.

(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the Petitioner asserts that it was improbable for him to have demanded P200,000.00 from Engr.
President and their personal or confidential staff(s); Resoso, when he could have just talked directly to the contractor himself. It is quite irrelevant
from whom petitioner demanded his percentage share of P200,000.00 whether from the
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their contractor's project engineer, Engr. Alexander Resoso or directly from the contractor himself
personal or confidential staff; Engr. Jaime Sta. Maria Sr. That petitioner made such a demand is all that is required by Sec. 3(b)
of R.A. No. 3019 and this element has been sufficiently established by the testimony of Engr.
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a Resoso, thus:
special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not
available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case
shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own xxx xxx xxx.
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and

(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel. (Italics ours.)[14] Q You said when you were computing your Change Order Mr. Preclaro or Dave
Preclaro whom you identified approached you, what did you talk about?
From the foregoing classification, it is quite evident that petitioner falls under the non-career
service category (formerly termed the unclassified or exemption service) of the Civil Service and A He mentioned to me that we are deductive in our Change Order three and four so
thus is a public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.
after our conversation I told this conversation to my boss that we are deductible in
No. 3019).
the Change Order three and four and then my boss told me to ask why it is
The fact that petitioner is not required to record his working hours by means of a bundy clock or deductive.
Q Who is your boss?
Q Did you ask the accused here, Dave Preclaro why it is considered deductive?
A Santa Maria Sr.
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the reaction of your boss when you relayed the message to Mr. Preclaro?
Q What was his answer if any?
A The next day he told me to ask Dave where and when to pick up the money so the
A I asked him that my boss is asking me to ask you how come it became deductive next day I asked Dave "Where do you intend to get the money, the Boss wanted to
when my computation is additive and he told me that I have done so much for your know."
company already and then he picked up cement bag paper bag and computed our
alleged profit amounting to One Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos and then he told Q What was the answer of Dave?
me that he used to use some percentage in projects maximum and minimum and in
our case he would use a minimum percentage and multiply to 60 and... A And he told me, Wendy's Restaurant at 3:00 o'clock.

JUSTICE ESCAREAL: Q When?

Q What is 460? A June 6 Wednesday.

A P460,000.00 and he said take of the butal and get two Hundred Thousand Pesos. Q When he told you that did you comply with June 6 appointment?

JUSTICE BALAJADIA: A I told my boss what he told me again that the meeting will take place at Wendy's
What is the translation now? Restaurant corner Edsa and Camias Street at around 8:00 o'clock p.m. June 6,
Wednesday.
WITNESS:
Q What did your boss tell you?
A And he said disregard the excess and I will just get the P200,000.00. (Underscoring
ours.) A The next day he told me to ask Dave.

PROS CAOILI: Q What did your boss tell you?

Q What does he mean by that if you know? A My boss told me to ask Dave to postpone the meeting on June 6 to be postponed
on June 8 at the same place and same time because my boss is having financial
A I do not know sir. problem.

He just said, I will get the P200,000.00 and tell it to your boss. (Underscoring ours.) Q Did you relay the postponement to Dave Preclaro?

JUSTICE BALAJADIA: A Yes sir. I told what my boss told me.

Q What is P200,000.00? Q What was his reaction?

A It is Two Hundred Thousand Pesos. A Dave told me "O.K. lang with me" because we are not in a hurry. Any way we are
the ones to sign the acceptance papers and my boss instructed me that on Friday to
PROS CAOILI: ask Dave to bring along the result of the punch list and if possible also to bring along
the acceptance papers to be signed by Dave, Lydia Mejia and Dr. Lirag the director.
Q What did you answer him when he told you that?
Q What happened next after meeting with Preclaro to relay the postponement if any?
A He told me to forget the deductive and electrical and after that I told my boss what
he told me. A Nothing happened. The next day, Thursday the boss instructed me to go with him to
the NBI to give a statement.
Q Did you go to the NBI and report to the incident to the NBI? PROS CAOILI:

A Yes sir. Q What does he mean by that if you know?

Q Did you give a statement before any of the agents of the NBI? A I do not know sir.

A Yes sir.[21] He just said, I will get the P200,000.00 and tell it to your boss.[24]

xxx xxx xxx. xxx

Likewise, petitioner's alleged refusal to see Mr. Jaime Sta. Maria Sr. when the latter tried to arrange The records, however, do not show the true and actual amount that the Sta. Maria Construction
meetings with him regarding his demand[22] does not weaken the cause against petitioner. It does will earn as profit. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner's contention as the actual profit may
not at all prove that petitioner did not ask for money. Conceivably, petitioner did not muster be lower or higher than his estimation.
enough courage to ask money directly from the contractor himself. Getting the amount through
the project engineer would be safer because if Mr. Sta. Maria, Sr. had refused to give money, Besides, as related by Engr. Resoso, petitioner considers the P200,000.00 percentage proper
petitioner could always deny having made the demand. compensation since he has allegedly done so much for the Sta. Maria construction company.[25]

Petitioner contends that the percentage demanded in the amount of P200,000.00 is too high Petitioner also argues that:
considering that the estimated profit of the contractor from the CMD project is only P460,000.00.
In petitioner's words, this would "scare the goose that lays the golden egg." [23] We reject this According to STA. MARIA, SR., they were deductive by P280,000.00 (Id., pp. 34-35).
argument. The aforementioned contractor's profit is petitioner's own computation as testified to
by Engr. Resoso: If STA. MARIA CONSTRUCTION was deductive in the amount of P280,000.00, why would the
petitioner still demand P200,000.00 which would increase the contractor's loss to P480,000.00!
xxx xxx xxx. It might have been different if the changes were additive where STA. MARIA
CONSTRUCTION would have earned more, thereby providing motive for the petitioner to ask
for a percentage![26]
A I asked him that my boss is asking me to ask you how come it became deductive
when my computation is additive and he told me that I have done so much for your But this is precisely what petitioner was bargaining for- P200,000.00 in exchange for forgetting
company already and then he picked up cement bag paper bag and computed our about the deductive[27] and thus prevent the Sta. Maria Construction from incurring losses.
alleged profit amounting to One Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos and then he told
Petitioner's contention that it was impossible for him to make any demands because the final
me that he used to use some percentage in projects maximum and minimum and in
decision regarding accomplishments and billing lies with the DOST technical committee is
our case he would use a minimum percentage and multiply to 460 and... (Italics
unacceptable. Petitioner is part of the abovementioned technical committee as
ours.) the ITDI representative consultant. This is part of his duties under the contract of services in
connection with which he was employed by the ITDI. Even, assuming arguendo that petitioner
JUSTICE ESCAREAL: does not make the final decision, as supervisor/consultant, his recommendations will necessarily
carry much weight. Engr. Resoso testified thus:
Q What is 460?
PROS CAOILI:
A P460,000.00 and it ended to P215 thousand or P20,000.00 and he said take of the
butal and get the Two Hundred Thousand Pesos. (Italics ours.)
Q As a Project Engineer to whom do you present your billing papers accomplishment
report or purchase order?
JUSTICE BALAJADIA:
A The billing paper was being taken cared of by the, of our office. I personally do my
Q What is the translation now?
job as supervision in the construction.
WITNESS:
Q Do you have any counterpart to supervise the project from the government side?
A And he said disregard the excess and I will just get the P200,000.00.
A Yes, we have.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Yes, the DOST have a technical Committee Infra-Structure Committee and also the
ITDI as its own representative. With the representative of DOST and Preclaro.

Q Who composed the Technical Committee of the DOST? ATTY. JIMENEZ:

A A certain Engineer Velasco, Engineer Sande Banez and Engineer Mejia. Does that also mean that Preclaro is also among the representatives he is going to
consult with?
Q How about the ITDI?
Well any way...
A The ITDI representative composed of Dave Preclaro.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Q Who is this Dave Preclaro?
Witness may answer the question.
A He is the consultant of ITDI. (Underscoring ours.)
Read back the question.
xxx xxx xxx.
COURT STENOGRAPHER:
ATTY. CAOILI:
Reading back the question as ordered by the Court.
Q As Project Engineer do you consult to any body regarding your job?
WITNESS:
A First if there is any problem in the site I consult my boss.
A Every Monday meeting we tackle with accomplishment report the billing
PROS CAOILI: papers.[28] (Italics ours.)

Q How about with the other consultants representing the ITDI and DOST? xxx xxx xxx.

A In the construction site we have meeting every Monday to discuss any problem. Petitioner also claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the entrapment
itself are conflicting, doubtful or improbable:
Q With whom do you discuss this problem?
(aaa) according to RESOSO, only FOUR (4) P500 bills were dusted with flourescent powder and
used in the alleged entrapment.
A The Infra-structure Committee of DOST and the Infra-structure Committee of ITDI,
the architect and the contractor. We had weekly meetings. Contradicting RESOSO, STA. MARIA, SR. said that he gave fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos in
P500 denomination to the NBI.[29]
Q What matters if any do you consult with Mr. Claro Preclaro?
There is no such inconsistency. Said witnesses were testifying on two different subjects. Engr.
ATTY. JIMENEZ: Sta. Maria, Sr.'s testimony touched on the amount he gave the NBI for use in the entrapment
while Engr. Resoso's declaration referred only to the number of bills dusted with flourescent
No basis. powder.

JUSTICE ESCAREAL: Petitioner, likewise, misappreciated the following testimony of Resoso:

They met on problems on Mondays. PROS CAOILI:

ATTY. JIMENEZ: Q What did he do with the two envelopes upon receiving the same?

But there is no mention of Preclaro specifically. Then he asked Jaime Sta. Maria, Jr. if there is bank teller express, if he could deposit
A
the money but Mr. Sta. Maria said, "I do not have, I only have credit cards."[30]
Petitioner intended to deposit the money in his own account not that of Mr. Sta. Maria, Jr. He Q So you did not intend to take photographs of the act of handing of the envelopes to
was merely inquiring from the latter if there was an express teller nearby where he could make the the suspect?
deposit. Mr. Sta. Maria Jr. himself testified as follows:
A We intended but during that time we cannot take photographs at the time of the
A He asked me if there was express teller. I told him I do not know then he asked me handing because the flash will alert the suspect. (Italics ours.)
whether it is possible to deposit at the Express Teller at that time. I told him I don't
know because I have no express teller card and he asked me how am I going to JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
arrange, how was it arranged if I will bring it, can I bring it. Then I told him that it
was placed in two envelopes consisting of 500 Peso bills and then he said "Okay na Why did you not position the photographer to a far distance place with camera with
yan."[31] telescopic lens?

The failure of the NBI to take photographs of the actual turn-over of the money to petitioner is A We did not Your Honor.
not fatal to the People's cause. The transaction was witnessed by several people, among whom
were Engr. Resoso, Mr. Sta. Maria Jr. and the NBI agents whose testimonies on the circumstances ATTY. JIMENEZ:
before, during and after the turn-over are consistent, logical and credible.
So was it your intention to take photographs only at the time that he is already
According to NBI Agent Francisco Balanban Sr., they purposely took no photographs of the
being arrested?
actual turn-over so as not to alert and scare off the petitioner. During cross-examination Agent
Balanban Jr. stated:
A Yes sir.[32]

xxx xxx xxx. xxx

Petitioner insists that when his hands were placed under ultra-violet light, both were found
Q Now, of course, this entrapment operation, you made certain preparation to make negative for flourescent powder. This is petitioner's own conclusion which is not supported by
sure that you would be able to gather evidence in support of the entrapment? evidence. Such self-serving statement will not prevail over the clear and competent testimony and
the report[33] submitted by the forensic expert of the NBI Ms. Demelen R. dela Cruz, who was the
one who conducted the test and found petitioner's right palmar hand positive for fluorescent
A Yes sir.
powder, the same hand he used, according to witnesses Resoso and Sta. Maria Jr., to get the
money from the latter.
Q As a matter of fact you even brought photographer for the purpose?

A That is right sir. xxx xxx xxx.

Q And that photographer was precisely brought along to record the entrapment?
Q Mrs. dela Cruz since when have you been a Forensic Chemist at NBI?
A Yes sir.
A Since 1981 sir.
Q From the beginning to the end, that was the purpose?
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
A At the time of the arrest sir.
Q By the way, is the defense willing to admit that the witness is a competent as ......
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
From the time of the handing over of the envelopes until the entrapment would
have been terminated? Admitted Your Honor.

A No sir we plan to take the photograph only during the arrest because if we take PROS. CAOILI:
photographs he would be alerted during the handing of the envelopes.
(Underscoring ours.)
Madam Witness did you conduct a forensic examination in the person of one Dave A The materials or the fibers of the clothings it could have been dyed with flourescent
Preclaro y Jambalos? dyes sir.[34]

A Yes sir. xxx xxx xxx.

Q If that person whom you examined is here in court would you be able to recognize What we find improbable and contrary to human experience is petitioner's claim that he was set
him? up by Engr. Sta. Maria Sr. and Engr. Resoso for no other purpose but revenge on account of
petitioner's failure to recommend the Sta. Maria Construction to perform the extra electrical
ATTY. JIMENEZ: works.[35]

The Sandiganbayan has aptly ruled on this matter, thus:


We admit that the accused is the one examined by the witness.
For another, the claim of accused that there was ill-will on the part of the construction company
ATTY. CAOILI: is hardly plausible. It is highly improbable for the company to embark on a malicious prosecution
of an innocent person for the simple reason that such person had recommended the services of
Did you prepare the result of the examination in writing? another construction firm. And it is extremely impossible for such company to enlist the
cooperation and employ the services of the government's chief investigative agency for such an
A Yes sir. anomalous undertaking. It is more in accord with reason and logic to presuppose that there was
some sort of a mischievous demand made by the accused in exchange for certain favorable
PROS. CAOILI: considerations, such as, favorable recommendation on the completeness of the project, hassle-
free release of funds, erasure of deductives, etc. Indeed, the rationale for the occurrence of the
Showing to you Physic Examination No. 90-961 which for purposes of identification meeting and the demand for money is infinite and boundless.[36]
has already been marked as Exh. H what relation has this have with the report that
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Engr. Sta. Maria Sr., who was then engaged in
you mentioned a while ago? the construction of another DOST building, would not risk his business or livelihood just to exact
revenge which is neither profitable nor logical. As we aptly stated in Maleg v. Sandiganbayan:[37]
A This is the same report that I prepared sir.
It is hard to believe that the complainant who is a contractor would jeopardize and prejudice his
Q How did you conduct such flourescent examination? business interests and risk being blacklisted in government infrastructure projects, knowing that
with the institution of the case, he may find it no longer advisable nor profitable to continue in his
A The left and right hands of the accused were placed under the ultra violet lamp sir. construction ventures. It is hardly probable that the complainant would weave out of the blue a
serious accusation just to retaliate and take revenge on the accused.
Q What was the result?
From the foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that on the basis of the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented during the trial, the guilt of petitioner has been established
A It gave a... under the ultra violent lamp the palmer hands of the suspect gave
beyond reasonable doubt.
positive result for the presence of flourescent powder.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED.
Q What palmar hands?

A Right hand sir.

Q What other examination did you conduct?

A And also the clothing, consisting of the t-shirts and the pants were examined. Under
the ultra violet lamp the presence of the flourescent powder of the t-shirts and
pants cannot be seen or distinguished because the fibers or the material of the
cloth under the ultra violet lamp was flouresce.

Q Please tell the Court why the t-shirts and pants under the ultra violent lamp was
flouresce?
G. R. No. L-2971, April 20, 1951 As correctly indicated by counsel for petitioner the four essential elements of the offense are: (1)
that the accused is a public officer within the scope of article 203 of the Revised Penal Code; (2)
FELICIANO MANIEGO Y CATU, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE that the accused received by himself or thru another, some gift or present, offer or promise; (3)
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some
crime or any act not constituting a crime; (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of the
DECISION functions of the public officer.

There can be no question that petitioner was a public officer within the meaning of article 20.3
BENGZON, J.: which includes all persons "who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Philippine
This petitioner was convicted, by the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, of a violation of Government, or shall perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an
article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. He pleads for acquittal, insisting upon purely legal points. employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class." That definition is quite
comprehensive, embracing as it does, every public servant from the highest to the lowest. For the
The facts found by that appellate court are substantially the following: purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the standard distinction in the law of public officers
between "officer" and "employee".
"That on February 27, 1947, the accused, although appointed as a laborer, had been placed in Petitioner, however, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in regarding him as a public
charge of issuing summons and subpoenas for traffic violations in the Sala of Judge Crisanto officer, expounded and discussed several grounds arranged under the following headings:
Aragon of the Municipal Court of the City of Manila. It appears furthermore, from the testimony
of Clerk of Court Baltazar and Fiscal De la Merced, then Deputy Fiscal attending to traffic
violations, that the accused had been permitted to write motions for dismissal of prescribed traffic "a. The doctrine of 'the temporary performance of public functions by a laborer' should not apply
cases against offenders without counsel, and to submit them to the Court for action, without in defendant's case.
passing through the regular clerk. On the day in question, Felix Rabia, the complainant herein,
appeared and inquired from the accused about a subpoena that he received. He was informed that b. The overt act imputed on the accused does not constitute a circumstance by which he may be
it was in connection with a traffic violation for which said Rabia had been detained and given considered a public official.
traffic summons by an American MP. The accused after a short conversation went to Fiscal De la
Merced and informed the Fiscal that the case had already prescribed. The Fiscal having found c. His appointment as laborer came from one source, while the designation and delimitation of
such to be the case, instructed the accused that if the traffic violator had no lawyer, he could write the functions of his appointment came from another source."
the motion for dismissal and have it signed by the party concerned. This was done by the accused
and after the signing by Felix Rabia the matter was submitted to the Court, which granted the After having carefully considered the expository argumentation, we are unconvinced. The law is
petition for dismissal. clear, and we perceive no valid reason to deny validity to the view entertained by the Spanish
Supreme Court that, for the purposes of punishing bribery, the temporary performance of public
"According to Felix Rabia and Agent No. 19 (Laforteza) of the National Bureau of Investigation, functions is sufficient to constitute a person a public official. This opinion, it must be stated, was
the accused informed Rabia that the latter was subject to a fine of P15; that Rabia inquired followed and applied by the Court of Appeals because the accused, although originally assigned*
whether the same could be reduced because he had no money, and that the accused informed to the preparation of summons and subpoenas, had been allowed in some instances to prepare
Rabia that he could fix the case if Rabia would pay him P10; which Rabia did and the accused motions for dismissal of traffic cases.
pocketed. This charged was denied by the accused."
And this Tribunal has practically concurred with the Spanish court when it opined [1] that a laborer
The pertinent portion of article 210 of the Revised Penal Code reads: in the Bureau of Posts temporarily detailed as filer of money orders was a public officer within the
meaning of article 203 of the Revised Penal Code. Indeed, common sense indicates that the
receipt of bribe money is just as pernicious when committed by temporary employees as when
"Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the committed by permanent officials.
performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received
by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision The second essential element has likewise been proven. The Court of Appeals said this petitioner
correctional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and received ten pesos from Rabia (and pocketed the money) in consideration of his "fixing" Rabia's
not more than three times such value, in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime case, and thereafter he "fixed" it by filing a motion for dismissal, which was approved in due
agreed upon if the same shall have been committed. course.
If the gift was accepted by the officer In consideration of the execution of an act which does not In connection with the last two elements of the offense, it should be stated that our
constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in pronouncements under the first sufficiently answer petitioner's propositions elaborated in several
the preceding paragraph * * *." parts of his brief, revolving around the thesis that since he was a mere laborer by appointment he
may not be convicted, because the preparation of motions for dismissal is not surely the official
function of a laborer. Enough to recall that although originally appointed as a mere laborer, this
defendant was on several occasions designated or given the work to prepare motions for
dismissal. He was consequently temporarily discharging such public functions. And as in the
performance thereof he accepted, even solicited, a monetary reward, he is certainly guilty as
charged.

Wherefore, there being no issue about the penalty imposed, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed in toto. With costs.
FIRST DIVISION Coseteng’s privilege speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate Committees for
G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002 investigation.

On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating an
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, IN HIS ad hoc and independent citizens’ committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances
CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENT. surrounding the Philippine centennial projects, including its component activities. Former
Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee.
DECISION
On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its
KAPUNAN, J.: Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committee’s
recommendations was “the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair
of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of
On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223
centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest
“constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998.”
bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring)
The Committee was mandated “to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National
even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for
Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the
participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for
Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.”[1]
the implementation of the said contracts all in violation… of the anti-graft law.”[5]
Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, “reconstituting the
Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended
Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998.” It renamed the
“the further investigation by the Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of,” among others,
Committee as the “National Centennial Commission.” Appointed to chair the reconstituted
NCC Chair Salvador H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in
Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and
relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons.[2]
The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were apparently referred to
Characterized as an “ad-hoc body,” the existence of the Commission “shall terminate upon the
the Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On January 27, 2000,
completion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations.”[3] Like its predecessor
the Bureau issued its Evaluation Report, recommending:
Committee, the Commission was tasked to “take charge of the nationwide preparations for the
National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence
and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.” 1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted
before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office
Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged with the responsibility to of the Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H.
“prepare, for approval of the President, a Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro Q. Peña and AK President
within six (6) months from the effectivity of” the Executive Order. Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and Regulations;
E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding:
Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative staff support by a 2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the
Secretariat to be composed of, among others, detailed personnel from the Presidential nominal complainant.[6]
Management Staff, the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, and the National
Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall be headed by a full time Executive Director who shall
be designated by the President. In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau, directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and those of
Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the Department his witnesses.
of Tourism and the president’s Contingent Fund, in an amount to be recommended by the
Commission, and approved by the President. Appropriations for succeeding years shall be On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss
incorporated in the budget of the Office of the President. questioning the jurisdiction of said office.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp)
was created.[4] Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order but the
On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate motion was denied in an Order dated October 5, 2000.
denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition
Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.
On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a resolution Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsman’s and Special Prosecutor’s
finding “probable cause to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the original.]
PEÑA before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon motion for clarification by the
in relation to Republic Act No. 1594.” The resolution also directed that an information for Ombudsman in the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in its Resolution
violation of the said law be filed against Laurel and Peña. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated March 20, 2001. The Court explained the rationale for this reversal:
approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge against Peña. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such
In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not
commanding respondents to desist from filing any information before the Sandiganbayan or any make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by
court against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt regular courts. It has been held that the clause “any illegal act or omission of any public official”
Practices Act. is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.

On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner, heard the parties in oral argument. The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section
15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation
because: and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be
A. construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman
EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH to such cases.
UNDERTOOK THE FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH
VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, NOT A Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman “to
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION. take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such
cases.” The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of
cases involving public officers and employees by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman
B.
of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with
THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE.
the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers
and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the
C. Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-
PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT A feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.
“PUBLIC OFFICER” AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT.[7] Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the
In addition, petitioner in his reply[8] invokes this Court’s decision in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,[9] where limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the
it was held that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable by the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act
Sandiganbayan, i.e., over public officers of Grade 27 and higher. As petitioner’s position was under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct
purportedly not classified as Grade 27 or higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently, the preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction over him. the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by
This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Court’s decision in Uy, we held that “it is the law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce
prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry
against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal,
in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.” state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to
In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded: assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the
The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in accordance with
provincial and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.
of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial
powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most
Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 (“An Act Providing for the Functional and important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed
Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes”) which vests the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in
upon the Ombudsman “primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan…” And ensuring accountability in public office. A review of the development of our Ombudsman law
this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the reveals this intent. [Emphasis in the original.]
Special Prosecutor shall have the power to “conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds upon which petitioner
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.” Thus, repeated references to the relies. We first address the argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public
officer. Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of
government as “[t]he most important characteristic” in determining whether a position is a public
The Constitution[10] describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as “protectors of the people,” office or not.
who “shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract
employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of
government-owned or controlled corporations.” Among the awesome powers, functions, and the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; – that
duties vested by the Constitution[11] upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to “[i]nvestigate… any some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches,
act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.” nature, the individual is not a public officer.[16]
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly,
The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or
known as the “Ombudsman Act of 1989.” Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law respectively provide: judicial. May the functions of the NCC then be described as executive?
SEC. 13. Mandate. – The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people shall act
promptly on complaints file in any form or manner against officers or employees of the We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power “is generally defined
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government- as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in operation and enforcing their due observance.”[17]The executive function, therefore, concerns the
every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
to the people.
The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following Sports) thereof:
powers, functions and duties: Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve, promote,
and popularize the nation’s historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of creations.
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998:
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be celebrated in 1998, and the
any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; centennial presents an important vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino
identity;
x x x.
Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino
The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in relation to Section 13, supra:
values;
SEC 16. Applicability. – The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned
Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be insured only through long-range
in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.
planning and continuous developmental programming;
In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-
feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or
Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas of special expertise and
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.[12]
capability, particularly in communication and information dissemination, is necessary for long-
range planning and continuous developmental programming;
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers
are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence[13] is that provided by Mechem, a
Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and undertake the primary task of
recognized authority on the subject:
harnessing the multisectoral components from the business, cultural, and business sectors to serve
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
as effective instruments from the launching and overseeing of this long-term project;
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
x x x.
for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.[14]
E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998,
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign
cited the “need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized
functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position,
celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-
scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.[15]
government or private organizations.” It also referred to the “need to rationalize the relevance of
historical links with other countries.”
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC Chair,
namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive
The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry
any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.
them into effect. Thus, the Commission was vested with the following functions:
(a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization, formulation and implementation of was done I agreed and Your Honor if I may also mention we wanted to generate employment
programs and projects on the utilization of culture, arts, literature and media as vehicles aside from attracting business investments and employment. And the Estrada administration
for history, economic endeavors, and reinvigorating the spirit of national unity and decided to junk this project there 48, 40 thousand people who lost job, they were employed in
sense of accomplishment in every Filipino in the context of the Centennial Expo. And our target was to provide 75 thousand jobs. It would have really calibrated,
Celebrations. In this regard, it shall include a Philippine National Exposition ’98 within accelerated the development of Central Luzon. Now, I think they are going back to that because
Metro Manila, the original eight provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues; they had the airport and there are plan to revive the Expo site into key park which was the
original plan.
There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full employment is a
(b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to awareness and celebration fundamental state policy.[20]
of the Centennial;
Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanilla[21] that the holding by a
municipality of a town fiesta is a proprietary rather than a governmental function. Petitioner argues
(c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and dissemination of all information that the “holding of a nationwide celebration which marked the nation’s 100th birthday may be
about the plans and events for the Centennial Celebrations; likened to a national fiesta which involved only the exercise of the national government’s
proprietary function.”[22] In Torio, we held:
(d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the implementation of the programs [Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code] simply gives
and projects; authority to the municipality to [celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to
observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical
event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general
(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and structures nationwide. In this welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the
regard, the Commission shall formulate schemes (e.g. lease-maintained-and-transfer, celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to
build-operate-transfer, and similar arrangements) to ensure the preservation and the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a
maintenance of the historical sites and structures; source of income for the town, nonetheless it is [a] private undertaking as distinguished from the
maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.
(f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and corporation, and to invite As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of
private individuals and organizations to assist it in the performance of its tasks; and, an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case
are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the
(g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans, programs, projects, activities as undertaking may be, is that it is government in essence, otherwise, the function becomes private or
well as the status of the preparations for the Celebration.[18] propriety in character. Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the
celebration of a town fiesta.
It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested,[19] created the NCC Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine. Note that the Court
by executive order. Book III (Office of the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2 cautioned that “there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of
describes the nature of executive orders: an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case
SEC. 2. Executive Orders. – Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent are to be considered and will be decisive.” Thus, in footnote 15 of Torio, the Court, citing an
character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be American case, illustrated how the “surrounding circumstances plus the political, social, and
promulgated in executive orders. [Underscoring ours.] cultural backgrounds” could produce a conclusion different from that in Torio:
Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the country’s economic development, especially We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances plus the political,
in Central Luzon. Petitioner himself admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court: social, and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on this question. The case of Pope v.
MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO: City of New Haven, et al. was an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused during a
Fourth of July fireworks display resulting in the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused
And in addition to that expounded by Former President Ramos, don’t you agree that the task of by defendants’ negligence. The defendants demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that
the centennial commission was also to focus on the long term over all socio economic the city was engaged in the performance of a public governmental duty from which it received no
development of the zone and Central Luzon by attracting investors in the area because of the pecuniary benefit and for negligence in the performance of which no statutory liability is
eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. imposed. This demurrer was sustained by the Superior Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff
sought to amend his complaint to allege that the celebration was for the corporate advantage of
FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL: the city. This was denied. In affirming the order, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
held inter alia:
I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is something I wanted to touch on by lack of
material time I could not but that is a very important point. When I was made Chairman I Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of purely public
wanted the Expo to be in Batangas because I am a Batangeño but President Ramos said Mr. Vice governmental duties, unless made liable by statute….
President the Central Luzon is suffering, suffering because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us
try to catalize [sic] economic recovery in that area by putting this Expo in Clark Field and so it A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of statute,
conducted a public Fourth of July celebration, including a display of fireworks, and sent up a At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be considered as
bomb intended to explode in the air, but which failed to explode until it reached the ground, and indispensable, for, if the other elements are present “it can make no difference,” says
then killed a spectator, was engaged in the performance of a governmental duty. (99 A.R. 51) PEARSON, C.J., “whether there be but one act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether
the office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or during good
This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented. behavior.”[25]
Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss.[26] There the
At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from [this] excerpt: Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States
Centennial Commission is an “office of trust” as to disqualify its holder as elector of the United
“July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a public holiday, called Independence States President and Vice-President. (Under Article II of the United States Constitution, a person
Day, by our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have similar statutes. While there is no holding an office of trust or profit under the United States is disqualified from being appointed an
United States statute making a similar provision, the different departments of the government elector.)
recognize, and have recognized since the government was established, July 4th as a national x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission holds an office of
holiday. Throughout the country it has been recognized and celebrated as such. These trust under the United States, and that he is therefore disqualified for the office of elector of
celebrations, calculated to entertain and instruct the people generally and to arouse and stimulate President and Vice-President of the United States.
patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently take the form of literary exercises consisting
of patriotic speeches and the reading of the Constitution, accompanied by a musical program The commission was created under a statute of the United States approved March 3, 1871. That
including patriotic air sometimes preceded by the firing of cannon and followed by statute provides for the holding of an exhibition of American and foreign arts, products, and
fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to the general public and their promotion a manufactures, “under the auspices of the government of the United States,” and for the
proper subject of legislation can hardly be questioned. x x x” constitution of a commission, to consist of more than one delegate from each State and from
Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebrations. The Centennial each Territory of the United States, “whose functions shall continue until close of the exhibition,”
Celebrations was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after centuries of struggle and “whose duty it shall be to prepare and superintend the execution of the plan for holding the
against our former colonial master, to memorialize the liberation of our people from oppression exhibition.” Under the statute the commissioners are appointed by the President of the United
by a foreign power. 1998 marked 100 years of independence and sovereignty as one united States, on the nomination of the governor of the States and Territories respectively. Various
nation. The Celebrations was an occasion to reflect upon our history and reinvigorate our duties were imposed upon the commission, and under the statute provision was to be made for it
patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a “vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of to have exclusive control of the exhibit before the President should announce, by proclamation,
Filipino identity,” an opportunity to “showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino the date and place of opening and holding the exhibition. By an act of Congress approved June
values.” The significance of the Celebrations could not have been lost on petitioner, who 1st, 1872, the duties and functions of the commission were further increased and defined. That
remarked during the hearing: act created a corporation, called “The Centennial Board of Finance,” to cooperate with the
Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, we wanted to rekindle the love commission and to raise and disburse the funds. It was to be organized under the direction of the
for freedom, love for country, that is the over-all goal that has to make everybody feel proud that commission. The seventh section of the act provides “that the grounds for exhibition shall be
he is a Filipino, proud of our history, proud of what our forefather did in their time. x x x. prepared and the buildings erected by the corporation, in accordance with plans which shall have
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as been adopted by the United States Centennial Commission; and the rules and regulations of said
its Chair, is a public officer. corporation, governing rates for entrance and admission fees, or otherwise affecting the rights,
privileges, or interests of the exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed and established by the
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little United States Centennial Commission; and no grant conferring rights or privileges of any
consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the description connected with said grounds or buildings, or relating to said exhibition or celebration,
position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the shall be made without the consent of the United States Centennial Commission, and said
office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary commission shall have power to control, change, or revoke all such grants, and shall appoint all
office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good.[23] Hence, the office of judges and examiners and award all premiums.” The tenth section of the act provides that “it shall
petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative be the duty of the United States Centennial Commission to supervise the closing up of the affairs
office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached.[24] But it of said corporation, to audit its accounts, and submit in a report to the President of the United
is a public office, nonetheless. States the financial results of the centennial exhibition.”

Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an “ad-hoc body” make It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that the duties and functions of the
said commission less of a public office. commission were various, delicate, and important; that they could be successfully performed only
The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position by men of large experience and knowledge of affairs; and that they were not merely subordinate
which is merely temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. “But,” says Chief and provisional, but in the highest degree authoritative, discretionary, and final in their
Justice Marshall, “if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the character. We think that persons performing such duties and exercising such functions, in
government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to perform, pursuance of statutory direction and authority, are not to be regarded as mere employees, agents,
who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining them, if those or committee men, but that they are, properly speaking, officers, and that the places which they
duties continue though the person be changed, -- it seems very difficult to distinguish such a hold are offices. It appears, moreover, that they were originally regarded as officers by Congress;
charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the duties from an officer.” for the act under which they were appointed declares, section 7, that “no compensation for
services shall be paid to the commissioners or other officers, provided for in this act, from the
treasury of the United States.” The only other officers provided for were the “alternates” Officer – as distinguished from “clerk” or “employee”, refers to a person whose duties not being
appointed to serve as commissioners when the commissioners were unable to attend. of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore, a functions of the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a
public office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a particular act or perform a particular person in the exercise of governmental power, “officer”
public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioner’s position includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that
as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the function.
NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
his powers and functions as NCC Chair.[27] Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a “public official”
whether or not one receives compensation, thus:
Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any compensation for his “Public Officials” include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act No. temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel,
3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.
Ombudsman. Which of these definitions should apply, if at all?

Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of said law, which reads: Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive, the term
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already “compensation,” which is not defined by said law, has many meanings.
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public Under particular circumstances, “compensation” has been held to include allowance for personal
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: expenses, commissions, expenses, fees, an honorarium, mileage or traveling expenses, payments
for services, restitution or a balancing of accounts, salary, and wages.[30]
xxx How then is “compensation,” as the term is used in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 3019, to be
interpreted?
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair? Granting that petitioner did not
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable receive any salary, the records do not reveal if he received any allowance, fee, honorarium, or
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government some other form of compensation. Notably, under the by-laws of Expocorp, the CEO is entitled
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. to per diems and compensation.[31] Would such fact bear any significance?
A “public officer,” under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. – As used in this Act, the term – Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle these issues lest we preempt the trial
court from resolving them.
xxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued in the Court’s
(b) “Public officer” includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or Resolution dated September 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED.
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph.
[Emphasis supplied.]
It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a “public officer” is expressly limited to
the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining the
Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters that are best
resolved at trial.

To illustrate, the use of the term “includes” in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not
restrictive.[28] The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define
“public officers.” Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public
officer is:
x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines, or
performs in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or
subordinate official, of any rank or class.
Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987,[29] on the other
hand, states:
EN BANC c. Accreditation of Agencies to take final action on appointments
under OPIA.
G.R. No. 116418, March 07, 1995 4. The Office for Central Personnel Records (OCPR) is renamed Management
Information Office (MIO).
5. The Information technology functions of OPM and the personnel assigned
SALVADOR C. FERNANDEZ AND ANICIA M. DE LIMA, PETITIONERS, VS. to the unit are transferred to MIO.
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, CHAIRMAN, AND HON. RAMON B. 6. The following functions of OPM and the personnel assigned to the unit
ERENETA, COMMISSIONER, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS. performing said functions are hereby transferred to the Office of the
Executive Director:
DECISION a. Financial Audit and Evaluation;
b. Internal Management and Improvement;
FELICIANO, J.: c. Research and Statistics; and
d. Planning and Programming.
7. The library service and its personnel under OCPR are transferred to the
In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for a Temporary
Central Administrative Office.
Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the validity of
8. The budget allocated for the various functions shall be transferred to the
Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission ("Commission") and the authority of the
Offices where the functions are transferred. Records, fixtures and equipment
Commission to issue the same.
that go with the functions shall be moved to where the functions are
transferred.
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit
("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel
Annex A contains the manning list for all the offices, except the OCES.
Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City,
Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710, signed by public
The changes in the organization and in operations shall take place before end of July 1994.
respondents Patricia A. Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner,
respectively, of the Commission, was issued on 7 June 1994.[1] Resolution No. 94-3710 needs to
Done in Quezon City, July 07, 1994.
be quoted in full:
(Signed)
Patricia A. Sto. Tomas
"RESOLUTION NO. 94-3710 Chairman

WHEREAS, Section 17 of Book V of Executive Order 292 provides that 'xxx as an independent (Signed) Did not participate
constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization as the need arises;’ Ramon P. Ereneta, Jr. Thelma P. Gaminde
Commissioner Commissioner
WHEREAS, the Commission finds it imperative to effect changes in the organization to
streamline its operations and improve delivery of public service; Attested by:

WHEREAS, the Commission finds it necessary to immediately effect changes in the organization (Signed)
of the Central Offices in view of the need to implement new programs in lieu of those functions Carmencita Giselle B. Dayson
which were transferred to the Regional Offices; Board Secretary V"[2]
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby RESOLVES to effect During the general assembly of officers and employees of the Commission held in the morning of
the following changes in its organization, specifically in the Central Offices: 28 July 1994, Chairman Sto. Tomas, when apprised of objections of petitioners, expressed the
determination of the Commission to implement Resolution No. 94-3710 unless restrained by
1. The OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], OPIA [Office of higher authority.
Personnel Inspection and Audit] and OPR [Office of Personnel Relations]
are merged to form the Research and Development Office (RDO). Petitioners then instituted this Petition. In a Resolution dated 23 August 1994, the Court required
2. The Office for Human Resource Development (OHRD) is renamed Human public respondents to file a Comment on the Petition. On 21 September 1994, petitioners filed an
Resource Development Office (HRDO). Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, alleging that petitioners had
3. The following functions and the personnel assigned to the unit performing received Office Orders from the Commission assigning petitioner Fernandez to Region V at
said functions are hereby transferred to HRDO: Legaspi City and petitioner de Lima to Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga and praying that
a. Administration of the Honor and Awards program under OCSS; public respondents be restrained from enforcing these Office Orders. The Court, in a Resolution
b. Registration and Accreditation of Unions under OPR; and dated 27 September 1994, granted this Motion and issued the Temporary Restraining Order
prayed for by petitioners.
The Commission filed its own Comment, dated 12 September 1994, on the Petition and then Service Regional Offices and government agencies in the implementation of their personnel
moved to lift the Temporary Restraining Order. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a programs and evaluation systems.
separate Comment dated 28 November 1994, defending the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710
and urging dismissal of the Petition. Petitioners filed separate Replies to these Comments. The (12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and assistance in the development and
Commission in turn filed a Rejoinder (denominated "Comment [on] the Reply"). implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations governing corporate officials and
employees in the areas of recruitment, examination, placement, career development, merit and
The principal issues raised in this Petition are the following: awards systems, position classification and compensation, performance appraisal, employee
welfare and benefits, discipline and other aspects of personnel management on the basis of
comparable industry practices.
(1) Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution
No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs — x x x
Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR
[Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development (14) The Office of Retirement Administration — x x x
Office]; and
(15) The Regional and Field Offices. — x x x" (Italics in the original)
(2) Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional right to
security of tenure. Immediately after the foregoing listing of offices of the Commission and their respective
functions, the 1987 Revised Administrative Code goes on to provide as follows:

I. "Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a Director
with at least one (1) Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary to carry out
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987) sets out, their respective functions. As an independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the
in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, the internal structure and organization of the organization as the need arises.
Commission in the following terms:
xxx xxx x x x"[3]
"Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission shall have the following offices:
(Italics supplied)
(1) The Office of the Executive Director — xxx
Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, and as
(2) The Merit System Protection Board — x x x well each of the other Offices listed in Section 16 above, consist of aggrupations of Divisions,
each of which Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections. Each Section, Division and Office
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs — x x x comprises a group of positions within the agency called the Civil Service Commission, each group
being entrusted with a more or less definable function or functions. These functions are related to
(4) The Office of Planning and Management — x x x one another, each of them being embraced by a common or general subject matter. Clearly, each
Office is an internal department or organizational unit within the Commission and that
(5) The Central Administrative Office — x x x accordingly, the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, as well as all the other Offices within the Commission
constitute administrative subdivisions of the CSC. Put a little differently, these offices relate to the
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records — xxx internal structure of the Commission.

(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation — x x x What did Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Commission do? Examination of Resolution No. 94-
3710 shows that thereby the Commission re-arranged some of the administrative units (i.e., Offices)
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement — x x x within the Commission and, among other things, merged three (3) of them (OCSS, OPIA and
OPR) to form a new grouping called the "Research and Development Office (RDO)." The same
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership and assistance in the Resolution renamed some of the Offices of the Commission, e.g., the Office for Human
formulation and evaluation of personnel systems and standards relative to performance appraisal, Resource Development (OHRD) was renamed Human Resource Development Office (HRDO);
merit promotion and employee incentive benefits and awards. the Office for Central Personnel Records (OCPR) was renamed Management Information Office
(MIO). The Commission also re-allocated certain functions moving some functions from one
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development — x x x Office to another; e.g., the information technology function of OPM (Office of Planning and
Management) was transferred to the newly named Management Information Office (MIO). This
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop policies, standards, rules and regulations re-allocation or re-assignment of some functions carried with it the transfer of the budget
for the effective conduct of inspection and audit of personnel and personnel management earmarked for such function to the office where the function was transferred. Moreover, the
programs and the exercise of delegated authority; provide technical and advisory services to Civil personnel, records, fixtures and equipment that were devoted to the carrying out of such
functions were moved to the Offices to where the functions were transferred. 3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of public employment between
the Commission and any of its officers and employees. We find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987
The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-3710 were described in Revised Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen (14) different "Offices" of the Civil
that Resolution in broad terms as "effect[ing] changes in the organization to streamline [the Service Commission, meant to freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal
Commission's] operations and improve delivery of service." These changes in internal organization of the Commission until it might please Congress to change such internal
organization were rendered necessary by, on the one hand, the decentralization and devolution of organization regardless of the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the
the Commission's functions effected by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional Offices and ninety- contrary, the legislative authority had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in
five (95) Field Offices of the Commission throughout the country, to the end that the the organization," "as the need [for such changes] arises."[7] Assuming, for purposes of argument
Commission and its staff may be brought closer physically to the government employees that they merely, that legislative authority was necessary to carry out the kinds of changes contemplated in
are mandated to serve. In the past, its functions had been centralized in the Head Office of the Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the Court is not saying that such authority is necessary), such
Commission in Metropolitan Manila and Civil Service employees all over the country were legislative authority was validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The
compelled to come to Manila for the carrying out of personnel transactions. Upon the other hand, legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are
the dispersal of the functions of the Commission to the Regional Offices and the Field Offices set out not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the Declaration of
attached to various governmental agencies throughout the country makes possible the Policies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code
implementation of new programs of the Commission at its Central Office in Metropolitan Manila. which required the Civil Service Commission

The Commission's Office Order assigning petitioner de Lima to the CSC Regional Office No. 3
"as the central personnel agency of the Government [to] establish a career service, adopt measures
was precipitated by the incumbent Regional Director filing an application for retirement, thus
to promote — efficiency — [and] responsiveness x x x in the civil service x x x and that personnel
generating a need to find a replacement for him. Petitioner de Lima was being assigned to that
functions shall be decentralized, delegating the corresponding authority to the departments, offices and agencies
Regional Office while the incumbent Regional Director was still there to facilitate her take over of
where such functions can be effectively performed." (Italics supplied)
the duties and functions of the incumbent Director. Petitioner de Lima's prior experience as a
labor lawyer was also a factor in her assignment to Regional Office No. 3 where public sector
II.
unions have been very active. Petitioner Fernandez's assignment to the CSC Regional Office No.
5 had, upon the other hand, been necessitated by the fact that the then incumbent Director in
We turn to the second claim of petitioners that their right to security of tenure was breached by
Region V was under investigation and needed to be transferred immediately to the Central Office.
the respondents in promulgating Resolution No. 94-3710 and ordering petitioners' assignment to
Petitioner Fernandez was deemed the most likely designee for Director of Regional Office No. 5
the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions III and V. Section 2(3) of Article IX (B) of the
considering that the functions previously assigned to him had been substantially devolved to the
1987 Constitution declares that "no officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or
Regional Offices such that his reassignment to a Regional Office would result in the least
suspended except for cause provided by law." Petitioners in effect contend that they were
disruption of the operations of the Central office.[4]
unlawfully removed from their positions in the OPIA and OPR by the implementation of
Resolution No. 94-3710 and that they cannot, without their consent, be moved out to the
It thus appears to the Court that the Commission was moved by quite legitimate considerations of
Regional Offices of the Commission.
administrative efficiency and convenience in promulgating and implementing its Resolution No.
94-3710 and in assigning petitioner Salvador C. Fernandez to the Regional Office of the
We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a
Commission in Region V in Legaspi City and petitioner Anicia M. de Lima to the Commission's
specified public office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks. Thus, a person
Regional Office in Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga. It is also clear to the Court that the
may be appointed to the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV
changes introduced and formalized through Resolution No. 94-3710 — re-naming of existing
or Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In the
Offices; re-arrangement of the groupings of Divisions and Sections composing particular Offices;
instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director IV, without specification of any
re-allocation of existing functions (and related personnel, budget, etc.) among the re-arranged
particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the other persons holding the same
Offices — are precisely the kind of internal changes which are referred to in Section 17 (Book V,
position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.
Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3) of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code), quoted above, as "changes
in the organization" of the Commission.
Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code recognizes
reassignment as a management prerogative vested in the Commission and, for that matter, in any
Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of public offices,
department or agency of government embraced in the civil service:
something which may be done only by the same legislative authority which had created those
public offices in the first place.
"Sec. 26. Personnel Actions. — x x x
The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept this argument. The term "public xxx xxx xxx
office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by As used in this Title, any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in the civil
which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be certification, promotion, transfer, re-instatement, re-employment, detail, reassignment, demotion,
exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public.[5] We consider that Resolution No. 94- and separation. All personnel actions shall be in accordance with such rules, standards, and regulations as may
3710 has not abolished any public office as that term is used in the law of public officers.[6] It is be promulgated by the Commission.
essential to note that none of the "changes in organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94- xxx xxx xxx
(7) Reassignment. An employee may be re-assigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency; The appointment of Navarro as principal does not refer to any particular station or school. As such, she could
Provided, That such re-assignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status and salary." (Italics be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific school. (Bongbong v.
supplied) Parado, 57 SCRA 623) When she was assigned to the Carlos Albert High School, it could not
have been with the intention to let her stay in said school permanently. Otherwise, her
It follows that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their previous appointment would have so stated. Consequently, she may be assigned to any station or school in Quezon
positions in OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research and Development Office (RDO) in the City as the exigencies of public service require even without her consent. As this Court ruled in Brillantes v.
Central Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their subsequent assignment from Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138, 143 —
the RDO to the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions V and III had been effected with
express statutory authority and did not constitute removals without lawful cause. It also follows
'Plaintiff's confident stride falters. She took too loose a view of the applicable jurisprudence. Her
that such re-assignment did not involve any violation of the constitutional right of petitioners to
refuge behind the mantle of security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution is not impenetrable. She proceeds
security of tenure considering that they retained their positions of Director IV and would
upon the assumption that she occupies her station in Sinalang Elementary School by
continue to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their new assigned stations which they had
appointment. But her first appointment as Principal merely reads thus: "You are hereby appointed
enjoyed at the Head Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners had not, in
a Principal (Elementary School) in the Bureau of Public Schools, Department of
other words, acquired a vested right to serve at the Commission's Head Office.
Education", without mentioning her station. She cannot therefore claim security of tenure as Principal of Sinalang
Elementary School or any particular station. She may be assigned to any station as exigency of public service
Secondly, the above conclusion is compelled not only by the statutory provisions relevant in the
requires, even without her consent. She thus has no right of choice.'"[9] (Italics supplied; citation omitted)
instant case, but also by a long line of cases decided by this Court in respect of different agencies
or offices of government.
In the very recent case of Fernando, et al. v. Hon. Sto. Tomas, etc., et al.,[10] the Court addressed
appointments of petitioners as "Mediators-Arbiters in the National Capital Region" in dismissing
In one of the more recent of these cases, Department of Education Culture and Sports, etc., et al. v. Court
a challenge on certiorari to resolutions of the CSC and orders of the Secretary of Labor. The
of Appeals, et al.,[8] this Court held that a person who had been appointed as "Secondary School
Court said:
Principal II" in the Division of City Schools, District II, Quezon City, National Capital Region,
and who had been stationed as High School Principal in the Carlos Albert High School in
Quezon City for a number of years, could lawfully be reassigned or transferred to the Manuel "Petitioners were appointed as Mediator Arbiters in the National Capital Region. They were not,
Roxas High School, also in Quezon City, without demotion in rank or diminution of salary. This however, appointed to a specific station or particular unit of the Department of Labor in the National Capital
Court held: Region (DOLE-NCR). Consequently, they can always be reassigned from one organizational unit to another of
the same agencywhere, in the opinion of respondent Secretary, their services may be used more
effectively. As such they can neither claim a vested right to the station to which they were assigned nor to security
"The aforequoted provision of Republic Act No. 4670 particularly Section 6 thereof which
of tenure thereat. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, petitioners' reassignnment is not a
provides that except for cause and in the exigencies of the service no teacher shall be transferred
transfer for they were not removed from their position as med-arbiters. They were not given new
without his consent from one station to another, finds no application in the case at bar as this is
appointments to new positions. It indubitably follows, therefore, that Memorandum Order No. 4
predicated upon the theory that the teacher concerned is appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station.
ordering their reassignment in the interest of the service is legally in order."[11] (Italics supplied)
Thus:
In Quisumbing v. Gumban,[12] the Court, dealing with an appointment in the Bureau of Public
'The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far as the appointment indicates a specification. Otherwise, the Schools of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, ruled as follows:
constitutionally ordained security of tenure cannot shield her. In appointments of this nature, this Court has
consistently rejected the officer's demand to remain — even as public service dictates that a
"After a careful scrutiny of the records, it is to be underscored that the appointment of private
transfer be made — in a particular station. Judicial attitude toward transfers of this nature is
respondent Yap is simply that of a District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools which does not indicate a
expressed in the following statement in Ibañez, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. (G.R.
specific station ( Rollo, p. 13). As such, she could be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay
No. L-26558, April 27, 1967; 19 SCRA 1002 [1967]); :
permanently at any specific station (Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA 623 [1974]; Department of
Education, Culture and Sports v. Court of Appeals [G.R. 81032, March 22, 1990] citing
"That security of tenure is an essential and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our Civil Service Brillantes v. Guevarra [27 SCRA 138 [1969])."[13]
System, is not open to debate. The mantle of its protection extends not only against removals
without cause but also against unconsented transfer which, as repeatedly enunciated, are Again, in Ibañez v. Commission on Elections,[14] the Court had before it petitioners' appointments as
tantamount to removals which are within the ambit of the fundamental guarantee. However, the "Election Registrars in the Commission of Elections," without any intimation to what city,
availability of that security of tenure necessarily depends, in the first instance, upon the nature of the municipality or municipal district they had been appointed as such.[15] The Court held that since
appointment (Hojilla vs. Marino, 121 Phil. 280 [1965].) Such that the rule which proscribes transfers petitioners "were not appointed to, and consequently not entitled to any security of tenure or
without consent as anathema to the security of tenure is predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is permanence in, any specific station," "on general principles, they [could] be transferred as the
appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station (Miclat v. Ganaden, et al., 108 Phil. 439 [1960]; exigencies of the service required," and that they had no right to complain against any change in
Jaro v. Hon. Valencia, et al., 118 Phil. 728 [1963])." [Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138 (1969)] assignment. The Court further held that assignment to a particular station after issuance of the
appointment was not necessary to complete such appointment:
"x x x. We cannot subscribe to the theory that an assignment to a particular station, in the light of the terms of the transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically
appointments in question, was necessary to complete the said appointments. The approval thereof by the reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. The use of
Commissioner of Civil Service gave those appointments the stamp of finality. With the view that the approved techniques or methods in personnel management to harness the abilities of employees to promote optimum
respondent Commission then took of its power in the premises and the demand of the mission it public service cannot be objected to. x x x
set out to accomplish with the appointments it extended, said appointments were definitely meant
to be complete as then issued. The subsequent assignment of the appointees thereunder that the said 5. The next point of inquiry is whether or not Administrative Order 77 would stand the test of
respondent Commission held in reserve to be exercised as the needs of each locality justified did validity vis-a-vis the principles just enunciated.
not in any way detract from the perfection attained by the appointments beforehand. And the
respective appointees were entitled only to such security of tenure as the appointment papers
xxx xxx xxx
concerned actually conferred — not in that of any place to which they may have been
subsequently assigned. x x x As things stand, in default of any particular station stated in their respective
To be stressed at this point, however, is that the appointment of Sta. Maria is that of 'Dean, College
appointments, no security of tenure can be asserted by the petitioners on the basis of the mere assignments which were
of Education, University of the Philippines.' He is not merely a dean 'in the university.' His appointment is to a
given to them. A contrary rule will erase altogether the demarcation line we have repeatedly drawn
specific position; and, more importantly, to a specific station."[21] (Citations omitted; emphases supplied)
between appointment and assignment as two distinct concepts in the law of public officers."[16] (Italics
supplied)
For all the foregoing, we conclude that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima
from their stations in the OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research Development Office
The petitioner, in Miclat v. Ganaden,[17]had been appointed as a "Welfare Office Incharge, Division
(RDO) and from the RDO to the Commissions' Regional Offices in Regions V and III,
of Urban, Rural and Community Administration, Social Welfare Administration." She was
respectively, without their consent, did not constitute a violation of their constitutional right to
assigned as Social Welfare Incharge of the Mountain Province, by an office order of the
security of tenure.
Administrator, Social Welfare Administration. After a little more than a year, petitioner was
assigned elsewhere and respondent Ganaden transferred to petitioner's first station in Baguio City.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Writ of
The Court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to remain in her first station. In Jaro v. Hon.
Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary
Valencia, et al.,[18] petitioner Dr. Jaro had been appointed "Physician in the Municipal Maternity
Restraining Order issued by this Court on 27 September 1994 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against
and Charity Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals." He was first assigned to the Municipal Maternity and
petitioners.
Charity Clinics in Batulati, Davao, and later to the corresponding clinic in Saug, Davao and then
to Catil, Davao. He was later assigned to the Municipality of Padada, also of Davao Province. He
resisted his last assignment and brought mandamus against the Secretary of Health to compel the
latter to return him to his station in Catil, Davao as Municipal Health Officer thereof. The Court,
applying Miclat v. Ganaden, dismissed this Petition holding that his appointment not being to any
specific station but as a physician in the Municipal Maternity and Charity Clinics, Bureau of
Hospitals, he could be transferred or assigned to any station where, in the opinion of the Secretary
of Health, his services may be utilized more effectively.[19]

Also noteworthy is Sta. Maria v. Lopez[20] which involved the appointment of petitioner Sta. Maria
as "Dean, College of Education, University of the Philippines." Dean Sta. Maria was transferred
by the President of the University of the Philippines to the Office of the President, U.P., without
demotion in rank or salary, thereby acceding to the demands of student activists who were
boycotting their classes in the U.P. College of Education. Dean Sta. Maria assailed his transfer as
an illegal and unconstitutional removal from office. In upholding Dean Sta. Maria's claim, the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, laid down the applicable doctrine in the following
terms:

"4. Concededly, transfers there are which do not amount to removal. Some such transfers can be effected without
the need for charges being preferred, without trial or hearing, and even without the consent of the employee.

The clue to such transfers may be found in the 'nature of the appointment.' Where the appointment does not indicate
a specific station, an employee may be transferred or reassigned provided the transfer affects no substantial change in
title, rank and salary. Thus, one who is appointed 'principal in the Bureau of Public Schools' and is
designated to head a pilot school may be transferred to the post of principal of another school.

And the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer
who is appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station. Such a rule does not proscribe a
G.R. No. 23226, March 04, 1925 Shortly after Segovia's appointment, however, the law was again amended by Act No. 1627 by
providing that "all justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall hold office during
VICENTE SEGOVIA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO NOEL, good behavior and those now in office shall so continue." Later amended by Acts Nos. 2041 and
RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT. 2617, the law was ultimately codified in sections 203 and 206 of the Administrative Code.

DECISION Codal section 203 in its first paragraph provides that "one justice of the peace and one auxiliary
justice of the peace shall be appointed by the Governor-General for the City of Manila, the City
MALCOLM, J.: of Baguio, and for each municipality, township, and municipal district in the Philippine Islands,
and if the public interests shall so require, for any other minor political division or unorganized
territory in said Islands." It was this section which section 1 of Act No. 3107 amended by adding
The question to be decided on this appeal is whether that portion of Act No. 3107 which at the end thereof the following proviso: "Provided, That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace
provides, that justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years." But section 206 of
until they have reached the age of sixty-five years, should be given retroactive or prospective the Administrative Code entitled "Tenure of office," and reading "a justice of the peace having the
effect. requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless his office be lawfully
abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice," was left unchanged by Act No.
Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of Dumanjug, Cebu, on January 21, 1907. He 3107.
continuously occupied this position until having passed sixty-five milestones, he was ordered by
the Secretary of Justice on July 1, 1924, to vacate the office. Since that date, Pedro Noel, the A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never
auxiliary justice of the peace has acted as justice of the peace for the municipality of Dumanjug. retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express
terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Following the lead of the United States Supreme
Mr. Segovia being desirous of avoiding a public scandal and of opposing physical resistance to the Court and putting the rule more strongly, a statute ought not to receive a construction making it
occupancy of the office of justice of the peace by the auxiliary justice of the peace, instituted act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning
friendly quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to inquire into the right can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied.
of Pedro Noel to occupy the office of justice of the peace, to oust the latter therefrom, and to No court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. As our Civil
procure reinstatement as justice of the peace of Dumanjug. To this complaint, Pedro Noel Code has it in article 3, "Law shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise
interposed a demurrer on the ground that it did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of provided." (Farrel vs. Pingree [1888], 5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac, 843; Greer vs. City of Asheville [1894],
action, because Act No. 3107 was constitutional and because Mr. Segovia being sixty-five years 114 N. C, 495; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. vs. Struthers Wells Co. [1907], 209 U. S.,
old had automatically ceased to be justice of the peace. On the issue thus framed and on 306; Montilla vs. Agustinian Corporation [1913], 24 Phil., 220; In re will of Riosa [1918], 39 Phil.,
stipulated facts, judgment was rendered by Honorable Adolph Wislizenus, Judge of First Instance, 23.)
overruling the demurrer, and in favor of petitioner and against respondent.
The same rule is followed by the courts with reference to public offices. A well-known New York
Proceeding by way of elimination so as to resolve the case into its simplest factors, it will first be decision held that "though there is no vested right in an office, which may not be disturbed by
noted that the petitioner abandons the untenable position, assumed by him in one portion of his legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right is to be taken away
complaint, to the effect that section 1 of Act No. 3107 is unconstitutional in that it impairs the by statute, the terms should be clear in which the purpose is stated." (People ex rel.
contractual right of the petitioner to an office. It is a fundamental principle that a public office Ryan vs. Green [1874], 58 N. Y., 295.) In another case, a new constitutional provision as to the
cannot be regarded as the property of the incumbent, and that a public office is not a contract. advanced age which should prevent the incumbents of certain judicial offices from retaining them
was held prospective; it did not apply to persons in office at the time of its taking effect.
(People vs. Gardner, 59 Barb., 198; II Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, Chap. XVII,
It will next be noted that, while the respondent as appellant assigns three errors in this court, the
particularly pages 1161, 1162; Mechem on Public Officers, sec. 389.)
first two relating to preliminary matters are ultimately renounced by him in order that there may
be an authoritative decision on the main issue. The third error specified and argued with ability by
the provincial fiscal of Cebu, is that the trial judge erred in declaring that the limitation regarding The case at bar is not the same as the case of Chanco vs. Imperial ([1916], 34 Phil., 329). In that
the age of justices of the peace provided by section 1 of Act No. 3107 is not applicable to justices case, the question was as to the validity of section 7 of Act No. 2347. The law under consideration
of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed and acting before said law went into not only provided that Judges of First Instance shall serve until they have reached the age of sixty-
effect. five years, but it further provided "that the present judges of Courts of First Instance * * * vacate
their positions on the taking effect of this Act: and the Governor-General, with the advice and
consent of the Philippine Commission, shall make new appointments of judges of Courts of First
Coming now to the law, we find on investigation the original provision pertinent to the
Instance * * *." There, the intention of the Legislature to vacate the office was clearly expressed.
appointment and term of office of justices of the peace, in section 67 of Act No. 136, wherein it
Here, it is not expressed at all.
was provided that justices of the peace shall hold office during the pleasure of the Commission.
Act No. 1450, in force when Vicente Segovia was originally appointed justice of the peace,
amended section 67 of the Judiciary Law by making the term of office of justices and auxiliary The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section 203 of the Administrative Code, gives no
justices of the peace two years from the first Monday in January nearest the date of appointment. indication of retroactive effect. The law signifies no purpose of operating upon existing rights. A
proviso was merely tacked on to section 203 of the Administrative Code, while leaving intact
section 206 of the same Code which permits justices of the peace to hold office during good
behavior. In the absence of provisions expressly making the law applicable to justices of the peace
then in office, and in the absence of provisions impliedly indicative of such legislative intent, the
courts would not be justified in giving the law an interpretation which would legislate faithful
public servants out of office.

Answering the question with which we began our decision, we hold that the proviso added to
section 203 of the Administrative Code by section 1 of Act No. 3107, providing that justices and
auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-
five years, should be given prospective effect only, and so is not applicable to justices of the peace
and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed before Act No. 3107 went into force. Consequently,
it results that the decision of the trial court is correct in its findings of fact and law and in its
disposition of the case.

Judgment affirmed, without costs. It is so ordered.

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi