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LUDO VS.

SAORNIDO (VA AWARDED NOT CLAIMED IN THE SUBMISSION AGREEMENT)


• LUDO engaged the arrastre services of Cresencio Lu Arrastre Services (CLAS) for the loading and unloading of its
finished products at the wharf.
• Accordingly, several arrastre workers were deployed by CLAS to perform the services needed by LUDO.
• These arrastre workers were subsequently hired, on different dates, as regular rank-and-file employees of LUDO
every time the latter needed additional manpower services.
• Said employees joined respondent union, the LUDO Employees Union (LEU), which acted as the exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.
• respondent union entered into a CBA with LUDO which provides certain benefits to the employees, the amount of
which vary according to the length of service rendered by the availing employee.
• the union requested LUDO to include in its members’ period of service the time during which they rendered arrastre
services to LUDO through the CLAS so that they could get higher benefits. LUDO failed to act on the request. Thus,
the matter was submitted for voluntary arbitration.
• The parties accordingly executed a submission agreement raising the sole issue of the date of regularization of the
workers for resolution by the Voluntary Arbitrator.
• the Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that: (1) the respondent employees were engaged in activities necessary and desirable
to the business of petitioner, and (2) CLAS is a labor-only contractor of petitioner; (3) the said complainants, being
entitled to the CBA benefits during the regular employment, are awarded a) sick leave, b) vacation leave & c) annual
wage and salary increases during such period in the amount of (P5,707,261.61);
Issue: whether or not a voluntary arbitrator can award benefits not claimed in the submission agreement?
• In construing the above provisions, we held in San Jose vs. NLRC, 9 that the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
and the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over the cases enumerated in the Labor
Code, Articles 217, 261 and 262, can possibly include money claims in one form or another.10
• compulsory arbitration has been defined both as "the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government
agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties, and as a
mode of arbitration where the parties are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a
third party (emphasis supplied)."12 While a voluntary arbitrator is not part of the governmental unit or labor
department’s personnel, said arbitrator renders arbitration services provided for under labor laws.
• Generally, the arbitrator is expected to decide only those questions expressly delineated by the submission
agreement. Nevertheless, the arbitrator can assume that he has the necessary power to make a final settlement since
arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes.13
• The succinct reasoning enunciated by the CA in support of its holding, that the Voluntary Arbitrator in a labor
controversy has jurisdiction to render the questioned arbitral awards:
o By the same token, the issue of regularization should be viewed as two-tiered issue. While the submission
agreement mentioned only the determination of the date or regularization, law and jurisprudence give the
voluntary arbitrator enough leeway of authority as well as adequate prerogative to accomplish the reason
for which the law on voluntary arbitration was created – speedy labor justice. It bears stressing that the
underlying reason why this case arose is to settle, once and for all, the ultimate question of whether
respondent employees are entitled to higher benefits. To require them to file another action for payment of
such benefits would certainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene the constitutional mandate
providing full protection to labor.14
VIVERO VS. CA (sea-man ; illegal termination case O&E jurisdiction of LA not VA; parties did not agree)
• Petitioner Vivero, a licensed seaman, is a member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's Union of the
Philippines (AMOSUP).
• by AMOSUP and private respondents entered into a CBA.
• Petitioner was hired by respondent as Chief Officer of the vessel "M.V. Sunny Prince"
• On grounds of very poor performance and conduct, refusal to perform his job, refusal to report to the Captain or the
vessel’s Engineers or cooperate with other ship officers about the problem in cleaning the cargo holds or of the shipping
pump and his dismal relations with the Captain of the vessel, complainant was repatriated on 15 July 1994.
• complainant filed a complaint for illegal dismissal at (AMOSUP) of which complainant was a member. P
• ursuant to Article XII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, grievance proceedings were conducted; however, parties
failed to reach and settle the dispute amicably,
• thus, complainant filed [a] complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).[2]
• The law in force at the time petitioner filed his Complaint with the POEA was EO No. 247.[3]
• Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case considering
petitioner Vivero's failure to refer it to a Voluntary Arbitration Committee in accordance with the CBA between the
parties.
• Upon the enactment of RA 8042, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the case was transferred to
the Adjudication Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission.
• Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor Jr., on the basis of the pleadings and documents available on record, rendered a
decision dismissing the Complaint for want of jurisdiction.
o , since the CBA of the parties provided for the referral to a VA should the Grievance Committee fail to settle the
dispute, and considering the mandate of Art. 261 of the Labor Code on the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
VA, the LA clearly had no jurisdiction over the case.[5]
• the NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that the record was clear that petitioner had
exhausted his remedy by submitting his case to the Grievance Committee of AMOSUP.
o the CBA providing for the intercession of a Voluntary Arbitrator was not binding upon petitioner since both
petitioner and private respondents had to agree voluntarily to submit the case before a Voluntary Arbitrator or
Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators.
• Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondents. It held that the CBA "is the law between the parties and
compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law."
Issue: whether or not NLRC is deprived of jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases whenever a CBA provides for
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration proceedings? No
• On the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters, Art. 217 of the Labor Code provides - (2) Termination
disputes; xx; (4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee
relations.
• However, any or all of these cases may, by agreement of the parties, be submitted to a Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators for adjudication.
• Private respondents attempt to justify the conferment of jurisdiction over the case on the Voluntary Arbitrator on the
ground that the issue involves the proper interpretation and implementation of the Grievance Procedure found in the
CBA.
• The argument is untenable. The case is primarily a termination dispute. It is clear from the claim/assistance request form
submitted by petitioner to AMOSUP that he was challenging the legality of his dismissal for lack of cause and lack of
due process. The issue of whether there was proper interpretation and implementation of the CBA provisions comes into
play only because the grievance procedure provided for in the CBA was not observed after he sought his Union’s
assistance in contesting his termination. Thus, the question to be resolved necessarily springs from the primary issue of
whether there was a valid termination; without this, then there would be no reason to invoke the need to interpret and
implement the CBA provisions properly.
• this Court held that the phrase "all other labor disputes" may include termination disputes provided that the agreement
between the Union and the Company states "in unequivocal language that [the parties] conform to the submission of
termination disputes and unfair labor practices to voluntary arbitration."[22] Ergo, it is not sufficient to merely say that
parties to the CBA agree on the principle that "all disputes" should first be submitted to a Voluntary Arbitrator. There is
a need for an express stipulation in the CBA that illegal termination disputes should be resolved by a Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, since the same fall within a special class of disputes that are generally
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters by express provision of law. Absent such express stipulation,
the phrase "all disputes" should be construed as limited to the areas of conflict traditionally within the jurisdiction of
Voluntary Arbitrators, i.e., disputes relating to contract-interpretation, contract-implementation, or interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies. Illegal termination disputes - not falling within any of these categories -
should then be considered as a special area of interest governed by a specific provision of law.
• A perusal of the CBA provisions shows that Sec. 6, Art. XII (Grievance Procedure) of the CBA is the general agreement
of the parties to refer grievances, disputes or misunderstandings to a grievance committee, and henceforth, to a voluntary
arbitration committee.
• The use of the word "may" shows the intention of the parties to reserve the right to submit the illegal termination dispute
to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, rather than to a Voluntary Arbitrator. Petitioner validly exercised his option to
submit his case to a Labor Arbiter when he filed his Complaint before the proper government agency.
• In other words, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Voluntary Arbitration is mandatory in character if there is
a specific agreement between the parties to that effect. It must be stressed however that, in the case at bar, the use of the
word "may" shows the intention of the parties to reserve the right of recourse to Labor Arbiters.
• It may be observed that under Policy Instruction No. 56 of the Secretary of Labor, dated 6 April 1993, "Clarifying the
Jurisdiction Between Voluntary Arbitrators and Labor Arbiters Over Termination Cases and Providing Guidelines for
the Referral of Said Cases Originally Filed with the NLRC to the NCMB," xxxAs earlier stated, the instant case is a
termination dispute falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, and does not specifically
involve the application, implementation or enforcement of company personnel policies contemplated in Policy
Instruction No. 56. Consequently, Policy Instruction No. 56 does not apply in the case at bar. In any case, private
respondents never invoked the application of Policy Instruction No. 56 in their Position Papers, neither did they raise the
question in their Motion to Dismiss which they filed nine (9) months after the filing of their Position Papers.

NAVARRO III VS. PAMASCO (Petitioner tried to rape co-worker)


• Petitioner was employed as typist of private respondent.
• petitioner went to visit Mercy Baylas, a co-employee, at the ladies' dormitory inside the compound of private
respondent.
• Upon seeing petitioner, Baylas hid behind the divider at the reception room.
• Rosemarie Basa and Isabel Beleno, co-boarders of Baylas, told petitioner that Baylas was not at the dormitory and
advised him to stop courting her because she had no feelings towards him.
• the two left leaving petitioner alone in the room. When he peeped behind the divider, he saw Baylas, who stood up
without answering his greetings and ran towards her room.
• He followed, and after taking hold of her left hand, pulled her towards him. The force caused her to fall on the floor.
He then placed himself on top of her. She resisted and futilely struggled to free herself from his grasp.
• Sonia Armada, upon hearing Baylas shout tried to separate petitioner from Baylas but to no avail. So she went
outside and asked Basa and Beleno to help Baylas. She also asked the help of Edmundo Subong.
• Basa and Beleno tried to pull petitioner away from Baylas, but it was Subong who was able to free Baylas from
petitioner.
• petitioner was informed of the complaint against him and was placed under preventive suspension.
• Nolito S. Densing, Jr. was instructed to investigate the incident. Densing recommended that the maximum penalty
be meted out against petitioner.
• petitioner was dismissed from the service for having violated paragraph 3.B (Conduct and Behavior) of the Code of
Employee Discipline, which provides:
o 1. Inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily injury, in any form, on fellow employee, with a penalty of
dismissal.
o 2. Immoral conduct within company premises, regardless of whether or not committed during working
time, punishable by reprimand to dismissal, depending on the prejudice caused by such act to the company.
o 3. Improper conduct and acts of gross discourtesy or disrespect to fellow employees at any time within the
company premises punishable by reprimand to dismissal, depending on the gravity of the offense.
o 4. Knowingly giving false or untruthful statements or concealing material facts in an investigation
conducted by authorized representative of the company, punishable by dismissal
• the President of the Mindanao Sugar Workers Union, for and in behalf of petitioner, and Jaime J. Javier, Personnel
Officer of private respondent, agreed to submit the case of petitioner to voluntary arbitration.
• a decision was rendered by the Voluntary Arbitrator dismissing petitioner from his employment and holding that
private respondent did not violate the provisions of the grievance procedure under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
ISSUE:Won the grievance procedure provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement was not followed; hence,
the Voluntary Arbitrator exceeded his authority when he took cognizance of the labor case? NO
HELD: AFFIRMED.
• Section 2, Article X of the Collective Bargaining Agreement specifies the instances when the grievance machinery
may be availed of, thus:
 Any protest or misunderstanding concerning any ruling, practice or working conditions in the
Company, or any dispute arising as to the meaning, application or claim of violation of any
provision of this Agreement or any complaint that any employee may have against the
COMPANY shall constitute a grievance
• The instant case is not a grievance that must be submitted to the grievance machinery. What are subject of the
grievance procedure for adjustment and resolution are grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation
of the collective bargaining agreement.
• The acts of petitioner involved a violation of the Code of Employee Discipline, particularly the provision penalizing
the immoral conduct of employees. Consequently, there was no justification for petitioner to invoke the grievance
machinery provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
• The case of petitioner was submitted to voluntary arbitration by agreement of the president of the labor union to
which petitioner belongs, and his employer, through its personnel officer. Petitioner himself voluntarily submitted to
the jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator when he, through his counsel, filed his position paper with the Voluntary
Arbitrator and even submitted additional documentary evidence. In addition thereto, during the initial conference on
March 27, 1991, the parties manifested that they were not questioning the authority of the Voluntary Arbitrator.
• Petitioner claims that he was denied due process of law because no hearing was held and he was not given an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.
 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.
 A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are
satisfied where the parties are fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing. . . .

• Concerning the allegation that petitioner was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses, the record shows that the
parties had agreed not to cross-examine their witnesses anymore.
• The harassment of an employee by a co-employee within the company premises even after office hours is a work-
related matter considering that the peace of the company is thereby affected. The Code of Employee Discipline is
very clear that immoral conduct "within the company premises regardless of whether or not [it is] committed during
working time" is punishable.

LANDTEX VS.CA

• Landtex, a sole proprietorship owned by Alex Go and managed by William Go, is a business enterprise engaged in the
manufacture of garments.
• Ayson worked in Landtex as a knitting operator
• He was an officer of Landtex Industries Workers Union – Federation of Free Workers (union) which had an existing
(CBA) with Landtex.
• Ayson received a letter from Landtex which stated that Ayson committed acts contrary to company policies.
• The letter required Ayson to explain in writing within 24 hours from receipt why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him for spreading damaging rumors about the personal life of an unspecified person, and for having an
altercation with one of the company’s owners when he was asked to submit an ID picture.

• Ayson replied in writing that he could not defend himself from the charge of spreading damaging rumors
because Landtex’s letter failed to state what rumors he was supposed to have spread. Ayson further explained that he
merely replied in a loud voice to the company owner’s request because he was carrying textiles. Ayson then apologized
for his actions.
• Landtex decided to conduct an investigation in view of Ayson’s denials.
• In the first meeting , Ayson was informed that there were witnesses who could testify that he spread rumors about the
personal life of William Go and his family.
• Ayson denied that he spread rumors and requested for another meeting so that he could hear the alleged witnesses and
defend himself. Ayson further requested that the next investigation be held at Landtex’s Mauban office because he and
the union officers accompanying him suffer salary deductions for their attendance of investigations during office hours.
Another meeting was scheduled, but Ayson was unable to attend it and went home early because he allegedly needed to
look after his child. 2nd meeting took place.
• In a letter, Landtex terminated Ayson’s services effective 30 June 1996 because of Ayson’s lack of cooperation during
the investigations. Despite this notice, Ayson still reported for work until 6 July 1996.
• the union president requested Landtex for a formal dialogue regarding Ayson’s case.
• Landtex reaffirmed its decision to terminate Ayson in meetings with the union. Landtex and the union agreed to refer
the matter to a third party in accordance with the provisions of law and of the CBA. Landtex expected Ayson to refer the
issue to the (NCMB) for the selection of a voluntary arbitrator. Ayson and the union, however, filed a complaint before
the labor arbiter.
• LA ruled in favor of Ayson. NLRC reversed case falls under VA
o Landtex merely imposed a disciplinary measure when it terminated Ayson’s employment.
o CA sustained the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and modified the award in favor of Ayson.

Held: affirmed.
The Labor Arbiter’s Jurisdiction

• Petitioner alleged thatAyson’s termination merely enforced Landtex’s personnel policy against misconduct. They
further claim that the union’s request for a formal dialogue signified the initiation of the grievance procedure
outlined in the CBA. Landtex and William Go even assert that because of Ayson’s failure to submit his claim
before the NCMB, he is barred from seeking relief from a forum other than that provided in the CBA.
• We agree with Ayson and the union and affirm the rulings of the labor arbiter and the appellate court.

o Article 261 of the Labor Code provides that voluntary arbitrators shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies. On the other hand, a reading of Article 217 in conjunction with Article 262
shows that termination disputes fall under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter unless the union and the
company agree that termination disputes should be submitted to voluntary arbitration. Such agreement
should be clear and unequivocal. Existing law is an intrinsic part of a valid contract without need for the
parties to expressly refer to it. Thus, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over unfair
labor practices, termination disputes, and claims for damages cannot be arrogated into the
powers of voluntary arbitrators in the absence of an express agreement between the union and the
company.
• In the present case, the CBA between Landtex and the union does not clearly state that termination disputes, as
opposed to mere disciplinary actions, are covered by the CBA. The CBA defined a grievance as “one that arises
from the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement, including disciplinary action imposed on any covered
employee.” The CBA did not explicitly state that termination disputes should be submitted to the grievance
machinery.
• We find nothing in the records which shows that the meetings between the union and Landtex already constitute the
grievance machinery as mandated by the CBA. The meetings happened only after
the effectivityof Ayson’s termination. The meetings did not comply with the requisite number of participants. The
CBA mandated that there should be three representatives each from the union and Landtex but there were seven
union members and two Landtex representatives who attended the meetings. More importantly, there was nothing in
the minutes that shows that the attendees constituted a Management-Employee Committee.
• Finally, the appellate court is correct in stating that if Landtex really believed that the labor arbiter did not have
jurisdiction over the present case, then Landtex should have filed a motion to dismiss. Instead of filing a motion to
dismiss, Landtex participated in the proceedings before the labor arbiter. Had Landtex immediately filed a motion
to dismiss, the labor arbiter would have determined the issue outright before proceeding with hearing the case. In
the present case, Landtex raised the issue of jurisdiction only after the labor arbiter required the parties to submit
their position papers.

Validity of Ayson’s Dismissal

• The requisites for a valid dismissal are (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in Article 282 of the
Labor Code, and (2) the opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself.
• Upon reading the records of the case, we cannot deduce any proof of Landtex and William Go’s accusations
againstAyson. Moreover, the NLRC did not make any pronouncement as to whether Ayson was dismissed for a just
cause. The appellate court and the labor arbiter were one in ruling that there was no just cause
in Ayson’sdismissal.
• We quote the labor arbiter’s factual findings with approval:

 We have painstakingly read the records of this case and, sadly, this Office finds no shred of evidence to
show that indeed [Ayson] had been spreading “news and gossips” or that he ever shouted at Mr. Go and engaged
Mr. Go in a heated argument.
 No affidavit of either the security guard who claimed to be one of the drinking group who heard the alleged
malicious news or gossips or that of Mr. and Mrs. Go who had been the subject of [Ayson’s] alleged shouting has
been presented if only to substantiate [Landtex and William Go’s] self-serving claims.

o Procedural due process in the dismissal of employees requires notice and hearing. The employer must
furnish the employee two written notices before termination may be effected. The first notice apprises
the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, while the second
notice informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. In the present
case, Landtex more than complied with the two-notice rule.

• The requirement of a hearing, on the other hand, is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard,
and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted. In the present case, Landtexscheduled three meetings
before terminating Ayson. However, Landtex failed to understand the law’s purpose in requiring the opportunity to
be heard. Landtex scheduled meetings with Ayson but these meetings were not free from
arbitrariness. Ayson could not adequately defend himself from Landtex’s and William Go’s accusations. No
witness was ever presented against Ayson, hence Ayson could not test the veracity of their claims.

• Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of the employer are not sufficient to justify an employee’s
dismissal. The employer must prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which the accusations are
made.[39]
• we ruled that the mere conduct of an investigation and the statements of the company’s security guard are not
enough to establish the validity of the charge of wrongdoing against the dismissed employees. It is not enough for
an employer who wishes to dismiss an employee to charge him with wrongdoing. The validity of the charge must
be established in a manner consistent with due process. A suspicion or belief no matter how sincerely felt cannot
substitute for factual findings carefully established through an orderly procedure.
SMC VS. NLRC (SMC REMOVE 55 POSITIONS; EMPLOYEES DID NOT FOLLOW CBA STEPS )
• San Miguel Cooperation, alleging the need to streamline its operations due to financial loses, shut down some of its
plants and declared 55 positions as redundant listed as follows: (17) employees in the Business Logistics Division
("BLD"), (17) in the Ayala Operations Center (AOC), and (18) in the Magnolia-Manila Buying Station ("Magnolia-
MBS"). 3
• Consequently, the private respondent union filed several grievance cases for the said retrenched employees, praying
for the redeployment of the said employees to the other divisions of the company.
• The grievance proceedings were conducted pursuant to Sections 5 and 8, Article VIII of the parties' 1990 Collective
Bargaining Agreement providing, to wit:
Sec.5. Processing of Grievance. — Should a grievance arise, an earnest effort shall be made to settle the
grievance expeditiously in accordance with the following procedures:
Step 1. — The individual employee concerned and the Union Directors, or the Union Steward shall, first
take up the employee's grievance orally with his immediate superior.
Step 2. — If the decision in Step 1 is rejected, the employee concerned may elevate or appeal this in
writing to the Plant Manager/Director or his duly authorized representative within twenty (20) working
days from the receipt of the Decision of the Department Manager, Otherwise, the decision in Step 1 shall
be deemed accepted by the employee.
Step 3. — If no satisfactory adjustment is arrived at Step 2, the employee may appeal the Decision to the
Conciliation Board as provided under Section 6 hereof, within fifteen (15) working days from the date of
receipt of the decision of the Plant Manager/Director or his designate.
• During the grievance proceedings, however, most of the employees were redeployed, while others accepted early
retirement. As a result only 17 employees remained when the parties proceeded to the third level (Step 3) of the
grievance procedure.
• In a meeting, petitioner informed private respondent union that if by October 30, 1990, the remaining 17 employees
could not yet be redeployed, their services would be terminated on November 2, 1990.
• The said meeting adjourned when Mr. Daniel S. L. Borbon II, a representative of the union, declared that there was
nothing more to discuss in view of the deadlock. 5
• the private respondent filed with the (NCMB) a notice of strike on the following grounds:
o a) bargaining deadlock; b) union busting; c) gross violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA), such as non-compliance with the grievance procedure; d) failure to provide private respondent with
a list of vacant positions pursuant to the parties side agreement that was appended to the 1990 CBA; and e)
defiance of voluntary arbitration award
• Petitioner on the other hand, moved to dismiss the notice of strike but the NCMB failed to act on the motion.
• petitioner SMC filed a complaint 6 with the respondent NLRC, praying for: (1) the dismissal the notice of strike; (2)
an order compelling the respondent union to submit to grievance and arbitration the issue listed in the notice of
strike; (3) the recovery of the expenses of litigation.
• respondent NLRC came out with a minute resolution dismissing the complaint
ISSUE: WON THE STRIKE IN VIOLATION OF A NO STRIKE CLAUSE? ILLEGAL STRIKE
• Rule XXII, Section I, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book V the Labor Code 10, reads:
 Sec.1. Grounds for strike and lockout. — A strike or lockout may be declared in cases of
bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. Violations of the collective bargaining
agreements, except flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions, shall
not be considered unfair labor practice and shall not be strikeable. No strike or lockout may be
declared on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes or on issues brought to
voluntary, or compulsory, arbitration.
• In the case under consideration, the grounds relied upon by the private respondent union are non-strikeable. The
issues which may lend substance to the notice of strike filed by the private respondent union are: collective
bargaining deadlock and petitioner's alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement. These grounds,
however, appear more illusory than real.
• Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as "the situation between the labor and the management of the company
where there is failure in the collective bargaining negotiations resulting in a stalemate" 11 This situation, is non-
existent in the present case since there is a Board assigned on the third level (Step 3) of the grievance machinery
to resolve the conflicting views of the parties. Instead of asking the Conciliation Board composed of five
representatives each from the company and the union, to decide the conflict, petitioner declared a deadlock,
and thereafter, filed a notice of strike.
• For failing to exhaust all the steps in the grievance machinery and arbitration proceedings provided in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, the notice of strike should have been dismissed by the NLRC and private
respondent union ordered to proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings.
• in the case of Liberal Labor Union vs. Phil. CanCo. 12, the court declared as illegal the strike staged by the union for
not complying with the grievance procedure provided in the collective bargaining agreement, ruling that:
o . . . the main purpose of the parties in adopting a procedure in the settlement of
their disputes is to prevent a strike. This procedure must be followed in its
entirety if it is to achieve its objective. . . . strikes held in violation of the terms
contained in the collective bargaining agreement are illegal, specially when they
provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly
adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved. . . . 13
• As regards the alleged violation of the CBA, we hold that such a violation is chargeable against the private
respondent union. In abandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly refusing to avail of the remedies under
the CBA. private respondent violated the mandatory provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
• Abolition of departments or positions in the company is one of the recognized management
prerogatives. 14Noteworthy is the fact that the private respondent does not question the validity of the business
move of petitioner. In the absence of proof that the act of petitioner was ill-motivated, it is presumed that
petitioner San Miguel Corporation acted in good faith. In fact, petitioner acceded to the demands of the private
respondent union by redeploying most of the employees involved; such that from an original 17 excess employees in
BLD, 15 were successfully redeployed. In AOC, out of the 17 original excess, 15 were redeployed. In the Magnolia
— Manila Buying Station, out of 18 employees, 6 were redeployed and only 12 were terminated. 15
• So also, in filing complaint with the NLRC, petitioner prayed that the private respondent union be compelled to
proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings. Petitioner having evinced its willingness to negotiate the
fate of the remaining employees affected, there is no ground to sustain the notice of strike of the private respondent
union.

BIFLEX VS. FIFLEX


• Petitioners were officers of Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor Union. And officers of Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing
Labor Union.
• 2 unions are affiliated with National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), are the respective CBA s of the
employees of corporations.
• Respondents Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation (respondents) are sister
companies engaged in the garment business.
• Situated in one big compound along with another sister company, General Garments Corporation (GGC), they have
a common entrance.
• the labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest the accelerating prices of oil.
• On even date, petitioner-unions, led by their officers, herein petitioners, staged a work stoppage which lasted for
several days, prompting respondents to file a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to comply with
procedural requirements.4
• Respondents resumed their operations.5
• Petitioners, claiming that they were illegally locked out by respondents, assert that aside from the fact that the welga
ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a ride and the apprehension that violence would erupt between those
participating in the welga and the authorities, respondents’ workers were prevented from reporting for work.
• Petitioners further assert that respondents were "slighted" by the workers’ no-show, and as a punishment, the
workers as well as petitioners were barred from entering the company premises.
• On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs in front of the main gate of respondents’ premises, petitioners, who
claim that they filed a notice of strike,6 explain that those were for the convenience of union members who reported
every morning to check if the management would allow them to report for work.
• Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the work stoppage was illegal since the following requirements for the
staging of a valid strike were not complied with: (1) filing of notice of strike; (2) securing a strike vote, and (3)
submission of a report of the strike vote to the Department of Labor and Employment.7
• The Labor Arbiter, held that the strike was illegal. NLRC reversed. CA REVERSED .

Issue: won petitioners engaged in an illegal strike? Yes


• That petitioners staged a work stoppage on October 24, 1990 in conjunction with the welga ng bayan organized by
the labor sector to protest the accelerating prices of oil, it is not disputed.
• Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an extended sympathy strike. It affects
numerous employers including those who do not have a dispute with their employees regarding their terms and
conditions of employment.15
• Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are scheduled to work, refuse to
work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an illegal work stoppage.16
• Even if petitioners’ joining the welga ng bayan were considered merely as an exercise of their freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly or freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances, the exercise of
such rights is not absolute.17 For the protection of other significant state interests such as the "right of enterprises to
reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth"18 enshrined in the 1987 Constitution must also be
considered, otherwise, oppression or self-destruction of capital in order to promote the interests of labor would be
sanctioned. And it would give imprimatur to workers’ joining demonstrations/rallies even before affording the
employer an opportunity to make the necessary arrangements to counteract the implications of the work stoppage on
the business, and ignore the novel "principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers" 19 aimed at
fostering industrial peace.
• There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or that they were allowed by
respondents, to join the welga ng bayan on October 24, 1990, their work stoppage is beyond legal protection.
• Petitioners, nonetheless, assert that when they returned to work the day following the welga ng bayan on
October 24, 1990, they were refused entry by the management, allegedly as punishment for their joining
the welga. Hence, they claim that they were illegally locked out by respondents.
• If there was illegal lockout, why, indeed, did not petitioners file a protest with the management or a complaint
therefor against respondents? As the Labor Arbiter observed, "[t]he inaction of [petitioners] betrays the weakness of
their contention for normally a locked-out union will immediately bring management before the bar of justice."20
• Even assuming arguendo that in staging the strike, petitioners had complied with legal formalities, the strike would
just the same be illegal, for by blocking the free ingress to and egress from the company premises, they violated
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that "[n]o person engaged in picketing shall … obstruct the
free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public
thoroughfares."
• Even the NLRC, which ordered their reinstatement, took note of petitioners’ act of "physically blocking and
preventing the entry of complainant’s customers, supplies and even other employees who were not on strike."21
• In fine, the legality of a strike is determined not only by compliance with its legal formalities but also by the means
by which it is carried out.
• Petitioners, being union officers, should thus bear the consequences of their acts of knowingly participating in
an illegal strike, conformably with the third paragraph of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code which provides:
o . . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status:Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer
during such lawful strike. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
• In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,22 this Court, passing on the use
of the word "may" in the immediately quoted provision, held that "[t]he law . . . grants the employer the option of
declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment." Reinstatement of a
striker or retention of his employment, despite his participation in an illegal strike, is a management prerogative
which this Court may not supplant.
CCBPI VS. NLRC
• Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. Postmix Workers union ("union") is the certified sole and exclusive bargaining agent
for all regular office and sales employees of CCBPI Postmix Division ("company").
• With the impending expiration of the (CBA) between the parties, a series of negotiations were held for the possible
renewal thereof.
• Since the negotiations failed to produce any agreement, the union filed a Notice of Strike with the (DOLE)
• Acting thereon, the DOLE summoned the parties for conciliation hearings to resolve the bargaining deadlock. Still
unable to reach a common ground, the union conducted a strike vote 9
• the result of which clearly showed the members' sentiments in favor of waging a strike.
• THE union struck.
• the company filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal, 10alleging that the union staged a strike without observing
the mandatory seven-day strike ban imposed under Art. 264 (f) of the Labor Code and that the strike was done in
bad faith, considering that the union did not exhaust the conciliation period.
• The strike, which lasted for about five months, ended with the signing of the renewed CBA 11between the union and
the company.
• The CBA includes the Memorandum of Agreement 12(the "Memorandum") drawn by the parties on and the
Amendments to Memorandum of Agreement 13 (the "Amendments").
• the Labor Arbiter 14 rendered a Decision 15 dismissing the Petition to Declare Strike Illegal for lack of merit, ruling
that there was substantial compliance with the mandatory seven-day strike ban, the union having struck on the sixth
day from the submission of the results of the strike vote to the NLRC.
• the NLRC reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. In its Resolution
o ruled that the seven-day strike ban is a mandatory requisite before a union may strike, such that "a strike
held even on the seventh day of the said seven-day ban, would be illegal."
o Consequently, the respondent officers of the union were declared to have lost their employment status. The
company thus terminated the services of eight employees who were believed to be officers of the union,
o the NLRC reversed ruling and ordered the company to reinstate the terminated employees based on the
finding that the latter were illegally dismissed, as they were not union officers during the strike. 28
Whether the strike declared by the union on April 20, 1987 was illegal for failure to comply with the
mandatory seven-day strike ban imposed under Art. 264 (f) of the Labor Code.
Held:
(1) STRIKE IS ILLEGAL
• It is easily understood that before a strike may be declared, the following requirements should be observed, to wit:
(1) the thirty-day notice or the fifteen-day notice, in case of unfair labor practices; (2) the two-thirds (2/3) required
vote to strike done by secret ballot; and (3) the submission of the strike vote to the DOLE at least seven days prior to
the strike. 30 These strike requirements must concur in order for the strike not to come under Article 265 of
the Labor Code, to wit:
 Art. 265. Prohibited activities. — It shall be unlawful for any labor organization or employer to
declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII
of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without
the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
 It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a strike or lockout after assumption of jurisdiction by the
President or Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary
arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
• Thus, we do not agree with the Labor Arbiter's opinion that a deficiency of one-day from the mandatory
seven-day strike ban is not a fatal defect, as to render the strike illegal. We do not share the view that the
union should be considered to have substantially complied with the strike requirements under the law.
• It bears stressing that the strike requirements under Articles 264 and 265 of the Labor Code are mandatory
requisites, without which, the strike will be considered illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring
the strike notice and strike-vote report as mandatory requirements is to reasonably regulate the right to
strike, which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. Verily,
substantial compliance with a mandatory provision will not suffice. Strict adherence to the mandate of the
law is required.
• In fine, we hold that for failure of the striking union to observe and comply with the seven-day mandatory strike
ban, the strike on April 20, 1987 was illegal.
 Art. 13. . . . . In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included.
• Accordingly, since the strike vote was conducted and submitted to the DOLE on April 14, 1987, the seventh day fell
on April 21, 1987. Since there is no dispute that the union struck on April 20, 1987, only the sixth day since the
submission of the strike vote, the strike was patently illegal.
• As correctly held by the NLRC in its Resolution dated December 28, 1993:
• When the law mandates that "the union . . . shall furnish the Ministry (now DOLE) the results of the voting at least
seven days before the intended strike . . ., subject to the cooling-off period herein provided", it is therefore clear that
a strike held even on the seventh day of the said seven-day ban, would be illegal. 34
(2) DISMISSAL HOWEVER IS IMPROPER
• However, while we agree with the Labor Arbiter's finding that the April 20, 1987 strike was illegal, we
maintain that a mere finding of illegality of a strike should not be followed by a wholesale dismissal of
strikers from employment.35
• Art. 264 of the Labor Code reads, inter alia:
o xxx xxx xxx
 Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout
shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike maybe declared to have lost his employment
status: Provided, That mere participation of worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer
during such lawful strike. (Emphasis supplied)
• The effects of illegal strikes, as outlined in Art. 264 of the Labor Code, make a distinction between ordinary workers
and union officers who participate therein. Under established jurisprudence, a union officer may be terminated from
employment for knowingly participating in an illegal strike. 36 The fate of union members is different. Mere
participation in an illegal strike is not a sufficient ground for termination of the services of the union
members. 37 The Labor Code protects ordinary, rank-and-file union members who participated in such a strike from
losing their jobs provided that they did not commit illegal acts during the strike. 38
• The company submits that the Labor Arbiter's decision of October 5, 1994 on the legality of the termination of the
employees was based on strong and convincing evidence. The company takes as substantial evidence the alleged
repeated admissions of the employees on their status as union officers in the CBA, Memorandum and Amendments.
In any event, the company alleges that the principle of estoppel should be applied, such that the employees should
not be permitted to assert the contrary. The company further alleges that, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion
when it relied upon the BLR certification despite its glaring inaccuracies.
• On this point, we are not persuaded by the company's submission. Anent the issue on the status of the employees,
we find for the union, and declare that the employees were mere union members, and not officers, during the strike
held on April 20, 1987.
• With respect to the company's allegation that, by being signatories to the CBA, Memorandum and Amendments, the
concerned employees have effectively represented themselves as union officers, we are of the view that such did not
sufficiently establish the status of the employees as union officers during the illegal strike.
• After a careful perusal of the evidence on record, nowhere can it be found that the cited employees signed the
documents as officers of the union. We find that the NLRC correctly appreciated the evidence:
 Again, We looked back and took a second look at the evidence adduced by the herein respondent
during the arbitration proceedings, namely the CBA, Memorandum of Agreement and
Amendments to the Memorandum of Agreement signed by the parties on 27 November 1987, and
found that contrary to respondent's claim, the same did not contain the signatures of the five (5)
terminated employees herein.
• It appears that said employees signed the documents only as witnesses to the perfection of the contract between the
union, represented by its officers and the company. The employees' signatures were not necessary to bind the union
or to perfect the CBA. These employees signed as mere witnesses to the contracts to attest to the fact that the
documents were indeed signed and that the CBA was validly renewed.
•With respect to the allegation that the employees played active roles or were perceived to be main players during the
bargaining negotiations, we hold that such participation did not make them union officers. Quite interestingly, in
situations such as negotiations and strikes, union officers could not have the monopoly of action and reaction.
Finding themselves to be similarly situated, the union members, stimulated by rising emotions, joined their leaders
and immersed themselves in the dealings and negotiations.
• An examination of the evidence on record fails to disclose any active participation in or the commission of illegal
acts of the cited employees during the illegal strike. Such being the case, they incur no liability for the said strike.
They cannot even be held responsible for an illegal strike solely on the basis of union membership. 45 And since
there is absolutely no showing, much less clear proof, that said employees actually participated in the commission of
illegal acts during the said strike involved in this petition, there is no adequate basis for us to hold that these
employees should be deemed to be among those who have lost their employment status, in consequence of a
declaration of illegality of the strike. The terminated employees should therefore be entitled to reinstatement with
back wages.
GRAND BLVD. VS. GENUINE LABOR ORG.

• Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries — Silahis International Hotel
Chapter (GLOWHRAIN-Silahis) (respondent union) and the petitioner Grand Boulevard Hotel (tSilahis
International Hotel, Inc.) executed a (CBA) covering the period from July 10, 1985 up to July 9, 1988.
• The petitioner thereafter dismissed some of its employees and suspended others who were members of the
respondent union.
• the respondent union filed a notice of strike with the (DOLE-NCR), based on the following grounds:
a) Illegal dismissal
b) Illegal suspension
c) CBA violations
d) Harassments3
• the then Acting (SOLE) issued a status quo ante bellum order certifying the labor dispute to the (NLRC) for
compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code;
• and further directing the employees to return to work within 48 hours from receipt of the order, 4 and for the
petitioner to accept all returning employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the labor
dispute.
• The respondent union complied with the order of the SOLE.
• the respondent union filed another notice of strike against the petitioner on account of alleged violations of the CBA
and the illegal dismissal of nine employees.
• the SOLE issued another status quo ante bellum order certifying the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration,
directing the nine employees to return to work and enjoining both parties from engaging in any strike or lockout that
would exacerbate the situation. The parties were also directed to sign a CBA within fifteen days from notice of the
said order.5
• the petitioner and the respondent union entered into and signed a third CBA covering the period of July 10, 1988 to
July 9, 1991.
• Union President Rogelio Soluta wrote the petitioner, calling its attention to and protesting the following violations of
the CBA:
o Union dues and other assessments deducted from CBU and union members' salary for July 15, 1990
payday; for July 31, 1990 payday; for August 15, 1990 payday.6
• The petitioner placed the respondent union's Director for Grievances Apolonio Bondoc, Jr. under preventive
suspension.
• the respondent union filed a manifestation and motion in NCMB praying that the petitioner be held in contempt for
violating Order of the SOLE.
• the petitioner suspended Francisco Pineda, a union counselor.
• the respondent union filed a notice of strike based on the following grounds:
a. Violation of CBA;
b. Coercion of employees;
c. Harassment;
d. Arbitrary transfer of employees; and
e. Illegal termination and suspension of employees7
• Michael Wilson, the petitioner's general manager, wrote the SOLE informing him of the petitioner's decision to
retrench seventeen less senior employees on a staggered basis, spread over a period of sixty days, to lessen the daily
financial losses being incurred by the petitioner.
o Due to the present continued downturn in tourism, we at the Silahis International Hotel are about to
undertake a retrenchment program.
o As you know the other hotels have also invoked this management prerogative in order to lessen their
financial losses incurred these last few months.
o We plan to retrench on a staggered basis (171) less senior employees over a period of sixty (60) days, in
order to stem the huge losses being incurred by us daily, during this unfortunate period.
• The next day, the respondent union, through its president, informed the DOLE-NCR that the union will conduct a
strike vote referendum. The members of the respondent union voted to stage a strike.
• the respondent union informed the DOLE-NCR of the results of the strike vote referendum.
• the SOLE issued another status quo ante bellum order certifying the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration
and enjoining the parties from engaging in any strike or lockout.
• Accordingly, any strike or lockout, whether actual or intended, is hereby enjoined.
• Consequently, pending resolution of the legality of the alleged dismissal of Apolonio Bondoc, Jr., the Company is
directed to effect payroll reinstatement and accord him free access to the union office so that his duties as union
officer will not be impaired.9
• The petitioner wrote the SOLE of its decision to implement its retrenchment program to stem its huge losses.
• the petitioner disseminated a circular to all the employees, informing them that the personnel plantilla would be
decreased by two hundred employees to be implemented on a staggered and "last in, first out" basis.
• the respondent union protested the actions of the petitioner invoking Section 15, Article VI of the CBA. The
respondent union filed an urgent motion for a reconsideration by the SOLE of the Certification Order.
• the petitioner terminated the employment of eighty-six more employees.
• The remaining employees were also informed that it will close in six months.
• the petitioner terminated the employment of Kristoffer So, effective December 14, 1990.
• the respondent union filed another notice of strike because of what it perceived as the petitioner's continuing unfair
labor practices (ULP). On the same day, at about 12:00 noon, the officers of the respondent union and some
members staged a picket in the premises of the hotel, obstructing the free ingress and egress thereto. At 3:00 p.m.,
the police operatives of the Western Police District arrived and dispersed the picket line. Police officers detained the
respondent union's president Rogelio Soluta, Henry Baybay and Dennis Cosico.
• the SOLE issued an order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for consolidation with the previously certified
case. The SOLE issued a return-to-work order, excluding those who were retrenched, and enjoined all parties from
committing any act that would aggravate the already tense situation. The SOLE further stated that the validity and
propriety of the retrenchment program of the petitioner should be ventilated before and resolved by the NLRC.
• The respondent officers and members complied with the order of the SOLE and returned to work
• the SOLE issued an order for the reinstatement of the thirty-five dismissed employees with full backwages.
• the petitioner filed a complaint13 with the Regional Arbitration Office of the NLRC for illegal strike against the
union, its members and officers,
• Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty of illegal strike as charged,
judgment is hereby rendered declaring the union officers to have lost and forfeited their employment.17
• CA REVSRESED.
HELD: REVERSED.
(1) The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, particularly those with respect to the unfair labor practice of
petitioner Hotel were not supported by the real facts and circumstances attendant to the instant case.
• A striker cannot invoke good faith where assumption orders of the SOLE, which operate as an injunction against a
prospective strike, are disregarded. The respondents failed to prove that the petitioner had committed any ULP on
the respondents and its employees. The testimony of respondent Rogelio Soluta and the other officers of the
respondent union before the Labor Arbiter did not constitute sufficient proof of ULP. If the respondents perceived
that the petitioner committed ULP, the matter should have been threshed out with the appropriate labor tribunal
(NLRC or CA). Instead, the respondents staged a strike. Thus, the retrenchment by the petitioner of its employees
was within its prerogative and was necessitated by —
o The years 1989 and 1990 were particularly harsh to petitioner Hotel. Serious financial reverses were
brought about by the increase in operational costs and a marked decline in its room occupancy rate. It was
also at this time that petitioner Hotel's business was threatened by the emergence of more modern and
refurbished hotels in Metro Manila. It was in order to forestall the imminent threat of a partial or a total
closure of the business that petitioner Hotel, after a thorough study and review of its corporate structure and
financial set-up, decided to implement the retrenchment program. Certainly, the employees were not
unaware of this situation.34
• The respondents assert that the issues posed by the petitioner in its petition at bar involve questions of facts which
are improper in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under the said Rule,
questions of facts should not be raised in a petition for review. However, this rule admits of exceptions, such as
where the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and those of the CA are contradictory; when the
conclusions of the CA are based on speculations, surmises and conjectures; where the judgment of the CA is
premised on misapprehension of facts; or when the CA failed to take into account and consider facts which if
properly considered would justify a different conclusion.
• The CA did not commit any error in ruling that the petitioner was guilty of ULP when it dismissed all the officers of
the respondent union despite the certificate orders of the SOLE and in defiance of the said orders; and the
respondents believed in good faith that indeed the petitioner committed ULP which belief cured whatever defects
there may have been in the November 16 to 29, 1990 strike staged by the respondents.
• According to the respondents, the petitioner enforced its retrenchment program at a time when there was an ongoing
dispute between the petitioner and the respondent union regarding the dismissal and suspension of employees. This
engendered an honest belief on the part of the respondents that the petitioner was indeed committing ULP which
impelled them to stage a strike to protect their basic rights.
(2) The Court of Appeals' finding of legality of the union's strike was a clear disregard of the requirements for a
legal and valid strike as prescribed by law and jurisprudence.32
• Under the aforequoted provisions, the requisites for a valid strike are as follows: (a) a notice of strike fled with the
DOLE thirty days before the intended date thereof or fifteen days in case of ULP; (b) strike vote approved by a
majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called
for that purpose; (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended
strike.37 The requisite seven-day period is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected
strike really carries the approval of the majority of the union members. The notice of strike and the cooling-off
period were intended to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. The requirements are mandatory and
failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. 38 A strike simultaneously with or immediately after
a notice of strike will render the requisite periods nugatory.
• Moreover, a strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance by the SOLE of an assumption or certification order,
becomes a prohibited activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended. As this Court ruled in Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc.,39 under Article 264(a) of the
said code, once an assumption certification order is issued by the SOLE, strikes are enjoined or if one has already
taken place, all strikers shall immediately return to work:
o We also wish to point out that an assumption and/or certification order of the Secretary of Labor
automatically results in a return-to-work of all striking workers, whether or not a corresponding order has
been issued by the Secretary of Labor. Thus, the striking workers erred when they continued with their
strike alleging absence of a return-to-work order. Article 264(g) (sic) is clear. Once an
assumption/certification order is issued, strikes are enjoined, or if one has already taken place, all
strikers shall immediately return to work.
o A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification
order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the
Labor Code as amended. The Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their
employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act.40
• In this case, the respondent union filed its notice of strike with the DOLE on November 16, 1990 and on the same
day, staged a picket on the premises of the hotel, in violation of the law. Police operatives of the Western Police
District had to disperse the picketers and take into custody Union President Rogelio Soluta and the other officers of
respondent union, Henry Babay and Dennis Cosico. The respondents cannot argue that since the notice of strike on
November 16, 1990 were for the same grounds as those contained in their notice of strike on September 27, 1990
which complied with the requirements of the law on the cooling-off period, strike ban, strike vote and strike vote
report, the strike staged by them on November 16, 1990 was lawful. The matters contained in the notice of strike of
September 27, 1990 had already been taken cognizance of by the SOLE when he issued on October 31, 1990
a status quo ante bellum order enjoining the respondent union from intending or staging a strike. Despite the SOLE
order, the respondent union nevertheless staged a strike on November 16, 1990 simultaneously with its notice of
strike, thus violating Article 264(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, which reads:
o Art. 264. . . .
o No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or
after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
• While it may be true that the petitioner itself barred the officers of the respondent union from working and had
terminated the employment of Kristoffer So, and sent out circulars of its decision to retrench its employees effective
December 16, 1990, the same were not valid justifications for the respondents to do away with the statutory
procedural requirements for a lawful strike. It behooved the respondents to avail themselves of the remedies under
the CBA or file an illegal dismissal case in the office of the Labor Arbiter against the petitioner or by agreement of
the parties, submit the case to the grievance machinery of the CBA so that the matter may be subjected to voluntary
arbitrary proceedings instead of resorting to an immediate strike. 41 There was no immediate and imperative need for
the respondents to stage a strike on the very day that the notice of strike on November 16, 1990 was filed because
the retrenchment envisaged by the petitioner had yet to take effect on December 14, 1990. The grievances of the
respondent union could still very well be ordered and acted upon by the SOLE before December 14, 1990.
• The respondents' claim of good faith is not a valid excuse to dispense with the procedural steps for a lawful strike.
o "The Company is one of the biggest hotels in the country and contributes substantially to the tourism
industry. It is recognized as one of the major sources of foreign exchange earnings of the country, housing
a government-owned and controlled income generating agency financing vital development projects of the
government. Clearly, the threatened work stoppage will result in huge financial losses not only to the hotel
but likewise the country. The ongoing development projects of the government will be severely jeopardized
and the economic recovery program of the government will be unduly hampered. Moreover, the security of
employment of the more or less seven hundred (700) employees is in grave state not to mention other
workers who are equally dependent on the continuous operations of the Company."
o These considerations have in the past guided this Office in consistently exercising its powers under Article
263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, in addressing and handling labor disputes in the hotel industry.44
• Hence, the need for a union to adhere to and comply strictly with the procedural conditions sine qua non provided
for by the law in staging a strike.

ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENENT UNION VS. NLRC


• the petitioners herein, were casual employees of respondent CENAPRO Chemicals Corporation.
• In the said company, the collective bargaining representative of all rank and file employees was CENAPRO
Employees Association (CCEA), with which respondent company had a (CBA).
• Their CBA excluded casual employees from membership in the incumbent union.
• The casual employees who have rendered at least one to six years of service sought regularization of their
employment.
• When their demand was denied, they formed themselves into an organization and affiliated with the Association of
Independent unions in the Philippines (AIUP).
• Thereafter, AIUP filed a petition for certification election, which petition was opposed by the respondent company.
The CCEA anchored its opposition on the contract bar rule.
• the union filed a notice of strike, minutes of strike vote, and the needed documentation, with the DOLE.
• The notice of strike cited as grounds therefor the acts of respondent company constituting unfair labor practice, more
specifically coercion of employees and systematic union busting.
• the union proceeded to stage a strike, in the course of which, the union perpetrated illegal acts. The strikers
padlocked the gate of the company. The areas fronting the gate of the company were barricaded and blocked by
union strikers. The strikers also prevented and coerced other non-striking employees from reporting for work.
• Because of such illegal activities, the respondent company filed a petition for injunction with the NLRC, which
granted a (TRO), enjoining the strikers from doing further acts of violence, coercion, or intimidation and from
blocking fee ingress and egress to the company premises.
• petitioners filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal lockout against the respondent company.
• the Labor Arbiter declares illegal the strike staged by the petitioners, and dismissed the charge of illegal lockout and
unfair labor practice.
• the Labor Arbiter issued an Order excluding Rosalito Bantulan and Edward Regner from the list of those to be
reinstated and to be paid backwages. The remaining four (4) workers, Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes,
Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, are the petitioners here.
• the NLRC affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiter's decision, it reiterated the Labor Arbiter's Order for the reinstatement
of the herein petitioners, Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana. The court
discerns no basis for altering the aforesaid findings which have been affirmed by the NLRC.
Held:
The court is not persuaded by petitioners' allegation of union busting. The NLRC correctly ruled that the strike
staged by petitioners was in the nature of a union-recognition-strike.
• A union-recognition-strike, as its legal designation implies, is calculated to compel the employer to recognize one's
union, and not the other contending group, as the employees' bargaining representative to work out a collective
bargaining agreement despite the striking union's doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of
formal certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining unit.
• It is undisputed that at the time the petition for certification election was filed by AUIP, petitioner union, there was
an existing CBA between the respondent company and CCEA, the incumbent bargaining representative of all rank
and file employees.
• The petition should have not been entertained because of the contract bar rule. When a collective bargaining
agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Labor Code, a petition for certification
election or motion for intervention may be entertained only within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of the said
agreement. 8
• Outside the said period, as in the present case, the petition for certification election or motion for intervention
cannot be allowed. Hence, the conclusion that the respondent company did not commit the alleged union busting.
From the gamut of evidence on hand, it can be gathered that the strike staged by the petitioner union was illegal for
reasons, that:
(1) The strikers committed illegal acts in the course of the strike. They formed human barricades to block the road,
prevented the passage of the respondent company's truck, padlocked the company's gate, and prevented co-workers
from entering the company premises. 9
(2) And violated the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) 10 enjoining the union and/or its members from obstructing
the company premises, and ordering the removal therefrom of all the barricades.
• A strike is a legitimate weapon in the universal struggle for existence. 11 It is considered as the most effective
weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. 12 But to
be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social
justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its exercise.
• Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly paragraph (e),
which states that no person engaged in picketing shall:
a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or
b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes or
c) obstruct public thoroughfares.
• Even if the strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the
means employed are illegal. For instance, the strike was considered illegal as the "strikers formed a human cordon
along the side of the Sta. Ana wharf and blocked all the ways and approaches to the launches and vessels of
Petitioners". 13
• It follows therefore that the dismissal of the officers of the striking union was justified and valid.
o Their dismissal as a consequence of the illegality of the strike staged by them finds support in Article 264
(a) of the Labor Code, pertinent portion of which provides: " . . Any union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and any . . union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. . ."
• Union officers are duty bound to guide their members to respect the law. If instead of doing so, the officers urge the
members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted authorities, their dismissal from the service is a just penalty
or sanction for their unlawful acts. The officers' responsibility is greater than that of the members. 14
The court finds merit in the finding by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the respondent company committed no
illegal lockout. Lockout means temporary refusal of the employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute. 15
• As observed by the Labor Arbiter, it was the appellant-workers who voluntarily stopped working because of their
strike. In fact the appellant workers admitted that non-striking workers who wanted to return to work were allowed
to do so. Their being without work could not therefore be attributed to the employer's refusal to give them work but
rather, to the voluntary withdrawal of their services in order to compel the company to recognize their union. 16
The next aspect of the case to consider is the fate of the four petitioners herein. Decisive on the matter is the pertinent
provision of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code that: ". . any worker . . who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. . ."
• It can be gleaned unerringly from the aforecited provision of law in point, however, that an ordinary striking
employee can not be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed
illegal acts during the strike 17 and the striker who participated in the commission of illegal act must be identified.
• But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant
circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.
• In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 18 the court ruled "Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial". Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion."
• Respondent company contends that sufficient testimonial, documentary and real evidence, including the
photographs supposedly taken by a certain Mr. Ponce, were presented at the arbitration level. It is argued that the
said pictures best show the participation of the strikers in the commission of illegal acts in the course of the strike. In
connection therewith, it is worthy to point out the sole basis of the NLRC for declaring the loss of employment
status of petitioner Joel Densing
• All things studiedly considered, the court is not convinced that the quantum of proof on record hurdled the
substantiality of evidence test 20 to support a decision, a basic requirement in administrative adjudication. If the said
pictures exhibited before the Labor Arbiter portrayed the herein petitioners performing prohibited acts during the
strike, why were these pictures not exhibited for identification of petitioners? Petitioners could have been identified
in such pictures, if they were reflected therein, in the same manner that the lawyer who examined Mr. Ponce, asked
witness Armamento to identify the Sheriff Mr. Leahmon Tolo, thus:
• The identification of the alleged pictures of the strikers, if properly made, could have been categorized as substantial
evidence, which a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion that Joel Densing participated in
blocking the gate of respondent company.
• Verily, the uncorroborated testimony of Mr. Ponce does not suffice to support a declaration of loss of employment
status of Joel Densing. This could be the reason why the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, in its decision dated August
15, 1994, upheld the reinstatement of Joel Densing.
• The contention of petitioners that the factual findings by the Labor Arbiter, as trial officer in the case, deserve much
weight is tenable. The NLRC is bound by the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter as the latter was in a better
position to observe the demeanor and department of the witnesses. "Absent any substantial proof that the trial court's
decision was based on speculation, the same must be accorded full consideration and should not be disturbed on
appeal. 22
• Premises studiedly considered, we are of the ineluctable conclusion, and hold, that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in declaring the loss of employment status of Joel Densing.
• For the severest administrative penalty of dismissal to attach, the erring strikers must be duly identified. Simply
referring to them as "strikers", "AIU strikers" "complainants in this case" is not enough to justify their dismissal.
On the issue of reinstatement and payment of salaries, the court also find for petitioners. Telling on the monetary
award is Article 223 of the Labor Code, the pertinent of which reads:
• . . . In any event, the decision of the labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed employee shall be immediately executory,
even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The
posting of bond shall not stay the execution of the reinstatement provided therein. . . .
• The NLRC Resolution of February 21, 1995 does not state any plausible ground or basis for deleting the award for
backwages. The mere fact that the petitioners were "not entirely faultless" is of no moment. Such finding below does
not adversely affect their entitlement to backwages. As opined by the NLRC in its Decision of August 15, 1994,
affirming in its entirety the conclusion arrived at by the Labor Arbiter "the only option left to the appellant-company
is whether to physically reinstate appellant workers or to reinstate them on the payroll."
• The unmeritorious appeal interposed by the respondent company, let alone the failure to execute with dispatch the
award of reinstatement delayed the payroll reinstatement of petitioners. But their long waiting is not completely in
vain, for the court holds that their (petitioners') salaries and backwages must be computed from October 15, 1993
until full payment of their separation pay, without any deduction. This is in consonance with the ruling in the case
of Bustamante vs. NLRC, 24 where payment of full backwages without deductions was ordered. The four petitioners
herein are entitled to reinstatement absent any just ground their dismissal. Considering, however, that more than
eight (8) years have passed since subject strike was staged, an award of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
pay for every year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, is deemed more practical and appropriate to all the parties
concerned.

FIRST CITY INTERLINK VS. ROL-DAN CONGRESSOR

• the Fil Transit Employees Union filed a notice of strike with the (BLR) because of alleged ULP of petitioner.
• Despite several conciliation conferences, the parties failed to reach an agreement, so that
• the Union went on strike. As a result several workers were dismissed.
• The Union filed another notice of strike alleging ULP, massive dismissal of union officers and members,
coercion of employees and violation of workers’ rights to self-organization.
• Conciliation conferences were again held but, the Union again went on strike, lifting their picket.
• the then Minister of Labor and Employment, after assuming jurisdiction over the dispute under Art. 264(g) and
Art. 278(b) of the Labor Code, ordered -
(1) all striking employees including those who were dismissed prior to the June 17, 1986 strike to
return to work within (48) hours from receipt of the order; and
(2) petitioner to accept all the returning employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing
previous to the dispute.
• Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that no strike vote had been obtained before the
strike was called and the result of strike vote was not reported to the Ministry of Labor and
Employment. Its motion was, however, not acted upon for the reason that petitioner had already
brought the matter to this Court on certiorari, resulting in the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
• DOLE issued a writ of execution, ordering the chief of the execution arm of the NLRC to cause the actual and
physical return to work of all striking employees, including those dismissed prior to the June 17, 1986 strike
under the same terms and conditions prevailing previous to the dispute, and to secure certification that the
parties have complied with such return to work order.
• The Union then filed a motion for the award of backwages in the total amount of P1,364,800.00 for the period
December 9, 1987 up to February 9, 1988 and for the issuance of a writ of execution.
• the Sheriff reported in his return that only 66 employees reported back to work and were accepted by petitioner
on condition that they submit certain requirements.
• the Secretary of Labor issued the order awarding backwages
• Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but its motion was denied
• Petitioner questioned the order in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed with this Court
which, however, dismissed the petition on for lack of showing that the Secretary of Labor committed a grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned order.[3]
• Sole ordered Fil Transit Co., Inc., to pay the dismissed striking employees the following:
1. Backwages for three (3) years without qualification and deduction and;
2. Separation pay equivalent to one-half month pay for every year of service in lieu of
reinstatement, the date of this office’s order as the cut-off date.
Held: decision set aside
First. Petitioner’s main contention is that the strike called by the Union was illegal. Pursuant to Art. 263(c)(f) of
the Labor Code, the requisites for a valid strike are as follows:
(1) a notice of strike filed with the Department of Labor at least 30 days before the intended date thereof or 15 days in
case of unfair labor practice;
(2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by
secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose;
(3) notice given to the Department of Labor and Employment of the results of the voting at least 7 days before the
intended strike.
• These requirements are mandatory.[4]
• Petitioner contends that the strike staged by the Union was illegal because no strike vote had been taken before
the strike was called. This matter was raised by petitioner before the Secretary of Labor and now in this
petition.
• However, in none of the numerous pleadings filed by respondent Union before this Court, has it been shown
that a strike vote had been taken before declaring a strike. As between petitioner and respondent Union, the
latter is in a better position to present proof of such fact. The Union’s failure to do so raises the strong
probability that there was no strike vote taken. The first and only instance it is mentioned that such a
vote had been taken before the strike was called was in the order dated July 23, 1992 of the Secretary of
Labor in which she stated:
• . . . the records show that a notice of strike was filed by the union with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on
May 27, 1986, and after a failure of several conciliation conferences due to management’s consistent refusal to
appear, the union went on strike on June 17, 1986, after a strike vote was obtained.[5] (Emphasis added)
• But the Secretary of Labor did not indicate the basis for her statement nor the date the strike vote was allegedly
taken. Neither did she mention whether her office had been notified of the strike vote as required by law.
• For that matter the statement in the same order that a notice of strike had been filed because several
conciliation conferences failed “due to management’s consistent refusal to appear” is contrary to evidence in
the record. Annexes E and F of the petition show that management was duly represented during the
conciliation proceeding prior to the strike on June 17, 1986. Annex G likewise shows that at the conciliation
conference held on July 17, 1986, management actively participated, contrary to the statement in the order of
the Secretary of Labor that the failure of the second set of conciliation conferences was due to management’s
refusal to attend.
• Moreover, even assuming that a strike vote had been taken, we agree with petitioner that the Union
nevertheless failed to observe the required seven-day strike ban from the date the strike vote should have been
reported to the DOLE up to the time the Union staged the strike on June 17, 1986. As petitioner contends:
• It must be noted in this regard that as shown in the minutes of conciliation conferences (Annex “F”), the parties
met in a conciliation conference on June 13, 1986, four (4) days before the June 17, 1986 strike. So even if it
is conceded that a strike vote was taken, there would have been non-compliance with the requisite cooling off
period and the 7-day strike ban for the simple reason that between June 13, 1986, the day the parties met for
conciliation conference and June 17, 1986, the day of the strike, there were only four (4) days.[6]
• It is nonetheless contended by the Solicitor General that “[a] strike inspired by good faith is not illegal simply
because certain requirements were not followed,” citing the case of Ferrer v. CIR.[7] The contention has no
merit. In Ferrer, the strikers failed to observe the 30-day cooling off period, but this Court found the strike
legal because of the strikers’ belief in good faith that the employer committed unfair labor practice. But, in
the case at bar, what is lacking is the strike vote which should have been reported to the DOLE seven
days before staging the strike. The importance of the strike vote and reporting of the results to the
DOLE cannot be gainsaid as it is the Union itself that the law seeks to protect by ensuring that the
majority of its members voted in favor of the strike. As held in National Federation of Sugar Workers
(NFSW) v. Ovejera:[8]
• When the law says “the labor union may strike” should the dispute “remain unsettled until the lapse of the
requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the mandatory filing of the notice,” the unmistakable
implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory
character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that “in any
case,” the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting “at least seven (7) days before the
intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period.” It must be stressed that the requirements of
cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with, although the labor union may take
a strike vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-off period.
• Moreover, petitioner is right that good faith can not be invoked by the Union in this case.
• As the records will bear out, the private respondent had clearly acted in bad faith when it went on strike.
• Indeed, there is no finding in this case that petitioner was guilty of the alleged unfair labor practices as charged
by the Union. The award of backwages and separation pay was based solely on the alleged refusal of
petitioner to comply with the Return to Work Order - an issue which will be discussed in the latter part of this
decision. Hence, the ruling in Ferrer v. CIR - that the strike staged before the expiration of the 30-day cooling
off period is not illegal because of what the strikers perceived in good faith to be unfair labor practices of the
employer - does not apply.
Second. Petitioner contends that the strikers, having engaged in violent, illegal, and criminal acts, have lost their
employment status. The Labor Code considers the commission of these acts a “prohibited activity” [10] and any worker
or union officer, who knowingly participates in their commission during a strike, may be declared to have lost his
employment status.
• Not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike as to cause the loss of employment
of the guilty party. Where acts of violence while the strike lasts are sporadic and not pervasive by design and
policy, responsibility therefore is individual and not collective.[11]
• Contrary to respondent Secretary’s finding, the strike declared by the Union was attended by pervasive and
widespread violence. The acts of violence committed were not mere isolated incidents which could normally
occur during any strike. The hijacking of Fil-Transit Bus No. 148 at the intersection of EDSA and Quezon
Avenue on Sunday, July 27, 1986, three days before the scheduled conciliation conference, reveals that it was
staged in pursuance of a preconceived plan. This was followed by the barricading of the terminal in Alabang
by means of five buses which had also been hijacked. In the days that followed, the strikers persisted in their
violent acts, (1) the hijacking of 26 more buses which resulted in injuries to some employees and panic to the
commuters; (2) the puncturing of tires; (3) the cutting of electric wirings, water hoses and fan belts; and (4) the
alleged theft of expensive equipment such as fuel injections worth P30,000 each. The commission of these
illegal acts was neither isolated nor accidental but deliberately employed to intimidate and harass the employer
and the public. The strikers even resorted to the use of molotov bombs which were thrown into the petitioner’s
compound.
• Nevertheless, we are constrained to uphold the respondent Secretary’s ruling that responsibility for
these illegal acts must be on an individual and not collective basis. Therefore, although the strike was
illegal because of the commission of illegal acts, only the union officers and strikers who engaged in
violent, illegal and criminal acts against the employer are deemed to have lost their employment
status. Union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated
differently.[12]
Third. As already noted, respondent Secretary awarded backwages on the ground that petitioner had refused to
comply with the Return to Work Order of September 16, 1986.
• On the other hand, the Union contends that petitioner imposed certain requirements as condition for reinstatement
which amounted to a refusal to comply with the Return to Work Order. These were:xxx
• Some requirements are indeed unreasonable considering that the strikers were not being hired for the first time but
merely being reinstated. Reinstatement connotes a continuity of the employer-employee relationship as contrasted
to an initial employment. Hence, a distinction must be made between requirements which are valid management
prerogatives and those which are unreasonable.
• On the other hand, there are certain conditions which are valid. The requirement to submit NBI, Police and
Barangay clearances is reasonable to enable management to determine whether the returning employees have
pending charges of illegal acts especially those committed during the strike. So also is the requirement to have
driver’s and conductor’s/conductress’ license, to enable them to perform their tasks. The pictures required are
necessary for the employer’s personnel records and so can validly be required.
• With respect to the required medical examination, the same can be justified as management prerogative since it is
the employer’s right to ensure that the employees are physically fit to resume the performance of their duties. This
is especially true in this case, because two years had elapsed since the time of dismissal of the employees. As held
in Jackbilt Concrete Block Co., Inc. v. Norton & Harrison Co.,[13] an employer should not be compelled to reinstate
an employee who is no longer physically fit for the job from which he was ousted.
• It is true that in Davao Free Workers Front v. CIR,[14] it was held that the medical examination could not be required
as a condition for reinstatement, but that is in cases where the employer is guilty of unfair labor practice.
• In the present case, although the Union has charged petitioner with unfair labor practice, the matter is still to be
resolved. Hence, the ruling in Davao Free Workers Front v. CIR[16] does not apply.
• With respect to some of the requirements (i.e., P1,000. cash bond, birth/baptismal certificate, residence certificate,
high school diploma/transcript of records, certification of employment, and marriage contract), we agree with
respondent Union that these requirements cannot be imposed being more appropriate for employees who are
being hired for the first time. However, the imposition of such requirements by the employer did not amount to a
refusal to admit workers back to work or an illegal lock-out so as to entitle the workers to the payment of backwages
under Art. 264(g) of the Labor Code, the pertinent portion of which states:
• From the foregoing, undersigned is of the opinion that the Order has been complied with upon completion of the
above-requirements being requested by Management. . . .
Consequently, petitioner is not liable for backwages. Employees, who are not guilty of illegal acts and, therefore,
are entitled to reinstatement would only be entitled to backwages if they were refused readmission.
• As none of such employees was refused readmission, no backwages are due from petitioner. On the other
hand, employees who are entitled to be reinstated because they did not take part in illegal acts would be
entitled to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in view of the fact that, after all the time that this case has
been pending, reinstatement is no longer feasible.
• Separation pay should be computed only up to March 8, 1988, the date when employees were supposed to
return as agreed upon by the parties. Those who failed to return on March 8, 1988, will not be entitled to
separation pay after such date.
To summarize, this Court holds that:
1) The respondent Secretary of Labor erred in declaring the strike legal. There is no evidence to show that a
strike vote had in fact been taken before a strike was called. Even assuming that a strike vote had been taken, the
strike called by the Union was illegal because of nonobservance by the Union of the mandatory seven-day strike
ban counted from the date the strike vote should have been reported to the Department of Labor and Employment
up to the time the Union staged the strike on June 17, 1986. In accordance with Art. 264 of the Labor Code, any
union officer who knowingly participated in the illegal strike is deemed to have lost his employment status.
2) The commission of the illegal acts during the strike rendered it illegal. However, only officers and leaders
of the Union and workers guilty of illegal acts are liable. Such employees are deemed to have lost their
employment status in accordance with Art. 264 of the Labor Code.
3) Petitioner substantially complied with the Return to Work Order. The medical examination, NBI, Police
and Barangay Clearances as well as the driver’s and conductor’s/conductress’ licenses and photographs required as
conditions for reinstatement were reasonable management prerogatives. However, the other requirements imposed
as condition for reinstatement were unreasonable considering that the employees were not being hired for the first
time, although the imposition of such requirements did not amount to refusal on the part of the employer to comply
with the Return to Work Order or constitute illegal lockout so as to warrant payment of backwages to the
strikers. If at all, it is the employees’ refusal to return to work that may be deemed a refusal to comply with the
Return to Work Order resulting in loss of their employment status. As both the employer and the employees were,
in a sense, at fault or in pari delicto, the nonreturning employees, provided they did not participate in illegal acts,
should be considered entitled to reinstatement. But since reinstatement is no longer feasible, they should be given
separation pay computed up to March 8, 1988 (the date set for the return of the employees) in lieu of reinstatement.
4) Because the award of backwages was based on the alleged refusal of the employer to comply with the
Return to Work Order, the same should be set aside for being without basis. commission of illegal acts are
deemed to have lost their employment status. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay the employees who did not
participate in the commission of illegal acts during the strike separation pay.

BAGUIO COLLEGES VS. NLRC

• Complainants Alma Angiwan, Danilo Soriano and Restituto Rivera were hired respectively in November 1987,
June 1978 and May 1982.
• Alma Angiwan is not a member of the Union while the latter two complainants are members of Kapisanan at
Lakas ng mga Guro sa BCF-ALU which staged a strike.
• the Secretary of Labor and Employment Franklin M. Drilon issued an order directing the striking employees to
return to work at the opening of the school year 1988-89 and for the school to accept them all under the same
terms and conditions prior to the work stoppage.
• Baguio Colleges Foundation, through its community newspaper, the "Gold Ore," directed all the striking
employees to report to the office of Mrs. Corazon R. Concepcion, Vice-President for Administration of BCF,
between the hours of 8:00 o'clock a.m. to 10:00 o'clock a.m.
• That aside from the published directive, respondent Concepcion likewise issued written directive to the
individual union members directing them to report to her office on said date and time "to signify their
compliance with the order of the Secretary."
• Some of the union members including the complainants who did not read the notice published in the newspaper
(Gold Ore) and who did not receive the directive of Concepcion, failed to report to her (Concepcion) on the date
and time set by her.
• Other union members who received their notices on time reported to Concepcion.
• They were required to enter her office one at a time. Inside her office, they were berated and chastised for
participating in the strike. Concepcion also told them to look for another job and threatened them that she has a
hand in the assignment of teaching loads.
• That later, the complainants came to know of the directive of Concepcion. They went to their office with their
letters signifying their intention to comply with the return to work order of the Secretary.
• However, Concepcion told them that she could no longer accommodate them because they reported only after
or beyond the date and time indicated in her directive and that they violated her written directive.
• Subsequently, the complainants received individual notices signed by respondent Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive
Vice-President of BCF stating that their employment is terminated.
• Claiming that their dismissals were illegal, private respondents filed complaints against petitioners with the
Labor Arbiter.
• Labor Arbiter Gambito rendered a joint decision ORDERING the respondents to reinstate Alma Angiwan,
Danilo Soriano and Restituto Rivera to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and without
reduction in their teaching loads prior to their dismissal and to pay their backwages . nlrc affirmed.

Held: affirmed.

• The precedent case of Union of Filipino Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc. 10 leaves no doubt as to the character
of the Secretary of Labor's Assumption Order (i.e. return-to-work order) and the compliance required of the parties,
as follows:UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied in Art. 264 (g) on the settlement of labor
disputes and this is, that assumption and certification orders are executory in character and are to bestrictly
complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. This extraordinary
authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes,
without jeopardizing national interests.Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the
striking workers must cease and/or desist from any or all acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the
secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-
to-work orders, citingunfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their actions. . . . 11 (Emphasis in
the original)
• Being executory in character, there was nothing for the parties to do but implement the same.
• It could be the case that petitioner school had to know several weeks in advance, who are of the striking teachers
were available for teaching assignments for the school year 1988-89 "because the subject offerings . . . (would) have
to be based on the availability of teachers" 12 but it would have been prudent for petitioner school to file with the
Secretary of Labor a motion for clarification 13 of said assumption order and inform him of petitioner school's
peculiar requirements regarding the offering of subjects based on the availability of teachers which had to be
determined way in advance of actual classes.
• Not having done so and having dismissed private respondents for not reporting on the date the petitioner school had
unilaterally determined, public respondent NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in ruling as follows:
• By directing striking employees to report on a fixed date and time prior (to) the opening of school year 1988-89,
respondents-appellants have indeed varied the tenor of the Return-to-Work Order with the obvious effect of
restrictively changing the time frame set in the Order to only one day. Nothing in the Order had authorized BCF,
either indirectly or impliedly, to alter the period within which striking employees should report at a fixed date and
time, must less clothe it with the power of dismissal over the striking employees who failed to report on the date it
set.
• The return-to-work Order is clear and unambiguous. It admits (of) no further interpretation such as (what) the BCF
would want to be read into it as part of its prerogative, (Rollo, 60), which it, in turn, invokes to justify the dismissal
of herein complainants. The publication of the directive in the community newspaper and the mailing of the same to
the striking employees would not give any added significance to an obviously self-serving act. 14
• Not having found any gave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent NLRC, its findings are conclusive
on this Court as they are supported by substantial evidence. 16 Verily, We have to deny he petition.

INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL VS. SECRETARY

• Prior to the expiration of the CBA between petitioner International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Company) and the
Associated Labor Union (Union), the latter submitted to the Company its economic and political demands. These
were not met by the Company, hence a deadlock ensued.
• the Union filed a notice of strike National Conciliation and Mediation Board. After all conciliation efforts had failed,
the Union went on strike on August 8, 1989 and the Company's operations were completely paralyzed.
• Subsequently, three other labor cases involving the same parties were filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) to wit:

(1) International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs. Associated Labor Union, NLRC Case No. VII-09-0810-89, 1 a petition for
injunction and damages with temporary restraining order filed by the Company against the Union and some of its
members for picketing the Company's establishment in Cebu, Davao, and Metro Manila allegedly without the
required majority of the employees approving and agreeing to the strike and with simulated strike votes, in direct
violation of the provisions of their collective bargaining agreement and in total and complete defiance of the
provisions of the Labor Code;
(2) Associated Labor Union vs. International Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., NLRC Case No-VII-08-0715-89, 2 a
complaint for unfair labor practice with prayer for damages and attorney's fees filed by the Union against the
Company, its personnel manager, and the Workers Alliance of Trade Unions (WATU) as a result of the Company's
refusal to include the sales workers in the bargaining unit resulting in a deadlock in the bargaining negotiations; for
coddling the respondent WATU as a separate bargaining agent of the sales workers despite a contrary ruling of the
Med-Arbiter; and undue interference by the Company in the right of the workers to self-organization through
harassment and dispersal of a peaceful picket during the strike; and
(3) International Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al. vs. Associated Labor Union, NLRC Case No. VII-08-0742-89, 3 a petition
to declare the strike illegal with prayer for damages filed by the Company alleging, among others, that the notice of
strike filed by the Union with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board did not conform with the requirements
of the Labor Code, and that the Union, in violation of the Labor Code provisions on the conduct of the strike, totally
blockaded and continued to blockade the ingress and egress of the Company's premises by human barricades,
placards, benches and other obstructions, completely paralyzing its business operations.

• Meanwhile, considering that the Company belongs to an industry indispensable to national interest, it being engaged
in the manufacture of drugs and pharmaceuticals and employing around 600 workers, then Acting Secretary of
Labor, Ricardo C. Castro, invoking Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, issued an order dated September 26, 1989
assuming jurisdiction over the aforesaid case and directing the parties to return to the status quo before the work
stoppage.
• the Union filed a motion in NCMB-, the case over which jurisdiction had been assumed by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment (hereafter referred to as the Secretary), seeking the consolidation of the three NLRC with the first
stated case.  granted.

Issue: whether or not the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment has the power to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its incidental controversies, including unfair labor practice cases, causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest? Yes

Held: dismissed.

• The foregoing provisions persuade us that the Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion when he issued the
questioned orders.
• As early as 1913, this Court laid down in Herrera vs. Baretto, et al., 7 the fundamental normative rule that
jurisdiction is the authority to bear and determine a cause — the right to act in a case. However, this should be
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a case at all and not the decision rendered
therein is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision
of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. 8
• In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority to
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume
jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising
therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.
• Moreover, Article 217 of the Labor Code is not without, but contemplates, exceptions thereto. This is evident from
the opening proviso therein reading "(e)xcept as otherwise provided under this Code . . ." Plainly, Article 263 (g) of
the Labor Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters share
jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. 9 Otherwise, the Secretary would not be able to effectively and
efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable
result wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may have diametrically opposed rulings. As we
have said, "(i)t is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather
than defeat it." 10
• In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of the Secretary as authorized by Article 263 (g) of
the Labor Code and Article 217 (a) (1) and (5) of the same Code, taken conjointly and rationally construed to
subserve the objective of the jurisdiction vested in the Secretary.
• In the present case, however, by virtue of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary has been conferred
jurisdiction over cases which would otherwise be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters.
There was an existing labor dispute as a result of a deadlock in the negotiation for a collective bargaining agreement
and the consequent strike, over which the Secretary assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor
Code. The three NLRC cases were just offshoots of the stalemate in the negotiations and the strike. We,
therefore, uphold the Secretary's order to consolidate the NLRC cases with the labor dispute pending before
him and his subsequent assumption of jurisdiction over the said NLRC cases for him to be able to
competently and efficiently dispose of the dispute in its totality.
• Petitioner's thesis that Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is null and void has no merit. The
aforesaid rule has been promulgated to implement and enforce Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. The rule is in
harmony with the objectives sought to be achieved by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, particularly the Secretary's
assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute and his subsequent disposition of the same in the most expeditious
and conscientious manner. To be able to completely dispose of a labor dispute, all its incidents would have to be
taken into consideration. Clearly, the purpose of the questioned regulation is to carry into effect the broad provisions
of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code.

UNION OF FILIPINO EMPLOYEES VS. NESTLE

In NCR 12-4007-85 and NCR 1-295-86:


• UFE filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations against Filipro (Nestle).
• UFE filed a complaint for (ULP) against Nestle and its officials for violation of the Labor Code (Art. 94) on Holiday
Pay, non-implementation of the CBA provisions (Labor Management Corporation scheme), Financial Assistance
and other unfair labor practice .
• Acting on Nestle’s petition seeking assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute or its certification to the NLRC
for compulsory arbitration, then Minister of Labor and Employment Blas F. Ople assumed jurisdiction and issued
the following order:
o In line with this assumption a strike, lockout, or any other form of concerted action such as slowdowns, sit-
downs, noise barrages during office hours, which tend to disrupt company operations, are strictly enjoined.
• UFE filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order, with this Court assailing
the assumption of jurisdiction by the Minister.
• Notwithstanding the automatic injunction against any concerted activity, and an absence of a restraining order, the
union members, at the instigation of its leaders, and in clear defiance of Minister Ople’s Order, staged a strike and
continued to man picket lines.
• Likewise, the union officers and members distributed leaflets to employees and passersby advocating a boycott of
company products
• Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegal premised on violation of the CBA provisions on “no strike/no
lockout” clause and the grievance machinery provisions on settlement of disputes.
• then Labor Minister Ople issued another Order, with this disposition:
o this Office hereby orders all the striking workers to report for work and the company to accept them under
the same terms and conditions prevailing before the work stoppage within (48) hours from notice of this
Order.
• the new Minister of Labor and Employment, Augusto B. Sanchez, issued a Resolution, the relevant portions of
which stated thus:
o “This Office hereby enjoins all striking workers to return-to-work immediately and management to accept
them under the same terms and conditions prevailing previous to the work stoppage except as qualified in
this resolution.
• the strikers returned to work.
• We granted UFE’s Motion to Withdraw its Petition for Certiorari
• Minister Sanchez rendered a Decision,:
• the Union charge for unfair labor practices is hereby dismissed for want of merit. Nestle Philippines is hereby
directed to make good its promise to grant an additional benefit in the form of bonus equivalent to one (1) month’s
gross compensation to all employees entitled to the same in addition to the one-month weighted average pay granted
by this office in the return-to-work Order.”
• Minister Sanchez modified the foregoing decision as follows:
• “1. Nestle Philippines is directed to pay the Anniversary bonus equivalent to one month basic salary to all its
employees in lieu of the one month gross compensation previously ordered by this office.”
• after trial on the merits, Labor Arbiter Eduardo G. Magno issued his decision, disposing as follows: 1. Declaring the
strike illegal.
In RAB-X-2-0047-86:
• Filipro (Nestle) and the Cagayan de Oro Filipro Workers Union-WATU, renewed a 3-year contract. Petitioners
signed the CBA as the duly-elected officers of the Union.
• the union officers, together with other members of the union sent a letter to Workers Alliance Trade Unions
(WATU), advising them “that henceforth we shall administer the CBA by ourselves and with the help of the (UFE)
to where we have allied ourselves.”
• WATU disregarded the unions’ advice, claiming to be the contracting party of the CBA. UFE filed a petition for
administration of the existing CBAs at Cebu, Davao and Cagayan de Oro bargaining units against TUPAS and
WATU.
• the rank and file employees of the company staged a strike at the instigation of the UFE officers, who had
represented themselves as officers.
• Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegal. The strikers countered that their strike was legal because the same
was staged pursuant to the notice of strike filed by UFE on November 14, 1985
• of which they claim to be members, having disaffiliated themselves from CDO-FWU-WATU.
• Executive Labor Arbiter Zosimo Vasallo issued his decision, disposing as follows:
1. “Declaring the strike illegal;
2. “Declaring respondent union guilty of unfair labor practice; and
3. “Declaring the following individual respondent Union officers namelyxxx to have lost their employment
status.”

3. In NCR-00-09-03285-87.
• UFE, its officers and members staged a walkout from their jobs, and participated in the Welga ng Bayan. Nestlé
filed a petition to declare the walkout illegal
• complainants (UFE) again did not proceed to their work, but joined the picket line in sympathy with the striking
workers of Southern Textile Mills, which became the subject of an Illegal Strike Petition
• UFE its officers and members just left their work premises and marched towards Calamba in a demonstration over
the slaying of a labor leader, hence a complaint for Illegal was filed by Nestle ;
• UFE filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (to protest the unfair labor practices of Nestle, such
as hiring of contractual workers to perform regular jobs and wage discrimination)
• then Minister Augusto S. Sanchez certified the labor dispute to the Commission for compulsory arbitration, strictly
enjoining any intended or actual strike or lockout
• UFE union officers and members at the Cabuyao factory again abandoned their jobs and just walked out, leaving
unfinished products on line and raw materials leading to their spoilage. The walk-out resulted in economic losses to
the company. Nestle filed a Petition to Declare the Walkout Illegal.
• UFE union officers and members at the Alabang factory also left their jobs in sympathy with the walkout staged by
their Cabuyao counterparts. Nestle filed again a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal
• UFE union members at the Alabang and Cabuyao factories, in disregard of the Memorandum of Agreement entered
into by the Union and Management on August 21, 1987, (to exert their best efforts for the normalization of
production targets and standards and to consult each other on any matter that may tend to disrupt production to attain
industrial peace) participated in an indignation rally in Cabuyao because of the death of two (2) members of
PAMANTIC, and in Alabang because one of their members was allegedly mauled by a policeman during the
nationwide strike on August 26, 1987 (p. 408, Rollo);
• around 6:00 P.M. all sections at the Alabang factory went on a 20-minute mealbreak simultaneously, contrary to the
agreement and despite
• admonition of supervisors, resulting in complete stoppage of their production lines. Responsible officials namely:
Eugenio San Pedro, Carlos Jose, and Cesar Ponce, were suspended from work for six (6) days without pay
• at the instigation of UFE union officers, all workers staged a sitdown strike; and
• Cabuyao’s culinary section’s union members sympathized with the sitdown strike at Alabang, followed at 12:30
P.M. by the whole personnel of the production line and certain areas in the Engineering Department. These sitdown
strikes at the Alabang and Cabuyao factories became the subject of two separate petitions to declare the strike illegal
• Hon. F. Drilon issued the following order:
• “All the workers are hereby directed to return to work immediately, refrain from resorting to any further slowdown,
sitdown strike, walkout and any other kind of activities that may tend to disrupt the normal operations of the
company. The company is directed to accept all employees and to resume normal operations.
• Parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that would aggravate the
situation.”
• Despite the order, UFE staged a strike without notice of strike, strike vote and in blatant defiance of then Labor
Minister Sanchez’s certification order dated November 23, 1986 and Secretary Drilon’s return-to-work order dated
September 8, 1987.”
• Nestle sent individual letter of termination dismissing them from the service effective immediately for knowingly
instigating and participating in an illegal strike, defying the order of the Secretary of Labor, and other illegal acts.
• UFE filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal, ULP and damages. Labor Arbiter Evangeline Lubaton ruled on both
issues of dismissal and strike legality, upon the premise that the issue on validity of the dismissal of the individual
complainants from employment “depends on the resolution of the issue on whether or not the strike declared by
complainants was illegal.” chanroblespublishingcompany
• Dismissing the instant complaint for lack of merit; and
• Confirming the dismissal of all individual complainants herein as valid and legally justified.”
• The NLRC affirmed the unanimous decisions of the three labor arbiters which declared the strikes illegal, premised
on the view that “the core of the controversy rests upon the legality of the strikes.”
• Hence this petition.
Held: affirmed.
1. UFE questions the power of the Secretary of Labor under Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute tainted with national interests, or to certify the same for compulsory
arbitration. UFE contends that Arts. 263 and 264 are based on the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 9 of
Art. II thereof, the pertinent portion of which reads:
• “Sec. 9. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration.” (p. 801, Rollo)
• UFE argues that since the aforecited provision of Sec. 9 is no longer found in the 1987
Constitution, Arts. 263(g) and 264 of the Labor Code are now “unconstitutional and must be
ignored.”
- We are not persuaded. We agree with the Solicitor General that on the contrary, both provisions are still
applicable.
- We quote:
- “Article 7 of the New Civil Code declares that:
- ‘Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.
- “In the case at bar, no law has ever been passed by Congress expressly repealing Articles 263 and 264
of the Labor Code. Neither may the 1987 Constitution be considered to have impliedly repealed the
said Articles considering that there is no showing that said articles are inconsistent with the said
Constitution. Moreover, no court has ever declared that the said articles are inconsistent with the
1987 Constitution.
- “On the contrary, the continued validity and operation of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code has been
recognized by no less than the Congress of the Philippines when the latter enacted into law R.A. 6715,
otherwise known as Herrera Law, Section 27 of which amended paragraphs (g) and (i) of Article 263 of
the Labor Code.
- “At any rate, it must be noted that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have been enacted pursuant
to the police power of the State, which has been defined as the power inherent in a Government to enact
laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society
2. On the issue of the legality of the strike committed, UFE seeks to absolve itself by pointing out
qualifying factors such as motives, good faith, absence of findings on specific participation and/or
liability, and limiting the no-strike provision to economic strikes.
• UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied in Art. 264(g) on the settlement of labor
disputes and this is, that assumption and certification orders are executory in character and are to be strictly
complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. This
extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy
solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests.
• Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or
desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor,
• once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work
orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their actions.
• Thus, the NLRC in its decision, re-emphasized the nature of a return-to-work order within the context of
Art. 264(g) as amended by BP Nos. 130 and 227:
• “One other point that must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issued pending the
determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if
the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the
status quo while the determination is being made. Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike is
legal can refuse to return to work to their work and cause a standstill on the company operations while
retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill. Worse, they will also claim
payment for work not done, on the ground that they are still legally employed although actually engaged in
the activities inimical to their employer’s interest. (Emphasis supplied) chanroblespublishingcompany
• “The return to work order does not so much confer a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may
be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker’s will. Returning to work in this
situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job
together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving
the public and promoting its interest.”
• We also wish to point out that an assumption and/or certification order of the Secretary of Labor
automatically results in a return-to-work of all striking workers, whether or not a corresponding order has
been issued by the Secretary of Labor. Thus, the striking workers erred when they continued with their
strike alleging absence of a return-to-work order. Article 264(g) is clear. Once an assumption/certification
order is issued, strikes are enjoined, or if one has already taken place, all strikers shall immediately return
to work.
• A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification
order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the
Labor Code as amended (Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. 82088, October 13, 1989; 178
SCRA 482). The Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status
for having knowingly participated in an illegal act.
3. STRIKE IS ILLEGAL
• The NLRC also gave the following reasons:
• The strike was staged in violation of the existing CBA provisions on “No Strike/No Lockout Clause”
stating that a strike, which is in violation of the terms of the collective bargaining statement, is illegal,
especially when such terms provide for conclusive arbitration clause .The main purpose of such an
agreement is to prevent a strike and it must, therefore, be adhered to strictly and respected if their ends are
to be achieved.
• Instead of exhausting all the steps provided for in the grievance machinery provided for in the collective
bargaining agreement to resolve the dispute amicably and harmoniously within the plant level, UFE went
on strike .
• The prescribed mandatory cooling-off period and then 7-day strike and after submission of the report of
strike vote at Nestle’s Makati Offices and Muntinlupa and Cabuyao Plants were not complied with while
no notice of strike was filed by respondents when they staged the strike at Nestle’s Cagayan de Oro Plant
(contrary to the pertinent provision of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, emphasizing that “the
mandatory character of these cooling-off periods has already been categorically ruled upon by the Supreme
Court”
• In carrying out the strike, coercion, force, intimidation, violence with physical injuries, sabotage, and the
use of unnecessary and obscene language or epithets were committed by the respondent officials and
members of either UFE or WATU. It is well-settled that a strike conducted in this manner is illegal .In fact,
criminal cases were filed with the Makati Fiscal’s Office (p. 402, Rollo). chanroblespublishingcompany
• Thus, the NLRC correctly upheld the illegality of the strikes and the corresponding dismissal of the
individual complainants because of their “brazen disregard of successive lawful orders of then Labor
Ministers Blas F. Ople, Augusto Sanchez and Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon dated December 11, 1985,
January 30, 1986 and February 4, 1986, respectively, and the cavalier treatment of the provisions of the
Labor Code and the return-to-work orders of the Minister (now Secretary) of Labor and Employment, or
Articles 264 and 265 (now renumbered Arts. 263 and 264),
4. On the alleged lack of jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter Lubaton, NLRC has clarified that the question on the
legality of strike was properly resolved by the Labor Arbiter, not only because the question is perfectly
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter to adjudicate, but also because the issue
was not subsumed by the Order of Labor Minister Sanchez, dated December 23, 1986, certifying the Notice
of Strike dated December 4, 1986 for compulsory arbitration, further clarifying that the issue of whether or
not the strike staged on September 11, 1987 by UFE and its officials and members was illegal is a
prejudicial question to the issue of whether or not the complainants were illegally dismissed.

FEU-VS. FEU-NRMF
• Petitioner FEU-NRMF and respondent union entered into a (CBA) that will expire on 30 April 1996.
• In view of the forthcoming expiry, respondent union, sent a letter-proposal 4 to petitioner FEU-NRMF stating therein
their economic and non-economic proposals for the negotiation of the new CBA.
• Petitioner FEU-NRMF replied rejecting respondent union’s demands and proposed to maintain the same provisions
of the old CBA. It reasoned out that due to financial constraints, it cannot afford to accede to a number of their
demands for educational and death benefits, uniforms, longetivity pay, meal allowance and special pay, but
nevertheless gave an assurance that it will seriously consider their proposal on salary increase.
• subsequent conciliation proceedings were conducted before the (NCMB-NCR) but the negotiation failed.
• Respondent union filed a Notice of Strike before NCMB-NCR on the ground of bargaining deadlock.
• A strike vote was conducted and the result thereof was submitted to NCMB-NCR.
• After the expiration of the thirty-day cooling off period and the seven-day strike ban, respondent union, on 6
September 1996, staged a strike.6
• Before the strike was conducted, respondent union offered a skeletal force of nursing and health personnel who
will man the hospital’s operation for the duration of the strike. For reasons unknown to respondent union,
however, petitioner FEU-NRMF failed or refused to accept the offer.
• For its part, petitioner FEU-NRMF, filed a Petition for the Assumption of Jurisdiction or for Certification of Labor
Dispute with the (NLRC), underscoring the fact that it is a medical institution engaged in the business of providing
health care for its patients.7
• the Secretary of Labor, granted the petition and thus issued an Order 8 assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute,
thereby prohibiting any strike or lockout whether actual or impending, and enjoining the parties from committing
any acts which may exacerbate the situation.
• the NLRC process server, certified that, at around 4:00 P.M., he attempted to serve a copy of the Assumption of
Jurisdiction Order to the union officers but since no one was around at the strike area, he just posted copies of the
said Order at several conspicuous places within the premises of the hospital.
• Claiming that they had no knowledge that the Secretary of Labor already assumed jurisdiction over the pending
labor dispute as they were not able to receive a copy of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order, striking employees
continued holding a strike until 12 September 1996.
• the Secretary of Labor issued another Order9 directing all the striking employees to return to work and the petitioner
FEU-NRMF to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.
• Accordingly, a Return to Work Agreement was executed by the disputing parties, whereby striking employees
agreed to return to their work and the petitioner FEU-NRMF undertook to accept them under status pro ante. On the
same day, the striking employees returned to their respective stations.
• Subsequently, petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a case before the NLRC, contending that respondent union staged the
strike in defiance of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order; hence, it was illegal. Further, the said strike was
conducted in a deleterious and prejudicial manner, endangering the lives of the patients confined at the hospital.
• petitioner FEU-NRMF specifically alleged that the striking employees effectively barricaded the ingress and egress
of the hospital, thus, preventing trucks carrying the supplies of medicines and food for the patients from entering the
hospital’s premises. In one instance, an ambulance carrying a patient in critical condition was likewise prevented
from passing through the blockade. Finally, respondent union also prevented patients from seeking medical
assistance by blocking their way into the hospital. In order to redress the wrongful and illegal acts of the respondent
union, petitioner FEU-NRMF prayed for the declaration that the strike is illegal and, resultantly, for the dismissal of
the striking employees and decertification of the respondent union, plus damages.
• respondent union avers that petitioner FEU-NRMF refused to bargain collectively despite hefty financial gains and,
thus, guilty of surface bargaining. Before staging a strike, respondent union complied with the procedural
requirements by filing a notice of strike and strike vote with the NCMB-NCR. The thirty-day cooling off period and
the seven-day strike ban was also fully observed.
• Respondent union also offered a skeletal work force but it was refused by petitioner FEU-NRMF. The strike was
conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner where striking employees merely sat down outside the hospital’s
premises with their placards airing their grievances.
• the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision10 declaring the strike illegal NLRC AFFIRMED. CA REVERSED.
HELD: DENIED.
1. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE OF THE ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION ORDER WAS
VALIDLY EFFECTED.
• It can be inferred from the foregoing that the process server resorted to posting the Order when personal service
was rendered impossible since the striking employees were not present at the strike area. This mode of service,
however, is not sanctioned by either the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure or the Revised Rules of Court.
• The pertinent provisions of the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure21 read:
• Section 6. Service of Notices and Resolutions.
• (a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the
Bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by registered mail;
Provided that in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court; Provided further, that in cases of decisions and final awards,
copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel or representative by registered mail;
• An Order issued by the Secretary of Labor assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute is not a final
judgment for it does not dispose of the labor dispute with finality. 22 Consequently, the rule on service of
summons and orders, and not the proviso on service of decisions and final awards, governs the service of the
Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.
• Under the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, service of copies of orders should be made by the process server
either personally or through registered mail. However, due to the urgent nature of the Assumption of
Jurisdiction Order and the public policy underlying the injunction carried by the issuance of the said Order,
service of copies of the same should be made in the most expeditious and effective manner, without any delay,
ensuring its immediate receipt by the intended parties as may be warranted under the circumstances.
Accordingly, in this case, personal service is the proper mode of serving the Assumption of Jurisdiction
Order.
• It is also provided under the same rules that in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.23
• Parenthetically, the manner upon which personal service may be made is prescribed by the following provisions
of the Revised Rules of Court:
• Rule 13. Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments And Other Papers.
• Section 6. Personal service. – Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or
his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. if no person is
found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving a copy, between the hours of
eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of
sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.
• Let it be recalled that the process server merely posted copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order in
conspicuous places in the hospital. Such posting is not prescribed by the rules, nor is it even referred to
when the said rules enumerated the different modes of effecting substituted service, in case personal
service is impossible by the absence of the party concerned.
• Clearly, personal service effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement
of due process is accomplished. If, however, efforts to find the party concerned personally would make
prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, that is, by leaving a copy,
between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if
known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.
• Worthy to note that in a number of cases, we have ruled that defiance of the assumption and return-to-work
orders of the Secretary of Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for the loss of employment
status of any striking union officer or member.26 Employment is a property right of which one cannot be
deprived of without due process.27 Due process here would demand that the respondent union be
properly notified of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order of the Secretary of Labor enjoining the strike
and requiring its members to return to work. Thus, there must be a clear and unmistakable proof that
the requirements prescribed by the Rules in the manner of effecting personal or substituted service had
been faithfully complied with.
• Merely posting copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order does not satisfy the rigid requirement for
proper service outlined by the above stated rules. Needless to say, the manner of service made by the
process server was invalid and irregular. Respondent union could not therefore be adjudged to have
defied the said Order since it was not properly apprised thereof. Accordingly, the strike conducted by the
respondent union was valid under the circumstances.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE STRIKE CONDUCTED BY THE RESPONDENT UNION WAS ILLEGAL.
• For a strike to be valid, the following requisites must concur: (1) the thirty-day notice or the fifteen-day notice,
in case of unfair labor practices; (2) the two-thirds (2/3) required vote to strike done by secret ballot; and (3) the
submission of the strike vote to the Department of Labor and Employment at least seven days prior to the
strike.28
• In addition, in case of strikes in hospitals, clinics and medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking
employees to provide and maintain an effective and skeletal workforce of medical and other health personnel in
order to insure the proper and adequate protection of the life and health of its patients.29 These procedural
requirements, along with the mandatory cooling off and strike ban periods had been fully observed by the
respondent union.
• It is true that the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal even if the procedural
requisites before staging a strike were satisfied.30 However, in the absence of evidence to support the allegations
that the respondent union did not commit illegal acts during the strike, we are constrained to dismiss the
allegations and uphold the strike as a valid exercise of the worker’s constitutional right to self-organization and
collective bargaining.
• The affidavits presented by the petitioner FEU-NRMF and relied upon by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, in
arriving at the conclusion that the respondent union committed illegal acts during the strike, could not be given
probative value by this Court as the adverse party was not given a chance to cross-examine the affiants. In a
catena of labor cases, this Court has consistently held that where the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.31 Neither can this Court rely on the photographs
supporting these allegations without verifying its authenticity.
MSF VS. CA

• A labor dispute arose between Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation (Philtread) and private respondent, Philtread
Tire Workers' Union (Union)
• as a result of which the Union filed a notice of strike in the NCMB charging Philtread with ULP for allegedly
engaging in union-busting for violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
• This was followed by picketing and the holding of assemblies by the Union outside the gate of Philtread's plant.
• Philtread, on the other hand, filed a notice of lock-out which it carried out on June 15, 1994.
• then Secretary of Labor Nieves Confesor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified it for compulsory
arbitration.
• She enjoined the Union from striking and Philtread from locking out members of the Union.
• During the pendency of the labor dispute, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre Public
Company Limited (Siam Tyre), a subsidiary of Siam Cement.
o Under the Memorandum of Agreement, Philtread's plant and equipment would be sold to a new company
(MSF Tire and Rubber, Inc.), 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by Philtread,
o while the land on which the plant was located would be sold to another company (Sucat Land
Corporation), 60% of which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre.
• This was done and the Union was informed of the purchase of the plant by petitioner. Petitioner then asked the
Union to desist from picketing outside its plant and to remove the banners, streamers, and tent which it had placed
outside the plant's fence.
• As the Union refused petitioner's request, petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with damages against the Union
and the latter's officers and directors before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
• the Union moved to dismiss the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. It insisted that
the parties were involved in a labor dispute and that petitioner, being a mere "alter ego" of Philtread, was not an
"innocent bystander."
• After petitioner made its offer of evidence as well as the submission of the parties' respective memoranda, the trial
court, in an order, denied petitioner's application for injunction and dismissed the complaint. However, on
petitioner's motion, the trial court, reconsidered its order, and granted an injunction.
• Without filing a motion for reconsideration, the Union filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court
of Appeals.
• the appellate court rendered a decision granting the Union's petition and ordering the trial court to dismiss the civil
case for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: whether petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the issuance of a writ of injunction under the "innocent
bystander" rule?

• Second. Petitioner asserts that its status as an "innocent bystander" with respect to the labor dispute between
Philtread and the Union entitles it to a writ of injunction from the civil courts and that the appellate court erred in not
upholding its corporate personality as independent of Philtread's.
• In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribel, 11 this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
stated the "innocent bystander" rule as follows:
o The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it can not be curtailed even in the absence
of employer-employee relationship.
o The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise
of free speech, we believe the courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of
communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest,
and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to
the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or "innocent
bystanders" if it appears that the inevitable result of its is to create an impression that a labor dispute with
which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an
invasion of their rights. In one case decided by this Court, we upheld a trial court's injunction prohibiting
the union from blocking the entrance to a feed mill located within the compound of a flour mill with which
the union had a dispute. Although sustained on a different ground, no connection was found between the
two mills owned by two different corporations other than their being situated in the same premises. It is to
be noted that in the instances cited, peaceful picketing has not been totally banned but merely regulated.
And in one American case, a picket by a labor union in front of a motion picture theater with which the
union had a labor dispute was enjoined by the court from being extended in front of the main entrance of
the building housing the theater wherein other stores operated by third persons were located. 12 (Emphasis
added)
• Thus, an "innocent bystander," who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court that aside from the grounds
specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it is entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either
party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof. For instance, inPAFLU
v. Cloribel, supra, this Court held that Wellington and Galang were entirely separate entities, different from, and
without any connection whatsoever to, the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, against whom the strike was
directed, other than the incidental fact that they are the bank's landlord and co-lessee housed in the same building,
respectively. Similarly, in Liwayway Publications, Inc. v. Permanent Concrete Workers Union,13 this Court ruled
that Liwayway was an "innocent bystander" and thus entitled to enjoin the union's strike because Liwayway's only
connection with the employer company was the fact that both were situated in the same premises.
• In the case at bar, petitioner cannot be said not to have such on to the dispute. As correctly observed by the appellate
court:
o Coming now to the case before us, we find that the "negotiation, contract of sale, and the post transaction"
between Philtread, as vendor, and Siam Tyre, as vendee, reveals a legal relation between them which, in the
interest of petitioner, we cannot ignore. To be sure, the transaction between Philtread and Siam Tyre, was
not a simple sale whereby Philtread ceased to have any proprietary rights over its sold assets. On the
contrary, Philtread remains as 20% owner of private respondent and 60% owner of Sucat Land Corporation
which was likewise incorporated in accordance with the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement with
Siam Tyre, and which now owns the land were subject plant is located. This, together with the fact that
private respondent uses the same plant or factory; similar or substantially the same working conditions;
same machinery, tools, and equipment; and manufacture the same products as Philtread, lead us to safely
conclude that private respondent's personality is so closely linked to Philtread as to bar its entitlement to an
injunctive writ. Stated differently, given its close links with Philtread as to bar its entitlement to an
injunctive writ. Stated differently, given its close links with Philtread, we find no clear and unmistakable
right on the part of private respondent to entitle it to the writ of preliminary injunction it prayed for below.
o xxx xxx xxx
o We stress that in so ruling, we have not touched on the issue of . . . whether or not private is a mere dummy
or continuation of Philtread . . . .14
• Although, as petitioner contends, the corporate fiction may be disregarded where it is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, or where the corporation is used as a mere alter-ego or
business conduit,15 it is not these standards but those of the "innocent bystander" rule which govern whether or not
petitioner is to an injunctive writ. Since petitioner is not an "innocent bystander", the trial court's order, dated
July 2, 1996, is a patent nullity, the trial court having no jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction. No motion
for reconsideration need be filed where the order is null and void.16

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