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Public Corporation and Local Governments

private corporations, such as powers

to hold property, to sue and be sued,
A. Public Corporation to use a common seal.
● Employees are registered and
1.Concept covered by SSS instead by GSIS.
● Even if impressed with public interest
Organized for the government of a portion of (to secure the protection and welfare
the State of animals) does not, by that
circumstance alone, make it as public
Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
● It is considered as QUASI-PUBLIC
to Animals v. COA, GR 169752, September 25, CORPORATION - which are private
2007 corporations that render public
PSPCA was incorporated as juridical entity by service, supply public wants, or
virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on year 1905. pursue other eleemosynary
At that time, both the Corporation Law and the objectives.
Constitution of SEC was not yet existing. ● The true criterion, therefore, to
determine whether a corporation is
When COA was to perform an audit, they public or private is found in the totality
refused on ground that it is a private entity. of the relation of the corporation to the
State. If the corporation is created by
the State as the latter’s own agency
ISSUE: or instrumentality to help it in carrying
Whether petitioner may be subject to the COA out its governmental functions, then
audit? that corporation is considered public;
otherwise, it is private.
The test to determine whether a corporation is
a GOCC or private in nature are as follow:
● Is it created by its own charter for the
Public Corporation v. Government-owned or
exercise of a public function or by
incorporation under the general controlled corporations
corporation law?
○ GOCC - with special charter Public corporation broader in scope. It covers
○ Private - with general charter municipal corporations and government
owned and controlled corporation.
In this case, this charter test will not apply
since it was only introduced by 1935 A government-owned or controlled corporation
Constitution. All statutes are to be construed is a stock or a non-stock corporation, whether
as having prospective operation, unless the performing governmental or proprietary
purpose and intention of the legislature to give functions, which is directly chartered by a
retrospective application is expressly declared special law or if organized under the general
or is necessarily implied from the language corporation law is owned or controlled by the
used. government directly, or indirectly through a
parent corporation or subsidiary corporation,
IT IS A PRIVATE ENTITY to the extent of at least a majority of its
● Not subject to control or supervision outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding
by any agency unlike GOCC voting capital stock.
● No government representative sits on
the Board of Trustees
● The successors of its members are
voluntarily and solely in accordance
with its by-laws and may exercise 2.Classifications
those powers generally accorded to
a) Quasi-corporation: created by the State for a
duties pertaining thereto, their acts are
narrow or limited purpose. political and governmental.

b) Municipal corporation: a body politic and Their officers and agents in such capacity,
corporate constituted by the incorporation of the though elected or appointed by them, are
inhabitants for purposes of local government. public functionaries performing public service,
and as such they are officers, agents, and
servants of the State. In the other capacity,
B. Municipal Corporations the municipality exercise a private, proprietary
or corporate right, arising from their exercise
1. Elements: legal creation or incorporation, as legal persons and not as public agencies.
corporate name, inhabitants and territory.
Municipal corporations are not liable for
damages for acts done in the performance of
a. Legal Creation or Incorporation - law governmental functions provided its officers
creating or authorizing the creation or performed it in good faith and did not act
incorporation of a municipal wantonly and maliciously.
b. Corporate Name - name by which the However, if the acts were done in the
corporation shall be known performance of proprietary functions, the
c. Inhabitants - the people residing in the municipality may be held liable for the acts of
territory of the corporation its agents under the doctrine of respondeat
d. Territory - the land mass where the superior.
inhabitants reside, together with the
internal and external waters, and the In this case, the holding of town fiesta is a
air space above the land and waters proprietary function. The Municipality of
Malasique, Pangasinan, was held liable for
the death of a member of a zarzuela group
when the stage collapsed, under the principle
2. Nature and functions of respondeat superior.
Section 15, Local Government Code

Every local government unit created or City of Manila vs. Intermediate Appellate court,
recognized under this Code is a body politic 179 SCRA 428
and corporate endowed with powers to be
exercised by it in conformity with law. It shall
exercise powers as a political subdivision of The City of Manila is a political body corporate
the national government and as a corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of
entity representing the inhabitants of its municipal corporations to be exercised by and
territory. through its city government in conformity with
law, and in its proper corporate name.
Torio vs. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599 It may sue and be sued.
It may contract and be contracted with.
Its powers are two-folds:
A municipal corporation proper has a public
character as regards the State at large insofar 1. Public, governmental or political
as it is its agent in the government and private 2. Corporate, Private, Proprietary
insofar as it promote local necessities and
conveniences for its own community. Governmental Powers are those exercised in
administering the powers of the State and
promoting the public welfare and they include
Municipal corporations exist in a dual
the legislative, judicial, public and political.
capacity, and their functions are two-fold. In
one, they exercise the right springing from
Municipal powers on the one hand are
sovereignty, and while in the performance of
exercised for the special benefit and
advantage of the community and include Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be
those which are ministerial, private and attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF),
corporate the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Land
Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of
In this case, the operation of public cemetery Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
is a proprietary function of the City of Manila.
The City is liable for the tortious acts of its Section 8. Division and merger of existing local
employees, under the principle of respondeat government units shall comply with the same
superior. requirements herein prescribed for their creation:
Provided, however, That such division shall not
reduce the income, population, or land area of the
local government unit or units concerned to less
3. Requisites for creation, conversion, division, than the minimum requirements prescribed in this
merger or dissolution Code: Provided, further, That the income
classification of the original local government unit
Sections 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, Local Government or units shall not fall below its current
Code classification prior to such division.
The income classification of local government
units shall be updated within six (6) months from
Section 6. A local government unit may be created, the effectivity of this Code to reflect the changes in
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries their financial position resulting from the increased
substantially altered either by law enacted by revenues as provided herein.
Congress in the case of province, city,
municipality, or any other political subdivision, or Section 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. -
by ordinance passed by the sangguniang A local government unit may be abolished when
panlalawigan or sangguiniang panlungsod its income, population, or land area has been
concerned in the case of barangay located within irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum
its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such standards prescribed for its creation under Book III
limitations and requirements prescribed in this of this Code, as certified by the national agencies
Code. mentioned in Section 7 hereof to Congress or to
the sangguniang concerned, as the case may be.
Section 7. As a general rule, the creation of a local The law or ordinance abolishing a local
government unit or its conversion from one level government unit shall specify the province, city,
to another level shall be based on a verifiable municipality, or barangay with which the local
indicators of viability and projected capacity to government unit sought to be abolished will be
provide services, to wit: incorporated or merged.
a. Income – it must be sufficient, based on
acceptable standards, to provide for all Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. - No creation,
essential government facilities and services division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration
and special functions commensurate with the of boundaries of local government units shall take
size of its population, as expected of the local effect unless approved by a majority of the votes
government unit concerned; cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
b. Population – it shall be determined as the political unit or units directly affected. Said
total number of inhabitants within the plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission
territorial jurisdiction of the local government on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred
unit concerned; and twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of
c. Land area – it must be contiguous, unless it the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless
comprises two or more islands or is separated said law or ordinance fixes another date.
by a local government unit independent of
others; properly identified by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions; and Section 10, Article X, Philippine Constitution
sufficient to provide for such basic services
and facilities to meet the requirements of the Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, Due to this, Mendenilla’s position as chief of
except in accordance with the criteria established police was given to Onandia.
in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a ISSUE: What legal effects had the conversion
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. of municipality to the city on the existing
municipal offices?
League of Cities v. COMELEC, GR 176951, HELD:
April 12, 2011 With the creation of the City of Legaspi, the
legal personality of the municipality was
extinguished. The new city came into being as
RA 9009 amended the income requirement for a new legal entity or municipal corporation.
the creation of cities including the conversion The consequent effect of said dissolution, was
of a municipality to city from P20M to P100M. the abolition of all municipal offices then
existing under the superseded municipality
After its adoption, Congress passed several except those exempted in the charter itself.
laws converting municipalities into cities
based on the old law (P20M income Since the repeal of the charter destroys all
requirement) and the new law (P100M income offices under it, it also put an end to the
requirement). functions of the incumbents.
Due to this, the constitutionality of the
Cityhood laws were questioned for violation of
Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Municipality of San Narciso vs. Mendez, 239
Constitution. The creation of LGU must follow SCRA 11
the criteria established in the LGC itself (which
is already repealed).
EO 353, creating the municipal district of San
Prior to the adoption of RA 9009, the Andres, was adjudged as unconstitutional in
municipalities covered by the Cityhood laws the case of Pelaez vs. Auditor General. Due to
had pending conversion bills. this, the municipality of San Narciso
questioned the officials’ exercise of duties and
ISSUE functions.
Whether RA 9009 would apply to the pending
conversion bills in the Senate? As a defense, they contend that due to the
enactment of LGC, it converted the municipal
HELD districts organized pursuant to presidential
NO. Congress clearly intended that the LGU issuances or executive orders into regular
covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted municipalities.
from the coverage of RA 9009. Therefore, the
Cityhood laws can become component cities ISSUE
of their respective provinces. Whether San Andres may be recognized as a
regular municipality? YES.

Mendenilla v. Onandia GR L-17803, June 30, The Municipality of San Andres at least
1962 attained a status uniquely of its own closely
approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a
de facto municipal corporation.
Mendenilla was appointed as Chief of Police ● When Pelaez v. Auditor General was
of Municipality of Legaspi, Albay by the promulgated, it was in existence for
Municipal Mayor. Under the new charter of more than six years.
City of Legaspi (RA 2334), the President of ● Certain governmental acts all pointed
the PH became the appointing power in to the State’s recognition of the
relation to the position of Chief of Police.
continued existence of the
Municipality of San Andres. The legal effect of nullification of Andong was
○ After more than five years as to revert the constituent barrios of the voided
a municipal district, EO No. town back into their original municipalities.
174 classified the Municipality
of San Andres as a fifth class
municipality. a. Barangay: Section 386, Local Government
○ It been covered by the 10th Code
Municipal Circuit Court of San
Francisco-San Andres for the
province of Quezon. Section 386. Requisites for Creation. -
(a) A barangay may be created out of a contiguous
Throughout its 30 years of existence, the territory which has a population of at least two
municipal district had exercised the powers thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the
and authority of a duly created local National Statistics Office except in cities and
government institution, and the State had, at municipalities within Metro Manila and other
various times, recognized its continued metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly
existence. urbanized cities where such territory shall have a
certified population of at least five thousand
(5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the creation
thereof shall not reduce the population of the
Camid vs. Office of the President 448 SCRA 711 original barangay or barangays to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed herein.
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the
E.O 353, creating the municipality of Andong, indigenous cultural communities, barangays may
was passed. Later, in the ruling of Pelaez vs. be created in such communities by an Act of
Auditor General, it was adjudged as Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement.
unconstitutional. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay
shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or
ISSUE: by more or less permanent natural boundaries. The
Whether Andong can be recognized as territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
municipal corporation? NO (2) or more islands.
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a
HELD: consolidation plan for barangays, based on the
Municipal corporations may exist by criteria prescribed in this Section, within his
prescription where it shown that the territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted
community has claimed and exercised to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang
corporate functions, with the knowledge and panlungsod concerned for appropriate action.
acquiescence of the legislature, and without
interruption or objection for period long In the case of municipalities within the
enough to afford title by prescription. Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan
political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation
Andong is not similarly entitled to recognition plan shall be prepared and approved by the
as a de facto municipal corporation. The sangguniang bayan concerned.
Executive Order which created Andong was
expressly annulled by the Court in 1965.
b. Municipality: Section 442, Local Government
Andong does not meet the requisites under Code
Sec. 442(d) LGC for said municipality created
by EO may receive recognition. Under said
provision, they must “have their respective set Section 442. Requisites for Creation. -
of elective municipal officials holding office at (a) A municipality may be created if it has an
the time of effectivity of LGC”. In this case, average annual income, as certified by the
Camid admits that Andong has never elected provincial treasurer, of at least Two million five
its municipal officers. hundred thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the
last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991
constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five reduce the land area, population, and income of the
thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by the original unit or units at the time of said creation to
National Statistics Office; and a contiguous less than the minimum requirements prescribed
territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers as herein.
certified by the Lands Management Bureau: (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce city shall be properly identified by metes and
the land area, population or income of the original bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
municipality or municipalities at the time of said apply where the city proposed to be created is
creation to less than the minimum requirements composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory
prescribed herein. need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created more islands.
municipality shall be properly identified by metes (c) The average annual income shall include the
and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
apply where the municipality proposed to be specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring
created is composed of one (1) or more islands. income.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund of the Alvarez vs. Guingona, 352 SCRA 695 (Annual
municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds, Income)
transfers and non-recurring income.
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the
effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and RA 7720, converting the municipality of
operate as such. Existing municipal districts Santiago, Isabela into an independent
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or component city, was passed. Petitioners claim
executive orders and which have their respective that Santiago could not qualify into a
set of elective municipal officials holding office at component city because its average annual
the time of the effectivity of this Code shall income for 2 consecutive years fall below 20M
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. for its conversion into a city. This is contrary to
the certification by Bureau of Local
Government Finance which indicates 20.9M
average annual income. In its computation, it
c. City: Section 450, Local Government Code included the Internal Revenue Allotments.
(RA 9009 increased the 20 Million pesos income
requirement to 100 Million pesos for the last two ISSUE:
Whether the Internal Revenue Allotments are
consecutive years based on 2000 constant
to be included in the computation?
HELD: YES. The Internal Revenue Allotments
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. should be included in the computation of the
average annual income of the municipality for
(a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may
purposes of determining whether the
be converted into a component city if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the municipality may be validly converted into a
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million city.
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
Annual income is defined to be “revenues and
years based on 1991 constant prices (NOW:
P100M based on 2000 constant prices), and if it receipts realized by provinces, cities and
has either of the following requisites: municipalities from regular sources of the
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred Local Government Fund including the internal
(100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands revenue allotment and other shares.
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty Samson vs. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53 (Population
thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the or land Area; Seat of Government)
National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not
Republic Act No. 8535, creating the City of original unit or units at the time of said creation to
Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon less than the minimum requirements prescribed
City, was challenged because it failed to herein.
comply with the land requirement and failed to (b) The territory need not be contiguous if it
specify the seat of government of the comprise two (2) or more islands or is separated by
proposed City of Novaliches. a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to
the income of the province.
Annual income of 13 barangays - P26M (more (c) The average annual income shall include the
than required P20M) income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
Population - 347K (more than required 150k) special funds, trust funds, transfers and non-
recurring income.
Whether land area must also be complied
with? C. Principles of Local Autonomy
Whether the failure to specify the seat of
government of the proposed City of Section 2, Article X, Philippine Constitution
Novaliches was fatal?

HELD: Section 2. The territorial and political

NO. The proposed city must comply with subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
requirements as regards income AND
population OR land area. Other than the
Section 17 (e), Local Government Code
income requirement, the proposed city must
have the requisite number of inhabitants OR
land area. Section 17 (e), Local Government Code
(e) National agencies or offices concerned
NO. This omission is not fatal as to the validity shall devolve to local government units the
of the law creating the City of Novaliches responsibility for the provision of basic
because under Section 12 of LGC, the city services and facilities enumerated in this
can still establish a seat of government after section within six (6) months after the
its creation. Section 12 of LGC provides for effectivity of this Code.
the site of government centers which can also As used in this Code, the term "devolution"
be the seat of the government. refers to the act by which the national
government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform
specific functions and responsibilities.
d. Province: Section 461, Local Government
Code Limbona v. Mangelin, GR 80391, February 28,
Section 461. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average Facts:
annual income, as certified by the Department of Petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
and either of the following requisites: Mindanao. He, together with other assembly
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand men in the region were invited in the House of
(2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Representatives for a “dialogue”. He agreed to
Management Bureau; or go on the condition that there would not be a
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty “session”. However, there was a session and
thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the he was unseated from his position. He now
National Statistics Office: questions the validity of his termination on the
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not ground that of the irregularity of the process.
reduce the land area, population, and income of the
Issue: W/N the court has jurisdiction in light of
the enactment of the LGC? - Yes Facts:
Petitioner Basco questions PAGCOR’s
Held: creation on the ground that LGUs cannot tax
The case was decided considering the current the latter with respect to the regulation of
provisions of the LGC. This however does not gambling in their locality. According to the
prejudice the existing rules at the time that the petitioner, PAGCOR’s exemption violates their
case was filed because there was an apparent local autonomy with regard to the generation
lack of due process. In relation to the central of their own revenue.
government, it provides that "[t]he President
shall have the power of general supervision Issue:
and control over the Autonomous Region. W/N PAGCOR’s exemption violates local
autonomy? – No.
Autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power. Held:
There is decentralization of administration No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987
when the central government delegates Constitution provides: “Each local government
administrative powers to political subdivisions unit shall have the power to create its own
in order to broaden the base of government source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and
power and in the process to make local other charges subject to such guidelines and
governments "more responsive and limitation as the congress may provide,
accountable, and ensure their fullest consistent with the basic policy on local
development as self-reliant communities and autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall
make them more effective partners in the accrue exclusively to the local government.” A
pursuit of national development and social close reading of the above provision does not
progress." At the same time, it relieves the violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing
central government of the burden of managing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines
national concerns. The President exercises and limitation as Congress may provide. It
"general supervision" over them, but only to should be stressed that “municipal
"ensure that local affairs are administered corporations are mere creatures of Congress”
according to law." He has no control over their which has the power to “create and abolish
acts in the sense that he can substitute their municipal corporations” due to its “general
judgments with his own. Decentralization of legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has
power, on the other hand, involves an the power of control over Local governments.
abdication of political power in the favor of And if Congress can grant the City of Manila
local governments units declare to be the power to tax certain matters, it can also
autonomous . In that case, the autonomous provide for exemptions or even take back the
government is free to chart its own destiny power.
and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. Further still, local governments have no power
According to a constitutional author, to tax instrumentalities of the National
decentralization of power amounts to "self- Government. PAGCOR is a government
immolation," since in that event, the owned or controlled corporation with an
autonomous government becomes original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of
accountable not to the central authorities but stocks are owned by the National
to its constituency. Government. Otherwise, its operation might
be burdened, impeded or subjected to control
Based on the decision of the Court after by a mere Local government.
examining the LGC, what is involved is
decentralization of administration and not
decentralization of power.
Lina v. Pano, GR 129093, August 30, 2001

Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52

Facts: to determine, taking into account national and
Private respondent Tony Calvento, was local interests. Since Congress has allowed
appointed agent by PCSO to install a terminal the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO
for the operation of lotto, applied for a mayor’s seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant toits
permit to operate a lotto outlet in San legislative grant of authority, the province's
Pedro,Laguna. It was denied on the ground Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the
that an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. exercise of said authority by preventing
508, Taon1995 of the Sangguniang something already allowed by Congress.
Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling
in the province,including the operation of lotto.
With the denial of his application, private
respondent filed an action for declaratory relief Judge Dadole v. COA, GR 125350, December
with prayer for preliminary injunction and 3, 2002
temporary restraining order. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent enjoining petitioners from Facts:
implementing or enforcing the subject Petitioner RTC Judge and other MTC judges
resolution. of Mandaue City questioned the validity of
DBM resolution No. 55 limiting the allowance
Issue: of local government officials to P1,000 and
W/N the local ordinance is valid? – No P700 pesos for City and Municipal officials
respectively. They alleged that this is a
Held: violation of the LGUs local autonomy.
The questioned ordinance merely states the
“objection” of the council to the said game. It Issue:
is but a mere policy statement on the part of W/N the DBM resolution is valid – No
the local council, which is not self-executing.
Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit Held:
the operation of the lotto system in the Our Constitution6guarantees autonomy to
province of Laguna. As a policy statement local government units, the exercise of local
expressing the local government’s objection to autonomy remains subject to the power of
the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part control by Congress and the power of
of the local government’s autonomy to air its supervision by the President. Section 4 of
views which may be contrary to that of the Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
national government’s.However, this freedom provides that: The President of the Philippines
to exercise contrary views does not mean that shall exercise general supervision over local
local governments may actually enact governments. This provision (Section 4 of
ordinances that go against laws duly enacted Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution)
by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed has been interpreted to exclude the power of
resolution in this case could not and should control. In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court
not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance contrasted the President's power of
prohibiting the operation of lotto. supervision over local government officials
with that of his power of control over executive
Moreover, ordinances should not contravene officials of the national government. It was
statutes as municipal governments are merely emphasized that the two terms -- supervision
agents of the national government. The local and control -- differed in meaning and extent.
councils exercise only delegated legislative The Chief Executive wielded no more
powers which have been conferred on them authority than that of checking whether local
by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior governments or their officials were performing
to the principal or exercise powers higher than their duties as provided by the fundamental
those of the latter. This being the case, these law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with
councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to local governments, so long as they act within
the principal or exercise powers higher than the scope of their authority. "Supervisory
those of the latter. The question of whether power, when contrasted with control, is the
gambling should be permitted is for Congress power of mere oversight over an inferior body;
it does not include any restraining authority Held:
over such body. An administrative order cannot modify or
abrogate a statute. RA 7160 cannot be
repealed by a mere administrative issuance.
Moreover, the General Appropriations act
Liga ng mga Barangay v. Judge Paredes, GR cannot repeal a special law like the LGC. In
130775, September 29, 2004 addition, the administrative order should apply
to national funds and not to the local funds of
the LGU.
DILG was appointed by the President as
interim caretaker to administer and manage
the affairs of the “Liga ng mga Barangay”. It Batangas CATV v. CA and Batangas City, GR
subsequently issued 2 memorandums which No. 138810, September 29, 2004
modify or set aside the previous actions made
by the Liga in relation to violations during the
conduct of election of its officers. The Liga Facts:
contends that the DILG as an alter ego of the Petitioner Batangas City CATV Inc., operates
President does not have the power of control CATV within the jurisdiction of Batangas.
over them. Through a resolution/ordinance, the
Sanggunuan Panglungsod of Batangas City
Issue: regulates the operation of the petitioner under
DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President the general welfare clause. However, when
has power of control over the Liga ng mga petitioner increased its subscription rate from
Barangay.? – No P88 to P180 per month, the Sanggunian
Panglungsod prevented the same.
Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that Issue:
the President of the Philippines shall exercise W/N the Sanggunian can regulate the
general supervision over local government, operations of Batangas City CATV? – No
which exclude the power of control. As the
entity exercising supervision over the Liga, Held:
the DILG’s authority is limited to seeing to it The SC traced the regulation of the CATV
that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay system in the Philippines from the issuance of
down such rules itself nor does it have the PD 1512, the creation of the NTC, issuance of
discretion to modify or replace the same. E.O 205, and E.O. 436. All of these points to
the NTC as the government agency tasked to
regulate the CATV system. The SC was
Judge Leynes v. COA, GR No. 143596, Dec. 11, convinced that the issuance of the LGU of
2003 Resolution No. 210 preventing the increase of
rates by the petitioner violates the limits of its
authority under the LGC. The flaws in
Facts: Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the
Judge Leynes receives allowance from both mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the
the local government unit and the Judiciary. State’s deregulation policy over the CATV
COA issued an administrative order limiting industry which was given to the NTC through
the allowance given to government officials. E.O No. 2015 and 436.
According to COA “no one should be allowed
to collect RATA from more than one source”.
This was challenged by the petitioner on the
ground that it violates the autonomy given to CREBA v. Secretary of DAR, GR 183409, June
local government units. 18, 2010

W/N the administrative order is valid? – No Facts:
DAR issued AO No. 01-02, as amended,
providing that the reclassification of society are questioning the constitutionality of
agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to the said Act. One of the issues alleged is that
the requirements of land use conversion it violates the local autonomy of LGUs and
procedure or that DAR’s approval or ARMM with respect to the delivery of basic
clearance to effect reclassification. Petitioner services and facilities.
questioned the same on the ground that it
violates the autonomy of the LGU to reclassify Issue:
agricultural lands within its jurisdiction. W/N RA 10354 violates the local autonomy of
LGUs and the ARMM – No.
W/N the administrative order is valid – Yes Held:
Unless an LGU is particularly designated as
Held: the implementing agency, it has no power
The SC distinguished conversion from over a program for which funding has been
reclassification, the former under the power of provided by the national government under
DAR and the latter under the LGU. the annual general appropriations act, even if
Conversion is the act of changing the current the program involves the delivery of basic
use of a piece of agricultural land into some services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. A
other use as approved by the DAR while complete relinquishment of central
reclassification is the act of specifying how government powers on the matter of providing
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non- basic facilities and services cannot be implied
agricultural uses such as residential, as the Local Government Code itself weighs
industrial, and commercial, as embodied in against it.
the land use plan, subject to the requirements
and procedures for land use conversion. In In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly
view thereof, a mere reclassification of an shows that whether it pertains to the
agricultural land does not automatically allow establishment of health care facilities, the
a landowner to change its use. He has to hiring of skilled health professionals, or the
undergo the process of conversion before he training of barangay health workers, it will be
is permitted to use the agricultural land for the national government that will provide for
other purposes. It is clear from the aforesaid the funding of its implementation. Local
distinction between reclassification and autonomy is not absolute. The national
conversion that agricultural lands though government still has the say when it comes to
reclassified to residential, commercial, national priority programs which the local
industrial or other non-agricultural uses must government is called upon to implement like
still undergo the process of conversion before the RH Law.
they can be used for the purpose to which
they are intended.

The DAR secretary simply implements the D. Intergovernmental Relation

provisions of RA 6657 and RA 8435 which Consultation Regarding Programs and Projects
penalize illegal or premature conversion of
Section 2 © LGC
It is likewise the policy of the State to require
all national agencies and offices to conduct
Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014 periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and
people's organizations, and other concerned
Facts: sectors of the community before any project or
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise program is implemented in their respective
known as the Responsible Parenthood and jurisdictions.
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, Section 26 LGC Duty of National Government
2012. Challengers from various sectors of Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological
Balance. - It shall be the duty of every national Local Government Code.
agency or government-owned or -controlled
corporation authorizing or involved in the
planning and implementation of any project or
program that may cause pollution, climatic Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary, 477
change, depletion of non-renewable SCRA 436
resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or
forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant
species, to consult with the local government Facts:
units, nongovernmental organizations, and In light of the waste management crisis in
other sectors concerned and explain the goals Metro Manila, the government issued
and objectives of project or program, its Proclamation No. 635 authorizing the use of
impact upon the people and the community in land fill located in San Mateo Rizal. Petitioners
terms of environmental or ecological balance, opposed the same on the ground that no
and the measures that will be undertaken to consultations were made and that it affects
prevent or minimize the adverse effects the nearby watershed located in the area.
W/N Consultations are necessary – Yes.

Lina vs. Pano, 364 SCRA 76 Held:

Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is
the policy of the state- "to require all national
Facts: agencies and offices to conduct periodic
Private respondent Tony Calvento, was consultation with appropriate local
appointed agent by PCSO to install a terminal government units, non-governmental and
for the operation of lotto, applied for a mayor’s people's organization, and other concerned
permit to operate a lotto outlet in San sectors of the community before any project or
Pedro,Laguna. It was denied on the ground program is implemented in their respective
that an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. jurisdiction." Likewise Section 27 requires
508, Taon1995 of the Sangguniang prior consultations before a program shall be
Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling implemented by government authorities ans
in the province,including the operation of lotto. the prior approval of the Sanggunian is
With the denial of his application, private obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v.
respondent filed an action for declaratory relief Paño, Section 2 (c), requiring consultations
with prayer for preliminary injunction and with the appropriate local government units,
temporary restraining order. The trial court should apply to national government projects
rendered judgment in favor of private affecting the environmental or ecological
respondent enjoining petitioners from balance of the particular community
implementing or enforcing the subject implementing the project. Briefly stated, under
resolution. the Local Government Code, two requisites
must be met before a national project that
Issue: affects the environmental and ecological
W/N consultation is necessary? – No balance of local communities can be
implemented: (1) prior consultation with the
Held: affected local communities, and (2)prior
The provision on consultation apply only to approval of the project by the appropriate
national programs and/or projects which are to sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory
be implemented in a particular local requirements, the project’s implementation is
community. Lotto is neither a program nor a illegal.
project of the national government, but of a
charitable institution, the PCSO. Though
sanctioned by the national government, it is
far fetched to say that lotto falls within the
contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the E. Power of Local Government Units
1. Police Power (general welfare clause)
must be through a valid delegation. In this
case the police power of registering tricycles
a. Registration of tricycle and licensing of drivers was not delegated to the LGU’s, but remained
LTO vs. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805 in the LTO.

Clearly unaffected by the Local

Facts: Government Code are the powers of LTO
Relying on the fiscal autonomy granted to under R.A. No.4136 requiring the registration
LGU's by the Constittuion and the provisons of of all kinds of motor vehicles "used or
the Local Government Code, the operated on or upon any public highway" in
Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of the country.
Butuan enacted an ordinance "Regulating the
Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire, providing The Commissioner of Land Transportation
mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, and his deputies are empowered at anytime to
Registration and Permit, and Imposing examine and inspect such motor vehicles to
Penalties for Violations thereof and for other determine whether said vehicles are
Purposes." The ordinance provided for, registered, or are unsightly, unsafe,
among other things, the payment of franchise improperly marked or equipped, or otherwise
fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles- unfit to be operated on because of possible
for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, excessive damage to highways, bridges and
and fees for the issuance of a permit for the other infrastructures. The LTO is additionally
driving thereof. charged with being the central repository and
custodian of all records of all motor vehicles.
Petitioner LTO explains that one of the
functions of the national government that, Adds the Court, the reliance made by
indeed, has been transferred to local respondents on the broad taxing power of
government units is the franchising authority local government units, specifically under
over tricycles-for-hire of the Land Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory tangential.
Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the
authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles Police power and taxation, along with
and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to eminent domain, are inherent powers of
drive such vehicles. sovereignty which the State might share with
local government units by delegation given
The RTC and CA ruled that the power to under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All
give registration and license for driving these inherent powers are for a public
tricycles has been devolved to LGU's. purpose and legislative in nature but the
similarities just about end there. The basic aim
Issue: of police power is public good and welfare.
Whether or not, the registration of tricycles Taxation, in its case, focuses on the power of
was given to LGU's, hence the ordinance is a government to raise revenue in order to
valid exercise of police power. support its existence and carry out its
legitimate objectives. Although correlative to
Ruling: each other in many respects, the grant of one
No, based on the-"Guidelines to Implement does not necessarily carry with it the grant of
the Devolution of LTFRBs Franchising the other. The two powers are, by tradition
Authority over Tricycles-For-Hire to Local and jurisprudence, separate and distinct
Government units pursuant to the Local powers, varying in their respective concepts,
Government Code"- the newly delegated character, scopes and limitations.
powers to LGU's pertain to the franchising and
regulatory powers exercised by the LTFRB To construe the tax provisions of Section
and not to the functions of the LTO relative to 133 (1) of the LGC indistinctively would result
the registration of motor vehicles and in the repeal to that extent of LTO's regulatory
issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. power which evidently has not been intended.
Corollarily, the exercised of a police power If it were otherwise, the law could have just
said so in Section 447 and 458 of Book III of Sometime in November 1993, petitioner
the Local Government Code in the same increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to
manner that the specific devolution of P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent
LTFRB's power on franchising of tricycles has Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to
been provided. Repeal by implication is not cancel its permit unless it secures the
favored. approval of respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
The power over tricycles granted under
Section 458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local Government Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7,
Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging
operation and to grant franchises for the that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has
operation thereof. The exclusionary clause no authority to regulate the subscriber rates
contained in the tax provisions of Section 133 charged by CATV operators because under
(1) of the Local Government Code must not Executive Order No. 205, the National
be held to have had the effect of withdrawing Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has
the express power of LTO to cause the the sole authority to regulate the CATV
registration of all motor vehicles and the operation in the Philippines.
issuance of licenses for the driving thereof.
These functions of the LTO are essentially ISSUE :
regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the may a local government unit (LGU) regulate
police power of the State, whose basic the subscriber rates charged by CATV
objectives are to achieve road safety by operators within its territorial jurisdiction?
insuring the road worthiness of these motor
vehicles and the competence of drivers HELD: No.
prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not insignificant is
the rule that a statute must not be construed xxx
in isolation but must be taken in harmony with
the extant body of laws. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in
light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the
LGUs indubitably now have the power to NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV
regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
to grant franchises for the operation thereof,
and not to issue registration. xxx

Ergo, the ordinance being repugnant to a Like any other enterprise, CATV operation
statute is void and ultra vires. maybe regulated by LGUs under the general
welfare clause. This is primarily because the
CATV system commits the indiscretion of
b. Regulation of Public Utilities crossing public properties. (It uses public
Batangas CATV, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 439 properties in order to reach subscribers.) The
SCRA 326 physical realities of constructing CATV system
– the use of public streets, rights of ways, the
founding of structures, and the parceling of
FACTS: large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang of regulation over CATV operators.
Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210
granting petitioner a permit to construct, xxx
install, and operate a CATV system in
Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power
provides that petitioner is authorized to charge under the general welfare clause, we cannot
its subscribers the maximum rates specified sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced
therein, “provided, however, that any increase that respondents strayed from the well
of rates shall be subject to the approval of the recognized limits of its power. The flaws in
Sangguniang Panlungsod. Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the
mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the
State’s deregulation policy over the CATV confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the
industry. vicinity of property of another owner who,
though creating a noise, is acting with
LGUs must recognize that technical matters reasonable regard for the rights of those
concerning CATV operation are within the affected by it.
exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
Action to abate private nuisance; incapable of
pecuniary estiation – an action to abate
private nuisance, even wehere the plaintiff
asks for damages is one incapable of
AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties pecuniary estimation
Corporation, 506 SCRA 625
FACTS: AC enterprises (Petitioner) is a
corporation owns a 10-storey building in
Makati City. Frabelle (Respondent) is a
DOCTRINE: Private and public nuisance; condominium corporation who's condominium
definition – The term “nuisance” is so development is located behind petitioner.
comprehensive that it has been applied to Respondent complained of the 'unbearable”
almost all ways which have interfered with the noise emanating from the blower of the air-
rights of the citizens, either in person, conditioning units of petitioner.
property, the enjoyment of property, or his
comfort; A private nuisance is one which ISSUES:
violates only private rights and produces (1) Is it a nuisance as to be resolved only by
damage to but one or a few persons while a the courts in the due course of proceedings or
nuisance is public when it interferes with the a nuisance per se?
exercise of public right by directly encroaching
on public property or by causing a common (2) Is an action for abatement of a private
injury, an unreasonable interference with the nuisance, more specifically noise generated
right common to the general public. In this by the blower of an air-conditioning system,
case, the noise generated by an even if the plaintiff prays for damages, one
airconditioning system is considered a private incapable of pecuniary estimation?
(3) What is the determining factor when noise
Noise emanating from air-con units not alone is the cause of complaint?
nuisance per se – Noise becomes actionable
only when it passes the limits of reasonable HELD:
adjustment to the conditions of the locality and (1) It is a nuisance to be resolved only by the
of the needs of the maker to the needs of the courts in the due course of proceedings; the
listener; Injury to a particular person in a noise is not a nuisance per se. Noise
peculiar position or of especially sensitive becomes actionable only whenn it passes the
characteristics will not render the noise an limits of reasonable adjustment to the
actionable nuisance. Whether or not the noise conditions of the locality and of the needs of
is a nuisance is an issue to be resolved by the the maker to the needs of the listener. Injury
courts. to a particular person in a peculiar position or
of especially sensitive characteristics will not
Test to determine noise as a nuisance – The render the house an actionable nuisance–– in
test is whether rights of property, of health or the conditions, of present living, noise seems
of comfort are so injuriously affected by the inseparable from the conduct of many
noise in question that the sufferer is subjected necessary occupations.
to a loss [i.e. Actual Physical Discomfort]which
goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed (2) Yes, the action is one incapable of
upon him by the condition of living, or of pecuniary estimation because the basic issue
holding property, in a particular locality in fact is something other than the right to recover a
devoted to uses which involve the emission of sum of money.
noise although ordinary care is taken to
(3) The determining factor is not its intensity or Ratio:
volume; it is that the noise is of such character 1. Petitioner contends that a resolution
as to produce actual physical discomfort and approved by the municipal council for the
annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities purpose of initiating an expropriation case
rendering adjacent property less comfortable “substantially complies with the requirements
and valuable. of the law” because the terms “ordinance” and
“resolution” are synonymous for “the purpose
of bestowing authority [on] the local
government unit through its chief executive to
2. Eminent Domain initiate the expropriation proceedings in court
in the exercise of the power of eminent
1. Necessity of Ordinance domain.
Municipality of Paranaque vs. V.M Realty To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited
Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and
Corporation, 292 SCRA 678
Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, which provides: “If the
LGU fails to acquire a private property for
Facts: public use, purpose, or welfare through
Under a city council resolution, the purchase, the LGU may expropriate said
Municipality of Parañaque filed on September property through a resolution of the
20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to
against Private Respondent V.M. Realty initiate expropriation proceedings.”
Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000 Court-No. The power of eminent domain is
square meters. The city previously negotiated lodged in the legislative branch of
for the sale of the property but VM didn’t government, which may delegate the exercise
accept. thereof to LGUs, other public entities and
The trial court issued an Order dated February public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise
4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take the power to expropriate private property only
possession of the subject property upon when authorized by Congress and subject to
deposit with its clerk of court of an amount the latter’s control and restraints, imposed
equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market “through the law conferring the power or in
value based on its current tax declaration. other legislations.
According to the respondent, the complaint Sec 19, RA 7160
failed to state a cause of action because it A local government unit may, through its chief
was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to executive and acting pursuant to an
an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
Local Government Code); and (b) the cause domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare
of action, if any, was barred by a prior for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed upon payment of just compensation, pursuant
that res judicata was not applicable. to the provisions of the Constitution and
The trial court dismissed the case. The pertinent laws.
petitioner’s MFR was denied. The CA Thus, the following essential requisites must
affirmed. concur before an LGU can exercise the power
of eminent domain:
Issues: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local
1. WON a resolution duly approved by the legislative council authorizing the local chief
municipal council has the same force and executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise
effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation case of a valid cause of action. expropriation proceedings over a particular
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a private property.
ground for dismissal of case is not applicable 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised
when public interest is primarily involved. for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9, Article III of the in eminent domain.
Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals
4. A valid and definite offer has been and the trial court, all the requisites for the
previously made to the owner of the property application of res judicata are present in this
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was case. There is a previous final judgment on
not accepted. the merits in a prior expropriation case
In the case at bar, the local chief executive involving identical interests, subject matter
sought to exercise the power of eminent and cause of action, which has been rendered
domain pursuant to a resolution of the by a court having jurisdiction over it.
municipal council. Thus, there was no Be that as it may, the Court holds that the
compliance with the first requisite that the principle of res judicata, which finds
mayor be authorized through an ordinance. application in generally all cases and
We are not convinced by petitioner’s proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State
insistence that the terms “resolution” and or its agent to expropriate private property.
“ordinance” are synonymous. A municipal Eminent Domain can reach every form of
ordinance is different from a resolution. An property which the State might need for public
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a use whenever they need it.
declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a While the principle of res judicata does not
lawmaking body on a specific matter. An denigrate the right of the State to exercise
ordinance possesses a general and eminent domain, it does apply to specific
permanent character, but a resolution is issues decided in a previous case.
temporary in nature. In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to the power of the State or its agent to exercise
exercise eminent domain through a mere eminent domain is not diminished by the mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the fact that a prior final judgment over the
language of the previous Local Government property to be expropriated has become the
Code. But Congress did not. In a clear law of the case as to the parties. The State or
divergence from the previous Local its authorized agent may still subsequently
Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 exercise its right to expropriate the same
categorically requires that the local chief property, once all legal requirements are
executive act pursuant to an ordinance. complied with.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain
necessarily involves a derogation of a
fundamental or private right of the people.[35]
Accordingly, the manifest change in the 2. Prior Offer to buy
legislative language -- from “resolution” under Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc.
BP 337 to “ordinance” under RA 7160 -- v. Municipality of Pasig, 466 SCRA 235
demands a strict construction.
When the legislature interferes with that right
and, for greater public purposes, appropriates FACTS: Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
the land of an individual without his consent, court’s decision of declaring respondent
the plain meaning of the law should not be municipality (now city) as having the right to
enlarged by doubtful interpretation. expropriate petitioner’s property for the
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the construction of an access road. Petitioner
Implementing Rules, which requires only a argues that there was no valid and definite
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise offer made before a complaint for eminent
eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear domain was filed as the law requires (Art. 35,
letter of the law is controlling and cannot be Rules and Regulations Implementing the
amended by a mere administrative rule issued Local Government Code). Respondent
for its implementation. contends that a letter to purchase was offered
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent to the previous owners and the same was not
domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not accepted.
eminent but “inferior” domain, since it must
conform to the limits imposed by the ISSUE: Whether or not a letter to purchase is
delegation, and thus partakes only of a share sufficient enough as a definite and valid offer
to expropriate.
The City of Manila has an undeniable right to
HELD: No. Failure to prove compliance with exercise its power of eminent domain within
the mandatory requirement of a valid and its jurisdiction specifically in pursuit of its
definite offer will result in the dismissal of the urban land reform and housing program.
complaint. The purpose of the mandatory
requirement to be first made to the owner is to Very clear from the provisions are the
encourage settlements and voluntary limitations with respect to the order of priority
acquisition of property needed for public in acquiring private lands and in resorting to
purposes in order to avoid the expense and expropriation proceedings as a means to
delay of a court of action. acquire the same. Private lands rank last in
the order of priority for purposes of socialized
housing. In the same vein, expropriation
3. Socialized Housing proceedings are to be resorted to only when
Filstream International, Inc. vs. Court of the other modes of acquisition have been
Appeals, 284 SCRA 716 exhausted. Compliance with these conditions
must be deemed mandatory because these
are the only safeguards in securing the right of
owners of private property to due process
when their property is expropriated for public
Facts: Filstream filed ejectment suit before use.
MTC against occupants on the grounds of
termination of contact and non-payment of RA 7279 Uran Development Housing Act of
rentals. MTC decided in favor of Filstream. 1992
This was appealed in RTC and CA and both
upheld existing decision. During the pendency Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land. —
of ejectment proceedings, City of Manila Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired
approved Ordinance 7813 authorizing Mayor in the following order:
Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation,
expropriation, purchase, or other legal means (a) Those owned by the Government or any of
certain parcels of land that covers properties its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
of Filstream. City of Manila filed complaint for including government-owned or controlled
eminent domain to expropriate Filstream corporations and their subsidiaries;
properties. Filstream filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint for eminent domain as well as a (b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
motion to quash the writ of possession on the
ground of no valid cause of action, the petition (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
does not satisfy the requirements of public
use and maneuver to circumvent the (d) Those within the declared Areas for
ejectment suit, violation of the constitutional Priority Development, Zonal Improvement
guarantee against non-impairment, price sites, and Slum Improvement and
offered was too low violating just Resettlement Program sites which have not
compensation. RTC denied the petition and yet been acquired;
declared the property condemned in favor of
City of Manila. (e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and
Services or BLISS sites which have not yet
Issue: Whether or not Filstream was deprived been acquired; and
of due process on the ground of non-
compliance with priority in expropriation? (f) Privately-owned lands.

Decision: There is no dispute as to the Where on-site development is found more

existence of a final and executory judgment in practicable and advantageous to the
favor of petitioner Filstream ordering the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this
ejectment of private respondents from the section shall not apply. The local government
properties. units shall give budgetary priority to on-site
development of government lands. purpose of establishing a pilot farm for non-
food and non-traditional agricultural crops and
housing project for the government
4. Deposit of Compensation The land sought to be expropriated
Knecht, Inc. vs. Municipality of Cainta, 495 belongs to the San Joaquins, which at the
SCRA 514 time the complaint is filed, the governing law
was BP 337 which authorizes expropriation by
mere resolution of the municipal council.
The Court of Appeals suspended the
Facts: Rose Packing Co., Inc. sold three expropriation proceedings and requires
parcels of land situated in Cainta, Rizal to petitioner to submit the requisite approval of
United Cigarette Corporation (UCC). On June the DAR to convert the classification of the
22, 1990, the Municipality of Cainta filed a property from agricultural to non-agricultural.
complaint for expropriation against PCIB Hence, the present petition.
(mortgagee bank) and Rose Packing. The Held: The power of eminent domain cannot be
expropriation complaint was based on restricted by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Resolution No. 89- Law (CARL or RA 6657) particularly Section
020 which sought to purchase the land as the 65 which requires the approval of the DAR
site of the municipal administration compound before a parcel of land can be reclassified.
and SB resolution No. 89-021 which called for CARL does not intimate in the least that
the condemnation of said land if the LGU's must first secure the approval of DAR
negotiation for its voluntary sale failed. The before petitioner can institute the necessary
negotiation did fail, hence, the complaint for proceedings.
expropriation. On June 16, 1992, the trial The authority of DAR to approve or
court issued an order directing the disapprove conversions of agricultural land
Municipality of Cainta to deposit 10% of the cannot extend to the exercise of eminent
provisional value of the property. A writ of domain, otherwise DAR will have the authority
possession was subsequently issued to to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a
respondent municipality. public use or not. Ordinarily, it is the municipal
council that determines whether the use of the
Held: The exercise of the power of eminent property sought to be expropriated is for
domain by a local government unit is now public use, the same being an expression of
governed by Section 19 of Republic Act 7160. legislative policy. The courts will intervene
For properties under expropriation, the law only when no real or substantial relation is
now requires the deposit of an amount established between the undertaking and
equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair public use.
market value of the property based on its Under the new concept, public use
current tax declaration. In the present case, means public advantage, convenience or
there is no valid exercise of the power of benefit, which tends to contribute to the
eminent domain. general welfare and prosperity of the whole
community. In the present case, the
expropriation for the establishment of pilot
development center is for a public purpose.
5. Conversion to Non- Agricultural Use Limitations on the exercise of the
Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, delegated power must be clearly expressed,
222 SCRA 173 either in the law conferring the power or in
other legislations.

Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of

petitioner passed a resolution in 1988 3. Taxing power
authorizing the provincial governor to Section 5, Article X, Philippine Constitution
purchase or expropriate private property Local Government Code
contiguous to the provincial capitol for the
LTO v. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805
insuring the road worthiness of these motor
vehicles and the competence of drivers
Adds the Court, the reliance made by prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not insignificant is
respondents on the broad taxing power of the rule that a statute must not be construed
local government units, specifically under in isolation but must be taken in harmony with
Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is the extant body of laws.
LGUs indubitably now have the power to
Police power and taxation, along with regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and
eminent domain, are inherent powers of to grant franchises for the operation thereof,
sovereignty which the State might share with and not to issue registration.
local government units by delegation given
under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All
these inherent powers are for a public
Lina v. Pano, 364 SCRA 76 (2001)
purpose and legislative in nature but the
similarities just about end there. The basic aim
of police power is public good and welfare.
Taxation, in its case, focuses on the power of
government to raise revenue in order to
Private respondent Tony Calvento, was
support its existence and carry out its
appointed agent by PCSO to install a terminal
legitimate objectives. Although correlative to
for the operation of lotto, applied for a mayor’s
each other in many respects, the grant of one
permit to operate a lotto outlet in San
does not necessarily carry with it the grant of
Pedro,Laguna. It was denied on the ground
the other. The two powers are, by tradition
that an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg.
and jurisprudence, separate and distinct
508, Taon1995 of the Sangguniang
powers, varying in their respective concepts,
Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling
character, scopes and limitations.
in the province,including the operation of lotto.
With the denial of his application, private
To construe the tax provisions of Section
respondent filed an action for declaratory relief
133 (1) of the LGC indistinctively would result
with prayer for preliminary injunction and
in the repeal to that extent of LTO's regulatory
temporary restraining order. The trial court
power which evidently has not been intended.
rendered judgment in favor of private
If it were otherwise, the law could have just
respondent enjoining petitioners from
said so in Section 447 and 458 of Book III of
implementing or enforcing the subject
the Local Government Code in the same
manner that the specific devolution of
LTFRB's power on franchising of tricycles has
been provided. Repeal by implication is not
whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the
denial of a mayor’s permit based thereon are
The power over tricycles granted under
Section 458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local Government
Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their
operation and to grant franchises for the
No. The questioned ordinance merely states
operation thereof. The exclusionary clause
the “objection” of the council to the said game.
contained in the tax provisions of Section 133
It is but a mere policy statement on the part of
(1) of the Local Government Code must not
the local council, which is not self-executing.
be held to have had the effect of withdrawing
Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit
the express power of LTO to cause the
the operation of the lotto system in the
registration of all motor vehicles and the
province of Laguna. As a policy statement
issuance of licenses for the driving thereof.
expressing the local government’s objection to
These functions of the LTO are essentially
the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part
regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the
of the local government’s autonomy to air its
police power of the State, whose basic
views which may be contrary to that of the
objectives are to achieve road safety by
national government’s.However, this freedom required Petron to pay the assessed tax. A
to exercise contrary views does not mean that Motion for Reconsideration was filed but it
local governments may actually enact was later denied by the court. Hence, the filing
ordinances that go against laws duly enacted of this petition.
by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed
resolution in this case could not and should ISSUE:
not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance Whether or not a local government unit is
prohibiting the operation of lotto. empowered under the Local Government
Code (LGC) to impose business taxes on
Moreover, ordinances should not contravene persons or entities engaged in the sale of
statutes as municipal governments are merely petroleum
agents of the national government. The local
councils exercise only delegated legislative HELD:
powers which have been conferred on them
by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior Petition GRANTED.
to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. This being the case, these Section 133(h) of the LGC reads as follows:
councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing
those of the latter. The question of whether Powers of Local Government Units. - Unless
gambling should be permitted is for Congress otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the
to determine, taking into account national and taxing powers of provinces, cities,
local interests. Since Congress has allowed municipalities, and Barangays shall not extend
the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO to the levy of the following:
seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant toits
legislative grant of authority, the province's xxx
Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the
exercise of said authority by preventing (h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under
something already allowed by Congress. the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, and taxes, fees or charges on
petroleum products;

Petron v. Mayor, GR No. 158881, April 16, 2008 Evidently, Section 133 prescribes the
limitations on the capacity of local government
units to exercise their taxing powers otherwise
While local government units are authorized to granted to them under the LGC. Apparently,
burden all such other class of goods with paragraph (h) of the Section mentions two
“taxes, fees and charges,” excepting excise kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by
taxes, a specific prohibition is imposed barring local government units, namely: “excise taxes
the levying of any other type of taxes with on articles enumerated under the National
respect to petroleum products. Internal Revenue Code [(NIRC)], as
amended;” and “taxes, fees or charges on
In accordance to the New Navotas Revenue petroleum products.”
Code or Ordinance 92-03, petitioner Petron
Corporation was assessed a total tax of The power of a municipality to impose
P6,259,087.62. Petron filed a letter protest business taxes is provided for in Section 143
arguing that it is exempt from paying local of the LGC. Under the provision, a
business taxes as provided by Article 232 (h) municipality is authorized to impose business
of the Implementing Rules of the Local taxes on a whole host of business activities.
Government Code. Suffice it to say, unless there is another
provision of law which states otherwise,
The letter-protest was denied. A Complaint for Section 143, broad in scope as it is, would
Cancellation of Assessment was filed before undoubtedly cover the business of selling
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon. diesel fuels, or any other petroleum product
The RTC dismissed the Complaint and for that matter.
then proceeds to assert that “[i]n case of
Section 133(h) provides two kinds of taxes doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure
which cannot be imposed by local government shall be construed strictly against the local
units: “excise taxes on articles enumerated” government unit enacting it, and liberally in
under the NIRC, as amended; and “taxes, favor of the taxpayer.” And this latter
fees or charges on petroleum products.” qualification has to be respected as a
There is no doubt that among the excise taxes constitutionally authorized limitation which
on articles enumerated under the NIRC are Congress has seen fit to provide. Evidently,
those levied on petroleum products, per local fiscal autonomy should not necessarily
Section 148 of the NIRC. translate into abject deference to the power of
local government units to impose taxes.
The power of a municipality to impose
business taxes derives from Section 143 of Section 133(h) states that local government
the Code that specifically enumerates several units “shall not extend to the levy of xxx taxes,
types of business on which it may impose fees or charges on petroleum products.”
taxes, including manufacturers, wholesalers, Respondents assert that the phrase “taxes,
distributors, dealers of any article of fees or charges on petroleum products”
commerce of whatever nature; those engaged pertains to the imposition of direct or excise
in the export or commerce of essential taxes on petroleum products, and not
commodities; retailers; contractors and other business taxes. If the phrase actually pertains
independent contractors; banks and financial to excise taxes, then it would be an exercise
institutions; and peddlers engaged in the sale in utter redundancy, since the preceding
of any merchandise or article of commerce. phrase already prohibits the imposition of
This obviously broad power is further excise taxes on articles already subject to
supplemented by paragraph (h) of Section such taxes under the NIRC, such as
143 which authorizes the sanggunian to petroleum products. There would be no sense
impose taxes on any other businesses not on the part of the legislature to twice
otherwise specified under Section 143 which emphasize in the same sentence that excise
the sanggunian concerned may deem proper taxes on petroleum products are beyond the
to tax. pale of local government taxation.

This ability of local government units to The Court concedes that a tax on a business
impose business or other local taxes is is distinct from a tax on the article itself, or for
ultimately rooted in the 1987 Constitution. that matter, that a business tax is distinct from
Section 5, Article X assures that “[e]ach local an excise tax. However, such distinction is
government unit shall have the power to immaterial insofar as the latter part of Section
create its own sources of revenues and to levy 133(h) is concerned, for the phrase “taxes,
taxes, fees and charges,” though the power is fees or charges on petroleum products” does
“subject to such guidelines and limitations as not qualify the kind of taxes, fees or charges
the Congress may provide.” There is no doubt that could withstand the absolute prohibition
that following the 1987 Constitution and the imposed by the provision. It would have been
Code, the fiscal autonomy of local government a different matter had Congress, in crafting
units has received greater affirmation than Section 133(h), barred “excise taxes” or
ever. Previous decisions that have been “direct taxes,” or any category of taxes only,
skeptical of the viability, if not the wisdom of for then it would be understood that only such
reposing fiscal autonomy to local government specified taxes on petroleum products could
units have fallen by the wayside. not be imposed under the prohibition. The
absence of such a qualification leads to the
Section 5(a) of the Code states that “[a]ny conclusion that all sorts of taxes on petroleum
provision on a power of a local government products, including business taxes, are
unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, prohibited by Section 133(h). Where the law
and in case of doubt, any question thereon does not distinguish, we should not
shall be resolved in favor of devolution of distinguish.
powers and of the lower local government
unit.” But somewhat conversely, Section 5(b) The language of Section 133(h) makes plain
that the prohibition with respect to petroleum that b.) Lepanto’s petition for review of the
products extends not only to excise taxes decision of the RTC to the CA is erroneous
thereon, but all “taxes, fees and charges.” The because when the RTC decided on the appeal
earlier reference in paragraph (h) to excise brought to it by Lepanto, the RTC was
taxes comprehends a wider range of subjects exercising its original jurisdiction and not its
of taxation: all articles already covered by appellate jurisdiction; that as such, what
excise taxation under the NIRC, such as Lepanto should have done is to file an
alcohol products, tobacco products, mineral ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
products, automobiles, and such non-
essential goods as jewelry, goods made of ISSUE: Whether or not a RTC deciding an
precious metals, perfumes, and yachts and appeal from the decision of a city treasurer on
other vessels intended for pleasure or sports. tax protests is exercising original jurisdiction.
In contrast, the later reference to “taxes, fees Whether or not a condominium corporation
and charges” pertains only to one class of organized solely for the maintenance of a
articles of the many subjects of excise taxes, condominium is liable for local taxation.
specifically, “petroleum products”. While local
government units are authorized to burden all HELD:
such other class of goods with “taxes, fees
and charges,” excepting excise taxes, a 1. Yes. Although the LGC (Section 195)
specific prohibition is imposed barring the provides that the remedy of the taxpayer
levying of any other type of taxes with respect whose protest is denied by the local treasurer
to petroleum products. is “to appeal with the court of competent
jurisdiction” or in this case the RTC
(considering the amount of tax liability is P1.6
million), such appeal when decided by the
Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium, GR No. RTC is still in the exercise of its original
154993, October 25, 2005 jurisdiction and not its appellate jurisdiction.
This is because appellate jurisdiction is
defined as the authority of a court higher in
Facts: In 1998, BA Lepanto Condominium rank to re-examine the final order or judgment
Corporation (Lepanto) received a tax of a lower court which tried the case now
assessment in the amount of P1.6 million from elevated for judicial review. Here, the City
Luz Yamane, the City Treasurer of Makati, for Treasurer is not a lower court.
business taxes. Lepanto protested the
assessment as it averred that Lepanto, as a The Supreme Court however clarifies that this
corporation, is not organized for profit; that it ruling is only applicable to similar cases
merely exists for the maintenance of the before the passage of Republic Act 9282
condominium. Yamane denied the protest. (effective April 2004). Under RA 9282, the
Lepanto then appealed the denial to the RTC Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), not CA,
of Makati. RTC Makati affirmed the decision of exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
Yamane. Lepanto then filed a petition for review on appeal decisions, orders or
review under Rule 42 with the Court of resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in
Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the local tax cases whether originally decided or
RTC. resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction.
Yamane now filed a petition for review under
Rule 45 with the Supreme Court. Yamane 2. No. Lepanto was not organized for
avers that a.) Lepanto is liable for local profit. The fees it was collecting from the
taxation because its act of maintaining the condominium unit owners redound to the
condominium is an activity for profit because owners themselves because the fees
the end result of such activity is the collected are being used for the maintenance
betterment of the market value of the of the condo. Further, it appears that the
condominium which makes it easier to sell it; assessment issued by Yamane did not state
that Lepanto is earning profit from fees the legal basis for the tax being imposed on
collected from condominium unit owners; and Lepanto – it merely states that Makati is
authorized to collect business taxes under the however, have already paid the last named
Local Government Code (LGC) but no other fees starting 1985.
reference specific reference to specific laws
were cited. Issue: Whether or not the Municipality may
validly impose taxes on petitioner’s business.

Held: No. While section 2 of PD 436 prohibits

the imposition of local taxes on petroleum
Philippine Petroleum v. Municipality of Pililla, GR products, said decree did not amend sections
No. 90773, June 3, 1991 19 and 19 (a) of PD 231 as amended by PD
426, wherein the municipality is granted the
right to levy taxes on business of
manufacturers, importers, producers of any
Facts: Philippine Petroleum Corporation is a article of commerce of whatever kind or
business enterprise engaged in the nature. A tax on business is distinct from a tax
manufacture of lubricated oil base stocks on the article itself. Thus, if the imposition of
which is a petroleum product, with its refinery tax on business of manufacturers, etc. in
plant situated at Malaya, Pilillia Rizal, petroleum products contravenes a declared
conducting its business activities within the national policy, it should have been expressly
territorial jurisdiction of municipality of Pilillia, stated in PD No. 436.
Rizal and is in continuous operation up to the
present. PPC owns and maintains an oil The exercise by local governments of the
refinery including 49 storage tanks for its power to tax is ordained by the present
petroleum products in Malaya, Pililla, Rizal. constitution. To allow the continuous effectivity
Under section 142 of NIRC of 1939, of the prohibition set forth in PC no. 26-73
manufactured oils and other fuels are subject would be tantamount to restricting their power
to specific tax. Respondent municipality of to tax by mere administrative issuances.
Pilillia, Rizal through municipal council Under section 5, article X of the 1987
resolution no. 25-s-1974 enacted municipal constitution, only guidelines and limitations
tax ordinance no. 1-s-1974 otherwise known that may be established by congress can
as “The Pililla Tax Code Of 1974” on June 14, define and limit such power of local
1974 which took effect on July 1, 1974. governments.
Sections 9 and 10 of the said ordinance
imposed a tax on business, except for those The storage permit fee being imposed by
which fixed taxes are provided in the local tax Pilillia’s tax ordinance is a fee for the
code on manufacturers, importers, or installation and keeping in storage of any
producers of any article of commerce of flammable, combustible or explosive
whatever kind or nature, including brewers, substances. In as much as said storage
distiller, rectifiers, repackers and makes use of tanks owned not by the
compounders of liquors distilled spirits and/or Municipality of Pilillia but by petitioner PPC,
wines in accordance with the schedule found same is obviously not a charge for any service
in the local tax code, as well as mayor’s rendered by the municipality as what is
permit sanitary inspection fee and storage envisioned in section 37 of the same code.
permit fee for flammable, combustible or
explosive substances, while section 139 of the
disputed ordinance imposed surcharges and
interests on unpaid taxes, fees or charges. Acebedo Optical v. CA, GR 100152, March 21,
Enforcing the provisions of the above 2000
mentioned ordinance, the respondent filed a
complaint on April 4, 1986 docketed as civil
case no. 057-T against PPC for the collection Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the
of the business tax from 1979 to 1986; City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit, to
storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986; which Mayor Camilo Cabili issued subject to
mayor’s permit fee and sanitary permit the following conditions: (1) that petitioner
inspection fees from 1975 to 1984. PPC, cannot put up an optical clinic but only a
commercial store and (2) that it cannot Facts:
examine or prescribe reading and optical PLDT paid a franchise tax equal to three
glasses for patients, because these are percent (3%) of its gross receipts. The
functions of optical clinics. franchise tax was paid “in lieu of all taxes on
The Samahan ng Optometrist sa this franchise or earnings thereof” pursuant to
Pilipinas (SOPI) lodged a complaint against RA 7082. The exemption from “all taxes on
petitioner, alleging that Acebedo had violated this franchise or earnings thereof” was
the conditions of the permit. subsequently withdrawn by RA 7160 (LGC),
Held: The authority of City Mayor to issue or which at the same time gave local government
grant licenses and business permits is beyond units the power to tax businesses enjoying a
cavil. It is provided by law. However, franchise on the basis of income received or
distinction must be made between the grant of earned by them within their territorial
a license or permit to do business and the jurisdiction. The LGC took effect on January 1,
issuance of a license to engage in the practice 1992.
of a particular profession. The first is granted The City of Davao enacted Ordinance No.
by the local authorities while the second is 519, Series of 1992, which in pertinent part
issued by the Board or Commission tasked to provides: Notwithstanding any exemption
regulate the particular profession. The first granted by law or other special laws, there is
authorizes the person, natural or juridical, to hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying
engage in business or some form of a franchise, a rate of seventy-five percent
commercial activity. A professional license on (75%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual
the other hand is the grant of authority to a receipts for the preceding calendar year”.
natural person to engage in the practice or
exercise of his/her profession. In 1995, the Congress enacted RA 7925, or
In the present case, what is sought by the Public Telecommunication Policy of the
petitioner from the respondent City Mayor is a Philippines, Sec. 23 of which provides that
permit to engage in the business of running an any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or
optical shop, and the city mayor cannot, immunity granted under existing franchises, or
through the issuance of such permit, regulate may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto
the practice of profession. Such a function is become part of previously granted
within the exclusive domain of the telecommunications franchises and shall be
Professional Regulation Commission and the accorded immediately and unconditionally to
Board of Examiners in Optometry. the grantees of such franchises.
The contention that business permit is
a contract and therefore the petitioner is Subsequently, Congress granted in favor of
estopped from questioning the same is Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
untenable. A license or permit is but a special (Globe) and Smart Information Technologies,
privilege, it is not in any way vested, absolute Inc. (Smart) franchises which contained “in
or permanent. leiu of all taxes” provisos.
The fact that a party acquiesced in the
special conditions imposed by the City Mayor In January 1999, when PLDT applied for a
in the subject business permit does not mayor’s permit to operate its Davao Metro
preclude it from challenging the said exchange, it was required to pay the local
imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the franchise tax
ambit of the authority of the City Mayor. The
doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give Issue:
effect to an act which is otherwise null and Whether or not by virtue of RA 7925, Sec. 23,
void or ultra vires. PLDT is again entitled to the exemption from
payment of the local franchise tax in view of
the grant of tax exemption to Globe and Smart
PLDT v. City of Davao, GR 143867, March 25, Held:
2003 Petitioner contends that because their existing
franchises contain “in lieu of all taxes”
clauses, the same grant of tax exemption
must be deemed to have become ipso facto
part of its previously granted Hence, it is only the legislature, as limited by
telecommunications franchise. But the rule is the provisions of the Constitution, which has
that tax exemptions should be granted only by full power to exempt any person or
a clear and unequivocal provision of law corporation or class of property from taxation.
“expressed in a language too plain to be
mistaken” and assuming for the nonce that the The Constitution may itself provide for specific
charters of Globe and of Smart grant tax tax exemptions or local governments may
exemptions, then this runabout way of pass ordinances providing for exemption from
granting tax exemption to PLDT is not a direct, local taxes, but otherwise, it is only the
“clear and unequivocal” way of communicating legislative branch which has the power to
the legislative intent. grant tax exemptions, its power to exempt
being as broad as its power to tax.
Nor does the term “exemption” in Sec. 23 of
RA 7925 mean tax exemption. The term refers The beneficiaries of the tax exemptions and
to exemption from regulations and other incentives in Section 12 of RA 7227 are
requirements imposed by the National clearly the business enterprises located within
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). the Subic SEZ.
Tax exemptions should be granted only by
clear and unequivocal provision of law on the
basis of language too plain to be mistaken.
Manila Electric v. Province of Laguna, GR No.
131359, May 5, 1999
John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim,
GR No. 119775, October 24, 2003

Facts: Certain municipalities of the province of

Laguna granted franchise in favor of petitioner
The case involves the law which designated a Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) for the
portion of the area covered by the former supply of electricity. Pursuant to the provisions
camp John Hay as the John Hay special of the Local Government Code of 1991,
economic zone (SEZ). Petitioners are franchise tax ordinance was enacted.
contending that the tax exemptions granted to MERALCO paid the tax under protest.
Subic SEZ should also apply to John Hay MERALCO assailed the trial courts ruling
SEZ. contending that the franchise tax ordinance is
violative of the non-impairment clause of the
Issue: Constitution.
Whether or not the tax exemptions and other
financial incentives granted to the Subic SEZ Issue:
are applicable to the John Hay SEZ. Whether or not the franchise tax ordinance is
violative of the non-impairment clause of the
Held: Constitution.

No. Held:
It is the legislative branch which has the
inherent power not only to select the subjects The petition was dismissed by the Supreme
of taxation but also grant exemptions. Court. Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may
Paragraph 4, Section 28 of Article VI of the not be revoked without impairing the
Constitution is crystal clear: "No law granting obligations of contracts. These contractual
tax exemption shall be passed without the tax exemptions, however, are not to be
concurrence of a majority of all the Members confused with tax exemptions granted under
of the Congress." franchises. A franchise partakes of the nature
of a grant which is beyond the purview of the Tax exemptions are never presumed and are
non-impairment clause of the Constitution. strictly construed against the taxpayer and
While the Court has referred to tax liberally in favor of the taxing authority. They
exemptions contained in special franchises as can only be given force when the grant is
being in the nature of contracts and a part of clear and categorical. The surrender of the
the inducement for carrying on the franchise, power to tax, when claimed, must be clearly
these exemptions are far from being strictly shown by a language that will admit of no
contractual in nature. reasonable construction consistent with the
reservation of the power. If the intention of the
legislature is open to doubt, then the intention
of the legislature must be resolved in favor of
Batangas Power v. Batangas City, GR No. the State.
152675, April 28, 2004
The "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smart's
franchise refers only to taxes, other than
Facts: income tax, imposed under the National
To attract investors in power generation, Internal Revenue Code. The "in lieu of all
National Power Corporation (NPC) assumed taxes" clause does not apply to local taxes.
the payment of investors’ taxes in the Build The proviso in the first paragraph of Section 9
Operate and Transfer (BOT) Agreement. of Smart's franchise states that the grantee
shall "continue to be liable for income taxes
Issue: payable under Title II of the National Internal
Whether or not NPCs tax exemption privileges Revenue Code." Also, the second paragraph
under its Charter were withdrawn by Section of Section 9 speaks of tax returns filed and
193 of the Local Government Code (LGC). taxes paid to the "Commissioner of Internal
Revenue or his duly authorized representative
Held: in accordance with the National Internal
Yes. Revenue Code."
Court recognized the removal of the blanket
exclusion of government instrumentalities
from local taxation as one of the most
significant provisions of the 1991 LGC.
Specifically, we stressed that Section 193 of 4. Closure and Opening of Roads
the LGC, an express and general repeal of all Cebu oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. vs.
statutes granting exemptions from local taxes,
Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481
withdrew the sweeping tax privileges
previously enjoyed by the NPC under its
Charter. Facts:
In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in Cebu
was excluded in the city’s development plan
Smart Communications v. City of Davao, GR hence the council declared it as abandoned. ,
The City Council of Cebu passed a resolution
No. 155491, September 16, 2008
authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the
land through a public bidding. Cebu Oxygen &
Facts: Acetylene Co., Inc. was the highest bidder .
Smart contends that its telecenter in Davao Cebu Oxygen applied for the land’s
City is exempt from payment of franchise tax registration before CFI Cebu but the provincial
to the City. fiscal opposed it. It was ruled that the road is
part of the public domain hence beyond the
Issue: commerce of man.
Whether or not Smart is liable to pay the
franchise tax imposed by the City of Davao. Issue:
Whether or not the city council may sell the
Held: property
Held: Issues:
Yes. Under Cebu’s Charter (RA 3857), the city Whether or not Sanggunian Members who are
council “may close any city road, street or abroad should be included in the counting of
alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. the entire Sangguniang body.

Such power to vacate a street or alley is Held:

discretionary. And the discretion will not Yes.
ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by Section 53 (a) of the LGC states that : “A
the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or majority of all members of the Sanggunian
fraud or collusion. who have been elected and qualified shall
constitute a quorum to transact official
Property thus withdrawn from public servitude business.” Quorum is defined as the “number
may be used or conveyed for any purpose for of members of a body which, when legally
which other real property belonging to the City assembled, will enable the body to transact its
may be lawfully used or conveyed.” Since that proper business or that number which makes
portion of the city street subject of Cebu a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon
Oxygen’s application for registration of title a law or ordinance or do any valid act.” When
was withdrawn from public use, it follows that required to constitute a quorum, “majority”
such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial means the number greater than half or more
property which can be the object of an than half of the total.
ordinary contract.
As further stated, it requires the majority of
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly ALL members of the Sanggunian. Quorum
provides that “Property of public dominion, should, thus, be based on the total number of
when no longer intended for public use or for members regardless of whether or not a
public service, shall form part of the member is said to be abroad.
patrimonial property of the State.”
Therefore, in cases where decisions have
been made during sessions deemed to have
not met the required quorum, such sessions
and decisions shall be considered void.
5. Legislative Power

A. Procedure
Casino vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 449
1. Quorum
Zamora vs. Caballero, 419 SCRA 384
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City
Facts: enacted Resolution No. 49, Code Ordinance,
Manuel Zamora, a member of the Series of 1984, which classified certain areas
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela of the city as residential zones, declaring,
Valley, filed before the RTC a petition to among others, the site of cockpit as such.
invalidate the acts executed and resolutions
issued by the Sanggunian lack of quorum. Sec 6.44. of the said resolution states
Zamora, the petitioner, argued that the that changes in the zoning ordinance shall be
Sanggunian, during its February 26 session, treated as an amendment provided that any
conducted official business without a quorum amendment to the zoning ordinance or
since only 7 out of the 14 members were provision thereof shall be carried out through
present. Respondents argued that Board a resolution of three fourths vote of the
Member Sotto was in the United States during Sangguniang Panglunsod.
such sessions and that the actual number of
Board Members in the country was only 13 Resolution No. 378, was then enacted which
which, they claimed, should be the basis for reclassified Block 125 as within the
the determination of a quorum. recreational zone, thus allegedly amending
Resolution No. 49. Nine (9) members of the government.
said sangguniang panlungsod, participated, In the meantime, the Vice Mayor requested for
with four (4) members voting for the the renovation of the councilors office and
amendment, while four (4) voted against, and salaries for the city government personnel.
with one (1) abstention. The vice-mayor, as The City Treasurer issued a certification on
presiding officer, broke the deadlock by voting the availability of funds. The City Council,
for the amendment. acting favorably on Mayor Malonzos
endorsement, appropriated the amount of
Issue: P39,343,028.00 and passed Ordinance No.
Whether or not the three fourths vote is 0254, S1998. A certain Eduardo Tibor filed an
merely a formal requirement administrative complaint against petitioners
before the Office of the President (OP) due to
Held: the passage of the said ordinance. Petitioners
No. herein filed a motion to refer the case to the
Department of Budget and Management. This
Section 6.44 of said ordinance regarding motion remained unresolved by the OP. Later,
amendments thereto is a specific and Teotimo de Guzman Gajudo filed an action for
particular provision for said ordinance and the nullity of the ordinance before the
explicitly provides for a different number of Regional Trial Court of Caloocan.
votes. Where there is in the same statute a
particular enactment and also a general one Petitioner again filed with the OP a
which in its most comprehensive sense would manifestation that the determination of the
include what is embraced in the former, the validity of the said ordinance was a prejudicial
particular enactment must be operative, and question. Likewise, the motion was not acted
the general statement must be taken to affect upon. Without resolving the two motions of the
only such cases within its language as are not petitioners, the OP rendered the assailed
within the provisions of the particular judgment meting upon them the penalty of
enactment. suspension for a period of three months,
which is immediately executory upon the
receipt of the decision. Without moving for
reconsideration, petitioners filed before the
2. Three Readings Supreme Court the instant Petition for
Malonzo vs. Zamora, 323 SCRA 875 Certiorari.

Facts: Moreover, the circumstances that preceded
In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of the enactment of Ordinance No. 0254, S.
Caloocan City authorized through an 1998 are irregular, to say the least. First, there
ordinance, the Mayor to initiate expropriation was undue haste in conducting the three (3)
proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 26 of the readings in one session day, especially so
Maysilo Estate registered in the name of CLT when said session day was in the first day of
Realty Development Corporation. Because of the regular session preceding the elections.
a territorial dispute between Caloocan City Although this is not prohibited by law,
and the Municipality of Malabon, CLT Realty separate readings were contrived to give local
filed an action for interpleader praying for an legislators, or national legislators for that
order for the two local government units to matter, ample time for cool reflection and
litigate their conflicting claims over the right to circumspection before a bill is passed into law.
collect real estate taxes from them. Second, no new rules have been adopted by
In 1997, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, under the Sanggunian and no new committees have
the stewardship of incumbent Mayor Malonzo, yet been formed at the time of the enactment
enacted an ordinance increasing the of the ordinance, so it is difficult to imagine
appropriated amount for the subject property how petitioners could have passed the
supposed to be expropriated. However, after ordinance in an orderly, mature and
failing to conclude the voluntary sale, a suit of deliberative manner. The argument that if no
eminent domain was filed by the city new rules were adopted by the new council,
the old ones could have been availed of is
unconvincing considering that petitioners did The resolution was approved by then
not ever bother to show what the old rules Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and
were. transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
for its approval.

Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said

Resolution and returned it with the comment
that “expropriation is unnecessary considering
B. Approval by Local Chief Executive that there are still available lots in Bunawan
De los Reyes vs. Sandiganbayan, 281 SCRA for the establishment of the government
631 center.”

Facts: Whether or not the Sangguniang
Petitioner was a mayor who was charged with Panlalawigan has the authority to disapprove
the crime of falsification of a public document. a resolution of municipality to expropriate
He contends that as local chief executive, he private property
has neither the official custody of nor the duty
to prepare said resolution Held:
Issue: Eminent domain, the power which the
Whether or not the singing of ordinance or Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
resolution by local chief executive affixes his instant case, is a fundamental State power
signature, is purely a ministerial act that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is
government’s right to appropriate, in the
Held: nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
No. private property for public use or purpose.
Contrary to petitioners belief, the grant of the Inherently possessed by the national
veto power confers authority beyond the legislature the power of eminent domain may
simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance be validly delegated to local governments,
or resolution, as a requisite to its other public entities and public utilities. For the
enforceability. Such power accords the local taking of private property by the government
chief executive the discretion to sustain a to be valid, the taking must be for public use
resolution or ordinance in the first instance or and there must be just compensation
to veto it and return it with his objections to the
Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider The power of the sangguniang panlalawigan
the same. The Sanggunian concerned, to review ordinances, resolutions and
however, may override the veto by a two- executive orders promulgated by the
thirds (2/3) vote of all its members thereby municipal mayor; declaration of invalidity must
making the ordinance or resolution effective be on the sole ground that it is beyond the
for all legal intents and purposes. power of the sanggunian bayan or mayor to
issue the resolution, ordinance or order under
C. Review Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was
Moday vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586 without the authority to disapprove Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89.
The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed a D. Power to Investigate
resolution authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative vs.
Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a Lot Sangguniang Panlungsod, 155 SCRA 421
owned by Moday .
Facts: contumacious behavior would be for said
The Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of power to be deemed implied in the statutory
Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation grant of delegated legislative power. But, the
in connection with pending legislation related contempt power and the subpoena power
to the operations of public utilities. Invited in partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be
the hearing were the heads of NORECO II implied in the grant of legislative power.
(Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.)
NORECO II is alleged to have installed
inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres
and Umbac refused to appear before the SP
and they alleged that the power to E. Validity of Ordinances and Resolutions
investigate, and to order the improvement of, 1. Validity Ordinances and Resolutions
alleged inefficient power lines to conform to
standards is lodged exclusively with the
National Electrification Administration (NEA) a municipal ordinance
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or
Issue: any statute
Whether or not SP has the power to (2) must not be unfair or oppressive
investigate a suspected violation by an (3) must not be partial or discriminatory
electric cooperative of the conditions of its
electric franchise (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(5) must be general and consistent with public
Held: policy, and
No. (6) must not be unreasonable.
The power to inquire into the efficiency of the
service supplied by electric cooperatives is
within the franchising powers of the NEA.
a. Zoning
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete Ortigas and Co., Limited partnership vs. Feati
may, therefore, enact ordinances to regulate Bank and Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533
the installation and maintenance of electric
power lines, e.g. prohibit the use of inefficient
power lines, in order to protect the city FACTS:
residents from the hazards these may pose. In Ortigas sold lots to two private individuals.
aid of this ordinance making power, said body These private individuals then sold the lots to
or any of its committees may conduct one person named Chavez. The TCT of the
investigations similar to, but not the same as, properties stipulated that the land is to be
the legislative investigations conducted by the used for residential purposes only. Then Feati
national legislature. As already discussed, the bank acquired the property from Chavez.
difference lies in the lack of subpoena power Feati is now buidling a bank. This was being
and of the power to punish for contempt on challenged as the TCT stipulated otherwise.
the part of the local legislative bodies. They
may only invite resource persons who are Feati argued that Resolution No, 27 provides
willing to supply information which may be that in the area where they are building the
relevant to the proposed ordinance. bank is declared to be an industrial area.

There is no express provision either in the ISSUE: WON Resolution No, 27 is valid
1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) HELD: YES
granting local legislative bodies, the power to Resolution prevails over contract stipulations
subpoena witnesses and the power to punish (TCT)
non-members for contempt. Absent a Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy
constitutional or legal provision for the Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt
exercise of these powers, the only possible zoning and subdivision ordinances or
justification for the issuance of a subpoena regulations for the Municipality
and for the punishment of non-members for Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied
Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157
power of the municipality should be “liberally
construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power
to the local government in promoting FACTS:
economic conditions, social welfare, and
There is a disturbance caused by the abaca
material progress in the community”.
Although non-impairment of contracts is manufacturing machine which affected the
constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due
since it has to be reconciled with the to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust
legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the emitted by the machine
power to promote health, morals, peace, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the
education, good order or safety and general Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966
welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was
declaring the warehouse owned and operated
obviously passed in exercise of police power
to safeguard health, safety, peace and order by petitioner a public nuisance
and the general welfare of the people in the petitioner contends that said ordinance is
locality unconstitutional, contrary to the due process
and equal protection clause of the Constitution
and null and void for not having been passed
Velasco vs. Blas, 115 SCRA 540
in accordance with law
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid
Resolution No. 3 authorized Blas to build a Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed
cinema house. However it was being built next
by the Municipal Council of Virac in the
to a medical clinic. Therefore, the Resolution
prohibited use of loudspeakers outside of the exercise of its police power.
cinema. Any violation would result to a municipal corporations are agencies of the
revocation of the permit. State for the promotion and maintenance of
Then Dr. Velasco challenged, so Resolution local self-government and as such are
No. 68 was enacted, declaring Resolution No. endowed with the police powers in order to
3 void because it is in clear contravention of
effectively accomplish and carry out the
Sec. 3 of RA 1224 (regulation of nightclubs,
cabarets, dancing schools - not built within declared objects of their creation
200 m of public schools, churches and Its authority emanates from the general
hospitals) welfare clause under the Administrative Code

ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 68 is valid a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene
HELD: NO the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be
Resolution No. 68 of the Provincial Board of
unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or
Cavite is null and void because it is beyond
the powers granted to the board discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may
the only power granted to the provincial board regulate trade (5) must be general and
by Sec. 2233 of the same Code is to declare a consistent with public policy, and (6) must not
municipal council issuance void on the sole be unreasonable.
ground that it is beyond the power of the
municipal council to issue.
the only ground upon which a provincial board Delfino vs. St. James Hospital, Inc., 501 SCRA
may declare any municipal resolution, 97
ordinance, or order invalid is when such
resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the
powers conferred upon the council or FACTS:
president making the same." St. James is a hospital. It expanded its
Absolutely no other ground is recognized by building structure into a four-storey building,
the law.
but then, an ordinance was enacted because
it’s a non-conforming structure already and
b. Foodstuff
violates the Zoning Ordinance
Javellana vs. Kintanar, 115 SCRA 627
St. James argues that it has complied with the
1981 zoning ordinance
But respondents provided that the 1981 FACTS:
zoning ordinance has already been repealed. Glicerio Javellana is the owner of a market
(building and lot) in Crossing Bago, Bago City,
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid which consists of store spaces and of
permanent and movable stalls all leased to
HELD: YES vendors
The enactment of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance Then the government refused to accept his
effectively repealed the 1981 Zoning payment of fees for the business permit
Ordinance. because the Treasurer said that an Ordinance
The complete title of said Ordinance, "An was enacted prohibiting the operation of a
Ordinance Adopting a Comprehensive Zoning market which is not owned by the government
Regulation for the Municipality of Santa Rosa,
Laguna and Providing for the Administration, ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid
Enforcement and Amendment Thereof. And
for the Repeal of all Ordinances in Conflict HELD: YES
Therewith," as well as the Repealing The enactment of these ordinances by the
10 City Council of the City of Bago is clearly
Clause of the same Ordinance which states
authorized under Section 15 of the said City
that "all other ordinances, rules or regulations Charter
that are in conflict with the provisions of this authorizes said Board 'to regulate and fix the
11 amount of the license fees for peddlers, and
ordinance are hereby repealed," clearly
the keeping, preservation and sale of meat,
express the intent of the Sangguniang Bayan poultry, fish, game, butter, cheese, lard,
of Santa Rosa, Laguna, to repeal any vegetables, bread, and other provisions;
enactment that is inconsistent with the new (b) Paragraph (cc) which authorizes said
Ordinance Board 'to provide for the establishment,
A perusal of the two pieces of legislation will maintenance and regulation, and to fix the
fees for the use of public markets;
reveal that both Ordinances were enacted to
Also, a scrutiny of the charter provision win
guide, control, and regulate the future growth readily show that by public market is meant
and development of the Municipality of Santa one that is intended to serve the public in
Rosa, Laguna, in accordance with the general. This is the only conclusion which can
municipality's development plan, as well as to be drawn when it used the word "Public" to
promote the general welfare of the residents modify the word 1 "market" for if the meaning
of the community by regulating the location sought to be conveyed is the ownership
thereof then the phrase "by any, person,
and use of all buildings and land within the entity, association, or corporation other than
municipality the city" win serve no useful purpose
Since it is presumed that the Sangguniang
Bayan knew of the existence of the older
c. Massage Parlors
Ordinance, by enacting the later law
Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568
embracing the complete subject matter of the
1981 Zoning Ordinance, it must be concluded
that the legislative body had intended to FACTS:
repeal the former Ordinance. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It
shall be prohibited for any operator of any
barber shop to conduct the business of devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws
massaging customers or other persons in any in municipal waters including the conservation
adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, of mangroves
or in any room or rooms within the same This necessarily includes the enactment of
building where the barber shop is located as ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery
long as the operator of the barber shop and laws within the municipal waters
the rooms where massaging is conducted is In light of the principles of decentralization and
the same person." devolution enshrined in the LGC and the
The petitioners assail the provision as it has powers granted therein to LGUs which
deprived them of their livelihood unquestionably involve the exercise of police
power, the validity of the questioned
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid – YES ordinances cannot be doubted.
HELD: it is a police power measure
e objectives behind its enactment are:" (1) To
e. Allowances for Judges
be able to impose payment of the license fee
Dadole vs. COA, 393 SCRA 262
for engaging in the business of massage clinic
under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by
Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure FACTS:
than the ordinance regulating the business of Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular
barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued
possible immorality which might grow out of notices of disallowances to RTC and MTC
the construction of separate rooms for Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of
massage of customers." P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities and
municipalities, respectively) authorized by said
circular. The additional monthly allowances of
the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each.
d. Moratorium on Fishing
They were also asked to reimbursed the
Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154
amount they received in excess of P1000 from
the last six months.
the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto ISSUE: WON the Budget Circular is valid
Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the HELD: NO
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Although the Constitution guarantees
Puerto Princesa City autonomy to local government units, the
Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, exercise of local autonomy remains subject to
Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a the power of control by Congress and the
resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, power of supervision by the President.
possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The
several species of live marine coral dwelling President of the Philippines shall exercise
aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming general supervision over local governments. x
from Palawan waters x x" The said provision has been interpreted to
exclude the power of control.
ISSUE: WON the ordinances are valid The members of the Cabinet and other
HELD: YES executive officials are merely alter egos of the
There is absolutely no showing that any of the President. As such, they are subject to the
petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or power of control of the President
marginal fisherman.
one of the devolved powers of the LCG on
f. Adjustment of Salaries
DBM vs. City Government of Cebu, 518 SCRA
iSSUE: WON the Ordinance is VALID
t was within the ambit of the Sanggunian’s
FACTS: authority in the exercise of police power to
Respondent City Government of Cebu, regulate the enjoyment of the privilege to
lease the market stalls. The enactment of the
through an appropriation ordinance, granted
Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of 1993
additional allowances to the judges and fiscals repealing Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series
of the city in an amount more than P1,000 per of 1983 (the basis of petitioners’ lease) was a
month valid exercise of such governmental authority
Then, it was passed and approved Ordinance to regulate the possession and use of the
No. 1468, which provided appropriations for public market and its facilities.
the salary adjustments of department heads The operation of a market stall by virtue of a
and assistant department heads. license is always subject to the police power
of the city government. An application for
ISSUE: WON the Ordinance is valid
this privilege may be granted or refused for
reasons of public policy and sound public
it was merely an appropriations bill
Court notes that Ordinance No. 1468,
approved on August 9, 1993, merely provided
for appropriations for the salary adjustments 2. Void Ordinances
of department heads and assistant
department heads to conform with the a. Working Permits
correct position titles under Joint Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA
Commission Circular Nos. 37 and 39 which 270
took effect on July 1, 1989
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537
g. Lease of Stalls in Public Market
Lucero vs. City Government of Pasig, 508 SCRA prohibits aliens from being employed or to
23 engage or participate in any position or
occupation or business enumerated therein,
whether permanent, temporary or casual,
FACTS: without first securing an employment permit
Petitioners were granted lease contracts to from the Mayor of Manila
3 Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho challenged the
occupy and operate stalls in the public
ordinance for being discriminatory and it is an
market of Pasig by virtue of Municipal
invalid exercise of police power
Ordinance No. 25, series of 1983.
Sometime in 1993, the municipal government
ISSUE: WON the Ordinance is valid
of Pasig renovated the market facilities and
constructed annex buildings to the old public
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any
criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
Pursuant to the new ordinance, municipal
exercise of his discretion.
officials urged all stall occupants to fill up and
It has been held that where an ordinance of a
submit the necessary application forms. The
municipality fails to state any policy or to set
application form contained the terms and
up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's
conditions for the occupation and operation of
action, expresses no purpose to be attained
the stalls
by requiring a permit, enumerates no
conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely
lacks standard, thus conferring upon the
Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to c. Disposition of Public Land
grant or deny the issuance of building permits, Baguio Citizens Action, Inc. vs. City Council, 121
such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined SCRA 368
and unlimited delegation of power to allow or
prevent an activity per se lawful.
Ordinance 386 passed by the City Council of
b. Traffic Regulation Baguio City. Said ordinance considered all
Primicias vs. Municipality of Urdaneta, 83 SCRA squatters of public land who are duly
462 registered as such at the time of the
promulgation of the ordinance as bona fide
FACTS: occupants of their respective lots.- Petitioners
Juan Augusta B. Primacias plaintiff appellee, filed a petition for declaratory relief, praying for
was driving his car within the jurisdiction of a judgment declaring the Ordinance as invalid
Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta's and illegal ab initio
Municipal Police asked him to stop.
He was told, upon stopping, that he had ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid
violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of HELD: NO
1964, "and more particularly, for overtaking a The Ordinance in question is a patent nullity. It
truck." The policeman then asked for plaintiff's considered all squatters of public land in the
license which he surrendered, and a City of Baguio as bona-fide occupants of their
temporary operator's permit was issued to respective lots. No amount of acquiescence
him. on the part of the city officials will elevate
Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in squatting from being an unlawful act into
the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against lawful. The land occupied by the squatters are
Primicias for violation of Ordinance No. 3, portions of water sheds, reservations,
Series of 1964 scattered portions of the public domain within
Thereafter, accused filed a motion to declare the Baguio townsite. Certainly, there is more
the ordinance void reason then to void the actions taken by the
City of Baguio through the questioned
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid ordinance.
An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, d. Admission Fee to Movie Houses
among others, that is "must not contravene . . Balacuit vs. CFI of Agusan Del Norte, 163
7 SCRA 182
. the statute," for it is a "fundamental
FACTS The city of Butuan passed Ordinance
principle that municipal ordinances are inferior
in status and subordinate to the laws of the No. 640 wherein any person, group of persons,
8 entity or corporation engaged in the business of
state." Following this general rule, whenever selling admission tickets to any movie or other
there is a conflict between an ordinance and a public exhibitions, games, contests, or other
statute, the ordinance "must give way. performances are PENALIZED if they require
Moreover, while the law did not contain any children between 7-12YO to pay full payment for
classification, it is thus important for the ticket. Price must be only ½ of the price.
Municipal to add details esp when it comes to
the classification of vehicles ISSUE WON ordinance is valid? NO.
HELD The operation of theatres, illegal gambling because it must be read in
cinematographs and other places of public relation to “and other prohibited games of
exhibition are subject to regulation by the chance”.
municipal council in the exercise of delegated
police power by the local government. However, Here: The Ordinance contravenes PD 1869
while a business may be regulated, such (creation of PAGCOR) and public policy since it
regulation must be within the bounds of prevents PAGCOR from exercising powers
reason—must be reasonable and cannot be conferred on it to operate a casino in CDO.
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary Ordinances should not contravene a statute
interference with the business or calling subject since municipal governments (LGU) are only
of regulation. In this case, the lack of safeguard agents of national government (Congress); a
measures against abuse to determine age of delegate cannot be superior to the principal.
child and the unjust burden upon theatre to bear
the loss of earning and penalty of the reduction Enacting ordinances are expressly vested upon
of price from children between 7-12YO is LGUs through the General Welfare Clause
unreasonable. (sec16) and under its powers, duties, and
functions under sec458 of the LGC. However,
To Test the validity of an ordinance, it must:
e. Prohibitions of Legalized Gambling 1. Not contravene constitution (or
Magtojos vs Pryce Properties Corporation, statute)
234 SCRA 255 2. Not be unfair or oppressive
FACTS PAGCOR decided to expand operation 3. Not be partial or discriminatory
in CDO in 1992 and leased a portion of a 4. Not prohibit or regulate trade
building from Pryce Corporation, to which 5. It is general and consistent with
renovations were made. Sangguniang public policy
Panlunsod then enacted Ordinance No. 3353 to 6. Must not be unreasonable
prohibit the issuance of a business permit and
cancel existing business permit of
establishments for using and allowing the use f. Allowances of Auditors
for operation of the casino. Later Passed Villarena vs. COA, 408 SCRA 455
Ordinance No. 3375-93 which prohibited the FACTS Villarena was the City auditor in
operation of casino as a whole, pursuant to Marikina. The city enacted Ordinances for the
powers given to LGUs under Section 458 of the budget which included allowances and benefits
LGC where it states, “enact ordinances to granted to COA personnel assigned to Marikina,
prevent, suppress and impose appropriate including Villarena. Under Sec18 RA 6758, to
penalties for…establishment and maintenance preserve the integrity and independence of
of houses of ill repute, gambling and other COA, its officials and employees are prohibited
prohibited games of chance”. from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses,
allowances or other emoluments from any govt
ISSUE WON the Ordinances were valid? NO. entity, local government unit, and govt-owned
and controlled corporations. Additionally, under
HELD Gambling is not illegal per se since there COA Memorandum No 89-584, receipt of such
is no categorical prohibition under the allowances and other forms of fringe benefits by
Constitution nor the mention of such. Thus, it is auditing personnel shall be considered illegal.
up to Congress to determine which to prohibit Thus, COA found Villarena guilty of neglect of
and allow. They prohibited jueteng and monte duty, simple misconduct and violation of Rules.
but permit lotteries, cockfighting and horse- Villarena argued, such receipt was valid
racing. Thus, in reading Section 458 of the LGC, pursuant to the ordinance pursuant to LGU
the word “gambling” must be referred to as power under Sec 447 of LGC to enact
ordinances “when the finances of the municipal employee of offices or govt corporations
govt allow, provide for addtl allowances and charged with the grant of licenses or permits
other benefits to judges, prosecutors…and other under concessions. Under EO 205, only the
national govt officials stationed in the NTC can grant such certificates of authority to
municipality”. cable television operators and issue the
necessary implementing rules and regulations
ISSUE WON Ordinance passing allowances and under EO 436, NTC is vested with such
was valid? NO. regulation and supervisions of the cable
television industry. Thus, members cannot be
HELD Local legislative bodies may provide for guilty of violation of Anti Graft since they have
additional allowances and other benefits to no power to grant franchise and cannot be held
national government officials stations or liable.
assigned to their municipality or city. This is, Although under the General Welfare Clause of
however, subject to RA 6758, removal of extra the LGC, it goes to show that LGUs can regulate
emoluments specifically prohibiting COA officials the operation of cable televisions BUT it must
from receiving such. So in order to perform their only do so when it encroaches public
constitutional mandate, COA need officials that properties, such as public street, rights of ways,
will be free from unwarranted influences and the founding of structures and parceling or large
removal of temptation and enticement of extra regions. Beyond such act of REGULATION such
emoluments under RA 6758 was placed to as the grant of franchise is ultra vires. No right
ensure this. nor privilege was granted to Spacelink by virtue
NOTE: Villarena stated the repeal clause of the of the void ordinance.
LGC (paragraph 7 of Section 534), however HERE: Since there was no commencement of
there was no mention of RA 6758 and implied operations and the Resolution 261 but merely
repeals are not lightly presumed. In case of expressed willingness to allow petitioner to
conflict, the courts must harmonize and not install and operate cable television and not grant
uphold one over the other. a franchise entirely, it is valid. However,
Ordinance No. 19 in specifically stating the grant
of the franchise is invalid.
g. Regulation of Cable Television Industry
Zoomzat, Inc. vs. People, 451 SCRA 226
FACTS memebrs of the Sangguniang
Panlungson of Gingoog City were charged for h. Prohibiting Entertainment Establishments
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for passing City of Manila vs. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308
Resolution No 261 in allowing the Zoomzat to FACTS Zoning Ordinance was passed that
install and operate a cable TV system and forbids the running of the enumerated
passed Ordinance No. 19 granting franchise to businesses such as sauna parlors, karaoke
Spacelink Cable TV to operate cable tv for 10 bars, beerhouses, nightclubs, day clubs,
years since such right must be don’t by NTC. superclubs, discotheques, motels, inns in the
Sanggunian contends that LGC also grants the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3, instructs
city councils to grant permits, licenses and the owners/operators to wind up business
franchises in aid of local govt unit regulatory or operations or transfer outside area or convert
revenue raising powers. business into those that are allowed.

ISSUE WON LGUs have power to grant ISSUE WON Ordinance is valid? NO.
franchise to cable television operators? NO
HELD LGC empowers legislative bodies to
HELD to be liable under RA 3019, Anti Graft and enact ordinances, approve resolution and
Corrupt Practices Act, one must be an officer or appropriate funds for the general welfare of
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants Ownership therefore of sidewalks in a public
pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the subdivision belongs to the subdivision until it is
proper exercise of corporate powers of the transferred to the government by donation or
province/city/municipality. However, such police acquired through expropriation. According to PD
power is still subordinate to constitutional 1216, the subdivision is relieved of responsibility
limitations and must be reasonable and for the of maintaining road lots and open space only
public good where there is a relation between upon securing a certificate of completion and
the purposes of the police measure and the executing a deed of donation of these road lots
means employed. Otherwise, it will be an and open spaces to the LGU. The use of LGU
arbitrary intrusion into private rights. funds for widening the privately-owned
Here, the ordinance is unreasonable and sidewalks is unlawful as it directly contravenes
oppressive since it permanently restricts the use Section 335 of RA 7160, wherein only
of property that cannot be used for any construction, improvement and repair of
reasonable purpose “Winding up” business is infrastructure facilities owned by the LGU may
tantamount to closure, a deprivation or property be bankrolled with the Local Govt funds.
and confiscation, which when not noxious,
cannot be removed without compensation.
j. Zoning
Parayno vs. Javellanos, 495 SCRA 85
i. Appropriation for Private Purposes FACTS SB Calasiao Pangasinan passed
Albon vs. Fernando, 494 SCRA 141 Resolution No. 50 recommending the closure or
FACTS City of Marikina undertook a public transfer of the locations of the gasoline station
works project to widen, clear and repair existing of Petitioner claiming that it was less than 100
sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision, meters from the nearest public school and
pursuant to Ordinance No. 59. Taxpayers suit church, violating Art 6 of the Official Zoning
was filed by Albon claiming unlawful to use govt Code of Calasiao. Petitioner claims that her
equipment and use of public funds for such gasoline FILLING station is NOT covered under
sidewalks within the subdivision since they were Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code since it
private property. City claims it is empowered was not a gasoline SERVICE station as
under LGC to exercise such powers necessary, contemplated under the section prohibiting
appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective gasoline service stations within 100m from any
provisions of the basic services and facilities. public or private school, public library,
Additionally, PD 1216 declares that roads, alleys playground and hospital based on straightline
and sidewalks in a residential subdivision are for method.
public use and beyond commerce of man,
mandating owners to set aside open spaces ISSUE WON Resolution is valid? NO.
which shall be devoted exclusively for use of
general public. HELD “Gasoline SERVICE station” does not
necessarily include “gasoline FILLING station”.
ISSUE WON LGU may validly use public funds Service station includes supply of gasoline oil,
to undertake widening, repair and improvement grease, batteries, tires and car accessories
of sidewalks of a privately-owned subdivision? while the other only services automobile and
NO; RTC ordered to see if donated and if other motor vehicles with gasoline and oil only.
public has full and unimpeded access to and Here, although it has the power under the
use of the roads and sidewalks. general welfare clause to take actions to enact
measures to promote health and general welfare
HELD Under subdivision laws, lots allotted by of its constituents, should still be within limits of
subdivision developers as road lots include constitution. There was no record that the
roads, sidewalks, alleys and planting strips. municipality measured the distance
notwithstanding the fact that such distance was of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No
crucial in determining whether there was an 01-96 that calls for the initiation of a recall
actual violation of section 44. Thus, abatement proceeding against the Mayor. Mayor contends
of a nuisance without judicial proceedings when that the recall proceedings were infirm because
it is NOT a nuisance per se, violating it was convened by the LIGA ng mga Brgy and
Constitutional Due process. A gas station is not the required members of the PRA.
NOT a nuisance per se or one affecting the
immediate safety of persons and property. ISSUE WON the Liga in meeting for Recall met
and voted in accordance with the law that
mandates it should be a Preparatory Recall
3. Initiative and Referendum Assembly and not a liga? YES. The same
Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, 37 personalities under the liga were those
SCRA 279 needed for a PRA.
FACTS SB of Morong Bataan agreed in the
inclusion of Morong as part of Subic Special HELD Liga ng mga barangay is DISTINCT form
Economic Zone in accordance with RA 7227. the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Liga is an
Petitioners resorted to power of initiative under organization of all barangays. The Preparatory
Local Govt code and started to collect Recall Assembly is an organization of barangay
signatures to repeal the resolution. COMELEC captains and kagawads. However, in this case,
denied petition claiming a resolution is not the representatives of the LIGA were the SAME
subject to any local initiative. MEMBERS needed for the Preparatory Recall
Assembly, convening as a PRA and not as a
ISSUE WON resolution can be subject of an Liga. Thus, the meeting and the voting of the
initiative? YES resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo
HELD Constitution includes not only ordinances was VALID.
but also resolutions as appropriate subjects of a
local initiative. Under Art 6, “whereby the people Malonzo v. Zamora – 323 SCRA 875
can directly propose and enact laws or approve FACTS City passed Ordinance No. 0254 to
or reject any act or law or part thereof” shows appropriate P39M to fund expropriation of Lot 26
that the word “ACT” includes a resolution. When of Maysilo Estate, which was found to be a
the Local Govt Code was passed, it did not realigned portion of the P50 denominated by law
change the scope of local initiative or limit for “expropriation of Properties”, classified under
coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. the Current Operating Expenses in the Annual
Section 120 Ch2 Title 9 of book 1 merely Budget of Caloocan City. Additionally, that
defines the concept of local initiative as a legal Ordinance was passed without funds actually
process where registered voters of a local govt available nor compliance with the requirement
may directly propose, enact or amend any under section 50 LGC that house rules be
ordinance. It does NOT deal with the subjects or adopted or updated and there was undue haste
matters that can be taken up in a local initiative in such passage.
since Section 124 includes the word “any
proposition or ordinance” upon the limitation ISSUE WON Ordinance is valid? Yes.
which shows the broad inclusion of resolutions HELD Nothing showing that Ordinance No 0246
as well. of the P39M is actually part of the P50M under
the “expropriation of properties” under the
Malonzo v. COMELEC, 269 SCRA 380 (1997) Current Operating expenditures. Moreover, it
FACTS Mayor Malonzo elected as Mayor of shows that the P39M is under ordinance series
Caloocan City. However, after a year, the 1997 while the P50M is under ordinance series
punong brgys and SB members and SK of 1998. Even more so, such ordinance under
chairmen met and deliberated upon the approval
the 1998 series did not even specify specific Sanggunian that requires such prior
properties for expropriation. authorization in favor of the mayor before filing a
Additionally, it showed that Sanggunian took up suit on behalf of the city.
the matter of adopting a set of house rules in a
general meeting to which it enacted Ordinance
0254. Although this was after such passage of 2. Representation by Counsel
the earlier expropriation ordinance, There is no
requirement that the completion of the updating a. Prohibitions against Hiring of Private Lawyers
or adoption of the internal rules of procedure Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 728
before the Sanggunian could act on any matter FACTS Municipality of Hagonoy Bulacan,
like the enactment of an ordinance. Lastly, there through a law firm of Cruz Durian & Academia
is No prohibition that the rule on the three sued Marcianos for the recovery of its 74-
readings of an ordinance be done in just one Hectare fishpond to which the municipality will
session day. The urgency of the passage was pay attorneys fees to the firm. The municipal
due to the salaries of the city employees funded attorney then entered appearance as counsel for
by the ordinance that even such councilors who municipality stating that the firm will be under
objected took advantage of such benefits. control of the officials. Marcianos moved for the
disqualification of the law firm.

6. Corporate powers ISSUE WON the law firm can represent the suit
brought by municipality? NO.
a) To sue and be sued
HELD While a public prosecutor is allowed in
1. Powers of Governors and Mayors criminal cases, the same is not allowed in CIVIL
City of Caloocan vs. Court of Appeals, 489 cases where the MUNICIPALITY is the plaintiff.
SCRA 45 Section 1683 of Revised Admin Code and
FACTS Sanggunian of Caloocan passed Section 3 of Local Autonomy Law is clear: only
Ordinance No. 068 authorizing Mayor to the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney
negotiate and enter into a contract of sale of the can represent a municipality in its lawsuits. This
patrimonial property of the city. Deed of is mandatory. Even if there was a collaborating
Absolute Sale with Gotesco over property for with the private law firm and the municipal
P136M signed. COA initially disapproved this attorney and fiscal, such is still in contravention
Deed of Sale but instead ordered that the price of Section 1683. The municipal attorney is the
should be at P182M. Mayor then disagreed with head of the legal division or office of a
the sale and refused to sign the documents or municipality and “shall act as legal counsel of
accept the payments. Mayor filed civil case for the municipality and perform such duties and
annulment of sale. Gotesco claims petition is exercise such powers as may be assigned to
defective because it was instituted by a non- him by the council”. He is paid out of the
party, the mayor, and not the city of Caloocan. municipal funds and can represent the
municipality without the collaboration of the
ISSUE WON the institution of the civil suit to fiscal, clearly showing that the municipality
recover land of the city by the Mayor was should not be burdened with the expenses of
proper? YES hiring a private lawyer. The only exception to
hiring a private lawyer is when the provincial
HELD The Mayor has the authority to file suits fiscal is disqualified to represent it.
for the recovery of the funds and property on
behalf of the city even without prior authorization
from the Sanggunian.There is nowhere in the b. Sanctioned Hiring of Private Lawyer
enumerated powers and duties of the
Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate and Philsucom. Atty Inciong filed case for
Court, 147 SCRA 447 payment of attorneys fees against Province of
FACTS While Governor Espina was in Manila, Batangas and RTC rendered judgment in favor
Vice Governor and 3 members of the Provincial of Atty. Inciong and the decision became final.
Board enacted Resolution No 188 donating to COA disallowed payment since hiring of private
the City of Cebu 210 province-owned lots all attorney had no approval by SB required by the
located in the City of Cebu which would later on law nor was there ay appropriation for such.
be sold by the City to raise funds for public ISSUE WON COA erred in disallowing the
improvement projects as well as authorizing the payment? YES.
VG to sign the deed of donation. Governor
returned and denounced the Resolution as HELD The employment of Barangay Coloocan
illegal and immoral since almost all patrimonial of petitioner as its counsel even if allegedly
property of the City was donated. Gov filed case unauthorized by SB is binding as it took no
to declare donation declared illegal and prompt measure to repudiate the employment.
employed the services of Atty. Garcia in filing Thus, there should be no disallowance in the
and prosecuting the case in his behalf and in payment to Atty Inciong as this has become final
behalf of the Province of Cebu. Provincial Board and executory. Lastly, the COA Circular in
disallowing payment cannot dimish the
ISSUE WON Governor allowed to hire private substantive right of recovery of attorney’s fees
lawyer? YES for this case falls within the under a final and executory Decision.
Alinsug vs. Regional trial court, 225 SCRA
HELD Although Section 1683 of the Revised 553
Admin Code is clear that only the municipal FACTS Alinsug was a regular employee of the
attorney and fiscal can represent the municipal government of Escalante, Negros
municipality, the municipality’s authority to Occidental and appointed as Clerk III in the
employ a private lawyer is expressly limited Office of Municipal Planning and development
only to situations where the provincial fiscal Coordinator. She was then detailed to work
is disqualified to represent it. In this case, under the newly elected Office of the Mayor.
however, since the Governor, in behalf of the When she absented herself from work to attend
Province of Cebu, seeks redress against the to family matters with only the permission of the
very members of the Provincial Board, can hire personnel officer and NOT the Mayor, the Mayor
a private counsel since the Provincial Fiscal had suspended her for one month on the grounds of
been directed by the Board already to appear on simple misconduct. She filed a petition for
behalf of the Board in the case, leaving the injunction with damagers and prayer for tro and
Governor no choice but to seek other prelim injunction against mayor and municipal
representation. treasurer. Mayor filed an answer through private
lawyer SM Lezama. Alinsug questioned
Inciong vs. Domingo, 211 SCRA 139 authority of private lawyer when it should be the
FACTS PHILSUCOM failed to pay real estate municipal officer instead. However, Mayor
taxes due on its sugar refinery in Brgy. Caloocan claimed that the municipality of Escalante has
Batangas so the Provincial Treasurer schedule no legal officer and that the case was based on
the sale of the refinery at a public auction. moral damages, thus, hiring a private counsel
PHILSUCOM filed petition for prohibition against was justified.
the Provincial Treasurer. The Brgy then hired
Atty. Inciong and filed a motion for intervention ISSUE WON the hiring of the private lawyer was
claiming it is an indispensable party as it has justified? YES.
10% share in the property tax. An Amnesty
Compromise Agreement was entered by the PT
HELD The law allows a private counsel to be Cebu as part of the defendants since they
hired by a municipality only when the operate, maintain, and manage the hospital. The
municipality is an adverse party in a case parties decided to enter into a compromise
involving the provincial government or another agreement including provision for payment of
municipality or city within the province since the sum of P30,000 to which the sanggunian ratified
provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve the agreement. COA disallowed the payment,
and represent it. In this case, although the claiming such was not within the powers of the
Mayor was sued in his official capacity, he was Sanggunian. The giving away of funds in form of
also held to have exceeded his authority financial assistance to a family has no causal
together with a complaint that contains other relation to the general welfare clause.
allegations and a prayer for moral damages. The
allegations in the complaint show that there ISSUE WON the juridical compromise is
were certain acts beyond official capacity: conclusive and binding on all parties, including
political vendetta, vengeance unleashed on her the City of Cebu? YES
for her family not voting him, political
harassment, grave abuse of discretion. Thus, HELD A compromise is a bilateral act or
such a case must be satisfied by them in their transaction that is expressly acknowledged as a
private capacity and may hire a private lawyer. juridical agreement by the civil code. The code
allows juridical persons to compromise as long
c. Representation of Mayor by City Fiscal is it is in conformity with the requisites necessary
Mabutol vs. Maza, 105 SCRA 564 to alienate their property. When the compromise
of a civil suit has a city that is involved as a party
FACTS Mabutol sought disbarment based on is a legitimate transaction, and is even
gross ignorance of the law of Atty Maza as City encouraged by law.
Fiscal of San Jose City is charged in an admin
case for removal as such based on his
representation as counsel for Mayor Pascual. b) To acquire and sell property
Mayor, in his private capacity, charged Mabutol City of Angeles vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA
for libel, charged his wife for violation of 90
Ordinance (operating pharmacy business FACTS Under the Deed of Donation to the City
without permit), and constructing fence and of Angeles of 51 parcels of land under the
repairing a warehouse without building permit. condition that it will be solely utilized for the site
of Angeles City Sports Center and that no
ISSUE WON the city fiscal can represent the commercial building, market or anything similar
Mayor in his private capacity? YES. shall be constructed, a substantial breach will
revoke such Donation. However, public officials
HELD A city fiscal is not prohibited from acting started to construct the drug rehabilitation center
as counsel of the City Mayor even when sued in on the portion of the donated land to which a
his private capacity if such arose out of the complaint was filed with the RTC seeking
performance of his official duties. revocation of the donation.
ISSUE WON can revoke the donation by
2. Compromises violation? NO, both in violation
Osmena vs. COA, 238 SCRA 463 HELD PD 957 is clear that the subdivision
FACTS In an incident where the son of the de owner/developer has to donate the open space
la Cerna spouses was stabbed and died, the for parks and playgrounds a certain percentage
spouses sued the Cebu City Medical Center for of the area; it is no longer optional to donate
damages for the gross negligence, such to the homeowners association with
irresponsibility and incompetence of the 5 consent of the city or municipality. Such
physicians of the public hospital, naming City of donation can be imposed with a condition not
contrary to customs, law, morals public order or under the LGC. There was a perfected contract
good conduct. Here, such condition was to make here entered into with the province and former
the park non-buildable- The public officials governor-therefore, new governor Yap cannot
violated the condition. Also, the petitioners revoke or renounce with consent of the other
likewise violated the required percentage to be party.
donated as open space (less). Therefore, both
being at fault, neither one can recover what he c) To enter into contracts
has given by virtue of the contract (i) Requisites
(Article1412NCC). Thus, the construction of the ● The LGU has the express, implied or
drug rehabilitation center on the land is not inherent power to enter into the
allowed and as a violation thereof, there can be particular contract;
no recovery of damages. There is no liability ● The contract is entered into by the
among public officers concerned because they
proper department, board, committee,
were sued only in their official capacity and
officer or agent;
cannot be made personally liable even if they
are in bad faith. Must separately try them in ○ Unless otherwise provided by
personal capacity. the Code, no contract may be
entered into by the local chief
GSIS vs. Province of Tarlac, 417 SCRA 60 executive on behalf of the local
FACTS Sang. Panlalawigan of Tarlac passed government unit without prior
REsolution which authorized and approved the authorization by the sanggunian
conversion of the Urquico Memorial Athletic concerned.
Field into a Government Center and donation of ● The contract must comply with certain
different portions of the land to other
substantive requirements; and
government agencies for purposes of
● The contract must comply with the
constructing their buildings. GSIS was one of
those that decided to put up their site on the formal requirements of written contracts.
land; Notice of Construction was issued by the (ii) Ultra vires contracts
Governor Cojangco and MOA entered into by ● When a contract is entered into without
both parties. When a new Governor, Gov. Yap compliance with the first and the third
was elected, he wrote GSIS demanding requisites (express, implied or inherent
payment of P33M, representing balance of value power to enter into the particular
of lot donated, claiming earlier MOA was unfair. contract & substantive requirements).
When denied by GSIS, Governor filed for nullity ● Null and void.
of the donation and MOA because of failure to
● Cannot be ratified or validated.
appraise valuation by local commitee on awards
○ Ratification of defective
before the transfer.
municipal contracts is possible
ISSUE WON new Governor can declare contract only when there is non-
entered into by old Governor and GSIS null? compliance with the second
NO. No prohibition requiring appraisal before and/or the fourth requirements
sale. (contract is entered into by the
proper department, board,
HELD A transfer of real property by a local committee, officer or agent &
government unit to an instrumentality of the formal requirements of written
government without first securing an appraised
valuation from the local committee on awards
○ Ratification may either be
does not appear as one of the void contracts
under the civil code nor is it mentioned express or implied.
1. Lease of properties for public use surrendered or bargained away through the
Villanueva vs. Castaneda Jr., 154 SCRA 142 medium of a contract.
Facts: Petitioners were owners of stalls in a
talipapa located in a land owned by the Dacanay vs. Asistio, 208 SCRA 404
municipal government of San Fernando, Facts: In 1979, the Metropolitan Manila
Pampanga. They were said be lessees of the Commission enacted an ordinance designating
land through a municipal council resolution certain city and municipal streets, roads and
dated since 1961. However, the municipal open spaces as sites for flea markets. One of
subsequently issued a new resolution revoking those streets was the "Heroes del '96" where the
the right previously granted to the vendor for the petitioner lives. Upon application of certain
area will be made as a parking space for the vendors, the city mayor and city engineer,
town plaza and subsequently demolished the issued them licenses to conduct vending
market stalls. activities on said street. After a few years, Mayor
Martinez caused the demolition of the said flea
Issue: WON the resolution in 1961 conferred markets on Heroes del '96, V. Hence, the stall
contractual rights to the stall owners making owners filed a case against such action. The
them lawful lessees of the land. RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the
streets are of public dominion, hence outside the
Held: No. There is no question that the place commerce of man. Thereafter, there was a
occupied by the petitioners and from which they change in the city administration and current
are sought to be evicted is a public plaza as mayor (Asistio) did not pursue the action of the
early as 1951. It is elementary that a public previous mayor and left the flea markets in the
plaza is beyond the commerce of man, lease streets as is. Thus, Petitioner,being a resident of
thereon is null and void. Applying this well Heroes del '96 filed a petition for mandamus to
settled doctrine, the Court ruled that the remove the stalls in their street.
petitioners had no right in the first place to
Issue: WON public streets be leased or licensed
occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist
to market stallholders by virtue of a city
in remaining there now on the strength of their
ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila
alleged lease contracts. Likewise, the mayor has
the duty to clear the area and restore it as a
parking place and public plaza. The problems Held: No. There is no doubt that the disputed
caused by the usurpation of the place by the areas from which the private respondents’
petitioners are covered by the police power as market stalls are public streets. A public street is
delegated to the municipality under the general property for public use hence outside the
welfare clause. Hence, police power was validly commerce of man. Being outside the commerce
exercised in this case. Even assuming a valid of man, it may not be the subject of lease or
lease of the property in dispute, the resolution other contract. The Executive Order issued by
could have effectively terminated the agreement Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of
for it is settled that the police power cannot be Heroes del ‘96 Street as a vending area for
surrendered or bargained away through the stallholders who were granted licenses by the
medium of a contract. city government contravenes the general law
that reserves city streets and roads for public
Doctrine: A public plaza is beyond the use. Such leases or licenses are null and void
commerce of man, and cannot be the subject of for being contrary to law. The right of the public
lease or other contractual undertaking. And, to use the city streets may not be bargained
even assuming the existence of a valid lease of away through contract. The interests of a few
the public plaza or part thereof, the municipal should not prevail over the good of the greater
resolution effectively terminated the agreement, number in the community whose health, peace,
for it is settled that the police power cannot be
safety, good order and general welfare, the Congress. These basic principles have the effect
respondent city officials are under legal of limiting such authority of the province, city or
obligation to protect. municipality to close a public street or
thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays
Doctrine: Public streets or thoroughfares are
down the basic principle that properties of public
property for public use, outside the commerce of dominion devoted to public use and made
man, and may not be the subject of lease or
available to the public in general are outside the
other contracts.
commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or
Macasiano vs. Diolino, 212 SCRA 464 leased by the local government unit to private
Facts: The municipality of Paranaque passed persons. Aside from the requirement of due
an ordinance authorizing the closure of some process which should be complied with before
streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque for the closing a road, street or park, the closure should
establishment of a flea market thereon. be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road
Thereafter, Mayor Ferrer was authorized to or other public property from public use when
enter into a contract to any service cooperative circumstances show that such property is no
for the establishment, operation, maintenance longer intended or necessary for public use or
and management of flea market and/or vending public service. When it is already withdrawn
areas. Because of this purpose, respondent from public use, the property then becomes
Palanyag entered into an agreement with the patrimonial property of the local government unit
municipality of Paranaque with the obligation to concerned. It is only then that the respondent
remit dues to the treasury. Consequently, municipality can “use or convey them for any
market stalls were put up by respondent purpose for which other real property belonging
Palanyag on the said streets. However, the PNP to the local unit concerned might be lawfully
Superintendent of Metropolitan Traffic used or conveyed” in accordance with the last
Command ordered the destruction and sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337,
confiscation of the stalls and were returned to known as Local Government Code.
Palanyag. Petitioner then sent a letter to
Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to discontinue Doctrine: The closure of the streets in Baclaran
the flea market otherwise the market stalls shall (Paranaque) was held invalid for non-
be dismantled. compliance with MMA Ordinance No. 2, and
Issue: WON the ordinance issued by the because provincial roads and city streets are
municipality of Paranaque authorizing the lease property for public use under Art. 424, Civil
and use of public streets or thoroughfares as Code, hence under the absolute control of
sites for flea market is valid? Congress. They are outside the commerce of
man, and cannot be disposed of to private
Held: No. Roads and streets which are available persons.
to the public in general and ordinarily used for
vehicular traffic are still considered public 2. Certificate of availability of public funds
property devoted to public use The said streets Osmena vs. Commission on Audit, 230 SCRA
in the case are local roads used for public 585
service and are therefore considered public Facts: In 1985 the City of Cebu decided to
properties of respondent municipality. Properties construct a modern abattoir. For this project, the
of the local government which are devoted to City Treasurer, Ricardo Pestaño, issued a
public service are deemed public and are under certificate of availability of funds (5,419,180php)
the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local specifically for the construction of the abbatoir
governments have no authority whatsoever to (slaughterhouse). After a public bidding, HFCCI
control or regulate the use of public properties was awarded to do the construction of the
unless specific authority is vested upon them by abattoir. Thus, the City of Cebu entered into a
contract with HFCCI wherein the cost was
indicated to be 8,368,920php. In 1986, Osmeña, entered into contrary to the foregoing
then Officer-In-Charge of the City of Cebu, requirements shall be VOID. Clearly then, the
ordered the suspension of the project and contract entered into by the former Mayor
review of the contract by the COA. HFCCI Duterte was void from the very beginning since
claimed the amount of 2,142,964.29php as the the agreed cost for the project (P8,368,920.00)
value of the work accomplished. Unable to was way beyond the appropriated amount
collect the said amount after so many demands (P5,419,180.00) as certified by the City
HFCCI instituted a civil action. According to the Treasurer. Hence, the contract was properly
City of Cebu, while admitting having entered into declared void and unenforceable in COA’s 2nd
a contract with HFCCI, alleged that the contract Indorsement, dated September 4, 1986.
it entered into was null and void as declared by
the Commission on Audit in its 2nd Indorsement Doctrine: The contract was properly declared
dated September 4, 1986. Therefore whatever void and unenforceable in COA’s 2nd
amount is due to HFCCI is to the sole liability of Indorsement. No contract involving the
the officer or officers who entered into the said expenditures of public funds shall be entered
contract. Nevertheless, the City of Cebu entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor and
into a compromise agreement to the effect that a certification that the amount necessary to
as a full and final settlement to the claim of cover the proposed contract for the current fiscal
HFCCI. However, the COA declared that the year is available for expenditure on account
compromise agreement is also void. Petitioner thereof.
argues that the decision of COA invalidating the
contract between the City of Cebu and HFCCI City of Quezon vs. Lexber, Inc., 354 SCRA
was void since it was already executed and 493
fulfilled. Petitioner further stresses that COA has Facts: In 1990, a Tri-Partite MOA was drawn
no authority to declare a contract already between petitioner (represented by its then
executed void. Mayor Simon), respondent Lexber, Inc. and the
then Municipality of Antipolo, whereby a 26,010
Issue: WON the COA has the power to square meter parcel of land located in Antipolo
invalidate the contract between the City of Cebu was to be used as a garbage dumping site by
and HFCCI. petitioner and other Metro Manila cities or
municipalities authorized by the latter, for a 5-
Held: Yes. The Commission on Audit has the year period commencing in January 1991. Part
power, authority and duty to examine, audit and of the agreement was that the landowner,
settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and represented by respondent Lexber, shall be
receipts of and expenditures or uses of funds hired as the exclusive supplier of manpower,
and property, owned or held in trust by, or heavy equipment and engineering services for
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its the dumpsite and shall also have the right of first
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities. The refusal for contracting such services.
Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1445) Respondent Lexber alleged that petitioner
further provides that no contract involving the immediately commenced dumping garbage on
expenditure of public funds shall be entered into the landfill site continuously from December
unless there is an appropriation therefor and the 1991 until May 1992. Thereafter, petitioner
proper accounting official of the agency ceased to dump garbage on the said site for
concerned shall have certified to the officer reasons not made known to respondent Lexber.
entering into the obligation that funds have been Consequently, even while the dumpsite
duly appropriated for the purpose and the remained unused, respondent Lexber claimed it
amount necessary to cover the proposed was entitled to payment for its services.
contract for the current fiscal year is available for Petitioner, this time acting through Mayor
expenditure on account thereof. Any contract Mathay denied any liability under the contract on
the ground that the same was invalid and city in its business transactions must be “upon
unenforceable. According to Mayor Mathay, the authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or
subject contract was signed only by Mayor pursuant to law or ordinance,” no such prior
Simon and had neither the approval nor authority was required under the Local
ratification of the City Council, and it lacked the Government Code of 1983.
required budget appropriation pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known 3. Conveyance of real property
as the Auditing Code of the Philippines. City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA
Issue: WON the subject contract is null and Facts: Before bowing out of office the lameduck
void. provincial administration of Camarines Sur in
1959 passed Resolution No. 1103 authorizing
Held: No. PD 1445 does not provide that the Provincial Governor Trivino to execute a deed of
absence of an appropriation ordinance ipso fact sale without consideration in favor of the City of
makes a contract entered into by a local Naga of two parcels of land with improvements,
government unit null and void. Public funds may belonging to the province. Pursuant to said
be disbursed not only pursuant to an resolution Provincial Governor Trivino executed
appropriation law, but also in pursuance of other two deeds of sale: one conveying the title and
specific statutory authority. In this case, BP 337, possession of a parcel containing 80,000 square
the law which was then in force, empowered the meters on which the Camarines Sur High School
Mayor to represent the city in its business complex (classroom buildings, library building,
transactions and sign all warrants drawn on the grandstand, etc.) are erected; and 4 parcel of
city treasury and all bonds, contracts and land containing 19,044 square meters which is
obligations of the city. While the Mayor has no devoted to horticulture, farming, gardening and
power to appropriate funds to support the to the study of poultry and pig-raising. The
contracts, neither does BP 337 prohibit him from consideration for each sale is one peso which
entering into contracts unless and until funds are has never been paid. Private Respondent Hon.
appropriated therefor. By entering into the two Apolonio G. Maleniza, as taxpayer and
contracts, Mayor Simon did not usurp the city governor-elect of Camarines Sur filed a
council’s power to provide for the proper complaint against the Province of Camarines
disposal of garbage and to appropriate funds Sur and the City of Naga. The complaint prays
therefor. The execution of contracts to address for the annulment of the two conveyances in
such a need is his statutory duty, just as it is the favor of defendant City of Naga of real
city council's duty to provide for such service. properties belonging to defendant Province of
There is no provision in the law that prohibits the Camarines Sur.
city mayor from entering into contracts for the
public welfare unless and until there is a prior Issue: WON the conveyances of land in favor of
authority from the city council. Furthermore, Naga City is void.
public bidding may have been dispensed with,
not only because “time is of the essence” but in Held: Yes. Section 2068 of the Revised
recognition of the reality that offering property to Administrative Code provides that: “When the
be used as a dumpsite is not an attractive nor government of a province is a party to a deed or
lucrative option for property owners. instrument conveying the title of real property,
such deed or instrument shall be executed on
Doctrine: Public funds may be disbursed not behalf of the said Government by the Provincial
only pursuant to an appropriation law, but also in Governor, upon resolution of the provincial
pursuance of other specific statutory authority. board, and with the approval of the President.”
While the Local Government Code of 1991 now Without the needed Presidential approval, it is
requires that the mayor’s representation of the evident that the conveyances were void. Note
that up to now, said approval has not been the Municipality of Olongapo executed a
obtained. The respondent Court cannot likewise contract for the purchase and sale of electric
be faulted for awarding damages to the City of power and energy. Petitioner filed a complaint to
Naga, for the improvements it had introduced on declare the contract between NPC and
the premises. To eliminate this award would Olongapo null and void for it was executed
certainly be less than fair. The damages can be against the provisions of mandatory and
set off against the rentals to be paid by the City. prohibitory laws, more particularly Section 18 of
the Public Service Law, which provides that it
Doctrine: Conveyances by the former Provincial shall be unlawful for any municipality, province
Board of Camarines Sur of parcels of land to the or other department of the Government of the
City of Naga are void as the required Philippines to engage in any public service
Presidential approval was not obtained. business without having first secured from the
Commission a certificate of public convenience
7. Operation of Public Utilities and necessity as provided for in this Act.

A. Operation of Public Utility by LGU Issue: WON Petitioner has a cause of action
Olongapo Electric Light and Power against respondent.
Corporation vs. National Power Corporation,
149 SCRA 153 Held: None. What section 18 of the Public
Facts: In 1960, Petitioner was granted a Service Law prohibits is the act of engaging in a
legislative franchise to install operate and public service business without first securing a
maintain an electric light, heat and power certificate of public convenience. The law does
system in the municipality of Olongapo, it wrote not declare as unlawful the act of buying electric
to the NPC offering to buy electric power. In power and energy by a public utility operator.
1961, the Municipal Council of Olongapo passed Said operator would only come under the penal
Resolution No. 52, permitting the Petitioner to and sanction of the law from the moment it sells
make use of or avail of its legislative franchise or disposes of the power to its customers,
with the municipality of Olongapo. In view because it would then be engaging in the public
thereof, the Petitioner submitted a power service business. Consequently, the execution
distribution plan which was approved by the of the contract did not by itself constitute a
District Engineer of Zambales and the Municipal violation of the provisions of Section 18 of the
Council of Olongapo. The Petitioner then started Public Service Law as it was merely a contract
negotiations with the individual members of the for the sale of electric power and energy.
Municipal Council of Olongapo for the lease and Accordingly, the amendment of the Public
eventual purchase of the municipality's Service Act by Republic Act No. 2677, placed
distribution lines, and the Municipal Council, public services operated by government entities
authorized the disposal of the existing electric and government owned or controlled
distribution system to private parties through a corporations under the jurisdiction of the Public
public auction sale. The municipal officials also Service Commission, with the qualification,
agreed to lease to the Petitioner the said electric however, that they are not required to secure
distribution system for a period of one (1) year at certificate of public convenience before
a monthly rental of P5,000.00. However, before commencing operations. Furthermore, petitioner
the lease contract could be formalized, the was not a party to the contract nor an assignee
municipal mayor was replaced, Resolution No. or representative of the parties thereto. Neither
58 was approved wherein it was resolved that was it directly affected by the execution of the
the Municipality of Olongapo would maintain and contract because the NPC was ready and in a
operate the electric and power system. Copies position to supply the plaintiff and the
of the resolutions were sent to the appellant for Municipality of Olongapo the specific quantity of
its information. On 4 January 1963, the NPC and power contracted by each.
the establishment of a municipal ferry is first
Doctrine: Public services owned or operated by given to a municipality, ferry service will
government entities or government owned or nevertheless be subject to the supervision and
controlled corporation shall be regulated by the control of the Board of Transportation. The
Commission in the same way as privately owned winner in a public bidding conducted by the
public services, but certificates of public municipal council obtains the privilege to operate
convenience or certificates of public the ferry service, but he has to apply for a
convenience and necessity shall not be required Certificate of Public Convenience from the
of such entities, or corporations. Board of Transportation which then has the duty
to regulate the operation, route, rates to be
B. Operation of Ferry by Private Party charged, as well as specify the kind of
Municipality of Echague vs. Abellera, 146 equipment to be used for the comfort,
SCRA 180 convenience and safety of the public using the
Facts: Since 1936, petitioner municipality had ferry. The grant of supervision and authority by
been operating a municipal ferry service Administrative Code to municipalities or
'traversing the Cagayan River to and from the municipal councils over public utilities such as
Barangays Soyung-Malitao and Barangays municipal ferries, markets, etc. is specific, and
Embarcadero-Dammang East and West, all undoubtedly was "intended to provide an
within the municipality of Echague, Isabela. In additional source of revenue to municipal
this regard, petitioner either operated the ferry corporations for their maintenance and
service itself, or annually leased the operation of operation" On the other hand, the authority
the same to the highest bidder. On November conferred on the respondent Board of
16, 1977, private respondent Ballad furnished Transportation was intended principally to insure
petitioner a copy of a Decision by the Board of and safeguard the convenience, comfort and
Transportation granting respondent a Certificate safety of the public.
of Public Convenience to operate a two-motor
boat service for the regular and public Doctrine: Where a ferry operation lies entirely
transportation of passengers and freight within within a municipality, prior approval of the
Echague, Isabela. Petitioner filed a Motion for municipal government is necessary; but once
Reconsideration on the grounds of lack of notice approved, the operator must thereafter apply
and deprivation of the opportunity to be heard by with BOT for a certificate of public convenience
respondent Board and that the award of said and he shall be subject also to BOT supervision.
Certificate of Public Convenience to respondent
Ballad was approved without favorable 8. Licensing of Cockpits
indorsement by resolution of the Sangguniang Canet vs. Decena, 420 SCRA 388
Bayan of Echague, Isabela of Ballad's Facts: Decena was the mayor of Bula,
application. Camarines Sur. In 1998, Canet, by virtue of a
council resolution, was allowed to operate a
Issue: WON the Board of Transportation has cockpit in Bula. The following year, the
the power to acquire or establish municipal Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance 001
ferries. entitled “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation
of Cockpits and Other Related Game-Fowl
Held: None. The provisions of the Revised Activities in the Municipality of Bula, Camarines
Administrative Code which grant to the Sur and Providing Penalties for any Violation to
municipal council or Sangguniang Bayan the (sic) the Provisions Thereof.” However, Decena
power to acquire or establish municipal ferries, denied to sign the ordinance because it does not
are different and should be distinguished from contain rules and regulations as well as a
the authority of the Board of Transportation to separability clause. When Canet applied for a
issue a Certificate of Public Convenience. While mayor’s permit for the operation of his cockpit.
Decena denied Canet’s application on the
ground that under the Local Government Code Doctrine: To compel a mayor to issue a mayor’s
of 1991, the authority to give licenses for the permit for a cockpit, in the absence of ordinance
establishment, operation and maintenance of allowing the operation of a cockpit, would not
cockpits as well as the regulation of cockfighting only be a violation of the explicit provisions of
and commercial breeding of gamecocks is Section 447 of the Local Government Code of
vested in the Sangguniang Bayan. Therefore, 1991, but would also be an undue
she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as encroachment on the mayor’s administrative
there was no ordinance passed by the prerogatives.
Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the same.
Canet claims that he should be given a permit Tan vs. Perena, 452 SCRA 53
based on the 1998 resolution allowing him to Facts: In 1974, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
operate a cockpit as by virtue of local municipal 449, otherwise known as the Cockfighting Law
tax ordinances which generally provide for the of 1974, was enacted. The decree provided for
issuance of a mayor’s permit for the operation of limits on the number of cockpits that may be
businesses. established in cities and municipalities (1 per
250K population). However, with the enactment
Issue: WON Mayor Decena can be compelled of the LGC in 1991, the municipal sangguniang
to issue a permit sans a municipal ordinance. bayan were empowered to authorize and license
the establishment, operation and maintenance
Held: No. It was Ordinance No. 001, S. 1999 of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and
which provided for the collection of application commercial breeding of gamecocks. In 1993, the
filing fees, ocular inspection fees, mayor’s permit Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of
fees, filing fees for the institution of complaints, Daanbantayan, Cebu Province, enacted
entrance fees and special derby assessments Municipal Ordinance which provides that there
for the operation of cockpits. This Ordinance, may not be more than 3 cockpits in the province.
however, was withdrawn by the Sangguniang Thereafter, petitioner Tan applied with the
Bayan. Hence, there being in effect no Municipal Gamefowl Commission for the
ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit, issuance of a permit/license to establish and
Resolution No. 049, S. 1998, authorizing operate a cockpit in Sitio Combado, Bagay, in
petitioner to establish, operate and maintain a Daanbantayan. At the time of his application,
cockpit in Bula, Camarines Sur cannot be there was already another cockpit in operation in
implemented. Suffice it to state in this regard Daanbantayan, operated by respondent Perea.
that to compel respondent to issue the mayor’s Nevertheless, mayor’s permit were issued which
permit would not only be a violation of the allowed Tan to establish/operate/conduct the
explicit provisions of Section 447 of the Local business of a cockpit for 1 year. Perea alleged
Government Code of 1991, but would also be an that there was no lawful basis for the
undue encroachment on respondent’s establishment of a second cockpit. She claimed
administrative prerogatives. It should, that Tan conducted his cockpit fights not in
furthermore, be borne in mind that cockfighting Combado, but in Malingin, at a site less than five
although authorized by law is still a form of kilometers away from her own cockpit. She
gambling. Gambling is essentially antagonistic to insisted that the unlawful operation of Tans
the aims of enhancing national productivity and cockpit has caused injury to her own legitimate
self-reliance. As has been previously said, a business. Petitioners asserted that under the
statute which authorizes a gambling activity or Local Government Code of 1991, the
business should be strictly construed, and every sangguniang bayan of each municipality now
reasonable doubt resolved so as to limit rather had the power and authority to grant franchises
than expand the powers and rights claimed by and enact ordinances authorizing the
franchise holders under its authority.
establishment, licensing, operation and have a population of over one hundred
maintenance of cockpits. thousand, in which case two cockpits may be
Issue: WON the Local Government Code has
rendered the Cockfighting Law inoperative. F. Liability of LGUs

Held: No. While the Local Government Code 1. Liability for Quasi-Delicts
expressly repealed several laws, the
Under Article 2189, provinces, cities and
Cockfighting Law was not among them; As laws municipalities shall be liable for damages for
are presumed to be passed with deliberation the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
and with knowledge of all existing ones on the person by reason of the defective condition of
subject, it is logical to conclude that in passing a roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
statute it is not intended to interfere with or other public works under their control or
abrogate a former law relating to the same supervision.
subject matter, unless the repugnancy between
It is not even necessary for the defective road
the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear or street to belong to the province, city or
and convincing as a result of the language used, municipality for liability to attach. The article
or unless the latter Act fully embraces the only requires that either control or supervision
subject matter of the earlier one. The qualifying is exercised over the defective road or street.
phrase “any law to the contrary notwithstanding”
in Section 447 (a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Municipal of Dagupan vs. Court of Appeals,
Code serves notice that it is the sangguniang 466 SCRA 78 (Correct case: Municipality of
bayan concerned alone which has the power to San Juan v CA)
authorize and license the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cockpits, and Facts:
● MWSS and Kwong Cheung of K.C.
regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding
Waterworks System Construction
of gamecocks within its territorial jurisdiction. entered into a contract for water
While the sanggunian retains the power to services connections in San Juan.
authorize and license the establishment, ● On the rainy night of May 31, 1988,
operation, and maintenance of cockpits, its while Priscilla Chan was driving her
discretion is limited in that it cannot authorize car along with Assistant Prosecutor
Laura Biglang-awa, the left front
more than one cockpit per city or municipality,
wheel of the car fell on a manhole
unless such cities or municipalities have a which was earlier excavated by K.C.
population of over one hundred thousand, in The said excavation occurred on
which case two cockpits may be established. Santolan Road, a national road within
Furthermore, a municipal ordinance must not the territorial jurisdiction of San Juan.
contravene the Constitution or any statute, ● As a result, Assistant Prosecutor
otherwise it is void. Ordinance No. 7 Biglang-awa suffered a fractured
humerus of the right arm.
unmistakably contravenes the Cockfighting Law
● Because of the incident, Biglang-awa
in allowing three cockpits in Daanbantayan. filed a complaint with the RTC against
Thus, no rights can be asserted by the the MWSS, Municipality of San Juan,
petitioners arising from the Ordinance. some municipal officials, and later on,
impleaded K.C.
Doctrine: While the sanggunian retains the ● RTC ruled in favor Biglang-awa
power to authorize and license the holding MWSS and Municipality of
San Juan jointly and severally liable.
establishment, operation, and maintenance of
cockpits, its discretion is limited in that it cannot Issue:W/N the Municipality of San Juan can
authorize more than one cockpit per city or be held liable for the injury of Biglang-awa?
municipality, unless such cities or municipalities
pile of earth from a digging done
Held/Ratio: YES relative to the base failure at
● For liability to arise under Article 2189 Matahimik Street nary a lighting
of the Civil Code, ownership of the device or a reflectorized barricade or
roads, streets, bridges, public sign perhaps which could have served
buildings and other public works, is as an adequate warning to motorist
not a controlling factor, it being especially during the thick of the night
sufficient that a province, city or where darkness is pervasive. None
municipality has control or supervision was ever presented to stress the point
thereof. that sufficient and adequate
● Petitioner municipality exercises the precautionary signs were placed at
power of control, or, at the very least, Matahimik Street
supervision over all excavations for ● The provisions of Article 2189 of the
the laying of gas, water, sewer and New Civil Code capsulizes the
other pipes within its territory. The responsibility of the city government
municipality’s liability for injuries relative to the maintenance of roads
caused by its failure to regulate the and bridges since it exercises the
drilling and excavation of the ground control and supervision over the
for the laying of gas, water, sewer, same. Failure of the defendant to
and other pipes, attaches regardless comply with the statutory provision
of whether the drilling or excavation is found in the subject-article is
made on a national or municipal road, tantamount to negligence per se
for as long as the same is within its which renders the City government
territorial jurisdiction. liable.

Quezon City Government vs. Dacara, 460 Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382
SCRA 243; and
Facts: ● Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter
● On February 1988, Fulgencio Dacara, of CFI-Dagupan, while trying to board
Jr., while driving a Toyota Corolla a tricycle along Perez Blvd. (a
sedan, rammed into a pile of earth national road within the control and
diggings found at Matahimik St., supervision of Dagupan City),
Quezon City, which was then being accidentally fell on an open manhole
repaired by the Quezon City which caused her to fracture her right
Government. leg.
● As a result, Dacara sustained injuries ● Guilatco filed a complaint for
and the car suffered extensive damages against the City of
damages. Dagupan.
● Because of this, Dacara filed a ● CFI ruled in favor of Guilatco.
complaint for damages against the ● CA reversed for failure of Guilatco to
Quezon City Government and a prove that the City of Dagupan had
certain Engr. Tiamzon. control or supervision over Perez
● RTC ruled in favor of Dacara. Blvd. where the manhole was located.
● CA affirmed.
Issue:W/N the City of Dagupan can be held
Issue:W/N Quezon City can be held liable for liable?
Held/Ratio: YES
Held/Ratio: YES ● The liability of public corporations for
● The accident of February 28, 1988 damages arising from injuries suffered
which caused almost the life and limb by pedestrians from the defective
of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car condition of roads is expressed in the
turned turtle was the existence of a Civil Code
● Under Article 2189, provinces, cities Issue:W/N the City of Manila can be held
and municipalities shall be liable for liable for damages?
damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of Held/Ratio: YES
the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and On the Applicable Law
other public works under their control ● According to the Charter of Manila
or supervision. (R.A. 409), the city shall not be held
● It is not even necessary for the liable for any damages or injuries
defective road or street to belong to caused by the negligence of the
the province, city or municipality for Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any
liability to attach. The article only other city officer(paraphrased).
requires that either control or ● On the other hand, Article 2189 of the
supervision is exercised over the New Civil Code provides that:
defective road or street. Provinces, cities and municipalities
● In the case at bar, this control or shall be liable for damages for the
supervision is provided for in the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
charter of Dagupan and is exercised person by reason of defective
through the City Engineer conditions of road, streets, bridges,
● The express provision in the charter public buildings, and other public
holding the city not liable for damages works under their control or
or injuries sustained by persons or supervision.
property due to the failure of any city ● Insofar as its territorial application is
officer to enforce the provisions of the concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a
charter, cannot be used to exempt the special law and the Civil Code a
city, as in the case at bar. general legislation; but, as regards the
● The charter only lays down general subject-matter of the provisions,
rules regulating the liability of the city. Section 4 of Republic Act 409
On the other hand article 2189 applies establishes a general rule regulating
in particular to the liability arising from the liability of the City of Manila for:
"defective streets, public buildings and "damages or injury to persons or
other public works." property arising from the failure of"
city officers "to enforce the provisions
of" said Act "or any other law or
City of Manila vs. Teotico, 22 SCRA 267 ordinance, or from negligence" of the
Facts: city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
● Genaro Teotico, fell on a uncovered officers while enforcing or attempting
manhole along P.Burgos Ave., City of to enforce said provisions." Upon the
Manila, as he was about to board a other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
jeepney. As a result, his eyeglasses Code constitutes a particular
broke which caused him to sustain a prescription making "provinces, cities
lacerated left upper eyelid among and municipalities . . . liable for
others. damages for the death of, or injury
● Because of this, Teotico filed a suffered by any person by reason" —
complaint for damages against the specifically — "of the defective
City of Manila, its mayor, its city condition of roads, streets, bridges,
engineer, city health officer, city public buildings, and other-public
treasurer, and chief of police. works under their control or
● CFI ruled to dismiss the complaint. supervision."
● CA affirmed except in so far as City of ● Since the present action is based
Manila is concerned. The City of upon the alleged defective condition
Manila was ordered to pay damages of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive
to Teotico. thereon.

On Liability
● Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it Market, despite the Management and
is not necessary for the liability therein Operating Contract between
established to attach that the respondent City and Asiatic Integrated
defective roads or streets belong to Corporation remained under the
the province, city or municipality from control of the former.
which responsibility is exacted. What ● Petitioner had the right to assume that
said article requires is that the there were no openings in the middle
province, city or municipality have of the passageways and if any, that
either "control or supervision" over they were adequately covered. Had
said street or road. Even if P. Burgos the opening been covered, petitioner
Avenue were, therefore, a national could not have fallen into it. Thus the
highway, this circumstance would not negligence of the City of Manila is the
necessarily detract from its "control or proximate cause of the injury suffered,
supervision" by the City of Manila, the City is therefore liable for the
under Republic Act 409. injury suffered by the petitioner

Jimenez vs. City of Manila, 150 SCRA 510

2. Execution
● Bernardino Jimenez along with some General Rule: Public funds are not subject to
other went to the public market of Sta. levy and execution, unless otherwise provided
Ana which was then flooded ankle- for by statute.
deep due to rainwater. After buying
bagoong, Jimenez fell on an Exception: when there is a corresponding
uncovered manhole which cannot be appropriation as required by law. Otherwise
seen because of the flood. As a stated, the rule on the immunity of public
result, a 4-inch nail pierced his leg funds from seizure or garnishment does not
which caused him to be hospitalized. apply where the funds sought to be levied
● Because of this, Jimenez filed a under execution are already allocated by law
complaint for damages against the specifically for the satisfaction of the money
City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated judgment against the government. In such a
Corporation (the administrator of the case, the monetary judgment may be legally
Sta. Ana public market). enforced by judicial processes.
● CFI dismissed the complaint.
● IAC modified the decision by holding Remedy of Claimant: Where a municipality
Asiatic Integrated Corporation liable fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to
but absolving the City of Manila. effect payment of a final money judgment
rendered against it, the claimant may avail of
Issue:W/N the City of Manila can be held the remedy of mandamus in order to compel
liable for damages? the enactment and approval of the necessary
appropriation ordinance, and the
Held/Ratio: YES corresponding disbursement of municipal
● Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it funds therefor.
is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach, that the
defective public works belong to the
province, city or municipality from Municipality of San Miguel vs. Fernandez,
which responsibility is exacted. What 130 SCRA 56
said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality has Facts:
either "control or supervision" over the ● In a different civil case, judgment was
public building in question. rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
● In the case at bar, there is no against the Municipality of San
question that the Sta. Ana Public Miguel. Said decision became final
and executory for failure of the
Municipality to perfect an appeal Facts:
within the prescribed period. ● The case is a result of the
● Because of this, the plaintiffs filed a expropriation proceeding initiated by
motion for issuance of writ of the Municipality of Makati against
execution. private respondents Admiral Finance
● Municipality of San Miguel filed a Creditors Consortium, Inc., Home
motion to quash alleging that the Building System & Realty
property or funds of the municipality Corporation, Arceli Jo involving a
are public funds exempt from parcel of land located at Mayapis St.,
execution. San Antonio Village, Makati.
● Respondent Judge Fernandez ● During the expropriation proceedings,
dismissed the motion to quash. In the petitioner Makati opened an
addition, the respondent ordered the account with PNB Buendia pursuant
Provincial Treasurer to comply with to the requirements of the law on
the order for lack of funds of the expropriations. The RTC, in a
municipality. decision, fixed the appraised value of
the subject property and ordered the
Issue:W/N the properties and funds of the petitioner pay the respondents.
province and the municipality are exempt from ● After becoming final and executory,
execution? the respondents moved for issuance
of a writ of execution. Eventually, a
Held/Ratio: YES Notice of Garnishment was issued to
● Public funds are not subject to levy PNB Buendia. However, petitioner
and execution. Makati opposed and filed a motion to
● They are held in trust for the people, lift the garnishment.
intended and used for the ● RTC denied the motion to lift the
accomplishment of the purposes for garnishment.
which municipal corporations are ● CA affirmed
created, and that to subject said ● On appeal to the SC, petitioner
properties and public funds to belatedly alleges and claims that
execution would materially impede, there are 2 accounts with PNB (1 for
even defeat and in some instances the expropriation containing
destroy said purpose. P99,743.94; 1 for its statutory
● All the funds of petitioner municipality obligations and other purposes of the
in the possession of the Municipal municipal government).
Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as
those in the possession of the Issue:W/N the PNB accounts can be
Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are garnished?
also public funds and as such they
are exempt from execution. Held/Ratio: YES, but only the 1st account.
● There must be a corresponding ● Admitting that the PNB Account No.
appropriation in the form of an S/A 265-537154-3 (1st account) was
ordinance duly passed by the specifically opened for expropriation
Sangguniang Bayan before any proceedings it had initiated over the
money of the municipality may be subject property, petitioner poses no
paid out. objection to the garnishment or the
● In the case at bar, it has not been levy under execution of the funds
shown that the Sangguniang Bayan deposited therein amounting to
has passed an ordinance to this P99,743.94. However, the funds
effect. garnished by respondent sheriff in
excess of P99,743.94, which are
public funds earmarked for the
Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals, municipal government's other
190 SCRA 206 statutory obligations, are exempted
from execution without the proper
appropriation required under the law. Facts:
● Public funds are not subject to levy ● Respondent V.D. Isip, Sons &
and execution, unless otherwise Associates entered into a contract
provided for by statute. The properties with the City of Pasay for the
of a municipality, whether real or construction of a new Pasay City Hall.
personal, which are necessary for ● Respondent was able to accomplish
public use cannot be attached and various stages of the construction
sold at execution sale to satisfy a worth P1,713,096 out of the
money judgment against the P4,914,500.80. Pasay City was able
municipality. Municipal revenues to pay only P1,100,000.
derived from taxes, licenses and ● For failure to pay the balance of
market fees, and which are intended P613,096, the respondent filed a
primarily and exclusively for the complaint for specific performance
purpose of financing the with damages against the City of
governmental activities and functions Pasay.
of the municipality, are exempt from ● Later on, a Compromise Agreement
execution was entered into by the parties
● Absent a showing that the municipal wherein the respondents will put up a
council of Makati has passed an new performance bond and the
ordinance appropriating from its public petitioner Pasay City will pay the
funds an amount corresponding to the balance of P613,096 within a period
balance due under the RTC decision of 90 days after approval of the
dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of compromise agreement.
P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. ● Eventually, a writ of execution was
S/A 265-537154-3 (1st account), no issued by the CFI and a Notice of
levy under execution may be validly Garnishment was served upon PNB
effected on the public funds of for the garnishment of the account of
petitioner deposited in Account No. Pasay City.
S/A 263-530850-7 (2nd account) ● Later on, a supplemental complaint
● Remedy of Respondent: Where a was filed by respondent V.D. Isip for
municipality fails or refuses, without rescission and damages against City
justifiable reason, to effect payment of of Pasay.
a final money judgment rendered
against it, the claimant may avail of Issue:W/N the City of Pasay may be ordered
the remedy of mandamus in order to to pay the balance of P613,096?
compel the enactment and approval
of the necessary appropriation Held/Ratio: YES
ordinance, and the corresponding ● As a general rule, "all government
disbursement of municipal funds funds deposited with the Philippine
therefor. National Bank by any agency or
● The State's power of eminent domain instrumentality of the government,
should be exercised within the bounds whether by way of general or special
of fair play and justice. In the case at deposit, remain government funds
bar, considering that valuable and may not be subject to
property has been taken, the garnishment or levy.” But, inasmuch
compensation to be paid fixed and the as an ordinance has already been
municipality is in full possession and enacted expressly appropriating the
utilizing the property for public amount of P613,096.00 of payment to
purpose, for three (3) years, the Court the respondent-appellee, then the
finds that the municipality has had herein case is covered by the
more than reasonable time to pay full exception to the general rule.
compensation. ● Nowhere in the Contract and
Agreement nor in the Compromise
Agreement could be found the fact
Pasay City Government vs. Court of First that payment by the petitioners-
Instance of Manila, 132 SCRA 156
appellants of the amount of passed an ordinance appropriating
P613,096.00 was dependent upon the the amount claimed by Santiago.
submission by the respondent- However, the City Mayor refused to
appellee of the performance bond. It sign the check.
cannot be argued that reciprocal ● Because of this, Judge Allarde issued
obligation was created in the an order to garnish the funds of the
Compromise Agreement, for the City of Caloocan with the PNB
obligation to pay on the part of the corresponding to the claim of
petitioners-appellants was established Santiago. After 21 years, the claim of
several years ago when the Santiago was fully satisfied.
respondent-appellee finished some of
the stages of construction. And, this Issue:W/N the funds of City of Caloocan may
argument is already moot and be subject to garnishment?
academic, for the amount of
P613,096.00 has already been Held/Ratio: YES
collected through execution and ● All government funds deposited in the
garnishment upon the funds of Pasay PNB or any other official depositary of
City with the Philippine National Bank. the Philippine Government by any of
its agencies or instrumentalities,
whether by general or special deposit,
City of Caloocan vs. Allarde, 410 SCRA 432 remain government funds and may
Facts: not be subject to garnishment or levy,
● In 1972, Marcial Samson, the Mayor in the absence of a corresponding
of Caloocan City, abolished the appropriation as required by law
position of Assistant City ● Although the liability of the state has
Administrator and 17 others. This led been judicially ascertained, the state
to a complaint filed by the affected is at liberty to determine for itself
employees. In a decision of the court, whether to pay the judgment or not,
the City of Caloocan was ordered and execution cannot issue on a
reinstate the employees and to pay judgment against the state. Such
backwages. statutes do not authorize a seizure of
● In 1986, only the balance of the state property to satisfy judgments
backwages of Delfina Hernandez recovered, and only convey an
Santiago was unpaid. Because of this, implication that the legislature will
in 1987, the City of Caloocan recognize such judgment as final and
appropriated funds for the payment of make provision for the satisfaction
unpaid wages. However, later on, thereof
they refused to release the money to ● The functions and public services
Santiago. rendered by the State cannot be
● Santiago filed a motion for writ of allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted
execution for the release of the funds by the diversion of public funds from
which was granted by Judge Allarde their legitimate and specific objects,
of the RTC of Caloocan. as appropriated by law
● After several appeals by the City of ● However, the rule is not absolute and
Caloocan against the writ of admits of a well-defined exception,
execution, in 1992, the Sheriff levied that is, when there is a corresponding
and sold at a public auction one of the appropriation as required by law.
motor vehicles of the City of Caloocan Otherwise stated, the rule on the
and proceeds were turned over to immunity of public funds from seizure
Santiago as payment for the unpaid or garnishment does not apply where
wages (balance left: P439,378). Three the funds sought to be levied under
more vehicles were ordered to be execution are already allocated by law
levied and sold at public auction. specifically for the satisfaction of the
● On October 1992, the City Council money judgment against the
government. In such a case, the
monetary judgment may be legally the issue which shall be decided
enforced by judicial processes. within 60 days from the date of
● In the instant case, the City Council of certification. (Sec. 118)
Caloocan already approved and
passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of Appeals: RTC having jurisdiction over the
1992, allocating the amount of area in dispute; to be decided within 1 year
P439,377.14 for respondent from the filing thereof. (Sec. 119)
Santiago’s back salaries plus interest.
Thus this case fell squarely within the Between two parties not belonging to the
exception. For all intents and enumeration in Sec. 118: RTC has exclusive
purposes, Ordinance No. 0134, original jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 19(c), BP
Series of 1992, was the 129. (See: Municipality of Kananga v.
"corresponding appropriation as Madrona)
required by law." The sum indicated in
the ordinance for Santiago were
deemed automatically segregated Municipality of Sta. Fe vs. Municipality of
from the other budgetary allocations Aritao, 533 SCRA 586
of the City of Caloocan and
earmarked solely for the City’s
● In 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta.
monetary obligation to her. The
Fe filed a case with the RTC of Nueva
judgment of the trial court could then
Vizcaya for the determination of
be validly enforced against such
boundary dispute involving barangays
of Batinan and Canabuan.
● Trial ensued. However, realizing an
error on the part of the RTC, it
G. Settlement of Boundary Disputes suspended the proceedings and
referred the matter to the
Applicable Law: Sec. 118 and 119 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the
LGC proper authority to decide the matter.
● The Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Settlement of Disputes: issued Resolution No. 64 stating that
● Between 2 or more barangays in the the barangays in question are within
same city or municipality – the territorial jurisdiction of respondent
Sanggunian Panlungsod or Municipality of Aritao and enjoining
Sangguniang Bayan concerned the petitioner from exercising
● Between 2 or more municipalities in jurisdiction over the barangays in
the same province – Sangguniang question. In addition, it also endorsed
Panlalawigan concerned the dispute to the RTC for further
● Between municipalities or component proceedings.
cities of different provinces – Jointly ● Back in the RTC, in 1992, the
referred for settlement to the respondent Municipality of Aritao filed
Sanggunians of the provinces a motion to dismiss for lack of
concerned jurisdiction alleging that at the time of
● Between a component city or the filing of the motion, the jurisdiction
municipality on the one hand and a to determine boundary disputes falls
highly urbanized city on the other; OR on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
between 2 or more highly urbanized based on the applicable laws at that
cities – Jointly referred for settlement time.
to the Sanggunians of the parties ● RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
● If no amicable settlement was ● CA affirmed.
reached within 60 days from the date
the dispute was referred to, the Issue:W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the
Sanggunian shall issue a certificate to settlement of boundary disputes of LGUs?
that effect and proceed to formally try
Held/Ratio: NO, Sangguniang Panlalawigan old rule under the RAC, prior to its
has jurisdiction amendment by R.A. No. 6128, under
which the provincial boards were
Legislative History empowered to investigate, hear the
● Oct. 1, 1917; Act No. 2711 or the parties and eventually decide the
Revised Administrative Code – case on the basis thereof.
“Provincial Boards of the provinces in ● On the other hand, under the LGC of
which such municipalities are 1991, the trial court loses its power to
situated” try, at the first instance, cases of
● Jun 17, 1970; RA 6128 was approved municipal boundary disputes. Only in
amending the RAC – “CFI of the the exercise of its appellate
Province where the municipalities jurisdiction can the proper RTC
concerned are situated” decide the case, on appeal, should
● Feb 10, 1983; BP 337 or the Local any party aggrieved by the decision of
Government Code of 1983 – the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
“SangguniangPanlalawigan of the elevate the same.
province where the municipalities
concerned are situated” Application
● January 1, 1992; RA 7160 or the ● The trial court had jurisdiction to take
Local Government Code of 1991 – cognizance of the complaint when it
“…sangguniang panlalawigan was filed on October 16, 1980 since
concerned.” the prevailing law then was Section
2167 of the RAC, as amended by
Doctrines Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6128, which
● Since the effectivity of R.A. No. 6128, granted the Court of First Instance
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has (now RTC) the jurisdiction to hear and
been the primary tribunal responsible decide cases of municipal boundary
in the amicable settlement of disputes. However, at the time of the
boundary disputes between or among filing of the motion to dismiss in 1992,
two or more municipalities located in the RTC no longer has jurisdiction.
the same province. With the LGC of ● Indeed, the RTC acted accordingly
1991, however, a major change has because at the time of the filing of the
been introduced – that in the event motion to dismiss its want of
the Sanggunian fails to effect a jurisdiction was evident. It was duty-
settlement, it shall not only issue a bound to take judicial notice of the
certification to that effect but must parameters of its jurisdiction.
also formally hear and decide the
case within the reglementary period.
● Unlike R.A. No. 6128 and B.P. 337, NHA vs. Commission on Settlement of Land
the LGC of 1991 grants an expanded Problems, 505 SCRA 38
role on the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan concerned in resolving
● Since 1968, there has been an
cases of municipal boundary disputes.
existing boundary dispute between
Aside from having the function of
the Municipality of San Jose del
bringing the contending parties
Monte, Bulacan and the City of
together and intervening or assisting
Caloocan. Because of this, 2
in the amicable settlement of the
Resolutions were passed by the
case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Sangguniang Bayan ng San Jose del
is now specifically vested with original
Monte delineating the official
jurisdiction to actually hear and decide
boundaries of the municipality and the
the dispute in accordance with the
City of Caloocan.
procedures laid down in the law and
● As a result, the DENR conducted a
its implementing rules and
relocation survey. In the DENR
Comprehensive Report, it was stated
● This situation, in effect, reverts to the
that the 2 Resolutions issued by the disputes.
Sangguniang Bayan ng San Jose del ● Thus, instead of assuming jurisdiction
Monte contradict the delineation over the case, the COSLAP should
embodied in Tala Estate, the property have referred respondents’ complaint
allocated by the government mainly to the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
for housing and resettlement site Caloocan City and the Sangguniang
under the NHA, pursuant to Bayan of San Jose del Monte. Their
Presidential Proclamation No. 843 decision may be appealed to the
issued by former President Marcos. proper Regional Trial Court.
● This prompted the Municipality of San
Jose del Monte, along with some
residents, to file a complaint with the Municipality of Kamango vs. Madrona, 402
Commission on Settlement of Land SCRA 330
Problems against the NHA.
● The Commission ruled that the correct
● A boundary dispute arose between
boundary lines are those contained in
the Municipality of Kananga and the
the twin resolutions issued by the
City of Ormoc. By agreement, the
parties submitted the issue to
● NHA filed a petition for certiorari with
amicable settlement by a joint session
the CA assailing the lack of
of the SangguniangPanlungsod of
jurisdiction of the Commission
Ormoc City and the Sangguniang
● CA dismissed the petition for being
Bayan of Kananga on October 31,
filed out of time
● No amicable settlement was reached.
Issue:W/N the Commission on Settlement of
Instead, the members of the joint
Land Problemshas jurisdiction to settle the
session issued Resolution No. 97-01
boundary dispute between the municipality of
which states that the parties have
San Jose del Monte and the City of
agreed to elevate the matter to the
proper court.
● Petitioner Municipality of Kananga
Held/Ratio: NO
filed a motion to dismiss.
● The Commission is an administrative
● RTC denied the motion to dismiss
body established and created under
EO 561 as a means of providing a
Issue:W/N the RTC may exercise original
mechanism for the expeditious
jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary
settlement of land problems to avoid
dispute between a municipality and an
social unrest. Its objective is to settle
independent component city?
land conflicts among small settlers,
landowners and members of cultural
Held/Ratio: YES
● There is no question that Kananga is
● In acting on a land dispute, the
a municipality constituted under
COSLAP may either assume
Republic Act No. 542. By virtue of
jurisdiction if the matter falls under
Section 442(d) of the LGC, it
paragraph 2(a) to (e) or refer the
continued to exist and operate as
matter to an agency having
appropriate jurisdiction.
● However, Ormoc is not a highly
● There is no provision in Executive
urbanized, but an independent
Order No. 561 that COSLAP has
component, city created under
jurisdiction over boundary dispute
Republic Act No. 179. Ormoc is
between two local government units.
deemed an independent component
Under Republic Act No. 7160 or the
city, because its charter prohibits its
Local Government Code, the
voters from voting for provincial
respective legislative councils of the
elective officials. It is a city
contending local government units
independent of the province. In fact, it
have jurisdiction over their boundary
At the time of his candidacy, Frivaldo was not
is considered a component, not a
highly urbanized, city of Leyte in yet a Filipino citizen because his repatriation
Region VIII by both Batas application is yet to be approved. His
PambansaBlg. 643 and the Omnibus qualification is questioned, hence this case.
Election Code.
● Section 118 of the LGC applies to a ISSUE: Whether the citizenship requirement
situation in which a component city or is met
a municipality seeks to settle a
boundary dispute with a highly
urbanized city, not with an LGC does not specify a particular date when the
independent component city. While candidate must possess Filipino citizenship. It is
Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is required to ensure that no alien shall govern our
an independent component city. people. An official begins to govern only upon
Clearly then, the procedure referred to proclamation and the day his term begins. In this
in Section 118 does not apply to
case, Frivaldo took his oath before he governed,
● Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC and therefore qualified to be proclaimed.
finds no application to the instant
case, the general rules governing Moreover, Sec 39 speaks of qualification of
jurisdiction should then be used. The elective officials, not candidates, and repatriation
applicable provision is found in Batas retroacts to the date of filing of application.
Pambansa Blg. 129.
● Since there is no law providing for the
2. Registered voter in the Brgy.,
exclusive jurisdiction of any court or
agency over the settlement of municipality, city, or province, or in the
boundary disputes between a case of a member of the sangguniang
municipality and an independent panlalawigan, panglungsod, or bayan,
component city of the same province, the district where he intends to be
respondent court committed no grave elected
abuse of discretion in denying the 3. A resident therein for at least one year
Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have
general jurisdiction to adjudicate all immediately preceding the election
controversies except those expressly 4. Able to read and write Filipino or any
withheld from their plenary powers. other local language or dialect
They have the power not only to take 5. Must be at least 23yo on election day
judicial cognizance of a case (for Governor, Vice Gov, Sangguniang
instituted for judicial action for the first panlalawigan, mayor, vice mayor,
time, but also to do so to the sangguniang panglungsod of highly
exclusion of all other courts at that
stage. Indeed, the power is not only urbanized cities); 21yo (for mayor or
original, but also exclusive. vice mayor of independent component
cities, component cities, or
municipalities); 18yo (sangguniang
panglungsod or bayan, punong
barangay, sangguniang barangay); at
H. Qualifications, Disqualifications and
least 15 but not more than 21 for
Prohibitions of Elective Officials
sangguniang kabataan.

I. Qualifications (S39 RA7160; Nachura p.746)

2. Residence
1. Citizen of the Philippines
a. Absence
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727
Caasi vs. Court of appeals, 191 SCRA 229
Facts: Private respondent Merito Miguel was
elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan during the local elections of January 4. COMELEC lifted TRO upon motion of
18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was Larrazabal.
sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on the 5. Feb 14, 1991, Comelec 2nd Division,
ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus disqualified L. (Held: Affirmed)
Election Code private respondent was not 6. July 18, 1991, Comelec en banc denied
qualified because he is a green card holder, L’s petition declaring decision void. –
hence, a permanent resident of the United STILL DISQUALIFIED. (Held: Affirmed)
States of America, not of Bolinao. 7. COMELEC, in the same decision
disallowed Abella’s proclamation as
Issues: governor.
1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the 8. Hence, the petitions.
holder is a permanent resident of the United 9. August 1, 1991 On petition by
States. Larrazabal for the issuance of TRO to
2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his COMELEC, SC: CEASE AND DESIST
status as a permanent resident of or immigrant from enforcing decision. (Held: Lifted,
to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on disqualification enforced)
January 18, 1988. 10. Vice Gov took oath as governor thru
COMELEC resolution, Court further
Held: The Supreme Court held that Miguel’s resolved that Petilla (Vice Gov) should
application for immigrant status and permanent DESIST from assuming position.
residence in the U.S. and his possession of a 11. Position of petitioners against L:
green card attesting to such status are respondent is neither a resident nor a
conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident registered voter of Kananga, Leyte as
of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the she claimed, but a resident of Ormoc
Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status City, a component city but independent
should be as indubitable as his application for it. of the province.
Absent clear evidence that he made an 12. L: she is a resident of Kananga, Leyte.
irrevocable waiver of that status or that he She had intent to return (animus
surrendered his green card to the appropriate revertendi) to Kananga even if she
U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of physically transferred to Ormoc.
Bolinao in the local election on January 18, 13. SC: There is no evidence to prove that
1988, the Court’s conclusion is that he was the petitioner temporarily left her
disqualified to run for said public office, hence, residence in Kananga, Leyte to pursue
his election thereto was null and void. any calling, profession or business.
COMELEC relied on provisions of the
Abella vs. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 Family Code.
1. Silvestre de la Cruz filed a petition for ISSUE:
disqualification against Larrazabal for Who is the rightful governor of the province of
alleged false statements in COC Leyte?
regarding her residence. ● 1. Petitioner Adelina Larrazabal who
2. TRO was issued by SC against obtained the highest number of votes
Larrazabal from being proclaimed (declared winner but subsequently
governor in the event that she obtains disqualified by COMELEC)
the winning margin of votes. (Since ● 2. Petitioner Benjamin Abella (2nd
COMELEC was not yet fully constituted highest but not proclaimed as gov after
that time) disqualification of Larrazabal)
3. Abella filed objections to COMELEC ● 3. Leopoldo E. Petilla, Vice Gov of
charging Larrazabal with falsification Leyte.
and misrepresentation in her residency. HELD:
● Article X of the Constitution is explicit to the two year residency in Oras was a material
that aside from highly-urbanized cities, misrepresentation as he only resided therein for
component cities whose charters 6 months after his oath as a citizen.
prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials are Before the COMELEC could render a decision,
independent of the province. elections commenced and Coquilla was
● connotes 2 prohibitions. One, from proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001,
running for, and the second, for voting COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and
for any provincial elective official. ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate
● Resolution of COMELEC AFFIRMED. of candidacy.
TRO issued against it was lifted. Costs
against petitioners. ISSUE:
● With regard to Abella, Larrazabal was Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of
voted for, and election proceeded. Net Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the
effect was that Abella lost, and elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he
repudiated by the electorate. represented in his COC.
● In the Firvaldo (governorship of
Sorsogon) and Labo(mayor in Baguio) RULING:
cases, this is exactly the reason why the No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of
candidates obtaining second highest candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras,
number of votes were not allowed to Eastern Samar for “two years” at the time he
assume the positions. filed such certificate is not true. The question is
whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering
Coquilla vs. COMELEC, 385 SCRA 607 the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for
FACTS: this reason. Petitioner made a false
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in representation of a material fact in his certificate
Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate
there until 1965, when he was subsequently liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is
naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US involved is a false statement concerning a
Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and candidate’s qualification for an office for which
took out a residence certificate, although he he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a
continued making several trips to the United misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the
States. cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully
R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On justified.
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines. Michelena vs. Boado, 475 SCRA 290
On November 21, 2000, he applied for 1. Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the
registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern position of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La
Samar which was approved in 2001. On Union during the May 10, 2004 Synchronized
February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of National and Local Elections.
candidacy stating that he had been a resident of
Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years. 2. Boado sought Dumpit-Michelena’s
disqualification and the denial or cancellation of
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for her COC on the ground of material
re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate misrepresentation under Sections 74 and78of
of candidacy on the ground that his statement as Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.Boado, et al. alleged
that Dumpit-Michelena, the daughter of preceding two years and five months was in the
Congressman Tomas Dumpit, Sr. of the same city. Rogelio Torayno Sr filed petition for
SecondDistrict of La Union, is not a resident of disqualification of Emano fo failing to meet the
Agoo, La Union. residency requirement. Emano won the mayoral
post and proclaimed winner. Torayno filed for
3. Boado, et al. claimed that Dumpit-Michelena annulment of election of Emano. COMELEC
is a resident and was a registered voter of upheld its decision.
Naguilian, La Union and that Dumpit-Michelena
only transferred her registration as voter to San Issue: Whether or not Emano failed the
Julian West, Agoo, La Union on October 24, constitutional residency requirement?
2003.Dumpit-Michelena countered that she
already acquired a new domicile in San Julian Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC
West when she purchased from her father, resolution affirmed. Emano was the
Congressman Dumpit, a residential lot on April overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan
19, 2003. de Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate the
principle that the manifest will of the people as
4. She even designated a caretaker of her expressed through the ballot be given the fullest
residential house. Dumpit-Michelena presented effect. Emano was actually and physically
the affidavits and certifications of her neighbors residing in CDO while discharging his duties as
in San Julian West to prove that she actually governor and even paid his community tax
resides in the area. COMELEC rules in favor of certificate in the same. The residency
Boado et al. The COMELEC En Banc denied in requirement intends to prevent the possibility of
its ruling the motion for reconsideration filed by a “stranger unacquainted with the conditions and
Dumpit-Michelena. needs of the community from seeing an elective
office to serve that community.”
WON Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the residency Papandayan vs. COMELEC, 381 SCRA 133
requirement under the Local Government Code Facts: In the May 14, 2001 elections, 3
of 1991. candidates ran for the position of mayor of
Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, namely: petitioner
Held: Papandayan Jr., respondent Balt, who was the
Dumpit-Michelena failed to prove that she has incumbent mayor seeking reelection, and
complied with the residency requirement. The Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought the
concept of residence in determining a disqualification of petitioner alleging that
candidate’s qualification is already a settled petitioner was not a resident of Barangay
matter. For election purposes,residence is used Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a
synonymously with domicile. permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.

Torayno vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574 Petitioner claimed that he was a resident of
Facts: Vicente Emano was provincial governor Tangcal, Tubaran; that in 1990, he transferred
of Misamis Oriental for three terms until 1995 his domicile from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed
election and his certificate of candidacy showed there with his wife, a native of Tangcal; that he
that his residence was in Tagoloan, Misamis managed an agricultural land in Tubaran; and
Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while still governor that he filed in 1998 his COC for the position of
he executed a voter registration record in municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later
Cagayan de Oro City which is geographically withdraw.
located in Misamis Oriental, claiming 20 years of
residence. He filed candidacy for mayor in the Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely
said city and stated that his residence for the abused its discretion in declaring him
disqualified in a resolution, on the ground that he 5. 1997 effectively abandoned her status
is not a resident of Tubaran. as lawful resident of USA for the May
1998 elections
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified to 6. January 1998 surrendered her alien
run as an elective official. registration
7. May 1998 elections was elected mayor
Held: No. 8. 2001 ran for re-election and won
The petitioner has duly proven that, although he
was formerly a resident of Bayang, he later
transferred residence to Tangcal, Tubaran as ISSUE
shown by his actual and physical presence 1. WON Vercenes was able to meet residency
therein for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001 requirement for municipal mayor in the May
elections. 2001 elections

Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local 2. WON LGC impliedly repealed Sec 68 of the
Government Code (RA 7160) provides that an OEC by the fact that LGC does not provide
elective official must be a “…resident therein waiver for status as permanent residents abroad
(barangay, municipality, city or province) for at which is provided under Sec 68 of OEC
least 1 year immediately preceding the day of
the election…” RULING
1. YES.
Domicile and residence are synonymous. The - Sec. 39 of the LGC of 1991 require residence
term residence as used in election law, imports for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
not only an intention to reside in a fixed place the day of the election for local elective officials
but also personal presence in that place, couple
with conduct indicative of such intention. - Abandoned status as permanent resident of
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence USA; surrender of green card; decision to
to which when absent for business, pleasure, or relocate to the Philippines; elected mayor in
for like reasons, one intends to return. 1998. Thus, animus manendi (intent to remain)
Requisites in order to acquire a new domicile by in the Philippines and animus non revertendi
choice are: there must concur (1) residence or (without intent to return) in USA prior 2001
bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an elections were established.
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. There must be 2. NO.
animus manendi coupled with animus non - Sec 40(f) LGC 1991: “Disqualified: Permanent
revertendi. residents in a foreign country or those who have
acquired the right to reside abroad xxx”
Gayo vs. Verceles, 452 SCRA 504
FACTS: - Sec 65 (e) OEC, BP 881 (1985) provides for
1. 1997 Verceles migrated to USA with an exception of the disqualification “xxx unless
family but she retained her Filipino said person has waived his status as a
citizenship permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
2. 1993 returned to the Philippines for country In accordance with the residence
good requirement provided for in the election laws”
3. 1995 registered herself as a voter of La
Union and filed her income tax returns - Both provisions are in pari materia – they
4. Between 1993-1997, would travel to relate to the same subject matter an thus should
USA to visit her children be construed together and each legislative intent
is to be interpreted
- OEC is a catchphrase or a conditional cause Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a
on how a permanent resident or immigrant of a resolution, declared petitioner disqualified from
foreign country could fall outside the coverage of running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti,
prohibition Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was
found guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-
- Legislature found the inclusion of how to fall Fencing Law, an offense whose nature involves
outside the prohibition in OEC is unnecessary, moral turpitude.
hence the deletion.
Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the
- Thus the absence of that conditional clause in Local Government Code does not apply to his
Sec. 40(f) of the LGC 1991 may be supplied by case inasmuch as the probation granted him by
Sec. 68 (e) of the OEC the MTC which suspended the execution of the
judgment of conviction and all other legal
consequences flowing therefrom, rendered
II. Disqualification inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he
S40, RA 7160: The following are disqualified admits all the elements of the crime of fencing.
from running for any elective local position:
1. Sentenced by final judgment for an Issue: WON the petitioner applicant is
offense involving moral turpitude or for disqualified for the coming elections due to a
an offense punishable by one year or crime involving moral turpitude.
more of imprisonment, within two years
after serving such sentence Held: Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act
2. Those removed from office as a result of of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
an administrative case duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
3. Those convicted by final judgment for society in general, contrary to the accepted and
violating the oath of allegiance to the customary rule of right and duty between man
Republic and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
4. Those with dual citizenship honesty, modesty, or good morals.
5. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-
political cases here or abroad From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD
6. Permanent residents in a foreign 1612, an element of the crime of fencing may be
country or those who have acquired the gleaned that “the accused knows or should have
right to reside abroad and continue to known that the said article, item, object or
avail of the same right after the anything of value has been derived from the
effectivity of the Code proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
7. The insane or feeble-minded
Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual
1. Conviction of offenses involving moral knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that
turpitude property received as stolen displays the same
a. Ground degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful
De la Torre vs. COMELEC, 258 SCRA 483 property as that which animated the robbery or
Facts: theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of
Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local moral turpitude. And although the participation of
Government Code of 1991) provides that a prior each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point
conviction of a crime becomes a ground for in time and in degree, both the “fence” and the
disqualification from running for any elective actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft
local position – i.e. “when the conviction is for an invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain – thus
offense involving moral turpitude.” deliberately reneging the process “private
duties” they owe their “fellowmen” in a manner disqualification from running for an elective local
“contrary to accepted and customary rule of right office.
and duty, justice, honesty and good morals.”
On his petition, Moreno argues that the
In determining whether a criminal act involves disqualification under the Local Government
moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of Code applies only to those who have served
the general principle that crimes mala in se their sentence and not to probationers because
involve moral turpitude while crimes mala the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence.
prohibita do not. However, SC admitted that it The Probation Law should allegedly be read as
cannot always be ascertained whether moral an exception to the Local Government Code
turpitude does or does not exist by merely because it is a special law which applies only to
classifying as crime as mala in se or as mala probationers. Further, even assuming that he is
prohibita. Whether or not a crime involves moral disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied
frequently depends on all the circumstance pardon of his previous misconduct.

Moreno vs. COMELEC, 498 SCRA 547 ISSUE: Does Moreno’s probation grant him the
FACTS: Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition right to run in public office?
to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay on the ground that the latter was HELD: Yes. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law
convicted by final judgment of the crime of provides that "[t]he final discharge of the
Arbitrary Detention. The Comelec en banc probationer shall operate to restore to him all
granted her petition and disqualified Moreno. civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition conviction and to fully discharge his liability for
states no cause of action because he was any fine imposed as to the offense for which
already granted probation. Allegedly, following probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno
the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of was finally discharged upon the court's finding
the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of
accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. his probation, his case was deemed terminated
Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result
Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final of his conviction were restored to him, including
discharge of the probation shall operate to the right to run for public office.
restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as
a result of his conviction and to fully discharge It is important to note that the disqualification
his liability for any fine imposed. under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or
However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec. more of imprisonment, a penalty which also
40(a) of the Local Government Code which covers probationable offenses. In spite of this,
provides that those sentenced by final judgment the provision does not specifically disqualify
for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an probationers from running for a local elective
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of office.
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence, are disqualified from running for any Probation Law should be construed as an
elective local position. Since Moreno was exception to the Local Government Code. While
released from probation on December 20, 2000, the Local Government Code is a later law which
disqualification shall commence on this date and sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications
end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a
to Moreno merely suspended the execution of special legislation which applies only to
his sentence but did not affect his probationers. It is a canon of statutory
construction that a later statute, general in its being the prohibitive period after such
terms and not expressly repealing a prior special conviction. Under the OEC, the prohibitive
statute, will ordinarily not affect the special period is perpetual, while the LGC merely
provisions of such earlier statute. disqualifies for two (2) years after serving the
sentence. Given that bribery is a crime involving
b. Duration moral turpitude, The issue is which of the two
Magno vs. COMELEC, 390 SCRA 495 laws would prevail.
Facts: Carlos Montes filed a petition for the
disqualification of Nestor Magno as mayoralty With LGC being the latter law, being enacted in
candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the 1992 while OEC was enacted in 1985, the
May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that the conflict must be resolved in favor of the latter
latter was previously convicted by the law. Hence, when Magno served his sentence,
Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery. he was only disqualified for two years.

COMELEC granted the petition and declared 2. Fugitive from justice

Magno disqualified from running for the position Rodriguez vs. Commission on elections, 259
of mayor since direct bribery is a crime involving SCRA 296
moral turpitude, citing Section 12 of the Facts: In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and
Omnibus Election Code which disqualifies any respondent Marquez ran for Governor of
person convicted of a crime involving moral Quezon Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez
turpitude from being a local elective official. challenged Rodriguez’ victory via a Quo
Warranto on the ground that there is a charge
According to COMELEC, inasmuch as Magno pending against him at the Los Angeles
completed the service of his sentence on March Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims,
5, 1998 when was discharged from probation, grand theft, etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from
his five-year disqualification will end only on justice.
March 5, 2003. COMELEC denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition. COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari
to the Supreme Court, it was held that:
Magno argued that direct bribery is not a crime Fugitive from justice includes not only those
involving moral turpitude. Likewise, he claims who flee after conviction to avoid punishment,
that Section 40 of RA 7160 (LGC), is the law but also those who after being charged, flee
applicable to the case, not the Omnibus Election to avoid prosecution. The case was remanded
Code as claimed by the COMELEC. to the COMELEC to determine WON Rodriguez
is a fugitive from justice.
Magno insists that he had already served his
sentence as of March 5, 1998 when he was In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for
discharged from probation. Such being the case, Governor. Marquez filed a Petition for
the two-year disqualification period imposed by Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same
Section 40 of the Local Government Code ground that he is a fugitive from justice.
expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, he was COMELEC then consolidated both cases and
qualified to run in the 2001 elections. found Rodriguez guilty based on the
authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA
Issue: Whether Magno is qualified Court and of the felony complaint.

Held: YES Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to

Both the OEC and LGC disqualifies those suspend his proclamation, the Provincial Board
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude of Canvassers proclaimed him.
from being a local elective official, the difference
Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC
a. Engage in any business transaction with
nullified the proclamation. Rodriguez filed a the local government unit in which he is an
petition for certiorari. official or employee or over which he has the
power of supervision, or with any of its
authorized boards, officials, agents, or
Issue: Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as attorneys, whereby money is to be paid, or
defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ property or any other thing of value is to be
transferred, directly or indirectly, out of the
resources of the local government unit to such
person or firm;
b. To hold such interests in any cockpit or
Held: No. other games licensed by the local government
A fugitive from justice is defined as “not only unit;
those who flee after conviction to avoid c. Purchase any real estate or other property
punishment but likewise who, after being forfeited in favor of the local government unit
charged, flee to avoid prosecution.” This for unpaid taxes or assessment, or by virtue of
a legal process at the instance of the local
indicates that the intent to evade is the government unit;
compelling factor that makes a person leave a d. Be a surety contracting or doing business
particular jurisdiction, and there can only be with the local government unit for which a
intent to evade prosecution or punishment when surety is required; and
the fleeing person knows of an already instituted e. Possess or use any public property of the
indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of local government unit for private purposes.
f. The prohibitions prescribed in RA 6713
conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a
also apply.
candidate must therefore be established by
proof that there has already been a conviction or 2.Practice of profession (Sec. 9C, RA 7160).
at least, a charge has already been filed, at the a. All governors, city and municipal mayors
time of flight. This cannot be applied in the case are prohibited from practicing their profession
of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the or engaging in any occupation other than the
Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months exercise of their functions as local chief
before the filing of the felony complaint in the
b. Sanggunian members may practice their
Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and professions, engage in any occupation, or
of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that teach in schools, except during session hours,
same foreign court. It was clearly impossible for Provided, that those who are also members of
Rodriguez to have known about such felony the Bar shall not (i) appear as counsel before
complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left any court in any civil case wherein the local
the US, as there was in fact no complaint and government unit or any office, agency or
instrumental of the government is the adverse
arrest warrant — much less conviction — to party; (ii) appear as counsel in any criminal
speak of yet at such time. case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an
Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this offense committed in relation to his office; (iii)
definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the collect any fee for their appearance in
Quezon Province gubernatorial post. administrative proceedings involving the
government unit for which he is an official; and
(iv) use property and personnel of the
III. Prohibitions government except when the sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest
1.Prohibited business and pecuniary interest of the government.
(Sec. 89, RA 7160): It shall be unlawful for c. Doctors of medicine may practice their
any local government official or employee, profession even during official hours of work
directly or indirectly, to: only on occasions of emergency, provided
they do not derive monetary compensation
therefrom. By the city or municipal mayor in case of
sangguniang barangay upon recommendation
of sangguniang barangay.
Javellana vs. DILG, 212 SCRA 475
By appearing as counsel for dismissed 1. Ranking
employees, City Councilor Javellana violated
Victoria vs. COMELEC, 229 SCRA 269
the prohibition against engaging in private
practice if such practice represents adverse to The law is clear, according to the Local
the government. Government Code, that the ranking in the
Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis
of the proportion of the votes obtained by
Teves vs. Sandiganbayan, 447 SCRA 309
each winning candidate to the total number of
Since it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has registered voters of each district. It does not
the authority to issue a license for the mention anything about factoring the number
establishment, operation, and maintenance of of voters who actually voted. In such a case,
cockpits, a mayor could not be found to have the Court has no recourse but to merely apply
intervened or taken part in its official capacity the law.
in the issuance of a cockpit license because
he is not a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan, and if there is no finding that the
mayor is guilty, a fortfiori, there is no legal 2. Ineligibility of winner
basis to convict an alleged co-conspirator. Bautista vs. COMELEC, 414 SCRA 299
The will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility.
I. Succession of Elective Officials
A permanent vacancy arises when an elective
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to 3. Appointment
assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is Farina vs. Barba, 256 SCRA 396
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
permanently incapacitated to discharge the In case the vacancy was created by a person
functions of his office. without a political party, the local chief
i) Governor or mayor à vice governor or executive shall, upon recommendation of the
vice mayor shall become vice governor or vice sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified
mayor person to fill the vacancy.
ii) Vice governor or vice mayor à the Where the vacancy to be filled was that of a
highest ranking sanggunian member, or in member of the sangguniang bayan who did
case of permanent disability, the second not belong to any political party, the Supreme
highest ranking sanggunian member, and so Court held that neither the petitioner nor the
forth in according to their ranking (depends on respondent was validly appointed. Not the
number of votes) petitioner, because although he was
iii) Punong barangay à the highest appointed by the governor, he was not
ranking sanggunian barangay member, or in recommended by the sangguniang bayan.
case of disability, the second highest Neither the respondent, because although he
sanggunian barangay member was recommended by the sangguniang
iv) Except: bayan, he was not appointed by the governor.
a. Filled by appointment by the
President, through the ES in case of a 4. Party of occupant of last vacancy
sanggunian panlalawigan or sanggunian Navarro vs. Court of appeals, 355 SCRA 672
panglungsod of highly urbanized cities or
independent component cities The “last vacancy” in the Sanggunian refers to
b. By governor in case of the that created by the elevation of the member
sanggunian panglungsod of component cities formerly occupying the next higher in rank
and sangguniang bayan which in turn also had become vacant by any
of the causes already enumerated, and the prision mayor
term “last vacancy” is thus used in Section 45 5. Abuse of authority
(b) to differentiate it from the other vacancy 6. Unauthorized absence for 15 consecutive
previously created. working days, except in case of members of
The reason behind the right given to a political the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod,
party to nominate a replacement where a bayan and barangay
permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian 7. Application for, or acquisition of, foreign
is to maintain the party representation as citizenship or residence or the status of an
willed by the people in the election. immigrant of another country
8. Such other grounds as may be provided in
this Code and other laws

5. Temporary vacancy
Monzon vs. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251 (ii) Jurisdiction

The mode of succession provided for · Provincial, highly urbanized city, or

permanent vacancies, under Sec. 49 in independent component city --- Office of the
connection with Sec. 52 of the Local President
Government Code, in the office of Vice- · Elective municipal officials --- Sangguniang
Governor, may likewise be observed in case panlalawigan --- Office of the President
of a temporary vacancy occurring in the same · Elective barangay officials --- Sangguniang
office. panlungsod or bayan. It shall be final and
The Supreme Court declared that even executory.
granting that the President, acting through the
Secretary of Local Government, possesses no (iii) Preventive suspension
power to appoint petitioner as Acting Vice
Governor, at the very least, the petitioner is a Preventive suspension may be imposed by
de facto officer entitled to compensation. the President, the governor, or the mayor [as
There is no denying that the petitioner the case may be] at any time after the issues
assumed the office of Vice Governor under are joined, when the evidence of guilt is
color of appointment, exercised the duties strong, and given the gravity of the offense,
attached to said office for a long period of there is great probability that the continuance
time, and was acclaimed as such by the in office of the respondent could influence the
people of Leyte. Under the principle of public witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
policy on which the de facto doctrine is based, integrity of the records and other evidence.
and on basic considerations of justice, it would This authority is concurrent with the
be iniquitous to now deny him the salary due Ombudsman.
him for the services actually rendered. Any single preventive suspension (by the
President, governor, or office of the mayor)
shall not extend beyond 60 days. The
Ombudsman can preventively suspend up to
J. Discipline of Local Officials 6 months (but for local officials, only 60 days).
In the event that several administrative cases
a) Elective officials are filed against the same official, he cannot
(i) Grounds be suspended for more than 90 days within a
single year on the same ground or grounds
An elective local official may be disciplined, existing at the time of the first suspension.
suspended, or removed from office on any of Rule: The penalty of suspension imposed
the following grounds: upon the respondent shall not exceed his
1. Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines unexpired term, or a period of 6 months for
2. Culpable violation of the Constitution every administrative offense, nor shall said
3. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the
office, gross negligence or dereliction of duty respondent as long as he meets the
4. Commission of any offense involving moral qualifications required for office.
turpitude or an offense punishable by at least
(iv) Removal
audit findings to the Commission of Audit.
The penalty of dismissal from service may be
imposed upon an erring local executive official
only by a court of law.
Under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, 3. Procedure
the penalty of removal from office as result of a. Preventive suspension
an administrative case shall bar to the i. Valid Suspension
candidacy of the respondent for any elective Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA 279
local office.
Preventive suspension may be imposed by
the disciplining authority any time:
(v) Administrative appeal o After the issues are joined
o When the evidence of guilt is strong
Decisions may, within 30 days from receipt o Given the gravity of the offense, there is
thereof, be appealed to: great probability that the respondent, who
i) Decisions of component cities,
continues to hold office, could influence the
sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
bayan --- sangguniang panlalawigan
integrity of the records and other evidence.
Sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
When the petitioner failed to file his answer
panglungsod of highly urbanized cities and
despite the many opportunities given to him,
independent component cities --- Office of the
he was deemed to have waived his right to
President. This shall be final and executory.
answer and to present evidence. At that point,
the issues were deemed joined, and it was
(vi) Doctrine of Condonation proper for the Executive Secretary to suspend
him, inasmuch as the Secretary found that the
The re-election of a local official bars the evidence of guilt was strong and that
continuation of the administrative case against continuance in office could influence the
him, inasmuch as the reelection of the official witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and
is tantamount to condonation by the people of integrity of the evidence against him.
whatever past misdeeds he may have
Miranda vs. Sandiganbayan, 464 SCRA 165
The remedy to an order of suspension is to
1. Grounds assail the validity of the order.
If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of
Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55
respect for the rule of law, they should have
An elective local official may be removed from assailed the validity of the order of suspension
office on the grounds enumerated above by in court instead of taking the law into their own
order of the proper court. Assuming then that hands.
the findings and conclusions of the OP in each
of the subject administrative cases are
ii. Void suspension
correct, it committed no grave abuse of
discretion in imposing the penalty of Joson vs. Court of appeals, 582 SCRA 360
suspension, although the aggregate thereof The requisites for a valid preventive
exceeded six months and the unexpired term suspension requires that evidence of guilt
of the petitioners’ term of office. must be strong and that given the gravity of
the offense, there is great probability that the
continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
2. Effect of Appeal of Finding of Commission
safety and integrity of the records and other
on Audit evidence.
Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55
The administrative investigation can proceed b. Decisions
even during the pendency of an appeal of i. Validity
Malinao vs. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616
c. Appeal
In order to render a decision in administrative
cases involving elective officials, the decision i. Availability of Appeal
of the Sanggunian must be in writing, stating Malinao vs. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616
clearly and distinctly the facts and reasons for
Petitioner brought this case by way of petition
such decision. What the Sanggunian, for certiorari and mandamus. A prime
therefore, did, on August 12, 1994, was not to specification of the writ of certiorari, however,
render a decision. is that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
ii. Penalty of law available to petitioner. But in the case
Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55 at bar, petitioner could have appealed the
decision of the Sanggunian to the Office of the
The penalty of suspension should not exceed President as provided in Sec. 67(b) of the
six months or the unexpired portion of the LGC.
term of office of the respondent for every
administrative offense. An administrative
offense means every act or conduct or ii. Execution Pending Appeal
omission which amounts to, or constitutes, Calingin vs. Court of Appeals, 439 SCRA 173
any of the grounds for disciplinary action. The
The decisions of the Office of the President
offenses for which suspension may be
under the Local Government Code are
imposed are enumerated in Sec. 60 of the
immediately executory even pending appeal.
Assuming then that the findings and
conclusions of the Office of the President in Berces vs. Guingona, 241 SCRA 539
each of the subject four administrative cases
are correct, it committed no grave abuse of The first sentence of Sec. 68 of the LGC
discretion in imposing the penalty of merely provides that “an appeal shall not
suspension, although the aggregate thereof prevent a decision from becoming final or
exceeds six months, and the unexpired executory.” As worded, there is room to
portion of the petitioners’ term of office. The construe said provision as giving discretion to
fact remains that the suspension imposed for the reviewing officials to stay the execution of
each administrative offense did not exceed six the appealed decision. There is nothing to
months, and there was an express provision infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are
that the successive service of suspension deprived of the authority to order a stay of the
should not exceed the unexpired portion of the appealed order.
term of office of the petitioners. The Supreme Court pointed that AO No. 18
The Office of the President is without any authorizes the Office of the President to stay
power to remove elected officials, since such the execution of a decision pending appeal.
power is exclusively vested in proper courts AO No. 18 was not repealed by the LGC.
as expressly provided in the last paragraph of
Section 60 of the LGC.
d. Effect of Re-election
Aguinaldo vs. Santos, 212 SCRA 768
Pablico vs. Villapando, 385 SCRA 601
The rule is that a public official cannot be
It was held that by virtue of Sec. 60 the LGC, removed for administrative conduct committed
which provides that “an elective local official during a prior term, since his re-election to
may be removed from office on grounds office operates as a condonation of the
enumerated by order of the proper court, the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of
penalty of dismissal from the service may be cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
imposed upon an erring local elective official
only by a court of law. The provisions of the
IRR granting the disciplining authority the b) Appointive officials
power to remove an elective local official
administratively are invalid. J. Recall
recall proceeding against her moot and
1. Initiation academic.
Angobung vs. COMELEC, 269 SCRA 245
The petition to initiate recall proceedings must
be of or by, at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters, i.e., the petition must be K. Term limits
filed, not by one person only, but by at least
Section 8, Article X, Philippine Constitution
25% of the total number of registered voters.

1. Term
Galarosa vs. Valencia, 227 SCRA 728

2. Limitations
Paras vs. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 49 - Galarosa is the incumbent president of the
Association of Barangay Councils of Sorsogon
SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall.—(a) Any - He was appointed as a member of the
elective local official may be the subject of a Sanggunuiang Bayan (Pursuant to EO 342)
recall election only once during his term of - As a member of the Sangguniang Bayan,
office for loss of confidence. Galarosa’s term expired on June 30, 1992.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1)
year from the date of the official’s assumption Issue & Held:
to office or one (1) year immediately Whether Galarosa could continue to serve as
preceding a regular local election. a member of the Sangguniang Bayan beyond
his term of appointment?

YES. The rule is settled that unless holding

Claudio vs. COMELEC, 331 SCRA 388
over be expressly or impliedly prohibited, the
Since the power vested on the electorate is incumbent may continue to hold-over until
not the power to initiate recall proceedings but some one else is elected and qualified to
the power to elect an official into office, the assume office.—
limitations in §74 of the Local Government
Code cannot be deemed to apply to the entire
The application of the hold-over doctrine in
recall proceedings—the limitations in Section
74 apply only to the exercise of the power of
both the aforementioned provisions of the IRR
recall which is vested in the registered voters. and the issuances of the DILG should be
upheld. The rule is settled that unless “holding
The limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to over be expressly or impliedly prohibited, the
apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other incumbent may continue to hold over until
words, the term “recall” in paragraph (b) refers some one else is elected and qualified to
only to the recall election, excluding the assume the office.” This rule is demanded by
convening of the PRA (Preparatory recall the “most obvious requirements of public
Assembly) and the filing of a petition for recall policy, for without it there must frequently be
with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the
cases where, from a failure to elect or a refusal
signatures of at least 25% of the voters for a
petition for recall. or neglect to qualify, the office would be
vacant and the public service entirely
suspended.” Otherwise stated, the purpose is
to prevent a hiatus in the government pending
the time when the successor may be chosen
3. Mootness and inducted into office. Section 494 of the
Afiado vs. COMELEC, 340 SCRA 600 Local Government Code could not have been
The assumption by legal succession of the intended to allow a gap in the representation
petitioner as the new Mayor of Santiago City of the barangays, through the presidents of the
is a supervening event which rendered the ABC, in the sanggunian. Since the term of
office of the punong barangay selected in the of RA 9164 is clear. It is the duty of this Court to
28 March 1989 election and the term of office apply the plain meaning of the language of Section
of the presidents of the ABC have not yet 5. Since there was a failure of elections in the 15
expired and taking into account the special July 2002 regular elections and in the 13 August
2002 special elections, petitioners can legally
role conferred upon and the broader powers
remain in office as barangay chairmen of their
and functions invested in the barangays by the respective barangays in a hold-over capacity. They
Code as a basic political unit, as a primary shall continue to discharge their powers and duties
planning and implementing unit of as punong barangay, and enjoy the rights and
government policies in the community, and as privileges pertaining to the office. True, Section
a forum wherein the collective views of the 43(c) of the Local Government Code limits the
people may be expressed and considered and term of elective barangay officials to three years.
where disputes may be amicably settled, it However, Section 5 of RA 9164 explicitly
would be in harmony with sound logic to infer provides that incumbent barangay officials may
that the Code never intended to deprive the continue in office in a hold over capacity until their
successors are elected and qualified.
barangays of their representation in the
sangguniang bayan during the interregnum
when the liga has yet to be formally organized
with the election of its officers.
2. Term Limits
Sambarani vs. Commission on elections, 438 Borja v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157
SCRA 319
- Capco was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros
- During the 2002 Barangay and Sangguniang - He became the Mayor by operation of law upon
Kabataan Elections, Sambarani ran as Punong the death of the incumbent Mayor
Barangay - Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two
- COMELEC issued a Resolution declaring a more terms
failure of elections in Lanao del Sur, and a Special - Capco then filed his Certificate of Candidacy as
Election was set on Aug. 13, 2002. Mayor for the 1998 elections
- No Special Elections were held on Aug. 13. - Borja sought Capco’s disqualification on the
- COMELEC refused to hold another special ground that Capco had already served for (3)
election due citing Sec. 6, of the Omnibus Election consecutive terms as mayor
Code “special elections shall be HELD ON A
DATE REASONABLY CLOSE TO THE DATE Whether Capco’s has already satisfied the (3) term
OF THE ELECTION NOT HELD, but not later limit?
than thirty days after cessation of the cause of such
postponement.” NO
- COMELEC then left to the DILG to Appoint - It is not enough that an individual has served
Barangay Captains, Kagawads, etc. three consecutive terms in an elective local
- Sambarani argues that as the incumbent punong office—he must also have been elected to the
barangay, he should remain in office in a Hold same position for the same number of times
Over Capacity before the disqualification can apply.—To
recapitulate, the term limit for elective local
Whether Sarambani is correct in arguing that as
officials must be taken to refer to the right to
the Incumbent Punong Barangay, he should
remain in office in a Hold Over Capacity? be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. Consequently, it is not
YES Since there was a failure of elections in the enough that an individual has served three
15 July 2002 regular elections and in the 13 consecutive terms in an elective local office,
August 2002 special elections, petitioners can he must also have been elected to the same
legally remain in office as barangay chairmen of position for the same number of times before
their respective barangays in a hold-over capacity. the disqualification can apply.
As the law now stands, the language of Section 5
proclaimed candidate may assume office on
Lozanida v. COMELEC, GR No. 135150, July
the strength of the proclamation of the Board
28, 1999
of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner
who assumes office subject to the final
- Lozanida was elected and served as Municipal outcome of the election protest.
Mayor of San Antonio Zambales during the
a) 1989-1992 term
b) 1992-1995 term
c) 1995-1998 term Adormeo v. COMELEC, GR No. 147927,
- The 1995 election was protested and was February 4, 2002
eventually declared by COMELEC as null and
void on the ground of failure of elections
- Talaga served as Mayor of Lucena during the
- Three months before the 1998 elections Lozanida
a) 1992-1995 term
vacated his post in light of COMELEC’s decision
b) 1995-1998 term
that there was a failure of elections
- Talaga then lost the 1998 elections to Tagarao
- Lozanida proceeded to file his certificate of
- Before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term ended, a
candidacy for the 1998 elections for Mayor
Recall Election was conducted on May 2000
- Talaga won the Recall Election
Whether Lozanida has satisfied the (3) term limit
- Talaga then ran for Mayor in the 2001 Mayoral
rule, thus barring him from running in the 1998
Mayoral Elections?
Whether Talaga has already satisfied the (3) term
limit rule, thus barring him from running in the
- Conditions for the application of the
2001 Elections?
disqualification: 1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms NO
in the same local government post and 2) that The term limit for elective local officials must be
he has fully served three consecutive terms.— taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
This Court held that the two conditions for the the right to serve in the same elective position.
application of the disqualification must Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
concur: 1) that the official concerned has been has served three consecutive terms in an elective
elected for three consecutive terms in the local office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before
same local government post and 2) that he has
the disqualification can apply.
fully served three consecutive terms. It stated:
“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen.
local officials must be taken to refer to the The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by
right to be elected as well as the right to serve his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between
in the same elective position. Consequently, it his second term and the recall election is sufficient
is not enough that an individual has served interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive
three consecutive terms in an elective local terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in
office, he must also have been elected to the the LGC.
same position for the same number of times
Talaga only served two consecutive full terms.
before the disqualification can apply.”
There was a disruption when he was defeated in
- Voluntary renunciation of a term does not the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000
cancel the renounced term in the computation recall election is not a continuation of his two
of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary previous terms which could constitute his third
severance from office for any length of time term thereby barring him for running for a fourth
short of the full term provided by law amounts term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the
to an interruption of continuity of service. “voluntary renunciation” contemplated by the law.
- A proclamation subsequently declared void
is no proclamation at all and while a
Socrates v. COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457 (2002)
was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn
- Hagedorn was elected as Mayor of Puerto was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly
Princessa for three (3) Consecutive terms an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s
a) 1992-1995 service as mayor, not because of his voluntary
b) 1995-1998 renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.
c) 1998-2001
- Hagedorn did not run in the 2001 elections
- The incumbent Mayor, midway into his term,
faced a Recall Election. Latasa v. COMELEC, GR No. 154829, Dec. 10,
- Hagedorn ran for the unexpired term of the 2003
Mayor that was subjected to the Recall Election
- Socrates, sought the disqualification of Hagedorn
- Latasa was elected Mayor of the
for violating the three (3) term limit rule
MUNICIPALITY of Digos during the 1992,
1995, 1998 terms
Whether Hagedorn violated the three (3) term limit
- The Municipality of Digos was converted to a
- Thus, Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for
Mayor in the 2001 elections
- These constitutional and statutory provisions
- Sunga argues that Latasa had already satisfied the
have two parts. The first part provides that an
(3) term limit rule, as such the latter was cannot
elective local official cannot serve for more than
run for a 4th term as Mayor
three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that
- Latasa argues that the Conversion of the
only consecutive terms count in determining the
Municipality to a City allowed him to run again as
three-¬term limit rule. The second part states that
the former is separate and distinct from the latter.
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
Thus, he was vying for a different governmental
time does not interrupt the continuity of service.
The clear intent is that involuntary severance from
office for any length of time interrupts continuity
Whether Latasa is eligible to run for Mayor of the
of service and prevents the service before and after
City of Digos?
the interruption from being joined together to form
a continuous service or consecutive terms.
- True, the new city acquired a new corporate
After three consecutive terms, an elective official
existence separate and distinct from that of the
cannot immediate re-election for a fourth term,
municipality. This does not mean, however, that
The prohibited election refers to the next regular
for the purpose of applying the subject
election for a fourth term. The prohibited election
Constitutional provision, the office of the
refers to the next regular election for the same
municipal mayor would now be construed as a
office following the same office following the third
different local government post as that of the office
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a
of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
recall election, is no longer covered by the
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that
prohibitionfor two reasons:
of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants
1) A subsequent election like a recall election, is
of the municipality are the same as those in the
no longer an immediate reelection after the three
city. These inhabitants are the same group of
consecutive terms; and
voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their
2) The intervening period constitutes an
municipal mayor for three consecutive terms.
involuntary interruption in the continuity of
These are also the same inhabitants over whom he
held power and authority as their chief executive
for nine years.
After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30,
- The framers of the Constitution specifically
2001, he became a private citizen until the recall
included an exception to the peoples freedom to
election of September 24, 2002 when he won by
choose those who will govern them in order to
3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the
September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa
same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for kagawads (as in the Code).
the position of city mayor after having served for - In enacting the general appropriations act of
three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor 1997, Congress appropriated the amount of P400
would obviously defeat the very intent of the million to cover expenses for the holding of
framers when they wrote this exception. Should he barangay elections this year. Likewise, under Sec.
be allowed another three consecutive terms as 7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained that a general
mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then registration of voters shall be held “immediately
be possibly holding office as chief executive over after the barangay elections in 1997.” These are
the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for clear and express contemporaneous statements of
a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the Congress that barangay officials shall be elected
very scenario sought to be avoided by the this May, in accordance with Sec. 43-c of RA
Constitution, if not abhorred by it 7160.
- In Paras vs. Comelec, this Court said that “the
next regular election involving the barangay office
concerned is barely 7 months away, the same
David v. COMELEC, 271 SCRA 90 (1997) having been scheduled in May, 1997.” This
judicial decision is “part of the legal system of the
Philippines (NCC 8).”
- David, in his capacity as barangay chairman and
- RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically
as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa
applies to local government units. It specifically
Pilipinas, filed a petition to prohibit the holding of
and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that “the
the barangay election scheduled on the second
term of office of barangay officials shall be for
Monday of May 1997.
three years.” It is a special provision that applies
- Meanwhile, Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City
only to the term of barangay officials who were
Chapter also filed a petition to seek a judicial
elected on the second Monday of May 1994. With
review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional:
such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed
(1) Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160; (2) COMELEC
a general law.
Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of
the holding of the barangay elections on May 12,
2. Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to
1997 and other activities related thereto; and, (3)
only three years constitutional? (YES)
The budgetary appropriation of P400 million
Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution
contained in Republic Act No. 8250 (General
- The Constitution did not expressly prohibit
Appropriations Act of 1997) intended to defray the
Congress from fixing any term of office for
costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay
barangay officials. It merely left the determination
of such term to the lawmaking body, without any
- Petitioners contend that under RA 6679, the term
specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving
of office of barangay officials is 5 years. Although
to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in
the LGC reduced the term of office of all local
accordance with the exigencies of public service. It
elective officials to three years, such reduction
must be remembered that every law has in its favor
does not apply to barangay officials.
the presumption of constitutionality. The
- As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q.
petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this
Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the petitions.
burden and to show clearly the unconstitutionality
they aver.
1. Which law governs the term of office of
- Constitutional Commission on how long the term
barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679? (RA
of barangay officials is: “As may be determined by
7160 – 3 years)
law”; more precisely, “as provided for in the Local
Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term
Autonomy Code (Sec 43-c limits their term to 3
to Three Years
- RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. It is
basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict
3. Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term
between two laws, the later enactment prevails.
other than that provided under RA 7160? (YES)
(Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.)
- Barangay officials are estopped from asking for
- During the barangay elections held on May 9,
any term other than that which they ran for and
1994 (second Monday), the voters actually and
were elected to, under the law governing their very
directly elected one punong barangay and seven
claim to such offices: namely, the LGC.
Petitioners’ belated claim of ignorance as to what
law governed their election to office in 1994 is
unacceptable because under NCC 3, “ignorance of
Montebon had been elected for three
the law excuses no one from compliance consecutive terms as municipal
therewith.” councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998,
2001, and 2004 elections. However,
in January 2004, or during his
Rivera v. COMELEC – 523 SCRA 41
second term, he succeeded and
assumed the position of vice-mayor
- Morales was elected Mayor of Mabalacat for the
a) 1995-1998 term of Tuburan when the incumbent
b) 1998-2001 term vice-mayor retired. When he filed
c) 2001-2004 term
- During his 1998-2001 term, Morales was his certificate of candidacy again as
preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an municipal councilor for 2007
anti-graft case and declared by the RTC as a “De elections, a petition for
Facto Officer” due to his Void Proclamation
- In the 2004 election filed his certificate of disqualification was filed against
candidacy him based on the three-term limit
Whether Morales already satisfied the (3) term rule. In his answer, Montebon
limit? argued that he cannot be
YES disqualified on the ground of the 3-
Respondent Morales was elected for the term
1998-2001. He assumed the position. He was term limit rule because his second
mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the term was interrupted when he
Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case
filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (Morales) as assumed the position of vice-
mayor (because the trial court’s ruling was ¬mayor due to the retirement of
promulgated only after the expiry of the 1998-2001 elected vice¬mayor Petronilo
term). Respondent Morales is now serving his
fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat Mendoza. Petitioners maintained
continuously without any break since 1995. In just that Montebon's assumption of
over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been
mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous office as vice-mayor in January
years. His assumption of office for the second term 2004 should not be considered an
constituted “service for the full term” and should interruption in the service of his
be counted as a full term served in contemplation
of the three-term limit prescribed by the second term since it was a voluntary
constitutional and statutory provisions barring renunciation of his office as
local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive terms for municipal councilor.
the same position.

For the three-term limit for elective local

government officials to apply, two conditions or Was Montebon's assumption to the
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official vice-mayoralty position considered
concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and (2) an involuntary severance or
that he has fully served three consecutive terms. interruption?

Montebon v. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50
Yes. Succession in local functions. It is therefore more
government offices is by operation compulsory and obligatory rather
of law. Section 44 of Republic Act than voluntary.
No. 7160, provides that if a
permanent vacancy occurs in the In this case, a permanent vacancy
office of the vice mayor, the highest occurred in the office of the vice-
ranking sanggunian member shall mayor due to the retirement of Vice
become vice mayor. Mayor Mendoza. Montebon, being
The legal successor is not given any the highest ranking municipal
option under the law on whether to councilor, succeeded him in
accept the vacated post or not. accordance with law. Thus,
Section 44 of the Local Government Montebon's assumption of office as
Code makes no exception. Only if vice-¬mayor in January 2004 was
the highest-¬ranking councilor is an involuntary severance from his
permanently unable to succeed to office as municipal councilor,
the post does the law speak of resulting in an interruption in the
alternate succession. Under no service of his 2001-¬2004 term. It
circumstances can simple refusal of cannot be deemed to have been by
the official concerned be considered reason of voluntary renunciation
as permanent inability within the because it was by operation of law.
contemplation of law. Essentially (Montebon vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
therefore, the successor cannot 180444. April 9, 2008)
refuse to assume the office that he is
mandated to occupy by virtue of Note:
succession. He can only do so if for
some reason he is permanently ● Since the law no less allowed
unable to succeed and occupy the Montebon to vacate his post as
post vacated. councilor in order to assume office
as vicemayor, his occupation of the
Thus, succession by law to a higher office cannot, without more,
vacated government office is be deemed as a voluntary
characteristically not voluntary renunciation of his position as
since it involves the performance of councilor.
a public duty by a government
official, the non-¬performance of
which exposes said official to
possible administrative and criminal Ong v. Alegre, GR No. 163295, January 23,
charges of dereliction of duty and
neglect in the performance of public
Facts: A candidate was disqualified by the
COMELEC en banc to run for mayor for he
has served for three-consecutive terms. A person without a valid certificate of
During his second term, the opposing party candidacy cannot be considered a
filed a protest and the RTC declared the candidate in much the same way as
opposing party as the duly elected mayor. any person who has not filed any
However, such decision came out three years certificate of candidacy at all cannot,
after and when the candidate has already by any stretch of the imagination, be a
started his third term. Since the COMELEC candidate at all.
disqualified the candidate, his political party
nominated the brother of the candidate as a
substitute. The COMELEC denied due course
the certificate of candidacy in the same Laceda v. Lumena – GR 182867, November 25,
mayoralty election as substitute for his 2008

FACTS: Petitioner Laceda and private
(a) Whether the assumption of office as respondent Limena were candidates for
mayor from July 1,1998 to June 30, 2001 Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan,
may be considered as one full term West District, Sorsogon City, during the
service in the context of the consecutive October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang
three-term limit rule. Kabataan Elections. On October 23, 2007,
Limena filed a petition for disqualification
(b) Whether the COMELEC committed and/or declaration as an ineligible candidate
grave abuse of discretion when it denied against Laceda before the COMELEC,
due course the certificate of candidacy in contending that Laceda had already served as
the same mayoralty election as substitute Punong Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan for
for his brother. three consecutive terms since 1994, and was
thus prohibited from running for the fourth time
Held: under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9164.

(a) YES. We hold that such assumption Limena likewise attached the following
of office constitutes, " service for the full certification from the DILG:
term", and should be counted as a full
term served in contemplation of the three- THIS IS TO CERTIFY that per records in this
term limit prescribed by the constitutional office HON. ROBERTO LACEDA, SR.,
and statutory provisions, supra, barring incumbent Punong Barangay of Panlayaan,
local elective officials from being elected West District, Sorsogon City. was elected as
and serving for more than three Punong Barangay during the May 9, 1994,
consecutive term for the same position. May 12, 1997 and July 15, 2002 Barangay
Elections. He resigned from office on March
For the three-term limit for elective 20, 1995 to run as Municipal Councilor.
local government officials to apply, Hence, he is covered by the three-term rule of
two conditions or requisites must paragraph 2, Section 2 of RA 9164 which
concur, to wit: (1) that the official provides that: No barangay elective official
concerned has been elected for three shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
consecutive terms in the same local terms in the same position: Provided,
government post, and (2) that he has however, that the term of office shall be
fully served three consecutive terms. reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections.
Voluntary renunciation of office [for] any length
(b) NO. A candidate whose certificate of of time shall not be considered as an
candidacy has been cancelled or not interruption in the continuity of service for the
given due course cannot be substituted by full term for which the elective official was
another belonging to the same political elected.
party as that of the former.
Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan,
Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be
In his Answer, Laceda admitted having served construed as a different local government post
as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan for three as that of the office of Punong Barangay of
consecutive terms. However, he asserted that Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The
when he was elected for his first two terms, territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan,
Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that Sorsogon City, is the same as before the
when he served his third term, the Municipality conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of
of Sorsogon had already been merged with the barangay are the same. They are the
the Municipality of Bacon to form a new same group of voters who elected Laceda to
political unit, the City of Sorsogon, pursuant to be their Punong Barangay for three
Republic Act No. 8806. Thus, he argued that consecutive terms and over whom Laceda
his third term was actually just his first in the held power and authority as their Punong
new political unit and that he was accordingly Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did
entitled to run for two more terms. He likewise not interrupt Laceda’s term.
argued that assuming he had already served
three consecutive terms, Rep. Act No. 9164 In Latasa v. Commission on Elections, this
which imposes the three-term limit, cannot be Court held that where a person has been
made to apply to him as it would violate his elected for three consecutive terms as a
vested right to office. He alleged that when he municipal mayor and prior to the end or
was elected in 1994 the prohibition did not termination of such three-year term the
exist. Had he known that there will be a law municipality has been converted by law into a
preventing him to run for the fourth time, he city, without the city charter interrupting his
would not have run for office in 1994 as he term until the end of the three-year term, the
was looking forward to the election in 2007. prohibition applies to prevent him from running
for the fourth time as city mayor thereof, there
being no break in the continuity of the terms.
ISSUE: Whether Laceda served his third term
in a new political unit and therefore he should
Thus, the COMELEC did not err nor commit
not be deemed already to have served a third any abuse of discretion when it declared
term as Punong Barangay for purposes of
Laceda disqualified and cancelled his
applying the three-term limit. certificate of candidacy.
HELD: NO. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164,
like Section 43 of the LGC from which it was
taken, is primarily intended to broaden the
choices of the electorate of the candidates Dizon v. COMELEC, GR No. 182088, January
who will run for office, and to infuse new blood 30, 2009
in the political arena by disqualifying officials
from running for the same office after a term
of nine years. This Court has held that for the FACTS: Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of
prohibition to apply, two requisites must Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the
concur: (1) that the official concerned has COMELEC to disqualify Morales, the
been elected for three consecutive terms in incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground
the same local government post and (2) that that the latter was elected and had fully
he or she has fully served three consecutive served three previous consecutive terms in
terms. violation of Section 43 of the LGC. Dizon
alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in
While it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales
the municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon should not have been allowed to have filed his
were merged and converted into a city thereby CoC on March 2007 for the same position and
abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon same municipality.
City as a new political unit, it cannot be said
that for the purpose of applying the prohibition Morales, on the other hand, contended that he
in Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of
is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of considered as an interruption in the continuity
Mabalacat because he was not elected for the of his service for the full term for which he was
said position in the 1998 elections. He averred elected.
that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the
decision of the RTC declaring Dee as the duly There should be a concurrence of two
elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 conditions for the application of the
elections. Thus, he was not elected for the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned
said position in the 1998 elections. His term has been elected for three consecutive terms
should be reckoned from 2001. He added that in the same local government post and (2)
his election in 2004 is only for his second that he has fully served three consecutive
term. terms.

COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was
Morales and denied the petition. It took judicial elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four
notice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera case consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001,
promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. We disqualified
held that Morales was elected as mayor of Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004
Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001 elections because of the three-term limit.
(notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an Although the trial court previously ruled that
electoral protest case that the then Morales’ proclamation for the 1998-2001 term
proclamation of Morales was void). The SC was void, there was no interruption of the
ruled in that case that Morales violated the continuity of Morales’ service with respect to
three--term limit under Section 43 of the LGC. the 1998-2001 term because the trial court’s
Hence, Morales was considered not a ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001,
candidate in the 2004 elections, and this or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.
failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a
gap and allows him to run again for the same Our ruling in the Rivera case served as
position in 2007 elections. Morales’ involuntary severance from office
with respect to the 2004-2007 term.
ISSUES: Involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by
1. W the period served by Morales in the law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
2004--2007 term (although he was ousted service. Our decision in the Rivera case was
from his office as Mayor on May 16, 2007) promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective
should be considered his fourth term. immediately. The next day, Morales notified
the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The
2. W the 2007--2010 term of Morales is his 5th vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor
term. from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The
assumption by the vice mayor of the office of
HELD: the mayor, no matter how short it may seem
to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of
1. NO. This Court unseated Morales during service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for
his fourth term. We cancelled his CoC dated the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.
30 December 2003. This cancellation (4th term)
disqualified Morales from being a candidate in
the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for 2. NO. Morales occupied the position of mayor
Morales were considered stray votes. of Mabalacat for the following periods: 1995-
1998; 1998-2001; 2001-2004; and 2004-2007.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution
and Section 43(b) of the LGC state that the However, because of his disqualification,
term of office of elective local officials, except Morales was not the duly elected mayor for
barangay officials, shall be three years, and the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold
no such official shall serve for more than three the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of term. Morales cannot be deemed to have
the office for any length of time shall not be served the full term of 2004-2007 because he
was ordered to vacate his post before the would be a voluntary renunciation of his post
expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy of as Punong Barangay.
the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 2004-
2007 cannot be counted as a term for In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he
purposes of computing the three-term limit. assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan
Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 member, he left his post as Punong Barangay
June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of by operation of law; hence, it must be
the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 considered as an involuntary interruption in
July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively the continuity of his last term of service.
Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-
term limit rule. Pending the resolution of the case before the
COMELEC, Bolos Jr. won in the election.

ISSUE: Whether there was a voluntary

Alboin v. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay
December 23, 2009 by Bolos Jr. when he assumed the post of
Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to
have served for three consecutive terms.

HELD: YES. The three--term limit for elective

official is contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the
Bolos v. COMELEC – 581 SCRA 786 [2009] Constitution states:

“Section 8. The term of office of elective

local officials, except barangay officials,
FACTS: Petitioner Bolos was elected as the which shall be determined by law, shall be
Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, three years and no such official shall serve
Bohol for 3 consecutive terms (1994,1997, for more than three consecutive terms.
2002). Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as
In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran an interruption in the continuity of his
for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He service for the full term for which he was
assumed office on July 1, 2004 leaving his elected.”
post as Punong Barangay.
The LGC provides for the term of office of
After serving his term as a councilor he filed Barangay Officials:
his candidacy for the position of Punong
Barangay in the October 29, 2007 Barangay Sec. 43. Term of Office. – x x x (b) No local
and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. elective official shall serve for more than
Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong three (3) consecutive terms in the same
Barangay and also a candidate for the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office, filed a petition for disqualification on the office for any length of time shall not be
ground that Bolos Jr. has already served the considered as an interruption in the
maximum limit of three- term hence no longer continuity of service for the full term for
eligible to run and hold the position. which the elective official concerned was
Cinconiegue contended that Bolos’
relinquishment of the position of Punong (c) The term of barangay officials and
Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his members of the sangguniang kabataan
part, as it could be presumed that it was his shall be for five (5) years, which shall
personal decision to run as municipal begin after the regular election of barangay
councilor in the May 14, 2004 National and officials on the second Monday of May
Local Elections. He added that petitioner knew 1997: Provided, that the sangguniang
that if he won and assumed the position, there kabataan members who were elected in the
May 1996 elections shall serve until the petitioner’s relinquishment of the office of
next regular election of barangay officials. Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as
a consequence of his assumption to office as
Socrates v. Comelec held that the rule on the Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol,
three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary renunciation.
and the LGC, has two parts: x x x The first
part provides that an elective local official When petitioner filed his certificate of
cannot serve for more than three consecutive candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive Bayan, he was not deemed resigned.
terms count in determining the three-term limit Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit
rule. The second part states that voluntary of his election as municipal councilor point out
renunciation of office for any length of time to an intent and readiness to give up his post
does not interrupt the continuity of service. as Punong Barangay once elected to the
The clear intent is that involuntary severance higher elective office, for it was very unlikely
from office for any length of time interrupts that respondent had filed his Certificate of
continuity of service and prevents the service Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post,
before and after the interruption from being campaigned and exhorted the municipal
joined together to form a continuous service or electorate to vote for him as such and then
consecutive terms. after being elected and proclaimed, return to
his former position. He knew that his election
After three consecutive terms, an elective as municipal councilor would entail
local official cannot seek immediate reelection abandonment of the position he held, and he
for a fourth term. The prohibited election intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like
refers to the next regular election for the same resignation, is voluntary.
office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Petitioner erroneously argues that when he
assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan
In Lonzanida v. Comelec, the Court stated member, he left his post as Punong Barangay
that the second part of the rule on the three- by operation of law; hence, he did not fully
term limit shows the clear intent of the framers serve his third term as Punong Barangay.
of the Constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary The term "operation of law" is defined by the
renunciation of office and at the same time Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as "a term
respect the people’s choice and grant their describing the fact that rights may be acquired
elected official full service of a term. The Court or lost by the effect of a legal rule without any
held that two conditions for the application of act of the person affected." Black's Law
the disqualification must concur: (1) that the Dictionary also defines it as a term that
official concerned has been elected for three "expresses the manner in which rights, and
consecutive terms in the same government sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person
post; and (2) that he has fully served three by the mere application to the particular
consecutive terms. transaction of the established rules of law,
without the act or cooperation of the party
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner himself.
was elected as Punong Barangay for three
consecutive terms, satisfying the first An interruption in the service of a term of
condition for disqualification. office, by operation of law, is exemplified in
Montebon v. Comelec and Borja vs. Comelec.
What is to be determined is whether petitioner In this case, petitioner did not fill or succeed to
is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his a vacancy by operation of law. He instead
position as Punong Barangay during his third relinquished his office as Punong Barangay
term when he ran for and won as during his third term when he won and
Sangguniang Bayan member and assumed assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan
said office. member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a
voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong
The Court agrees with the COMELEC that Barangay.
Datu Michel Abas Kida v. Senate of the
Philippines, GR 196271, February 2012
Aldovino v. COMELEC – 609 SCRA 234 [2009] (reconsideration; holdover provision in RA 9054
Unconstitutional as Congress in passing RA
10153 has made clear)
FACTS: Lucena City councilor Asilo was
elected to the said office for three consecutive
terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-
FACTS: These cases are motions for
2007. In September 2005, during his third
term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision
order of 90-day preventive suspension against where it upheld the constitutionality of
him in relation to a criminal case. The said Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA
suspension order was subsequently lifted by
No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in
the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance
the ARMM (which were scheduled to be held
of the functions of his office. Asilo then filed
on the second Monday of August 2011) to the
his certificate of candidacy for the same
second Monday of May 2013 and recognized
position in 2007. His disqualification was
the President’s power to appoint officers-in-
sought by herein petitioners on the ground
that he had been elected and had served for charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these
positions upon the expiration of the terms of
three consecutive terms, in violation of the
three-term Constitutional limit. the elected officials.

ISSUE: Whether the suspensive condition ISSUE: Is the holdover provision in RA No.
9054 constitutional?
interrupts the three-term limitation rule of
HELD: The petitioners are one in defending
the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII
HELD: NO. The preventive suspension of
of RA No. 9054, which allows the regional
public officials does not interrupt their term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule under the officials to remain in their positions in a
holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially
Constitution and the Local Government Code
argue that the ARMM regional officials should
(RA 7160).
be allowed to remain in their respective
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Asilo positions until the May 2013 elections since
there is no specific provision in the
for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
Constitution which prohibits regional elective
contravention of the three-term limit rule of
officials from performing their duties in a
Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his
holdover capacity.
2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the
preventive suspension imposed on him.
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution expresses the intent of the
“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does
not involve an effective interruption of service framers of the Constitution to categorically set
a limitation on the period within which all
within a term and should therefore not be a
elective local officials can occupy their offices.
reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held
the Court. It noted that preventive suspension Since elective ARMM officials are also local
can pose as a threat “more potent” than the officials, they are, thus, bound by the three-
voluntary renunciation that the Constitution year term limit prescribed by the Constitution.
It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the
itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as
Constitution does not expressly prohibit
it is easier to undertake and merely requires
elective officials from acting in a holdover
an easily fabricated administrative charge that
capacity. Short of amending the Constitution,
can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed. Congress has no authority to extend the
three-year term limit by inserting a holdover
provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of
three years for local officials should stay at (b) For efficient, effective and economical
three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, governance, the purpose of which is the
and cannot be extended by holdover by general welfare of the barangay and its
Congress. inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code, the punong barangay shall:


L. Local Governments Units (5) Upon approval by a majority of all the

members of the sangguniang barangay,
A. Barangays appoint or replace the barangay treasurer, the
Alquizola vs. Ocol, 313 SCRA 273 barangay secretary, and other appointive
barangay officials;

The term replace would obviously embrace

FACTS: Petitioner Alquizola won the post of not only the appointment of the replacement
Punong Barangay of Barangay Tubod, Iligan but also the prior removal of, or the vacation
City, in the 12th May 1997 barangay elections. by, the official currently occupying the
Respondents Gallardo Ocol et. al were appointive position concerned. To replace is
appointees of the former punong barangay of to take the place of, to serve as a substitute
Barangay Tubod. for or successor of, to put in place of, or to fill
the post of an incumbent. In order to provide a
After the elections, petitioner Alquizola replacement to an office, the prior holder must
terminated the services of respondents and have first been removed or the office must
appointed his co-petitioners, Doromal and have, otherwise, been previously rendered
Seco, respectively, as barangay treasurer and vacant.
as barangay secretary. In consonance with
Section 394 and Section 395 of the LGC, he Aside from what may be implicit in Section
submitted both appointments to the 389, there is no other provision in the LGC
Sangguniang Barangay for approval. The that treats of the power of the Punong
Sanggunian rejected the appointments. Barangay to remove the barangay secretary,
the barangay treasurer, or any other
Following the action taken by the appointive barangay official from office. The
Sangguniang Barangay, respondents filed a duration of the term of office of these
complaint for quo warranto, mandamus and barangay officials have not been fixed by the
prohibition with the RTC to enjoin petitioner LGC. Where the tenure of the office is not
from terminating the services of the former. fixed by law, it is a sound and useful rule to
The trial court found in favor of respondents consider the power of removal as being an
and ordered petitioner Alquizola to cease and incident to the power of appointment.
desist from dismissing respondents on the Elsewise stated, the power to remove is
ground that their dismissal had been effected deemed implied in the power to appoint.
without the corresponding approval of the
Sangguniang Barangay. It held that Section The Code explicitly vests on the punong
389(b)(5) limited the power of a barangay barangay, upon approval by a majority of all
captain to remove appointive barangay the members of the sangguniang barangay,
officials by requiring an approval of such act the power to appoint or replace the barangay
by a majority of the Sangguniang Barangay. treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other
appointive barangay officials. This provision is
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of respondents reinforced, in the case of the secretary and
without the approval of the Sangguniang Brgy the treasurer, by the provisions of Section 394
is valid. and Section 395 of the LGC; to wit:

HELD: NO. Section 389. Chief Executive: Section 394. Barangay Secretary:
Powers, Duties, and Functions. x x x Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and
Duties. - (a) The barangay secretary shall be of Manila accompanied by copies of alleged
appointed by the punong barangay with the complaints against her. Respondent was
concurrence of the majority of all the required in the said letter to explain within 72
sangguniang barangay members. The hours upon receipt why no administrative
appointment of the barangay secretary shall sanctions shall be imposed upon her for gross
not be subject to attestation by the Civil misconduct and conduct unbecoming x x x a
Service Commission. public officer in violation of the Civil Service
Law, Rules and Regulations.
Section 395. Barangay Treasurer:
Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and Respondent de Castro filed her answer-
Duties. - (a) The barangay treasurer shall be affidavit which was received by the Office of
appointed by the punong barangay with the the City Legal Officer.
concurrence of the majority of all the
sangguniang barangay members. The Subsequently, Aguirre notified the respondent
appointment of the barangay treasurer shall that her answer-affidavit was found
not be subject to attestation by the Civil unsatisfactory for which reason she was
Service Commission. summoned to appear before the said City
Legal Officer for the purpose of conducting a
Verily, the power of appointment is to be formal investigation.
exercised conjointly by the punong barangay
and a majority of all the members of the Respondent filed a motion to dismiss. She
sangguniang barangay. Without such conjoint claimed that she was a subordinate of the
action, neither an appointment nor a Secretary of the Department of Education,
replacement can be effectual. Culture and Sports (DECS). Thus, the case
should be endorsed to the Office of the DECS
Applying the rule that the power to appoint Secretary or its legal division as nowhere in
includes the power to remove, one that the RA 409, Charter of the City of Manila is there
Court finds no cogent reason to now depart a provision conferring upon the Office of the
from, the questioned dismissal from office of City Legal Officer jurisdiction to try and
the barangay officials by the punong barangay investigate personnel of the DECS in general,
without the concurrence of the majority of all or the Division of City Schools where
the members of the Sangguniang Barangay petitioner is under, in particular.
cannot be legally justified. To rule otherwise
could also create an absurd situation of the This motion to dismiss of respondent was
Sangguniang Barangay members refusing, denied citing Sec. 455 b(1) and (V) of the LGC
like here, to give their approval to the and Section 3(c) of the same code. It was held
replacements selected by the punong that the records of the personnel office
barangay who has unilaterally terminated the disclosed that respondent was included in the
services of the incumbents. It is likely that the plantilla of the City of Manila and therefore her
legislature did not intend this absurdity to flow salary derived wholly and mainly from the
from its enactment of the law. funds of the City for which reason she was
subject to the disciplinary authority of the said
City Legal Officer.
B. Municipality and Cities Thereafter, respondent was notified to appear
before the panel formed by the City Legal
1. Employees Officer to hear administrative case CLO 24-96
Aguirre vs De Castro, 321 SCRA 95 filed against her for grave misconduct and
conduct unbecoming x x x a public officer.

FACTS: Respondent Atty. De Castro is the ISSUE: Whether the Office of the City Legal
Chief of the Legal Affairs and Complaint Officer of Manila has jurisdiction to investigate
Services of the Division of City Schools of the complaint for grave misconduct filed
Manila. Respondent received a letter from against the respondent.
public respondent Aguirre, City Legal Officer
HELD: NO. Under Book IV, Chapter V, the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizing
Section 7(4) of the Administrative Code of the regional director to discipline national
1987, the power to appoint and discipline first- education employees. Nothing prohibits the
level employees, which include respondent, is mayor from filing complaints against
specifically lodged with the regional director of respondent before the DECS.
the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports. Petitioners cite paragraph 12, Section 2 (a) of
Executive Order (EO) 503, which states that
(4) Appoint personnel to positions in the first devolved personnel are automatically
level and casual and seasonal employees; reappointed by the local chief executive. Since
and exercise disciplinary actions over them in respondent was deemed reappointed by the
accordance with the Civil Service Law." city mayor, it follows that the latter can
exercise disciplinary authority over her.
This is also clear in Book V, Section 47 (2) of
the same Code; and in Section 32, Rule XIV We are not convinced. First, the above
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of provision applies to devolved personnel, and
the Administrative Code of 1987. there is no proof whatsoever that respondent
is one of them. Second, even if respondent
SEC. 32. The Secretaries and heads of can be considered as a devolved personnel,
agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, the cited paragraph of EO 503 must not be
cities, and municipalities shall have jurisdiction read in isolation from but in conjunction with
to investigate and decide matters involving the other paragraphs in Section 2 (a).
disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Thus, paragraph 12 -- along with paragraphs
5, 6, 8, 13 and 14[15]of EO 503 -- deals with
The LGC did not automatically repeal the safeguards against termination, reduction of
provisions in the 1987 Administrative Code, pay and diminution in rank of existing
contrary to petitioners argument. There is no personnel; it is not about the power of the
provision in the LGC expressly rescinding the mayor to discipline personnel of the Division
authority of the DECS regional director to of City Schools. In effect, the said provision
appoint and exercise disciplinary authority serves more to limit the appointing authority of
over first-level employees. On the other hand, the city mayor, whose acts must be
implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the circumscribed by the aforecited conditions. It
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing is not incompatible and can exist with
of such intention. aforecited provisions of the Administrative
Code. Indeed, it cannot be deemed to have
Furthermore, responden’ts position as senior divested the regional director of his
legal officer in the Division of City Schools is disciplining power.
not one of the offices covered by the city
mayor’s power of appointment under the LGC. As to petitioner’s argument that respondents
salary is wholly or mainly paid out of city
Moreover, petitioners failed to show a specific funds, suffice it to say that the source of the
provision in the LGC showing that the power wages is not the only criteria in determining
to discipline officials in the Division of City whether the payor may be deemed the
Schools has been devolved from the regional employer. In fact, the most important factor is
director of the DECS to the city mayor. All that the control test; that is, who has the power to
Section 17 (4) of the LGC states is that the supervise and direct the work of the employee
city must provide support for education and concerned?
other such services and facilities.
Absent any contrary statutory provision, the
Section 455 (b-1-x) of the LGC which provides power to appoint carries with it the power to
that the city mayor may cause to be instituted remove or to discipline. Since respondent was
administrative or judicial proceedings against appointed by the regional director of DECS,
any official or employee of the city, is not she may be disciplined or removed by the
necessarily incompatible with the provisions of latter pursuant to law.
a. Local autonomy for territorial and political
Finally, respondent’s primary duty is to subdivisions
conduct investigations of cases involving b. Accountability of Local Government units
teaching and nonteaching personnel of the through recall, initiative and referendum
Division of City Schools of Manila. The report c. Consultation by national offices with local
on the results of her investigations is then government units and no-government
submitted for final evaluation to the DECS organizations before implementing any program
regional director, who may approve,
disapprove or allow respondent to modify it. (Sec.2)
This fact clearly shows that supervision over 2. Rules interpretation
respondent is lodged with the regional a. Liberal Interpretation of power of local
director, not the mayor. government units
b. Strict construction of tax ordinances
c. Liberal interpretation of general welfare
2. Powers of Mayors d. Application of Original terms of construct or
a. Imposition of conditions for issuance of law upon vested rights
mayor’s permit e. Resort to customs in the absence of law or
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of jurisprudence (Sec.5)
Appeals, 329 SCRA 314 B. General Powers and Attributes of Local
b. Issuance of mayor’s permit Government Units
Robe Arraste, Inc. vs. Villaflor, 499 SCRA 434 1. A local government unit may be created,
c. Revocation of mayor’s permit divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries
Gordon vs. Veridiano, 167 SCRA 51 substantially altered by law in the case of a
Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 149 province, city, municipality, or other political
d. Appointment of employees subdivision, or by city or provincial ordinance in
Lopez vs. Civil Service Commission, 195 SCRA the case of a barangay
777 2. The creation or conversation of a local
e. Removal of employees government unit to another level shall be based
Municipal of La Libertad vs. Penaflor, 453 SCRA on:
833 a. sufficient income
f. Prevention of pollution b. Population
Technology Development Inc, vs. Court of c. Land area (Sec.7)
Appeals, 201 SCRA xi 3. Division and merger of local government units
shall comply with the same requirements for
C. Provinces their creation. The income, population or land
1. Appointment of officials area shall not be reduced to less than the
Dimaandal vs. Commission on Audit, 291 SCRA minimum requirements.(Sec.8)
322 4. a local government unit may be abolished
2. Vice Governor when its income, population or land area has
Gamboa vs. Aguirre, 310 SCRA 867 been reduced to less than the minimum
Atienza vs. Villarosa, 458 SCRA 385 requirements (Sec.9)
5. The creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of the boundaries of local
government units must be approved by
1. Basic Principle plebiscites in the political units affected. (Sec.10)
A. Policy and Application 6. The corporate existence of a new local
1. Declaration Policy government unit shall commence upon election
and qualification of its chief executive and
majority f the members of the sangunian. ii. The President shall exercise supervision over
(Sec.14) component cities and municipalities though the
7. Every local government unit is a body politic province and over barangays through the city
and corporate. (Sec.15) and municipality.(Sec.25)
8. Powers b. No project shall be implemented by
a. Powers expressly granted government authorities without consultation with
b. implied powers the local government units and prior approval of
c. powers necessary, appropriate, or the sangunian.(Sec.27)
incidental for efficient and effective governance 2. Inter-Local Government Relations
d. Powers essential for promotion of general a. The province, through the governor, shall
welfare. (Sec.16) ensure that any component city and municipality
9. A local government unit may exercise the acts within powers. (Sec.27)
power of eminent domain. b. The city or municipality, through the major,
a. an offer must have been made to the shall ensure that barangays act within the scope
owner and rejected. of their powers.(Sec.29)
b. The local government unit may c. The governor shall review all executive
immediately take the possession upon filling of orders promulgated by the mayor. The mayor
expropriation proceedings and deposit in court shall review all executive orders promulgated by
of 15% of the fair market value. (Sec.19) punong barangays. (Se.30)
10. a local government unit may close or open II. Elective Officials
any local road, alley, park or square by two A. Qualifications and Election
thirds vote of all members of the sangunian. 1. Qualifications
Property permanently withdrawn from public use a. Common qualifications
may be used or conveyed for any proposes. i. Filipino Citizen
(Sec.20 ) ii. Registered over the local government
11. Corporate Powers unit, or the district where he intends to elected in
a. powers the case of members of the sangunian.
i. To have continues succession in the name iii. Residence therein for the least one
ii. To sue and the sued year immediately before the election.
iii. To have and use a seal iv. Ability to read and write Filipino or
iv. To acquire and convey property any other local dialect.
v. To exercise other powers granted to b. Age
corporations. (Sec.22) i. candidates and the provinces and highly
b. The local chief executive may not enter into urbanized cities--- 23 years.
any contract without prior authorization by ii. Candidates for mayor or vice mayor of
sangunian. (Sec.22) component cities or municipalities--- 21 years
12. Local government units and their officials are iii. Candidates for sangunian member in
not exempt from liability for death or injury to a component cities and municipalities—18 years
person or damage to property. (Sec.24) iv. Barangay officials—18 years
C. Intergovernmental relations v. Sanguniang kabataan--- 15 to less than 18
1. national government and local government years (Sec. 7, Rep. Act. No. 1964)
units 2. Disqualifications
a. The President shall exercise general a. Those sentenced for an offense involving
supervision over government units. moral turpitude or an offense punishable by
i. The President shall exercise supervisory imprisonment for one year or more, within two
authority directly over provinces, highly years after serving sentence
urbanized cities and independent component b. Those removed from office because of an
cities. administrative case
c. Those convicted for violating oath of b. Second highest ranking sanguniang
allegiance t the Philippines barangay member
d. Those with dual citizenship 3. Ranking in the sangunian shall be determined
e. Fugitive from justice on the basis of the proportion of the votes
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or obtained to number of registered voters in each
those who have the right to reside abroad and district.
continue to avail of it. 4. Ties will be resolved by drawing of lots.
g. The insane feeble minded (Sec.44)
3. Election 5. Sangunian
a. The Governor, vice governor, mayor, a. Provinces, highly urbanized cities, and
vice mayor, and punong barangay shall be independent component cities---- appointment
elected large. (Sec.41) by President
b. For Provinces and cities with two or b. Component city and municipality ----
more legislative districts, the elective member of appointment by governor
sangunian shall be elected by legislative c. Sanguniang barangay – appointment by
districts. Provinces and cities and municipalities mayor
in Metropolitan in Manila with only one d. Except for the sanguniang barangay, the
legislative district shall be divided into two appointment shall come from the political party
districts by the Commission on Elections. (Sec. of the member who caused the vacancy.
3 (a) and (b) Rep. Act. No. 7166; Sec. 1, Rep. e. If the member does not belong to any party,
Act. No. 7887) the appointee shall be recommended by the
c. Regular elective members of the sangunian sangunian.
of cities and municipalities shall be elected at f. The appointee for the sanguniang barngay
large. (Sec.1, Rep. Act. NO. 7887) shall be recommende by the sanguniang
d. Sanguniang barangay members shall be barangay.
elected in large. g. Vacancy in the representation of the youth
e. The president of the league of the sangunian and the barangay in the sangunian shall be filed
members of component cities and municipalities by the official next in rank in the organization.
shall be ex officio member of the sanguniang (Sec.45)
panlalawigan. 6. Temporary Vacancy
f. The president of the liga ng mga barangay a. When the governor, the mayor or
and the pederasyon ng mga sanguniang punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to
kabataan shall be ex officio member of the perform his duties, the vice governor, vice
sangunian. mayor, or ranking sanguniang barangay
g. There shall be a sectoral representative member shall exercise his powers except the
from the women, workers, urban poor, power to appoint, suspend or dismiss
indigenous cultural communities, disabled employees, which can only be exercised after 30
persons, or any other sector determined by the working days.
sangunian. (Sec.41) b. When the local chief executive is traveling
4. Terms of office 3 years (Sec.43, as amended within the Philippines for not more than 3
by Sec. 2, Rep. At. No. 9164) consecutive days, he may designate an officer-
B. Vacancies and Sucession in-charge. The authorization shall specify the
1. Governor and mayor powers of the officers-in-charge except the
a. Vice governor and vice mayor power to appoint, suspend or dismiss
b. sanguniang members according to ranking employees.
2. Punong barangay c. If the local executive does not issue the
a. Highest ranking sanguniang barangay authorization, the vice governor, vice mayor, or
member highest ranking sanguniang member shall
assume his powers on the fourth day of his municipality. The sanggunian may override the
absence. (Sec.46) veto by two-thirds of all its members. (Sec. 54)
C. Legislation 8 The governor or mayor may veto any item in
1. The vice governor, the vice mayor, and the the following cases:
punong barangay shall be presiding officer of a. Appropriation ordinance
the sangunians but shall vote only in case of a b. Ordinance adopting a local development plan
tie. and public investment program.
2. In case of inability of the presiding officer, c. Ordinance directing the payment of money or
the members shall elect a temporary presiding creating a liability. (Sec. 55)
officer from among themselves. (Sec.49 9. Review
3 For disorderly behavior and absence without a. the sangguniang panlalawigan shall review
justifiable cause for four consecutive sessions a, ordinances and resolutions of cities and
member may be censured, reprimanded, municipalities to determine if they are within their
excluded from the session, suspended for not power. (Sec. 56)
more than 60 days, or expelled. Suspension or b The sangguniang panlungsod or bayan shall
expulsion shall require concurrence of at least review sangguniang barangay ordinance to
two –thirds of all the sanggunian members. A determine if they are lawful. (Sec. 57)
member sentenced by final judgment to 10. Effectivity
imprisonment for at least one year for a crime a. Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance, it
involving moral turpitude shall be automatically shall take effect after 10 days from posting at the
expelled. (Sec.50 provincial capitol or city, municipality or
4 Every sanggunian member, upon assumption barangay hall and two other conspicuous
of officer , shall make a full disclosure of his places.
business and financial, or professional b.The gist of all ordinance with penal sanction
relationship or any relation within the fourth shall be published in in a newspaper of general
degree which he may have with any one circulation in the province. In the absence of
effected by any ordinance or resolution of the such newspaper, the ordinance shall be posted
sanggunian which involves a conflict interest. in all municipalities and cities of the province
a. such relationship included: where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
I Investment in the entity to which the ordinance c. In highly urbanize and independent
may apply component cities, in addition to posting , the
Ii Contracts with any person to which the main features of the ordinance shall be
ordinance nance may apply published in a local newspaper of general
b. Conflict of interests refers to a situation circulation. In the absence of such newspaper, it
where a sanggunian member may not act in the shall be circulation. (Sec. 59)
public interest due to personal consideration D. Disciplinary Action
that may affect his judgment to the prejudice of 1 Grounds
the public. (Sec. 51) a. Disloyalty to the Philippines
5 A special session may be called by the local b. Culpable violation of the Constitution
chief executive or a majority of the sanggunian c. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office,
members. Unless concurred in by two-thirds gross negligence, or dereliction of duty
vote of the members present, no matter may be d. Commission of an offence involving moral
considered at a special session except those turpitude or punishable by at least prision mayor
stated in the notice. (Sec. 52) e. Abuse of authority
6 A majority of all the members of the f. Unauthorized absence for 15 consecutive
sanggunian shall constitute quorum. (Sec. 53) working days, except sanggunian members
7 The veto shall be communicated to the g. Application for acquisition of citizenship,
sanggunian within 15 days in the case of a resident or immigrant status of another country
province and 10 days in the case of a city or h. Other grounds in the code and other laws,
2. Filling complaint considered as under preventive suspension
a. Elective provincial or city official – Office of should he win the appeal. (Sec.68)
the president E. Recall
b. Elective municipal official – sangguniang 1. Initiation
panlalawigan, whose decision may be appealed Petition of at least 25% of the registered voters
to the Presidfent. in the local government unit. (Sec.71)
c. Elective barangay official - sangguniang 2. Recall shall be effective upon proclamation of
panglungsod or bayan, whose decision shall be successor receiving the highest number of
final (Sec.61) votes. (Sec.72)
3. NO investigation shall be held and no 3. Prohibition against Resignation,
preventive suspension shall be imposed within The official sought to be recalled cannot resign
90 days before any local election. (Sec.62) during the recall. (Sec.73)
4. Preventive Suspension 4. Limitations
a. Authority a. An official may be subject of recall only once
i. Official of province, highly urbanized city or during his term.
independent component city- President b. No recall shall take place within one year
ii. Official of component city or official from assumption of office or one year before
iii. Barangay official – mayor regular local election. (Sec.74)
b. Ground III. Human Resources and Development
i. Strong evidence of guilt; and A. Casual Employees
ii. Probability that continuance in office can The local chief executive may employ casual
influence witnesses or endanger safety records. employees without approval of the Civil Service
c. Duration Commission for not more than six months.
i. Single suspension – 60 days (Sec.77)
ii. Several suspensions – 90 days within a year B. Limitation on Appointment
5. The respondent has the right to appear and No person shall be appointed in the career
defend in person or by counsel, to confront the service if he is related within the fourth degree of
witnesses against him, and the compulsory consanguinity or affinity to the appointing or
process to require the attendance of witnesses recommending authority. (Sec.79)
and production of evidence in his favor C. Compensation
6. Penalty Increase in compensation of elective local
a. The penalty of suspension shall not exceed officials shall take effect after expiration of the
the unexpired term of the respondent nor bar his term of those approving the increase. (Sec.81)
candidacy. D. Resignation
b. Removal from office shall bar candidacy of 1. Submission
the respondent for any elective office. (Sec.66) a. Governor, vice governor, vice mayor, of
7. Appeal highly urbanized and independent component
a. Period – Thirty days cities – President
b. Appellate authority b. Municipality mayor, municipal vice mayor,
i. sangguniang panglusod of component cities and mayor and vice mayor component city –
and sangguniang bayan - sanguniang Governor
panlalawigan c. Barangay official – Mayor
ii. Sangguniang panlalawigan and sangguniang 2. Effectivity
panglungsod of highly urbanized cities and a. Resignation takes effect upon acceptance.
independent component cities – President b. It is deemed accepted if not acted upon within
iii. President – final (Sec.67) 15 working days
c. Execution; The decision shall be executory
pending appeal, and respondent shall be