1) People v.
Collado Upon arraignment on November 4, 2004, all the appellants and the other
DOCTRINE
Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Arrests; Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in
flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and, (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants, they can no
longer question the validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected to the
same before their arraignment.
Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, “[a] person lawfully arrested may be searches for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant.”
Evidence; Witnesses; There is no requirement for the prosecution to present as
witness in a drugs case every person who had something to do with the arrest of the
accused and the seizure of the prohibited drugs from him.
FACTS
Version of the Prosecution
An information from a civilian asset that spouses Marcelino and Myra
were engaged in selling shabu and that drug users, including out-of-school youth,
were using their residence in Pasig City, for their drug sessions. After recording the
report in the police blotter, PO2 Noble relayed the information to his superior who in
turn ordered the conduct of a surveillance operation. A buy-bust operation team was
thereafter formed. Upon reaching the target area, the asset introduced PO2 Noble to
Marcelino as a regular buyer of shabu. When PO2 Noble was handing over the
marked money to Marcelino, the latter motioned that the same be given to his wife,
Myra, who accepted the money. Marcelino then took from his pocket a small metal
container from which he brought out a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance and gave the same to PO2 Noble. While PO2 Noble was inspecting its
contents, he noticed smoke coming from a table inside the house of the couple around
which were seven persons. When PO2 Noble gave the pre-arranged signal, the
backup team rushed to the scene. Simultaneously, PO2 Noble introduced himself as a
policeman and arrested Marcelino. He frisked him and was able to confiscate the
metal container that contained another sachet of white crystalline substance.
Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went inside the house of Marcelino
and Myra, where they found Apelo, Cipriano, Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang
and Latario gathered around a table littered with various drug paraphernalia such as
an improvised water pipe, strips of aluminum foil with traces of white substance,
disposable lighters, and plastic sachets. A strip of aluminum foil used for smoking
marijuana was recovered from Ranada. The buy-bust team arrested all these persons,
advised them of their constitutional rights, and brought them to police headquarters for
investigation and drug testing.
Version of the Defense
Marcelino suddenly heard someone say “Walang tatakbo!” Four armed
men rushed inside the house and pointed their guns at him and said “Wag ka nang
pumalag.” He was thereafter dragged outside where he saw the other accused already
in handcuffs. Marcelino was later informed that they were being arrested for selling
shabu. Marcelino protested and disclaimed any knowledge about drugs. When the
officers frisked all the accused, Marcelino claimed that nothing illegal nor incriminating
was recovered from them. When Myra arrived at the scene, she was shocked to see
her husband being arrested. The police officers then brought all the accused to the
police station for further questioning. At the police station, PO2 Noble asked Marcelino
for P50,000.00 as settlement of their case. Marcelino, Apelo, Cipriano, and Ranada
were also made to drink water that according to Marcelino tasted bitter. They were
then brought to Camp Crame for medical examination and drug tests. Those who
drank the bitter water tested positive for drugs use while the others, who did not drink,
tested negative. Marcelino surmised that their arrest was due to a misunderstanding
he had with a former police officer named Rey who bought a VCD player from his
shop. He specifically instructed Rey not to let anyone repair the VCD player should it
malfunction. However, when the VCD player malfunctioned, Rey had it repaired by
somebody else, hence Marcelino refused to accept the VCD player and return Rey’s
money. This earned the ire of Rey who threatened him with the words “Humanda ka
pagbalik ko.”
accused pleaded not guilty.7 Pretrial and joint trial on the merits subsequently ensued.
RTC found the accused guilty.
CA found the warrantless arrest of the appellants to be lawful considering that they
were caught in the act of committing a crime and affirmed the RTC’s decision to
declare the accused guilty.
Not satisfied, the appellants are now before this Court arguing that irregularities
attended their arrest and detention as well as the procedure in handling the specimen
allegedly seized from them. Because of these, they assert that their guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt
ISSUE
Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure is legal.
RULING
The warrantless search and seizure is legal. The appealed Decision
should be affirmed, with modification. The presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties must be upheld in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
overturn the same.
A common example of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after
conducting a buy-bust operation. This is precisely what happened in the present case.
The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of
Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was effected after Marcelino and
Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada
of having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia. Thus, there is no other
logical conclusion than that the arrest made by the police officers was a valid
warrantless arrest since the same was made while the appellants were actually
committing the said crimes.
Assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants, they
can no longer question the validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected to
the same before their arraignment. Neither did they take steps to quash the
Informations on such ground. They only raised this issue upon their appeal to the
appellate court. By this omission, any objections on the legality of their arrest are
deemed to have been waived by them.
2) People v. De Lara
QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila in
Criminal Case No. 94953, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by B.P. Blg. 179.
I
The Information charged appellant as follows:
"That on or about January 9, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or distribute any
prohibited drug, did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale two (2)
foils offlowering tops of marijuana and one (1) plastic bag of flowering tops of
marijuana, which are prohibited drugs" (Rollo, p. 6).
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to
the information (Records p. 5).
II
On December 15, 1986, Capt. Restituto Cablayan of the National Criminal
Investigation Service (NCIS) of the Western Police District (WPD), instructed Sgt.
Enrique David to conduct a surveillance operation in the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora
Streets at Sta. Ana, Manila, after receiving reports of rampant drug-pushing in that
area (TSN, December 14, 1987, p. 21).
In compliance thereof, a team led by Sgt. Enrique David, conducted a surveillance
operation on December 15 and 17, and confirmed the reported drug-pushing activities
in that area by the group of appellant and a certain Ricky alias "Pilay" (TSN, December
2, 1987, pp. 5-6). No arrest was made because the team was instructed by their
superior to conduct a surveillance operation only (TSN, January 11, 1988, p. 28).
On January 8, 1987, Malaya (Exh. "F") and People's Tonight (Exh. "K"), reported that
there were rampant, drug-pushing activities in the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora
Streets in Sta. Ana, Manila, prompting Gen. Alfredo Lim, then WPD Superintendent, to
reprimand the NCIS office (TSN, December 2, 1987, p. 2).
On January 9, because of the reprimand given by Gen. Lim, Capt. Cablayan instructed
Sgt. David to plan a buy-bust operation and to form a six-man team with Pfc. Martin
Orolfo, Jr. as the poseur-buyer (TSN, December 2, 1987, p. 6, January 11, 1988, p. 6).
At around 4:45 P.M. of the same day, the team, together with their confidential
informant, went to Garrido Street. Upon arriving thereat, they strategically positioned
themselves. Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. and the confidential informant proceeded to the house of
appellant located at No. 2267 Garrido Street, where they saw him standing outside.
The confidential informant introduced Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. to appellant as an interested
buyer of marijuana. Appellant asked Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. "Ilan ang bibilhin ninyo?" (How
much will you buy?). Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. replied: "Two foils" handing at the same time the
marked twenty-peso bill (Exh. "E") to appellant. The latter, after placing the money in
the right pocket of his pants, went inside his house (TSN, January 11, 1988, pp. 7-9).
Minutes later, appellant came back and handed two foils (Exhs. "D-1-a" and "D-1-b")
wrapped in onion paper (TSN, January 11, 1988, p. 8). It was after he handed the two
foils to Pfc. Orolfo, Jr., that he sensed the presence of the police operatives. He then
tried to retrieve the two foils but Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. prevented him from doing so. During
the scuffle, one foil was torn. Appellant then ran inside his house with Pfc. Orolfo, Jr.
in pursuit. The latter was able to subdue appellant. Sgt. David confronted appellant,
who admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house. Appellant showed the
arresting officers a blue plastic bag with white lining containing prohibited drugs. A
receipt of the articles seized (Exh. "F") was made by Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. (TSN, January 11,
1988, pp. 12-15).
Thereafter, the team, together with appellant, proceeded to the WPD headquarters for
investigation. Thereat, Sgt. David ordered Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. to commence the
investigation of appellant (TSN, January 11, 1988, pp. 19-21).
During the investigation, appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to have the assistance of counsel. When appellant was asked to give a
written statement, he refused to do so pending arrival of his lawyer (TSN, January 11,
1988, p. 23).
The prohibited drugs seized from appellant were brought to the NBI for chemical
analysis. A report and certification of Ms. Aida Pascual, Forensic Chemist of the NBI
(Exhs. "C" and "D"), show the drugs to be positive for marijuana.
Appellant denied having sold marijuana to anyone and claimed that the arresting
officers merely planted the marijuana on his person. He testified that on January 9,
1987, he arrived home from work as a security guard of the Vergara Brothers Agency
at around 3:00 P.M. After changing his clothes, he went out to fetch his son, who was
left in the care of a neighbor. Upon returning to his house with his son, he was
arrested by the police. The police proceeded to search his house, without any search
warrant shown to him. After the search, he and his wife were brought to the WPD
headquarters. He claimed that inspite of his protestation that he would like to wait for
his lawyer before giving any statement, the police continued their interrogation.
Appellant denied that the twenty-peso bill was given to him by the poseur-buyer. He
claimed that he was merely forced to sign his name on the photocopy of the twenty-
peso bill (Exh. "F") and that the first time he saw the blue plastic bag containing
prohibited drugs was when he was at the police station (TSN, June 14, 1988, pp. 1-
11).
To corroborate his story, appellant presented his younger brother, Gerry de Lara.
On October 2, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425 as amended as charged in
the Information; and this Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer a penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00" (Rollo, p. 24).
Hence, this appeal.
III
In his appeal, appelIant questions the legality of his arrest and the seizure of prohibited
drugs found inside his house. Furthermore, he claims that he was not assisted by
counsel during his custodial interrogation (Rollo, pp. 55-57).
As to the legality of appellant's arrest, we find that the police operatives acted within
the bounds of law.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure dealing with warrantless
arrests provides:
"Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person;
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
xxx xxx xxx"
In the case at bench, appellant was caught red-handed in delivering two tin foils of
marijuana to Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer. Applying the aforementioned provision
of law, appellant's arrest was lawfully effected without need of a warrant of arrest.
"Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the
policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the
drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest" (People v. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 644
[1991]; People v. De Los Santos, 200 SCRA 431 [1991]).
Appellant, however, asseverates that his arrest was precipitated only by newspaper
publications about the rampant sale of drugs along Garrido and Zamora Streets, Sta.
Ana, Manila (Rollo, p. 53). If appellant implies that the police merely stage-managed
his arrest in order to show that they were not remiss in their duties, then appellant is
wrong. A surveillance on the illegal activities of the appellant was already conducted
by the police as early as December 15 and 17, 1986. The newspaper reports
concerning the illegal drug activities came out only on January 8 and 14, 1987, long
after the police knew of the said illegal activities. Appellant's eventual arrest on
January 9, 1987 was the result of the surveillance conducted and the buy-bust
operation.
The evidence shows that appellant ran inside his house upon sensing the presence of
the police operatives. The testimony of Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer, is as follows:
"FISCAL:
Q: After placing the P20 bill in his right pocket, what did he do?
A: He went to his house and minutes later, he came back, sir.
Q: When he came back what happened?
A: He handed to me two tin foils containing suspected marijuana leaves wrapped in
onion paper.
Q: And what happened next when he returned with those items?
A: After he handed to me two foils, he sensed the presence of the operatives and he
tried to retrieve the two foils, sir, and I prevented him and during the scuffle one piece
of foil was broken, he tried to run inside the house, so I subdued him immediately and
apprehended him while he was inside the house.
Q: After he was subdued by your group, what happened?
A: Sgt. David confronted him regarding this case and he voluntarily admitted that he
was still keeping prohibited drugs inside his house?
Q: What did the group do after he voluntarily admitted that he was keeping
prohibited drugs inside his house?
A: He pointed inside his house (sic) one plastic bag colored blue with white lining
containing prohibited drug" (TSN, January 11, 1988, pp. 12-14).
The policemen's entry into the house of appellant without a search warrant was in hot-
pursuit of a person caught committing an offense inflagrante. The arrest that followed
the hot-pursuit was valid (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Section 5[a]).
We also find as valid the seizure of the plastic bag of prohibited drugs found inside
appellant's house.
The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was the result of appellant's
arrest inside his house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the
person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made
(People v. Castiller, 188 SCRA 376 [1990]).
We find to be meritorious appellant's claim that he was not assisted by counsel during
the custodial investigation, specifically when he was forced to sign the photocopy of
the marked twenty-peso bill (Exh. "E"), Receipt of Property Seized (Exh. "F"), and the
Booking and Information Sheet (Exh. "H").
The said documents are inadmissible in evidence for the reason that there was no
showing that appellant was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into
writing (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 3[2]).
Be that as it may, the rejection of said evidence would not affect the conviction of
appellant in view of the abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt. The ruling
in People v. Mauyao, 207 SCRA 732 (1992) is apropos:
"It bears emphasis, however, that the accused appellant's conformity to the questioned
documents has not been a factor at all in his conviction. For even if these documents
were disregarded, still the accused-appellant's guilt has been adequately established
by other evidence of record. The trial court's verdict was based on the evidence of the
prosecution not on his signatures on the questioned documents. Accused-appellant's
denial simply can not prevail over the detailed and unshaken testimonies of the
apprehending officers who caught him red-handed selling marijuana and who have not
shown to have any ulterior motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant."
IV
The trial court sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P20,000.00 pursuant to Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended by B.P. Blg. 179. However, said law was further amended by R.A.
No. 7659.
Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty to be imposed for selling,
administering, delivering or distributing less than 750 grams of marijuana, shall range
from "prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity."
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for selling, dispensing, delivering,
transporting or distributing marijuana in excess of 750 grams or more shall be
"reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos to
Ten Million Pesos."
We noticed that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by R.A. No. 7659 as
the maximum penalty when the quantity of the marijuana involved in the offense is less
than 750 grams and at the same time as the minimum penalty when the quantity of
marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. It is the duty of the Court to harmonize
conflicting provisions to give effect to the whole law (Rufino Lopez and Sons v. Court
of Appeals, 100 Phil. 850 [1957]). Furthermore, one of this Court's primordial
responsibilities is to give a statute its sensible construction. This is to effectuate the
intention of the legislature so as to avoid an absurd conclusion with regard to its
meaning (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456 [1912]). Therefore, when the quantity involved
is less than 750 grams, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 should be read correctly to
provide a penalty ranging from prision correccional to reclusion temporal only.
The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that "penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony," finds
meaning in this case. Appellant is entitled to benefit from the reduction of the penalty
introduced by R.A. No. 7659.
In order to determine the penalty to be imposed on appellant, we first divide the
amount of 750 grams into three to correspond to the three applicable penalties,
namely, prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal.
If the marijuana involved is from 500 to 749 grams, the penalty to be imposed
is reclusion temporal. If the marijuana involved is from 250 to 499 grams, the penalty
to be imposed is prision mayor and if the weight of the marijuana involved is below 250
grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision correccional.
Since there is no evidence as to the weight of the two foils and one plastic bag of
flowering tops of marijuana seized from appellant, we resolve the doubt in favor of
appellant and conclude that the quantity involved was: (i) below 750 grams; and (ii) not
less than 250 but not more than 499 grams.
Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on appellant is prision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to appellant, who was convicted under a
special law (People v. Macantando, 109 SCRA 35 [1981]), and as such law was
interpreted in People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, the minimum penalty
that can be imposed on appellant should be within the range of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that
appellant shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) years and TWO (2) days
of prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) years and ONE (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
3) People v. Molina
DOCTRINE
RELIABLE INFORMATION ALONE NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE PROBABLE
CAUSE. — As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable
information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
REQUISITES; VALID IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO ARREST. — Clearly, to constitute a
valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.
FACTS:
Police officers received an information from an informer that an alleged marijuana
pusher will be passing at a specific place anytime. A trisikad carrying Nasario Molina
and Gregorio Mula passed by, they were pointed as pushers. The police overtook the
trisikad, Mula handed a black bag.
After introducing himself as police officer, PO Pamplona requested Molina to open the
bag. The bag contained marijuana leaves inside. For unlawful possession of 946.9
grams of dried marijuana, accused Molina and Mula were found by the RTC of Davao
City guilty of violation of Section 8, of the Dangerous Drugs Act and sentenced them to
death. The court anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless
arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace
officers, were valid because accused-appellants were caught in flagrant delicto in
possession of prohibited drugs, thus, this automatic review.
ISSUE: W/N accused-appellants were caught in flagrant delicto
HELD: No. Accused-appellants are acquitted. The Supreme Court held that the
accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In
holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be
committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that
accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the
request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly
reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused appellants were
committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute
probable cause to effect an in flagrant delicto arrest. As applied to in flagrante delicto
arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are
not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto
arrest.
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was
any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating
or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview
of the constitutional guarantee. Thus, the Court held that the arrest of accused-
appellants did not fall under the exception allowed by the rules. Any evidence obtained
in violation of the Constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Since the search conducted
on their person was likewise illegal, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could
not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants.
 4) People V. De Los Reyes
PEOPLE v. DE LOS REYES
G.R. No. 174774/ AUG 31 2011 / LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J./CRIMPRO-
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, CRIMINAL RECORD/PSPAMBID
NATURE Appeal (Final Review)
PETITIONERS People of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS Rolando delos Reyes and Raymundo Reyes
SUMMARY. Delos Reyes, Reyes, de Claro, and Lantion-Tom were arrested for drug
trafficking while parked at Whistlestop based on an anonymous tip. The Court held
that the police officers had no prior knowledge of the suspects identities and that
nobody actually saw shabu being sold.
DOCTRINE. "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest
SUBSTANTIVE FACTS.
 Information version:
o on 17 February 2000 a confidential informant called up relative to a
narcotics drug deal to commence at the vicinity of the parking area
of Shangrila Plaza Hotel, Mandaluyong City
o about 2:00 p.m they strategically positioned themselves at the
vicinity parking area of said hotel
o that about 10:00 p.m., Reyes, on board a white Toyota Corolla, and
delos Reyes, a.k.a. Botong, on board a red Toyota Corolla, arrived
and proceeded inside Whistletop Bar and Restaurant. delos Reyes
then called de Claro through his cellular phone;
o delos Reyes and de Claro then proceeded to the latter’s parked
Mazda car where Lantion-Tom was waiting; from the parked car, a
box in transparent plastic bag was taken, which de Claro handed-
over to delos Reyes;
o delos Reyes in turn handed the box in a plastic bag to Reyes;
o The accused admitted having in their possession illegal drugs and
the recovered items containing ten (10) pcs. of shabu
o Mandaluyong City found probable cause to indict accused-
appellants, together with Emmanuel de Claro, for violation of
Republic Act No. 6425, and resolved to continue the preliminary
investigation in so far as Lantion-Tom was concerned
 delos Reyes (Botong) version:
o He claims that on 17 February 2000, he went to Buenas Market,
Manggahan, Pasig City, together with a neighbor, one Marlon
David, to talk to Raymundo Reyes (Mac-mac) who was to pay his
indebtedness
o while looking for a parking space, several men with firearms
suddenly appeared, with one shouting, “buksan mo ang pintuan ng
sasakyan at kung hindi babasagin ko ito”
o He and Marlon David were forced out of their vehicle with one of the
armed men bringing out a plastic shopping bag of Shoe Mart,
asking where the said bag allegedly containing shabu came from,
delos Reyes answered hindi ko alam, and he and Marlon David
were blindfolded when forcibly taken to the groups vehicle and
continuously asked who the source of the shabu was
 Marlon David (17-year-old high school student with Botong) version:
o he accompanied delos Reyes, to the Buenas Market in Cainta,
Rizal, to collect some money
o While they were inside their car, another car suddenly arrived, from
which an armed male passenger alighted and approached them.
o Four other armed men followed and poked their guns at accused-
appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David.
o The armed men, in civilian attire, were carrying an SM plastic
shopping bag and questioned delos Reyes if he knew the owner of
said plastic bag.
o Rolando delos Reyes denied any knowledge about the plastic
bag. Marlon David was also asked and he answered that he knew
nothing about the plastic bag.
 Emmanuel de Claro (Cocoy) and Lantion-Tom version:
o they were with de Claro’s brother, Roberto and a friend, James,
with the two remaining outside Whistlestop
o Lantion-Tom went to accompany Ms. Milan (Lantion-Tom’s
accountant), while de Claro was left inside
o After Ms. Milan left, Lantion-Tom was suddenly surrounded by men
who introduced themselves as police officers and were arresting
them for being the source of shabu in a drug deal
o Corroborated by Roberto de Claro (Emmanuel de Claro’s brother)
 PO3 Santiago (one of the police officers who arrested Cocoy and Lantion-Tom
admitted that he did not actually see what was inside the plastic bag and that he
did not even see Botong hand over such plastic bag to Mac-Mac.
 SPO1 Lectura (leader of the team) initially denied that Marlon David was
with Botong when the latter was arrested, but he later admitted that the police
also arrested Marlon David. SPO1 Lectura acknowledged that his team heavily
relied on the information given by the confidential informant in identifying the
suspects in the illegal drug deal, who were eventually arrested.
 RTC: found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
 CA: Same
PROCEDURAL FACTS.
 February 17, 2000: Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes,
Emmanuel de Claro, and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom (Lantion-Tom) were all
arrested for illegal possession, sale, delivery, distribution, and/or transportation
of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu)
 March 3, 2000 Resolution: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City found probable cause to indict accused-appellants, together with Emmanuel
de Claro, for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, and resolved to continue the
preliminary investigation in so far as Lantion-Tom was concerned
 The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, after preliminary
investigation and reinvestigation, recommended that the RTC drop accused-
appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Lantion-Tom from the criminal charge.
 March 7, 2000: accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, Emmanuel de Claro,
and Lantion-Tom, moved for a reinvestigation of their case before the RTC
 March 15, 2000: RTC granted Order
 Prosecution filed a motion with leave of court to admit amended information
 April 4, 2000: RTC denied prosecution’s motion
 Sept 23, 2003: RTC found accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro guilty
beyond reasonable doubt
 Emmanuel de Claro, Robert delos Reyes and Reyes filed notice of appeal
 Emmanuel de Claro moved to withdraw his notice of appeal, instead filing an
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Re-Open Proceedings
 Emmanuel de Claro asked the RTC to review its judgment of conviction
 o pointed out that although these police officers testified that Lantion-
Tom, from the car, handed to him the plastic bag containing the box
with sachets of shabu, the prosecution still dropped the criminal
charges against Lantion-Tom.
o the prosecution failed to contradict his alibi that he, his wife, and his
brother went to Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City to meet his
wife’s accountant, so they could attend to several documents
pertaining to a business permit
 November 11, 2003: RTC granted Emmanuel de Claros motion to withdraw his
notice of appeal and required the prosecution to comment to his motions for
reconsideration
 December 19, 2003: Prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition
 January 12 2004: RTC acquitted Emmanuel de Claro (OMG!) explicitly
admitted that it erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul, and in
entirely rejecting the alibi of the defense
 March 29, 2004: RTC forwarded case to SC
 November 2004: SC remanded case to CA
 July 12, 2006: CA sustained conviction, modified penalty to reclusion perpetua
(“the police officers testimonies deserve credence than accused-appellants
defenses of denial and alibi, there being no evidence to rebut the presumption
that the police officers regularly performed their official duties” –inconsistent with
de Claro acquittal)
 HENCE, SC FINAL REVIEW
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON the lower courts were inconsistent. – YES.
 RTC erred in ignoring the recommendation of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City to drop delos Reyes and Lantion-Tom
from the criminal charge
 CA erred in refusing to consider the acquittal of Emmanuel de Claro by
the RTC
 Guided by the settled rule that where the inculpatory facts admit of several
interpretations, one consistent with accused's innocence and another with
his guilt, the evidence thus adduced fail[ed] to meet the test of moral
certainty
 the very same evidence were presented against Emmanuel de Claro and
accused-appellants; if the evidence is insufficient to convict the former,
then it is also insufficient to convict the latter.
 Lantion-Tom was never charged with any criminal involvement even
when, according to the prosecutions version of events, she was the first
person to deliver the shabu.
2. RELEVANT!!: If the prosecution’s version were true, did it establish
probable cause? – NO.
 Even assuming that the prosecutions version of the events were true, it
still failed to establish probable cause to justify the in flagrante
delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of accused-appellants
persons, incidental to their arrests, resulting in the seizure of the shabu in
accused-appellants possession
 A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
o (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto);
o (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit);
o (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners)
 Citing People v Molina:
o “As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that
"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and
within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient
to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest”
o “Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.”
 SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no prior knowledge of
the suspects identities, and they completely relied on their confidential
informant to actually identify the suspects.
 None of the police officers actually saw what was inside that box.
 There is also no evidence that the confidential informant himself knew that
the box contained shabu.
 No effort at all was taken to confirm that the arrested suspects actually
knew that the box or carton inside the white plastic bag, seized from their
possession, contained shabu.
 The police officers were unable to establish a cogent fact or circumstance
that would have reasonably invited their attention, as officers of the law, to
suspect that accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime, particularly, an illegal drug deal.
DECISION.
CA judgment REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Delos Reyes and Reyes are ACQUITTED
on the ground of reasonable doubt
5) People v. Nazareno Villareal
GR 201363 / March 18 2013 / J. Perlas-Bernabe / 693 SCRA 549
Doctrine: For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed
and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant
had committed it. In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the
commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under paragraph (a), the officer
himself witnesses the crime while under paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime
has just been committed. (Rule 113, Section 5, Rules on Criminal Procedure)
Facts:
- Appeal from the CA decision which affirmed the RTC Caloocan decision
- As P03 Renato De Leon was was driving his motorcycle on his way home
along 5th Avenue, he saw Villareal from a distance of about 8 to 10
meters, holding a plastic sachet of shabu. PO3 de Leon, a member of the
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU) in Caloocan
City, approached Villareal whom he recognized as someone he had
previously arrested for illegal drug possession. Upon seeing PO3 de Leon,
Villareal tried to escape but was quickly apprehended. PO3 de Leon
confiscated the plastic sachet of shabu and brought Villareal to the SAID-
SOU office, and marked the plastic sachet. PO3 de Leon turned over the
marked evidence as well as the person of appellant to the investigator,
PO2 Randulfo Hipolito. Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet,
which contained 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance, tested positive
 for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Villareal was
charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs.
- Version of Villareal: Denied PO3 de Leon’s allegations and instead
claimed that he was walking alone towards 5th Avenue when someone
who was riding a motorcycle called him from behind. Villareal approached
the person, who turned out to be PO3 de Leon, who then told him not to
run, frisked him, and took his wallet. He was brought to the 9 th Avenue
police station where he was detained and mauled by eight other detainees
under the orders of PO3 de Leon. He was then brought to the
Sangandaan Headquarters where two other police officers took him to the
headquarters’ firing range and forced him to answer questions about a
stolen cellphone, eventually mauling him when he denied the accusations.
The following day, he underwent inquest proceedings before one Fiscal
Guiyab, who informed him that he was being charged with resisting arrest
and "Section 11." The first charge was eventually dismissed.
- RTC Ruling: Conviction of Villareal, as all the elements of the crime of
illegal possession were present: (1) the appellant is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) that such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and
consciously possesses said drug. Also, the plain view doctrine was found
to be applicable, as the confiscated item was in plain view of PO3 de Leon
at the place and time of the arrest
- CA Ruling: Sustained the conviction, finding "a clear case of in flagrante
delicto
- warrantless arrest". The CA held that Villareal "exhibited an overt act or
strange conduct that would reasonably arouse suspicion," aggravated by
the existence of his past criminal citations and his attempt to flee when
PO3 de Leon approached him.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s Decision convicting appellant of
the offense charged
Ruling: YES.
- Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
for lawful warrantless arrests by a peace officer or private person: (a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
- For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate,
two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand,
paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of
the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had
committed it. In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the
fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under
paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under
paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
- Based on PO3 de Leon’s testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable that
P03 De Leon would be able to identify, from a distance of about 8-10
meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, an amount of
powdery substance inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by Villareal.
That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is
insufficient to create a conclusion that Villareal held shabu.
- Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in
paragraph (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 have been complied with, i.e., that
an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.
- PO3 de Leon failed to show he had personal knowledge that a crime had
been committed. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had reasonable
ground to believe that Villareal had just committed a crime; a crime must
in fact have been committed first, which did not happen in this case.
- A previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense,
will not suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section
5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal
knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been
committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a
person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous
precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police
officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a
person’s previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous
requisites laid out under Section 5.
- Also, Villareal’s act of running away from PO3 de Leon should not be
construed against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and
must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.
- Villareal’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his
hands, even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous
criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to
incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to
justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5. "Probable cause" has been
understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he
is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.
Acquitted due to reasonable doubt and immediately released from detention
6.PEOPLE vs TUDTUD G.R. NO. 144037 SEPTEMBER 26, 2003
Facts: Sometime on July 1999, the Toril Police Station received a report from a
“civilian asset” about a certain Noel Tudtud who was allegedly responsible for the
proliferation of marijuana in their area. They were informed that Tudtud headed to
Cotabato and would be back later. A team composed of PO1 Florentino, PO1 Desierto
and SPO1 Villalonghan waited for Tudtud’s arrival. Two men disembarked from a bus
and helped each other carry a carton box marked, “King Flakes.” One of them
appeared to be Tudtud. The police officers approached them, identified themselves
and informed them that they had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would
be arriving at night. PO1 Desierto asked if they could open the box. Tudtud obliged by
saying “all right.” The box yielded pieces of dried fish and beneath which were
bundles, one wrapped in a plastic bag and one in a newspaper. They turned out to be
marijuana. The police then arrested Tudtud and the companion.
Tudtud and his companion were charged with illegal possession of
prohibited drugs. However, they raised the issue of admissibility of evidence which
they claimed were seized in violation of their rights against unreasonable search and
seizure.
Issue: W/N the search is valid.
Held: No. The warrantless search is not valid.
A search as an incident to a lawful arrest must precede such arrest. The
process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the
arrest at the outset of the search.
The question therefore is whether the police herein had probable cause to
arrest Tudtud. The longstanding rule is that “reliable information” alone is not sufficient
to justify a “warrantless search.” Likewise, there must be an 1.) overt act indicating
felonious design; 2.) such overt act can be done in the presence of the arresting
officer.
In the case at bar, in no sense can the knowledge of the arresting officer
be considered “personal” having learned only from an informant. Such information is
only hearsay.
On the issue of waiver, there is an effective waiver only if the ff. requisites
are present: 1.) it must appear that the right exists; 2.) the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of such right; and 3.) said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.
In the case, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third
requisites. Tudtud’s implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstance and is,
thus, considered no consent at all, and his lack of objection is not tantamount to
waiver.
7) People v. Burgos
Summary: An informant identified a certain person as a member of a subversive group
who forcibly recruited him and based on this information, the police went to arrest the
suspect. At the time of the arrest, the suspect was merely plowing his field.
Rule of Law: In a warrantless arrest, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact.
Facts: Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos (D) as member of the
NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused. Pursuant to
this information, PC-INP members went to the house of the Burgos (D) and saw him
plowing his field when they arrived. One of the arresting offices called Burgos (D) and
asked him about the firearm. At first, Burgos (D) denied having any firearm, but later,
Burgos's (D) wife pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in the
ground.
After recovery of said firearm, Burgos (D) pointed to a stock pile of cogon where the
officers recovered alleged subversive documents. Burgos (D) further admitted that the
firearm was issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, team leader of sparrow unit.
Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid? Is the warrantless search valid?
Ruling: No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within
his view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was
possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the wife of
Burgos (D).
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually
been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime
may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator.
In this case, the Burgos (D) was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal
report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a
crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The
subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of
a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful
at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterward
can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
8) G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.
Facts: Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of
firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment
of his warrantless arrest. The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987,
after the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there
were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay
Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith
dispatched to the place. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned
out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor
Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were
taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters
for investigation by the Intelligence Division. Besides the police officers, one other
witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the
subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house
in Malabon on June 13, 1987. It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver
should not have been admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure. no warrant
therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an
incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having
been also effected without a warrant.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence was admissible
Ruling: The Court held that Par. (c) of Section 5 of Rule 113 is obviously inapplicable
as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. We
therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either
Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence
of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the
arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and
"holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was
apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed
or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
There was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's
darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it
have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was
actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.
9. JOEY M. PESTILOS [and others] vs. GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 182601. November 10, 2014.
FACTS: An altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Generoso at
Kasiyahan St. Quezon City where the petitioner and Atty. Generoso reside. Atty.
Generoso called the Central Police District. Atty. Generoso then pointed to the
petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to “invite” the
petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. At the inquest
proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty.
Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.
Petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation12 on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged
that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal
knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they
were just “invited” to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper,
and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed
pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The Urgent Motion was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest made by the officers is not a valid warrantless
arrest?
HELD: We hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the
crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer’s exercise of
discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts
and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of
probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes
of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests. Hence,
for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the
present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid
warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when
they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts
and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners’
arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted
murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? (Court held in affirmative)
The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty.
Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the
crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in
a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso
positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably,
the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more
importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not
deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a
different version of what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they
have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at
the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it
reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances justifying the petitioners’ warrantless arrests. These circumstances
were well within then police officers’ observation, perception and evaluation at the time
of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers’ personal observation,
which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless
arrests.
10. People of the Philippines vs. Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta,
G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014
FACTS: On November 11, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control two bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops with a total
weight of 997 .9 grams, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug. PO1 Nelson
Mariano and PO3 Eduardo Ramirez were on duty; a certain Edwin Lojera arrived at
their office and asked for police assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per report of
the latter, it appears that while driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA,
Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab
prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue Street corner
C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was
accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns.
PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately responded to said complaint by
proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the white
taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their
guns towards them and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but
they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing
two bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with
ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiao’s companion a .38 revolver. The
suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 Pablo Temena,
police investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1
Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with his initials, “NM”.
Thereafter, said specimens were forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical
analysis. The result of the examination conducted by P/SINSP. Jesse Dela Rosa
revealed that the same was positive for marijuana.
On Calantiao’s defense the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding
almost collided with another car. Reyes then opened the window and made a “fuck
you” sign against the persons on board of that car. That prompted the latter to chase
them and when they were caught in a traffic jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano; one of the
persons on board of that other car alighted and kicked their taxi. Calantiao and Reyes
alighted and PO1 Mariano slapped the latter and uttered some words, police officer
poked his gun against Reyes and when Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired.
Calantiao and Reyes were then handcuffed and were brought to the police station.
Thereat, they were subjected to body frisking and their wallets and money were taken.
PO1 Mariano then prepared some documents and informed them that they will be
charged for drugs. A newspaper containing marijuana was shown to them and said
police officer told them that it would be sufficient evidence against them.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not that the allegedly seized items are inadmissible evidence
in accordance to plain view doctrine.
HELD: In People v. Valeroso, this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible
reach of a valid warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz: When
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered,
and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction. Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both
the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not
only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s
reached. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate
control. The phrase “within the area of his immediate control” means the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on
a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. In Valeroso,
however, the Court held that the evidence searched and seized from him could not be
used against him because they were discovered in a room, different from where he
was being detained, and was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the area searched could not
be considered as one within his immediate control that he could take any weapon or
destroy any evidence against him. In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a
black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his immediate control. He could have
easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it.
As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it was within
the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless
search.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s
person and premises under his immediate control. This is so because “objects in the
‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.” “The doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It serves to
supplement the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and permits the
warrantless seizure. ”The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s
situation because the police officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The
police officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in
Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to
Calantiao’s lawful arrest.
11) People V. Valeroso
People v. Valeroso,14 this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible reach of
a valid warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz: When an arrest
is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order
to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself
frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction. Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the
suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a
valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person
of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the
area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in
front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one
concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. (Citations omitted.) In Valeroso,
however, the Court held that the evidence searched and seized from him could not be
used against him because they were discovered in a room, different from where he
was being detained, and was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the area searched could not
be considered as one within his immediate control that he could take any weapon or
destroy any evidence against him.15 In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a
black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his immediate control. He could have
easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it.
As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it was within
the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless
search. Calantiao’s argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against
him because its discovery was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s
person and premises under his immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in the
‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence."16 "The doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to
supplement the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and permits the
warrantless seizure."17 The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in
Calantiao’s situation because the police officers purposely searched him upon his
arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was
in Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to
Calantiao’s lawful arrest. Inventory and Chain of Custody of Evidence Calantiao claims
that even if the search and seizure were validly effected, the marijuana is still
inadmissible as evidence against him for failure of the apprehending officers to comply
with the rules on chain of custody, as the item was marked at the police station.18 The
pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as follows: Section 21. Custody
and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof[.] Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state: SECTION 21.
Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.) This Court has held that the failure to
strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, such as
immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of
custody because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.19 Section 21 and its IRR do
not even mention "marking." What they require are (1) physical inventory, and (2)
taking of photographs. As this Court held in People v. Ocfemia20: What Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of
"marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence
seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at
the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the
"marking" of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter
the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. The
prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from
the time the police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the
investigating officer, up to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination.21 This Court has no reason to overrule the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the seized drugs to have not been
broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of
the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved
will remain. The burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that
the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly
discharged their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge
such burden.22 It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by Calantiao
on his appeal. He himself admits this.23 His theory, from the very beginning, was that
he did not do it, and that he was being framed for having offended the police officers.
Simply put, his defense tactic was one of denial and frame-up. However, those
defenses have always been frowned upon by the Court, to wit: The defenses of denial
and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily
be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation
of Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up
must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. In the cases before us, appellant
failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving
assertions, no plausible proof was presented to bolster his allegations.24 Hence, as
Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the apprehending officers
were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies
deserve full faith and credit.
12) G.R. No. 156320 February 14, 2007
RODOLFO ABENES y GACUTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
HE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
Topic: Search and Seizure
Brief Facts:
RODOLFO ABENES y GACUTAN, Petitioner was charged and found guilty of illegal
possession of high powered firearm & its ammunitions (Violation of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294) and violating Section 261(q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(B.P. Blg. 881), otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, vis-à-vis COMELEC
Resolution No. 2958 (Gun Ban) by the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City for
carrying unlicensed firearms during the election period
The petitioner on appeal to the CA, he claimed that the checkpoint was not shown to
have been legally set up, and/or that the frisking of the petitioner who was ordered to
alight from the Tamaraw FX, along with his companions in the vehicle, violated his
constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure.
Issue: Whether or not the of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure
has been violated
Held: No. The court ruled that hat not all checkpoints are illegal and those are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive
to motorists are allowed. The court also provides that for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of
the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine
checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
Also, in relation to the seizure. In the instant case, the firearm was seized
from the petitioner when in plain view, where the policemen saw it tucked into his waist
uncovered by his shirt.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an
officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
All the foregoing requirements are present in the instant case.
13) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI (at large), accused. FATI OMOGBOLAHAN Y ALABI,
YAMBA LISASI BHOLA, and ZARIATU AMIDU, accused-appellants.
Topic: Warrantless Search
Brief Facts:
Accused Leangsiri was arrested at the arrival area of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA). He was in the act of bringing into the country 8,225.31
grams of heroin hidden under the false bottom of a black suitcase. He informed the
authorities that he was to deliver the contraband to three (3) people at the Las Palmas
Hotel in Manila. The police officers then conducted an entrapment operation at Rm.
504 of the Las Palmas Hotel where accused appellants FATI OMOGBOLAHAN Y
ALABI, YAMBA LISASI BHOLA, and ZARIATU AMIDU where they caught and
arrested. Upon knowing that Amidu is staying at Rm. 413 of the same Hotel, the police
authorities accompanied by the hotel’s owner and security officers proceeded in his
room and conducted search and seizure where they found tucked within the pages of
her telephone and address book was a piece of paper with the name SUCHINDA
LEANGSIRI written on it.
Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence obtained in the hotel room of Amidu be
admissible as evidence
Held:
No. A warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest may only be made in
the place of immediate control of the person arrested right after the arrest where he
may obtain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Thus, in relation to the
cases, the evidence obtained at Rm. 413 cannot be admitted as evidence because the
arrest of the accused appellants were made at Rm. 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel and
does not fall within the exception of warrantless search. Given though that the
evidence obtained at Rm. 413 is inadmissible other evidence clearly established their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
14) People V. Salanguit
FACTS: Two criminal cases were filed against Salanguit, the first for possession/use of
shabu, and the second, for possession/use of marijuana. Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied in
the RTC of Cavite a warrant to search the premises of Robert Salanguit for shabu and
shabu paraphernalias. He presented as a witness Edmund Badua, an undercover
officer, which transacted with Salanguit for the purchase of shabu.
The application was granted and the team of Aguilar proceeded to the premises of
Salanguit in QC to serve the warrant. The operatives proceeded to knock on
Salanguit’s door but the same was left unanswered. The operatives heard people
panicking inside the house and they began to force their way inside the house. They
indicated their authority to conduct the search and began which yielded to the finding
of clear plastic bags with shabu and 2 bricks of dried marijuana leaves covered in
newspaper.
Salanguit refused to sign the receipt for the confiscated drugs. During his arraignment,
he pleaded not guilty and in the trial court, he gave stated that he never got the chance
to review the purported warrant that Aguilar and his team has. He further stated that
the operatives ate their food and took his cash and valuable, as well as canned goods.
The RTC found him guilty for possession/use of shabu and marijuana. Salanguit
appealed the said decision and argues that the shabu allegedly recovered from his
residence is inadmissible as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used
to obtain it was invalid and that the marijuana seized from him was also inadmissible
as evidence against him pursuant to the plain view doctrine, and that the operatives
employed unnecessary force in executing the warrant.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the warrant used to seize the shabu was valid and the said shabu was
inadmissible in evidence against him.
2. W/N the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence against Salanguit pursuant to
plain view doctrine.
HELD:
1. Yes, all the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied.
2. No, the marijuana was not one of the drugs indicated in the warrant and it was not in
plain view when it was seized.
RATIO:
1. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia. Salanguit contends that it should be void as it did not indicate the
existence of drug paraphernalias. The warrant was valid as to the seizure of shabu
and void as to the seizure of drug paraphernalia. It is to be noted that no drug
paraphernalia was seized. Salanguit further contends that the warrant was issued for
more than one specific offense because possession or uses are punished under two
different provisions in the Dangerous Drugs Act. This Court has decided in the case of
People v Dichoso that a warrant that does not specify what provisions of the law were
violated, is valid as to the authority to search and seize marijuana, shabu and drug
paraphernalias. Lastly, Salanguit argues that the search warrant failed to indicate the
place to be searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of the
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched. The location of Salanguit’s
house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the
warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
2. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to
the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets and
shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain
view doctrine can no longer provide basis for admitting the other items subsequently
found. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent
illegality to justify their seizure. Not being in a transparent container, the contents
wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. That being
said, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against Salanguit
15 People v. Suzuki
Facts: Appellant was found guilty of illeal possession of prohibited drugs and was
sentenced to death. Hence, the instant review.
The facts of the case are:Appellant was in the airport for his flight to Manila. PASCOM
and NARCOM agents were in the airport to follow on reports on drug trafficking.When
he walked through the metal detector, the alarm sounded. He was bodily frisked and
nothing was found on his person so they proceeded to check his luggage but appellant
refused then consented eventually and opened it. There they found packs of aluminum
foil and when opened, it was found to be marijuana.
Issue: WON the PASCOM agents were authorized to conduct the search. WON
accused consented to the search. WON the search was conducted was incidental to a
lawful arrest. WON the confiscated items were in plain view.
Held: In PPvs.Canton and PPvs.Johnson we validated the search conducted on the
departing passengers and the consequent seizure of the shabu found in their persons,
thus:
"Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation
of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.xxx"
It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right against unreasonable search
and seizure is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search or
seizure.9
Here, appellant voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted by the PASCOM
agents.
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula
but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 12 Given the circumstances
obtaining here, we find the search conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and,
therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the box
of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is deemed to have been
caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.13 The packs of marijuana obtained
in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against appellant.14
Nonetheless, we find the trial court’s reliance on the plain view doctrine misplaced.
Such doctrine finds application only when the incriminating nature of the object is in
the "plain view" of the police officer.15 Here, it is beyond cavil that the marijuana seized
from appellant is contained in the box of piaya, wrapped in aluminum foil and not
immediately apparent to the airport authorities.
Neither was the search incidental to a lawful arrest since appellant was not yet
arrested at the time of the search. To be considered a search incidental to a lawful
arrest, the law requires that there must be a lawful arrest before the search can be
made
16) PEOPLE VS. ARUTA [288 SCRA 626; G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR 1998]
FACTS: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain
“Aling Rosa” will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and
assembled a team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the
bus coming from Baguio, when the informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was, the
team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello
asked “aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police.
They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “cash katutak”.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging
the illegality of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused
claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie
“Balweg”. While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a
shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of
the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no
search warrant was presented.
prevented her from doing so. They apprised the petitioner of her constitutional rights
and then they confiscated the sachet. They marked the sachet with the initials “SRE”
and took the petitioner to the police station.
The petitioner contends against the police officer’s statement. The petitioner said that
she was resting at home when policemen barged inside and asked her whether or not
she knew a certain “Ryan.” She replied in the negative. Afterwards, she was forcibly
taken to the police station and was detained there. During her detention, the police
officers were claiming that there was shabu inside the wallet they seized from her. In
fine, the petitioner was claiming that the evidence was planted.

The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972 ISSUES:

ISSUE: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the Can the issue of warrantless arrest as well as the inadmissibility of evidence acquired
accused on the occasion thereof be raised for the first time only on appeal?

HELD: Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid?
she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was
merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a
reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was
committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and HELD:
identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as
No. Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest before her arraignment.
the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant
Neither did she take steps to quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she raised
were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the
the issue of warrantless arrest as well as the inadmissibility of evidence acquired on
evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that
the occasion thereof for the first time only on appeal before the appellate court. By
accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
such omissions, she is deemed to have waived any objections on the legality of
informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of
her arrest.
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was
there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause Yes. The circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender the
and warrantless arrests. belief that a search on her was warranted. Recall that the police officers were on a
surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a
petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her
warrantless search of accused-appellants bag, there being no probable cause and the
cigarette case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as a law enforcement officer,
accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest
it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That
being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly
petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he introduced himself as a police officer
illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against
and inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant.
As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution. who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed
about him. Such a stop-and-frisk practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal.
that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person
manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based
even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful,
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
for being contrary to law.
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
one without too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers
person intended to be searched has been particularized and the thing to be seized
constituted a valid stop-and-frisk operation. The search/seizure of the suspected
specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon of
shabu initially noticed in petitioners possession - later voluntarily exhibited to the police
December 14, 1988. Aling Rosa turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing to
operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a
be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact,
cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police
the NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where Victory
officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and
Liner buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents
in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had identified himself.
failed to particularize the vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing
a search warrant. The above particulars would have already sufficed. In any case, this CONVICTED 12 yrs and 1 day minimum to 14 years maximum
Court has held that the police should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.

ACQUITTED for lack of evidence to establish her guilt 18) PEOPLE VS AYANGAO (G.R. No. 142356, April 14, 2004)

Facts: Two weeks before August 13, 1999, policemen received an information that a
woman would be traveling with marijuana from Mountain Province to Mabalacat,
17) ESQUILLO V PEOPLE (G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010) Pampanga.
FACTS: Police officers were assigned in Malibay, Pasay to conduct surveillance on a
At around 5:00 oclock in the morning of August 13, 1999, the informant went to the
notorious snatcher named “Ryan.” It was during that time the police officers noticed
police headquarters and informed them that the suspect is due to arrive at Sapang
the petitioner. The police saw the petitioner standing three meters away from them.
Biabas, Mabalacat at 6:00 A.M (just an hour later) that day.
They saw the latter place inside a yellow cigarette case a plastic sachet containing a
white substance. They approached the petitioner and introduced themselves as police
The informant went with the police in the place pointed and he personally identified the
officer. Subsequently, they inquired regarding the sachet the petitioner placed inside
woman. They approached the woman. The policemen noticed a protruding marijuana
the case. The petitioner acted suspiciously and even tried to flee. The police officers
leaves from the sacks of sweet potatoes. The policemen identified themselves
and asked the woman to put out the contents of the sack. The sack contains sweet
potato with a brick-like substance packed with a masking tape. In plain view of the
policemen it was identified to be marijuana. She was arrested and was convicted in
the trial court. She argued that the marijuana is inadmissible since the
warrantless search is invalid, not having been pursuant to lawful arrest.
ISSUES
Whether the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of proving the appellants
guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
Whether her arrest was illegal because she was not read her Miranda rights?
Whether the defense of alibi stands?
HELD:
Yes. The decision of the trial court was supported by the evidence on record.
Regarding the credibility of witnesses, this Court has ruled time and again that this is a
matter best assessed by the trial court judge since he has the opportunity to observe
the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the stand. Besides, in this case, the
inconsistencies criticized by the appellant were minor ones involving negligible details
which did not negate the truth of the witnesses testimonies nor detract from their
credibility.
No. In this case, the arresting officers had probable cause to make the arrest in view of
the tip they received from their informant. This Court has already ruled that tipped
information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search.[17] Although
the apprehending officers received the tip two weeks prior to the arrest, they could not
be faulted for not applying for a search warrant inasmuch as the exact date of
appellants arrival was not known by the informant. Although there was testimony by
PO3 Galvez that the informant told them the exact date of arrival, the trial court gave
more weight to the testimony of PO3 Sagum that stated otherwise, as evidenced by
his finding that the informant arrived at the police station at 5:00 A.M. on August 13,
1999 and informed them that the appellant was arriving at 6:00 A.M.
No. The appellant also faults the trial court for failing to give weight to her defense of
alibi. Appellants alibi could not prevail over the overwhelming evidence presented by
the prosecution. Alibi as a defense is inherently weak and for it to serve as basis for an
acquittal, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the
physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime. The appellant failed to meet
these two requirements. Jaime Alarcons house where appellant claimed to be sleeping
at the time of her arrest, was only 10 meters from the tricycle terminal where she was
arrested by the officers. Thus, the trial court was correct in ruling that the alibi of
appellant was not enough to acquit her of the charges.
CONVICTED
19) PEOPLE VS VALDEZ [G.R. No. 127801. March 3, 1999]
FACTS: Valdez was found guilty of the crime of illegal transport of marijuana. SPO1
Bernardo Mariano was waiting for a ride to report for work when a civilian asset
approached him and intimated that an Ilocano person was ready to transport
marijuana. This asset described to him the physical appearance of the suspect as thin
and possessing a green bag. Mr. Mariano invited the asset and together they
proceeded to Barangay O-ong, Hingyon, Ifugao. There they alighted and stopped and
ordinary Dangwa passenger bus bound for Baguio City. Aboard on this bus, they did
not find the person concerned. They waited for the air conditioned Dangwa bus bound
for Manila. When this bus arrived, Police Officer Mariano boarded the aircon bus and
looked for that person from among the passengers and noticed him holding the green
bag. He immediately ordered the person to get out of the bus. This fellow followed
holding the bag. Once outside, he further ordered the suspect to open the bag and
saw a water jug colored red and white and a lunch box. He told this man to open the
jug and the lunch box and when opened, he saw marijuana leaves as contents.
ISSUE: Whether the court erred in admitting the drugs as evidence?
HELD: In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was carrying marijuana
at the time of his arrest. A crime was actually being committed by the appellant, thus,
the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of the
foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to lawful
arrest. While it is true that SPO1 Mariano was not armed with a search warrant when
the search was conducted over the personal effects of appellant, nevertheless, under
the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said police
officer to believe that appellant was then and there committing a crime.
Police officer Mariano was tipped off by a civilian asset that a thin Ilocano
person with a green bag was about to transport marijuana from Banaue, Ifugao. Said
information was received by SPO1 Mariano the very same morning he was waiting for
a ride in Banaue to report for work in Lagawe, the capital town of Ifugao
province. Thus, face with such on-the-spot information, the law enforcer had to
respond quickly to the call of duty. Obviously, there was not enough time to secure a
search warrant considering the time involved in the process. In fact, in view of the
urgency of the case, SPO1 Mariano together with the civilian asset proceeded
immediately to Hingyon, Ifugao to pursue the drug trafficker. In Hingyon, he flagged
down buses bound for Baguio City and Manila, and looked for the person described by
the informant. It must be noted that the target of the pursuit was just the thin Ilocano
person with a green bag and no other. And so, when SPO1 Mariano inspected the bus
bound for Manila, he just singled out the passenger with the green bag. Evidently,
there was definite information of the identity of the person engaged in transporting
prohibited drugs at a particular time and place. SPO1 Mariano had already an inkling
of the identity of the person he was looking for. As a matter of fact, no search at all
was conducted on the baggages of other passengers. Hence, appellants claim that the
arresting officer was only fishing for evidence of a crime has no factual basis.
Clearly, SPO1 Mariano had probable cause to stop and search the buses
coming from Banaue in view of the information he got from the civilian asset that
somebody having the same appearance as that of appellant and with a green bag
would be transporting marijuana from Banaue. He likewise had probable cause to
search appellants belongings since he fits the description given by the civilian
asset. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the police officer, any evidence
obtained during the course of said search is admissible against appellant.
CONVICTED
20. PEOPLE V. DORIA [G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]
FACTS: Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one “
Jun” [Doria] was engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest
him in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did not find the
marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the house of his
associate “ Neneth ” [Gaddao], so he led the police team to her house.
The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. “ Jun” identified
her as “Neneth, ” and she was asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked money as
PO3 Manlangit looked over her house [he was still outside the house]. Standing by the
door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. One of the box’ s
flaps was open, and inside it was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared
similar to the marijuana earlier sold to him by “ Jun. ” His suspicion aroused, so he
entered the house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and saw 10
bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered the
marked bills from “ Neneth ” and they arrested her. The bricks were examined and
they were found to be dried marijuana leaves.
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA 6425
[Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution
and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21 [Attempt and
Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them.
ISSUE:
WON the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid?
HELD: No. Gaddao ’s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely
on the basis of the alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as
his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked
bills. This identification does not necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with Doria in
pushing drugs. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless
arrest had knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of the
criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her person and home
and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal
as an incident to her arrest.
“ Plain view ” issue
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced
in evidence.
Requisites
a. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view
a particular area
b. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
c. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure
An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty
arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was
inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be
seized without a warrant. If the package is such that an experienced observer could
infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the
box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. On
cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be
marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust
marijuana." Each of the ten bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in
old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color. PO3
Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be
items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he
had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately apparent to
PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain
view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and
the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and
never considered by the trial court.
The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddao ’s
house Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission
of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller and the
presentation of the drug as evidence in court.
 Prosecution established the fact that in consideration of the P1,600.00 he
received, Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the
poseur-buyer
 Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant
Doria in the sale of said drug
DORIA IS SENTENCED TO SUFFER RECLUSION PERPETUA + 500K FINE WHILE
GADDAO IS ACQUITTED
21. Pestilos v. Generoso
FACTS:
In the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty.Moreno
Generoso. Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District,Station to report
the incident. Acting on this report, Desk
SPO1Monsalve
dispatched SP02 Javier to go to the scene of the crime and torender assistance.
SP02 Javier, together with augmentation personnelfrom the Airforce, A2C Alano
Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived atthe scene of the crime less than one hour
after the allegedaltercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beate.
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauledhim. This
prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to goto Batasan Hills Police
Station for investigation.The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills
PoliceStation. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon Cityfound that
the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladedweapon. Atty. Generoso
fortunately survived the attack.The petitioners were indicted for attempted murderThe
petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested.No arrest warrant was
ever issued; they went to the police station onlyas a response to the arresting officers'
invitation.The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took placeunder
the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court.The incident happened
two (2) hours before the police officers actuallyarrived at the crime scene. The police
officers could not haveundertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no
personalknowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.
ISSUE:W/N there is valid warrantless arrestRULING:Yes.The court held that
petitioners were validly arrest withoutwarrant.
The requirements of a warrantless arrest are nowsummarized in Rule 113, Section 5
which states that: A peace officer ora private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, isactually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;(b) When an offense has just been
committed, and he has probablecause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstancesthat the person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped froma penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or istemporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped whilebeing transferred from one confinement to another.In
cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrestedwithout a warrant
shall be forth with delivered to the nearest policestation or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section7 of Rule 112.A warrantless arrest under the
circumstances contemplated underSection 5(a) above has been denominated as one
"in flagrante delicto,"while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot
pursuit"arrest.Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedureprovides that:When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
theperson to be arrested has committed it.The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been
committed; andsecond, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based
onpersonal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to bearrested has
committed it.The Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just
beencommitted" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances thatthe person
to be arrested committed it" depended on the particularcircumstances of the case.
The element of ''personal knowledge of factsor circumstances", however, under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
clarification.Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the
actualperception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer atthe scene
of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seensomeone actually
fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if,based on his personal evaluation of
the circumstances at the scene ofthe crime, he could determine the existence of
probable cause that theperson sought to be arrested has committed the
crime.However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering offacts or
circumstances should be made immediately after thecommission of the crime in order
to comply with the element ofimmediacy. In other words, the clincher in the element of
''personalknowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element ofimmediacy
within which these facts or circumstances should begathered.With the facts and
circumstances of the case at bar that the policeofficers gathered and which they have
personally observed less thanone hour from the time that they have arrived at the
scene of the crime it is reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances justifying the petitioners’ warrantless
arrests.Hence, the petitioners were validly arrested and the subsequentinquest
proceeding was likewise appropriate
22. People vs. Joselito del Rosario –
GR 127755, April 14, 1999
FACTS
The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and sentenced to
death. The conviction of the accused was based on the testimony of a tricycle driver
who claimed that the accused was the one who drove the tricycle, which the suspects
used as their get-away vehicle. The accused was then invited by the police for
questioning and he pointed to the location where he dropped off the suspects. When
the police arrived at the supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to
the death of some of the suspects.
After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precint where his statement was
taken on May 14, 1996. However, this was only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the
accused was made to execute a waiver of detention in the presence of Ex-Judge
Talavera. It was noted that the accused was handcuffed through all this time upon
orders of the fiscal and based on the authorities' belief that the accused might attempt
to escape otherwise.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated.
(2) Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.
HELD
(1) YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel in the course of the
investigation. The Court held that the accused should always be apprised of his
Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the authorities as this is deemed the
start of custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included “invitations” by police officers
in the scope of custodial investigations.
It is evident in this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to the
station, he was already considered as the suspect in the case. Therefore, the
questions asked of him were no longer general inquiries into an unsolved crime, but
were intended to elicit information about his participation in the crime.
However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary,
express, in writing and made in the presence of counsel. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to establish that the accused made such a waiver.
(2) NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful
warrantless arrest: (a) when the accused is caught in flagrante delicto; (b) when the
arrest is made immediately after the crime was committed; and © when the one to be
arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused in this case did not fall in
any of these exceptions. The arrest was not conducted immediately after the
consummation of the crime; rather, it was done a day after. The authorities also did not
have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed the offense because they were not there when the crime was committed.
They merely relied on the account of one eyewitness.
Unfortunately, athough the warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not affect the
jurisdiction of the Court in this case because the accused still submitted to arraignment
despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he waived his right to contest the legality of
the warrantless arrest.
23. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNULFO CENDANA y REYES,
accused-appellant. G.R. No. 84715. October 17, 1990.
DOCTRINE: The arrest of accused was effected one day after the killing of the victim
and only on the basis of information obtained by the policemen from unnamed
sources, hence, par. b. of Sec. 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allowing
warrantless arrest cannot be applied. The arrest of accused without a warrant is
therefor unlawful
FACTS: The Police Station in Pangasinan received a report that a man was found
dead on the field near the ricemill. Upon investigation, policemen found the cadaver,
identified to be that of Dominador Manongdo, lying prostrate on the ground with one
gunshot wound on the head. Subsequently, accused-appellant Arnulfo Cendana y
Reyes was apprehended and later charged with the crime of murder "thru illegally
possessed firearm.”
The trial judge convicted accused-appellant finding the latter guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder thru Illegally Possessed Firearm, and considering that the
crime of Murder was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Solicitor General filed a manifestation recommending the acquittal of accused-
appellant. He asserts that the alleged admission made by the accused-appellant and
the gun seized from him are both inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in
violation of accused-appellant's constitutional rights.
From the narration of events, we note the following: (1) That there was no eye witness
to the killing of the victim Dominador Manongdo; (2) That the accused-appellant was
apprehended by the police investigators on the basis of information obtained from
unidentified persons that accusedappellant was seen carrying a gun before the
incident. (3) That the accused-appellant was apprehended by the police officers
without any warrant of arrest; (4) That the shotgun was recovered without a search
warrant from the house where accused-appellant was arrested; and (5) That the
alleged statement made by accusedappellant to the police officers admitting to the
commission of the offense and made after his arrest, was used as the main basis for
his conviction.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the
instances when a peace officer or a private person may arrest a person without a
warrant. (Refer to the said provision)
ISSUE: Is the arrest made against Cendana, only on the basis of information obtained
by the officers from unnamed sources, lawful?
HELD: Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the
instances when a peace officer or a private person may arrest a person without a
warrant: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in
fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. The facts of the case do not
warrant the applicability of paragraphs (a) and (c). Moreover, in paragraph (b), the only
instance under which accused-appellant's case could possibly fall, what is essential is
that the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just been committed [People v.
Burgos, G.R. No. 68955, September 4,1986,144 SCRA 1]. Accused appellant was
arrested one day after the killing of the victim and only on the basis of information
obtained by the police officers from unnamed sources. These abovementioned
circumstances clearly belie a lawful warrantless arrest. [Also read: Section 20, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution]
Note.—View that extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible as they were taken without
admonition to accused as to constitutional rights to silence and to counsel.
24) G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge,
Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts: According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1
on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro
Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a
one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner
of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped
each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his
car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby
restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived
shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and
one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land
Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go. On 8
July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify
news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2)
lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at
the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same
day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide. On 9 July 1991,
while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be
filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for
frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court.
No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified
that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not
execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the
Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary
investigation,4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that
no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed.
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest was valid
Ruling: The Court do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner
in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113. Petitioner's "arrest"
took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously
were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had
allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the
shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been
committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting"
officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the
gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been
derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated
that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's
car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That
information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." It is thus clear to the
Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of
Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112 s also not applicable.
Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police
Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of
the police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all
probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or
that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a
preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging
petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan.
25) People V. Tonog
Facts: Dumaguete City Police Station received a report that a lifeless body was
found who was later identified as Efren Flores. Based from the investigation, a
motorcab stopped near the place where the deceased was found. It was also
revealed that Ignacio Tonog, Jr. was the one who was responsible for his
death and that prior to the incident, there were grudges between the two.
Without warrant, police officers went to Bacong, Negros
Oriental, and upon being invited forquestioning, voluntarily went with the law enforcers
unaccompanied by a counsel. While they were on their way to the police station, it
was noticed that there were blood stains the accused’s pants
and when asked about it, he said that it was from a pig. He was then requested to take
off his pants for examination.At the station, he confessed his guilt but was
not recorded. After a month, the pants and the knife found were brought to the
Cebu crime lab and found that the blood was the same as the victim’s. One of
the witnesses, Liberato Solamillo, testified that while drinking with the accused
and a certain Allan.
The accused left with certain Biyok. At around 11pm, Liberato and Allanrode a
motorcab to look for the accused. They then saw the victim and requested to convey
himto Dumaguete. Allan left and when it fauled to return, Liberato decided to ride
a pedicab. Onhis
way, he saw the motorcab, and when he proceeded to the motorcab, he saw Tonog wi
thinside and noticed the blood stains on his pants. All the facts were denied by the
accused and that he only confessed because he was told to do so. Charged with three
others, Ignacio Tonog was convicted of murder.
Issue:Whether the trial court faulted in admitting the pants and knife as evidence since
theywere taken during a warrantless arrest?
Rule:The "acid-washed maong"pants
were admissible in evidence, They were taken fromAccused-appellant as
an incident of his arrest. It may be that the police officers were not armed with a
warrant when they apprehended Accused-Appellant. The warrantless
arrest, however,was justified under Section 5(b), Rule 133 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure providing that a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a
person "when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it."
In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of Accused-appellant,had
knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the course of his investigation
indicaTng that Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators. The "maong" pants
having been taken from Accused-appellant as an incident to a lawful arrest, no
inµrmity may bea´ributed to their seizure without a warrant. SecTon 12 of Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court explicitly provides that "A person charged with an o²ense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the o²ense."
“It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they
apprehended Accused-appellant. The warrantless arrest, however, was justified under
Section 5 (b), Rule 133 (sic) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure providing that a
peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when an offense has in fact just
been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it. In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of
Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the
course of his investigation indicating that Accused-appellant was one of the
perpetrators. “
26) PEOPLE vs GERENTE
G.R. NO. 95847-48
MARCH 10, 1993.
Facts: The Valenzuela Police Station received a report about a mauling incident. Upon
learning at the hospital that the victim died on arrival and being informed of the cause
of death, the policemen proceeded to the crime scene where they found a piece of
wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. After being told
by the eye witness the identity of one of the three assailants, the policemen went to
appellant’s house where they introduced themselves, and apprehended him and
confiscated dried marijuana leaves.
Issue: W/N the search of appellant’s person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in
his possession were valid.
Held: Yes.
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente
and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when
they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of
wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death.
The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and
pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances,
since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest
Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it
was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: "Section 12. Search incident to
lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a
permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the
person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is
first disarmed.
27) People v. Armando Alvario
GR 120437-41 / July 16 1997 / J. Romero / 341 PHIL 526
Doctrine: Warrantless arrest, when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. (Rule 113, Section 5, Rules on Criminal Procedure)
Facts:
- Appeal of RTC Makati judgment
- Esterlina Quintero, a single mother, was looking for another job, and was
employed by accused-appellant Armando Alvario to cook and do laundry
for him. Alvario was a caretaker of a house in Bel-Air Subdivision. On her
first day of employment, she was not given any food, and on the next day,
she was only allowed 2 spoonfuls of leftover food despite doing her
regular chores. Alvario gave strict instructions for Esterlina not to leave the
house. He forced himself on her every night with a gun. He forbid the use
of the telephone, and he threatened that he will file a case against her if
she told anyone. She later then called her sister, who asked for the help of
the Makati police, and on the pretense of a missing wallet, arrested
Alvario without a warrant.
- Version of Alvario: Esterlina was introduced to him because his employer,
Atty. Rogelio San Luis, was looking for a maid for the latter’s house at Bel-
Air. When he arrived home in the afternoon, Esterlina was already there
with her things. She asked for an advance on her salary, which he gave
her, and they had sexual intercourse repeatedly afterwards. He later
confronted Esterlina and Alma about the use of the telephone and about
his missing money and necklace. The security guards of Bel-Air arrived
because of Esterlina’s missing wallet, and when he went out for a call of
nature, 4 men who identified themselves as Makati policemen grabbed
him from behind and told him there was a complaint against him. They
insisted that he come with them peacefully even as he kept asking for a
warrant of arrest. At the police station, he learned that he was being
detained on charges of rape; the complainant was, however, willing to
settle the case for P350,000.00, but he refused to settle.
 - RTC Judge Magpale rendered the judgment finding Alvario guilty of 5
counts of rape
Issue: Is Alvario guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling: NO.
- While the defense is not persuasive enough, the prosecution is even less
convincing in proving the guilt of Armando Alvario beyond a reasonable
doubt.
- In her complaint, Esterlina Quintero claimed that she was sexually abused
by Alvario with the use of force, violence and intimidation. This was not
proved by the prosecution.
o The only witnesses she presented were her sister Merlyn and
SPO3 Reyes, whose testimonies failed to provide the
necessary support to her allegations of rape. Merlyn’s
testimony was that her sister Esterlina called her up and
sought her aid in the arrest of the man who raped her. SPO3
Reyes’ testimony was that he responded to a radio message
that a certain Esterlina Quintero was raped by a man named
Armando Alvario, and he engineered Alvario’s arrest. The
other maid, Alma Barliso, who by Esterlina's own account was
always inside the house while she was allegedly being raped
by Alvario, was never utilized as a witness. The medical
report reveals nothing that would prove a charge of rape as
there was no evident sign of extragenital physical injuries.
o The house was not in an isolated place. Located in an
exclusive subdivision in Makati surrounded by neighbors
where sentinels continuously stood guard at the gate nearby,
Esterlina could have easily yelled for help whenever Alvario
was out of the house.
o The element of seeming indifference to her predicament,
when the denial of food on her first day of employment and to
have to eat 2 spoonfuls of leftover food the next day should
have been warning to her, as she was not an inexperienced
house helper. She had many opportunities to escape as
Alvario was out of the house daily. Between her and the other
househelp, Alma, who was alleged to have been also
sexually abused by Alvario, they could have escaped the
house.
o She did not call her sister Merlyn immediately on the day
when she had been repeatedly raped.
o Her self-imposed silence, because of Alvario’s threat to file a
case against her, which she did not elaborate on. Alvario
testified that he confronted Esterlina and Alma about his
missing money and necklace, but neither admitted the theft.
- Alvario consistently protested his warrantless arrest. Rule 113 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure states that for a warrantless arrest to be
lawful, an offense has in fact just been committed and the peace
officer/private person has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it. In this case, the personal
knowledge of the arresting officers in the case at bar was culled from the
information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the
man who raped her at the time of his arrest.
Acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt; immediate release from prison is ordered
28) People V. Jayson
FACTS:
In March 1991, Wenceslao Jayson was a bouncer at the Ihaw-Ihaw nightclub
in Davao City. He wasarrested without a warrant after being pointed by eyewitnesses
as the gunman in the killing of NelsonJordan. Recovered from him was a .38 caliber
revolver with 4 live bullets and an empty shell.
The gun and ammo were covered by a memorandum receipt and mission order issued
by Major Arquillano, Deputy Commander of the Civil-Military Operation and CAFGU
Affairs of DavaoMetropolitan District Command. Said order authorized the Jayson to
carry the gun and 12 rounds ofammo for 3 months following certain restrictions:
Carrying of firearms is prohibited in places where people gather for political, religious,
social, educational, andrecreational purposes, such as churches or chapels, carnival
grounds or fairs, nightclubs, cabarets (...) except whenthe personnel concerned is on
official mission in such places for which he was authorized to carry firearms.
•With respect to the arrest, SPO1 Tenebro testified that while he and
Patrolmen Camotes and Racolaswere patrolling in their car, they received a radio
message directing them to Ihaw-Ihaw where there hadbeen a shooting. They
proceeded to the place and saw the victim. Bystanders pointed to Jayson as
thegunman. He was apprehended about 10 meters away, attempting to flee.
He was initially charged with murder but was allowed to plead guilty to the
lesser offense of homicideafter plea-bargaining. He was sentenced to 6 years and 1
day of prision mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal
He was subsequently charged with illegal possession of firearm (violation of
PD 1866). Finding him ingood faith (believing that the mission order and memorandum
receipt issued to him were valid), RTCsentenced him to 20 years imprisonment. CA
increased the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
SC: Although not raised as an error by the accused-appellant, it is pertinent
to consider thecircumstances surrounding accused-appellant’s arrest and the seizure
from him of the firearm inquestion considering that both were made without any
warrant from a court.
W/N the warrantless arrest, search, and seizure were valid YES, YES, YES
Rule 113, §5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an
warrantless arrest shall belawful when an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating thatthe person to be arrested has
committed it. In the case at bar there was a shooting. The policemen summonedto the
scene of the crime found the victim. Jayson was pointed to them as the assailant only
moments afterthe shooting. In fact Jayson had not gone very far. The arresting officers
thus acted on the basis of personalknowledge of the death of the victim and of facts
indicating that Jayson was the assailant. The search andseizure were hence incident
to a lawful arrest as allowed under Rule 126, §12.
W/N Jayson is liable for illegal possession of firearm YES
Major Arquillano was not authorized to issue mission orders to civilian agents of the
AFP as he was notany of the officers enumerated in the IRR of PD 1866. Neither was
Jayson qualified to be issued a missionorder because he was a mere reserve of
the CAFGU without regular monthly compensation. He also violatedthe restrictions in
the mission order by carrying the firearm inside the nightclub. While the
defense argues thatthe prosecution failed to present the police officer who certified
that Jayson is not licensed to own a firearm, theobjection must be deemed waived in
view of Jayson's failure to object to the presentation of the certificate.
W/N RA 8294 amending PD 1866 can be applied on the theory that it is more
favorable to Jayson NO
While the new law reduces the penalty for illegal possession of firearm, it cannot be
applied becausethe statute provides that the lighter penalty does not apply to cases
where another crime has been committed.Neither can the paragraph treating the use
of the subject firearm in the commission of murder or homicide tobe considered as an
aggravating circumstance be applied because this case concerns solely the charge
ofillegal possession of firearm.
29) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TIRSO ACOL Y
BARNUBAL and PIO BOSES Y DOLFO, defendants, PIO BOSES,
appellant.
DOCTRINE: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED;
WARRANTLESS ARREST; WHEN VALID; CASE AT BAR. —since accused-
appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental thereto was
valid. Moreover, the unlicensed firearms were found when the police team
apprehended the accused for the robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition. When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a
criminal offense, the offending police officers should happen to discover a
criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty
person and the taking of the corpus delicti.
FACTS:
There was a hold-up inside the jeepney where passengers were divested of their
personal belongings, including the jacket of passenger Rene Araneta. Thereafter, the
robbers alighted and after which Percival Tan (the jeepney driver) and his passengers
went to Fort Bonifacio to report the crime. A CAPCOM team was forthwith formed to
track down the culprits. Victim Rene Araneta who went with the responding police
officers, upon seeing four persons, one of whom was wearing his stolen jacket,
walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio, told the police authorities to accost said
persons. After the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves, the four men scampered
to different directions but three of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert
Blanco, were apprehended. Tirso Acol and Pio Boses were each found in possession
of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with bullets. After the arrest, the three men were
brought to Fort Bonifacio and were identified by Percival Tan and the passengers who
ganged up on the accused. They were apprehended and haled to court, not for the
felonious asportation, but for possession of the two unlicensed firearms and bullets
recovered from them which were instrumental in the commission of the crime.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid warrantless arrest and search conducted
thereafter?
RULING: Yes. With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of accused-appellant,
we are of the view that the search falls within the purview of the Section 5(b) of Rule
113 which serves as anexception to the requisite warrant prior to arrest:
When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
inasmuch as the police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons
responsible for the crime on account of the information related by Percival Tan and
Rene Araneta that they had just been robbed (People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756
[1993]; People vs. Tonog, Jr ., 205 SCRA 772 [1992]).
And since accused-appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made
incidental thereto was valid (People vs. Tanilon, 221 SCRA 671 [1993]). Moreover, the
unlicensed firearms were found when the police team apprehended the accused for
the robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (People vs.
Cruz, 165 SCRA 135 [1988]). The principle imparted by Justice Padilla in Cruz was
based on the ruling of this Court in Magoncia vs. Palacio (90 Phil. 771 [1948]) that:
. . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal
offense,
the offending police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense
being
committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their
duties as
police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of
the
corpus delicti.
30) CADUA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
DOCTRINE
Arrests and Seizures; Words and Phrases; Personal knowledge of facts,– in arrests
without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The right to search incidental to a lawful arrest
includes that of searching the person of one who is arrested, in order to find and seize
things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means for its commission.
The legality of apprehending the accused would not depend on the actual commission
of the crime but upon the nature of the deed, where from such characterization it may
reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment
leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen–
police authorities can stop a person forcibly when such action is based on something
more than a mere “reasonable and articulable– suspicion that such a person has been
engaged in criminal activity.
FACTS
This case stemmed from a charge for Illegal Possession of Firearms. Police officers
were dispatched in the area where the accused was apprehended after a report of
concerning an alleged holdup of complainants Lourdes Bulos and her daughter
Bernadette, who were in need of police assistance. Upon the assistance of the
complainants, the police officers noticed two men walking alongside the street and as
the officers slowed down the mobile unit to get a closer look, the complainants
identified the men as the alleged holduppers, one of which is the petitioner in this
case. As the police officers was approaching the suspects, he noticed that petitioner
Cadua was about to pull something which was tucked at the right side of his waist.
Burdeos promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua and warned him not to move. He then
frisked Cadua and found in his possession a .38 caliber “paltik– revolver. PO3
Reynoso Bacnat then apprehended Cadua’s companion, who was later identified as
Joselito Aguilar. In Aguilar’s possession was found a fan knife.
Petitioner seeks to invoke his constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures, 18 and the corresponding prohibition against admitting into
evidence anything obtained in violation of such right. Petitioner further claims that the
police officers incorrectly premised their action on the instances provided for in
warrantless arrests. He adds that since the complainants later on disclaimed
petitioner’s identity as the holdupper and that no case of robbery was filed against him,
any probable cause or personal knowledge thereof, alleged by the arresting officers,
had been totally negated. Thus, petitioner now posits that, absent probable cause or
personal knowledge by the arresting officers, the arrest and the incidental search are
illegal; hence, the “paltik– they seized is inadmissible in evidence.
Both the trial and appellate courts, according to respondents, found that at the time
that petitioner was arrested, the police officers had probable cause to arrest him based
on the information which was given by the complainants.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Petitioner’s arrest and the seizure of the firearms lawful.
RULING
Yes. Petitioner’s arrest has been found valid and the seizure of the
firearms lawful. Actual possession of an unlicensed firearm, which the accused
attempted to draw out, by itself, amounts to committing an offense in the presence of
the arresting officer.
From a careful study of the records of this case, we find no cogent reason
to disturb the findings by the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. Petitioner’s
declaration that the police officers trumped up a charge of illegal possession just so
that they would “not go home emptyhanded– is far from persuasive. Findings of the
trial court as to the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution and the lone
testimony of the defense deserve, in our view, great weight. Jurisprudence has
consistently held that, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or
substance which could have affected the result of the case, its findings on the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. Furthermore, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty strengthens the foregoing doctrine on the credibility of witnesses. The
uncorroborated claim of the accused that he had been framed is, to our mind,
selfserving as well as baseless.
The findings of the trial court, accepted by the appellate court, show the
pertinence of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5 abovecited. Through police dispatch
to the scene of a crime report and in the presence of complainants, it was ascertained
that a robbery had just been committed, and the arresting officers had personal
knowledge that petitioner was directly implicated as a suspect. As explained by a
respected authority on criminal procedure: “It has been ruled that ‘personal knowledge
of facts,’ in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. . . . Peace officers may pursue
and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious
circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is
about to commit, any crime or breach of the peace. Probable cause for an arrest
without warrant is such a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing the
accused to be guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is
another protective bulwark for the officer. Under such conditions, even if the suspected
person is later found to be innocent, the peace officer is not liable. The cases hold that
a peace officer might arrest and detain in prison for examination persons walking in
the street at night whom there is reasonable ground to suspect of felony, although
there is no proof of a felony having been committed; but the arrest would be illegal if
the person so arrested was innocent and there were no reasonable grounds of
suspicion to mislead the officer. The reason of the rule is apparent. Good people do
not ordinarily lurk about the streets and uninhabited premises at midnight. Citizens
must be protected from annoyance and crime. Prevention of crime is just as
commendatory as the capture of criminals. Surely the officer must not be forced to
await the commission of robbery or other felony. The rule is supported by the
necessities of life.