Case No.

137
G.R. No. L-1278 January 21, 1949
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE and FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Commissioners of
the Fourteenth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioners, Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged of the crime of murder. Barrioquinto has not
yet been arrested while the case proceeded against Jimenez. After trial Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment. Before the period for appeal had expired, Jimenez
became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged
with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding
in the war efforts of the enemy and committed from December 8, 1941, to the date when each particular
area where the offense was committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation. On January 9,
1947, respondent, the14th Amnesty Commission issued an order returning the cases of the petitioners
to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding on the case saying that since Barrioquinto
and Jimenez deny having committed the crime, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty. Jimenez &
Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one who committed the crime being charged to
them.
Petitioners instituted a special action of mandamus to compel respondents to act and decide
whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty.

ISSUE:
Wether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty, considering the respondents
contention that the petitioners refusal to admit the crime charged to them disqualify them from amnesty.

HELD:
Yes. The petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty.
Article 36. of the the Revised Penal Code provides that “A pardon shall not work the restoration
of the right to hold public office, or the right to suffarage, unless such rights be expresly restored by the
terms of the pardon. A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence.”
Section 10[6], Article VII, 1935 Philippine Constitution states that “The President shall have the
power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction,
for all expenses except in case of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and
limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of the Congress.”
And In the cases State vs. Blalock, 62 N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs, 135 N.C., 118; 47 S.E. 402.,
403; Ex parte Law, 35 GA., 285, 296; State ex rel Anheuser—Busch Brewing Ass'n. vs. Eby, 170 Mo.,
497; 71 S.W 52, 61; Burdick vs United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267; 271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476 it
was qouted that “amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.”
In this case, the court ruled that the theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting
opinion, is founded on a wrong conception of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be
distinguished from pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and a private act which the Court takes no notice. It is
granted after a convivtion. It looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which a person has been convicted. And it doesn’t restore right to hold public office or right of suffrage,
unless stipulated in the pardon.
While amnesty is a proclamation of the Chief Executive with concurrence of the Congress and a
public act which the Court should take judicial notice. It is granted to classes of persons or community
who may be guilty of political offenses generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution
and sometimes after conviction. And it looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which a person is charged as though no crime was
committed.
Admittance of having committed the crime is not a condition precedent in order to be granted
Amnesty. It is enough that the offense committed comes within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
The Commissions should conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants
and the accused, on whether a person has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether a person is entitled
to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services
to the nation."
The Supreme Court ordered the 14th Guerilla Amnesty Commission to hear and decide on the
application for amnesty of the petitioners.
Case No. 138
G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989
SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner,
vs.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.

FACTS:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Monsanto and three accused of the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of public documents.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same.
She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then
President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the
Calbayog City Treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant.Petitioner’s letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for
resolution. The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also
directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required
to be indemnified in favor of the government. Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner
wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies
that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of reinstatement
should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire
period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the
amount of P4892.50. The Ministry of Finance referred petitioner’s letter to the Office of the President for
further review and action.
The respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied the petitioner’s request and holds
that Monsanto is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted
her, but must secure an appointment to her former position and that she is liable for the civil liability to
her previous conviction.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a public officer who had been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive
is entitled to reinstatement to his or her former position without need of a new appointment.

HELD:
No. A public officer who had been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive is NOT
entitled to reinstatement to his or her former position without need of a new appointment.
In the case of People v. Lising, Crim. Case No. 6675, October 4, 1985 it was qouted that “that
acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former
position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period
of his suspension pendente lite”
And in the case of State v. Hazzard it was cited that "To assume that all or even a major number
of pardons are issued because of innocence of the recipients is not only to indict our judicial system, but
requires us to assume that which we all know to be untrue. The very act of forgiveness implies the
commission of wrong, and that wrong has been established by the most complete method known to
modern civilization. Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a
conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of bad character, which has been definitely fixed”
In this case, the court ruled that having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have
abandoned her appeal and her conviction by the Sandiganbayan and has assumed the character of
finality.
 The essence of pardon is the remission of guilt. Thus pardon implies guilt. Pardon does not ipso
facto reinstate a convicted felon to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction. It should
be noted that public office is intended primarily for collective protection, safety and benefit of the common
good. Thus, it cannot be compromised to favor private interests. A pardon does not virtually acquit the
accused of the offense charged.
But the pardon restores the petitioner eligibility for appointment to the said office. Thus, to regain
her former post, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
The Supreme court ordered that the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, be AFFIRMED at No costs.
Case No. 139
G.R. No. L-18184 January 31, 1963
GAUDENCIO VERA, RESTITUTO FIGUERAS, LORENZO AMBAS, JUSTO FLORIDO,
PAULINO BAYRAN AND JAYME GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Vera, together with 92 others were charged for the crime of kidnapping with murder
done against a certain Lozaňes. The said crime was committed allegedly to aid the Japanese occupation.
During the hearing in the Court of First Instance of Quezon city, none of the petitioners-defendants
admitted having committed the crime charged. In fact, Gaudencio Vera, the only defendant who took the
witness stand, instead of admitting the killing of the deceased Lozañes, categorically denied it. Hence,
the Eighth Amnesty Commission held that it could not take cognizance of the case, on the ground that
the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked only by defendants in a criminal case who,
admitting the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance
movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation.
Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial.
Petitioners appealed to respondent, the Court of Appeals but it affirmed the order of the commission.
Petitioners moved for a motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied, petitioners
instituted the present petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit having committed the
crime of which they were accused.

HELD:
Yes. Persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit having committed the crime of
which they were accused.
In the cases of People vs. Llanita, et al. (L-2082, April 26, 1950, 86 Phil. 219) and People vs.
Guillermo, et al. (L-2188, May 19, 1950, 86 Phil. 395) it was qouted “It is rank inconsistency for appellant
to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty
presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a
crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions,
as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation
of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits
the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved,
would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation.”
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that it is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act,
or seek forgiveness for an act which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the
commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot
have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case,
it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is
in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations
against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring
the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation. The present rule requires a previous
admission of guilt since a person would not need the benefit of amnesty unless he was, to begin with,
guilty of the offense covered by the proclamation.
 The Supreme Court finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals affirms the latter
court’s decision, with costs against the petitioners.