CHAPTER 1: FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE (Police Power) ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due
r not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.
Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO
626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the
movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef.
On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He
was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional
for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the
authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being
heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down
the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-
A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of
carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the
same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that
the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because
the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense
and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation
of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution
of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Assoc., Inc vs Mayor of Manila
Police Power – Due Process Clause
On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was
approved by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and
motels. It classified them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at 4.5k/yr).
It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checks in to
their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to
conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law
averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court
as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted
by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation
of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of
facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid
exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to
minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in
doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu
concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process
contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason
as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to
curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by
mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.
White Light Corp., vs City of Manila
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised – Infringement of Private Rights
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance”
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses
and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of
mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said
Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of
WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is
a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the
City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty
for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades
private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are
really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to
“wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said
ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC
reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
 City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio
Police Power
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke
bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously
viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development
Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the
enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that
they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC
also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit
their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police
Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose
of the law is to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed
by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate
to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its
exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the
enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
JMM Promotion and Management vs Court of Appeals
Police Power
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of
performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with
the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later
proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad.
In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to
realize the plan which included an Artist’s Record Book which a performing artist
must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of
the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to
travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual
rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in
favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of
police power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare
or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity,
it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said
order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists,
particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3.
Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to
“high risk” destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further
underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening
performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them
and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the
unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that
this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals
and agencies.
Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez
Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the
Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of
business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For
some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local
market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail
Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to
engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said
Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which,
according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said
that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps
in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally
accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this
case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and
with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his
right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.
Espina vs. Zamora, Jr
FACTS:
On March 7, 2000, President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.)
8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly
repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in
the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories.
R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship
and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the
same rights as Filipino citizens.
On October 11, 2000, petitioners, all members of the House of Representatives,
filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the
following grounds:
The law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which
enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to
achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full
employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade
policies.
The implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade,
which taken together with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result
in the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.
Foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari
store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment.
The World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage
of R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for the release of certain loans.
There is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or
combinations in restraint of trade.
Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary
Mar Roxas, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe
Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura, and Securities and
Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:
Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact
that they are taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public
funds.
The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.
Petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A.
8762. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing
provisions that are judicially demandable.
The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign
investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of
investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest
so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or
not to make such reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws
allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the
Constitution to Filipino citizens.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762
Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional
POLITICAL LAW: Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come
to a court of justice and make such a challenge.
HELD:
Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of
justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing refers to his personal
and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result
of the passage of that law.
Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as
taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since
the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs when the public
interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
POLITICAL LAW: The declarations of principles and state policies in the Constitution
are not self-executing.
As the Court explained in Tanada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987
Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing.
Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the
courts.
Furthermore, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino
monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign
powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that
Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress
the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the
recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus,
Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the
economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain
industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress
has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign
investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has
not opposed such policy.
Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of
R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said,
there is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The
Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead
to alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any
concrete and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided
strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus -
First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-
enumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or
incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed
to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be
allowed to engage in certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores
through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives,
door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing
activities.
United States vs Luis Toribio
Police Power
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be
slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for
work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was
eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the
other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter
his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and
legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such
particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights
of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall
not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights
and interests of the community.”
TOMAS VELASCO et al vs HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS et al
This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory
relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of
Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of
petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The
assailed ordinance is worded thus: “It shall be prohibited for any operator of any
barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any
adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the
same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber
shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person.” 1 As noted in
the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the
violation of this ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court,
therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability being
dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. 2
Even if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As
pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The
objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to impose payment of the license
fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as
amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance
regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible
immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage
of customers.” 3This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on
the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this
Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a
clause, which “delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As
above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities
and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally
construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine
jurisprudence.” 5 As it was then, so it has continued to be. 6There is no showing,
therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.
Agustin vs Edu
Generally Accepted Principles of International Law – Police Power
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter
of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices
particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning
devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and
unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights
which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate
to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant
and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor
oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights
in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside
motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor
vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and
visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any
motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized
rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways,
will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that
road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or
disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist
who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum
lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think
what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement
car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist
will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power.
That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the
submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has
offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the
Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and
expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice
Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as “nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision
after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power
with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus
‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948,
Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as
‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth
in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful
to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ In that sense it could be hardly
distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative
power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential, insistent, and
at least illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the
great public needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or
parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the
nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a
dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare.”
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact
that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote
public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a
legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention,
an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta,
sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same
end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the
purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads
and streets designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the first law sought
to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense
Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative
demands of public safety.
Taxicab Operators vs Board of Transportation
Police Power
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic
corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public
Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in
Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No.
80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974,
as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time
of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord
with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the
petitioners’ constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation
and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners’
constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the
overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police
power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language
of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando “the necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded”.
Mary Concepcion Bautista et al vs Alfredo Juinio et al
“Equal Protection” – Distinction Between Heavy and Extra Heavy Cars and Others
Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified
vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during
weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this
law is to curb down petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil.
Bautista claimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and
EH cars are heavy on petroleum consumption when in fact there are smaller cars
which are also big on oil consumption. Further, the law restricts their freedom to
enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers
that there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles classified
as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by them fall within such
category.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection.
HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention.
The classification on cars on its face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason.
The ideal situation is for the law’s benefits to be available to all, that none be placed
outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and
the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the
very essence of the idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to
continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the
reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure
that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure
may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under
such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common
weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that
finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be
treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every
person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated
in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding
on the rest.
Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City and MMDA – July 18, 2006 (G.R.
No. 177807) MMDA vs. Gancayco – May 10 2007 (G.R. No. 177933)
FACTS: The consolidated petitions of Retired Justice Emilio Gancayco, City
Government of Quezon City and the Metro Manila Development Authority stemmed
from a local ordinance pertaining to Construction of Arcades, and the clearing of
Public Obstructions. Gaycanco owns a property, of which he was able to obtain a
building permit for a two-storey commercial building, which was situated along EDSA,
in an area which was designated as part of a Business/Commercial Zone by the
Quezon City Council. The Quezon City Council also issued Ordinance No. 2904, which
orders the construction of Arcades for Commercial Buildings. The ordinance was
amended to not require the properties located at the Quezon City - San Juan
boundary, and commercial buildings from Balete - Seattle Street to construct the
arcades, moreover, Gancayco had been successful in his petition to have his property,
already covered by the amended ordinance, exempted from the ordinance. MMDA
on April 28, 2003, sent a notice to Gancayco, under Ordinance no. 2904, part of his
property had to be demolished, if he did not clear that part within 15 days, which
Gancayco did not comply with, and so the MMDA had to demolish the party wall, or
“wing walls.” Gancayco then filed a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the
demolition of his property, without due process and just compensation, claiming that
Ordinance no. 2904 was discriminatory and selective. He sought the declaration of
nullity of the ordinance and payment for damages. MMDA contended that Gancayco
cannot seek nullification of an ordinance that he already violated, and that the
ordinance had the presumption of constitutionality, and it was approved by the
Quezon City Council, taking to note that the Mayor signed the ordinance. The RTC,
however, declared that the Ordinance was unconstitutional, invalid and void ab
initio. MMDA appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the CA partly granted the appeal,
with the contention that the ordinance was to be modified; it was constitutional
because the intention of the ordinance was to uplift the standard of living, and
business in the commercial area, as well as to protect the welfare of the general
public passing by the area, however the injunction against the enforcement and
implementation of the ordinance is lifted. With that decision, the MMDA and
Gancayco filed Motions for Reconsideration, which the CA denied, as both parties
have no new issues raised. Therefore they petitioned to the Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the wing wall of Gancayco’s property can be constituted as
a public nuisance. Whether or not MMDA was in their authority to demolish
Gancayco’s property.
HELD: The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court decided
that the wing wall of Gancayco’s building was not a nuisance per se, as under Art. 694
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, nuisance is defined as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures of
endangers the health or safety of the others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3)
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstruct or interferes with the
free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or
impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be a nuisance per se or a nuisance per
accidens. A nuisance per se are those which affect the immediate safety of persons
and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity. As
Gaycanco was able to procure a building permit to construct the building, it was
implied that the city engineer did not consider the building as such of a public
nuisance, or a threat to the safety of persons and property. The MMDA was only to
enforce Authoritative power on development of Metro Manila, and was not
supposed to act with Police Power as they were not given the authority to do such
by the constitution, nor was it expressed by the DPWH when the ordinance was
enacted. Therefore, MMDA acted on its own when it illegally demolished Gancayco’s
property, and was solely liable for the damage.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs Secretary of Agrarian
Reform
175 SCRA 343 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal
Protection – Valid Classification
Eminent Domain – Just Compensation
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian
Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights
includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State
shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to
provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among
tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987,
President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor
of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands
covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O.
No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted.
Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments,
nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with
its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from
the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised
of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7
hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they
should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they
themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be
exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different
class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228,
and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian
reform program and that the specific amount must be determined by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the
principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution,
no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for
their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just
compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be
in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class
exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been
defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it
must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be
treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The
Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other
properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that
is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on
this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of
justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as
part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the
courts. However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR
from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount
agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial
intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation
through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not
needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation
determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does
not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it
can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination.
This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to
the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept
in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a
revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos
in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then
the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities,
i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.
DECS vs San Diego G.R. No. 89572
FACTS: Roberto Rey San Diego, a graduate of the University of the East with a
degree of B.S. Zoology, had taken and flunked 4 National Medical Admission Tests
and was applying to take another test. NMAT Rule provides that a student shall be
allowed only three (3) chances to take the test. After three successive failures, a
student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The Regional
Trial Court held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a
medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has been deprived of his right to quality
education.
RULING: NMAT is a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools to
those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education. The regulation of practice of medicine is a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public. This regulation includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. NMAT is a
means of achieving the country’s objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants
into medical schools” and of “improving the quality of medical education in the
country” It is the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is
not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives
and health.
The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every
citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirement.
The equal protection requires equality among equals. There would be unequal
protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others
who have also qualified are denied entrance.
The petition has been granted and the decision of the respondent court has been
reversed.
Villanueva vs Castañeda
There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along
Mercado Street, a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a
conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is commonly known as a
talipapa. This is the subject of the herein petition. The petitioners claim they have a
right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous
authorization granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny
this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public
property. At the petitioners’ behest, we have issued a temporary restraining order to
preserve the status quo between the parties pending our decision.
This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of San
Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the
Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls
and sell in the above-mentioned place. The action was protested on November 10,
1961, in Civil Case No. 2040, where the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch
2, issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants from
constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. On January 18,
1964, while this case was pending, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted
Resolution No. 29, which declared the subject area as “the parking place and as the
public plaza of the municipality,” thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218,
series of 1961. Four years later, on November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar
decided the aforesaid case and held that the land occupied by the petitioners, being
public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the
subject of private occupancy. The writ of preliminary injunction was made
permanent.
HELD
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have
effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be
surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. In fact, every
contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains
an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order.
This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or
even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare.
Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and
limited by the paramount police power.
We hold that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petition for prohibition. On the contrary, he acted correctly in sustaining
the right and responsibility of the mayor to evict the petitioners from the disputed
area and clear it of all the structures illegally constructed therein.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION VS. ARLENE DE GUZMAN, ET AL.,
June 21, 2004
POLICE POWER/Public Health; THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE A PROFESSION
Facts:
After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) released the names of
successful examinees in the Medical Licensure Examination, the Board of Medicines
observed that the grades of the 79 Fatima College of Medicine successful
examinees were unusually and exceptionally high in the two (2) most difficult
subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and Obstetrics and Gynecology.
The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the registration as physicians
of all the examinees from Fatima College of Medicine. Compared with other
examines from other schools, the results of those from Fatima were not only
incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. The NBI Investigation
found that the “Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.”
On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition for mandamus before
the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC to give them their licenses to practice medicine.
Meanwhile on July 21, 1993, the Board of medicine issued Resolution No. 21 charging
the respondents of immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud and deceit and
recommended that the test results of the Fatima Examinees be nullified.
On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated its decision ordering the PRC
to allow the respondents to take the physician’s oath and to register them as
physicians. The same was appealed by the PRC to the Court of Appeals which
sustained the RTC decision.
Hence, this petition.
Held:
It must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a profession or pursuit
of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State in an arbitrary, despotic or
oppressive manner. However, the regulating body has the right to grant or forbid
such privilege in accordance with certain conditions.
But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, their exercise may
be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals,
peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As such,
mandamus will not lie to compel the Board of Medicine to issue licenses for the
respondents to practice medicine.
RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of
medicine, the qualifications of the candidates for the board examination, the scope
and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for the denying of the issuance of a
physician’s license, or revoking a license that has been issued. It is therefore clear
that the examinee must prove that he has fully complied with all the conditions and
requirements imposed by law and the licensing authority to be granted the privilege
to practice medicine. In short, he shall have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. The petition is therefore granted.
Didipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association et al vs DENR Sec Elisea Gozun et al
Police Power – Eminent Domain
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign
companies when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or
mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994,
Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The
FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N.
Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its
implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled as it
is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify
Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional,
petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO
96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust “taking” of private property for
private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and the
corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent
DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot,
on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without
payment of just compensation.
Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a
taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the
state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation
involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails
some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public
respondents concluded that “to require compensation in all such circumstances
would compel the government to regulate by purchase.”
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain.
They are;
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking
involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just
compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner,
occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly
compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done
to the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a
consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation
of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly
compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to
exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.
5-a. Not Valid Exercise of police power
City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”. The law basically provides
that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be
set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no
reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total
area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes
the burden to private cemeteries.
Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras
Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title – Police Power Not Validly Exercise
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance
of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to
engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business.
That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out
with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84
after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938
which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE
POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF
CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power
to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived
of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the
exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in
pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not
prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had
stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It
cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy
and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a
field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose
sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather
than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue
should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
CHAPTER 2: DUE PROCESS
El Banco Español-Filipino vs Vicente Palanca
Judicial Due Process Requisites
Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security
to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than
what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed
an instrument to mortgage Engracio’s property. Engracio however left for China and
he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify
Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper.
The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that
it’d be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute
Engracio’s property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his
administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there
had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons.
 ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due
process had been met. The requisites are;

1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and decide the matter before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.