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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DIGEST On the third issue, the Court pointed out that the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data
Secretary Leila De Lima vs. Magtanggol B. Gatdula,
Facts:
Respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. This case
was docketed and raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr.
Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M.
De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo
O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, et al)
Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. “to cease and desist from framing up
Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus
charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation
to the alleged ambush incident”.
RTC rendered a “Decision” granting the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely:
temporary protection, production and inspection orders. The RTC
denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filed
by De Lima, et al.
Issues
1. Whether or not the filing of an answer is appropriate.
2. Whether or not the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to
the issuance of the writ and the filing of a RETURN is proper.
3. Whether or not the Privilege of the Writ of Amparo is the same as
the Writ of Amparo.
Ruling On the first issue, the Court ruled that the insistence on filing
of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the
responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of
Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the
intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose
right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be
violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge
Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.
On the second issue, the Return in Amparo cases allows the
respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it
should be done prior to the hearing, not after. Without a Return, the
issues could not have been properly joined. Memorandum is a
prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. It is a
synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading
usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One
cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have
different functions in facilitating the suit.
Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called
the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire
procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC. After examining the
petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence
presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the
required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally
eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life,
liberty or security. A judgment which simply grants “the privilege of
the writ” cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the
judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner.
Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise
out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses
cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as “granting the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo.” 1 |Case Digests in Special
Proceeding
Spouses Nerio vs. Brgy. Capt. Arcayan, G.R. No. 183460
Facts:
Petitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors circulated that
petitioner Nerio Pador was a marijuana planter in Barangay
Tabunan, Cebu City. On 17 March 2008, respondents Alberto Alivio,
Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin raided their ampalaya farm
to search for marijuana plants, but found none. After the raid,
petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador received invitation letters for a
conference from respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan. They
referred the invitation letters to their counsel, who advised them
not to attend and, instead, send a letter-reply to Barangay Captain
Arcayan. When the latter received the letter-reply, he allegedly read
its contents, got one copy, and refused to sign a receipt of the
document. Petitioners then concluded that the conduct of the raid,
the sending of the invitation letters, the refusal of respondent
barangay captain to receive their letter- reply – as well as the
possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and possible
violence from respondents – gravely threatened their right to life,
liberty and security and necessitated the issuance of a writ of
amparo. After examining the contents of the petition and the
affidavits attached to it, the RTC issued the Writ and directed
respondents to make a verified return. Respondent filed a verified
return. The RTC then heard the petition. On 3 July 2008, it issued the
assailed Resolution finding that petitioners’ claims were based
merely on hearsay, speculations, surmises and conjectures, and that
respondents had sufficiently explained the reason behind the
issuance of the letters of invitation. It thereafter proceeded to deny
petitioners the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Issue Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the privilege of the
writ of Amparo.
Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that to be entitled to the privilege of the
writ, petitioners must prove by substantial evidence that their rights
to life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission. The writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is
a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds.
Gen. Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3 2009
Facts:
Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. More than a month after his
disappearance, the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty.
Felipe P. Arcilla, directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, et. al. The
petition stated that Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to
take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly
men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him
and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without
the knowledge of his student and according to a reliable source; that
he was in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically
with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an
earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis
with the different terrorist groups;
That the respondent filed a complaint with the PNP Police Station in
the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, but instead of helping her she
was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband, subject
of the petition, was not missing but was with another woman having
good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal to
help and provide police assistance in locating her missing husband.
The petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and substance
of the Amparo petition filed before the CA. Petitioners contend that
the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule.
Issue: Does the Amparo Rule intended that the petition be
complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation
of a victim’s rights for it to be given due course by the court?
Ruling of the Court: Negative.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be
complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation
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of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader
must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of
action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition,
however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and
purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of
uncertainty;
The petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the
victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct
or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these
information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who
caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the
level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners
apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a
token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional
rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court
requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo
situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine
whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a
violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through
State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in
its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to
determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance,
the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations
of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.
Gen Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration on the ruling of the Supreme
Court on December 3, 2009, finding that the government in general,
through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of
these organizations, together with Col. Kasim, were fully
accountable6 for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically,
it was held that Col. Kasim was accountable for his failure to disclose
under oath information relating to the enforced disappearance; for
the purpose of this accountability.
It was ordered that Col. Kasim be impleaded as a party to the case.
And held the PNP accountable for the suppression of vital
information that Col. Kasim could, but did not, provide with the
same obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries. However,
before this directive was given, Col. Kasim was already dead.
Issue: Whether or not Col. Kasim’s death renders the directive to
implead him moot and academic.
Ruling: The Court held that the directive to implead Col. Kasim as a
party to the present case has been rendered moot and academic by
his death. Nevertheless, it is resolve to deny the petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit. Undisputably, this directive can

no longer be enforced, and has been rendered moot and academic,
given Col. Kasim's demise. His intervening death, however, does not
necessarily signify the loss of the information Col. Kasim may have
left behind, particularly the network of "assets" he utilized while he
was in the service. Intelligence gathering is not an activity conducted
in isolation, and involves an interwoven network of informants
existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships with the police and
the military. It is not farfetched that a resourceful investigator,
utilizing the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo requires,13 can still access or reconstruct the information
Col. Kasim received from his "asset" or network of assets during his
lifetime.
Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 182795
Facts:
The petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of Amparo alleging
that they have been deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights
to shelter enshrined and embodied in our Constitution, as the result
of the nefarious activities of both the Private and Public
Respondents. Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land
situated in the Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings have
either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is
about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment which was
affirmed with finality in four other cases.
Issue: Whether or Not the writ of Amparo is a correct remedy for
the petitioners.
Ruling: No.
The writ of amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners. The
threatened demolition of a dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment
of the court is not included among thee numeration of rights
covered by the writ. Hence, the court finding no legal basis for the
issuance of the writ dismissed petition outright. It rationed that new
remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is
intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any
person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The
Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give
priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not
waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the
writ.
Arthur Balao vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050
Facts:
On the early morning of September 17, 2008, James Balao was
abducted by unidentified armed men. With no idea where he is, the
siblings asked the assistance of the organization Cordillera Peoples
Alliance (CPA) and other NGOs to locate James. One of the teams
also went to the office of the AFP-ISU (PA-ISU) in Navy Base and the
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office of the Military Intelligence Group in Camp Allen, both in
Baguio City, but the personnel in said offices denied any knowledge
on James’s whereabouts. Contending that there is no plain, speedy
or adequate remedy for them to protect James’s life, liberty and
security, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo
ordering the respondents to disclose where James is detained or
confined, to release James, and to cease and desist from further
inflicting harm upon his person. The RTC granted the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the order of the court granting the petition
for writ of amparo was correct.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court partially granted the petitions and modified the
judgment of the RTC. Writ of Amparo was formulated amidst rising
incidents of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The trial
erred in granting amparo reliefs. Such pronouncement of
responsibility on the part of public respondents cannot be made
given the insufficiency of evidence. However, the Court agreed with
the trial in finding that the actions taken by respondent officials are
very limited, superficial and one-sided. In view of the foregoing
evidentiary gaps, respondents clearly failed to discharge their
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of James’s
abduction. Such ineffective investigation extant in the records of this
case prevents us from completely exonerating the respondents from
allegations of accountability for James’ disappearance.
The reports submitted by the PNP Regional Office, Task Force Balao
and Baguio City Police Station do not contain meaningful results or
details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. In order
to effectively address thru the amparo remedy the violations of the
constitutional rights to liberty and security of James who remains
missing to date, the Court deems it appropriate to refer this case
back to the trial court for further investigation by the PNP and CIDG
and monitoring of their investigative activities that complies with
the standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule
Edgardo Navia vs. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari challenges the decision6 of the
RTC of Malolos which granted the Petition for Writ of Amparo7 filed
by herein respondent against the petitioners. The petition was filed
due to the mysterious disappearance of respondent’s husband after
he was arrested by the security of Asian Land. The petition does not
contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence
presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents
orchestrated Ben’s disappearance. In fact, none of its agents,
officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s
amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable persons

Issue: Whether or not allegation and proof that the persons subject
of the petition for Writ of Amparo are missing are enough for such
writ to issue.
Ruling: The Court ruled in the negative.
The Court pointed out that “in an amparo petition, proof of
disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to
establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or
indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government.”
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof. "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of
persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a
political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we
can derive the following elements that constitute it: (a) that there be
an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be
followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the
person subject of the amparo petition; and, (d) that the intention for
such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
Lourdes Rubrico vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871
Facts:
On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita
para sa Gawa Adhikan, was abducted by armed men belonging to
the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS) based in Lipa
City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite. She was
brought to and detained at the air base without charges. She was
released a week after relentless interrogation, but only after she
signed a statement that she would be a military asset. Despite her
release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint
for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and grave misconduct against
Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but nothing has
happened. She likewise reported the threats and harassment
incidents to the Dasmarinas municipal and Cavite provincial police
stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their investigation.
Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an
investigation which indicated that men belonging to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes. Based
4
on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo
with the Supreme Court on 25 October 2007, praying that
respondents be ordered to desist from performing any threatening
act against the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsman to
immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the
aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico
also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents
submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is
applicable in an Amparo petition.
Ruling: No.
Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in
amparo proceedings Command responsibility, as a concept defined,
developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all,
bearing in amparo proceedings.
There is no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under
the Doctrine of Command Responsibility – While there are several
pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine
law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may
plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis
to hold military/police commanders liable for extra- legal killings,
enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this
jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine
now constitutes a principle of international law or customary
international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the
Constitution.
Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the
doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done,
as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual
respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of
amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings
on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an
infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed.
Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to
cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing,
on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end.
Daniel Masangkay vs. Judge Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484
Facts:
Spouses Gregorio and Mar Lourdes Samson filed a complaint for
forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction against herein petitioner Daniel Masangkay
Tapuz et al, for entering without permission and against their
objection the disputed land in Aklan registered under the name of
the spouses armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and
unidentified persons numbering 120 and for building a nipa and

bamboo structure. The Municipal Trial Court decided in favor of the
spouses, herein private respondent. The herein petitioners appealed
the ruling to Regional Trial Court which affirmed the decision and
granted the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and
subsequently, ruled positively on the motion of the spouses to
demolished the structure built by Masangkay Tapuz et. al.
While their petition for review of the permanent mandatory
injunction and order of demolition at the Court of Appeals is
pending, the sheriff issued notice to vacate and for demolition.
Petitioners now seek the succor of the Supreme Court with a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
and issuance of writ of habeas data and writ of amparo.
Issue: Whether or not writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is the
proper remedy.
Ruling: No, the Supreme Court found the petition for certiorari and
issuance of writ of habeas data and writ of amparo as fatally
defective in this case. The writ of amparo does not issue to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ
that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. It was
originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary
and independent remedy beyond those available under the
prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. On the
other hand, the writ on habeas data on the other hand, is intended
to address the unjustified/unlawful violation of the right to privacy
related to the right to life, liberty and security, which was not
concretely alleged in this case to merit an issuance of the writ.
Fr. Robert Reyes vs. Raul Gonzales, G.R. No. 182161
Facts:
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel
siege on November 30, 2007. Petitioner together with fifty (50)
others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings.
In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L.
Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to
ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold
petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or
Inciting to Rebellion. Upon the request of the DILG, respondent DOJ
Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45
ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the
Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the
aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public
safety. After finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others
5
for the crime of Rebellion the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an
Information before the RTC, Branch 150 of Makati City.
RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against
petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Petitioner filed
the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the
rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists. Every
time petitioner would leave and return to the country, the
immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for
several minutes because of the existing HDO.
Issue: Whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo.
Ruling: No, the Right to travel is not covered by the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the
Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the
following:
(1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the
pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful.
Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was
impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a
serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which
there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo
due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the
HDO. Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus,
he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The new remedy
of writ of amparo which is made available by the Supreme Court is
intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any
person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The
Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give
priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not
waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the
writ.
Noriel Rodriguez vs. GMA, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011
Facts:
On September 6, 2009, Petitioner was forcibly taken to a military
camp and was forced to confess to his membership in the NPA.
During his 11 days of captivity, he was repeatedly threatened,
detained and mauled. He was also forced to confess the
whereabouts of NPA camp and his fellow NPA comrades, sign
documents declaring that he had surrendered to the military and
that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military
asset. On his last day of incarceration, September 17, 2009, he was
ordered to sign a piece of paper stating that he was a surrenderee
 6

and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal,
he signed the paper and was warned not to report anything to the
media. On December 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo and Petition for Writ of Habeas Data with prayers for the
Protection Order, Inspection of Place and Production of Documents
and Personal Properties.
The Supreme Court granted the respective writs on December 15,
2009, after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged that
Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by the
members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
Issue: Whether or not the interim reliefs prayed for by the
Petitioner maybe granted after the writs of amparo and habeas data
have already been issued in his favor.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the provisional relief, such as the
interim reliefs of temporary protection order, inspection order and
production order are intended to assist the court before it arrives at
a judicious determination of the amparo petition. Being interim
reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the
case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege
of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the
protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since the Court grant the
petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to
issue a ytemporary protection order independently of the former.
So vs. Tacla, G.R. No. 190108 (2010)
confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMH’s
determination that she was ready for trial. During the pendency of
these consolidated cases, various events occurred which ultimately
led to the incident before this Court, The Criminal Case for Qualified
Theft was dismissed.
Issue:
1. Is issuance of writ of amparo and habeas corpus a proper remedy
based on the facts at hand?
2. Does the dismissal of the criminal case for qualified theft warrants
the dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus and amparo?
Ruling:
On the first issue, The Court ruled in the negative.The Rules on the
Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or
the threatened act or omission complained of - confinement and
custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a
person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal
or unlawful. In this case , the confinement and custody of Accused
Guisande is proper. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the
writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of
illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrainted via some legal
process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in
order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint
of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action.

Facts: On the second issue, The court completely agreed with the OSG,
that with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused
Petitioner David E. So (So) filed the petition for the writs of habeas
Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility,
corpus and amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So
much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande’s person, and
Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case
treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not
pending before Judge Tacla. Prior to the institution of the criminal
have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC
proceedings before the RTC, Guisande was committed by So for
Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been rendered
psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC).
moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-
Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by
Arroyo, is defined as "one that ceases to present a justiciable
Judge Tacla, stated that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
Mood Disorder and that she was "not ready for discharge," as
thereon would be of no practical use or value."
certified by her personal psychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan. Acting on
the prosecution’s Urgent Motion to Refer Accused’s Illness to a Castillo vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 182165 (2009)
Government Hospital, Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s referral to the
Facts:
NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisande’s mental
health to determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and Respondent Amanda Cruz, who along with her husband Francisco G.
undergo trial for Qualified Theft. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio
Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property,
Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that
despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan
accused Guisande be physically brought to the NCMH, with NCMH
(the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects. Amanda
Chief Dr. Vicente to have temporary legal custody of the accused,
and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however.
and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order of
Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the

Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the
latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault,
trespassing and other forms of light threats. Thus, respondents filed
a motion for writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to
property rights.
2. Whether or not Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when
there is a criminal case already filed.
Ruling:
On the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Section 1 of the
Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the
coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life,
liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but also
threats of unlawful acts or omissions. Secretary of National Defense
v Manalo teaches: “As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. Tapuz vs. Del Rosario also teaches: What is not is a
writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs,
reposndents must meet the threshold requirement that their right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful
act or omission.
Evidently, the present controversy arouse out of a property dispute
between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any
considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on
respondents’ right to life, liberty, and security, the Court will not
delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property. It
bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual
violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and
security. Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice to prove
entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue
confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were
even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.
On the second issue, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of
amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal
proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested
in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the
proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by
respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of
amparo and habeas data.
Burgos vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155
Facts:
7
On April 30, 2007, the petitioner held a press conference and
announced that her son Jonas was missing. That same day, the
petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the person
abducted was her son Jonas. Upon subsequent police investigation
and LTO verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194
was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro
B. Mudlong. The poloce was able to generate cartographic sketches
of two of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of
eyewitnesses. On August 29, 2007, the PNP-CIDG presented Emerito
Lipio @ KA TIBO/KA CRIS, Marlon D. Manuel @ KA CARLO, and
Melissa Concepcion Reyes @ KA LISA/RAMIL to support the theory
that elements of the New People’s Army (NPA) perpetrated the
abduction of Jonas. As for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its
investigation as “rather shallow” and “conducted haphazardly.”
The CA took note that P/Supt. Estomo’s investigation merely delved
into the administrative liability of Lt. Col. Clement, Lt. Col. Feliciano
and Lt. Col. Caga of the 56th IB, and failed to consider them as
suspects in the abduction of Jonas. The CA emphasized that the
PNP-CIDG’s investigation should focus on the criminal aspect of the
present case pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, which
mandates the PNP to “investigate and prevent crimes, effect the
arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in
their prosecution.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an
exhaustive and meaningful investigation and to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties is fatal to
the grant of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
Ruling:
“Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of
the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far
failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into
the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the
extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires.
Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the
case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary
diligence, is undertaken.” It was further noted that no independent
investigation appeared to have been made by the PNP-CIDG to
inquire into the veracity of Lipio’s and Manuel’s claims that Jonas
was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of
the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG. The case was referred to the CHR as
the Court’s directly commissioned agency tasked with the
continuation of the investigation of the Burgos abduction and the
gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual
findings and recommendations to the Court
 8

Melissa Roxas vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155 (2010) resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to
make a verified return of the writ before the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
Cleofas amended her petition on January 14, 2008 to include

In the September 7, 2010 Decision of the Supreme Court,[1] after Marciana Medina ) and to implead other military officers including

finding that the failure of the petitioner to present substantial proof Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos as therein additional respondents.

as to the respondents' responsibility anent her abduction and

In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana alleged that their
torture was in part attributable to the lack of extraordinary diligence
respective sons Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were
on the part of existing police and military investigations, this Court
catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno,
ordered the conduct of further investigations, this time, to be
Capas, Tarlac. On September 18, 2006 at around 1:00 a.m., the
spearheaded by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the
“wives” of Nicolas, namely, Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were
designated lead investigating agency for purposes of this petition.
then at home, heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers’
The CHR was then required to submit a report of its investigations as
uniforms passing by; and that that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same
well as a recommendation to the Court of Appeals which, in the
day, Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and He her
meantime, retained jurisdiction of this case.
son but only saw their caps, slippers, pana and airgun for catching

Finally, the Court of Appeals was directed to monitor the frogs, as well as bloodstains. They likewise alleged that Josephine

investigations and submit to the Court its own report and Galang Victoria informed them that she saw Nicolas and Heherson

recommendation, for its consideration and, ideally, final disposition. at the Camp of the Bravo Company sometime in 2006.

Issue: Can the Court of Appeals conduct a summary hearing to The respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of Amparo, the

require the personal appearance of confidential witnesses production of the victims’ bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the

interviewed by the CHR and affirm their allegations under oath? inspection of certain military camps, the issuance of temporary and
permanent protection orders, and the rendition of judgment under
Ruling: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

The Court pointed out that “while the CHR investigations have Issue:
already been concluded, no additional evidence tending to implicate
any of the public respondents in the abduction and torture of the 1. Whether or not failure of the respondents to present substantial

petitioner have materialized. CHR Resolution (IV) No. A2010-130 is evidence to prove that the public officials observed extraordinary

quite clear that the evidence gathered during the CHR investigations diligence in the performance of their duty is ground for the grant of

were still not sufficient to identify any of the respondents, or anyone the privilege of the writ of amparo.

in particular for that matter, as the persons responsible for

2. Whether or not the grant of provisional remedy in Section 14 of
petitioner's abduction. Neither did the ocular inspections of various
the Amparo Rule is proper in cases where the public respondents
military facilities and firing ranges in Pampanga, conducted by the
were absolved of the disappearance of the alleged victim.
CHR, definitively point that petitioner was detained in any of them.”
The Court agreed that bringing the persons interviewed in the CHR- Ruling:
Region III confidentialreports or at the least, the CHR field
As regards the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Evidence
investigators themselves, before a summary hearing before the
is required in Amparo petition. Effect of failure to establish that the
Court of Appeals will serve as a huge step towards identifying the
public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance
persons behind the abduction and torture of petitioner. Certainly, it
of their duty the requirement for a government official or employee
may aid an on-going investigations by pointing them at an
to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty
alternative, if not the right direction. Before disposing of this case
stresses the extraordinary measures expected to be taken in
once and for all, the Court must ensure that each and every possible
safeguarding every citizen’s constitutional rights as well as in the
lead or theory was pursued and verified, and no stone left unturned.
investigation of cases of extra-judicial killings and enforced
Gen. Yano vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640 (2010) disappearances. The failure to establish that the public official
observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does
Facts:
not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the Amparo writ.

Cleofas Sanchez filed before the Supreme Court a petition for It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim

issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Motion for Production and by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the

Inspection directed against Gen. Esperon, the then Chief of Staff of public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to

the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Supreme Court move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs.

On the second issue, the Court also ruled in the negative. The
interim or provisional remedies provided in Section 14 of the
Amparo Rule are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a
judicious determination of the amparo petition – Section 14 of
theAmparo Rule provides for interim or provisional reliefs that the
courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and
the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence, These
provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at
a judicious determination of the amparo petition.
Gamboa vs. Chan, G.R. No. 193636 (2012)
Facts:
Marynette Gamboa, the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, filed a
petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data before the Regional
Trial Court alleging that her right to privacy was violated by her
supposed inclusion in the enumeration of indiiduals maintaining a
private army group in the report of the Philippine National Police,
made pursuant to the administrative order no. 275 by then
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. She also prayed for destruction
of the report which she claimed was unverified and to restrain the
PNP from forwarding it. The RTC denied her petition for failure to
establish the source of the information.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper.
Ruling:
No, it is not proper. In denying the petition, the Supreme Court
cited the ruling of the European Commission on Human Rights in
Leander vs Sweden which it says, illustrates how the right to
informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to
privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. While
the Court held that petitioner established that the PNP was indeed
the source of the report, she nevertheless failed to impute that the
leakage came to third parties on the PNP and such made her and her
supporters more susceptible to harassment and increased police
surveillance.
The Court ruled, taking cognizance of the Constitutional fiat of
dismantling private armed groups, the state interest outweighs the
alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa as the collection of
forwarding of the report was pursuant to a lawful mandate. In this
case, the Court also cautioned investigating entities that information
sharing must observe strict confidentiality and the intelligence
gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities empowered
to receive the relevant information. It must be emphasized the in
order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand and the right to
life , liberty or security on the other.
9
Meralco vs. Lim, G.R. No. 184769 (2010)
Facts:
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an
administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). An
anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of
the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at
which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter
reads: Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA
NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG
BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG
MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB….
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO
linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter to the
Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. By Memorandum,
petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource
Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang
Sector in Muntinlupa as “A/F OTMS Clerk,” effective July 18, 2008 in
light of the receipt of “… reports that there were accusations and
threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which
could possibly compromise [her] safety and security.” Respondent,
by letter addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President,
appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could
voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the
“punitive” nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due
process.
Citing the gruelling travel from her residence in Pampanga to
Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job
security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Respondent
thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her
transfer. No response to her request having been received,
respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan.
Issue: Whether or not a labor-related issue is within the parameters
of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.
Ruling: Negative.
Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with
MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment to the
Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data
allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the
province of a writ of habeas data. Writ habeas data will NOT issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the
context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident
that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer
a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s
employment are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
 10

remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably
lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. In another vein,
there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners
committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s
right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. Her
posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
(Rule 72, Rules of Court)
Hagans vs. Wislizenus, No. 16680 (1920)
involving members of the same family hence the same should be
dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on
the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not
been complied with.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the case on hand is in the nature of an ordinary
civil action involving members of the same family.

Facts: 2. Is Article 222 of the civil code applicable to Special proceeding

cases?
This is an original petition for writ of certiorari. The facts alleged in
the petition are admitted by a demurrer. The respondent judge, in Ruling:
support of his demurrer, argues that the provision of Act 190 permit
With regard to the first issue, the Court declared that the nature of
him to appoint assessors in special proceedings. The petitioner
the case partakes that of a Special proceeding. The court reiterated
contends that no authority in law exists for the appointment of
that it is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature
assessors in such proceedings. Issue Whether or not a judge of the
of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the
Court of First Instance, in special proceedings, is authorized under
relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall
the law to appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount
be controlling. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional
due to an administrator or executor for his services and expenses in
facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a
the care, management, and settlement of the estate of a deceased
deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio, as well
person.
as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death.
Ruling The Court held that in the proceedings like the present the
The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the
judge of the Court of First Instance is without authority to appoint
country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent
assessors. The only provisions of law which could permit this are
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. It also contains
sections 153 – 161 of Act appointment of assessors in a special
an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative
proceeding are sections 153 – 161 of Act No. 190. Section 154
list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be
provides that “either party to an action may apply in writing to the
settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed
judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of such
for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the
application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided…”
intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to
Upon examination of Section 1 of Act 190, there is a distinction
seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father,
between an “action” and a “special proceeding”. Said section 1
Troadio Manalo. Although, it contains certain averments which may
provides that an “action” means an ordinary suit in a court of justice,
be typical of an ordinary civil action, the Petitioners may not be
while “every other remedy furnished by law is a ‘special
allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the
proceeding.”
settlement of the estate of the deceased. The rule has always been
Vda. De Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129242 (2001) to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the
concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in
Facts:
the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer.

Troadio Manalo died intestate and was survived by his wife, Pilar S.
As to the second issue, the Court declared that Art. 222 of the civil
Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, who are all of legal age. The
code which provides that : " No suit shall be filed or maintained
Respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late
between members of the same family unless it should appear that
Troadio Manalo, filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late
same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035" is
father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother,
applicable only to ordinary civil actions and NOT WITH SPECIAL
Romeo Manalo, as administrator. Petitioners filed a petition for
PROCEEDINGS. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an
certiorari under rule 65 with the CA, alleging that there was absence
action by one person or persons against another or other in a court
of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same
of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law
family. According to them, the petition is an ordinary civil action
affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a

right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed
in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133000 (2001)
Facts:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were
registered owners of a parcel of land. Upon the death of Graciana in
1951, Graciano, together with his six children, entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate adjudicating and
dividing among themselves the mentioned real property. In 1980,
Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their
marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his
wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the
latter's name. On 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs. The private
respondents filed a civil case against the petitioner before RTC
Manila. They alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher,
through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery,
acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale in favor herein petitioner resulting in the
cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059
in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private
respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such
fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
Issue:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in
an action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages,
adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of
property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
Ruling: Negative.
The court ruled that an action for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement
of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific
rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.Matters which involve
settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within
the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its
limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased
to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the
court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions
11
and on the heir. In the case at hand, RTC is acting in its general
jurisdiction is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and
resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of
herein petitioner. Moreover, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not
properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon
the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del
Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
Reyes vs. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405 (2006)
Facts:
Respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena
Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac. Chichioco claimed that she
was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate on July 31, 1998.
Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante
Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising,
Alfredo Lising and respondents Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.
According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in
the municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted
pieces of jewelry and money which were allegedly in the possession
of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.
Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of the estate,
upon payment of a bond, pending settlement and distribution of
Lising’s properties to the legal heirs Petitioner Anna Reyes opposed
such petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and
the latter’s husband, Serafin Delos Santos.
She asserted that the petition should be dismissed and that the
appointment of an administrator was unnecessary, since she was
the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts.
She has attached, as supplement to her opposition, the judicial
decree issued under seal by the Civil Registrar. Chichioco and her
alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
annulment of the adoption decree. They claimed that no
proceedings for the adoption of petitioner took place in 1968 since
the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) had no records of the adoption case. Petitioner’s
natural mother supposedly connived with the court personnel to
make it appear that petitioner was adopted by the Delos Santos
spouses and that the CFI’s order for initial hearing was published in a
weekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court orders
in special proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding that
petitioner had to prove her adoption due to imputations of
irregularities in view of Section 47 of Rule 39.
Ruling: No, petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any
evidence other than those which she had already presented before
the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a certification from
the local civil registrar’s office. Both certifications were issued under

the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers.
These are thus presumed to have been regularly issued as part of
the official duties that said public officers perform. It should be
borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document
required by law to be entered into the public records, the official
repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements
affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as
well as the court which rendered the judgment. Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of
doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and its
contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, G.R. No. 139868 (2006)
Facts:
Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard)
were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30
years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill. Audrey
died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire
estate to Richard consisting of Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate
improvements at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance
and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Two years after her death,
Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years
thereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his
entire estate to respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he
left to his adopted daughter. Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in
the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, filed a
motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project
of partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of partition
were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards
to Richard’s will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of
Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to
respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their
three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the
law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy
passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the
property subject to the legacy.
Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be
annulled under the circumstances.
Ruling:
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the
title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous
may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its
binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in
exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be
set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs.
Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate
12
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out
by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Petitioner’s failure to
proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to
the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted
to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
Domingo vs. Landicho, G.R. No. 170015 (2007)
Facts:
Petitioner Crisologo Domingo filed for the registration of parcels of
lands in Tagaytay and was opposed by Landicho et. al. During the
pendency of the case, Domingo died and his lawyer failed to inform
the court. The Regional Trial Court ruled in his favor, but was later
reversed by the Court of Appeals. The heirs of Domingo interposed
the defense that there was no valid substitution of parties and
therefore, they are not bound by the reversal of the Court of
Appeals. Hence, they now come to the succor of the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not failure to substitute parties is fatal to the
proceedings.
Ruling: Yes, the Supreme Court held that when a party dies in an
action that survives and no order is issued by the court for the
appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of the
deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no
substitution has been effected , the proceedings held by the court
without such legal representatives or heirs and the judgment
rendered after such trial are null and void, because the court
acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the legal representative
or of the heirs upon whom trial and judgment would be binding.
However, in this case, the Court deemed objection on the
jurisdiction over the person of the parties as waived as the surviving
heirs participated in the present petition, albeit belatedly.
(Rules 73-90, Rules of Court) Settlement of Estates of Deceased
Persons
Maloles II vs. Phillips, G.R. No. 133359 (2000)
Facts:
On July 20, 1995 Dr. Arturo De Santos filed for the probate of his
will. He claimed he had no compulsory heirs and had named in his
will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation,
Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate
value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will
were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. On Feb. 16 1996, Makati RTC Branch-61
under judge Gorospe issued an order granting the petition and
allowing the will, the court found that the testator was of sound

mind and freely executed said will. Shortly after on Feb. 26, 1996 Dr.
De Santos died.
Petitioner (testator’s nephew) claiming to be the only son of the
deceased’s sister Alicia de santos, filed a motion for intervention as
the nearest of kin, and also as a creditor of the deceased. Defendant
filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Makati
Branch 61, but then withdrew the same. Later defendant then filed
the motion in Makati RTC Branch 65. Petitoner then filed a motion
for intervention also with Branch 65, stating again he was a full
blooded nephew and that a case already related to the subject
matter was pending in Branch 61. Judge Abad Santos, referred the
case to Branch 61. Meanwhile Judge Gorospe in Branch 61 denied
the petitioner’s motion to intervene, and denied taking cognizance
of the case forwarded by Branch 65, because the case in Branch 65
involved the Estate of Decent Arturo De Santos, while the one in
Branch 61 was filed by Arturo de Santos Himself when he was alive
and had already been decided back in Feb. 16 1996, when it allowed
the will. Branch 65 did not want to take the case, but reversed it’s
decision and again took cognizance of the case to expedite
proceedings.
Issue:
1 Whether or not Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed
with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing
the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
2 Whether or not Makati, Branch 65 acquired jurisdiction over the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private)
respondent.
3 Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr.
Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition
for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Branch 65 now has jurisdiction.
Petitioner’s contention that that the proceedings must continue
until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and
legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, §1 of the Rules of
Court is without merit. In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-
settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the
extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of
sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law. This was already done in the ante-
mortem probate of Dr. De Santos’ will during his lifetime. Thus, after
the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996,
there was 25
13
Malig vs. Bush, G.R. No. L-22761 (1969)
Facts:
The plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were the
acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of
the deceased John T. Bush; that the defendant, by falsely alleging
that she was the legal wife of the deceased was able to secure her
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased; that
she submitted to the court for approval a project of partition,
purporting to show that the deceased left a will; that the defendant
then knew that the plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural
children of the deceased; and that they discovered the fraud and
misrepresentation perpetrated by the defendant only in July, 1962.
They prayed that the project of partition be annulled. The defendant
filed a motion to dismiss stating that since the action was one to
annul a project of partition duly approved by the probate court it
was that court alone which could take cognizance of the case, citing
Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed on jurisdictional
ground based on Rule 75, Section 1 (now Rule 73, Section 1) of the
Rules of Court.
Ruling: No. The case should be remanded for further proceedings.
Section 1 of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court fixes the jurisdiction for
purposes of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person, "so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location of his estate." The matter really
concerns venue, as the caption of Rule cited indicates, and in order
to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction
from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." In the final
analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the partition
already made and approved by the probate court, and to reopen the
estate proceeding so that a new partition may be made, but for
recovery by the plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged inheritance
of which, through fraud, they have been deprived. Without
prejudice to whatever defenses may be available to the defendant,
the Court believes that the plaintiffs' cause should not be foreclosed
without a hearing on the merits.
Rodriguez, et. al. vs. Borja, et. al, G.R. No. 180906
Facts: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan
delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and
testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners filed a
petition before the court to examine the purported will but which
was later withdrawn, and a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a another
court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought the dismissal of the
special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's estate based

on the purported will, questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI
Bulacan.
Issue: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the
testate proceedings?
Ruling: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late
Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until
later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu
proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the
will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is
prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court.
Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, intestate succession
is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only
takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.
Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-24742
Facts:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by
his widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children
of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children
from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator
died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in
Cebu and Quezon City. While petition was still pending with CFI
Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with
CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she
was named executrix. Hence, Rosa also filed an opposition and
motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance
resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on
the probate proceedings. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or
improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to
dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and
issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
Issue: Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming
exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to
CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the
precedence of probate over intestate proceedings.
Ruling:
The rules on venue and jurisdiction, under Rule 73, provides that
the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
14
However, upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's
last will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving
widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the
intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate
may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition
and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the
second court which has before it the petition for probate of the
decedent's alleged last will. The residence of the decent or the
location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would
affect the prompt administration of justice. Therefore, the CFI of
Quezon City did not act with grave abuse of discretion nor it acted
without jurisdiction.
San Luis vs. San Luis
Facts:
The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis.
During his lifetime Felicisimo contracted three marriages. From the
first marriage contracted in 1942 he had six children, two of whom
are the petitioners in this case. His first wife died in 1963 and his
second marriage to an American citizen ended in the wife getting a
divorce in 1971. In 1974 Felicismo married Felicidad, the respondent
in this case, in the USA. They had no children but lived together for
18 years until Felicismo died in 1992.After Felicisimo death, Felicidad
sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and filed
a petition for letters of administration. The children of Felicisimo
from his first marriage opposed this on the grounds that Felicidad is
only a mistress, the second marriage to the American wife
subsisting. The petitioners claimed that Article 26, Paragraph 2 of
the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate the
bigamous marriage because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimo is legitimate children.
Issue: Does the respondent Felicidad have legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration?
Ruling Yes, Felicidad haslegal personality to file the petition for
letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during
their cohabitation. Sec. 2, Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters
of administration must be filed by an interested person. 30 |Case
Digests in Special Proceeding
Macias vs. Uy Kim, G.R. No. L-31174 (1972)
Facts:
Petitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias filed on December 2, 1969 a
petition for review by certiorari against respondents Uy Kim, Andres
Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co, Manuel Sosantong, Reliable Realty

Corporation, and Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance. It
appearing from the complaint that there is presently pending in
Branch VIII of this Court Special Proceeding No. 63866 for the
settlement of the inheritance of the deceased Rosina Marguerite
Wolfson. That the plaintiff claims to be a beneficiary by hereditary
title of her estate. It being unquestionable that the authority to
distribute the inheritance of a deceased person and determine the
persons entitled thereto belongs exclusively to the court or branch
thereof taking cognizance of the proceedings for its settlement
(Branch VIII) in this case.
The orders sought to be annulled and set aside by herein petitioner-
appellant in his complaint against private respondents which was
assigned to Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance presided
over by Judge Jose L. Moya, were issued by Judge Barcelona
presiding over Branch VIII of the same court. The Petitoner filed a
separate civil case in Branch X, seeks to recover his distributive share
of the estate of the decedent Rosina.
Issue: Whether or not the Judge of Branch X of the Manila Court of
First Instance can legally interfere with, or pass upon the validity of
said orders of the Judge of Branch VIII, as the probate court.
Ruling: No, Branch VIII as the probate court has exclusive
jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent, including the validity of
the will, the declaration of heirs, the disposition of the estate for the
payment of its liabilities, and the distribution among the heirs of the
residue thereof. Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the
deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts."
Pursuant to this provision, therefore all questions concerning the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson
should be filed before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First
Instance, then presided over by former Judge, now Justice of the
Court of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where Special Proceedings No.
63866 for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased
Rosina Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is still pending. The reason
for this provision of the law is obvious. The settlement of the estate
of a deceased person in court constitutes but one proceeding. For
the successful administration of that estate it is necessary that there
should be but one responsible entity, one court, which should have
exclusive control of every part of such administration. To intrust it to
two or more courts, each independent of the other, would result in
confusion and delay. The Court cannot ignore the proclivity or
tendency of appellant herein to file several actions covering the
same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief, which is
unduly burdening the courts.
Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18148
Facts:
15
Capili died in 1958, testate in which he disposed his properties in
favor of his wife, cousins all surnamed Capili and Arturo, Deogracias
(petitioner) and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Reyes died the
following year. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernando, executor of
the estate of Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives
and intestate heirs. The executor filed a project of partition in the
estate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will,
adjudicating the estate of Capili among the testamentary heirs with
the exception of Reyes, whose share was allotted to her collateral
relatives. These relatives filed an opposition to the executor’s
project of partition and submitted a counter-projection of their own,
claiming ½ of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased
Capili on the theory that they belong not to the latter alone but to
the conjugal partnership of the spouses. The probate court issued an
order declaring the donation void for the reason that it falls under
Article 133 of the Civil Code which prohibits donation between
spouses during the marriage. In the same order, the court
disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to
file another, dividing the property mentioned in the last will and
testament of Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of
donation, between the instituted heirs of Capili and Reyes, upon the
basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of the
deceased spouses.
Issue: Whether or not a probate court in special proceeding had
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation in
question and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the
properties mentioned in the will.
Ruling: Affirmative. The Court held that the determination of title to
property is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The
probate court has the jurisdiction since there is a necessity to
liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate
of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are
all parties, who are all parties to the proceedings, including the
widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who
have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and
who have appeared voluntarily. The petitioners, by presenting their
project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the
claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband) put in
question the issue of ownership of the properties is within the
competence of probate court.
Ermac vs. Medelo, G.R. No. L-32281 (1975)
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the
respondent court in its Special Proceeding No. 1517 approving the
project of partition filed by private respondent, pursuant to the
order of the same court providing for summary settlement of the
intestate estate of the deceased spouses Potenciano Ermac and

Anastacia Mariquit as well as of the order of denying
reconsideration of the first order. The above-named spouses both
died leaving as the only property to be inherited by their heirs a
parcel of land with an assessed value of P590.00. Accordingly, a
grandchild filed a petition for the summary settlement of the said
estate which was consequently granted. However, Petitioner Ermac,
one of the children of the deceased spouses, moved for
reconsideration on the ground that it belongs to him and his wife.
The motion was denied, the court ruling that the proper remedy is a
separate suit. Accordingly, the petitioner filed a corresponding
action. And when upon submission of the project of partition, the
respondent court approved the same over his objection. The
petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction or
gravely abused its discretion in approving the project of partition
notwithstanding that it is being claimed by petitioners in a separate
civil action to be their property and not of the estate.
Ruling: No. The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons with the least loss of
time. This is especially true with small estates for which the rules
provide precisely a summary procedure dispensing with the
appointment of an administrator together with the other involved
and cumbersome steps ordinarily required in the determination of
the assets of the deceased and the persons entitled to inherit
therefrom and the payment of his obligations. Definitely, the
probate court is not the best forum for the resolution of adverse
claims of ownership of any property ostensibly belonging to the
decedent's estate. While there are settled exceptions to this rule as
applied to regular administration proceedings, it is not proper to
delay the summary settlement of a deceased person just because an
heir or a third person claims that certain properties do not belong to
the estate but to him. 3 Such claim must be ventilated in an
independent action, and the probate court should proceed to the
distribution of the estate, if there are no other legal obstacles to it,
for after all, such distribution must always be subject to the results
of the suit. For the protection of the claimant the appropriate step is
to have the proper annotation of lis pendens entered.
PCIB vs. Escolin, G.R. No. L-27860 (1974)
Facts:
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton
Hodges as well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who
predeceased him by about five years and a half. In their respective
wills which were executed on different occasions, each one of them
provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder (after funeral and administration
expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both real and personal,
16
wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and to
hold unto (him/her) — during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to
the condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived the
other, the remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other
is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters
of the latter. Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957.
Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was appointed special
administrator of her estate, and in a separate order of the same
date, he was "allowed or authorized to continue the business in
which he was engaged, (buying and selling personal and real
properties) and to perform acts which he had been doing while the
deceased was living." Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after
Mrs. Hodges' will had been probated and Hodges had been
appointed and had qualified as Executor thereof, upon his motion in
which he asserted that he was "not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial court
ordered that "for the reasons stated in his motion dated December
11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, ... all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles
Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further
authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and
testament of the latter."
Issue: Does the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her
brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions?
Ruling: The Court overruled PCIB's Contention that the provision in
Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes
ineffective hereditary substitutions.
The Court ruled that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously
instituted her brothers and sisters as co- heirs with her husband,
with the condition, however, that the latter would have complete
rights of dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and
what would go to the former would be only the remainder thereof
at the time of Hodges' death. In other words, whereas they are not
to inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on the other hand,
Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly then,
the essential elements of testamentary substitution are absent; the
provision in question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous
institution of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a
partial resolutory condition the operative contingency of which is
coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the institution
of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not
prohibited by law.

Ocampo vs. Potenciana, G.R. No. L-2263 (1951)
Facts:
The petitioners filed an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the
Court of Appeal. The petitioner executed a document purporting to
convey the subject property located in Binan, Laguna by way of
pacto de retro sale to the defendant. The petitioner also executed
another document making it appear that for the period of
redemption, an annual rental of P300 or 12% of the purchase price
shall be paid for the lease house and lot. Although the subject
property is registered only in the name of the husband, Edilberto
Ocampo, the same is actually a conjugal property. Also, the original
period fixed for repurchase was one year, “extendible to another
year”. However, several extensions were granted up to its last
extension in 1937, with the vendor paying the principal in addition
to interests. After the lapse of the last extension defendant, and
without the right to repurchase being exercised, Potenciano filed
with the register of deeds of Laguna for the consolidation of the title
under the names of Sps. Potenciano.
In 1939, defendant, Potenciano gave the wife of Edilberto, Paz Yatco
an option to repurchase the property within 5 years. Yatco sought to
exercise the option by tendering to Potenciano but being rejected,
she then deposited the money (P4,000) in court and brought an
action for in her own name as administratrix of the estate of her
husband. Defendant’s children, intervened by way of cross-
complaint. They alleged that the option given by their father to the
plaintiff was null and void with respect to the share of their
deceased mother which passed unto by right of inheritance. Also,
the defendant’s children wanted to exercise the right to redemption
accorded by law to co-owners of property held in common.
Issue: Whether or not the surviving spouse (Potenciano) has the
authority as the de facto administrator of the conjugal estate to
enter into an agreement after the death of his wife with respect to
their conjugal property.
Ruling: NO, the court of appeals erred in the supposing that the
surviving spouse had the authority to as de facto administrator in of
the conjugal estate. The supreme court pointed out that the
decision relied upon by the CA is now obsolete. The rule that, upon
dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the husband
must liquidate the partnership affairs has been changed by ACT No.
3176, now section 2, Rule 75 which provides that when marriage is
dissolved by death of either the husband or wife, the partnership
affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of
the deceased spouse. The court also noted that CA found and it was
undisputed that the pacto de retro sale was in reality a loan with
security or an equitable mortgage, with simulated rental for interest.
Also, the option agreement in question was nothing more than mere
extension of the time of payment of the mortgagee, since in the
17
mind of the parties the real transaction between them was that of a
loan with security or equitable mortgage. Consequently, under such
view there it is no longer necessary to consider the claim of the
defendant’s children, Victor and Lourdes Potenciano, since the
consolidation of title to the property in the name of their parents
was null and void.
Reyes and Arcon vs. Ysip, G.R. No. L-7516 (1955)
Facts:
This is a petition for a writ to compel the judge of the CFI of Bulcan
to permit and allow petitioner to submit evidence of her claim that
she is a natural daughter of the deceased, Juan Reyes Panlilio.
Probate of the last will and testament of decedent was filed in the
CFI. Leonor P. Reyes, herein petitioner filed an opposition. The
special administratix, who had presented the will for probate, object
to the personality and right of the petitioner herein to contest the
will and asked that the court resolve her right to contest the will
before the hearing thereon. The Honorable Judge held that only the
probate of the will was at issue and that the question of the
presentation of evidence as to the filiation of the oppositor,
petitioner herein was out of place. Counsel for petitioner made
attempts to have the court reconsider its order but the court
refused to do so.
Issue: Whether or not the natural child is allowed to intervene in
the proceedings for the probate of the will.
Ruling: In distribution proceedings where a will is sought to be
admitted to probate, a person who can have no interest in the
succession cannot be allowed to intervene and oppose such
probate. A person intervening in the proceedings should be required
to show interest in the will or the property affected thereby. For
such purpose, it is sufficient that he shows or produces prima facie
evidence of his or her relationship to the testator. The court did not
amount to a prohibition to take part in the hearing for the probate
of the will and was motivated by desire to avoid multiplicity of the
issues and the limitation thereof to the execution of the will. The
court did not therefore deprive the petitioner of any right which she
is entitled to under the rules of law. 36 |Case Digests in Special
Proceeding
Cortes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117417 (2000)
Facts:
Petitioner Reselva, private respondent. Cortes, and Florante Reselva
are brothers and sister and children - heirs of the late spouses
Teodoro T. Reselva and Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva. During their
lifetime, they acquired a property particularly a house and lot
consisting of 100 square meters, more or less. Lucrecia Aguirre
Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter executed a

holographic will which was probated in this case, Cortes was
appointed Executrix. She filed a motion before respondent probate
court praying that Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of the
property, be ordered to vacate the property at No. 173 Ilaw St.,
Balut, Tondo, Manila and turn over to said Executrix the possession
thereof.
Issue: Can the probate court decide a question of title of ownership?
Ruling:
General rule provides that a probate court cannot decide a question
of title of ownership. By way of exception to the above-mentioned
rule, "when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional
upon them to submit to the probate court the question of title to
property.Here, the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership. More so, when the opposing parties belong
to the poor stratum of society and a separate action would be most
expensive and inexpedient.
(FULL TEXT)FORTUNATA VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, BENJAMIN
RODRIGUEZ, MERCEDES RODRIGUEZ DE HALLARE, LUZ RODRIGUEZ
DE CARLOS AND ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, petitioners, vs. HON.
BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
and ABELARDO RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the order of
respondent Judge dated August 11, 1952, wherein after overruling
the opposition to the institution of the intestate estate proceedings
of the late Flaviano Rodriguez, he appointed Abelardo Rodriguez
administrator of the estate upon filing a bond in the sum of P2,000.
It is averred in the petition that Flaviano Rodriguez died on February
8, 1944, at Parañaque, Rizal, leaving an estate with a value of
P10,000; that the surviving heirs are the widow, Fortunata Vda. de
Rodriguez, and six children who are the petitioners and respondent
Abelardo Rodriguez all the heirs, who were then already of age,
entered into a verbal agreement whereby they agreed not to make a
liquidation of the estate but to place it under the administration of
the widow with the understanding that each of the six children
would be entitled to receive a portion of the income in equal shares
from year to year for the needs of their families provided that they
do not exceed the participation to which they are entitled;
that on March 19, 1952, or eight years after the death of Flaviano
Rodriguez, respondent Abelardo Rodriguez filed a petition for
administration of their intestate estate of said deceased in spite of
his knowledge that the estate had no debts and all the heirs were of
age;
that on June 2, 1952, the other heirs, petitioners herein, objected to
the petition invoking the rule that if the estate is free from
obligations and the heirs are all of age, no administration
18
proceedings shall be allowed; that on August 11, 1952, respondent
Judge, after overruling the opposition, appointed Abelardo
Rodriguez administrator of the estate upon filing the requisite bond.
Respondents herein, in answer to the petition, admitted the
existence of a verbal agreement entered into between the heirs in
1944, wherein they agreed not to liquidate the estate and to place it
under the administration of the widow in view of the unsettled
conditions then prevailing at the time, but they contend that while
that was the understanding the same was not carried out because in
reality it was Benjamin Rodriguez, one of the petitioners herein, who
took over the administration of the estate and in the discharge of his
duties he failed and refused to give to respondent Abelardo
Rodriguez his share in the income which he badly needed for the
support of his family, for which reason he started the intestate
proceedings which gave rise to the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: 1. whether respondent Judge acted properly in maintaining
the administration proceedings and in appointing Abelardo
Rodriguez as administrator of the estate notwithstanding the fact
that the estate has no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its
distribution are all of age.
RULING:
Under section 1, rule 74 of the Rules of Court, if the decedent left no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by
their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit,
and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition.
Construing the scope of said section 1, (formerly section 596, Act
No. 190), this Court repeatedly held "that when a person dies
without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of
age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been uniformly
held that in such case the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings".
It, therefore, appears from said section 1, as construed by this Court,
that when the estate has no pending obligations to be paid, his
heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property
to a judicial administration for the reason that it is superfluous or
unnecessary, and in most cases long and costly, in which case the
way left to the heirs is to divide the estate among themselves as
they may see fit, and should they disagree, they may do so in an
ordinary action of partition.
ISSUE: 2. Is this pattern mandatory upon the heirs? Should the heirs
be unable to agree on a settlement of the estate, do they have to

resort necessarily to an ordinary action of partition? Can they not
choose to institute administration proceedings?
Our answer is that section 1 does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no
debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons
to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to
divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort
to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so
if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said
section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the
use made therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise
the framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was
done in other provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that
the word may is used not only once but in the whole section which
indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the discretion
of the heirs.
The inquiry before us is not new. In a case where one of the heirs
chose to institute administration proceedings in court, even if the
estate had no debts, and the widow sought to dismiss the case
invoking in support of her contention the doctrine enunciated in the
cases already adverted to, this Court said:
The principal ground of the opposition is that the heirs being of legal
age, and their being no proof that there is any valid and effective
credit against the deceased, no legal reason exists for the court to
appoint an administrator, as prayed for in the petition, citing in
support of this contention the doctrine enunciated in the case of
Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa (17 Phil., 321); Bondad vs. Bondad (34
Phil., 232); Baldemor vs. Malangyaon (34 Phil., 367).
It is true that, under section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
whenever all the heirs of a person who died intestate are lawful age
and legal capacity, and there are no debts due from the estate, or all
the debts have been paid, the heirs may, by agreement duly
executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and
divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without
court proceedings. But there is nothing in this section which
prohibits said heirs from instituting special proceedings for the
administration of the intestate estate if they cannot agree on the
extrajudicial partition and appointment of the same. (Orozco vs.
Garcia, 50 Phil., 149, 151.)
In this particular case, however, we find that the core of petitioners'
objection is not that the heirs have erroneously instituted these
administration proceedings but that the court erred in appointing
Abelardo Rodriguez administrator of the estate. It is claimed that
Abelardo Rodriguez was appointed administrator without the
petitioners having been given an opportunity to be heard. But this
claim has no basis it appearing that the parties had been duly heard
before the court issued its order now complained of. It appears that
19
both parties submitted the names of the persons they wanted to be
appointed as administrator and the court made its choice only after
weighing the fitness and qualifications of the persons
recommended. Thus, on this point, the court said:
The petitioner in this case appears to be qualified to act as
administrator of the estate of the deceased Flaviano Rodriguez and
does not possess any of the disqualifications. Moreover, he is one of
the heirs left by the deceased. Inasmuch as one of the oppositors
appear to be more qualified to act as administrator of the estate,
the court is inclined to grant the petition presented by Abelardo
Rodriguez. (Annex D)
The petition is dismissed with costs. The preliminary injunction
issued is hereby dissolved.
GUICO, ET AL., vs. PABLO G.BAUTISTA, ET.
Facts:
The petitioner in this case filed a case of partition despite the
existence of debts of the decedent.
Issue:
The petitioner urges that their action for partition and liquidation
may be maintained, notwithstanding that there are pending
obligations of the estate, subject to the taking of adequate measures
either for the payment or the security of its creditors. Is his
contention correct?
Held:
No. There is no question that the law allows the partition of the
estate of a deceased person by the heirs, extrajudicially or through
an ordinary action for partition, without the filing of a special
proceeding and the appointment of an administrator for the
purpose of the settlement of said estate, but this they may do only
"if the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of
age or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians". The
reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations,
there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to
administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of
their possession to which they are immediately entitled
The situation is different, however, where the deceased left pending
obligations. In such cases, such obligations must be first paid or
compounded with the creditors before the estate can be divided
among the heirs; and unless they reach an amicable settlement as to
how such obligations should be settled, the estate would inevitably
be submitted to administration for the payment of such debts. As
compared to ordinary partition, the regular estate proceedings offer
the advantage of requiring all creditors of the deceased to disclose
themselves and submit their respective claims within a

comparatively short period (12 months under Rule 87, unless claims
are contingent), otherwise, they are forever barred; while in
ordinary judicial partitions the creditors' claims are only
extinguished by the expiration of the period of extinctive
prescription. An heir, therefore, may have an interest in making sure
that the share allocated to him will be freed from invisible claims, so
that creditors may not later appear and initiate the very estate
proceedings sought to be avoided, and he may properly object to an
action for partition on this ground. Unless, therefore, all the heirs
are agreeable to assuming personal liability for all the decedent's
obligations, those known as well as those undisclosed, regular estate
proceedings can not be avoided.
Appellants claim that there is nothing that would prevent the trial
court from directing and ordering that the pending obligations of the
estate be paid first, or that they should constitute as liens on the
respective shares to be received by the heirs. In other words,
appellants propose that the administration of the estate for the
purpose of paying off its debts be accomplished right in this partition
suit, with either the Court performing the duties of the
administrator, or an administrator appointed to take care of such
debts, as prayed for in their complaint. Obviously, an ordinary action
for partition can not be converted into a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased, without compliance with the
procedure outlined by Rules 79-90 of the Rules of Court, especially
the provisions on publication and notice to creditors.
PEREGRINA REBONG, vs. JUDGE FIDEL IBAÑEZ
(A very short case. Need not be digested. The Following is a
reproduction of the original case)
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari against the respondent judge of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna on the ground that the latter acted
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying
the petition for cancellation of the lien or annotation on the
certificate of title issued to the petitioner, of a land extrajudicially
inherited by him as the only heir of her predecessors in interest to
the effect that the property described in the title is subject to the
claims of the creditors and other heirs of the deceased Jose Rebong
and Maria Rebong within two years from July 9, 1947, in accordance
with sections 1 and 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
section 4 of Rule 74, has not yet terminated or ceased, for the
period of two years from July 9, 1947, have not yet elapsed, the
respondent judge had no jurisdiction or power to order the
cancellation of said lien or annotation as prayed by the petitioner.
Neither section 4, Rule 74, of the Rules of Court, nor section 112 of
Act No. 496 authorizes the substitution of a bond for a lien or
registered interest of any description, whether vested, expedient,
inchoate or contingent, which have not yet terminated or ceased.
20
The petitioner based her petition on section 112 of Act No. 496 and
offered to file a bond of P5,000, the estimated value of the above
mentioned property to answer for such contingent claims.
In view of the foregoing, it is plain that the respondent judge has not
acted in excess of jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion, but
in conformity with the law, in denying the petitioner's petition, and
the petition for certiorari is therefore denied.
The pertinent part of said section 112 of Act No. 496 provides:
"SEC. 112. * * * Any registered owner or other person in interest
may at any time apply by etition to the court, upon the ground that
registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; or that new
interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the
certificate; * * * and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and
determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may
order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a
memorandum upon a certificate or grant any other relief upon such
terms and conditions, requiring security if necessary, as it may deem
proper; * * *."
According to the above quoted provisions, the court "may order the
entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a
memorandum upon a certificate or grant any other relief upon such
terms and conditions, requiring security if necessary," upon
application of a registered owner on "the ground that registered
interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant,
or inchoate, have terminated and ceased, or that new interests have
arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate."
Applying these provisions to the present case, it is evident that,
since the registered or annotated contingent interest of the
creditors or other heirs of the petitioner's predecessors in interest,
established by intestate estate of the deceased.
McMICKING vs. SY CONBIENG (No. 6871 January 15, 1912)
Facts:
In 1902 one Margarita Jose, died and one Engracio Palanca was
appointed administrator with the will annexed of the estate of the
said Margarita Jose, and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy
Cunyao became his sureties.
After the execution of this bond said Palanca, as such administrator,
took possession of all the property of the said Margarita Jose. In
1904, Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco died in the city of Manila. CFI
made an order directing the Palanca to furnish a bond to take the
place of the undertaking upon which said Mariano Ocampo and Dy
Cuyao. The bond thus required was duly filed and the new surities

thereon being Juan Fernandez, Luis Saenz de Vismanos and
Alejandro Palanca.
In the same year 1904, Doroteo Velasco was appointed
administrator of Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Mariano Velasco
and Pio de la Guardia Barretto qualified as sureties of the said
administrator. Doroteo Velasco, as administrator, filed with the
court a complete report and inventory of the property of the
deceased, together with a statement of all his debts and liabilities.
As a part of this report and inventory said administrator filed an
instrument signed by all of the persons interested in the estate of
the said Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the partition of the estate
among themselves without proceedings in court, at the same time
assuming the payment of all obligations against the estate.
In 1908, Palanca was removed from office as administrator of the
estate of said Margarita Jose and Jose McMicking, was appointed in
his stead. Palanca refused to render an account of the property and
funds of the estate of the said Margarita Jose. Instead of so doing,
he retained possession of said property and funds, absconded with
the same, and never returned to the Philippine Islands.
In 1909, Jose McMicking, as administrator, made an application to
the court for the appointment of commissioners of the estate of said
Mariano Ocampo for the purpose of hearing claims against the
estate. The commission having been appointed and qualified, a
claim was presented to it by the plaintiff based upon the defalcation
of said Engracio Palanca, as administrator, which claim was allowed
by said commission and later approved by the court, which directed
that the said claim be paid by Doroteo Velasco, if he had sufficient
funds to make such payment. No part of the sum thus found to be
due by the commission has been paid to the representative of the
estate of said Margarita Jose.
In 1905, Pio de la Barretto died and letters of administration were
issued to Benito Sy Conbieng. In 1909, upon the application of
McMicking, a committee was appointed by CFI Manila to appraise
the estate of the said Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, and to
hear claims presented against his estate. The claim so presented
against the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, was
disallowed by the committee thereof.
Upon these facts the court having heard the evidence and the
arguments of counsel, rendered judgment in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint upon merits,
without costs.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in rendering judgment in favour of
the defendants.
21
Ruling:
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Held:
The judgement must be affirmed base upon the ground that
Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio de la Guardia Barretto
was surety, would not have been liable himself had this action been
commenced against him. If the principal is not liable upon the
obligation, the surety cannot be.
GERONA vs CA (G.R. No. L-19060 May 29, 1964)
Facts:
Legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman
(legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and Teodora Dela Cruz
in the first marriage) filed a complaint against the children of
Marcelo on his second marriage claiming that they are
representative of the latter in the partition of the estate. Placida de
Guzman predeceased Marcelo on August 9, 1941, the latter died on
September 11, 1945. Respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman",
fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only
surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they
well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs. This fact has
been discovered only by the petitioners a year before institution of
the case. Petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their
(petitioners) share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest
thereon instead of the 1/7th sharing made by the respondent.
Petitioner's Contention: They are legitimate heir as such is allowed
to receive equal amounts. Also, present action for partition of the
latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action;
that, if affected by said statute, the period of four (4) years therein
prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud
perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956
or 1957; and that accordingly, said period had not expired when the
present action was commenced on November 4, 1958. Respondent's
Contention: Placida de Guzman's heirs are not entitled to the share
of Marcelo's estate since she is merely a spurious child. Either which,
the claim made by the petitioners are already barred by statute of
limitations which is only 2 years upon after the settlement and
distribution of an estate.
Issue: Whether or not statute of limitations has been properly raised
by the respondents.
Held: Yes.
Generally, Action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe.
This is true ONLY so long as defendants do not hold property in
question under adverse title. The statute of limitations operates as

in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by
the possessor of the property. An action for reconveyance of real
property based upon constructive or implied trust resulting from
fraud may be barred by statute of limitations.
With regards to annulment of EJS, plaintiffs learned at least
constructively of the alleged fraud committed against defendants on
June 25, 1948 the date of registration of the title with the Register of
Deeds as registration of the deed of extra- judicial settlement
constitute constructive notice to the whole world, and complaint
was filed until November 4, 1958 or 10 years after, claim for
discovery of fraud, which is 4 years had already prescribed.
BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA
Facts:
Teodoro Tolete died, leaving his wife and nephews and nieces who
are children of his deceased brothers and sisters.
His wife executed an affidavit of self-adjudicating saying that
Teodoro had no children or dependents, neither ascendants or
acknowledged natural children, neither brothers, sisters, nephews
and nieces..
Then, his wife sold the property to Sampilo, then Sampilo sold it to
Salacup. Sinopera instituted estate proceedings asking for letters of
administration. She alleged that Teodoro’s wife, Leonicia de Leon
has no right to execute the affidavit of self adjudication for there are
other heirs aside from her.
The trial court ruled in favor of Sinopera. The CA modified the ruling
stating that the affidavit of Leonicia is null and void, but the
subsequent sales are valid insofar as it is not above Leonicia’s share
from Teodoro’s estate.
Issues:
The petitioners now argue that Sinopera’s cause of action has
already prescribed because according to the rules of court, person’s
deprived of their right due to the partition or self adjudication must
bring their action within two years from the date of partition or self-
adjudication. Is their contention correct?
Held: No. The said rule applies only to persons who participated in
the said proceedings and does not prejudice those who did not have
the chance to participate.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74.
In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or
all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This
requirement is made more imperative in the old law (Section 596,
Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By
the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are Indicated was
22
the persons to answer for right violated by the extrajudicial
settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention
is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on
persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or
knowledge thereof.
There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or bad
knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to
them he law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner
,deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the
extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest
within the period of two years, and both "the distributees and estate
would be liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they
are the persons who, in accordance with the provision, may seek to
remedy the prejudice to their rights within, the two-year Period. But
as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice
of the death of the decedent or of the setlement, there is no direct
or express provision, and it is unreasonable and unjust that they also
be required to assert their claims within the period extend the
effects of the settlement to the two years. To to them, to those who
did no t take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express
legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental
right to due Process law.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of exrajudicial
settlement or by affidavit, is ail ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any
reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution
would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the
death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit,
especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by
implication.
We have examined the two cases cited by appellants and there is no
similarity at all between the circumstances on which the ruling
therein had been predicated and those of the case at bar.
The two year rule is applicable only:
(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of
the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition,
(2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly
complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent
have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians.
The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not
all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial
settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent
left, aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of
his death.

CUA vs VARGAS (G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006)
Facts:
Paulina Vargas left behind a parcel of residential land. Extrajudicial
Settlement among heirs was executed (9 heirs) but only 6 heirs
signed on the said partition. EJS was published for 3 consecutive
weeks. EJS with sale was again executed, same heirs, same property
and also same shares, only the same person signed thereof and was
sold to Joseph Cua (55m²) on November 15, 1994.
EJS was only known by one of the heirs (who did not sign) when the
house built in their property on May 1995 was demolished. After
knowledge, Gloria Vargas (widow of Santiago an heir who did not
sign said EJS) tried to redeem the property. Offer to redeem was
refused and failed to reach an amicable settlement. Thus, filed a
case for annulment of EJS and Legal redemption.
Respondent's Contention: As co-owners of the property, they may
be subrogated to the rights of purchaser by reimbursing him the
price of the sale. Likewise alleged that 30-day period following a
notice by the vendors to co-owners for them to exercise the right of
redemption of the property had not yet set in as no written notice
was sent to them.
MTC denied petition. Deed of EJS among heirs with sale is valid and
binding. RTC affirmed. CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts
and declared said deed and sale to be void.
Issue: Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound
regardless of failure to participate therein by an extrajudicial
settlement and partition of estate when the extrajudicial settlement
and partition has been duly published.
Held: No.
Persons who did not participate therein nor had no notice of an
extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. Publication of
the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs
who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same
was notice after the fact of execution. The records of the present
case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement
documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before
the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these
extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition
made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they
are concerned.
CRUZ vs CRISTOBAL (G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006)
Facts:
Petition assails the decision of CA affirming in toto the decision of
RTC. Petitioner (Cristobal) claim that they are the legitimate children
of Buenaventura Cristobal, deceased, resulting during first marriage,
23
respondents on the other hand are children of the said deceased on
his second marriage. More than 6 decades later, petitioners learned
that private respondents had executed and EJP of the subject
property and transferred its titles to their names. No settlement was
reached before the barangay thus a complaint for annulment of Title
and damages were filed before RTC by petitioners against private
respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares.
To prove filiation, baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo and the
late Socorro (petitioner) were presented. Mercedes who was born
on January 31, 1909 produced a certification issued by the office of
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, attesting that records of birth for
years 1901, 1909, 1932- 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all
destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. Eufrosina upon execution
of EJP declared that her father died in 1930, Elisa, Mercedes and
Anselmo (child of first marriage) never asserted their alleged right
over the property subject to present litigation and that they have
been paying all the taxes due on the parcel of land.
RTC Ruling: Dismissed the case as petitioners failed to prove their
filiation with the deceased Bueneventura Cristobal as the baptismal
and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and
that petitioners' inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches
CA Ruling: Able to prove their filiation with the decease thru other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. However,
affirmed the ruling of RTC barring their right to recover their share
of the subject property because of laches.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of
the subject property executed by private respondents.
Whether right to challenge has already prescribed.
Held:
No. As to As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject
property executed by the private respondents among themselves to
the exclusion of petitioners, the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74
of the Rules of Court, which states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons
involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not
binding on said persons. The partition of the subject property by the
private respondents shall not bind the petitioners since petitioners
were excluded therefrom. Petitioner Elisa became aware of the
 24

transfer and registration of the subject property in the names of

private respondents only in 1994 when she was offered by private
respondent Eufrosina to choose between a portion of the subject
property or money, as one of the children of private respondent
Jose wanted to construct an apartment on the subject property.
Partition excluded four of the eight heirs of Buenaventura Cristobal
who were also entitled to their respective shares in the subject
property.

No. It was incorrect for the trial and appellate court to hold that
petitioners' right to challenge the said settlement had prescribed.
Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, "no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co- owner may demand
at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as
his share is concerned." Action for partition is imprescriptible; it
cannot be barred by prescription.