SP.8.O. San Luis vs.

San Luis

FACTS: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him, then married again to an American citizen who
divorced him, then remarried again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st marriage contested
the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting
under RP law (can't apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn and other
jurisprudence sufficiently provides the validity to the 3rd marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse
against the Filipino spouse. However, as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently proved, the case was remanded in order for
the 3rd spouse to present further evidence on this.

The petition was contested by Felicisimo's children on the ground that venue improperly laid, theat they hould have filed
petition in Laguna (domicile) and not in Makati (covers Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his death). RTC
Makati dismissed the petition while CA reversed and set aside saying that place of residence should be understood in as
the personal, actual or physical habitation so petition was properly filed

ISSUE: Whether Venue was properly laid?

RULING: YES. The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases. There is a distinction between "residence"
for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and
"domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

SP.8.1. Gerona, et al vs Carmen de Guzman, et al

FACTS: Petitioners, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, allege in their complaint for
reconveyance that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter was a
legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife,
Marcelo married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, namely, respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco,
Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that subsequently after the death of Marcelo, respondents executed
a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased, fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the
only surviving heirs, although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that respondents had thereby
succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land in their own name; that such
fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of this case; that petitioners forthwith demanded
from respondents share in said properties but the respondents refused to heed said demand, thereby causing damages to
the petitioners.

In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners’ mother, the deceased Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to share
in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners’ action is barred
by the statute of limitations.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners’ action is barred by the statute of frauds.

RULING: Yes the SC held that an action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust,
resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among
co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse
title. The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor
of the property. When respondents executed the deed of extrajudicial settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs
of the deceased, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from
the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse to them.

Hence, the action for reconveyance should have been filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, in 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of
Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of
extra-judicial settlement constitutes constructive notice to whole world.

SP.8.2. De Aranz v. Judge Galing

FACTS: Private respondent filed w/ the Pasig RTC a petition for the probate & allowance of the will of the late Montserrat
Infante. The petition specified the names & addresses of herein petitioners as legatees & devisees. The probate court issued
an order setting the petition for hearing & the order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila
once a week for 3consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. The hearing was reset, on w/c date
the probate court issued an order designating the clerk of court to receive evidence ex-parte of the petitioner as there was no
opposition. During the proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.2 Days later, petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order. They alleged that as legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by Sec 4 of Rule
76 ROC. They prayed that they be given10 days to file their opposition to the probate of the will. The probate court denied
the motion for reconsideration. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari & prohibition consequently filed by petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that the requirement of notice on individual heirs, devisees & legatees is merely
a matter of procedural convenience to better satisfy in some instances the requirements of due process

RULING: Yes. It is clear from Sec 4 Rule 76 ROC that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a
will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their
places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners
legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the names
and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause
copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by
mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3)weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The case
cited by the CA in its assailed decision to support its theory is not applicable in the present case.
.
If the allegation of the petition was wrong and the true residence of petitioners was not known, then notice upon them
individually was not necessary. Individual notice upon heirs, legatees and devisees is necessary only when they are known
or when their places of residence are known. In other instances, such notice is not necessary and the court may acquire and
exercise jurisdiction simply upon the publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation.

SP8.4 Roxas v. Pecson

FACTS: Pablo Roxas died, thus his sister and brother, maria and pedro the respondents herein filed petition for intestate
proceeding and be appointed as administrator. But later on dismissed, as petitioner Natividad roxas, the surviving spouse
filed petition for probate of the last will where she was named as executrix and half of the property bequeathed to her and
the other half to pablo’s adulterous child.

Later on, the will was denied probate technically for lack of signatures. Petitioner spouse appealed and pray she be
appointed as special administrator. So Maria and Pedro petitioned the court to be appointed as special administrators. The
judge ordered the appointment of Natividad as special administrator but only for the conjugal property of the deceased and
appoint at the same time Maria to administer the exclusive property of the deceased. Hence this petition by the surviving
spouse

ISSUE: Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion in appointing 2 separate special administrator of the
decedent.

RULING: Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The judge erred in appointing 2 independent special administrators. It
finds no reason to do so especially if the estate to be settled is that of the deceased husband.
a. Since marriage is dissolved upon death of the husband or wife, it follows then that that the community
property shall be inventoried, administered and liquidated, and the person to do this shall also be the one to
administer, Distribute and liquidate the exclusive property of the deceased spouse
b. The widow, who still has a beneficial interest even after the will was disapproved since pending appeal, has
the right of usufruct over the ½ of the exclusive property of decedent besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. And has more interest in the entire estate correctly
c. The beneficial interest required as qualification for appointment of administrator is the interest in the whole
estate and not only in some part thereof
d. Lastly, Since under the law, only one general administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and
distribute estate of the deceased, it follows then that only 1 special administrator maybe appointed in lieu
of the former until question causing delay are decided.