Also by William E. Connolly ‘The Bibos of Phuralization Political Theory and Modernity The Torms of Political Discourse ‘The Augustinian Imperative: A Reflaction on the Polis of Morality “Klentigy Difference: Democratte Negotiations of Pokiical Paradox Politics and Ambiguity Appearance and Reality in Politics Political Science and Ideology WHY IAM NOT A SECULARIST William E. Connolly ‘UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA PRESS: Minneapolis London SoEzs‘Copyright 1999 by the Regens ofthe Unversity of Minnesota ‘The publication ofthis book was assisted by a bequest fom Josh H, Chase to honor his parents, Elen Rankin Chase and Josiah Hook Chase, Minnesota teriteria pioneers ‘The Univertiy of Minnesota Press gratefully acknowledges permision to repeat the following, An eacier version of chapter 2 oxgiallysppeated as Suffering, Justice, and the Poites of Becoming,” Guba, Medicine, and Payehiatry 20 G, Septombor 1996: 251-77, copyright Kluwer Academie Publishers repnted with Jad permission of Kluwer Academie Publishers. Chapter 2 also appeared uncer the same le in Moral Spaces Reinking Bbics and World Poles, edited by David (Campbell and Mice! J Sapiro Qlnespolis: Univers of Winnescta Press, 199). {An ear version ofchapte 4 cxigllyappemed 28 "Peelanclag the Nation: The Moral Universe of Willam Benaee,” Thar) and Event (1957), copyright The Johns Hopkins University Press, used by permision ofthe publisher. An eaticevession of chapter 7 onginally appeared as "A Crigne of Pure Poles,” Mblosophiy and Soctal “Grttcio (September 1997), copyright 1987, Sage Lid, Uk reprinted by peaission (of Sage Pobleations Li All rights rebeved No par of his publication may be reproduced, stored in 2 reveal system, or transmitted in ay form oF by any means, elecconi, imechanieal, photocopying, reocding, or otherwise, without the prior writen Perision ofthe publisher, Published by the Universty of minnesota Press 111 Third avenue Sout, Sue 250 Minnespols, MN 35401-2520, Ingp/ few upess uma. da brary of Congress Cataloging n-Publletion Data Conall, Wiliam &. ‘Why Iam not sul / Willen E. Connolly. pom Includes billogapical references and index ISBN 08166-58512 he acd free paper), — ISBN 08166-33520 (> acre papes) 1, Religion and poliies. 2, Secularism, 1. Tile, BSSPICES 1959 lider se-esais Printed inthe United Sates of America on side paper ‘The Univer of Minnesota isan equaloppemunity educator and employer 11 20 09 06 07 06 o5 Of 0302 100 «1098765432 283777 For JaneContents Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 Refashioning the Secular Chapter 119 The Conceits of Secularism Chapter2. 47 Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of Becoming Chapter3 73 Liberalism, Secularism, and the Nation Chapter 497 Freelancing the Nation Chapter 5115 ‘The Will, Capital Punishment, and Cultural War Chapter 6137 An Ethos of EngagementChapter 7 A Critique of Pure Politics Notes Index 163 189 Acknowledgments have been fortunate to have the opportunity to present several chapters in this book to very stimulating groups. am particulasly grateful to Arthur ‘Kleinman for inviting me to present the Roger Allen Moore Lecture at the Harvard Medical Schoo! in the spring of 1995 and for his very thoughtful ‘commentary on the lecture that eventually became chapter 2 of this book. 1 also thank the organizes ofthe 1998 Program of The English Insite at Har var University, particularly Judith Butler, for inviting me to speak on “re fashioning the secular.” I was during the summer of 1997, when I was a vis itor at the Research School forthe Social Sclences at Australian. National University, that it became clear to me just what my thesis was and how ‘much more work was needed 10 anculate i, Responses to papers I gave at ANU, the University of Sydney, and the University of Melbourne were inot- ‘inately helpful. That may be in part because Australia is both the most secular country I have yet 10 visit and the least haunted by religious wars. ‘Many secularists there were very receptive tthe need to refashion the sec: tla I mast give special thanks ‘o Ana Curthroy, John Docker, Carl Johnson, Christine Helivell, Bany Hindess, Moira Gatens, lan Hunter, Duncan Ivison, Brian Massuen, Paul Patton, Michael Peters, Sendi Buckley, James Tully (a fellow visito), and Philip Petit both for the rewarding conversations we had in general and for the very reflective comments they made on chapters in this book. Coser to home, the wonderful atmosphere for theory at the Johns Hop- kins University is very much due to the influence of my colleagues Dick Flathman and Kittie McClure, Graduate sudents in two seminars have madex—Acknowledgments major contributions to my thinking on this topic. I must mention in particular the contributions of jason Frank, Davide Panag, Jobn Tambornino, Nicholas ‘Tampio, and Kathy Tievenen, Above all, Paul Saurede took on the assign- ment of going over the entire manuscript in its penultimate draft. His sog- gestions have been extremely helpful ‘Talal Asad, Romand Coles, Bonnie Honig, David Ketler, Mor Schoo! man, Mike Shapiro, Michael Warnes, Nathan Widder, and Linda Zesil: have made invaluable suggestions on particular chapters in his study. Tam espe- ally grateful to Tom Dumm, Bary Hindess, Wendy Brown, Kathy Fergu- son, and Stephen White, who took time out from busy schedules to read find comment on the entire manuscript. Their commentaries have been pa ticularly important to me in crafting the final version of this book. Finally, 1 ‘am grateful beyond words to Jane Bennet, to whom this book is dedicated [Not only is she my favorite coteaches, gentle criti, and source of intellectual stimulation, she makes lfe enchanting by her mode of being inthe wold t Refasbtonjye/ Oduction $$ the Scar x tascey eon on fe ron up in a factory town in s tate ter mn an tr ri Flnt iver several blocks away. On a a8 ™Y town ga 9 SE SEO struggle billowing from smokestacks go 3" day % could smell the ‘vas the religious feevor display ‘own gue’ 2% Ould see the class Tae ete cy binge SE More palpable ye had moved north in the 19408 and 19h acu ahem: ariclaly te the Southern Baptist fit th them, 1° 8 jy, oe Parents 1s nor believes, so my ealy ex + aad they often car goes nor believers, 50 my ey experience Pare were se, to the ground and outside the house, ee Jesus? Bly would ask "Because is yo 0 you sian Was lose ‘One wits wien he was reve, ga Bibl ipo ME Jems led ‘with bis friends. The church organize 4 a led a a = most verses in the Bible, The competi MH 20 ane gh Chueh nea the eventual winner earnirg more than» Ong te eg Cou Hear the more composed, The day efor it 2°? poing Ss was Herc, wih Bly aide, You know se sa “Yo ® Stay gy aS COMES it 5 poi behind len for fine sh 93 ps0 acer pul nih Re wat decd wien he ne 3€ winner Won a Fre Weele a the ae les avay. The camp cons sly 112 point, niles away. Te camp conte of ey, tl Bap gue tuated by enough regulated fun w digg, tions, ge MME CEP, ty SOLS CEE ager mem pe . ‘semble, nity kept alow Points, and th at puts you 'y put with led out the stops thet 1Introduction profile at those, Nonetheless, one day he and two other boys were held lover. “Do you want to give yourself to Jesus, Billy?” an adult hovering over hhim would repeat. Bily adopted 2 delinquent pose: don't look up, dont gaze off, just stare down, stupidly. Wait em out. Finally, after leting loose a cascade of tears, he was released from in- terrogation. He ran to the ball field to join the game in progress, Bur tie smear of old tears did him in this time. The coach and players gathered round. "Billy, you've been saved! Its all over your face." So he marched silenty those last three days, an undocumented prisoner of cultural wae ‘A couple of years later, he confided to his parents that he had become fan atheist. Within @ few years Bills conversion crystallized into a creed, particularly ater he read Bertrand Russell's Why Am Not a Christian, Athe= ism was now installed both in his (hough-imbued) gut feelings and in the arguments through which he represented himself ‘As it med out, the crtique of Chestianty had made Bertrand Russell the object of an American campaign of vilification 2 couple of decades ear lier He had been appointed to a one-year term at Ciy College in New York City in 1940, but conservative Christian leaders launched a crusade wo over= turn the appointment, Bishop Manning from the Episcopal Church kicked the campaiga off with a Jere to all the New York newspapers: “What i to be sd of colleges and universes which hold up before ‘bur youth se a responsible teacher of philosoply...a man who isa recopizad propagindlt agains bos religion and morality, and who specially defends adukery....Can anyone who cares forthe welfare GF the county be willg 1 sce sich teaching dlseminated wt the ‘coustenance of our collet and uaiversies....There are those who fre 20 confused monly aed mentally that dey see nothing wrong in the appointment..of one who ip his published writings said “ouside ‘of human desires there s no moral standard." Several Catholic and Protestant groups joined the crusade, with some city politicians chiming in, Rusells sock views were roundly misrepresented inthe process, Pablic support for him came from some Mberals and secu its in the academy, several sberal religious leaders, and a few publishing houses, Rabbi Jonah Wise, FS. Brightman, diector of the National Council on Religion and Education, and the Reverend Guy Emery Shipler were promi= nent clerical supporters of the appoiniment. John Dewey and Sidney Hook were leading secular supporters. The judge, nonetheless, ruled against Rus- sell and the college, basing his judgment on “norms and erteia....which are the laws of nature and nature's God"t Rusel's greatest sins were support for cohabitation before marriage and tolerance of homosexual experimen- Introduction—3 tation among schoolboys if it dd not “interfere with the growth of normal sexual life later The judge labeled the later endorsement of “the damnable felony of homosexvalis."® Under the spell of his cocversion to atheism it was quite a while be- fore Bil called into question many things Russell endorsed. That included secularism, For Paul Edwards, in the introduction to Why 1 Am Not a Chris- tan, bad defined ihe fight over Russells appoiniment as a cultural war be- tween religious bigotry and secular tolerance: | have added as an appendt to this hook, 2 very fll account of how Bestand Rusal was prevered from becoming Professor of Piosopy a the Coleg ofthe Cly Unversity of New York. The facts ofthis case eserve 1 be more widely known if ony ta show the needle dor tons and abuses of power which fanatics ae wing to employ when ‘hey ae ou wo vanquish an remy. Those people who euceeeded in nul Iijing Rusel'ssppoinimenc ae the same ones wi would estoy the secular character ofthe Unted Stats. Thy and thet Sitsh counter: sare on the whole move power today than they were in 1940" imagine that everyone —"believers' and *nonbelieves" alike —could tell stories comparable to the minor trauma recounted here. Indeed, today, "we are often invited to find a trumatic niche for ourselves. But pechaps we are less primed to explore whsc such events indicate more generally about the layered inticacy of thinking and judgment—and about the postive role they often play ia life, uch contingencies become burned into your b providing premonitions from which reflection proceeds and signposts 10 ‘which it appeals Ethical and politcal thinking could not gather the complex: lty they need unless they had such storehouses to draw upon. But the in- tensity of some of these experiences can slo forestall critical thinking about defects and deficiencies in the judgments to which they are bonded, The Visceral register of subjectivity and intersubjecivity, as I will ell i, 8 et once part of thinking, indispensable to more concepeually refined thinking, 1 periodic spur to creative thinking, and a potendal impediment to rethink ing. The visceral register, moreaver, can be drawn upon to thicken an iter subjective ethos of generous engagement between diverse constituencies or to harden strife between pasisans.{t can be and do all these things, and others besides. And yet moders secularism—in the main and for the most ‘part —either ignores this register or disparages it Tt does so in the name of 4 pubife sphere in which reason, morality, and tolerance flourish. By doing sot forfeits some ofthe very resources needed to foster 2 generous pluralism, continue to admire Russel's epposition to bullies on the Christian right ‘who frst advance profoundly contestable doctrines as the normative ground Bilkent University Library4— Introduction of life self and then pull them above the reach of public debate because of their sacred character. I also accept his judgment that while each meta physical or religious orientation makes a diference in polities, no such per- spective suffices by islf to determine a polieal stance. But over the past few decades | have increasingly found secular conceptions of language, ethics, discourse, and politics in which Russell pancipated to be insuicemtly alert to the layered density of political chinking and judgment, even a5 I op- pose a religiously centered polides in which the state represents the dic- tates of a specific church or ofa religious faith as general as Christianity. 1 am neither a secularist in my conception of public fe nor the defender of 1 specific chureh. Are there, though, other spaces of possiblity? Or am I merely conflicted about the possiblities that do exis? This study is an at- tempt 10 engage tensions within myself as well as 10 advance considers tions worthy of the atenion of others. My sense is that many people chafe ‘under the constrlctions of secular doctrine without being ready to accept ‘one of the disturbing options its most fervent defenders present as the only alvenative. The idea is to rework the secular problematic by exploring lay- ‘eed conceptions of thinking, ethos, and public life appropriate to a timely vision of mulidimensional plurals ‘The historical modus vivendi of secularism, while socking to chasten religious dogmatism, embodies unacknowledged elements of Immodesty in ‘elf, The very intensity of the struggle it wages against religious intoler- ance may induce blind spots with respect to itself. F also wonder whether the dime of the secular modus vivendi is drawing to 2 close. We may need to fashion modifications in secular practices today, modifications that both honor debts to it and support more religious and nonreligious varity in pub> lie Hie than many traditional secularists and monoxheists tend to appreciate ‘This isa sky tack to pursue. Many believe tha the thin blue line of secularism, however frayed and tattered it has become, is sill necessary 10 contain religious enthusiasm and dogmatism. While I harbor afew such anxe fexies myself, the stains of dogmatism in secularism may make a contribu ‘don tothe effets secularists dery. People say that Communism kept virulent aationalsms alive in Raster Europe by suppressing public engagement with them, Maybe secularism in democratic capitalist states has muffled the pub- lic ventilation of diverse religious and ieligious perspectives needed 10 ad- jus public life o the multidimensional pluralism of today. Or perhaps itis ‘wise to remain agnostic about the past ambigultles of secularism while fo ‘using upon the confining effects ofthat legacy on the present. There is ite tle doubt that some compromise formation was needed with the breakup ‘of the Catholic monopoly over religious belie in Christendom, and that the Introduetion—5 secular formation contained admirable feaures. But there is also a case to bbe made in favor ofits reexamination under new conditions of being. Tam aware that several doctrines walk under the lage umbrella of sec- Ularism, even if you limit Jourself—as Ido because of limitations in ony grasp of the world—to Western conceptions of the secular. But there is also a cliscetnibfe hierarchy among them. The shape of that hierarchy may be gov- cerned by a general secular wish to provide an authortative and self sufficent public space equipped to regulate and limit “religious” disputes in public life. The pursult of a modified ideal of public Mf, then, may strengthen the hand of minority perspectives already circulating within secularism. Refash- joning secularism might help t temper or disperse religious inolerance while honoring the desire of 2 variey of believers and nonbelievers to represent their faiths in pablic life. Ik might, thereby, help to render public life more i= nlc in shape and, paniculary, more responsive to what I call the poles of becoming, These are big "is" and *maybes,” but t seems timely to give them a hearing. Several variants of seculaism lil wo birds with one stone: as they ty to seal public life from religious doctrines they also cast outa set of nonthe= {ste orlertations to reverence, ethics, and public ie that deserve to be heard, These two effec follow from ihe secular conceit to provide a single, author. tative bass of public reason and/or public ethics that governs al reasonable citizens regardless of “personal” or “private” faith. To invoke that principle against religions enthusiasts, secularists are also pressed. to be pugnacious against asecular, nonthestic perspectives that call these very assumptions and prerogatives into question. That's one reason it rlls off the tongue rather easily to describe John Fawis,}0rgen Habermas, Amy Guttman, and Hans Blumenberg as secularist and to think of Alasdair Macintyre, Pal Rie coeur, and Charles Taylor as defenders of «larger role for theological con- c2m in public Ife, while a dives set of nonthelati thinkers such as Friecrich [Nietasche, Sigmund Freud, Michel Foucaulk, Giles Deleuze, judith Butler, Paul Patton, Thomas Dumm, Romand Coles, Barbara Hercasiin Smith, Wendy Brown, and Michael Shapiro do not fit comfortably on elther side of that Unstable line berween secular and sacred orientations to public lif. For to adhere o a separation of church and state Is not automatically © concur in those conceptions of public life most widely bound up with secularism, To put the point briefly, de secular wish 10 contain religious and ireligious passions within private life helps to engender the immodest conceptions of public life pedled by so manr secularists. The need today is co cultivate 4 public ethos of engagement ic. which a wider variety of perspectives than heretofore acknowledged inform and restrain one another.6— Introduction “Today reflective engagement is needed among a vatiety of religions and irceligions to support a more vibrant public pluralism. Bound up with these judgments isthe conviction chat secular models of thinking, discourse, and ethics are too constipated to sustain the diversity they seek to admire, ‘while several theocratic models that do engage the density of culture do 80 in ways that are too highly centered, The division of labor that fell out of that historic compromise within predominantly Christan states may indeed have provided fragile protection against sectarian conflict and intolerance for a few centuries, But i also spawned practices of public life coo dogmatic and terse to suszin the creative tension needed between democratic gover- nance and crieal responsiveness to the polities of becoming, And the de- _szuetive orientations it supported to non-Christian countries lft lt to be esized to0, Limitations in the early organization of secularism leave finges- prints all over contemporary life. And yet, ironically, the precarious, mul ‘imensional pluralization of life occuring before our eyes may create new conditions of possbiliy (I do nat say probability) to renegodate the old modus vivendi of secularism. Is i, agai, possible to zefashion secularism as 2 model of thinking, dis. ‘course, and public life without lapsing ito the “opposite” view that “Chris: Laniy" or “the Judeo-Christian tradition” must set the authoritative max ‘of public life? Not s you thin the world comes predesigned with these (wo ‘options alone. Or even if your goal isto elevate the panicular faith to which ‘you are attached into the new center of gravity around which secularism and 1 couple of monotheisms rotate. Such 4 game plan recapitulates the historic ‘objectives of secularism and Christianity, respectively. There is another way. Ihe objective 's to project your own perspective into the fray while also ecentering the political imagination of the ensconced contestants 0 that each becomes an honored panicipant in a pluralistic culture rather than the authoritaive embodiment of it, then the positive possibilities expand, Now parisans of several types might negoUare a public ethos of engagement ‘drawn from several moral sources, Here no constiovency would be allowed. to represent auhorzauvely the single source from which all others must draw’ in public life, even as each continued to articulate the srengths of the source it honors. For, again, secular and religious strugales to occupy the authoritative center help to manufacture those reciprocal recipes of dogma. tism discernible in and around vs. Secularism is represented by some of its religious detractors wo be a set of procedures that eventually delves vst, morality, nd fadh out of culture. ‘What if that charge is onto something, even in its false reduction of seculae- iem to proceduralism, while the authortative conceptions of virtue, moral> Introduction —7 ity, and faith prominent antisecularsts often endorse are too singy, excl sionary, and self-sanctifying? I that were 0, he last thing needed would be the introduction of another perspective asserting is obligation to occupy the authoritative center. We need, rather, to renegotiate relations between interdependent partisans in 2 werld ia which no constituency’ claim to embody the authoritative source of public reason is sanctified, Sure, a few formaliss will seam from the rooftops that any proposal to dlversily the center constcuwes— formally, as it were—a new center. But since they often advance such cxiques on the way to supporting an old, narrow center, they reveal an ability to distinguish between a network of constiuency relations modulated by a general ethos of generosity and for- bearance drawn from multiple sources and a narrow practice of public life governed by one conception of reason or morality. The success of the for- sali euse, in this instance, depends upon the ertc's and the target's both forgeting momentary the cae for the plurovoeity of being thet inspired the later to support pluralization of the center inthe frst place. Ifthe for- imalist recognizes no source of morality beyond the dictates of argument, it isall t00 easy to override a different type of element inthe ethic of cultiva- tion endorsed by the other. But when that discordant element is folded back into the engagement, the power of the formalist critique fades. Such a result does not mean that either formalist or secularists must now endorse care for the pluovocity of being as a key element in their ‘ethic—for one version of formalism may be se in a contestable metaphysic that promises the possiiliy ofan ininsic communiky while snothecf lodged Jn one that projects automatic harmonization beween self-interested par ties abiding by general principles of rationality in a market society. It means only that both formalists and secularists are now placed under ethical pres- sure to negotiate in good faith with those inspired by alternative faiths, do- ing so at least until they estbish the positive capacity to fix their own ‘moral practice as necessary and universal. Every such attempt to date has {allen far short of the mark. ‘here are several ruses of formalism. Those adopted by one type of secularist for many secularists are not formalists) are prefigured in AUguS- line's estiques of heretics and pagans. But the fai that inspired Augustine's tactics against the heretics of his day was hited to the forefront of his pre sentations, while contemporary formaliss generally keep their own faith in ‘what Giles Deleuze calls “the good nature of thought” shrouded. Nonethe- Jess, I have yet to meet a formalist who is simply one, There is always a sensibility moving below and within the argument, propeling the intensity ‘with which a critique is advanced and the insistence through which the8— Introduction terms of the other aze contracted Maybe itis timely, then, 1o place the ‘question of ethical seasbiity more actively onto the agenda of politcal re: fection, for in matters such as these varations in sensibility male much of the difference. There may be expansive modes of persuasion, convincing, and inspcation that can alter the sensbilty in which an argument is set and ‘open up new lines of communication among partisans. Atleast the explO- rations to follow ofthe visceral register of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, an ethic of cultivation, relational ars of the self, feelancing and micropoli- ties, and a generous ethos of public engagement pursue these possibilites. Condensations and Abbreviations ‘This book explores a possible world of intersecting publics, expressing a variety of religious and metaphysical orientations, interacting on several reg- Isters of being. No constituency gets everyting it wants in such a world, par ticulacy fi imagines itself—in is purty, neutrality, simplicity, faith, ratio- ality, sinctty, or civilizational necessity-—ro be the one party to the case that must also be its final judge. af and when the immodest demands of transcendental narcissism are relaxed, the substance of your judgment can sometimes be separated from the character of the public decision you en- dorse, accept, oF tolerate. The key is 0 acknowledge the comparative con- lestabiity of the fundsmental perspectives you bring into public engage- ‘ments while working hard not to conver that acknowledgment into stolid ‘or angry stance of existential resentment” For those who resent the fragility ‘of their own Fundamentals are apt, eventually, o blame some other group ‘or doctrine for this obdurate condition ‘Appreciation of the profound contestabilty of the fundamentals you honor does not mean dat you must forfeit faith in a loving or commanding ‘0d, give up secular fit in reason (or one of ts surogates), or adopt my rnontheistic faith in the plurovecity of being, It means that you and I come to terms with ouc respective inabilites, so far at east, to secure our respec tive faiths so tightly that all ceasonable humans must place ether one at the ‘center of public Ife, And it means that we do not follow this acknowledg- ment of modesty immediately with another doctrine of justice or consti= tutional coreciness or public reason or truth oF communicative rationality invested with the same certainty just called into question. Now the crystal= lization of agonistic respect between interdependent panisans can support ‘tempts to build protections, exemptions, defesals,individvalities, or diver sities ino a variety of collective decisions. And in those cases where that proves impossible or seems destructive, acknowledgment of an element of tragedy, injustice, oF uncertainty i the decision can now more readily be Introduction —9 addressed: searches can be organized to find other ways to reduce or com ‘pensate for losses incurred. Moreover, when you acknowledge the com- ‘parative contestabiliy of the fondamentals you endorse—for @ new zone ‘of contestabilily might be exposed at any time by the entrance of an unex [pected party into de fray—you are in 2 beter postion ta cultivate crical responsiveness (0 emerging constnencies who seek to modify the opera- tive register of identity, justice, or constitutional legitimacy. Another thing; to legitimate bringing fundamental orientations into the public realm does not mean its either necessary or honorable to announce all the fundamentals you can marshal each time you address an issue. lot an be beld back much ofthe me, I means that when the issue is, say, the right to die, itis relevant to bring some dimensions of your theological or theological perspective to the engagement, and when it isthe just distribu- tion of income another set may be pertinent. Forbearance and modesty are ‘presumptive vitwes in pluralist politics. They become even more important 4s the secular delineation betwen pavate ile and public debate is rendeved ‘more fluid et me, then, draw up a lit of charges and lines of connection to other tsaditions as they find expression in the following chapters. Inthe first chap- ter, I begin by reviewing a few secular manifestoes I then dig into the con- ceptions of thought, intersubjestvity, and ethics residing in them. The goal Js fist to disclose a connection between medieval pracsices of Christian rit val and Nietaschean arts of the self and then to bring both to bear upon antian and Habermasian conceptions of thinking and public discourse, Wht falls out when the later concepsions prevail How do these practices of rea- son block potential lines of cemmunication between theistic and asecular, nontheisie dogmas? Chapter 1, then, explores the ethical implications of tale ing the visceral register of int:/subjecivity seriously. A host of historically ‘contingent routines, traumas, ors, and conversion experiences leave imprints ‘upon the visceral register of thinking and judgment, and these thought im- Dued, often intersubjective intensities also exert effects on linguistically re fined patterns of discourse and judgment. Moreover, attention to the fund ‘of cultural inscriptions incorperated into those human brains les lingvisti- cally refined than the prefrontal conex may be crucial to elaboration of a ‘more generous ethos of engagement between multiple constituencies hon- ring lfferent moral sources. “The next thing is to uncover the implications of secular conceptions of thinking for delineation of “the public sphere" Here Kant is taken as fore- runner and Habermas as exemplar, for Kant developed a classi strategy trough which to curl the authority of Christian ecclesiology within both10—Introduction the university and the state, and Habermas bears crucial debis to Kant even fas he tries to scrap the laters practical metaphysic ofthe supersensible. Fi- pally, an engagement emong Kantian, Habermasian, Kierkegaardian, and Deleuzian perspectives is simulated to show how itis possible o refashion the secular. For once the hangman's noose of Habermasian theory (Le, the peeformative self-contradiction) is lifted from the necks of those who dis= ent from its assumptions, the limits set by high secularism on public com= munication have been broken, Now it may be possible to uncover traces of ‘ther traditions in the subsructure of your own, thereby opening up spaces for tclations of partial indebtedness and agonistic respect between interde- pendent partisans. Since high seculadsm isself.was crafted through a his- toric set of crossings between the organization ofthe university and the or ‘eanization of public discourse, a contemporary simulation might aspize to ‘exert modest effets in both domains Secularism and liberalism aze connected, though neither is entirely 1e- ocible tothe other. There aze, for instance, theological tiberalisms and non- liberal secularisms. Some neoconservatives, for instance, define themselves as secularists and resist pressures from theoconservative, I myself aspire to ‘2 ctiical liberalism that both expands and thickens the range of secularism, ‘Often, though, the differences between liberalism and secularism are those oF inflection, Liberalism draws your attention to questions of rights, justice, tolerance, and the role ofthe state, whereas secularism draws it to the char- acter of public discourse, the role of religion and nonreligion in public life, ‘and so on. If you push against secularism very long you come up against the models of thinking it promotes and the limits it ets upon the politics of becoming. Chapter 2, then, examines John Rawls, a secularist who is also a Hberal. T argue that Rawsian theory engages conflicts besween constituen cies and claims already caised to the register of justice, bu iis rendexing of the separation between the private and the public makes it woneleaf t0 nitiple modes of soffering and subordination currently subsisting below the public register of justice. Rawislan theory, in sho, is both invaluable ‘once an identity is placed on the scales of justice and radically insufficient to the polis of becoming, The politics of becoming is that conflictual pro- cess by which new identities are propelled into being by moving the pre- existing shape of diversity, justice, and legitimacy. Sure, Rawlsians often display an admirable ability to assimilate new constituencies and demands alter much of the arduous, dangerous, and inventive work bis been done. ‘But the arid conceptions of persons, public reason, and justice sanctioned by Rawls disable him from listening receptively (0 such protean movements at their dense poinis of inception below the threshold at which the formal Introduction —11 practice of justice kicks In, To come to terms with the paradoxical politics of becoming is to endorse a more complex public ethos, one in which the practice of justice exists in'censtruive tension with critical responsiveness to the politics of becoming. No simple formula can dissolve this interdepen- dence andl tension between an ethos of erktical responsiveness and the prac- tice of justice. That means, though, that Kantian, neo-Kantan, end secular ives to simplicity and singularity ia public life do not cope subtly enough, ‘with the complexity and mulifaceted character of acually existing ethical fssues. And it means that cultivation of an ethical sensibly appropriate to the complexity and ambiguity of cultural Ife {sas important 10 a generous public ethos as commitment tothe practice of justice. In the fist two chapters a series of resonances beween Christianity and secularism emerges. In John Stuart Mil's image of the nation, these: ‘connections become even more apparent. In chapter 3, the idea Is to exca- vate the Millian image of the nation and to explore an alternative to it Mill himself helps wih che second assignment, for existing in tension with his dominant image of the nations a set of ideas about nenaational pluralism. {mine and rework this secondary theme to explore the emergent possitil- lty of a shizomatic or network pluralism ranging beyond the Tocqueville” [Mill legacies of national pluralism, The thizome—as a network of diverse Imersections between constituencies of numerous types—beth already op- erates t0 some degree in societies masked by secularism and provides a ‘model of aspiration for contemporary politics. The rhizome now assumes & place alongside other asecular conceptions elaborated to this point, such as the visceral register of intersubjectivty, an ethic of cultivation, and the poli- tics of becoming. ‘The fist three chapters play up differences bewween secular perspec tives and the positions endorsed here, but they also identify some afiniies and connections from which politcal connections can be forged across these differences in perspective. For the objective is not 10 eliminate secularism, bbut to conver it into one perssective among several in a pluralise culture CChapter 4 underlines some connections between secularism and the per~ spective advanced het. I fist show how the American Republican morals William Bennett reduces academic “seculasiss,”“uberals," and “deconstruc- tonists" to a common denominator and then examine how be deploys this trio to wage culeural war. Although Mill would gag on Bennet tactics, Mill's ineteenth-century image of the nation stocks Bennett's arsenal in the ef ferent circumstances of the late ventieth century. Bennett dogmatizes the Milian image ofthe nation in circumstances even less conducive to its real- ‘zation. Bennet is 2 master at working on the visceral register of subjectivity12—Introduction and intersubjectiviy. If you contend, as 1 do, that it is impossible to shuffle the visceral regiser of intersubjecivity out of politics, if you thin that is neglect in liberal and secular doctrines opens up opportunites for oligopo- liste control of fe by conservative Fores, then it becomes very pertinent 10 Understand how Bennett participates in what is here called micropolitc, [And important to ask how critical intellectuals might work on these same registers in noamenipolative ways. Chapter 4 continues to refashion secu lari, but i also shows why people like me need to forge alliances with those who retain commitments to old-style secularism, That is not 2 coaces- sion, but a cardinal lesson of a perspective that prizes the incliminable plu rality of comtestable perspectives in public lfe.and the recurrent need t0 orm collective assemblages of common action from this divers. If chapter 4 is organized around the role drug wars play in mobilizing disaffected constituencies to reinstate @ nation that never Was, the next chap- ter explores capita punishment along similar lines. Some secular critics of capital punishment believe it s possible to issue definitive arguments agains. Ik T suggest in chapter 5 that an agaressive politics of forgetfulness about the Jong history of unceraiory and instability over “the will" forms a key pat in campaigns on behalf of capital punishment. The idea is to disclose the constitutive experience of uncertinry and instability ip the wil, while identifying social pressures that press for cultural forgetfulness in this do- rain, This agenda is complicated by the fact that the state, as the official ste of accountability to citizens and a crucial forum for the mobilization of national sentiments, has reasons of is own to nurture such forgetfulness, For when the state is both the highest ste of electoral accountability and the paradigmatic target of electoral extcism for ineptness, it s tempting 10 convert its power to exeeute criminals into a dheatical politics of apparent accountability Chapter 6 clarifies the shape and character ofa postive ethos of engage- ment among mukiple constituencies in a culture where no single concep: tion of public rationality oF morality can hope to gain the free assent of a significant majorky, 1 begin by addressing the individualism of George Kateb and the problem of evil recognized through it. There are several lines of connection between Kateb’s postion and mine. T parcipae, for instance, in his desire to think a nontheistic conception of evil, Nonetheless, differ- ences persist. Because Kateb finds che worst evils to flow from collective politics, he supports an individualism of political minimalism. It seems 10 ‘me, however, that a robust politics dhat addresses ambiguities in ethics, the paradoxical character of becoming, shizomatie pluralism, and a positive ethos Introduction —13 of engagement among diverse constituencies is beter equipped than politi- cal minimalism to resist che evils he identifies, CChapier 6 explores the indispensable sole of relational arts and mi- ‘ropoltcs in public ethics once the multiple registers of subjectivity and in- tersubjecivty have been ackrowledged. It proceeds from these to explore an ethos of engagement becwsen diverse constinencies honoxig diferent ‘moral sources, The work required isnot ll that arduous, since several ele ‘ments in ths imaginary already find some expression in existing practices ‘Chapter 7 examines more closely admixtures, impurities, and nstabil- ties secreted into Kantian conzeptions of morality and the will. It joins the exploration in chapter 1 of thoughtimbued intensities below the level of feeling and conceptual sophisication to thought-imbued feelings subsisting below the threshold of conceatual refinement. When you bring these two themes together the comparatve contestabilty of the Kantian idea of pure ‘morality drawn from an inscruable supersensble source becomes apparent (One hinge in several secular models of justice and morality falls off the ‘all 100. An ethic of cultivation emphasizing the positive possibilities in mi cropolitics now becomes mors plausible to consider, a8 does the drive to negotiate public ethos of engagement bereeen multiple constituencies ons ting different moral sources, In chapter 7, I engage Kentian conceptions to challenge the exclusive authority of any morality anchored in the commands of a god, practical rea: 00, or communicative competence; in doing go, I reopén thinking about the registers upon which subjectivity and intersubjecivity are organized. Kant Js alert to the ethical import of acts of the self, even though his practical rmevaphysic of the supersensile limits their ange. By placing the Kantian smetaphysic ofthe inscrutable sipersensible and the crude sensible into com petion with the Deleuzian maaphysic of a protean infrasensible and lay cred sensbilty, we are in a batter position to think about how the arts of the self work, what they work upon, and what role they might play in a public ethos. This second encounter with Kant undedines something operative in the fist. Its not just your agreements or disagreements with Kant that are imponant. I is sometimes profable to squeeze through cracks he pies ‘open but does not himself pass through. Such possibilies emerge i that brief moment of uncertainty Letween bis critique of speculative theology and the defense of rational thedlogy; in his experimentation withthe thought that “radical evil” arses out of childhood duress before reason has had a chance to mature; in his appreciation of the opacty of the supersensible14—Introduction flor to insistence that it issues moral laws recognizable by any “ordinary ‘man’; in his appreciation of arts of the self before placing the will and the supersensible above their reach; and in bis exploration of the sublime just before hitching it to an imperative of inscrutable reason. “To resist one alte of pusilcaton is sometimes to open up another. The case of Hannah Arend i fascinating; she forms the second dlalogial par ner in chapter 7, Arendt altracts many who are dissatisfied with both secu- Jar models of politics and those governed by one or another religion of the ‘Book. She explores how love for the world is fundamental to an ethical per spective worthy of admiration, She charts the paradoxical politics by which the new is brought into being. And she knows that these explorations carry her beyond the reach of Kantiza and secular conceptions of morality. But ‘Avendt may reinstate purty in “the political realm” after pulling it out of, ‘morality. Ic is not simply that she pushes out “the social question” and “the body" to render the word clean enough for political acion, Bu, first these ‘expulsions bring back into play the reactive polls of the nation she re- sists, And, second, her tendency to reduce so much of the body toa set of ‘automatisins and then to valorze “carfiee" thinking, opinion, and engage- ment drains thinking and judgment of some of their richness and density. “This drive draws her along one dimension toward forms of secular thinness she otherwise resists. And it pushes some significant sites of polities below the threshold of Arendtian nurturance. True, the visceral i « dangerous site ‘of politics, But all sites ave. And there is never @ vacuum in this domain. An ‘ethic of cukvaton that suppor and broadens Arenctian pluralism is blooked by the terms of her corporeal abstinence, Several readers of Arendé incerpret her t be a forerunner of “post metaphysical thoughs,” an orientation represented in the frst chapter ofthis book by the recent work of Jirgen Habermas. Iam uncertain whether Arendt actually belongs to that camp, even though her orientation resists the two or thrce perspectives commonly recognized by the crew of postmetaphisi- cians as metaphysical. But once contending renderings of the corporeal/ cultural relation are brought into view that depart from the metaphysical tradition of Plato, Augustine, and Kant while being indebted to counterra- lions of Epicurs, Lucretius, Spinoza, Niewsche, and Deleuze, the claim to bbe postmetaphysical Is seen to rest upon exposure to too small a sample of possibiies, Gynicism and Enchantment Is the desice to he postmetaphysical bonded to the secular attempt to pro- tect a universal matric of public discousse by thinning it out each time = Introduction —15 ew disturbance arses? The dive to be postmetaphysical contains many Ii abilities: it represses too many operative assumptions of is own caries, it thing out the resources they cen draw” upon in making a case, aod it opens them to charges of hypocrisy or innocence by other groups who quite hap- pily being their metaphysical and religious perspectives into public life. To- day, the need is to draw a larger plurality of metaphysical/religious orienta- tions into public life than heretofore, and to do so in ways that encourage more people to adjus: more postivly tothe inevitable bouts of uncertainty, ‘disruption, and surpese to which their own faiths are periodically subjected, Far @ positive ethos of public life requires more constituencies to respond araciously and generously to ements of comparative contestabilty in their ‘own religious, secular, and asecular faiths. Again, I concur tat this a risky enterprise, but the ssks must be compared tothe losses and risks occasioned by the contemporary decline f secularism. Niewsche, Deleuze, Foucault, and Arent, amid significant differences in thelr interpretations of thinking, corporeaiy,intersubjectvity, ethics, and ‘democracy, inspire a lot in ths book. That is parly because none is easly described a5 a secularist, even though none suppors reinstatement of theologically centered politics. I would not reduce my perspective to any of these thiakers, But the Fist thee do insist upon the ethical importance of ‘engaging the visceral register of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. And they do place « minosty metaphytc into competition with the dominant meta- physical perspectives of the West. In expanding the range of available pos sibilies, they expose those cellcate tactics by which secularists frst pur- or 10 leave religious/metaphysical perspectives in the closet at home and then quiely draw upon a subset of them to elevate themselves ito pillars of public authority. ‘Arendt joins the first three in cultivating that fugitive enchantment with being and becoming from which joy emanates and care forthe plurovocty of existence might grow. Arend, in her love of the world, and Nietsche, in his gratiude for existence, both confound dhat dour division between the enchanted world of medieval Christianity and the disenchanted world of secular modernism. Such a tersporal division not only exaggerates complex historical differences it stifles distinctive possibiles of enchantment on each side of ts fictive divide. Informed by the recent work of Jane Bennett, more ‘of us might cultivate those fugitive spaces of enchantment lodged between. theistic faith and secular abstinence. For secular stories of disenchantment and theological nostalgia for: past when enchantment is alone thought (0 have been possible combine » squeeze out these alternative spaces of pos- silly, Bennett ploralizs the sites and sources of enchantment. She also16—Introduation shows how enchantment can be ethically significant even as itis irreducible ‘o experiences of happiness or satisfaction, for its fascinations disturb a5 Well as inspire, and lit as well as enable, Nietache and Deleuze also inspite fugitive experiences of enchantment that exceed most secular representations and resist theological monopoliza- tion, Despite Nietzsche's aristocratic proclivites, his enchantment with the plurovociy of being is highly pertinent to a democravie ethos of generosity ‘and forbearance. Such a source of ethical receptivity does not soar above the partisanships of identi, interest, and interpretation, nor does it subject them to transcendental command. Ic infiltrates into practices of partisanship, ‘modulating them and opening partisans to more gracious engagements with dllferences within und without. As the discussion of an ethos of engagement berween partisans in a world of multidimensional plurality contends, such Aispositions can be cultivated inside religious trltions as well as outside them. Indeed, the formation of muliple lines of connection across these spaces of difference is crucial to a generous ethos of engagement in a post- secular society. I contend chat nontheistic enchantment with the world pro. vides one valuable source of such a temper, not the only one, ‘The four thinkers honored here come to terms with the tragic charac ter of existence through the rubtic of enchantment. On this reading a secular ‘wish to master a disenchanted world too readily degenerates into cynicism if'and when that world proves unsusceptible to mastery. Both the wish to ‘master and the temptation to eynicism recede if you experience being 25 Nietzsche, Deleuze, Arendt, and Foucault do, in thee different inflections. All four, in'the moments f admire, find the most fervent secular epresenta- tions ofa disenchanted worid to be almast as enervating to an ethos of ce- ‘lprocal generosity asthe demand that everyone adopt a singular theistic faith is destructive to human plurality AA hardy minority of secularists today locate themeelves on the demo- cratic left. Perhaps the greatest risk faced by this band isa decline into cyn- icism, It fs pertinent to be critical about the gap between the pretensions of democratic regimes and thee performance in employment, income distbu- tion, health care, race relations, education, housing, and cities. But generic {ynicism is at csk of becoming the defining mark of the sophisticated left. Any expression of atachiment to the world is thus chastized by being treated. ‘as incompatible with a commitment to social justice, But attachment to the world, it seems to me, provides an invaluable source for participation in the polis of social justice. Indeed, che mood of generic cynicism may express Fesidus faith in the Kantian model of morality in which most democrats on ‘he left purpor to have lost effective faith, Such a residual faith is exhibited, Introduction —17 first, by treating the ideal radicals offically renounce as the operative stan- dard through Which akematve orientations to politcal cies ate judged and, second, by failing t0 tap into akernatve sources of energy rendered avail able by an ethic of cuvation, ‘The slide toward generic cynicism undercuts the nerve oferticl action within radicalism, liberalism, and secularism, It may be wise, then, to cult vate litle spaces of enchantment, both individually and collectively, partly for your own sake and partly to lend energy to political struggles against unnecessary suffering. An ethic of cultivation seeks both to expose is prac: tidoners to voices and movements beyond their previous range of hearing and 10 mobilize energy to parteipate in the resuking campaigns. Eich of the thinkers discussed above, then, contributes something an ebic of cultivation as well as to pursuit of a general ethos of engage- ment amiong adherents of divergent moral sources. None commandeers a “universal moral source complete, automatic, or authortative enough to gene crate a masterful response to every dificult issue. In drawing generosity and forbearance from that tropical undergrowth of life Nourishing beneath the Dritle trees of grand moral theny, each contributes something to an appre- ciation of the indispensabilty and consteuive fragiliy of ethies im political liteThe Conceits of Secularism The Modus Vivendi of Secularism ‘The historical modus vivendi called secularism is coming apart at the seams. Secularism, in its Euro-American forms, was a shifting, somewhat unsetled, and yet reasonably efficacious organization of public space that opened up new possibilities of freedom and action. It shuffled some of is own pre- conditions of being into « newly crafted space of private religion, faith, and situa. I requires cautious reconfiguration now when religious, metaphysical, cehnic, gender, and sexual differences both exceed those previously legt- mute Within European Christendom and challenge the immodest concep- tions of ethics, public space, and theory secularism cxrved out of Christen- dom. [certainly do not suggest that a common religion needs to be reinstated in public life or that separation of church and state in some sence of that phrase needs to be reversed, Such attempts would intensify cultural wars already in motion, Secularism nceds refashioning, not elimination, ‘The secular modus viverdi [gnores or devalues some dimensions of being that need 10 be engaged moze openly. On one level the secular is ‘more bound up with generic characteristics of Christian culture than its most enthusiastic proponents acknowledge. On another level, the paral success of secularism in pushing spectic Christian sects into private fe has had the secondary effect of consolidating flat conceptions of theory, ethies, and public life. Many academic seculaiss, following the lead of Kant, model public life upon an organization of uxivesity life they endorse. And vice versa. The field and authority divisions they project in the university among philoso- 1»20—The Conceits of Secularism phy, theology, ars, and the sciences marshal an ideal of thinking and dis- ‘couse that i insufficient either tothe university oto public fe. The secular division of labor between “religious fath” and “secular argument,” where faith and riual are to be contained in a protected private preserve and ra tional argument is said to exhaust public if, suppresses complex registers ‘of persuasion, judgment, and discourse operative in public life. Again, these registers continue to operate, even within secularism. But they do so largely below the threshold of appreciation by seculaiss. A cautious reconfigura- tion of secular conceptions of theory, thinking, discourse, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity is needed ro come t0 terms more actively with these regis: ters of being. Indeed, such a project might open up promising lines of con- rection berwcen theistic orientations on the one hand and nontheisitc, asec- ‘lar orfentations on the other blocked by the historic secular division between private and public lif. For representatives ofthese two orientations often share important insights into the character of thought and intersubjectivity before they break over specific questions of fh and divin. Secularism, in its dominant expression, combines 2 distinetve organ ‘zation of public space with a generic understanding of how discourse and ‘ethical judgment proceed on that space. The historical narrative secularists ‘commonly offer in support ofthis historical modus vivendi goes something Hike this ‘once the universal Catholle Church was challenged and dispersed by ‘vasous Protestant seats «unified public authority grounded in 2 com- ‘mon faith was drawn into a sense of secaren conflicts and ware. Be- ‘cause the sovereigns sippont ofthe righ way to etemal hfe was said {o hang in the balance, these conflict were often homily destctive tnd inacable, Te best hope fora peacefl and st word under these new circumstances wat institution of a publi Me in which the fal ‘meaning of fe, the proper route to le sfer death, andthe divine source ‘of morality were polled out ofthe public tealm snd deposted ino pe ‘to Me. The saclasaction of publi fe ists coca o private Free- ‘dom, pluralistic democracy, individual sights, public veasea, and the primacy ofthe sate. The key tos sucess i the separation of hch and ste and generl acceptance of a conception of publle reson (or Some surogat) through wach to reach puble agreement on non gous issues. "This isnot the only story that could be told about the origins and legit macy of secularism. You could tell one about the needs of capital and com- mercial society to increase the range and scope of monetary exchange in social relations. Here Adam Smith, Montesquieu, and Adam Ferguson would ‘The Conceits of Secularism —21 take on great salience” Or you could concentrate on the challenge that nom- inalism posed within Christianty to enchanted conceptions of the world in the medieval era, showing how the nominalist intensification of faith in an omnipotent God presiding over a contingent world Gather than one obey- {ng the dicates of 2 teleological order) joncally opened the door to secu- Jarist conceptions of mastery over a disenchanted nature? Or you could tweat secularism as the loss of organic connections that can be sustained only by general participation in a common Christian faith. Or play up the role of princely statecrat in supporting secular forces in onder to suergthen. {self [want 19 suggest, however, thatthe story summarized above has be- come the dominant self-represenation by secularists in several Wester sates. ‘This sory prevails largely because it pants the picure of a self-sufficient public realm fostering freedom and governance wilhout recourse © @ spe- ile religious faith [Bvidence of the dominance of the first story can be found in the Oxford English Dictionary. According to it, Secuere, in Christian Latin, means “he \worid” as opposed to the One Church ot heaven, The early (Christan) Church tweated the secular a a necessary but residual domain of ts way of life. 1 ‘was, the OBD says, mostly “a negative term,” even though a resriced secular domain of life was deemed essential. A sense of how it could be both lowly, and necessary Is revealed in tis statement by 2 prlest in 1593 (quoted in the OED): "The tongue is the Judge; the rest of our organs but the secular executioners of his sentence." As you go down the Ist of OED meanings and up the list of temporal references, the secular becomes a more positive and independent domain. Thus Ben Franklin is moved to say, ironically, that he speaks as “a mere secalar man” in expressing his opinions. By the modern period secularism, as « dstinatve political perspective und socal movement, is represented postively as “ihe doctrine that morality should be based solely in regard to the wellbeing of mankind in the present life to the exclusion ofall considesttions drawn from the belie in God or in 2 future state.” Note, for ater consideration, the refecence 10 “the belief ia God in which beth a personal God andl belle about i ae treated as de- fnive of religious practice. And now to “seculseae” is to “dissociate Gay art or educational studies) from religion or spirtval concems.* This language of *solely,* "exclusion," “dissociation” conceals the subterranean flow be- tween the Christian sacred, which now becomes lodged in something called the private domain, and secular discourse, which now becomes associated. ‘with public authority, common sense, rational argument, justice, tolerance, ‘the public interest, publicity, and the like. The OED story, in fact, becomes22—The Conceits of Secularism 4 partisan secular history of the sacred/secular division in the West, adopt- ing as neutral terms of analysis several concepts and themes that became authorkative only through the hegemony of secularism, John Rais, t00, participates in the dominant story of secularization, fa Politcal Liberalism, for instance, he says that *Catholis and Protestants in the sixteenth century" licked the ability or willingness to disconnect their divergent religious views from contending conceptions of public life. He then distills one cardinal point about the insufficiency of presecular reghnes: "Both falths held tht it was the duty ofthe ruler to uphold the tue religion and to repress the spread of heresy and fale doctrines.” Under such in- tense conditions either tolerance emerged as:a precasious modus vivendi \etseen contending groups or one sie suppressed the others in the inter es of truth or justice, Finally, Ras insists upon the sanctity of an authost- tative line of division berween religion in private life and public political discourse, even while joining a lst of modern predecessoss in uying 10 e- define that line ‘We appeal Casead) to « political conception of justice to dtnguish bemveen those questions tat can he reasonably removed fom the po- lial agenda and thove that cannot... To Matte rom within a po- lida! conception of justice let ws suppose we can accouat both foe equal bey of conscience, which tes the with ofeligion off the agenda, aod dhe equal poltial and cv bees, which by ring out ferfdom and slavery ake the possibilty of those istitons aff the Agenda. But congoversa sues remains for example, how, more excl, to drove the boundaries ofthe base boris whea they confi (wire to eet te “ll berveen church and state) how 10 interpret require- rents of dsinbsive justice even when there is considerable agreement on genera priaipes....But by avoiding comprehensive doctines Ike, basic religous and metaphyseal ystern we try to bypase religion and philsoply’s profeundest conuovesis £0 a5 t have some hope of luncoverng a table overlapping consenss* So secularism strains metaphysis out of polities. But notice how frag- le the specific discrimination berween the secular public realm and private life has become amid insistence that such a line of discrimination provides the way to regulate “religions” disputes in public life: “Let us suppose; "We try to bypass “avoiding’; “so a8 to have some hope of uncovering a basis fora suble, overlapping consensus,” The word “avoid is revealing because it mediates elforlessly between a demarcation established by some philo- sophical means and one commended because its political acceptance prior to introduction of an impartial philosophy of justice would reduce the in- tensity of cultural conflict, You also encounter i these lines a paradigmatic ‘The Conceits of Secularism —23 secular tactic for taming confla: the idea is to dcedge our of public life as such cultural density and depth as possible so that muddy “metaphysical” and "religious differences dont flow Into the pure water of public reason, ‘procedure, end justice Finally the word “religion” now becomes treated as ‘a universal term, as fi could always be distilled from a variety of culures in a variety of times rather than representing a specific fashioning of spic- tual life engendered by dhe secular public space carved out of Christendom. ‘The fist quandary of secularism, then, is tht is inability © draw a Jirm line between private life and public discourse creates opportunities for ‘some Christian enthusiasts to call forthe return to @ theologically centered sate, while the increasingly uansparent favoritism of its ‘newval” public space opens a window of opportunity for critics ro accuse secularists of ‘moral hypocrisy. Thus, ia an issue of Fist Things: A Journal of Religlon and Public Lfe, the editors asset that the American cours have Jost cul- tural leglimacy because of ther (Secular) stands on abortion, homosextal- ity, and the right to die. The substantive pestions the authors oppose are ‘not 109 far from those many secularists say emerge out of the dictates of ‘public reason itself In a followup the next month, the editors asserted Almost all Americans claim adherence to am ethic and mocaty tha rane ‘scends huran Invention, a0 forall bt relatively small minorky, that adherence is expresed in terms of biblical religion. By the ange doe~ tne promulgated by the cuts, Chistans, Jews and others who ad- her ta tancendent monty Would, ro he extent that her actors as zens ar inuenced by dit moray, be etlecivey disenfanchised 11s s doctrine tha ends op casing religous Americans, cadionlly ‘he most loyal of eizens, so the tle of enemies ofthe public ore? Secularism, is (primarily) Christan eves contend, locks the ability to come to terms with the sources of morality mostcizens endorse; therefore, secularism itself drifts toward public orientations that challenge the moral sensibilities of many of its citzens. Many such theological critics call upon ‘seculatists to return t the nineeentb-century vision of public Ife registered by Tocqueville. Tocqueville centended that the separation of church and ‘sate was viable only because subll ife was already grounded in a larger Christan civilization. Tocquevile’s version of church and state fs both ob- Jectionable to contemporary secstaists and revelatory of a subterranean com ponent of contemporary life too often minknized in secular selfrepresen= tations. ‘Consider two quotations fem Tocqueville. The fst deals witha network of internal relations among religion, mores, reason, and morals in American, civilization:24—The Coneeits of Secularism ln the Unite States it snot oniy mores that are controle by religion, but its sway extends over reason. Among Anglo-Amerioane there are some who profess Christian dogmas because they believe them and ‘others who do $0 because they are affald to look as dough they did ‘no belive them. So Chrsanitysegns without obstacles, by universal consent: consequenly...evenebing in be moral field ts certain and Po, altiough the worl of poles seems given over to argument and ‘experimentation ‘You might read this to say that while polities is located in a secular realm, that realm remains safe for Christianity as long 2s the unconscious mores that organize public reason, morality, and politics are Christian. Crise tianty does not need to be invoked that often because itis alceady in- seribed in the prediscursive dispositions and cultural insincs of the civi- lation, Tocqueuille defends a secularism contained within Chrstianky, while modern secularists generally seek to contain Christianity within the private realm. Tocqueville proceeds by invoking a conception of preconsclous mores eventually pushed out or debased by most secular self-representations. But ‘why, then, bother to support separation of church and state at all Here is part of the answer, for Tocqueville atleast, ‘There § an inoumenble muldude of sec inthe Unked Sues. ach seat worships God in ts own fasion, but all preach the same rmoraliy in the same of God....America is stil the place where the (Chis religion ls kepe the greatest power over men's soul; and nothing better demonstrates how weful and narra ii © man, since the eounwy whee it now has widest sway is beth the most enlighened snd frees” Separation of church and state functions to soften sectarian divisions between Christian sects while retaining the civilizational hegemony of Chris- tianty ina larger sense, This is so because the instinctive register of inter- subjective judgment to which Tocqueville appeals both embodies Christian ‘culture and helps to regulate public argumentation. Most contemporary Sec- Uularists, unlike Tocqueville, either ignore this register of being or locate it be- peath public deliberation. Indeed, atthe very point where many secularist, and devotees of public religious faith meet in combat a space opens up o&- ‘cupid by neither. For most erties of secularism who recognize the viscer register iavoke ito deepen the quest for unity or community in public life, while most secularists who eschew ic act as if diversity can be fostered only by leaving the gutural register of being out of public life. My suspicion, ‘contrary to one element in each view, is that elaboration of an expansive pluralism appropriate 0 contemporary life requires cultural investments In the visceral register of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, We must press ‘The Conceits of Secularism —25 “Tocqueville's appreciation of intersubjective mores beyond his colonization of them by a civilization of Christan containment. And we must press the (underdeveloped) secular appreciation of diversity into registers of being it tends to reserve to “‘eligion.” Visceral Judgment and Represented Beliefs ‘Talal Asad, an anthvopologist of Islamic heritage, has explored long-term sluts in the Christin expesience of ritual, symbol, belie, faith, and doctrine. I is not simply that dominant Chiistan Deli have changed over the cen- tories, a5, say, the doctrine of original sin gives ground to that oF individual choice. But the operative meanings of ritual and symbol have shifted too. ‘With the emergence of secularism and Protestantism, a symbol, n its domi rant valence, Becomes the representation of an inner state of belief that precedes i; and ritual is now understood to be the primitive enactment of betgfs tat could also be displayed through cognitive representation. Even sophisticated anthropologists such as Cifford Geert, says Asad, tend 10 adopt these historically specific meanings of symbol and ritual as if they ‘were pertinent f0 the universil experience of ‘religion.* But in medieval CCristanity, Asad assens, a syeabol was bound up with enactment or perfece sion of inner states and meanings it also represented; and ritual was prac- Liced 25 2 means of educating and constituting appropriate dispositions of appraisal and aptitudes of performance, In medieval monastic ie, the lurgy Is nota species af enacted syabolism to be casted cepe rely (om acivies defined a technical bu isa practice among ol fe esse 10 the aequiston of Christan vires. Each thing done ‘was not only to be done apy in self, bu done in order to mae the salf approximate more and more to predefined mode! of excelience ‘The things presenbed,incleding lima servis, had a place ia the coverll scheme of waning the Chan self. In thi concepton Uaere ‘could be no radical dsuncion berween gute behavior ae nner = te, berween socal uals ad indvidval sentiments, between activ tie that are expressive snd hove that are echnicsl® ‘Asad draws upon Mauss's exploration of habitus as “embodied apti- tude" to sharpen the sense of how intersubjective disposition, instincts, and virues can be constituted chrough ritual performance. 1 Asad is eight, then secular understandings of discourse, analysis, and argument capture ‘merely one dimension of thinking, intersubjective judgment, and doctrinal ‘commitment in public li, You might say, then, that inexsubjecvity oper tes on several registers (with significant subjective variations) and that each register exerts effects upon the organization of the ethers.26—The Conceits of Secularism would augment Asad modestly. Fist, as the reading of Kant to follow suggest, it would exaggerate to draw a sharp line between presecular and secular understandings, Some of these practices persist in Christian Protes- tantsm as well ss in some secular erientations to education and training in izeaship. Seculariss sometimes address these practices, but seldom in sways that affect profoundly their presentations of how an ethos is to'be festered in public ife, So Asad seems eight in suggesting thatthe significance fof such practices ia contemporary life is underappreciated in secular dis- course, Second, and connected to the above, ic may be important to under- line how representational discourse itself, including the public expression and defense of fundamental beliefs, affects and is affected by the visceral regiser of intersubjectivty. Public discourses do operate within dense lin uistc fields that specify how beliefs are to be articulated and tested and how ethical claims are to be redeemed. But repetitions and defenses of these articulations also wate scripts upon prerepresentational sites of ap- praisal. although secular presentations of public reason and moral discourse remain tone-deaf to this second register of intersubjectivity, they nonethe= less depend upon it to stabilize those practices. Most pertinent for my purposes, however, is that in addition to the ap- preciation ofthis register by many theological thinkers, several nonsecular, ‘theistic thinkers pay attention to it 2s well. This correspondence opens a line of potential communication berween theisic and nonsecular, atheistic agents deflected historically by the secular division between private faith and secular public argument. Indeed, as we shall soon see more closely, secularism as an authortative model of public lie is predicated upon 3 twotold stategy of containment: to secure the public realm as it construes 4 itis almost as imporant to quarantine certain nontheisti pattems of think- ing and technique as ts to monitor ecclesiastical intrusions into public life. Consider, then, how Nietzsche makes contact with Cheistan practices of taining and thinking. In The Anui-Gbrist, he distinguishes between Chis- sian docirines of original sin, free wil, heaven, and damnation, which he attributes to Paul, and pre-Pauline practices of character formation, which he attributes to Jesus. He finds the later infinitely preferable to the Former: Ite false tothe point of absurdity to se ina “beli* perchance the ‘ele in redempsion through Chast, the dsinguishing characterise of ‘the Chistian: only Chistian prac, ile sich ase who died onthe Cross lived, s Chistan...Not a belie but a doing, above all, « not doing of many tags, liferent bing... Sats of eonsciouseess, be- lets of any kind, boleing something to be wue, or example—every pychologat koows thie—are a mater of compete inference and of ‘at rank compared to the vale of dhe instincts... -Pa” has been at ‘The Conceits of Secularism —27 al times, with Luter for insance, only & cloak, pete, 2 sree, be hind wihich the instints played thei guinea sheew Diindaes the dominance of certain instincts? IF you attend t0 what Nietsche says elsewhere about the relations among culture, insinet, thinking, and language, it hecomes apparent that instinct is more than a brutish, biologically fixed force. Insinets ate proto- thoughss situated in culturally formed moods, affects, and situations. They are not even entirely reducible 10 implicit thoughts or tact judgmenss, for the later imply thoughts and judgments like those in explicc discourse that have not been raised t0 its level. In such a view a dialectical logic of render {ng explicit what was implicit would be sufficient to the case fitting the new entry into an emergent, coheceat whole. But for Nietzsche thinking bounces in magical bumps and charges across several registers. Proto-thoughts n- ddergo significant modification end refinement when bumped into a com- plex linguistic network of contasts. Moreover, these visceral modes of ap- praisal are often invested with considerable intensity, carrying considerable energy and fervency with them into the other registers of being, This “invis- Ible" set of intensive appraisals forms (as I wil call #) an infrasensible sub- text from which conscious thoughts, felings, and discursive judgments draw part of their sustenance, Moreover, instincts that are culturally formed can sometimes be modified by cubural strategies applied by groups to then- selves and by individual ants of the sell. Hence Niewsche's durable incerest in polytbelstic and monotheistic rituals and festivals, and the “misuses” to ‘which Christianity has subjected ther, So Nietzsche says things like, “Our true experiences are not garrulous" and “Even one’s thoughts one cannot reduce entirely to words," and “Our invisible moral qualities follow their own course — probably 2 wholy difer- ‘ent course; and they might give pleasure o a god with a divine micioscope.” He says these things because insines are thought-imbued intensties mov- Ing below linguistic sophisticaton, consciousness, and reflective judgment as well as through them.” ‘What Niesche shares with the medieval Christian perspective explored by Asad isthe idea that thinking and intersubjectivity operate on more than ‘one register and that to work on the instinctive register of intersubjective judgment can algo be to introcuce new possbilties of thinking and belag into life, What the medieval and Nietschean orientations have in common {& an appreciation ofthe significant role the visceral register of incersubyee tivity plays in moral and politcal life and a desire to do some of their et cal work on that register, Where they may differ isin the goals they set for such work, though it isnot at ll clear that such differences can be read off28—The Conceits of Secularism simply by knowing whether thinker © 2 thest or a nonihest. Berrand Russell and Niewsche were both ates, but they diverged significantly in their orientations o ethics and the registers of being they acknowledged. ‘When Nctzche,aguin, speaks of thoughts behied your thoughts and thoughts behind those thought” he is speaking of "concealed gardens and plantings’ below the threshold of reflective surveillance.” Now ecclesist- cal practices of stual are translated by Nietsche and Foucault into experi- mental arts ofthe self and by Deleuze into an experirtntal micropoltis of incersubjeciviy. Bach ries to shift ethical practices that impinge onthe vs- cera register from ther uses, ay, in the Augustinian confessional or in state practices ofcscpln, but each also strives to make investments inthis d0- main that exceed the scope of secular sellepresentatons. Such stateges are experimensl because they wor’ on thoughtimbued intensities behind conscious thoughts not ready or fully subject to conscious purview, they are important 10 thinking and theory becauee such work an oneself can sometimes untc kaos in one's thinking; they ae important to poles be- cause such work can pave the way for new movement inthe politics of be- coming; and they are pertinent to the ethos of a plurals culture beezuse such wor can help to install generosity and forbearance ito ethical sensi- batts in a orld of autidimensional plurality. To change an itersobjec tive ethos significant is to modify the instinctive subjectites and inter subjectvities in which tis set. But this may sound like mumbo jumbo to many secularists ‘The recent work by Joseph LeDoux, a neurophysologist who maps complex intersections connecting the several human brains involved in our thoughtimbued emotional lie, may be petiaeat here. His study not only confound behaviorist and computes models of thinking, may expose in- suliciences in linguistic models of thous and discourse. Let us focus on te relation berween the amygdala, a small almond-shaped brain located st the base ofthe cortex, and the preftontal conex, the lage brain developed more extensively in humans than ia other animals. The amygdala and the prefrontal cortex can receive messages from the same sources, but exch registers them ina efferent way. When receiving, say, a sign it has stored as an indication of danger, the amygdala reacts quickly, relatively crudely, and with intense energy. Fxposure to signs that resemble a past trauma, pane, or disturbance ‘pass Iie greased lighning over the potendated pa ‘ways othe amyl, unleashing the fear reaction. The prefrontal cortex receives its version ofthe message more slowly, processing kt trough 2 0- Phistcated linguistic network in a more refined way and forming a more ‘The Conceits of Secularism—29 complex judgment. In a situation of stress, the amygdala slso transmits fs interpretation and much of is intensity to the prefrontal cortex; and ‘he amygdala has a greater lafluence on the coxtex than the cones has fo the amygdala, allowing emotional arousal to dominate and contol Thinking... Aldbough dhoulus can easily eigger emotions (by activating the amy), we are ne very effective at wally curing of mosons by deativaing the amygdak) = ‘The amygdala is a ste of thoughtimbued Intensities that do not in themselves take the form of either conscious feelings or representations. The amygdala is then, literally ene of the “concealed gardens and plantings” of. ‘which Nietzche speaks, implicated ina set of relays with other more open gardens. LeDousx suggests tha itis forthe most part a good thing the amyg- dala is wired o the cortex, fork imparss energy and intensity to that center needed for the livers formation of representations and practical decisions, ‘And, I suggest, those gaps and dissonances between the amygdala and the cortex, and between it and the hippocampus (the site of complex memo- fies), may czeate some of the frktions from which creativity in thiaking and judgment arses. How, though, can the amygtlala be educeted? It is under variable degrees of control by the cortex, depending on the context. But, als, since its specific organization Is shaped ro an uncertain degree by pec ‘ious intensities of cultural experience and performance, either itor, more LUkely, the nerwork of relays in which i is set may be susceptible to modest influence by rituals and intersubjective ars thematized by religions of the ‘Book and Nietzscheans, respectively So, ifthe frst quandary of secularism is bound up with uncertainties in the line of demarcation t parsues between private and publi life, the soc ‘ond is that its forgeting or deprecation of an entire register of thought-im- bbued intensities in which we participate sequires it to misrecognize itself and encourages it ro advance dismissive interpretations of any culture or ethical practice that engages the visceral register of being actively. The sec: ‘lar understanding of symbol and stual reviewed by Asad provides one in- ‘dex of this combination. A whole litany of dismissive misinterpretations of ‘Nietesehean and Foucauldian as ofthe self provides a second.™ The Secular Public Sphere ‘We now need to draw this preliminary engagement with secular accounts of thinking zad discourse into coordination with a conception of public space that has become hegemonic within Euro-American secularism. For to ‘engage its presentation of public ie is to go some way toward explaining30—The Conceits of Secularism how the plurality of secular self interpretations noted eatlier becomes orga nized into a hierarchy, And it helps to set the table for another conception ‘of public life that more acively appreciates the visceral register, that engages the role of micropolites, and that embraces @ more expansive and generous model of public discourses Lets begin with Kant. Kant struggled to give “uni versal philosophy” primacy over ecclesiastical (Christan) theology in way that has become authoritative for secularism, And his passage from an ac: ‘count of the proper organization ofthe university to the proper organization ‘of public discourse is also exemplary. Card-carrying seculariss are very ‘often university academics as well as cizens of a state. And they often pur ‘sve the same mantle of authority in each domain. Most pestinently, the way In which they imagine the contour of one inscution regularly infiltrates into the mode of governance they project into the other. In The Conflict of the Faculties, Kane's immediate objective isto curail the authority of the faculty of ecclesiastical theology within both the Ger- rman university and the larger polial culture. His concern is that since ‘Chuistian) ecclesiastical theology is governed by texts and practices sunk in the medium of history and sensibility, the claim by each ecclesiastical sect” to moral supremacy is likely to meet with an equal and opposite ‘claim by others, His object isto cleanse the university and public life of the adverse effets oF seetacianism, This isto be accomplished by elevating uni- ‘versal philosophy, also known as “rational religion,” 0 the authoritative po- ‘stion previously reserved for Christian theology. Kant asserts that 4 dvsion ito secs can never occur in maters of pre religous belie Wherever sectarian ito be found, arises fiom a mistake on the part of ecclesiasel faith: the mistake of regarding is sates (even if they are clvine revelations fr esental pars of religion. But sac, In contingent doctines, dire can be all sor of conflicting ates or intepreations...., We can ready see that mere dogma wil be a pro Me source of incumerable sects ia matters of unles ii etled by pure religious fh.” ‘Kanan philosophy is then wheeled out 10 Bil dhe place of ecclesiati- cal authority just vacated. But, as we now know from repeated experience after Kant, the claim of an upstart to occupy the authoritative place of a tee tering authority succeeds best if the upstart plays up the arbitrariness and divisiveness of the resources it predecessor drew upon while sanctifying ‘and purlying the source from whieh it daves. Kant imagines himself to be up (0 the task, He elevates a generic Chuistanity called “rational religion” above sectarian faith, anchoring the former in a metaphysic of the super- sensible chat, so the story goes, is presupposed by any agent of morality. In ‘The Conceits of Secularism —31 the process, he degrades ritual nd ars ofthe self without eliminating them altogether, for these ars work on the “sensibility” ther than drawing, moral Cbligation from the supersensible realm as practical reason does. The poiat {s to deploy them just enough ‘0 render erude sensibilities berer equipped to accept the moral law drawn from practical reason. Seculariss later cary this Kentan project of diminishment a step or two further, ‘To secure the authority of philosophy over theology, Kant then reduces ‘moral judgment to practical reson alone, The program of anointing one discipline by degrading the other is pursued inthe following formulation: For unless the supersenibe (ue dhought of whlch Is essential to any thiog called religion) 8 anchored to determinate concepts of reason, such as those of morality, firasy nevably get lost in the tanscen ‘dent, wheze religious matte are coneemed, ad leads to an fms ‘sein which everyone has His owe pate, inser fevelasons, and there ‘Sno loager any public toudstone of tah ‘Kant anchors rational religion in the law of morality rather than anchor {ng morality ia ecclesiastical fath. That is, he retains the command model (of morality from Augustinian Christianity, but he shifts the proximate point ‘of command from the Christin God to the moral subject itself. This, with significant vacations, becomes x key move i later secular models of public Ie. Bur it also engenders a legacy of uncerainty and instability that still hhaunts the secular problematic For authoritative moral phllosophy and ra- tional religion are now only as secure asthe source of morality upon which they draw. And morality as law now itself becomes anchored only in the “apodicic” recognition by ordinary human beings of its binding authority. To tie sbis knot of recognition tightly Kant must continue his atack on the relative dificukies ecclesiastical theology faces in anchoring monty diecly in the commands of God: Now a code of Gots statutory (and so revealed wil, not derived from human reason but harsonising peseely with moral practical reason toward the nal end—In cher words the Blble—would be the most effective organ for guiding men and citizens to thet lemporary and ‘eeznal wel being, only b could be aceredted asthe word of God ‘and its auhentey could be proved by documenss. But there are many cues ia the way of valdatlng Ic...For i God would cealiy speak to man, man could sil never now k was God speaking..But in some ses man can be sue thar th voice he hears isnot God's; foe the ‘yoice commands hie to do something contrary t the mora law, then no mater how majete the apparition may be....he must coaside an iluson....And....We must regard the credentials of the Bible as raw fom the pure spring of universal rational religion dwelling i32—The Conceits of Secularisin very ordinary many and this very simplicity tht accounts forthe Bible's extremely widespread and powerful influence on the heats of the people * [eis a significant move to give morality peiorly over ecclesiology, but ‘Kant’s rational zeligion sill shares much sructurally with the “dogmatic” ec- clesiology it seeks to displace. Fie, It places singular conceptions of renson and command morality above question. Second, i sets up (Kantisn) philos phy as the highese potential authority in adjudicating questions in these ‘wo domains and in guiding the people toward eventual enlightenment, “This, ic defines the greatest danger to public morality as sectarianism within CChristankty. Fourth, in the process of defrocking ecclesiastical theology and crowning philosophy as judge in the last instance, it also delegitimates place for several non-Kantian, nontheistic perspectives in public life. Thus, as Kantian philosophy is elevated to public preeminence, the pre-Kentian philosophies of Epicureanism, Spinoaism, and Humeanism are devalued be- cause of the priority they give to sensible life and an ethic of cultivation, x spectively, over the supersensible and a morality of command. Moreover, series of postKantian philosophies such 25 Nictscheanism, Bergsonism, Foucauldianism, and Deleuzianism are depreciated in advance on similar rounds. For denigration of these latter perspectives sets a crucial condition (of possibilty for the authortative regulation of religious sects in publie fe by universal philosophy, later, neo-Kantian simulations of secularism, ten, consist ofa series of avempis to secuge these four effects without open recourse to the Kantian meiaphysic of the supersensible. Secularism, in its dominant Western form, is this Kantian fourfold without metaphysical portfolio. The slogans “politi- cal not metaphysical," -postmetaplhysical,” “beyond metaphysics, and even “pragmatic” often provide signals of this attemps, although they occasion- ally set the stage for atempts to refigure seculatism. My sense is, as Twill argue later inthis chapter and further in the las, that recent attempts to be ppostmetaphysical often complement secularism by depreciating the visceral register of intesubjectvity and investing too much purity into polities. At any rite the thd quandary of contemporary secularism i that its advocates ‘often disavow dependence wpon a metaphysic ofthe supersensible to fend ‘off sectarian religious suggles in the public realm while they then invoke authoritative conceptions of thinking, reason, and morality that draw them perilously close ro the Kantian metaphysic of the supersensible as they ward ‘off contemporary defenders of an ethic of cultivation. Secularism functions most effectively poliially when its criticisms of a public role for Christian ‘The Conceits of Secularism —33 theology are insulated from its corollary disparegements of nontheistic, non- Xantian philosophies. “The Kantian achievement, however, is cas rom fragile crystal. For what ‘fone contends, as Gilles Deleuze does, thatthe *apodietic” racagnusion by crdinary people upon which Kantian morality is grounded in dhe fist in- stance is acwally a secondary formation reflecing the predominant Chris: tian culture in which i is set? Now the same objections Kant brought against the atbitary authority of eoctesiology can be brought against him. And this ifficulty returns to haunt other attempts to secure secular authority in the public realm after Kant, even by secularists who eschew reference to the Kantian supersensible. The rerum of Kentin charges against the philosophy that issued them leads one to wonder whether every ater to occupy such 2 place of unquestioned autherity reenacts the plot of Greek tragedy in ‘hich all panies promising to solve an bdurate conflict inthe same old ‘way soon find themselves succumbing to ‘ant introduces defining cements into the logic of secularism, but he himself does not construct a complete philosophy of secularism. His obse- {quious deference to the prince, his explicit dependence on the supersensi- ble, his hope that a natural teleology of publi life wll promote rationality in the public sphere by automatic means, and his hesitancy to include most “subjects within the realm of public discourse render him a forerunner rather than 4 partisan of secularism Nonetheless, most contemporary secularists attempt to secure the Kantian eect by Kantian and/or non-Kantian means. ‘This implicates them, though tc varying degrees, in a cluster of protection- (sc strategies against (2 the intrusion of ecclesiastical theology into public le; () the academic and public legtimacy of nontheistic, non-Kantian philoso- phies: (€ the exploration of the visceral register of thinking. and inversub- Jectivty; (the admiration of creativity in thinkings (e) the related appreci- ation of the politics of becoming by which the new comes into being from below the operative register of justice and cepresentational discourse; and © productive involvement with experimental practices of micropolites and selParistry These intercoded interventions are pursued in the name of pro- tecting the authority of deliberative argument in the secular public sphere, that is, of securing the Kanwian effec Lets look at how one effort to secure the Kantisn effect by nom-Kant jan means unfolds in the early work of Jangen Habermas, when he traces the emergence ancl decline of ‘the public sphere" in modern Western soci ies. In The Sirictural Transformation ofthe Public Sphere, Habermas draws sustenance from Kant without endorsing a metaphysic of the supersensible. Bilkent Universiry Kibrary.34—The Conceits of Secularism According to the Habermas story, a small, vibrant public sphere shone beil lianly for a brief me in postmedieval Europe. Salons, coffeehouses, and ‘weekly periodicals coalesced to foster a public that received ideas disintee cestedly and debated them in a way that allowed “the authority of the beter argument” to prevail. Early theorists who cataloged this sphere, including Kani, eernalized the historically contingent conditions that rendered ios: sible. But cis historical practice of public, critical reason, and pursuit of a free public consensus set a model for public life transcending its immedi- ate place of sppraximation, Unlike most secularists, the exdy Habermas (this changes late) finds this moment of evanescence to be short-lived. One ele- ment in his account of is fall from grace, however, may express & more pervasive proclivity in secolae conceptions of public discourse. By the middle of the twentieth cenury, under pressure fom an expand- {ng welfare state, the sophisticated capaciles of corporate and political ma- nipulation, and s0 on, the authentic public sphere had given way to a false copy. Consider some summary formulations from Habermas to capture the caaracter ofthis decline: Pur blundy, you had to pay for books, thester, concer, and museum, ‘but nt forthe convention about what you had rad, heard, and seea snd what you might completely abso only through this conversation. “Tay the conversation tse is adminBlered. Profesional dialogues from the podium, pinel discussions and round table ehows—the mtonal ‘debate of prtnte people becomes one ofthe production numbers of tne. atumes commodity foem even a eoaforences’ Whore sny- ‘one ca “picipate."* ‘Te sounding board of an educated sian tutored in the pubitc use ‘of reason has been shaered the publics plc apart into minors of specials who pot their eacon to use nonpubliey ad the great mass ‘of consumers whose receptiveness is puble but uncial. Consequenty Ik completely lack the form of communication spect a poblic™ ‘The consensus developed in ronal policl public debut has yeked ‘o compromise Fought out or simply imposed noapubliey.® ‘A process of public commusicaon evolving inthe medium ofthe par- tes... obviosely sands in sn inverse relation to the aged nd manip lative eflecveness ofa publcny med a endaring te broaé popt- lation... ifecousy ready for ecclamaion.* ‘The collapse of eciogy seems tobe only onesie of the proces “The other side that Meology full, on doeper lve of conscious nes, sold function... This flee consciovsness no longer consists of tn internally harmonized nexus of ideas...,but of @ nexus of modes of benaviee”™ ‘The Conceits of Secularism —35 1 do not object, of course, to exploration of how the contours of public discourse shift with changes in their technological and economic context, nor to how structural binds created by the expansion of capitalism squeeze the space in which public discourse appears. But the early Habermas —for his position, as we stall see, changes later—inflects the account of tis his- tory in a particular direction. Interpreted through the perspective advanced here, the early Habermasian formulations first extract a desiccated model of,