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CHAPTER 1: FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE (Police Power) ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due

r not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.


HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted
Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court
by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of
facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO
exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to
movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef.
minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in
On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He
doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu
was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional
concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process
for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the
contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason
authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being
as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to
heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by
valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.
the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
White Light Corp., vs City of Manila
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626- Police Power – Not Validly Exercised – Infringement of Private Rights
A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance”
carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses
same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of
carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said
the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is
the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate
and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the
of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the City.
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution
of the properties arbitrarily taken. ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Assoc., Inc vs Mayor of Manila
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty
Police Power – Due Process Clause for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades
private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are
On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was
really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to
approved by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said
motels. It classified them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at 4.5k/yr).
ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC
It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checks in to
reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law
averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court
as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.
City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of
performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with
Police Power the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad.
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN realize the plan which included an Artist’s Record Book which a performing artist
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to
bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual
viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in
Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the favor of EIAC.
enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC
also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of
their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police police power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely
Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare
of the law is to promote morality in the City. or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity,
it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid. order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists,
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3.
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to
by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: “high risk” destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further
underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them
and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals
and agencies.
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the
(6) must not be unreasonable. Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate
to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For
exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local
market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail
enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said
JMM Promotion and Management vs Court of Appeals Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which,
according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said
Police Power that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps
in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally Foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari
accepted principles. store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this
The World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage
case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and
of R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for the release of certain loans.
with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
There is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
combinations in restraint of trade.
enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
Mar Roxas, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura, and Securities and
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact
surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his that they are taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public
right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market. funds.
Espina vs. Zamora, Jr
The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.
FACTS:
Petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A.
On March 7, 2000, President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing
8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly provisions that are judicially demandable.
repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in
the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories. The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign
investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of
R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest
and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or
same rights as Filipino citizens. not to make such reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws
allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the
On October 11, 2000, petitioners, all members of the House of Representatives, Constitution to Filipino citizens.
filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the
following grounds: ISSUES:

The law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the
enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to constitutionality of R.A. 8762
achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full
employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional
policies.
POLITICAL LAW: Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come
The implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, to a court of justice and make such a challenge.
which taken together with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result
in the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy. HELD:
Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of
justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing refers to his personal First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-
and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result enumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or
of the passage of that law. incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed
to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be
Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade allowed to engage in certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores
Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives,
taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing
the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs when the public activities.
interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching United States vs Luis Toribio
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
Police Power
POLITICAL LAW: The declarations of principles and state policies in the Constitution Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be
are not self-executing. slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for
work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was
As the Court explained in Tanada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987 eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the
Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter
Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
Furthermore, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and
controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such
monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights
powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall
Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development. not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights
and interests of the community.”
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress
the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the TOMAS VELASCO et al vs HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS et al
recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus,
This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory
Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the
relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of
economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain
Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of
industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress
petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The
has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign
assailed ordinance is worded thus: “It shall be prohibited for any operator of any
investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has
barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any
not opposed such policy.
adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the
same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber
Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of
shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person.” 1 As noted in
R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said,
the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the
there is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The
violation of this ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court,
Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead
therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability being
to alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any
dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. 2
concrete and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided
strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus -
Even if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum
pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think
objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to impose payment of the license what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement
fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist
amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible
On Police Power
immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage
of customers.” 3This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power.
the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the
Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has
clause, which “delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the
above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and
and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice
construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as “nothing more or less
jurisprudence.” 5 As it was then, so it has continued to be. 6There is no showing, than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the
therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance. aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision
after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.
with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
Agustin vs Edu property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus
‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
Generally Accepted Principles of International Law – Police Power comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948,
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as
of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth
devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that
unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful
which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ In that sense it could be hardly
to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative
and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires. power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential, insistent, and
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid. at least illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor great public needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or
vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a
visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the
motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government
rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and
disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist welfare.”
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact HELD
that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the
public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a
overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention,
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police
an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta,
power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same
safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the
safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language
purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads
of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando “the necessities imposed by public welfare may
and streets designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the first law sought
justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain
to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded”.
Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative
demands of public safety. Mary Concepcion Bautista et al vs Alfredo Juinio et al
Taxicab Operators vs Board of Transportation “Equal Protection” – Distinction Between Heavy and Extra Heavy Cars and Others
Police Power Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified
vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic
weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this
corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public
law is to curb down petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil.
Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in
Bautista claimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and
Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
EH cars are heavy on petroleum consumption when in fact there are smaller cars
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued which are also big on oil consumption. Further, the law restricts their freedom to
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads: enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers
that there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles classified
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by them fall within such
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. category.
80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection.
registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974,
as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention.
of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. The classification on cars on its face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason.
The ideal situation is for the law’s benefits to be available to all, that none be placed
ISSUES:
outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the
with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the very essence of the idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to
petitioners’ constitutional right to procedural due process? continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the
reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation
may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under
and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners’
such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the
constitutional rights to.
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common
(1) Equal protection of the law; weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that
finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and
(2) Substantive due process; and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard? treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be Gancayco filed Motions for Reconsideration, which the CA denied, as both parties
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every have no new issues raised. Therefore they petitioned to the Court.
person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated
ISSUES: Whether or not the wing wall of Gancayco’s property can be constituted as
in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding
on the rest. a public nuisance. Whether or not MMDA was in their authority to demolish
Gancayco’s property.
Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City and MMDA – July 18, 2006 (G.R.
No. 177807) MMDA vs. Gancayco – May 10 2007 (G.R. No. 177933)
HELD: The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court decided
FACTS: The consolidated petitions of Retired Justice Emilio Gancayco, City that the wing wall of Gancayco’s building was not a nuisance per se, as under Art. 694
Government of Quezon City and the Metro Manila Development Authority stemmed of the Civil Code of the Philippines, nuisance is defined as any act, omission,
from a local ordinance pertaining to Construction of Arcades, and the clearing of establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures of
Public Obstructions. Gaycanco owns a property, of which he was able to obtain a endangers the health or safety of the others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3)
building permit for a two-storey commercial building, which was situated along EDSA, shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstruct or interferes with the
in an area which was designated as part of a Business/Commercial Zone by the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or
Quezon City Council. The Quezon City Council also issued Ordinance No. 2904, which impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be a nuisance per se or a nuisance per
orders the construction of Arcades for Commercial Buildings. The ordinance was accidens. A nuisance per se are those which affect the immediate safety of persons
amended to not require the properties located at the Quezon City - San Juan and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity. As
boundary, and commercial buildings from Balete - Seattle Street to construct the Gaycanco was able to procure a building permit to construct the building, it was
arcades, moreover, Gancayco had been successful in his petition to have his property, implied that the city engineer did not consider the building as such of a public
already covered by the amended ordinance, exempted from the ordinance. MMDA nuisance, or a threat to the safety of persons and property. The MMDA was only to
on April 28, 2003, sent a notice to Gancayco, under Ordinance no. 2904, part of his enforce Authoritative power on development of Metro Manila, and was not
property had to be demolished, if he did not clear that part within 15 days, which supposed to act with Police Power as they were not given the authority to do such
Gancayco did not comply with, and so the MMDA had to demolish the party wall, or by the constitution, nor was it expressed by the DPWH when the ordinance was
“wing walls.” Gancayco then filed a temporary restraining order and/or writ of enacted. Therefore, MMDA acted on its own when it illegally demolished Gancayco’s
preliminary injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the property, and was solely liable for the damage.
demolition of his property, without due process and just compensation, claiming that
Ordinance no. 2904 was discriminatory and selective. He sought the declaration of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs Secretary of Agrarian
nullity of the ordinance and payment for damages. MMDA contended that Gancayco Reform
cannot seek nullification of an ordinance that he already violated, and that the
ordinance had the presumption of constitutionality, and it was approved by the 175 SCRA 343 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal
Protection – Valid Classification
Quezon City Council, taking to note that the Mayor signed the ordinance. The RTC,
however, declared that the Ordinance was unconstitutional, invalid and void ab Eminent Domain – Just Compensation
initio. MMDA appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the CA partly granted the appeal, These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the
with the contention that the ordinance was to be modified; it was constitutional Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian
because the intention of the ordinance was to uplift the standard of living, and Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
business in the commercial area, as well as to protect the welfare of the general
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights
public passing by the area, however the injunction against the enforcement and includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State
implementation of the ordinance is lifted. With that decision, the MMDA and shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits HELD:
thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class
provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among
exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been
tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987,
defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor
particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it
of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands
must conform to the following requirements:
covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted.
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
its provisions.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary) Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from
properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that
of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7
is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on
hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they
this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of
themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be
justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different
In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as
class.
part of the agrarian reform program.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, courts. However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR
and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount
reform program and that the specific amount must be determined by the agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation
principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation
no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does
not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for
can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination.
their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just
This is even so provided by RA 6657:
compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to
ISSUE:
the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process. in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos
in terms of cash. in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then
the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, property. At the petitioners’ behest, we have issued a temporary restraining order to
i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation. preserve the status quo between the parties pending our decision.
DECS vs San Diego G.R. No. 89572 This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of San
Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the
FACTS: Roberto Rey San Diego, a graduate of the University of the East with a Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls
degree of B.S. Zoology, had taken and flunked 4 National Medical Admission Tests and sell in the above-mentioned place. The action was protested on November 10,
and was applying to take another test. NMAT Rule provides that a student shall be 1961, in Civil Case No. 2040, where the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch
allowed only three (3) chances to take the test. After three successive failures, a 2, issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants from
student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The Regional constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. On January 18,
Trial Court held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a 1964, while this case was pending, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted
medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. Resolution No. 29, which declared the subject area as “the parking place and as the
public plaza of the municipality,” thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218,
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has been deprived of his right to quality series of 1961. Four years later, on November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar
education. decided the aforesaid case and held that the land occupied by the petitioners, being
public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the
RULING: NMAT is a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools to subject of private occupancy. The writ of preliminary injunction was made
those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical permanent.
education. The regulation of practice of medicine is a reasonable method of
HELD
protecting the health and safety of the public. This regulation includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. NMAT is a Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have
means of achieving the country’s objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be
into medical schools” and of “improving the quality of medical education in the surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. In fact, every
country” It is the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains
not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order.
This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or
and health.
even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare.
The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every
Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and
citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, limited by the paramount police power.
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirement.
The equal protection requires equality among equals. There would be unequal We hold that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others denying the petition for prohibition. On the contrary, he acted correctly in sustaining
the right and responsibility of the mayor to evict the petitioners from the disputed
who have also qualified are denied entrance.
area and clear it of all the structures illegally constructed therein.
The petition has been granted and the decision of the respondent court has been
reversed.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION VS. ARLENE DE GUZMAN, ET AL.,
Villanueva vs Castañeda
June 21, 2004
There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along
POLICE POWER/Public Health; THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE A PROFESSION
Mercado Street, a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a
Facts:
conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is commonly known as a
talipapa. This is the subject of the herein petition. The petitioners claim they have a
After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) released the names of
right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous
successful examinees in the Medical Licensure Examination, the Board of Medicines
authorization granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny
observed that the grades of the 79 Fatima College of Medicine successful
this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public
examinees were unusually and exceptionally high in the two (2) most difficult Didipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association et al vs DENR Sec Elisea Gozun et al
subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and Obstetrics and Gynecology.
Police Power – Eminent Domain
The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the registration as physicians In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign
of all the examinees from Fatima College of Medicine. Compared with other companies when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or
examines from other schools, the results of those from Fatima were not only mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994,
incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. The NBI Investigation Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The
found that the “Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.” FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N.
Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its
On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition for mandamus before implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled as it
the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC to give them their licenses to practice medicine. is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify
Meanwhile on July 21, 1993, the Board of medicine issued Resolution No. 21 charging Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional,
the respondents of immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud and deceit and petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO
recommended that the test results of the Fatima Examinees be nullified. 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust “taking” of private property for
private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated its decision ordering the PRC mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and the
to allow the respondents to take the physician’s oath and to register them as corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent
physicians. The same was appealed by the PRC to the Court of Appeals which DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot,
sustained the RTC decision. on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without
payment of just compensation.
Hence, this petition.
Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a
Held: taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the
state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
It must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a profession or pursuit good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation
of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State in an arbitrary, despotic or involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails
oppressive manner. However, the regulating body has the right to grant or forbid some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public
such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. respondents concluded that “to require compensation in all such circumstances
would compel the government to regulate by purchase.”
But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, their exercise may ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.
be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals,
peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As such, HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain.
mandamus will not lie to compel the Board of Medicine to issue licenses for the They are;
respondents to practice medicine. (1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
medicine, the qualifications of the candidates for the board examination, the scope (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for the denying of the issuance of a
physician’s license, or revoking a license that has been issued. It is therefore clear (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
that the examinee must prove that he has fully complied with all the conditions and appropriated or injuriously affected;
requirements imposed by law and the licensing authority to be granted the privilege (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
to practice medicine. In short, he shall have all the qualifications and none of the oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
disqualifications. The petition is therefore granted.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to
involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business.
compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit, That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out
with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner,
after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938
occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly
which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE
compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.
POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
to the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power
consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived
of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly of due process.
compensated.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the
Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands. occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in
pursuant to RA 938.
5-a. Not Valid Exercise of police power
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not
City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”. The law basically provides field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose
that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather
set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.
CHAPTER 2: DUE PROCESS
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no El Banco Español-Filipino vs Vicente Palanca
reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total Judicial Due Process Requisites
area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed
Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes an instrument to mortgage Engracio’s property. Engracio however left for China and
the burden to private cemeteries. he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify
Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper.
Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that
it’d be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute
Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title – Police Power Not Validly Exercise
Engracio’s property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed. This Office finds however finds [sic] that the foregoing provisions [pertaining to
Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman] do not entitle respondent [Sen.
process had been met. The requisites are;
Estrada]to be furnished all the filings of the respondents.

1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
It is to be noted that there is noprovision under this Office’s Rules of Procedure which
and decide the matter before it.
entitles respondent to be furnished all the filings by the other parties, e.g. the
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
respondents.
property subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing. Under the Rules of Court as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the respondents are only required to furnish their counter-affidavits
and controverting evidence to the complainant, and not to the other respondents.
SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

To reiterate, the rights of respondent [Sen.] Estrada in the conduct of the preliminary
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no
investigation depend on the rights granted to him by law and these cannot be based
right to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3,
on whatever rights he believes [that] he is entitled to or those that may be derived
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have
from the phrase "due process of law." Thus, this Office cannot grant his motion to be
the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by
furnished with copies of all the filings by the other parties. Nevertheless, he should
the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory
be furnished a copy of the Reply of complainant NBI as he is entitled thereto under
questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be
the rules; however, as of this date, no Reply has been filed by complainant NBI.
present but without the right to examine or crossexamine.

On 12 May 2014, Sen. Estrada filed before the Ombudsman a motion to suspend
Facts: On 25 November 2013 and 3 December 2013 the Ombudsman served upon
proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 because the denial of his
Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397,
Request to be furnished copies of counter-affidavits of his co-respondents deprived
filed by the FIO of the Ombudsman, which prayed, among others, that criminal
him of his right to procedural due process, and he has filed the present Petition
proceedings for Plunder, as defined in RA No. 7080 against Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada
before this Court.
filed his counter-affidavit inOMB-C-C-13-0313 on 9 January 2014 and 16 January
2014.
This Office fails to see how Senator Estrada was deprived of his right to procedural
due process, There was also no violation of Sen. Estrada’s right to due process
Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-
because there is no rule which mandates that a respondent such as Sen. Estrada be
affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014
furnished with copies of the submissions of his co-respondents.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of
Issue: THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IN ISSUING THE CHALLENGED ORDER
Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other
DATED 27 MARCH 2014, ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR
Filings (Request) in OMB-C-C-13-0313
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED SEN. ESTRADA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
Sen. Estrada’s request was made "[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine PROCESS OF LAW
the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’
(Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on
Ruling: the Ombudsman’s denial in its 27 March 2014 Order of Sen. Estrada’s Request
record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the denial did not violate Sen.
Ombudsman)."
Estrada’s constitutional right to due process
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent and Regulations Implementing [RA] 6713,"101 otherwise known as the "Code of
with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman and/or the Sandiganbayan committed any
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter affidavits of his co-
grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions ultimately finding
respondents violates his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however,
probable cause against petitioners for the charges against them.
fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due
process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with Ruling:
the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure In G.R. Nos. 212593-94, Reyes imputes grave abuse of discretion against the
of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Ombudsman in finding probable cause against her for Plunder and violations of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 on the basis of: (a) Tuason's Sworn Statement dated February
the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and 4, 2014, which was not furnished to Reyes despite her repeated requests therefor,
documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the thereby violating her right to due process; 134 (b) Tuason's Supplemental Sworn
respondent. Statement dated February 21, 2014 that did not mention Reyes's name at all; 135 (c)
documentary evidence that were forged, falsified, and fictitious; 136 and (d) hearsay
"A respondent’s right to examine refers only to "the evidence submitted by the declarations of the whistleblowers who merely mentioned Reyes's name in general
complainant." terms but did not positively declare that they saw or talked with her at any time or
had seen her receive money from Janet Napoles or the latter's employees
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or under Assuming arguendo that such whistleblower accounts are merely hearsay, it must be
Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever reiterated that - as held in the Estrada case - probable cause can be established with
that the affidavits executed by the corespondents should be furnished to a hearsay evidence, so long as there, is substantial basis for crediting the same.
respondent

This Court has unequivocally ruled in Paderanga that "Section 3, Rule 112 of the Reyes erroneously posits that under Section 4,184 Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the respondent shall only the Office of the Ombudsman, she is entitled to copies of Tuason's affidavit, as well
have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted as the transcripts of the clarificatory hearings conducted by the Ombudsman with
by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory Tuason, and that the Ombudsman's denial of such copies constitutes a violation of
questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be due process on her part. In Estrada, the Court had already resolved in detail that
present but without the right to examine or cross-examine." under both Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 4, Rule II of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, a respondent to a
JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN preliminary investigation proceeding (such as Reyes in this case) is only entitled to
the evidence submitted by the complainants, and not to those submitted by a co-
Facts: Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations respondent185 (such as Tuason in this case, prior to her grant of immunity as a state
in the anomalous Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving, as witness). It must also be noted that by virtue of the Ombudsman's Joint
reported15 by whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas Order186dated May 7, 2014, Reyes was even provided with copies of Tuason and
(Suñas), the illegal utilization and pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Cunanan's respective Counter-Affidavits,187 and directed to file a comment thereon.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010, in the total In fact, Reyes even submitted separate Comments188 on May 13, 2014. Thus, there is
amount of P172,834,500.00. The charges are contained in two (2) complaints of more reason to decline Reyes's assertion that the Ombudsman deprived her of due
plunder. process. Time and again, it has been said that the touchstone of due process is the
Reyes wrote a letter100 dated May 7, 2014 to the Ombudsman, requesting a copy of opportunity to be heard,189 which was undeniably afforded to Reyes in this case.
the immunity agreement that it entered into with Tuason. Again, the Ombudsman
denied Reyes's request for the reason that the immunity agreement is a "privileged
communication which is considered confidential under Section 3, Rule IV of the Rules
EDELBERT C. UYBOCO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Ruling: As to petitioner’s claim that his right to due process was denied due to his
former counsel’s error, abuse of discretion or gross incompetence, We find no merit
Facts: In his motion, petitioner prayed for the reopening of the proceedings on the in this claim. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a client is bound by his
ground that his constitutional rights to due process and to competent counsel were counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistake in handling a case,13 and to allow a client
violated when his former counsel, due to blatant error, abuse of discretion, and to disownhis counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and
gross incompetence, did not present any evidence in his defense, causing serious subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.14 While this rule
prejudice to him. has recognized exceptions,15 We find that there is no reason for this Court to
deviate from the findings of the Sandiganbayan. We held in Gotesco Properties, Inc.
According to petitioner, he was "accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by his v. Moral:16
former lawyer" who informed him that "there was no necessity for a preliminary
investigation and to present any evidence." His former counsel also "failed to cross The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in
examine the main prosecution witness because said counsel was inexplicably the realm of procedural technique. The basis is the tenet that an act performed by
absent on the trial date" and even "failed to prepare and file a memorandum" and counsel withinthe scope of a "general or implied authority" is regarded as an act of
"merely relied on the defense presented by the lawyers of co-accused Valencia and the client. While the application of this general rule certainly depends upon the
Maramot by adopting the defenses of the other accused and all their pleadings and surrounding circumstances of a given case, there are exceptions recognized by this
manifestations, even when these were clearly not applicable to petitioner’s Court: "(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
defense." Thus, petitioner avers that his constitutional rights to procedural and process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the
substantive due process and of law and to competent counsel were violated. client’s liberty or property;or (3) where the interests of justice so require."

In its Comment dated September 30,2014, the Office of the Special Prosecutor The present case does not fall under the said exceptions. In the present case, the
opposed petitioner’s plea toreopen the case on the ground of denial of due Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioner’s motion to re-open the proceedings on
process. In citing Lagua v. CA,3 they claim there is no basis to set aside the assailed the ground of violation of his due process, to wit:
decision and resolution since "a client is bound by the action of his counsel."
In the same vein, accused-movant Uyboco’s clear admission that "he had been
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only given the opportunity to present his evidence" and despite said opportunity, he and
questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists his counsel decided/opted not to present any evidence for his defense, as shown by
when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of their written Manifestatio ndated November 20, 2012, that "after earnest
fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. assessment and evaluation, the accused EDELBERT C. UYBOCO has deemed it
unnecessary to present further evidence in his defense, thus he is waiving his right
Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by to present further testimonial and documentary evidence," militates against his
an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can claim of miscarriage of justice, and hence, his motion to reopen proceedings must
otherwise affect the results of the case, those findings should not be likewise fai
ignored.5 Absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness
committed by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the The Office of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that petitioner was given
Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. 6 an opportunity tobe heard during trial.1âwphi1 This opportunity to be heard is the
essence of due process. While petitioner claims that he was incorrectly advised by
This rule admits of exceptions, asfollows: (1) where the conclusion is a finding his former counsel that the presentation of evidence is no longer necessary, this
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) where the inference unfortunate mistake cannot qualify as gross negligence or incompetence that would
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) where necessitate a reopening of the proceedings. In fact, not once did petitioner refute,
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact of or at the very least, address the Sandiganbayan’s finding that he had expressly
the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted consented to the waiver of the presentation of evidence by affixing his signature as
by evidence on record.7 conformity to the manifestation submitted by his former counsel.
ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR., vs. ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS Settled is the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. The only
exception is when the negligence of the counselis so gross, reckless and inexcusable
Facts: As culled from the CA, petitioner sent letters with similar contents on 7 that the client is deprived of his day in court. In such instance, the remedy is to reopen
February 1996 to House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., and on 26 February 1996 to Dr. the case and allow the party who was denied his day in court to adduce evidence.
Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. The controversial portion of the first However, perusing the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the general rule.
and second letters reads as follows:
Petitioner was given several opportunities to present his evidence or to clarify his
This is to notify your good self and your staff that one ALEXIS "DODONG" C. medical constraints in court, but he did not do so, despite knowing full well that he
ALMENDRAS, a brother, is not vested with any authority to liaison or transact any had a pending case incourt. For petitioner to feign and repeatedly insist upon a lack
business with any department, office, or bureau, public or otherwise, that has bearing of awareness of the progress of an important litigation is to unmask a penchant for
or relation with my office, mandates or functions. x x x. the ludicrous. Although he rightfully expected counsel to amply protect his interest,
he cannot just sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. In keeping with the
Note worthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr. Alexis "Dodong" C. Almendras, normal course of events, he should have taken the initiative "of making the proper
a reknown blackmailer, is a bitter rival in the just concluded election of 1995 who ran inquiries from his counsel and the trial court as to the status of his case." For his
against the wishes of my father, the late Congressman Alejandro D. Almendras, Sr. failure to do so, he has only himself to blame.19 The Court cannot allow petitioner the
He has caused pain to the family when he filed cases against us: his brothers and exception to the general rule just because his counsel admitted having no knowledge
sisters, and worst against his own mother. of his medical condition. To do so will set a dangerous precedent of never-ending
suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the
client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law.
I deemed that his act of transacting business that affects my person and official
functions is malicious in purpose, done with ill motive and part of a larger plan of
harassment activities to perforce realise his egoistic and evil objectives. Maliksi vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 203302 April 11, 2013
May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above
information to concerned officials and secretariat employees of the House of Facts: During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Representatives.3 Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the
candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election
protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were
These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published by
irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the
petitioner, assisted by Atty. Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao del Sur and Quezon City,
RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared
with evident bad faith and manifest malice to destroy respondent Alexis C.
Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and
Almendras’ good name. Hence, the latter filed an action for damages arising from
desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the
libel and defamation against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19,
COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending
Digos City.
appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor. In resolving the appeal, the
COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the
RTC: In the course of trial at the lower court, petitioner failed to present any ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus,
evidence, except his Answer, despite several rescheduling of hearings at his instance
it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount
CA: the CA ruled that petitioner was not denied due process. It noted that petitioner necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images.
was given full opportunity to present his evidence, but he vehemently disregarded Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash
the proceedings by merely absenting himself from trials without valid excuses deposit.

Isue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived due process Issue: Whether or not the conduct of recount by the first division of the COMELEC is
proper.
Ruling: We rule that petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process.
Held: No. It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held recount through a seasonable
conducted the assailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate petition for certiorari in this Court. In that context, he had no real opportunity to
jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount assail the conduct of the recount proceedings.
in the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC The service of the First Division orders requiring Saquilayan to post and augment the
Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election cash deposits for the printing of the picture images did not sufficiently give Maliksi
protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city notice of the First Division’s decision to print the picture images. The said orders did
officials. not meet the requirements of due process because they did not specifically inform
Maliksi that the ballots had been found to be tampered. Nor did the orders offer the
Section 6, Rule 10 (Conduct of Revision) of the 2010 Rules of Procedure for Municipal factual bases for the finding of tampering. Hence, to leave for Maliksi to surmise on
Election Contests, which governs the proceedings in the Regional Trial Courts the factual bases for finding the need to print the picture images still violated the
exercising original jurisdiction over election protests, provides: principles of fair play, because the responsibility and the obligation to lay down the
factual bases and to inform Maliksi as the party to be potentially prejudiced thereby
xxxx firmly rested on the shoulders of the First Division.

(m) In the event that the revision committee determines that the integrity of the MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI vs. COMELEC
ballots and the ballot box have not been preserved, as when proof of tampering or FACTS:
substitution exists, it shall proceed to instruct the printing of the picture image of the
ballots stored in the data storage device for the precinct. The court shall provide a During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was proclaimed as winner for the position of
non-partisan technical person who shall conduct the necessary authentication Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest
process to ensure that the data or image stored is genuine and not a substitute. Only number of votes, brought an election protest in the RTC in Imus, Cavite alleging that
after this determination can the printed picture image be used for the recount. there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts.
Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the
The foregoing rules further require that the decryption of the images stored in the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding
CF cards and the printing of the decrypted images take place during the revision or
Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office.
recount proceedings. There is a good reason for thus fixing where and by whom the
Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi's
decryption and the printing should be conducted. It is during the revision or recount
motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
conducted by the Revision/Recount Committee when the parties are allowed to be
represented, with their representatives witnessing the proceedings and timely
raising their objections in the course of the proceedings. Moreover, whenever the The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount
Revision/Recount Committee makes any determination that the ballots have been the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards.
tampered and have become unreliable, the parties are immediately made aware of Thus, it issued an order dated requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary
such determination. to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it
issued another order for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
The disregard of Maliksi’s right to be informed of the decision to print the picture
images of the ballots and to conduct the recount proceedings during the appellate The First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the
stage cannot be brushed aside by the invocation of the fact that Maliksi was able to duly elected Mayor.
file, after all, a motion for reconsideration. To be exact, the motion for
reconsideration was actually directed against the entire resolution of the First Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right
Division, while Maliksi’s claim of due process violation is directed only against the to due process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He
First Division’s recount proceedings that resulted in the prejudicial result rendered
argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary
against him. Notably, the First Division did not issue any order directing the recount.
evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of
Without the written order, Maliksi was deprived of the chance to seek any
the paper ballots had not been preserved. equivalents of the original official ballots themselves.In Vinzons-Chato v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013the Court held
The COMELEC En Banc denied Maliksi's MR. that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are
likewise official ballots that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof
to the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus,
notice to him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest."
proceedings conducted by the First Division.
That the two documents the official ballot and its picture image are considered
The Supreme Court via petition for certiorari dismissed the same. The Court then "original documents" simply means that both of them are given equal probative
pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as
ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot weightier than the other.
images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the
same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the
and that the First Divisions finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture
tampered had been fully established by the large number of cases of double- images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to the
shading discovered during the revision. parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the
printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted for
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or
clear violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law considering best evidence of the voters will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are
that decryption, printing and examination of the digital images of the ballots were to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their
done inconspicuously upon motu propio directive of the COMELEC First Division integrity has been compromised.
sans any notice to the petitioner and for the first time on appeal.
Imelda Marcos vs Sandiganbayan
HELD: The decision of the court a quo is granted. Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious
transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light
POLITICAL LAW notice to parties Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The
division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission associate justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienza’s
on Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the dissent in favor of Imelda’s innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special
speedy resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the division of the SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores
parties the opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The parties right to be then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the date
heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to of Amores’ request, Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating that
he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued
be treated so lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be
a special order to immediately dissolve the special division and have the issue be
thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc
raised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores’
should not have upheld the First Divisions deviation from the regular procedure in
manifestation granted that a majority has already decided on Imelda’s favor. The SB
the guise of speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its failure to provide en banc ruled against Imelda.
the parties with notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most
basic requirements of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.
HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong
The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the showing of Imelda’s guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of
due process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores’ manifestation. Such he was assisted by one Atty. Jocelyn Reyes who seemed not to be a lawyer. Granting
procedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of that she indeed is not a lawyer, her withdrawal from the case in the earlier part of
its ”decision” convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special the case has cured the defect as he was subsequently assisted by a lawyer coming
Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in from the PAO.
the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five
People vs Opida G.R. No. L-46272, July 13, 1986
(5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del
FACTS: This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Circuit Criminal Court,
Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her. At that point,
Seventh Judicial District, imposing the death penalty upon Alberto Opida and Virgilio
Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change their mind and agree
Marcelo for the crime of murder.
with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot deprive
petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It On July 31, 1976, in Quezon City, several persons ganged up on Fabian Galvan, stoned
may be true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an and hit him with beer bottles until finally one of them stabbed him to death. The
informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that actual knife-wielder was identified as Mario del Mundo. 3 Nonetheless, Alberto
opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was Opida and Virgilio Marcelo were charged with murder as conspirators and, after trial,
denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice sentenced to death. 4
Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.
The basis of their conviction by the trial court was the testimony of two prosecution
Emma Delgado vs Court of Appeals witnesses, neither of whom positively said that the accused were at the scene of the
crime, their extrajudicial confessions, which were secured without the assistance of
Delgado together with 3 others were charged for estafa causing the frustration of
counsel, and corroboration of the alleged conspiracy under the theory of interlocking
one medical student. Delgado was assisted by one Atty. Yco. The said lawyer has filed
confession.
for multiple postponement of trial and one time he failed to appear in court by reason
of him being allegedly sick. No medical certificate was furnished. The court was not What is striking about this case is the way the trial judge conducted his interrogation
impressed with such actuation and had considered the same as Delgado’s waiver of of the two accused and their lone witness, Lilian Layug. It was hardly judicious and
her right to trial. The lower court convicted her and the others. She appealed before certainly far from judicial, at times irrelevant, at Worst malicious. Reading the
the CA and the CA sustained the lower court’s rule. Delgado later found out that Yco transcript, one gathers the impression that the judge had allied himself with the
is not a member of the IBP. prosecution to discredit at the outset the credibility of the witnesses for the defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed. ISSUE:
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Delgado. An accused person is entitled to be
1. Whether or not the extrajudicial confession that was used as a basis for conviction
represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the
was admissible as evidence.
Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that
any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal 2. Whether or not the evident hostility and bias of the judge in the case at bar is
perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a proper.
denial of due process.
DECISION:
Pedro Consulta vs People of the Philippines
1. We have consistently held that, aside from the required assistance of counsel, the
Consulta is charged for stealing a gold necklace worth 3.5k owned by a certain rights guaranteed during a custodial investigation are not supposed to be merely
Silvestre. He was convicted by the lower court. Consulta raised before the CA the communicated to the suspect, especially if he is unlettered, but must be painstakingly
issue that he was not properly arraigned and that he was represented by a non explained to him so he can understand their nature and significance. Moreover,
lawyer. manhandling of any sort will vitiate any extrajudicial confession that may be
ISSUE: Whether or not Consulta was denied of due process. extracted from him and renders it inadmissible in evidence against him.

HELD: The SC ruled that Consulta’s claim of being misrepresented cannot be given 2. Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the
due course. He was assisted by two lawyers during the proceeding. In the earlier part, cold neutrality of an impartial judge. we have added that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties to reach the main road, Alberto Rojas, Tonying and a certain "Duk" (brother-in-law of
that his decision will be just. This guaranty was not observed in this case. Given the Tonying) accosted him and asked him for liquor money. When he refused, the three
obvious hostility of the judge toward the defense, it was inevitable that all the men got angry. After telling them that he had to go, Tonying hit him with a spray gun
protestations of the accused in this respect would be, as they in fact were, dismissed. (for painting), causing him to fall down. While he was in a supine position, Tonying
And once the confessions were admitted, it was easy enough to employ them as attempted to hit him again. It was at that point that he was able to get hold of his
corroborating evidence of the claimed conspiracy among the accused. knife and thrust it forward and hit someone. He did not know who got stabbed. He
then immediately fled.
The judge disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too eager to convict the
accused, who had manifestly earned his enmity. When he said at the conclusion of On January 23, 2007, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of
the trial, "You want me to dictate the decision now?" 23, he was betraying a pre- murder. In rejecting the claim of self-defense, the trial court stated that it was not
judgment long before made and obviously waiting only to be formalized. worthy of belief as it was belied by the credible testimonies of the prosecution
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo is reversed and witnesses.
they are hereby ordered released immediately. No costs
The accused appealed to the CA raising the issues of denial of due process of law and
People vs Mortera (Right Of The Accused To An Impartial Trial) his right to an impartial trial. He claimed that the trial court judge, Judge Jesus
Carbon, was hostile towards him and prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from
FACTS: This is an appeal from the January 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals his "prosecutor-like" conduct. The accused likewise reiterated his claim of self-
which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in criminal defense.
case which found accused Benancio Mortera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder for the killing of one Robelyn Rojas. In its decision, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the
civil liabilities. The CA ruled that the trial judge did not transgress the standard of
Prosecution witness Ramil Gregorio testified that one afternoon, he together with "cold neutrality" required of a magistrate and added that the questions he
other men were drinking tuba. They have just started drinking when Benancio propounded were "substantially clarificatory."
Mortera, Jr. arrived. He wanted to hit Alberto Rojas with a Nescafe glass. Alberto
Rojas ran away. Mortera said, "Sayang." He listened while the group of Ramil Still not satisfied, the accused now comes before the SC.
Gregorio were singing accompanied by a guitar. Jomer Diaz, brother-in-law of Alberto
Diaz, arrived. Mortera said, "Here comes another Rojas." Gregorio and his ISSUE: WON the accused were denied of his right to have an impartial trial.
companions told Jomer Diaz to run away. Mortera hurled a stone at Diaz but the
latter was not hit. Mortera left but he said that he will return. After a few minutes, HELD: As correctly pointed out by the CA, although the trial judge might have made
Mortera came back. When Jomer Diaz ran, Robelyn Rojas, brother of Alberto Rojas improper remarks and comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due
went to Jomer. Mortera met Robelyn at a distance of about seven meters from the process or his right to an impartial trial. Upon perusal of the transcript as a whole, it
place where the group were drinking. Mortera and Robelyn discussed with each cannot be said that the remarks were reflective of his partiality. Not only did the
other and later shook hands. Robelyn turned his face and Mortera suddenly stabbed accused mislead the court by initially invoking a negative defense only to claim
Robelyn Rojas at the back. After stabbing Robelyn, Mortera ran away. Robelyn Rojas otherwise during trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the
tried to chase Mortera but he was not able to catch up but he fell down mortally dark as to his intended defense. The invocation of Opida did not persuade the SC. In
wounded. He was brought to the hospital by his brother but he was pronounced DOA Opida, SC did not fail to notice the "malicious," "sadistic" and "adversarial" manner
at the hospital. Jovel Veñales who was drinking together with Ramil Gregorio and of questioning by the trial judge of the accused therein, including their defense
others, corroborated Ramil Gregorio's testimony. witness. In Opida, the accused never admitted the commission of the crime, and so
the burden of proof remained with the prosecution.
Although the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned, during the trial, he
admitted having stabbed the victim whom he referred to as Tonying, but claimed Therefore, SC affirmed the ruling of the lower courts.
self-defense. By his account he passed by a corner and saw a group of people
drinking. They were Ramil Gregorio, Jonel Veñales and Tonying. Upon seeing him,
Tonying ran away and called his brother, Alberto Rojas. When the accused was about