EN BANC

[G.R. No. 133917. February 19, 2001.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . NASARIO

MOLINA y MANAMAT @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y
MALAGURA @ "BOBOY" , accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Ateneo Legal Aid Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

In the morning of August 8, 1995, the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City,
dispatched the team of SP04 Dionisio Cloribel, SP02 Paguidopon and SPO1 Pamplona
to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, after the latter received an
information from his informer that an alleged marijuana pusher will be passing at that
place anytime that morning. At around 9:30, a "trisikad" carrying Nasario Molina and
Gregorio Mula passed by. SPO1 Paguidopon then pointed at Nasario and Gregorio as
the pushers. The team then immediately boarded the vehicle, overtook the "trisikad" and
then requested it to stop. Mula then handed the black bag, which he was holding to
Molina. After introducing himself as police of cer, Pamplona requested Molina to open
the bag. Molina replied " Boss, if possible we will settle this." Pamplona however
insisted on opening the bag, which revealed the marijuana leaves inside.
For unlawful possession of 946.9 grams of dried marijuana, accused-Nasario
Molina and Gregorio Mula were found by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City guilty of
violation of Section 8, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentenced them to death. The court a quo
anchored its judgment of conviction on a nding that the warrantless arrest of
accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace of cers, were
valid because accused-appellants were caught in agrant delicto in possession of
prohibited drugs.
Hence, this automatic review.
In acquitting accused-appellants of the crime charged, the Supreme Court held
that the accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their
arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be
committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that
accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the
request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced
the "suspicion" of the arresting of cers that accused appellants were committing a
crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable
cause to effect an in flagrant delicto arrest. Moreover, it could not be said that accused-
appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
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 considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Thus,
the Court held that the arrest of accused-appellants did not fall under the exceptions
allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace of cers could not be admitted as
evidence against accused-appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE: EXCLUSIONARY RULE; RATIONALE FOR
THE RULE. — The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be
carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search
warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of
the Constitution provides: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or af rmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule
enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidi es the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures Thus: Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form, of words, valueless
and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so
too, without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so
ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all
brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a
freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. — The constitutional proscription, however, is
not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the
evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation
of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST; A
LAWFUL ARREST MUST PRECEDE THE SEARCH; PERMISSIBLE WARRANTLESS
ARREST. — The rst exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which
must precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be rst a lawful
arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. As a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of
Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace of cer or a
private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense (arrest in agrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest
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 effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving nal judgment or is
temporarily con ned while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO WAIVER OF THE RIGHT WHERE IMPLIED ACQUIESCENCE
TO THE SEARCH WAS GIVEN UNDER COERCIVE CIRCUMSTANCES. — Moreover, it
could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable
searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not
have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ILLEGALITY OF THE SEARCH RENDERS ARTICLES SEIZED
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. — Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-
appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search
conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by
the peace of cers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and
the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellant.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST; IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO ARREST. — In People v. Chua Ho San , the Court held that in cases of in
agrante delicto arrests, a peace of cer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting of cer,
therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to,
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of
probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria, probable cause means an actual belief
or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in
the absence of actual belief of the arresting of cers, the suspicion that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances suf ciently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace of cers
making the arrest.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIABLE INFORMATION ALONE NOT SUFFICIENT TO
CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE. — As applied to in agrante delicto arrests, it is
settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting of cers, are not
suf cient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in agrante delicto arrest.
Thus, in People v. Aminnudin , it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so
or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the
M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from
the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana
that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension."
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES TO BE VALID. — Clearly, to constitute a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.
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 9. ID•, ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar,
accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In
holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be
committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that
accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the
request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced
the "suspicion" of the arresting of cers that accused-appellants were committing a
crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable
cause to effect an in agrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-
appellants to the arresting of cers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any
suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p

To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of

protecting the society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and
to subvert those values upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend. 1
For automatic review is the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, nding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y
Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias "Boboy," guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, 3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 4 and sentencing them
to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
The information against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in
conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grams of dried marijuana
which are prohibited.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty
to the accusation against them. 6 Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented
Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1
Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the
Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an
information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. 7 The
rst time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the rst week
of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed
by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the
pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him
before the arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused-appellants came
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 to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested. 8
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time
that morning. 9 Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the same day, he called for
assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately
dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon
(brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of
SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. 1 0
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned
in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed
by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the
pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." 1 1 SPO1
Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from where the accused-appellants
were accosted. 1 2
The police of cers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-
appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant
Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police of cer and asked
accused-appellant Molina to open the bag. 1 3 Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will
settle this. " 1 4 SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried
marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and Molina were
handcuffed by the police officers. 1 5
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly led a
Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is
inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 1 6 The demurrer was denied by the
trial court. 1 7 A motion for reconsideration was led by accused-appellants, but this
was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to
file a joint memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, 1 8 the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, nding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any
evidence from both accused who waived presentation of their own evidence
through their counsels, more than suf cient to prove the guilt of both accused
of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par.
5 of Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are
sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal injection
under Republic Act 8176, to be effected and implemented as therein provided
for by law, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate
the entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court,
Manila, for the automatic review of their case by the Supreme Court and its
appropriate action as the case may be.
SO ORDERED. 1 9
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the
Rules of Court, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-
appellants contend: EICScD

I.
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 THAT THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING
BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
II.

THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT

HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
AND
III.

THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8
OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH. 2 0
The Solicitor General led a Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein
he prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried
out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant
predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the
Constitution provides:
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or af rmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2 1
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined
under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidi es the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 2 2 Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and
undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too,
without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 2 3
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions.
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful
arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; 2 4 and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search).
25

The rst exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid

warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which
must precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be rst a lawful
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 arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. 2 6 As a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of
Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace of cer or a
private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense (arrest in agrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest
effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving nal judgment or is
temporarily con ned while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners). 2 7
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a
nding that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search
conducted by the peace of cers, are valid because accused-appellants were caught in
agrante delicto in possession of prohibited drugs. 2 8 This brings us to the issue of
whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San, 2 9 the Court held that in cases of in agrante delicto
arrests, a peace of cer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting of cer, therefore, must have
personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As
discussed in People v. Doria, 3 0 probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting of cers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances suf ciently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace of cers making the
arrest.
As applied to in agrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information"
alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and
within the view of the arresting of cers, are not suf cient to constitute probable cause
that would justify an in agrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin, 3 1 it was
held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he
was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the
other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became
suspect and so subject to apprehension."
Likewise, in People v. Mengote, 3 2 the Court did not consider "eyes . . . darting
from side to side . . . [while] holding . . . [one's] abdomen", in a crowded street at 11:30
in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances suf cient to arouse suspicion and
indicative of probable cause. According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch of the imagination
could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or
was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in [the arresting
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 of cers'] presence." So also, in People v. Encinada, 3 3 the Court ruled that no probable
cause is gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby
chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 3 4 the trial court concluded that
petitioner was attempting to commit a crime as he was "'standing at the corner of
Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking at
every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them."' 3 5 In declaring the warrantless
arrest therein illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in agrante delicto ... arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of
Yu, the arresting of cer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was
going to be committed. 3 6
It went on to state that —
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which
could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes
were "moving very fast" — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu
and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m.,
thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at
the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble . . .
Third, there was at all no g-round, probable or otherwise, to believe that
petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he
admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of
petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner,
any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could
not have been visible to Yu. 3 7
Clearly, to constitute a valid in agrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 3 8
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that
would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could
not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It
matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle
this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly
reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting of cers that accused-appellants were
committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute
probable cause to effect an in agrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1
Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-
appellants to the arresting of cers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any
suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. cCDAHE

While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a

surveillance of accused-appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he
only learned Mula's name and address after the arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if
SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that,
before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his
informer while they were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have
afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that
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 the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of
him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had
never seen him before the arrest.
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-
appellants even before the arrest, to wit —
"Q: When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person
and how did you know that it was Mula who handed the black bag to
another person?
A: Because I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula and
Molina, when they pass by through the street near the residence of
Paguidopon. He told that the one who is big one that is Gregorio Mula and
the thin one is Nazario Molina" 3 9

The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless.

SPO1 Pamplona could not have learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1
Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly conducted the surveillance,
was not even aware of accused-appellants' name and address prior to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguipodon, who acted as informer of the arresting of cers,
more so the arresting of cers themselves, could not have been certain of accused-
appellants' identity, and were, from all indications, merely shing for evidence at the
time of the arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting of cer in the said case knew
appellant Encinada even before the arrest because of the latter's illegal gambling
activities, thus, lending at least a semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the
peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court declared in said case that the warrantless arrest
and the consequent search were illegal, holding that "[t]he prosecution's evidence did
not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or
while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could
be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances." 4 0
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was
any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating
or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview
of the constitutional guarantee. 4 1
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under
the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace of cers could not be
admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no
choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug
addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement of cers towards this
drive, all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the
fundamental rights and liberties of individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
protection extends even to the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in
Criminal Case No. 37, 264-96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants Nasario Molina y
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 Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias "Boboy", are ACQUITTED
and ordered RELEASED from con nement unless they are validly detained for other
offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
1. Dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037,
49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1105 [1976].
2. Dated April 25, 1997, Rollo, pp. 11-24.

3. Sec. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion

perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess
or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds
or Instruments of the Crime. — The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and
9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if
the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
5) 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;

xxx xxx xxx

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the forgoing quantities, the penalty
shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.
4. An Act Imposing the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes.

5. Filed on August 10, 1996; Rollo, p. 7.

6. Records, p. 14.
7. TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 2-4.
8. TSN, November 14, 1996. pp. 7-9.
9. Id., pp. 10 and 18.
10. TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 4-5 (Direct examination of SPO1 Pamplona).
11. TSN, November 26, 1996. pp. 5-6.
12. TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 14-15.
13. TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 6-8.

14. Id., p. 14.

15. Id., p. 9.

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 16. Records, pp. 32-37.
17. Records, pp. 39-43.
18. Penned by Judge Renato A. Fuentes.
19. Decision, Rollo, p. 24.
20. Rollo, p. 40.
21. Constitution, Article III, Section 2.
22. People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, 443 [1999].
23. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. ed. 2d 1081, 1090 [1961].
24. People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 705 [1999]; citing Hizon v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA
517, 527 [1996]; People v. Fernandez, 239 SCRA 174, 182-183 [1994]; Roan v. Gonzales,
145 SCRA 687, 697 [1986]; Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, p.
169 [1996]; Cruz, Constitutional Law, pp. 147-153 [1986]; Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, Rule 126, Section 12, and Rule 113, Section 5; People v. Bagista, 214 SCRA
63, 69 [1992]; People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122, 126-128 119911; Roldan, Jr. v. Arca,
65 SCRA 336, 348 [1975]; Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857, 871-874 [1968]; People v. Tabar,
222 SCRA 144, 153 [1993]; Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 33, 48 [1937]; and People v. Kagui
Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 226 [1936].
25. People v. Chua Ho San, supra.; citing Terry v. Ohio, 20 L Ed 2d. 896 adopted in Posadas
v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 [1990]; and People v. Ramos, 222 SCRA 557 [1993].
26. Id., at 449; citing Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159, 175 [1997].
27. Id., at 444; and the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (as amended), Rule 113,
Section 5.

28. Decision, Rollo, p. 22.

29. People v. Chua Ho San, supra.; citing People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; People v.
Encinada, 280 SCRA 72 [1997]; People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 [1998]; People v.
Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 [1988]; People v. Maspil, Jr., 188 SCRA 751 [1988]; People v. Lo
Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 [1991]; People v. Tangliben 184 SCRA 220 [1990]; Posadas v.
Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 [1990]; People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 [1991].
30. People v. Doria, supra.; citing Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251, 263 [1991]; United States
v. Santos, 36 Phil. 851 [1917]; People v. Bati, 189 SCRA 97 [1990]; People v. Sucro, 195
SCRA 388 [1990] and People v. Ramos 186 SCRA 184 [1990].

31. 163 SCRA 402, 409-410 [1988].

32. 210 SCRA 174, 179-180 [1992].

33. 280 SCRA 72, 86-87 [1997].

34. 283 SCRA 159 [1997].

35. Id., at 169.

36. Id., at 175.
37. Id., at 178.

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 38. Concurring Opinion of Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668,
720 (1999).

39. TSN, November 26, 1996, p. 7.

40. People v. Encinada, supra.
41. Id., at 91; citing Aniog v. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424, 436-437 [1994].

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