A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994
That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the
STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54,
Manila, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a
magistrate, legal authorities place a premium on how he has complied
with his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus considered
essential to the judicial character is that of "a man of learning who spends
tirelessly the weary hours after midnight acquainting himself with the great
body of traditions and the learning of the law; is profoundly learned in all
the learning of the law; and knows how to use that learning." 1
Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public
and to the legal profession, to know the very law he is supposed to apply
to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party
litigants will have great faith in the administration of justice if judges
cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal
principles. For, service in the judiciary means a continuous study and
research on the law from beginning to end. 2
In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel
T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was
charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and
Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and
violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
committed as follows:
1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an
Order dismissing eleven (11) cases (docketed as Crim.
Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive) filed by
the undersigned complainant prosecutors (members of
the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank
Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as consolidated in CB
Circular No. 960, in relation to the penal provisions of
Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .;
2.
basis of newspaper reports (August 11, 1992 issues of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe)
concerning the announcement on August 10, 1992 by the
President of the Philippines of the lifting by the
government of all foreign exchange restrictions and the
arrival at such decision by the Monetary Board as per
statement of Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;
3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the
Executive Department on the lifting of foreign exchange
restrictions by two newspapers which are reputable and of
national circulation had the effect of repealing Central
Bank Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported by
Supreme Court decisions . . ., the Court contended that it
was deprived of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu,
prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven cases
aforementioned "for not to do so opens this Court to
charges of trying cases over which it has no more
jurisdiction;"
4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992
on the basis of a Central Bank Circular or Monetary Board
Resolution which as of date hereof, has not even been
officially issued, and basing his Order/decision on a mere
newspaper account of the advance announcement made
by the President of the said fact of lifting or liberalizing
foreign exchange controls, respondent judge acted
prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of
determining the full intent of the new CB Circular or
Monetary Board resolution, and whether the same
provided for exception, as in the case of persons who had
pending criminal cases before the courts for violations of
Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations previously
issued on the matter;
5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture
in taking judicial notice purportedly as a matter of public
knowledge a mere newspaper account that the President
had announced the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions
as basis for his assailed order of dismissal is highly
irregular, erroneous and misplaced. For the respondent
judge to take judicial notice thereof even before it is
officially released by the Central Bank and its full text
published as required by law to be effective shows his
 precipitate action in utter disregard of the fundamental
precept of due process which the People is also entitled
to and exposes his gross ignorance of the law, thereby
tarnishing public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary. How can the Honorable Judge take judicial
notice of something which has not yet come into force and
the contents, shape and tenor of which have not yet been
published and ascertained to be the basis of judicial
action? The Honorable Judge had miserably failed to
"endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts" in the case at
bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
constituting Grave Misconduct;
6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the
prudence of requiring first the comment of the prosecution
on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank Circular/Monetary
Board resolution on the pending cases before dismissing
the same, thereby denying the Government of its right to
due process;
7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge
acted to dismiss the cases may be gleaned from the fact
that such precipitate action was undertaken despite
already scheduled continuation of trial dates set in the
order of the court (the prosecution having started
presenting its evidence . . .) dated August 11, 1992 to wit:
August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1,
1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen
disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby depriving the
Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing
his bias and partiality; and
8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in
dismissing the case without even waiting for a motion to
quash filed by the counsel for accused has even placed
his dismissal Order suspect.
Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992,
respondent judge filed his comment, 4 contending, inter alia, that there
was no need to await publication of the Central Bank (CB) circular
repealing the existing law on foreign exchange controls for the simple
reason that the public announcement made by the President in several
newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls was
total, absolute, without qualification, and was immediately effective; that
having acted only on the basis of such announcement, he cannot be
blamed for relying on the erroneous statement of the President that the
new foreign exchange rules rendered moot and academic the cases filed
against Mrs. Marcos, and which was corrected only on August 17, 1992
but published in the newspapers on August 18, 1992, and only after
respondent judge had issued his order of dismissal dated August 13,
1992; that the President was ill-advised by his advisers and, instead of
rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming
responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, they chose to toss
the blame for the consequence of their failures to respondent judge who
merely acted on the basis of the announcements of the President which
had become of public knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB
Circular No. 1353 specifically refers only to pending actions or
investigations involving violations of CB Circular No. 1318, whereas the
eleven cases dismissed involved charges for violations of CB Circular No.
960, hence the accused cannot be tried and convicted under a law
different from that under which she was charged; that assuming that
respondent judge erred in issuing the order of dismissal, the proper
remedy should have been an appeal therefrom but definitely not an
administrative complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake committed by a
judge should not necessarily be imputed as ignorance of the law; and that
a "court can reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show ignorance of
the justices or judges whose decisions were reversed or modified"
because "even doctrines initiated by the Supreme Court are later
reversed, so how much more for the lower courts?"
He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution
had nothing to explain because, as he theorized, "What explanation could
have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' (to use
a colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should wait for the
publication (as now alleged by complainants), of a still then non-existent
CB circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does not
affect my dismissal order because the said circular's so-called saving
clause does not refer to CB Circular 960 under which the charges in the
dismissed cases were based;" that it was discretionary on him to take
judicial notice of the facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 129; that the contention of complainants that he acted
prematurely and in indecent haste for basing his order of dismissal on a
mere newspaper account is contrary to the wordings of the newspaper
report wherein the President announced the lifting of controls as an
accomplished fact, not as an intention to be effected in the future,
because of the use of the present perfect tense or past tense "has lifted,"
not that he "intends to lift," foreign exchange controls.
Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers
of the Department of Justice, violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court which provides that "proceedings against judges of first instance
shall be private and confidential" when they caused to be published in the
newspapers the filing of the present administrative case against him; and
he emphasizes the fact that he had to immediately resolve a simple and
pure legal matter in consonance with the admonition of the Supreme
Court for speedy disposition of cases.
In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although
the saving clause under Section 16 of CB Circular No. 1353 made specific
reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be noted that Section 111 of
Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause substantially similar to
that of the new circular, in turn refers to and includes Circular No. 960.
Hence, whether under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending
cases involving violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the
coverage thereof. Further, it is alleged that the precipitate dismissal of the
eleven cases, without according the prosecution the opportunity to file a
motion to quash or a comment, or even to show cause why the cases
against accused Imelda R. Marcos should not be dismissed, is clearly
reflective of respondent's partiality and bad faith. In effect, respondent
judge acted as if he were the advocate of the accused.
On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the
complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report
and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved. The
corresponding report and recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994,
was submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, with the
approval of Court Administrator Ernani Cruz-Paño.
The questioned order 8 of respondent judge reads as follows:
These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank
Foreign Exchange Restrictions as consolidated in CB
Circular No. 960 in relation to the penal provision of Sec.
34 of R.A. 265, as amended.
The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to
all these cases; apparently the other accused in some of
these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto, was not arrested and
therefore the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person; trial was commenced as against Mrs. Marcos.
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines,
announced on August 10, 1992 that the government has
lifted all foreign exchange restrictions and it is also
reported that Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia said that
the Monetary Board arrived at such decision (issue of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992 and issue of the
Daily Globe of the same date). The Court has to give full
confidence and credit to the reported announcement of
the Executive Department, specially from the highest
official of that department; the Courts are charged with
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
without introduction of proof, the announcement published
in at least the two newspapers cited above which are
reputable and of national circulation.
Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People
vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520, People vs. Francisco, 56 Phil.
572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People vs. Crisanto
Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225), among others, it was held that the
repeal of a penal law without re-enactment extinguishes
the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed
under the old law and if the law repealing the prior penal
law fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense
defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repealed
law carries with it the deprivation of the courts of
jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged
with violations of the old law prior to its repeal. Under the
aforecited decisions this doctrine applies to special laws
and not only to the crimes punishable in the Revised
Penal Code, such as the Import Control Law. The Central
Bank Circular No. 960 under which the accused Mrs.
Marcos is charged is considered as a penal law because
violation thereof is penalized with specific reference to the
provision of Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which
penalizes violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960,
produces the effect cited in the Supreme Court decisions
and since according to the decisions that repeal deprives
the Court of jurisdiction, this Court motu proprio dismisses
all the eleven (11) cases as a forestated in the caption, for
not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases
over which it has no more jurisdiction.
This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with
the Court of Appeals, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel
T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos," docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment, private
respondent Marcos failed to file any. Likewise, after the appellate court
gave due course to the petition, private respondent was ordered, but
again failed despite notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show
cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should issue. Eventually, on
April 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 9 setting aside
the order of August 13, 1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-
101959 to 92-101969.
In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, the appellate
court held that:
The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any
motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the accused, without
giving an opportunity for the prosecution to be heard, and
solely on the basis of newspaper reports announcing that
the President has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
The newspaper report is not the publication required by
law in order that the enactment can become effective and
binding. Laws take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise
provided (Section 1, Executive Order No. 200). The full
text of CB Circular 1353, series of 1992, entitled "Further
Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation" was published
in the August 27, 1992 issue of the Manila Chronicle, the
Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin. Per certification of
the CB Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular No. 1353
took effect on September 2 . . . .
Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not
seen the official text of CB Circular No. 1353, he was in
no position to rule judiciously on whether CB Circular No.
960, under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged,
was already repealed by CB Circular No. 1353. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily
shown that the repeal of the regulations on non-trade
foreign exchange transactions is not absolute, as there is
a provision that with respect to violations of former
regulations that are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, they shall be governed by the regulations
existing at the time the cause of action (arose). Thus his
conclusion that he has lost jurisdiction over the criminal
cases is precipitate and hasty. Had he awaited the filing of
a motion to dismiss by the accused, and given opportunity
for the prosecution to comment/oppose the same, his
resolution would have been the result of deliberation, not
speculation.
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the
courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative. 10
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court. 11 The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed
to be judicially known is that of notoriety.1 12 Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety. 13
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way
of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if
knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14 This is because the
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be
disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere
personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court,
and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not
generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial
cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may
be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may
be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
1 the state of being famous or well known for some bad quality or deed.
noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. 18
Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis
of a mere newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as
hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed
lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be
considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took
cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force
when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that
judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes
effective. 19 The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and
hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of
ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the
requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.
Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not
proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when
the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of
dismissal was issued.
II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1,
1992, further liberalized the foreign exchange regulations on receipts and
disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and trade transactions.
Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus:
Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All
the provisions in Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318
insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the
provisions of this Circular, shall remain in full force and
effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on non-
trade foreign exchange transactions which has been
repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations
of which are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as
such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it
being understood that as to such pending actions or
investigations, the regulations existing at the time the
cause of action accrued shall govern.
Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the
provisions of Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven criminal cases he
dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960. Hence, he insists,
Circular No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new circular and since the
former is not covered by the saving clause in the latter, there is no more
basis for the charges involved in the criminal cases which therefore
warrant a dismissal of the same. The contention is patently unmeritorious.
Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly
provides that "any regulation on non-trade foreign transactions which has
been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which
are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be
considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are
concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or
investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action
accrued shall govern." The terms of the circular are clear and
unambiguous and leave no room for interpretation. In the case at bar, the
accused in the eleven cases had already been arraigned, had pleaded not
guilty to the charges of violations of Circular No. 960, and said cases had
already been set for trial when Circular No. 1353 took effect.
Consequently, the trial court was and is supposed to proceed with the
hearing of the cases in spite of the existence of Circular No. 1353.
Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more
carefully the texts of the circulars involved, he would have readily
perceived and known that Circular No. 1318 also contains a substantially
similar saving clause as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section 111
of the former provides:
Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of
Circulars 365, 960 and 1028, including amendments
thereto, with the exception of the second paragraph of
Section 68 of Circular 1028, as well as all other existing
Central Bank rules and regulations or parts thereof, which
are inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this
Circular, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly:
Provided, however, that regulations, violations of which
are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall
be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions
or investigations are concerned, it being understood that
as to such pending actions or investigations, the
regulations existing at the time the cause of action
accrued shall govern.
It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although
Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular No. 960, the former specifically
excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old regulations which
were then pending at the time of the passage of the new regulations.
Thus, any reference made to Circular No. 1318 necessarily involves and
affects Circular No. 960.
III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a
righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no
suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20 This means that a
judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but
should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its
fairness and impartiality and as to his integrity. While a judge should
possess proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and
enforce the law, it is more important that he should act and behave in
such a manner that the parties before him should have confidence in his
impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that he decides cases without bias and
favoritism. Nor is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions.
His actuations should moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesar's wife, a
judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 21
Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of
controverted cases, judges should show their full understanding of the
case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote confidence in
their intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents to the growth of
the law. 22 A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of
general law to particular instances, that ours is a government of laws and
not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under
such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider
substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as
he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental
consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer
his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,
remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge
under the sanction of the law. 23 These are immutable principles that go
into the very essence of the task of dispensing justice and we see no
reason why they should not be duly considered in the present case.
The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await
publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public
announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general
circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without
qualification, and immediately effective, is beyond comprehension. As a
judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, respondent is supposed to be
well-versed in the elementary legal mandates on the publication of laws
before they take effect. It is inconceivable that respondent should insist on
an altogether different and illogical interpretation of an established and
well-entrenched rule if only to suit his own personal opinion and, as it
were, to defend his indefensible action. It was not for him to indulge or
even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of
yielding to first impressions. 24 He having done so, in the face of the
foregoing premises, this Court is hard put to believe that he indeed acted
in good faith.
IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous
interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether
dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to
quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the
prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a
written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of
elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of
bad faith and partiality.
The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases
as early as possible is no license for abuse of judicial power and
discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a
deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right
to due process of
law. 26
The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which
respondent judge resolved to dismiss the cases without the benefit of a
hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably
opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused.
Regardless of how carefully he may have evaluated changes in the factual
situation and legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper
report, the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no chance
whatsoever to show or prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of the
accused. To repeat, he thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its
right to due process. 27 More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that
respondent was not sure of the effects and implications of the President's
announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt whether or not
he should dismiss the cases, 28 he nonetheless deliberately refrained from
requiring the prosecution to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his
action, respondent judge can but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could
have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' and
should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication of a still then
non- existent CB Circular?" The pretended cogency of this ratiocination
cannot stand even the minutest legal scrutiny.
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the
patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to
present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not
be adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of
petulance and impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct
which is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 29 At
the very least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified
haste in the outright dismissal of the eleven cases, and thereby rendered
his actuation highly dubious.
V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could
have seriously and substantially affected the rights of the prosecution had
the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering that the
dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of said
accused. This could have spawned legal complications and inevitable
delay in the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court
of Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since
in the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in. To stress this
point, and as a caveat to trial courts against falling into the same judicial
error, we reiterate what we have heretofore declared:
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be
invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial
court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in
criminal cases is denied due process. . . . .
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is
thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of
basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue . . . which
cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is
void for lack of jurisdiction . . . . 30
It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never
submitted either her comment on or an answer to the petition
for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy
invoked in her defense. This serves to further underscore the fact that the
order of dismissal was clearly unjustified and erroneous. Furthermore,
considering that the accused is a prominent public figure with a record of
influence and power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism and
suspicions on how said dismissal order came to be, to the consequent
although undeserved discredit of the entire judiciary.
VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be clearly shown that
although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the
performance of his duty that diligence, prudence and care which the law is
entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and
ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot
be explained by a reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a
misunderstanding or error of the law applied, it nevertheless results
logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in
the notorious violation of the legal precept. 31
In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent
judge reveals that no substantial argument has been advanced in
plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual,
or even equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal
cases. The explanation given is no explanation at all. The strained and
fallacious submissions therein do not speak well of respondent and cannot
but further depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point, it is best that
pertinent unedited excerpts from his comment 32 be quoted by way of
graphic illustration and emphasis:
On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is
said that I issued the Order dismissing the eleven (11)
cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the basis of
newspaper reports referred to in paragraph 2 of the letter
complaint without awaiting the official publication of the
Central Bank Circular. Ordinarily a Central Bank
Circular/Resolution must be published in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, but the
lifting of "all foreign exchange controls" was announced
by the President of the Philippines WITHOUT
QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily Globe,
August 11, 1992" the government has lifted ALL foreign
exchange controls," and in the words of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer report of the same date "The government
yesterday LIFTED the LAST remaining restrictions on
foreign exchange transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both
quotations supplied) not only the President made the
announcement but also the Central Bank Governor Jose
Cuisia joined in the announcement by saying that "the
Monetary Board arrived at the decision after noting how
the "partial liberalization" initiated early this year worked."
Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, there was
no need to await the publication of the repealing circular
of the Central Bank. The purpose of requiring publication
of laws and administrative rules affecting the public is to
inform the latter as to how they will conduct their affairs
and how they will conform to the laws or the rules. In this
particular case, with the total lifting of the controls, there is
no need to await publication. It would have been different
if the circular that in effect repealed Central Bank Circular
No. 960, under which the accused was charged in the
cases dismissed by me, had provided for penalties and/or
modified the provisions of said Circular No. 960.
The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not
yet in force when I dismissed the cases but it should be
noted that in the report of the two (2) newspapers
aforequoted, the President's announcement of the lifting
of controls was stated in the present perfect tense (Globe)
or past tense (Inquirer). In other words, it has already
been lifted; the announcement did not say that the
government INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange
restrictions but instead says that the government "has
LIFTED all foreign exchange controls," and in the other
newspaper cited above, that "The government yesterday
lifted the last remaining restrictions on foreign exchange
transactions". The lifting of the last remaining exchange
regulations effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No.
960.
The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly
announced the lifting of all foreign exchange regulations.
The President has within his control directly or indirectly
the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Secretary of
Finance being the Chairman of the Monetary Board which
decides the policies of the Central Bank.
No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's
announcement of August 10, published the following day,
nor made an announcement that the lifting of the controls
do not apply to cases already pending, not until August 17
(the fourth day after my Order, and the third day after
report of said order was published) and after the
President said on August 17, reported in the INQUIRER's
issue of August 18, 1992, that the "new foreign exchange
rules have nullified government cases against Imelda R.
Marcos, telling reporters that the charges against the
widow of former President Marcos "have become moot
and academic" because of new ruling(s) which allow free
flow of currency in and out of the country" (Note,
parenthetically, the reference to "new rules" not to "rules
still to be drafted"). The INQUIRER report continues: "A
few hours later, presidential spokeswoman Annabelle
Abaya said, RAMOS (sic) had "corrected himself'." "He
had been belatedly advised by the Central Bank Governor
Jose Cuisia and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the
Monetary Board Regulation excluded from its coverage all
criminal cases pending in court and such a position shall
stand legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said."
I will elaborate on two points:
1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10
announcement (published in August 11, 1992,
newspapers) and in the August 17
announcement, SUPRA, and thus I should have relied on
the Presidential announcements, and there is basis to
conclude that the President was at the very least ILL-
SERVED by his financial and legal advisers, because no
one bothered to advise the President to correct his
announcements, not until August 17, 1992, a few hours
after the President had made another announcement as
to the charges against Imelda Marcos having been
rendered moot and academic. The President has a lot of
work to do, and is not, to my knowledge, a financier,
economist, banker or lawyer. It therefore behooved his
subalterns to give him timely (not "belated") advice, and
brief him on matters of immediate and far-reaching
concerns (such as the lifting of foreign exchange controls,
designed, among others to encourage the entry of foreign
investments). Instead of rescuing the Chief Executive
from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors
in the latter's announcement, these advisers have chosen
to toss the blame for the consequence of their failing to
me, who only acted on the basis of announcements of
their Chief, which had become of public knowledge.
 xxx xxx xxx
The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that
respondent judge is possessed with more than ordinary credentials and
qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City of
Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the
nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would
want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency
thereof. This calls to mind similar scenarios and how this Court reacted
thereto.
In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting
the accused of a violation of CB Circular No. 960 despite the fact that the
accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a plane
for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove criminal
intent to violate the law and benefit from the illegal act, and further
ordering the return of US$3,000.00 out of the total amount seized, on the
mistaken interpretation that the CB circular exempts such amount from
seizure. Respondent judge therein was ordered dismissed from the
government service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law. 33
of the complainant, without affording due process to the latter and other
interested parties. 36
Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was
dismissed after he acquitted all the accused in four criminal cases for
illegal possession of firearms, on the ground that there was no proof of
malice or deliberate intent on the part of the accused to violate the law.
The Court found him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, his error of
judgment being almost deliberate and tantamount to knowingly rendering
an incorrect and unjust judgment. 37
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court
finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the
law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry
with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government
service. 38
Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from
rendering any judgment or order, or continuing any judicial action or
proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this decision.

Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of SO ORDERED.
retirement benefits, for gross ignorance of the law and for knowingly
rendering an unjust order or judgment when he granted bail to an accused
charged with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary
recommendation of the investigating judge, and thereafter granted the
motion to dismiss the case allegedly executed by the complainant. 34

Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is
ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal principles and
administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying
unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of
controversies, exhibits indifference to and even disdain for due process
and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and
oppressively, and displays bias and impartiality," was dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities. 35

Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by

this Court for gross ignorance of the law after she ordered, in a probate
proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name
THIRD DIVISION On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus
damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip).
SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, G.R. No. 177809
Petitioners, Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles in
Present: Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees

CARPIO MORALES, J.,thereof.



CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - Acting Chairperson,
NACHURA, The contract of lease reads:
PERALTA, and
ABAD, JJ. CONTRACT OF LEASE
ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Promulgated: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
Respondent.
October 16, 2009 This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married

with office at 2/F JOFERXAN Building, F.B. Harrison St.,
DECISION Brgy. Baclaran, Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the
LESSOR,
NACHURA, J.:
- and -

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA) OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also
both Filipino, of legal age with address at 24 Anahan St. RGV
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300:[1] (1) reversing the decision of the Regional Homes Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274, Paraaque City in Civil Case No. 04-0052;[2] and LESSEES.
(2) reinstating and affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in Civil Case No. 2001-315.[3] WITNESSETH

First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower courts. 1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building
erected at the lot of the Toribio G. Reyes Realty, Inc. situated
at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay
Baclaran in Paraaque Ctiy;
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua
(Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located 2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the
1st & 2nd Floor, of said building with an area of 56 square
at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay meters under the following terms and conditions, to wit:
Baclaran, ParanaqueCity.
a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in
PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00),
 Philippine Currency. However, due to unstable power
of the peso LESSEES agrees to a yearly increase of ten
(10%) percent of the monthly rental;
b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the
expiration of the contract to the LESSOR;
c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and
electric consumptions in the said premises;
d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any
alteration in the cubicles without a written permission
from the LESSOR. Provided, however, that at the
termination of the Contract, the lessee shall return the
two cubicles in its original conditions at their
expenses;
e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a
safe and sanitary conditions, and shall not keep any
kinds of flammable or combustible materials.
f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly
rental every time it falls due or violate any of the
above conditions shall be enough ground to terminate
this Contract of Lease. Provided, further, that, if the
LESSEES pre-terminate this Contract they shall pay
the rentals for the unused month or period by way
of liquidated damages in favor of the LESSOR.
3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only
starting from December _____, 1999 or up to December
______, 2005.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed
their hands this ___th day of December, 1999 at City of
Manila, Philippines.
(sgd.) (sgd.)
ROSALIE PALAA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF
LESSORLESSEE
(sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(sgd.) (sgd.)
1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua
Republic of the Philippines)
C i t y o f M a n i l a )s.s.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City
of Manila personally appeared the following persons:
Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Paraaque City on
2/1/99; Moshiera Latief with CTC No. 12885654 at Paraaque
City on 11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653
Paraaque City on Nov. 11, 1999.
known to me and to me known to be the same persons who
executed this instrument consisting of two (2) pages duly signed
by them and the two (2) instrumental witnesses and
acknowledged to me that the same is their free and voluntarily
acts and deeds.
IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto
affixed my hand and Notarial Seal this ____th day of
December, 1999 at the City of Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS
Page No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC
Book No. LXV Until December 31, 2000
Series of 1999 PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
IBP # 00262-Life Member[4]
A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already
occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter
demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the
leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalies demand, she instituted
the aforesaid complaint.
 construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They averred that the of P2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction of the building giving them
lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.
showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of P2,570,000.00. The three (3)
receipts, in Rosalies handwriting, read: Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished,
Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting for the completion of five (5) other
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos)
from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed had been
cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were
Baclaran P[ara]aque City. ROFERLAND[5] Bldg. with the
terms 6 yrs. Contract. surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalies counsel and the subsequent
filing of a complaint against them.
P2,000,000.00 ______(sgd.)______
CHECK # 3767924 Rosalie Chua
FAR EAST BANK The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:
______(sgd.)______
Ferdinand Chua WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses
Latip] and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby
2. Received cash ordered to VACATE the property subject of this case located at
P500,000.00 the 1st and 2nd floors of a Roferxane Building situated at No.
From Moshiera Latip 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay
Baclaran, Paraaque City. The [Spouses Latip] are also ordered
(sgd.) to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED
12/10/99 Rosalie Chua TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P720,000.00) as rent
Received by arrearages for the period of December 1999 to December 2000
and thereafter to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY
3. Received cash TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P72,000.00) per month from
P70,000.00 from January 2001 to December 2002, plus ten percent (10%)
Moshiera Latip increase for each and every succeeding years thereafter as
12-11-99 stipulated in paragraph 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x, until
the [Spouses Latip] have completely vacated the leased
____(sgd.)___ premises subject of this lease. Finally[,] the [Spouses Latip] are
Received by:[6] hereby ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as attorneys fees and TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) per [Rosalies] appearance in
Court as appearance fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.
Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie
offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in [Spouses Latips] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted
Rosalies offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under SO ORDERED.[7]

In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip.
The RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not
notarized and, in all other substantial aspects, incomplete. Further on this point,
the RTC noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of Ferdinand
Chua, Rosalies husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses Latip on the first page
thereof; (3) the specific dates for the term of the contract which only stated that
the lease is for six (6) y[ea]rs only starting from December 1999 or up to
December 2005; (4) the exact date of execution of the document, albeit the month
of December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for
payment of deposit or advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big
commercial lease contracts.
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was
modified and supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the two (2) cubicles
for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount
of P2,570,000.00. As to Rosalies claim that her receipt of P2,570,000.00 was
simply goodwill payment by prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment
for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot this down and pointed out that,
apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce evidence to substantiate
this claim. On the whole, the RTC declared an existent lease between the parties
for a period of six (6) years, and already fully paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus,
Spouses Latip could not be ejected from the leased premises until expiration of
the lease period.
The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed
decision of the [MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is reversed as
judgment is hereby rendered for the [Spouses Latip] and against
[Rosalie], ordering the latter to pay the former
(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per
court appearance as and for attorneys fees;
and
(4) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC
and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of lease,
albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete
and valid contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the alleged
defects in the contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective. On the issue
of whether the amount of P2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill
money, the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of
Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate
court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the
stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie
prior to occupying the stalls thereat. Thus, ruling on Rosalies appeal, the CA
disposed of the case:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for
Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of RTC
Paraaque City Branch 274 dated September 24, 2004 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the January 13, 2004
decision of the MeTC is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en
toto.
SO ORDERED.[9]

Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.
The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should be ejected
from the leased cubicles.
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the
ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of the alleged practice of
prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
We disagree.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the
taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall
take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and
their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known
to judges because of their judicial functions.
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro[10] is instructive:
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom
and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice
is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken
that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable
doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed
to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be
said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by
public records and facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely
another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be
dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise
acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so
notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not
judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the
judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is
not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact,
not generally or professionally known, the basis of his
action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which
are commonly known.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial
notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or
they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind
as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may
be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person.[11]
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in
the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[12] which
cited State Prosecutors:
 Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records
and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed
fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is
either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of
the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial
notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or
they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind
as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may
be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide,
a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as
being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take
judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the
existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.
From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that
the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the
requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this
supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area.
Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie,
found that the practice was of common knowledge or notoriously known.
We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare
allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount
of P2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money.
Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA,
containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg.
that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we
emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need
not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with
the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known,
it will not be disputed by the parties.
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of
attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to
Rosalies appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven
by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court What
need not be proved.
Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the
practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As was held in State
Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take
judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly
resolved in the negative.
Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected
from the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence is the documentary evidence
signed by both parties the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment
of P2,570,000.00.
 We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which documents were
executed first or if there was a novation of the contract of lease. As had been
found by the RTC, the lease contract and the receipts for the amount
of P2,570,000.00 can be reconciled or harmonized. The RTC declared:
Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two
(2) cubicles of the 1st and 2nd floors of Roferxane (Roferland)
Building, a commercial building located at 158 Quirino
Avenue, corner Redemptorist Road,
Baclaran, Paraaque City and belonging to [Rosalie]. The lease
agreement is for a term of six (6) years commencing in
December 1999 up to December 2005. This agreement was
embodied in a Contract of Lease x x x. The terms of this lease
contract, however, are modified or supplemented by another
agreement between the parties executed and or entered into in
or about the time of execution of the lease contract, which exact
date of execution of the latter is unclear.[13]
We agree with the RTCs holding only up to that point. There exists a lease
agreement between the parties as set forth in the contract of lease which is a
complete document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand Chua as he likewise did
not sign the other two receipts for P500,000.00 and P70,000.00, respectively,
which contained only the signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is undisputed that
Rosalie owns and leases the stalls in Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away with the
need for her husbands consent. The findings of the three lower courts concur on
this fact.
The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in December
1999. This fact is again buttressed by Spouses Latips admission that they
occupied the property forthwith in December 1999, bearing in mind the brisk
sales during the holiday season.
On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting
to P2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of payment of goodwill money in the
Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able
to provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint
Affidavit of the stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for
the payment of goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals by Spouses
Latip.
In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code provisions
on interpretation of contracts, to wit:
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting
parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally
considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be,
they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and
cases that are different from those which the parties intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of
several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is
most adequate to render it effectual.
The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts
for P2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the contract of lease. However, it
made a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was payment for rentals of the
two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year period. We cannot subscribe to this
finding. To obviate confusion and for clarity, the contents of the receipts, already
set forth above, are again reproduced:
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos)
from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2
cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,]
 Baclaran P[ara]que City. ROFERLAND Bldg. with the terms 6
yrs. Contract. Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be
ejected from the leased premises. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on
P2,000,000.00 ______(sgd.)______
CHECK # 3767924 Rosalie Chua the lease of the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on rentals in
FAR EAST BANK the Contract of Lease. However, the amount of P2,570,000.00, covering advance
______(sgd.)______ rentals, must be deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.
Ferdinand Chua

2. Received cash WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

P500,000.00
hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
From Moshiera Latip
89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are
(sgd.)
12/10/99 Rosalie Chua liable to respondent Rosalie Chua for unpaid rentals minus the amount
Received by of P2,570,000.00 already received by her as advance rentals. No costs.

3. Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
12-11-99
SO ORDERED.
___(sgd.) ____
Received by:[14]

There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and
receipt of P2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals for the whole period
of the lease. All three receipts state Rosalies receipt of cash in varying amounts.
The first receipt for P2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but this
cannot mean full payment of rentals for the entire lease period when there are no
words to that effect. Further, two receipts were subsequently executed pointing to
the obvious fact that the P2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of rentals. Thus,
since the contract of lease remained operative, we find that Rosalies receipt of the
monies should be considered as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease
rentals only in 2000, a full year after the commencement of the lease.
[G.R. No. 130656. June 29, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO
REANZARES* also known as ARMANDO RIANZARES, accused-
appellant.*
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This case is with us on automatic review of the 26 May 1997 Decision[1] of
the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, finding accused
ARMANDO REANZARES also known as "Armando Rianzares" guilty of
Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532[2] and sentencing him to
the extreme penalty of death. He was also ordered to pay the heirs of his
victim Lilia Tactacan P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related
expenses, P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, P1,000.00 for the cash
taken from her bag, and to reimburse Gregorio Tactacan P2,500.00 for
the Seiko wristwatch taken from him.
The facts, except as to the identity of accused Armando Reanzares, are
undisputed. Spouses Gregorio Tactacan and Lilia Tactacan owned a sari-
sari store in San Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. On 10 May 1994 at
around 8:10 in the evening, the Tactacan spouses closed their store and
left for home in Barangay San Roque, Sto. Tomas, Batangas on board
their passenger-type jeepney. As Gregorio was maneuvering his jeep
backwards from where it was parked two (2) unidentified men suddenly
climbed on board. His wife Lilia immediately asked them where they were
going and they answered that they were bound for the town proper. When
Lilia informed them that they were not going to pass through the town
proper, the two (2) said they would just get off at the nearest intersection.
After negotiating some 500 meters, one of the hitchhikers pointed a .38
caliber revolver at Gregorio while the other poked a balisong at Lilia's neck
and ordered Gregorio to stop the vehicle. Two (2) other persons, one of
whom was later identified as accused Armando Reanzares, were seen
waiting for them at a distance. As soon as the vehicle stopped, the
accused and his companion approached the vehicle. Gregorio was then
pulled from the driver's seat to the back of the vehicle. They gagged and
blindfolded him and tied his hands and feet. They also took his Seiko
wristwatch worth P2,500.00. The accused then drove the vehicle after
being told by one of them, "Sige i-drive mo na."[3]
Gregorio did not know where they were headed for as he was blindfolded.
After several minutes, he felt the vehicle making a u-turn and stopped
after ten (10) minutes. During the entire trip, his wife kept uttering, "Maawa
kayo sa amin, marami kaming anak, kunin nyo na lahat ng gusto
ninyo." Immediately after the last time she uttered these words a
commotion ensued and Lilia was heard saying, "aray!" Gregorio heard her
but could not do anything. After three (3) minutes the commotion ceased.
Then he heard someone tell him, "Huwag kang kikilos diyan, ha," and left.
Gregorio then untied his hands and feet, removed his gag and blindfold
and jumped out of the vehicle. The culprits were all gone, including his
wife. He ran to San Roque East shouting for help.[4]
When Gregorio returned to the crime scene, the jeepney was still there.
He went to the drivers seat. There he saw his wife lying on the floor of the
jeepney with blood splattered all over her body. Her bag
containing P1,200.00 was missing. He brought her immediately to the C.
P. Reyes Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival. [5] (wife
died)
At the time of her death Lilia Tactacan was forty-eight (48) years old.
According to Gregorio, he was deeply depressed by her death; that he
incurred funeral, burial and other related expenses, and that his wife was
earning P3,430.00 a month as a teacher.[6]
Dr. Lily D. Nunes, Medical Health Officer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas,
conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of the victim. Her
medical report disclosed that the victim sustained eight (8) stab wounds
on the chest and abdominal region of the body. She testified that a sharp
pointed object like a long knife could have caused those wounds which
must have been inflicted by more than one (1) person, and that all those
wounds except the non-penetrating one caused the immediate death of
the victim.[7]
Subsequently, two (2) Informations were filed against accused Armando
Reanzares and three (3) John Does in relation to the incident. The first
was for violation of PD 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for allegedly conspiring, with intent to gain
and armed with bladed weapons and a .38 caliber revolver, to rob and
carry away one (1) Seiko wristwatch owned by Gregorio Tactacan
and P1,000.00 cash of Lilia Tactacan, and on the occasion thereof, killed
her. The second was for violation of RA 6539, An Act Preventing and
Penalizing Carnapping, for taking away by means of violence and
intimidation of persons one (1) passenger-type jeepney with Plate No.
DBP 235 owned and driven by Gregorio Tactacan and valued
at P110,000.00. Only the accused Armando Reanzares was arrested. The
other three (3) have remained unidentified and at large.
The accused testified in his defense and claimed that he could not have
perpetrated the crimes imputed to him with three (3) others as he was in
Barangay Tagnipa, Garchitorena, Camarines Sur, for the baptism of his
daughter Jessica when the incident happened. [8] His father, Jose
Reanzares, corroborated his story. Jose claimed that the accused
borrowed P500.00 from him for the latter's trip to Bicol although he could
not say that he actually saw the accused leave for his intended
destination.[9] To bolster the alibi of the accused, his brother Romeo
Reanzares also took the witness stand and alleged that he saw the
accused off on 9 May 1994, the day before the incident. Romeo
maintained that he accompanied the accused to the bus stop that day and
even helped the latter carry his things to the bus. He however could not
categorically state where and when the accused alighted or that he in fact
reached Bicol.[10]
On 26 May 1997 the trial court found the prosecutions evidence credible
and ruled that the alibi of the accused could not prevail over his positive
identification by complaining witness Gregorio Tactacan. The court a
quo declared him guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532
and sentenced him to death. It further ordered him to pay the heirs of Lilia
Tactacan P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, P172,000.00 for funeral,
burial and related expenses, and P1,000.00 for the cash taken from her
bag. The accused was also ordered to reimburse Gregorio
Tactacan P2,500.00 for the Seiko wristwatch taken from him. [11] But the
trial court exonerated the accused from the charge of carnapping under
RA 6539 for insufficiency of evidence.
The accused insists before us that his conviction for Highway Robbery
with Homicide under PD 532 is erroneous as his guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that the testimony of private
complainant Gregorio Tactacan, who implicated him as one of the
perpetrators of the crime, is incredible. He maintains that Gregorio failed
to identify him because when the latter was questioned he stated that he
did not know any of the culprits. He also claims that in the publication
of Hotline by Tony Calvento in People's Tonight, Gregorio even asked the
readers to help him identify the malefactors.
The trial court observed that Gregorio Tactacan testified in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and was consistent on
cross-examination. Indeed, Gregorio might not have immediately revealed
the name of accused Armando Reanzares to the police authorities when
he was first investigated but the delay was not an indication of a fabricated
charge and should not undermine his credibility considering that he
satisfactorily explained his reasons therefor. According to him, he did not
immediately tell the police about the accused because he feared for the
safety of his family as his neighbors told him that they saw some people
lurking around his house on the day of the incident. Moreover, he was
advised not to mention any names until after the burial of his wife. No ill
motive could be attributed to him for implicating the accused. If at all, the
fact that his wife died by reason of the incident even lends credence to his
testimony since his natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty
would deter him from implicating persons other than the real culprits,
otherwise, those responsible for the perpetration of the crime would
escape prosecution.
To further undermine the credibility of Gregorio, the accused underscores
Gregorio's refusal to be subjected to a lie detector test. We cannot
subscribe to this contention as the procedure of ascertaining the truth by
means of a lie detector test has never been accepted in our jurisdiction;
thus, any findings based thereon cannot be considered conclusive.
Finally, the accused chides Gregorio for supposedly suppressing a very
material piece of evidence, i.e., the latter failed to present as witnesses a
certain Renato and his wife who allegedly saw the holduppers running
away from the crime scene. But this is only a disputable presumption
under Sec. 3, par. (e), Rule 131, of the Rules of Court on evidence, which
does not apply in the present case as the evidence allegedly omitted is
equally accessible and available to the defense.
These attempts of the accused to discredit Gregorio obviously cannot hold
ground. Neither can they bolster his alibi. For alibi to be believed it must
be shown that (a) the accused was in another place at the time of the
commission of the offense, and (b) it was physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene.[12]
In this case, the accused claims to have left for Bicol the day before the
incident. To prove this, he presented his father and brother but their
testimonies did not meet the requisite quantum to establish his alibi. While
his father testified that the accused borrowed money from him for his fare
to Bicol for the baptism of a daughter, he could not say whether the
accused actually went to Bicol. As regards the claim of Romeo, brother of
the accused, that he accompanied the accused to the bus stop on 9 May
1994 and even helped him with his things, seeing the accused off is not
the same as seeing him actually get off at his destination. Given the
circumstances of this case, it is possible for the accused to have alighted
from the bus before reaching Bicol, perpetrated the crime in the evening of
10 May 2000, proceeded to Bicol and arrived there on 12 May 2000 for his
daughters baptism.
Thus the trial court was correct in disregarding the alibi of the accused not
only because he was positively identified by Gregorio Tactacan but also
because it was not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the crime scene on the date and time of the incident.
Indeed the accused is guilty. But that the accused was guilty of Highway
Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 was erroneous. As held in a
number of cases, conviction for highway robbery requires proof that
several accused were organized for the purpose of committing it
indiscriminately.[13] There is no proof in the instant case that the accused
and his cohorts organized themselves to commit highway robbery. Neither
is there proof that they attempted to commit similar robberies to show the
"indiscriminate" perpetration thereof. On the other hand, what the
prosecution established was only a single act of robbery against the
particular persons of the Tactacan spouses. Clearly, this single act of
depredation is not what is contemplated under PD 532 as its objective is
to deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts of depredation
upon persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travel from one place to another thereby disturbing the peace and
tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of
the people.
Consequently, the accused should be held liable for the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by RA 7659[14] as the allegations in the Information are
enough to convict him therefor. In the interpretation of an information,
what controls is the description of the offense charged and not merely its
designation.[15]
Article 294, par. (1), of the Revised Penal Code as amended punishes the
crime of robbery with homicide by reclusion perpetua to death. Applying
Art. 63, second par., subpar. 2, of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that "[i]n all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof: x x x 2. [w]hen there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser
penalty shall be applied," the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is
imposed in the absence of any modifying circumstance.
As to the damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victim, we
sustain the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the wrongful death
of Lilia Tactacan. In addition, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages is ordered. Also, damages for loss of earning capacity of Lilia
Tactacan must be granted to her heirs. The testimony of Gregorio
Tactacan, the victims husband, on the earning capacity of his wife,
together with a copy of his wifes payroll, is enough to establish the basis
for the award. The formula for determining the life expectancy of Lilia
Tactacan, applying the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, is as
follows: 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased). [16] Since
Lilia was 48 years of age at the time of her death,[17] then her life
expectancy was 21.33 years.
At the time of her death, Lilia was earning P3,430.00 a month as a teacher
at the San Roque Elementary School so that her annual income
was P41,160.00. From this amount, 50% should be deducted as
reasonable and necessary living expenses to arrive at her net earnings.
Thus, her net earning capacity was P438,971.40 computed as follows: Net
earning capacity equals life expectancy times gross annual income less
reasonable and necessary living expenses
Net = Life expectancy x Gross annual reasonable
earni income & necessary
ng living
- expenses
capa
city
(x)
x = 2 (80-48) x [P41,160.00 P20,580.00]
-
......3
= 21.33 x P20,580.00
= P438,971.40
However, the award of P1,000.00 representing the cash taken from Lilia
Tactacan must be increased to P1,200.00 as this was the amount
established by the prosecution without objection from the defense. The
award of P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses must be
reduced to P22,000.00 as this was the only amount sufficiently
substantiated.[18] There was no other competent evidence presented to
support the original award.
The amount of P2,500.00 as reimbursement for the Seiko wristwatch
taken from Gregorio Tactacan must be deleted in the absence of receipts
or any other competent evidence aside from the self-serving valuation
made by the prosecution. An ordinary witness cannot establish the value
of jewelry and the trial court can only take judicial notice of the value of
goods which is a matter of public knowledge or is capable of
unquestionable demonstration. The value of jewelry therefore does not fall
under either category of which the court can take judicial notice. [19]
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused
ARMANDO REANZARES also known as "Armando Rianzares" is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide under Art.
294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as
indemnity for death, another P50,000.00 for moral damages, P1,200.00
for actual damages, P438,971.40 for loss of earning capacity,
and P22,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000] Appellants defense was bare denial. He claimed that private
complainant had fabricated the rape charges against him since he and his
daughter, had a quarrel when he accordingly reprimanded her for going
out whenever he was not at home.[3]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TOMAS
Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.
TUNDAG, accused-appellant.
On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
DECISION
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is hereby
QUISUMBING, J.:
rendered, to wit:

For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 -
Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Cases Nos.DU-6186 and DU-6203,
finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two counts of incestuous rape
and sentencing him to death twice. a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag filed
with the Mandaue City Prosecutors Office two separate complaints for b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
incestuous rape. The first complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-
6186, alleged:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and

That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Mandaue,
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral
accused, being the father of complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-
shock suffered by her and for the commission of the crime of rape with one
year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latters
will.
c) To pay the costs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 -
The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred:
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of Mandaue,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being the father of complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13- b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latters (1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
will.
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2] relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral
shock suffered by her and for the commission of the crime of rape with one
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
Not Guilty to the charges.
(3) To pay the costs.
The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainants
version of what accused did to her.
The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly
shows that private complainant Mary Ann Tundag is a 13 year old girl who does
not know how to read and write and has an IQ of 76% which is a very low general
mental ability and was living with her father, the herein accused, at Galaxy
Compound, Mandaue City.
xxx
That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, she was in the
house together with her father. But before she went to sleep, her father was
already lying down on the mat while herself (sic) just lied down at his head side
which was not necessarily beside him.However, when she was already sleeping,
she noticed that her father who was already undressed was beside her and was
embracing her. Then, he undressed her which she resisted but her father used a
knife and told her that he would kill her if she shouts and after that, he inserted his
penis into her vagina and told her not to shout or tell anyone. In effect, his penis
penetrated her genital, which made her vagina bleed and was very painful.
That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina, her father
was all the time asking by saying (sic) : Does it feel good? And at the same time,
he was laughing and further, told her that a woman who does not marry can never
enter heaven and he got angry with her when she contradicted his statement.
That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was humping
over her, she felt intense pain that she cried and told him to pull it out but did not
accede and in fact, said: Why will I pull it out when it feels so good(?)
That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that she could
not go to heaven if she did not get married, her father just stayed there and
continued smoking while she cried.
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing the dishes
while her father was just smoking and squatting. That after she finished washing
the dishes, she lied (sic) down to sleep when her father embraced her and since
she does not like what he did to her, she placed a stool between them but he just
brushed it aside and laid down with her and was able to take her womanhood
again by using a very sharp knife which he was holding and was pointing it at the
right side of her neck which made her afraid.
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her fathers place and went
to her neighbor by the name of Bebie Cabahug and told her what had happened to
her, who, in turn, advised her to report the matter to the police, which she did and
accompanied by the policemen, she went to the Southern Islands Hospital where
she was examined and after her medical examination, she was brought back by
the police and was investigated by them.[5]
Appellants claim that the complainants charges were manufactured
did not impress the trial court, which found him twice guilty of rape. Now
before us, appellant assails his double conviction, simply contending
that:[6]
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT ABSOLVING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT TO
EXCULPATE HIM OF THE SAME.
Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took
place. He contends that on September 5, 1997, he was working as a
watch repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went
home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that evening. On November
7, 1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was
impossible for him to have raped his daughter because when the incidents
allegedly transpired, he went to work and naturally, being exhausted and
tired, it is impossible for him to do such wrongdoings.[7]
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges
the Court to affirm the trial courts decision, with the recommendation that
the award of damages and indemnity ex delicto be modified to conform to
prevailing jurisprudence.
Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous crime
and the irreversibility of the penalty of death imposed in each of these
cases before us, the Court leaves no stone unturned in its review of the
records, including the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the
defense. Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of
guilt.[8] But here we find no room to disturb the trial courts judgment
concerning appellants guilt, because his defense is utterly untenable.
Appellants defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It
hardly counts as a worthy and weighty ground for exculpation in a trial
involving his freedom and his life. Against the testimony of private
complainant who testified on affirmative matters,[9] such defense is not
only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak defense, which
becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the
victim of the appellant as the violator of her honor. [10] Indeed, we find that
private complainant was unequivocal in charging appellant with ravishing
her. The victims account of the rapes complained of was straightforward,
detailed, and consistent.[11] Her testimony never wavered even after it had
been explained to her that her father could be meted out the death penalty
if found guilty by the court.[12]
In a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility is the single
most important issue.[13] The determination of the credibility of witnesses is
primarily the function of the trial court. The rationale for this is that the trial
court has the advantage of having observed at first hand the demeanor of
the witnesses on the stand and, therefore, is in a better position to form an
accurate impression and conclusion.[14] Absent any showing that certain
facts of value have clearly been overlooked, which if considered could
affect the result of the case, or that the trial courts finding are clearly
arbitrary, the conclusions reached by the court of origin must be respected
and the judgment rendered affirmed.[15]
Moreover, we note here that private complainants testimony is
corroborated by medical findings that lacerations were present in her
hymen. The examination conducted by Dr. Bessie Acebes upon the
private complainant yielded the following results:
Genitalia: grossly female
Pubic Hairs: scanty
Labia Majora: coaptated
Labia Minora: do
Fourchette: U-shaped
Vestibule: pinkish
Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 oclock position(s).
Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease
Vagina:
Walls: pinkish
Ruganities: prominent
Uterus: small
Cervix: closed
Discharges: Mucoid, minimal
Smears:
Conclusions: sperm identification (-)
Gram staining of vaginal disc. [16]
Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in
the complainants private parts meant a history of sexual congress on her
part.[17] According to her, the lacerations may have been caused by the
entry of an erect male organ into complainants genitals. The examining
physician likewise pointed out that previous coitus may be inferred from
complainants U-shaped fourchette since the fourchette of a female who
has not yet experienced sexual intercourse is V-shaped.[18]While Dr.
Acebes conceded under cross-examination, that the existence of the
datum U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively and absolutely mean
that there was sexual intercourse or contact because it can be caused by
masturbation of fingers or other things,[19] nonetheless, the presence of
the hymenal lacerations tends to support private complainants claim that
she was raped by appellant.
Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges
against him because she had quarreled with him after he had castigated
her for misbehavior. He stresses that the prosecution did not rebut his
testimony regarding his quarrel or misunderstanding with private
complainant. He urges us to consider the charges filed against him as the
result of his frequent castigation of her delinquent behavior. [20]
Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the
charges away. Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a
daughters accusation must be taken seriously. It goes against human
experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag herself as
well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is
her natural instinct to protect her honor.[21] More so, where her charges
could mean the death of her own father, as in this case.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have
committed the crimes imputed to him considering that he and his wife had
ten children to attend to and care for. This argument, however, is
impertinent and immaterial. Appellant was estranged from his wife, and
private complainant was the only child who lived with him. [22] As pointed
out by the Solicitor General, appellant was thus free to do as he wished to
satisfy his bestial lust on his daughter.[23]
Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has some
psychological problems and a low IQ of 76 in any way favor his
defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her testimony that
appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim understood the
consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her own father, as
shown by the following testimony of the victim on cross-examination:
Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be found guilty,
your father will be sentenced to death?
A : Yes.
Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced by death?
A (Witness nodding.)
xxx
Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two cases
against your father and in case your father would be found guilty,
two death sentences will be imposed against him?
A: Yes.
Q: With that information, do you still want this case would proceed?
A: I want this to proceed.[24]
Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death imposed on him
correct?
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11
of R.A. No. 7659,[25] penalizes rape of a minor daughter by her father as
qualified rape[26] and a heinous crime. In proving such felony, the
prosecution must allege and prove the elements of rape: (1) sexual
congress; (2) with woman; (3) by force or without her consent[27] and in
order to warrant the imposition of capital punishment, the additional
elements that: (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the
rape and (5) the offender is a parent of the victim.[28]
In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender
was the victims father.[29] But the victims age was not properly and
sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that she was
thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted that she
did not know exactly when she was born because her mother did not tell
her. She further said that her birth certificate was likewise with her
mother. In her own words, the victim testified - [30]
COURT TO WITNESS
Q: When were you born?
A: I do not know.
Q: You do not know your birthday?
A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.
COURT: Proceed.
FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your
Honor, may we just request for judicial notice that the victim here
is below 18 years old.
ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may
properly take and act on without proof because they already know
them.[31] Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory
or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides
when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts -
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may
take discretionary judicial notice of facts -
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed
that the scene of the rape is not always nor necessarily isolated or
secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The offense of rape can
and has been committed in places where people congregate, e.g. inside a
house where there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with five (5)
people inside, or even in the same room which the victim is sharing with
the accuseds sister.[32]
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipinas inbred
modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which
blemish her honor and virtue.[33]
On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable
demonstration pertain to fields of professional and scientific
knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante,[34] the trial court took
judicial notice of the clinical records of the attending physicians
concerning the birth of twin baby boys as premature since one of the
alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7 months earlier.
As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions, an example would be facts which are ascertainable from
the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when court notices were
received by a party.
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or
discretionary judicial notice, the court can take judicial notice of a fact
pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
which requires that -
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on
its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper,
despite the defense counsels admission, thereof acceding to the
prosecutions motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any
other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take
judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven
by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof,
upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other
documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim was
below 12 and we found that the rape committed was statutory rape. The
mother testified that her daughter was born on October 26, 1974, and so
was only 9 years old at the time of the rape on February 12,
1984. Although no birth certificate was presented because the victims
birth had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal certificate was duly
presented. Hence, we ruled that the mothers testimony coupled with the
presentation of the baptismal certificate was sufficient to establish that the
victim was below 12 at the time of the rape.
However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that
appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, and not statutory rape,
because of failure of the prosecution to prove the minority of the victim,
who was allegedly 10 years old at the time of the rape. The prosecution
failed to present either the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim. Also
there was no showing that the said documents were lost or destroyed to
justify their non-presentation. We held that testimony of the victim and her
aunt were hearsay, and that it was not correct for the trial court to judge
the age of the victim by her appearance.
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for
independent proof of the age of the victim, aside from testimonial
evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,[35] we
stressed that the prosecution must present independent proof of the age
of the victim, even though it is not contested by the defense. The minority
of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the
crime itself. In People v. Cula,[36] we reiterated that it is the burden of the
prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below 18
when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death
penalty. Since the record of the case was bereft of any
independent evidence thereon, such as the victims duly certified
Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainants age,
appellant could not be convicted of rape in its qualified form. In People v.
Veloso,[37] the victim was alleged to have been only 9 years of age at the
time of the rape. It held that the trial court was correct when it ruled that
the prosecution failed to prove the victims age other than through the
testimony of her father and herself.
Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 8353, we
reiterate here what the Court has held in Javier without any dissent, that
the failure to sufficiently establish victims age by independent proof is a
bar to conviction for rape in its qualified form. For, in the words of Melo, J.,
independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and
essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the case falls under the
qualifying circumstances for the imposition of the death penalty set by the
law.
In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and
is therefore governed by the death penalty law, R.A. 7659. The penalty for
the crime of simple rape or rape in its unqualified form under Art. 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659,
is reclusion perpetua. The second rape was committed on November 7,
1997, after the effectivity of R.A. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape Law
of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997. The penalty for rape in its
unqualified form remains the same.
As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 for
each count of rape as civil indemnity. However, the award of another
P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in
relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil Code for each count is
imprecise. In rape cases, the prevailing jurisprudence permits the award
of moral damages without need for pleading or proof as to the basis
thereof.[38] Thus, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we award the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape.
The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on
a different basis and for a different amount. Appellant being the father of
the victim, a fact duly proved during trial, we find that the alternative
circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here as an
aggravating circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. Hence, we find an award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 proper. Note that
generally, in rape cases imposing the death penalty, the rule is that
relationship is no longer appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance in view of the amendments introduced by R.A. Nos. 7659
and 8353. The father-daughter relationship has been treated by Congress
in the nature of a special circumstance which makes the imposition of the
death penalty mandatory.[39] However, in this case, the special qualifying
circumstance of relationship was proved but not the minority of the victim,
taking the case out of the ambit of mandatory death sentence. Hence,
relationship can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in
this instance so that exemplary damages are called for. In rapes
committed by fathers on their own daughters, exemplary damages may be
imposed to deter other fathers with perverse tendency or aberrant sexual
behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters.[40]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City, Branch 28, in Criminal Case Nos. DU-6186 and DU-6203, is hereby
MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas Tundag is found guilty of two (2)
counts of simple rape; and for each count, sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.