Outline

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Atty. Crisostomo A. Uribe

I. Preliminary Title

A. Effect and Application of Laws: When laws take

effect

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. HYPERMIX FEEDS

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 179579 February 1, 2012 SERENO, J

Considering that the questioned regulation [Customs Memorandum

Order 27-2003] would affect the substantive rights of respondent as
explained above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the
pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative
Code, to wit:

Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University
of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which
are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be
the bases of any sanction against any party of persons.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its

applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on
the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of
the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves
the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard,
and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the
force and effect of law.

B.Judicial Decisions: Doctrine of Stare Decisis

NANCY L. TY v. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS

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G.R. No. 188302 June 27, 2012

BRION, J

The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the

necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and
necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of
law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle
and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that
follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may
be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike.

C. Retroactivity of Laws

PERT/CPM MANPOWER EXPONENT v. Vinuya, et. al

G.R. No. 197528 September 5, 2012 BRION, J.

Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.53 By

its very nature, the amendment introduced by R.A. 10022 — restoring a
provision of R.A. 8042 declared unconstitutional — cannot be given
retroactive effect, not only because
there is no express declaration of retroactivity in the law, but because
retroactive application will result in an impairment of a right that had
accrued to the respondents by virtue of the Serrano ruling - entitlement to
their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
application, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them
a retrospective effect are expressly declared or are necessarily implied from
the language used. 54 We thus see no reason to nullity the application of the
Serrano ruling in the present case.

GEMMA P. CABALIT v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 180236 January 17, 2012 VILLARAMA, JR., J

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The rule in this jurisdiction is that one does not have a vested right in
procedural rules. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court elucidated:
33

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as

applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights
may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive
application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws. It has been held that “a person has no vested
right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the
application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any
other than the existing rules of procedure. (Emphasis supplied.)

While the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the statute itself
expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are
excepted from its operation, or where to apply it would impair vested rights,
petitioners failed to show that application of A.O. No. 17 [amending the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman] to their case would cause
injustice to them. Indeed, in this case, the Office of the Ombudsman afforded
petitioners every opportunity to defend themselves by allowing them to submit
counter-affidavits, position papers, memoranda and other evidence in their
defense.

D. Waiver of Rights

F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC v. HR CONSTRUCTION CORP

G.R. No. 187521 March 14, 2012 REYES, J

Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or

abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the
voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right
known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered
and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the
intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it."

As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is

settled:
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x x x the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges

of any character, and, since the word ‘waiver’ covers every
conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may
waive any matter which affects his property, and any
alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or
which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled,
whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or
guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and
privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole
benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and
further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is
not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public
policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a
right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law
or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the
individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed
with and relinquished without infringing on any public
right, and without detriment to the community at large.

HYPTE R. AUJERO v. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS

SATELLITE CORPORATION

G.R. No. 193484 January 18, 2012 REYES, J

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement,
it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a
change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was
wrangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to
annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person
making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was
doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.

The petitioner's educational background and employment stature render

it improbable that he was pressured, intimidated or inveigled into signing the
subject quitclaim. This Court cannot permit the petitioner to relieve himself
from the consequences of his act, when his knowledge and understanding
thereof is expected. Also, the period of time that the petitioner allowed to lapse
before filing a complaint to recover the supposed deficiency in his retirement
pay clouds his motives, leading to the reasonable conclusion that his claim of
being aggrieved is a mere afterthought, if not a mere pretention.
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E. Legal Periods

ALFREDO JACA MONTAJES v. People

G.R. No. 183449 March 12, 2012 PERALTA, J

Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court relied upon by petitioner provides:

Section 1. How to compute time. – In computing any period of time

prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated
period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance
included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the
time shall not run until the next working day.

We find that the CA correctly ruled that the petition for review was filed out
of time based on our clarification in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC that the 15-day
extension period prayed for should be tacked to the original period and
commences immediately after the expiration of such period.1[14] Thus,
counting 15 days from the expiration of the period which was on May 19,
2007, the petition filed on June 5, 2007 was already two days late. However,
we find the circumstances obtaining in this case to merit the liberal
application of the rule in the interest of justice and fair play.

F. Binding Effect of Laws

TUNA PROCESSING v. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD

G.R. No. 185582 February 29, 2012 PEREZ, J.

“The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all types of

corporations, while the New Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks
and other financial institutions, including the dissolution and liquidation
thereof. As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail –
generalia specialibus non derogant.

G. Capacity to Act: Restrictions

NILO OROPESA v. CIRILO OROPESA

1
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G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified

guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that

persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak
mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and
their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision
reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word “incompetent.” – Under this rule, the
word “incompetent” includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who
are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though
they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot,
without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property,
becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

II. MARRIAGE
A. Requisites : Kinds of requisites, FC 2, 3, 5; cf. NCC 53
Kinds of non-compliance; Effect of non-compliance

SYED AZHAR ABBAS v. GLORIA ABBAS

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013 Velasco, Jr. J.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a

copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies
of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such
license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that
he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted
by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. xxx

B. Law Governing Validity

1. General Rule on contracts
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a. As to form, NCC 17 Lex Loci celebrationis, FC

26
b. As to substantive requirements, NCC 15 & 17
2. Special rule in marriage Art. 26.

MEROPE VDA. DE CATALAN v. LOUELLA CATALAN-LEE

G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012 Sereno, J.

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality

principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In
the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of
Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino
citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van
Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could “very well lose
her right to inherit” from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by
the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There,
we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

C. Void Marriages
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
Psychological incapacity FC 36, cf FC 68- 73
Incestuous marriage FC 37 cf NCC 963 – 967
Marriages against public policy FC38; Compare FC38
(9) with NCC80(6)
Requisite for valid remarriage FC 40

Bigamous Marriage FC41-44; Bigamy

Republic v. Court of Appeals and de Quintos

G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012 Bersamin, J.

Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes
did not present the gravity and incurability of Catalina’s psychological
incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence showing the root cause of
her alleged borderline personality disorder and that such disorder had existed
prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of
the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness,
with its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality
of the evidence presented during trial.
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The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her
Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live with another
man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of
marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological
incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article
55(10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not
a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity
was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.33 Needless to state,
Eduardo did not adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her
infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.

Republic v. Cesar Encelan

G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013 Brion, J.

In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged

psychological incapacity. xxx
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity;
these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the
erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.27 No
evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s
infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological
illness.

ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012 BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the
OSG no longer required, and that the appeal by the OSG was a mere superfluity that could be
deemed to have become functus officio if not totally disregarded. 25

The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere stated that
appeals by the OSG were no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly
required the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings, to wit:
 9

a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the
date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same
period.26

b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with
the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of their
claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the
Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave
of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered
submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda. 27

c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be
served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent
summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the
decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation. 28

d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the
parties.1âwphi1 Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or
new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the
Solicitor General.29

e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a
Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal
on the adverse parties.30

The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as counsel for the
State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose
petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently
evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.

Republic v. Yolanda Granada

G. R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012 Sereno, J.

Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent

spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41
of the Family Code is a summary proceeding “as provided for” under the
Family Code.

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding

shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no
appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
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MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTANES v. LOURDES TAJOLOSA

CIPRIANO

G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012 Peralta, J.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b)
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has
all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of
the second marriage or subsequent marriage.23ςrνll It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.24ςrνll

In Mercado v. Tan,26Ï‚rll we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the
first was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code.

As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration
that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because
Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went
on to explain, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws.

D. Voidable Marriages:
1. Grounds for annulment FC 45, 46
2. Who can seek annulment and when, FC 47

III. LEGAL SEPARATION AND DIVORCE

A. Grounds for legal Separation FC 55, compare with
NCC 97
B. Who can ask for legal separation? FC 55, compare with
NCC 99-100
C. When may petition be filed? FC 57, compare with NCC
102, NCC 99
D. Defenses FC 56
E. Effect of Decree of Legal Separation

Brigido Quiao v. Rita Quiao, et. al.

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G.R. No. 176556 July 4, 2012 Reyes, J.

The net profits of the conjugal

partnership of gains are all the
fruits of the separate properties of
the spouses and the products of
their labor and industry.

Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit
his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded
to the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior
marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or
entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from
the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall
not apply.

In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled

to all the net profits.

From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no

basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of
the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a
legal separation case.

IV. PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND

AND WIFE
A. What made; governs marriage settlements
B. Donations propter nuptias
C. Absolute community of property (ACP)
D. Conjugal Partnership of Gains: Presumption
E. Regime of Separation of Property
F. Judicial Separation of Property
G. Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage
1. Unions under FC 147
2. Unions under FC 148 of FC 50 in rel. to FC 43 (2) and
FC 50

SPOUSES ATTY. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA and JOENA B.

ABRENICA v. LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL and TIBAYAN

G.R. No. 180572 June 18, 2012 Sereno, J.

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Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property
the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of
that property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the
second marriage.

ANTONIA R. DELA PEÑA and ALVIN JOHN B. DELA PEÑA v.

GEMMA AVILA and FEBTC

G.R. No. 187490 February 8, 2012 Perez, J

Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it
is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership,2[30] proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential
condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership.

Xxx this Court ruled, however, that the phrase “married to” is merely
descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean
that the husband is also a registered owner. Because it is likewise possible
that the property was acquired by the wife while she was still single and
registered only after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in said
manner constitute proof that the same was acquired during the marriage and,
for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature.

ESTRELLA ADUAN ORPIANO v. SPOUSES TOMAS

G.R. No. 178611 January 14, 2013 del

Castillo, J.

As plaintiff in the collection case, Estrella – though merely succeeding to

Alejandro’s rights – was an indispensable party, or one without whom no
final determination can be had in the collection case.12 Strictly, she may not
be dropped from the case. However, because of her dual identity, first as heir
and second as owner of her conjugal share, she has been placed in the unique
position where she has to succeed to her husband’s rights, even as she must
protect her separate conjugal share from Alejandro’s perceived undue
disposition. She may not seek to amend the cause of action in the collection
case to one for annulment of sale, because this adversely affects the interests

2
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of her co-heirs, which is precisely to obtain payment of the supposed balance

of the sale price.

To repeat, the absence of the consent of one spouse to a sale renders the
entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.

WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,

vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution reads:

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred

or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain.

Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited
constitutional prohibition"25 and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and
respondent registered the subject properties in the latter’s name. 26 Clearly, petitioner’s
actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of
such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and
accordingly, deny petitioner’s claim for reimbursement.

V. THE FAMILY HOME

SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES RAUL LAPITAN and RONA LAPITAN, Respondents.

G.R. No. 178288 August 15, 2012 DEL CASTILLO, J.

As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. 49 However,
Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts
secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there
is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over the subject property which was even notarized by their original
counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses
Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it
was sold at the public auction. As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of Appeals:50

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it
is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under
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Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved
to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming the exemption.

VI. PATERNITY AND FILIATION

A. Paternity and filiations in general, FC 163
B. Legitimate children, FC 164
C. Illegitimate children FC 165
D. Action to impugn legitimacy
E. PROOF OF FILIATION
F. Legitimated Children

CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,

vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.

G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012 BRION, J.

We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child." 31

One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 32 We have held that such other
proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in
which [his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission
by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court."33

Xxxx In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the
putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with
one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. 38 Rodulfo corroborated her testimony
that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. 39

ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner,

vs.
MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 172471 November 12, 2012 DEL CASTILLO, J.

Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
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(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

xxxx

Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.

xxxx

Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the
father. However, said certificate has no probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to
Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. 60 It is settled that "a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate."

Xxxxx Anent Randy’s baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a
good proof of Antonio’s paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of
participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this
document incompetent to prove paternity.65 And "while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s
paternity. Thus, x x x baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the
same."66

VII. ADOPTION
A. Who may adopt
B. Who may not adopt, FC 184
C. Who may be adopted FC 183, FC 185
D. Who may not be adopted, FC 187
E. Effects of adoption FC189

VIII.SUPPORT

CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,

vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.

G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012 BRION, J.

Xx xxx Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent
is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. 45 Support consists of
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everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education

and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. 46 Thus, the amount of
support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made
as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to
the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of
the person obliged to support.48

IX. PARENTAL AUTHORITY

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
NORA FE SAGUN, Respondent.

G.R. No. 187567 February 15, 2012 VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese,
unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule
that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children
are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. 20 An illegitimate
child of Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges
attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. 21 But in
the case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

20July2014cau