Does decentralization improve perceptions of accountability?

Attitudes in response to decentralization in Colombia

Maria Escobar-Lemmon

Texas A&M University

escobar@polisci.tamu.edu

Ashley D. Ross

Texas A&M University – Corpus Christi

ashley.ross@tamucc.edu

Abstract

Does decentralization create greater local government accountability? In theory, political and
fiscal decentralization should create incentives for local and regional politicians to be more responsive
and accountable to their constituents, but few studies have examined whether this is true in practice.
We use survey data from Colombia for the years 2004-06 to examine individual-level evaluations of the
degree to which citizens believe department government is perceived as accountable in fiscal and policy
terms. We estimate the effect of both departmental-level context variables including decentralization
and political competition and individual-level predictors such as education, income, participation,
political knowledge, and perception of corruption. Our results indicate that citizens are cognizant of the
degree of empowerment decentralization has given their departmental government and that
decentralization does improve perceptions of accountability.
 Does decentralization improve perceptions of accountability?
Attitudes in response to decentralization in Colombia

What does it mean to say that government is accountable? Does accountable government
require elections and are elections sufficient for citizens to hold government accountable? If a
government pursued a policy that had negative consequences (say made the local economy worse
rather than better) and then was voted out of office, most scholars (and citizens) would say voters held
them accountable for their policies. But, is voter's ability to sanction or reward governments at the polls
all that is required to say that accountability exists? Do periodic referenda on what government has
done providing a sufficient opportunity to hold those governing to account or are more extensive
measures – including making sure that government responds to the preferences of citizens required?

At the heart of all definitions of accountability, and perhaps the most basic use of the word, is a
sense of being called to account (Jones 1992) implying some form of external control. While he
advocates for this more limited notion of the concept, Mulgan (2000) argues that accountability seems
to be an ever-expanding concept where more criteria must be met and more dimensions must be
included in order for government to be deemed accountable. Primary among these is an expanding
notion of accountability to include responsiveness on the part of government to do what citizens want.
This broadening of the meaning of accountability to include responsiveness has led many to argue that
decentralization is the means to improve the accountability (and responsiveness) of local governments.

For some, it is the wrapping of accountability and participation into the concept itself that
distinguishes democratic decentralization – or democratic local governance (DLG) from prior reforms
even those which might be labeled decentralizing. As Blair (2000: 22) explains, "DLG has been advocated
for what it is (or ought to be) and for what it does (or what it should do), i.e., as a process or end-in-itself
and as a means to further ends, in this case the outputs of DLG. On the process side, through
participation DLG promises to increase popular input into what local government does, and through
accountability it bids to increase popular control over what local government has done or left undone."

Decentralization refers to the transfer of responsibility for providing services from the national
government to state and local governments and can be thought of as having political, fiscal, and
administrative components (Rondinelli 1989). It promised to increase responsiveness of local
governments to citizen needs, mobilize citizens through new venues of local political participation,
increase democratic accountability on the local level where government is most proximate to citizens,
and generally improve democracy from below (Bardan and Mookherjee 2006). As Daughters and
Harper (2007:215) note, "A broad consensus was thus created around two major benefits of
decentralized regimes: (a) that decentralization helps to improve the channels of citizen participation
and political accountability, and (b) that decentralization allows for a more responsive, and thus
effective, government allocation of public goods to a regionally diverse citizenry." International
organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF tended to promote decentralization as part of a
strategy to realize these twin goals of accountability and efficiency (Rondinelli 1989). As part of efforts
to improve local capacity, both the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank increased

1
funding for municipal development grants while decentralizing reforms were being adopted (Nickson
1995).

Decentralization then is perhaps a contextual framework or the architecture that must be

constructed so that more accountable local governments can develop. In this conceptualization,
decentralization may be a sufficient, but not necessary, precondition for the development of
accountable government. Thus, if decentralization works as predicted, countries (or parts of a country)
where it has become most institutionalized and/or implemented most extensively should be
characterized by greater perceptions of government accountability on the part of citizens. Places where
decentralization has not been as extensive, in contrast, should be characterized by a consensus view
that there is less accountability of government.

Despite the seemingly clear predictions that emerge about how decentralization should produce
accountability, previous work has either failed to examine the relationship directly or more commonly
asserts that the relationship will follow without rigorous testing (e.g. Manor 1997).1 Admittedly there
have been efforts to examine whether there is greater electoral accountability in subnational elections
(e.g. Gelineau and Remmer (2005) and Khemani (2001)), but these works seem to assume that if it
happens decentralization is responsible. Consistently ignored in the literature, perhaps because of
issues of data availability, is a direct evaluation of the effect of decentralization on the opinions of those
to whom government should actually be accountable: the citizens. We fill this hole in the literature
using individual-level survey data from Colombia to test whether more extensive decentralization does
in fact increase citizen's perceptions of the accountability of government accounting for both individual-
level attributes and attitudes as well as context. In the next section of the paper, we review the extant
literature as a way to ground our expectations and predictions regarding the effect that contextual and
individual-level factors should have upon perceptions of accountability. We then offer a detailed
discussion of the data and methods used in our analysis beginning with a discussion of why Colombia is
an ideal test case for these hypotheses. The results of our analysis examining contextual and individual
level predictors of perceived accountability are reported in the fourth section and the last concludes.

Context matters: The incentives to be accountable under decentralization

We argue that while attitudes about government accountability are going to be shaped by an
individual's experience, they are also going to be shaped by the context in which that individual lives.

1
It is worth noting that not all scholars agree that decentralization will improve accountability. In an overall work
critical of the effect of political decentralization and whether it is either sufficiently better than centralization to be
a general policy recommendation, Treisman (2007: 184) argues, "On examination, the association between
decentralization and accountability seems at best quite weak and contingent. Most of the arguments commonly
invoked do not seem compelling. Decentralization could either increase or decrease voters' ability to get accurate
information about government performance. Given the level of voter information, decentralization might enhance
the ability of voters to coordinate to discipline government on a very limited number of policy areas. The ambition
to rise from local to national politics might motivate local elected officials to serve responsibly. It is hard to say
much more than this."

2
Thus, we open our discussion of the determinants of accountability by examining first the way in which
context matters and then turning to individual level variables. We see context as playing an important
role in determining attitudes about accountability in two ways: through the extensiveness of
decentralization and through political competition.

Decentralization was viewed as a positive development for legitimizing government as well as

enhancing accountability and governability (Blair 2000; Burki, Perry, Dillinger 1999; Manor 1999;
Peterson 1997). Local governments are closer to citizens and thus it is argued it will be easier for them
to monitor them. For instance, in his examination of Indian elections Khemani (2001) concludes that
voters do pay better attention to what is happening at the local level forcing those governments to be
more accountable. "In this paper, we have interpreted voter responses to economic performance in
local and national elections as evidence that voters are more vigilant in monitoring the more local level
of government. The argument is based on strong evidence that while voters reward local incumbents for
high growth and low inequality throughout their term in office, they evaluate national incumbents only
on the basis of performance just before elections" (2001:13). Adapting models that have been used to
study voting in national versus state elections in the United States, Gélineau and Remmer (2005)
consider determinants of subnational and national voting in Argentina. After examining data on both
aggregate performance and individual-level survey data from six provinces they conclude there is
evidence that provincial (state) elections turn on state as well as national conditions. Specifically, while
both presidential and gubernatorial approval are consistent predictors of vote intention, only provincial
level economic conditions matter. Assessment of national economic conditions didn't consistently
predict vote choice.

Decentralization is also expected to improve accountability because in a decentralized setting

more and varied mechanisms are available to governments to involve citizens in government decision-
making. Innovations such as citizen oversight commissions or town hall meetings where government
must provide an explanation for its actions seem to garner the most support at the local level. One of
the most frequently touted of these is participatory budgeting modeled on the highly successful Porto
Alegre, Brazil model. While the participatory budgeting process in Porto Alegre was structured in such
as way that many and diverse stakeholders from across the community were involved, some for the first
time, as Smith (2009) notes, attempts in Brazil to translate the process to the state-level have not
proved as successful, in part because of differences in scale.

Closer government, more monitoring by citizens, and transparency that are expected to
characterize decentralization should thus be associated with a move toward increased accountability.
According to Lederman, Loayza and Soares (2005, 5) "Transparency can also be improved by
decentralization, since, because of easier monitoring, informational problems are less severe at the local
level. Smaller constituencies facilitate the monitoring of the performance of elected representatives and
public officials and, additionally, reduce the collective action problems related to political participation.
Thus, in this sense, decentralized political systems tend to have stronger accountability mechanisms and
lower corruption (Nas et al., 1986; Rose-Ackerman, 1999).

3
 Decentralization is a policy that holds significant promise for improving governance. However,
as others have noted, its design (aka getting institutions "right") matters. In reflecting over the case
studies in their edited volume, Selee and Tulchin (2004:296) agree that decentralization can improve
governance, but this result is not guaranteed, especially as in some cases decentralization increased
inequalities. They conclude that three things matter in determining whether better governance results
from decentralization: the motivation of key actors; how institutions are structured and; the "texture of
state-society relations" (how active and participatory civil society is). Thus, it is not enough to simply say
decentralize and expect more accountable government will follow. Instead, decentralization provides
the context in which political competition and reduction in corruption can help to bring about improved
perceptions of accountability. Certainly decentralization can play a role in helping to do both of these
things, however as we argue, it is the reduction in corruption and the rise in competition in the space
created especially by political decentralization that makes citizens see government as more accountable.
Thus, we argue that context matters and hypothesize: citizens living under more regimes with more
extensive decentralization will be more likely to perceive government as being more accountable (H1).

A commonly articulate motivation for decentralization is the expectation that it will improve the
provision of public services both in terms of quality and efficiency (IADB 1997). Decentralization is
expected to reduce the costs of services by reducing waste and inefficiency by leaving these functions
up to subnational government (Weingast 1995).2 Decentralized services are expected to be of higher
quality and greater efficiency because local governments have better knowledge about what levels of
public goods are needed (Hayek 1945). But, for local governments to actually do this, (e.g. provide
better services or more demanded services at lower prices) they must have some motivation for doing
so. This is where political competition comes into play. If local officials are concerned about being re-
elected (or having their party re-elected if they personally cannot be re-elected) then they are more
likely to care about improving services. Thus, as we discuss below while decentralization is a necessary
precondition, the extent to which the political environment is competitive may also be important in
determining whether government seems accountable.

In reviewing the literature on local versus national government accountability, Keefer, Narayan,
and Vishwanath (2006:285) note, "From this literature, one can conclude that local government will do
better than central governments if local electoral and political institutions and local competition for
political office hold local governments more tightly accountable to citizens." Linz and Stephan (1996)
and Rose-Ackerman (1999) showed that competitive elections were helpful in making sure that elected
officials are accountable for their actions. After all if there is no threat that they will be ousted in an
election because there is no real competition for the office then officials might be less fearful of
electoral sanctions for their actions. More competitive races should give politicians incentives to be
more responsive and accountable to voters in order to gain (or keep) their support. Looking at USAID
programs to develop and enhance democratic local governance in six different countries, Blair (2000)
concludes that free and fair elections are critical in ensuring accountability to citizens. But, he also goes

2
This relies on the Tiebout (1956) or Public Choice model where citizen’s public spending preferences are revealed
as they "walk" to the combination of goods and services at the price (taxes) they prefer, all else being equal. This
leads to efficiency as local governments "compete".

4
on to note that elections are not the only component in holding officials accountable, pointing to the
important role played by political parties (especially opposition parties ), civil society, and the media.
These additional mechanisms provide extra monitoring, extra chances to uncover government
malfeasance, as well as provide voice for additional ideas and disseminate extra information. All this
points to the importance of competition in increasing accountability.

In cases where there is a lack of electoral competition (as well as voter information), Bardhan
and Mookherjee (2000) argue that local governments are more likely to be captured by elites and
resulting in distortions in the provision of public goods. Their formal model leads to the intuition that
elite capture is relatively more likely when they govern areas that are poor and with high degrees of
inequality. Interestingly, they find that in situations where voters have more information they are
better able to pick candidates and thus they avoid this problem. In cases where there are more
competitive elections both (all) parties have incentives to try and satisfy as many voters as possible.
Thus, because they fear losing the next election they are more likely to behave in ways that work toward
the general (rather than purely the elite) public good which should produce less elite dominated and
more accountable governments.

Fisman and Gatti (2002:326) examined the relationship between decentralization and
corruption, which is related to, but certainly not identical with accountability. Based on a cross-national
study of perceptions of corruption they conclude "that fiscal decentralization in government
expenditure is consistently associated with lower measured corruption across countries." Building on
the seminal work of Brennan and Buchanan (1980) who note that competition among local governments
attracts residents, they argue that competition may in turn foster better government. They argue,
"Analogous to the effect of competition in product markets, political competition reduces the ability of
bureaucrats to extract rents in exchange for services." (2002: 327) This would also suggest a secondary
reason why competition might help to improve accountability, especially to the extent that
accountability is confounded with corruption in the minds of respondents. Thus, we hypothesize:
Higher electoral competition will be associated with positive perceptions of accountability (H2).

Who sees government as accountable?: Individual-level determinants

The above discussion suggests two ways in which context matters thus directly positing that the
way institutions themselves work have a clear impact upon how accountable citizens perceive
government to be. However, we do not expect that evaluations of government accountability will be
constant across all respondents in a department. Indeed we fully expect that two individuals living in the
same department will think about accountability differently. Specifically we expect that their attitudes
about the quality of government, the extent to which they are involved in and participate in
government, and their knowledge about politics will all affect their evaluations of government
accountability. We discuss each of these in turn.

As was noted above there is something of an expectation in the literature that decentralized
governance will be akin to better or more transparent governance. We do not make that assumption,

5
but we do recognize that the extent to which citizens are optimistic and positive about their government
– and believe it to function in a transparent, rather than a corrupt way, should likely make them see it as
more accountable. Based on a review of the literature Shah, Thompson and Zou (2004) conclude that in
general decentralization works to reduce corruption. Their conclusion is consistent of that of Fisman and
Gatti (2002:326) whose cross-national study finds that "fiscal decentralization in government
expenditure is consistently associated with lower measured corruption across countries." That said, in
one of the most extensive cross-national examination of the causes of corruption, Treisman (2000)
examines empirically whether federal states experience higher or lower perceived levels of corruption.
He finds that when other variables are taken into account, federal states score a half to one point higher
on the Transparency International Corruption scale. And he finds this to be true across all groups when
countries are sub-divided by income.

Some have noted that the relationship may depend on context. In Shah's (2006) review of the
literature he finds clear instances and situations in which decentralization limited corruption because it
increased monitoring and accountability, but in other settings it seemed to expand the opportunities for
corruption, making it worse. In general though, he seems to conclude that decentralization is beneficial
for both accountability and corruption arguing, "Localization strengthens government accountability to
citizens by involving citizens in monitoring government performance and demanding corrective actions.
Localization as a means to make government responsive and accountable to people can help reduce
corruption and improve service delivery." (2006: 23)

The hypothesis that decentralization reduces (or increases) corruption is not tested empirically
in our study and in some ways that relationship is tangential to our central question. Instead, we are
concerned with the fact that how controlled individuals think corruption is (regardless of the objective
reality) may affect if they evaluate their government as accountable. Clean government (or government
seen as clean) is less likely to have things to hide and thus is more likely to behave in the open and
transparent way that is associated with accountability – especially in terms of providing citizens with
information. We expect this to be particularly true where decentralization has been successful because
then government functions should be clear and political institutions and practices transparent. Thus,
we'd hypothesize: Optimism about the quality of government should be correlated with perceptions of
higher accountability (H3).

In her examination of how marginalized groups used democratic decentralization in Uganda and
South Africa to demand accountability from leaders who would not normally have given it to them,
Dauda (2006) highlights the role and importance of community participation. In South Africa, the
impetus for community participation at local level resulted from the legacy of community organization
particularly growing out of groups organized during apartheid struggle. She cautions though that we
have to look at political participation broadly if we want to think about how the marginalized might be
included. "However, developing accountability and transparency involves complex political challenges
and is not solved simply by instituting democratic elections at the local level, as the evidence from these
two municipalities demonstrates. Developing ways of demanding accountability and transparency
involves developing new political relationships which, in turn, demands popular participation in, and
engagement with, local government institutions." (Dauda 2006: 301) Similarly, in a study of local

6
governments in Colombia, Fiszbein (1997) worked to identify those which have most effectively worked
to increase their capacity to carry out the service responsibilities assigned to them as a result of
decentralization. In the sample of municipalities studied, he concludes that a combination of political
competition and community participation were both critical ingredients in the construction of capacity.
For example, participation allowed local governments to leverage resources contributed by the
community to continue public works projects. Fiszbein (1997: 1034) emphasizes the importance of
participation writing, "In other words, community participation forced government accountability."

This suggests that individual political participation may be an important predictor of perceptions
of accountability. Those who are more actively involved in local government may be seeing more than
those who are not involved or simply vote and they might perceive greater accountability. Moreover,
part of how accountability is envisioned to work involves citizens being willing to take step to monitor
government, demand transparency, and the like. Independent media and opposition political parties (or
candidates) do full-fill this role, but so do community meetings and town halls (for instance). Thus, to
the extent that respondents have realized that accountability is a result of individuals working to hold
government to account, they may view government as more accountable because they realize they are
working to make it so. Thus, we'd hypothesis: Political participation should increase perceptions of
accountability (H4).

Finally, we anticipate that the amount of information citizens have about government will
influence their perceptions of government accountability. Because we are interested in examining
accountability broadly (that is to say we care about more than electoral accountability), we expect
political knowledge and information to matter. If the municipal government posts the budget on-line
and citizens have a chance to review it and leave feedback – something we would say represents a high
degree of accountability – but no one actually reads it or knows it is there, then they are unlikely to see
their government is accountable even if objective observers score it as such. In a case where
government made information available, but only to citizens who knew it was there or had the interest
to look for it – such as posting documents on website or holding open council meetings – there should
be significantly different perceptions of accountability among those who know the information is there
(even if they chose not to read it) and those who are ignorant it exists. The later may mistakenly believe
that government is not providing information to citizens simply because they did not know where to
look for it. Thus, we'd expect more informed citizens to view government as more accountable. This
leads to our hypothesis that Respondents with higher levels of political knowledge will be more likely to
perceive government as accountable (H5).

Modeling Accountability: Case Selection, Data and Methods

Our analysis in this paper focuses on Colombia, although we expect that our conclusions should
apply more broadly, something we discuss further in the conclusion. The Colombian case is an
interesting one to study and a good one in which to test our expectations for several reasons. Moreover,
limiting our examination and evaluation to a single country allows us to hold constant the national-level

7
enabling legislation that characterized decentralization. First, decentralization in Colombia is relatively
advanced, a fact captured in the country's self description in its constitution as a decentralized, unitary
republic. Second, the fact that Colombia is a unitary state makes it an especially interesting case to
study. On the one hand, it poses challenges for our theory because there is no constitutional
preservation or guarantee of departmental prerogatives of departments. At the same time though, the
conclusions we draw more broadly applicable because unitary states are more common that federal.

Third, studying the accountability of department-level governments in Colombia represents

something of a tough test for our theory. We are not looking at the level of government that is most
proximate to citizens so any automatic boost in perceived accountability because of easy access isn't
there. Additionally, the transfer of responsibility in Colombia has emphasized decentralizing from the
national to the municipal level, bypassing the departments to a large extent and leading some to argue
that increased municipal strength has come at the expense of the departments (DANE 2007). In some
ways, one could contend this has made departments the forgotten level of government in Colombia
with neither the power or visibility of the national nor the proximity and empowerment of the
municipal, meaning we might expect citizens to not view them as particularly accountable. Fourth,
while laws decentralizing responsibility for service provision or establishing subnational elections have
applied everywhere, the implementation of those reforms and their success has varied significantly
across the country. Thus, while on paper departmental governments might all appear the same in
practice there is significant variation.3 While governors are elected in all departments (and
municipalities), meaning the level of political decentralization is constant, the same is not true for fiscal
decentralization. Reforms in the early 1980s advanced fiscal decentralization significantly when
municipalities were authorized to collect and administer the property tax and were guaranteed a
percentage of revenue from the national Value Added Tax (VAT). This put the municipalities on better
fiscal footing than the departments, who were forced to rely on revenue given to them by the national
government under the situado constitucional 4 and the very limited revenue that could be generated
from some "vice" taxes (liquor, beer, and tobacco). The department's financial situation is often
described as being highly dependent because while significant revenue flows through department
administration, the vast majority of that is transfers from the central government. There are few
chances for departments to break this dependency as legally there are few things they can tax as a way
of generating more revenue though their own sources. Consequently, there is significant variation
across the departments in the extent to which they have been able to carve out a role for themselves
and to play a role in citizen's day-to-day lives.5

3
Government in Colombia consists of three levels: the national level government (also referred to as the central
government), the department level (analogous to state government in the United States), and the municipal level
(which despite its name is more closely analogous in territorial terms to a country than a city in the US).
4 The situado constitucional refers to constitutionally guaranteed percentage of the national government’s total
revenue that is transferred to the states and municipalities. Monies included under the situado constitucional
include both earmarked funds and general revenue sharing.
5
For more on decentralization in Colombia see Alesina (2000), Departamento Nacional de Planeación (1998),
Dillinger and Webb (1998), Dugas (1992), Garay (1994), Gaitán Pavía and Moreno Ospina (1992), Henao Hildrón
(1998); and Pérez C. y Farah Q. (1999).

8
 Finally, in order to carry out this study certain data requirements had to be met. We rely on
both individual-level survey data and department-level indicators of the extensiveness of
decentralization. The individual-level survey data is taken from the Latin American Public Opinion
Project (LAPOP) Democracy Audit and Culture of Democracy surveys of Colombia for the years 2004 and
20066, respectively. These surveys are ideal for testing how perceptions of accountability vary across
differing contexts of decentralization because there are numerous questions exploring individual
assessment of common themes of decentralization - ranging from service delivery to corruption - on
varying levels government, including municipal, departmental, and national. The extensiveness of the
questions exploring accountability at multiple levels of government in this survey, which is not found in
a comparable way in other LAPOP surveys from those years, contributed to our decision to focus this
analysis on Colombia. While the survey we analyze does ask citizens specifically about municipal,
departmental, and national government, however we focus on the department level as a way of
ensuring that we have a sufficient number of respondents in each department – something that would
not be possible if we focused on the municipal government. Additionally, by focusing on the department
level we are able to obtain some independent context level variables that quite simply do not exist at
the municipal level and do not appear to exist in other countries– in particular the public functionaries'
evaluations of departmental government (discussed further below). In essence then, if we find that a
more decentralized level of government under a unitary system improved perceptions of accountability
this would represent strong confirmation that decentralization can contribute to improved perceptions
of accountability.

We examine accountability (our dependent variable) in three ways: accountability in

management of fiscal resources, in providing information, and in consulting citizens. To measure
accountability of fiscal management we rely on the survey question that asks individuals: “Do you think
that your Department is accountable in its management of fiscal resources?” (yes or no). Because
decentralization is not only about the devolution of responsibilities and fiscal management, but also
about building democracy from below we include a measure for consulting citizens. To measure this, we
use a survey question that asks respondents: “In your opinion, your departmental government consults
citizens before making decisions…never (1), almost never (2), once in a while (3), almost always (4),
always (5).” To measure accountability in providing information we use responses to the following
survey question: “In your opinion, your departmental government shares information openly and on
time…never (1), almost never (2), once in a while (3), almost always (4), always (5).”7

Considering that proponents of decentralization assert that decentralization should create more
efficient and accountable use of fiscal resources as well as more open, transparent, and responsive local

6
See Appendix A for all variable coding and Appendix B for descriptive statistics.
7
We carefully examined the extent to which perceptions of local, departmental and national (or government in
general) accountability perceptions differed. Using a series of t-tests, we found that individual perceptions of
accountability are statistically different for subnational and national levels of governments. Municipal and
departmental evaluations are not always distinct. Municipal evaluations of consulting citizens is not significantly
different from departmental evaluations for the year 2006, and municipal evaluations of sharing information are
not significantly different from departmental evaluations for the years 2004 and 2006. Nonetheless, citizens do
make distinctions between subnational and national accountability.

9
government, the three measures of accountability that we have chosen nicely capture the intended
effects of decentralization both on resource management and information. To use Mulgan's (2000)
terms they are perhaps closer to accountability as responsiveness (especially the consultation measure),
however all also have a strong and clear sense of external control which he argues is a key component of
accountability. Finally, we note that examining accountability in this way provides us with a significant
opportunity to advance our understanding of how non-electoral forms (i.e. moving beyond studying
vote intention) of accountability are determined.

In order to test our hypothesis that citizens living under more regimes with more extensive
decentralization will be more likely to perceive government as being more accountable we include an
independent assessment of the extent to which decentralization has been implemented in a given
department. Rather than relying on citizens to judge the relative power and competence of
departmental government, which might be highly correlated with their satisfaction with officeholders,
their partisan leanings, or their attitudes about accountability, we rely on expert surveys to judge the
level of decentralization in each department. Data on the extent of decentralization in each department
is taken from a 2007 report issued by the Administrative Department of National Statistics (DANE 2007).
The report outlines evaluations by government officials of their own department’s decentralization
efforts and success. Numerous decentralization areas are explored, including resources, management,
labor welfare, and administrative accountability. A score is given to each of Colombia’s 32 departments
on each decentralization dimension.8

In each of the areas DANE surveyed, public functionaries were asked to evaluate the
department's performance on a series of indicators. For each question the scores ranged from 1-5 (very
low, low, medium, high, very high), creating a theoretical average with a range of 1-5. In practice,
reflecting the pattern of decentralization which seems to have favored municipalities, most
departments cluster on the low to medium part of the scale. We added a departmental level variable
that records the average score for six of the ten areas DANE evaluates: credibility in applying rules;
having sufficient resources; making credible policy; being credible in terms of responsibilities; credibility
in sources of finance; and administrative accountability. The mean of this score is 3.22.

The second context-level variable (meaning it only varies at the department level) we include
allows us to test the hypothesis that increased political competition increases perceptions of
accountability (H2) because competition works to keep those governing honest. We use margin of
victory of the governor’s race for the 2003 election, which was the last gubernatorial election prior to
both surveys, to measure competition. [The governors and department assemblies elected in this
election were still holding office during both waves of the survey.] We treat smaller margins of victory as
representing more closely contested elections and thus we'd expect the coefficient for this variable to
be negative. The data is taken from the National Registry’s voting records. The margin of victory is

8
DANE's scores for each category reflect the average across multiple functionaries who responded to each
question. Multiple question items were used by DANE to construct each measure. The full survey is available at
http://www.dane.gov.co/files/EDI/INFORME_RG_EDI_DPTAL_2007.pdf.

10
calculated as the difference between the winning party’s vote share and the second place party’s vote
share.

We include numerous individual-level independent variables to test our hypotheses regarding

the effect of evaluation of government quality (H3), political participation (H4), and political knowledge
(H5) on perceptions of accountability. Recall that we expected perceptions of quality government to be
correlated with perceptions of higher accountability. To measure quality government we use a measure
of whether government is free of corruption. We combine individual responses to three corruption
evaluations – of politicians in general, of departmental officials, and of municipal officials. Responses
ranged from not widespread (coded 1) to widespread (coded 4). If a respondent evaluated government
at all three levels as having “widespread” or “very widespread” corruption we coded them 1, meaning
they are cynical about the quality of government, 0 means a respondent is optimistic about the quality
of government. This variable was chosen over corruption evaluations (municipal, departmental,
national, or aggregate) because it is empirically and theoretically distinct from our dependent variables.9

We expected political participation and political knowledge to increase evaluations of

departmental accountability. To measure political participation, we create an additive index of the
following components: 1.) attendance at a municipal meeting, 2.) participation in a meeting to plan the
budget or annual municipal plan, and 3.) solicitation of help from some municipal office, official, or
councilman. The index ranges from 0 - no participation - to 3 - participation in all three activities. We
use the municipal level participation measure because similar questions at the department level were
not asked in the survey. We expected that those who are active at the municipal level should both be
more likely to be active at the department level, but also to view departmental accountability as good.
In part this reflects greater familiarity with government as well as social capital and community building
that has been argued to contribute to accountability. To measure political knowledge we create an
additive index of four political knowledge questions - name of U.S. president, number of departments in
Colombia, term limit of Colombian president, and name of Brazilian president. Individuals were assigned
a value representing the number of correct answers they gave (i.e. 2 of 4 correctly answered = 2).

We also include a series of individual level control variables which we anticipate might have
either a direct effect on perceptions of accountability or might work with other variables and thus their
exclusion would lead to biased estimates. These control variables include age (measured in years),
education (also measured in years), and income (measured in ranges with higher values indicating more
monthly family income). Finally, because we have pooled data from surveys administered at two

9
Theoretically it is a fine line to draw between corruption and accountability perceptions. Is there a conceptual
distinction, particularly from an individual respondent’s standpoint, between government corruption and
accountability? They seem to be the flip sides of a coin. Empirically, corruption and accountability evaluations were
substitutable. Measures of corruption, including evaluations of individual levels of government or averaged
perceptions across subnational and national governments, were significant predictors of accountability and
accountability perceptions were a significant variable when corruption is substituted as the dependent variable. This
is not the case with this measure of optimism. When we substitute optimism as the dependent variable,
accountability is not significant. This indicates that we have captured an underlying individual dimension that
speaks to a personal value of quality rather than evaluations of government in general. We believe like other
scholars (Cleary and Stokes) that this cynicism is important to our understanding of government legitimacy and
accountability.

11
different time points, 2004 and 2006, we include a control variable for 2004 in the event there is
something distinctive about the two time points.

Because we wish to include variables that vary at the individual level and the department level,
we have chosen to estimate the models using a multi-level modeling framework. These models are
most appropriate when the data being analyzed is individuals nested in groups (such as respondents
living in a state) and one wishes to determine whether both characteristics of those individuals as well
as the context in which they live (the state) affect some outcome. Given that we believe that context
matters – and in specific ways we hypothesize about – we take into account the structure of our data
when selecting a modeling strategy. Given the nature of our dependent variables, we estimate a HLM
random intercept model (restricted maximum likelihood) with the logit link function for fiscal
accountability and with OLS for consulting citizens and sharing information.

Results

The regression results are reported in Table 1. The dependent variable in the first column of the
table is fiscal accountability; the second column reports the model for evaluations of consulting citizens,
and the third column reports the sharing information openly model. Most of our theoretical
expectations are confirmed, although not all. Most strikingly, we observe differences between fiscal
accountability versus consulting citizens and information accountability. Conceptually, consulting
citizens before making decisions and sharing information openly are closely linked to democratic
dimensions of accountability (transparency, openness, and responsiveness)10 while fiscal accountability
captures the notion that decentralization should create more efficient and responsible use of resources.
Nonetheless, citizens are equally pessimistic about all three forms of accountability. The percent of
respondents that say the departmental government is not fiscally accountable is 67%. Similarly, 66% and
60% of respondents say that departmental government never or almost never consults citizens and
shares information, respectively. Therefore, the difference between fiscal accountability versus
consulting citizens and sharing information has something to do with the nature of fiscal resources
versus transparency and openness. Examination of both individual respondent characteristics and
departmental context evidences this.

[Table 1 about here]

Who sees departmental government as accountable?: Individual Level Results

The individual level results are reported in Table 1 under the heading “Fixed Effects: Level 1”.
Recall that we hypothesized optimism toward government, political participation, and political
knowledge should all have a positive relationship with the three forms of accountability – fiscal,
consulting citizens, and sharing information. Overall these three are significant and positive predictors of
accountability. Political knowledge, however, is significantly correlated only with fiscal accountability.

10
The correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.65, while the correlation of each with fiscal
accountability is less than 0.40.

12
 General optimism toward government is positive and significant in each model. For fiscal
accountability, optimistic individuals have a 32% higher likelihood of saying their departmental
government is accountable as compared to pessimistic individuals (according to the odds ratios).
Optimism increases consulting citizens evaluations by 0.19 and sharing information evaluations by 0.17
for our average respondent.11 This is illustrated in Figures 1A and 1B. The separate lines on the graphs
indicate the regression lines for each department with varying intercepts.

[Figures 1A and 1B About Here]

Similar to optimism, subnational political participation is positively associated with the three
perceptions of accountability we have modeled. Individuals who are more active in their local
government are more likely to view their departmental government as accountable. Certainly this gets
to the heart of decentralization by capturing the extent to which citizens are involved in government
and policymaking at the subnational level. Decentralization proponents expected devolution to bring
government closer to the people and that in turn this generated positive effects like the spilling-up of
good evaluations of higher levels of government.

The regression coefficients of our models indicate the influence of political participation on
accountability perceptions is large. The odds ratios for the fiscal accountability model indicate that a one
unit increase in participation (that is, activity in one additional local event) increases the odds of saying
the departmental government is fiscally accountable by 37%. A one unit increase in political
participation is also associated with a 0.22 increase in evaluations of consulting citizens and sharing
information for the average respondent.12 This effect is more pronounced for those individuals that are
also optimistic, as shown in Figures 2A and 2B.

[Figures 2A and 2B About Here]

The effect of political knowledge is significant and positive only in the fiscal accountability
model. As mentioned before, decentralization largely bypassed departmental governments in Colombia,
making evaluations of this level of government difficult for citizens. Added to this is the complexity of
fiscal evaluations in general. It is logical, therefore, that individuals with more political knowledge are
able to navigate this complexity and make assessments regarding departmental government fiscal
responsibility. Surprisingly, this increased knowledge positively affects evaluations of departmental
government. An increase of political knowledge by one item (knowing the US president’s name, the
Brazilian president’s name, the term limits of the Colombian president, or the number of departments in
Colombia) increases the likelihood of saying the departmental government is accountable by 10%. This
effect is even more pronounced for optimistic individuals who are politically active on the subnational
level, as shown in Figure 3. This graph also indicates that political participation is a substitute for

11
Our average respondent does not participate politically on the subnational level, medium political knowledge
rd
(knows 2 of 4 items), income in the 3 category (of 10), 37 years of age, and 9 years of education.
12 rd
Recall our average respondent is cynical, medium political knowledge (know 2 of 4 items), income in the 3
category (of 10), 37 years of age, and 9 years of education.

13
cynicism; the odds for an individual who is cynical, but politically active of saying her departmental
government is fiscally accountable are higher than for an optimistic, but non-active individual.

[Figure 3 About Here]

In addition to optimism, political participation, and political knowledge, individual characteristics

of income and age have statistically significant effects on perceptions of departmental accountability.
Individuals with higher monthly income have more positive accountability perceptions overall. In
addition, younger individuals have higher accountability evaluations of consulting citizens and sharing
information. The effects of these variables are shown in Figures 4A, 4B, and 4C. Figure 4A indicates the
varying regression lines for each department across the range of income, and Figures 4B and 4C
illustrate the negative effect of age for the range of income values (minimum, mean, and maximum).

[Figures 4A, 4B, and 4C About Here]

In conclusion, the individual level characteristics related to positive evaluations of departmental

government work largely as expected. Optimism regarding government in general is positively related to
evaluations for all three measures of accountability - fiscal, consulting citizens, and sharing information.
In addition, subnational political participation is positively correlated with accountability perceptions.
Those individuals that are more active on the local level are more likely to say that their departmental
government is fiscally responsible, consults citizens before decisions, and shares information openly.
Political knowledge is significantly related only to fiscal accountability indicating that this evaluation is
distinct from consulting citizens and sharing information. The departmental context further
demonstrates the distinctions between these two sets of accountability evaluations.

Does context matter?: Level 2 Effects

We hypothesized that the departmental context affects accountability perceptions in two ways.
One, decentralization should influence accountability evaluations. Where decentralization has been
implemented more extensively (as measured by our multi-faceted measure of decentralization from the
DANE survey) accountability evaluations should be higher than where policies have been carried out
poorly. Two, electoral competition should increase perceived accountability because it keeps politicians
honest and provides incentives for politicians and parties to appeal to a broad base of voters. Therefore,
we expect higher electoral competition to improve individual accountability evaluations. Recall that we
measure this as margin of victory in the governor’s race, therefore, higher values (less competitive
races) should be negatively related to accountability evaluations. The results of these departmental level
effects are shown in Table 1 under “Fixed Effects: Level 2”. We find that electoral competition is not
significantly related to accountability perceptions, and, once again, there is a difference between fiscal
accountability on one hand, and consulting citizens and sharing information on the other.

The results indicate that departmental context matter in terms of how accountable citizens
perceive government to be when asked if they share information and consult citizens, but not when

14
asked if government is accountable in terms of fiscal management. Neither of the Level 2 variables
achieve statistical significant at even the more permissive 0.10 level in the fiscal accountability model.
When examining accountability in terms of consulting citizens and sharing information we find that
decentralization works as expected and is highly statistically significant, but that electoral competition is
not correlated with accountability evaluations. Departments that have experienced more extensive
decentralization have a significant increase in the average level of accountability in terms of sharing
information and consulting with citizens (see Figures 5A and 5B). This provides strong support for our
first hypothesis that whether the context is decentralized or not matters.

[Figures 5A and 5B About Here]

The null effect of electoral competition is surprising given the strong expectation from theory
and past research that the political context, particularly the pressures and incentives politicians face to
be honest and broadly appeal citizens in highly competitive environments, is linked to perceptions of
accountability. In future iterations of this paper, we will further examine possible alternative measures
of electoral competition and explanations into this null finding. Because the political landscape in
Colombia is nuanced with personalistic politics, terrorism and violence, as well as other complexities,
there may be outliers cases or additional departmental level variables we should explore in depth
before definitively concluding that electoral competition has no effect on accountability.

Another troubling finding is that neither the extent of decentralization nor the competitiveness
of the political environment affect perceptions of fiscal accountability. There are two possible
explanations for this phenomenon. The first is that we noticed some difference between perceptions of
fiscal accountability and the other forms of accountability that go beyond differences in the way the
dependent variable was coded. Fiscal decentralization correlates only at 0.39 with accountability in
sharing information and 0.40 with accountability in consulting citizens whereas the two correlate at 0.65
with each other. This suggests that it is quite possible that citizens really do think differently about the
government's management of finances than they do about the other aspects of government which
might seem to blur together explaining why the results across those two models are very consistent.

Secondly, it is worth reiterating that departments are in a difficult fiscal position in Colombia.
The national government kept the right to administer and collect the IVA (Value Added Tax) for itself
(which is a major source of tax revenue) as well as business taxes. It transferred to municipal
governments the right to collect property taxes. With the two most lucrative taxes assigned to other
levels and no effective income tax, the only own-source tax revenue departments got was car licensing
fees, liquor, and cigarette taxes. The result of this is that departments are relatively universally heavily
dependent on transfers from the national government. To the extent that citizens realize this they
either do not get good information about how those monies are transferred or realize states can't
control their own fiscal destiny. Because fiscal decentralization has not varied particularly much across
departments we may not be seeing an effect here. Moreover, given that there are institutional issues
increased competition might not change things because departments have to spend the money in
specific ways regardless of which party wins, so competition doesn't matter and they have little for
discretion.

15
 In an effort to better understand what was happening at the department level with regard to
perceptions of fiscal accountability we estimated some additional models that used some of the
disaggregated components of the decentralization measure. Recall that the decentralization measure is
an average of six different indicators (each of which was a composite of several questions). Thus our
decentralization measure captured decentralization in terms of credibility in applying rules; having
sufficient resources; making credible policy; being credible in terms of responsibilities; credibility in
sources of finance; and administrative accountability. We initially estimated a model that included each
component separately in case there was only one dimension that mattered. Of the original six
dimensions, only credibility in competencies and administrative accountability were significant. We
present the results of this more limited specification in Table 2.13 When the measure is disaggregated
then we find that decentralization does in fact increase evaluations of fiscal accountability as predicted,
but that political competition still does not matter. These results are consistent with the possibility that
competition cannot move departments’ spending because they have very limited flexibility. However, it
also appears that what matters most in presenting at least an image of fiscal accountability for
department is appearing to have policy relevant responsibilities and scoring well on objective measures
of accountability.14 We frankly were surprised that their measures of sufficiency in resources and
sources of financing were consistently insignificant. Perhaps this reflects the fact that there is less
variation in this measure or departments have overall lower levels of fiscal empowerment compared
with other dimensions. Plus they have limited room to maneuver and improve their own capacity.

[Table 2 About Here]

The effect of decentralization, measured as credibility in competencies and administrative

accountability, are shown in Figure 6. The bottom line indicates the minimum value of administrative
accountability, and the top line indicates the maximum value. The middle line is the mean value of
administrative accountability scores. This band represents the range of varying intercepts for the 22
departments in our model.

[Figure 6 About Here]

Conclusion

Decentralization was adopted across much of Latin America amid much fanfare that it would
increase accountability, improve government, and bring representation closer to citizens. Given the
amount of promise the policy held it seems worthwhile to evaluate the effectiveness of these reforms.
While extensive attempts have been made to identify the way in which decentralization improved (or
failed to) the provision of particular services, very few attempts have been made to consider if

13
Note that the same individual level variables are significant and in the same direction.
14
We note that DANE defines Credibility in Competencies as "Relevance of the functions given to the territorial
entity under the framework of the policy of decentralization." They define Administrative Accountability as "The
capacity of the territorial entity to give citizens clear, complete and timely information and to counteract incidents
of irregular practices."

16
decentralization fulfilled its grander promises in terms of accountability and representation. Our
research represents an initial attempt to determine if and how decentralization changed whether
citizens saw their government as accountable.

We examined the case of decentralization to the department level in Colombia which

admittedly should represent a hard test for our theory because of how weakly empowered
departmental governments have been. And yet even in this inauspicious context, we find strong and
compelling evidence that decentralization matters! Overall, more extensive government
decentralization clearly boosted average evaluations of how accountable citizens thought government
was in terms of consulting with them and sharing information. Additionally, even limited
decentralization in terms of administrative accountability and credibility in competencies boosted
evaluations of fiscal accountability. This suggests quite strongly that department governments that
attempted to do the most they possibly could with the resources given them under decentralization and
who worked as best they could to improve their capacity to deliver services and respond to citizens are
being rewarded with higher perceptions of accountability on the part of citizens.

While we find support for our expectation that the decentralization context matters to
individual perceptions of accountability, we do not find that electoral competition affects these
perceptions. Perhaps because decentralization in Colombia largely bypassed departmental governments
or because of the political landscape in this case, electoral competition does not significantly change
evaluations of accountability. However, we do believe that this should matter for individual perceptions
and plan to examine this further in future iterations of this study.

While aruge that the context of decentralization matters for individual evaluations of
accountability, we also find that perceptions result from what an individual has experienced personally.
Across all three specifications of the dependent variable, we find consistent support for our hypothesis
that optimism about the quality of government improved perceptions of accountability. Citizens who
are less cynical about government and who do not see corruption as a significant or widespread
problem saw government as more accountable. This finding corroborates other works that have found
that efforts to decrease corruption in a country have practical pay-offs in terms of improved
accountability.

We also find consistent support for our expectation that those who are more involved in and
participate in government see it as more accountable. Building social capital through political
involvement has positive payoffs for government both in terms of generating participation in
government itself, but also in building citizen confidence in government. In our study, familiarity does
not breed contempt as those who work most closely with government see it as more accountable. We
also find limited evidence that knowing more doesn't breed contempt either, as respondents who
displayed higher levels of political knowledge also saw government as more accountable. Interestingly
there appear to be positive and significant spillover effects in terms of participation. Those who become
involved in local government (the level most proximate to citizens and thus easiest for them to access)
also more favorably evaluate department governments too. This suggests that broad efforts to boost
participation, even if only in the community, can be helpful for all levels of government.

17
 This paper makes two important contributions to the literature. First, we offer an explicit test of
whether decentralization alters how accountable citizens see subnational government as being on a
broad variety of measures. In doing so we provide empirical evidence that one of the most popular, and
yet frequently untested, assumptions about the benefits of decentralization is correct. Second, we
expand tests of accountability beyond electoral outcomes to provide a more nuanced view of the
concept. Elections are certainly a significant and important aspect of calling governments to account for
their actions and remain a critical requirement for accountability. However, government that is
accountable and responsive in the eyes of citizens may require more than simply periodic opportunities
to "toss the bums out". Decentralization provides the context in which subnational governments can
work to engage and involve citizens between elections. It provides them the chance to make extra
information available to citizens, to consult with them through forums such as town hall meetings, and
to seek their input on how to use some discretionary monies through mechanisms such as participatory
budgeting.

While our results suggest that decentralization can have a powerful and significant effect upon
accountability, they also suggest that this might not be automatic. As the Colombian evidence indicates,
even when decentralization offers the same opportunities to all units (or imposes the same restrictions
upon them) they will not respond in the same way. There are ample studies providing rich evidence that
given the chance to be different under decentralization, governments will be different. Some will seek
to extract the maximum amount of autonomy, some ambitious subnational politicians will seek to
reinvent the way their government functions improving capacity and trying to respond to citizen needs,
still others will seek to do as little as possible and may in fact divert the extra resources available to
them into their own pockets. Those interested in better government seem to be rewarded with more
favorable citizen evaluations of their performance. A national policy of decentralization is definitely not
a panacea improving accountability and responsiveness; however in the "right" hands it can certainly be
a useful tool.

18
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 Table 1: Predictors of Departmental Accountability

Fiscal Accountability Consult Citizens Share Information

Fixed Effects: Level 1 n=1548 n=1691 n=1699

Optimistic towards government 0.281 (0.117) ** 0.185 (0.062) *** 0.170 (0.062) ***

Subnational political participation † 0.313 (0.074) *** 0.216 (0.040) *** 0.212 (0.040) ***

Political knowledge ‡ 0.099 (0.058) * -0.045 (0.031) -0.030 (0.031)

Income ‡ 0.091 (0.037) ** 0.042 (0.019) ** 0.068 (0.020) ***

Age ‡ -0.001 (0.004) -0.005 (0.002) ** -0.009 (0.002) ***

Education ‡ 0.006 (0.016) -0.010 (0.009) -0.011 (0.009)

Year 2004 -0.098 (0.112) 0.024 (0.058) 0.074 (0.060)

Intercept -2.554 (2.122) -0.060 (0.806) 0.047 (0.866)

Fixed Effects: Level 2 n=22 n=22 n=22

Decentralization 0.545 (0.659) 0.565 (0.249) ** 0.587 (0.268) **

Margin of victory (governor's race) 0.0002 (0.009) 0.005 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)

Random Effects

Level 1 Variance (standard deviation) 1.363 (1.168) 1.410 (1.187)

Level 2 (Intercept) Variance (standard deviation) 0.187 (0.433) 0.016 (0.128) 0.022 (0.148)

Notes: HLM random intercept model (restricted maximum likelihood) estimated with logit link function for
Fiscal Accountability and with OLS for the other models; Coefficients shown with standard errors in
parentheses;

Statistical significance denoted as: * p> 0.10 **p> 0.05 ***p> 0.01;

Level 1 variables: † uncentered ‡ centered around its grand mean.

23
 Table 2: Alternative Specification of Fiscal Accountability Model

Fixed Effects: Level 1

Optimistic towards government 0.276 (0.117) **
Subnational political participation † 0.311 (0.074) ***
Political knowledge ‡ 0.101 (0.058) *
Income ‡ 0.090 (0.037) **
Age ‡ -0.001 (0.004)
Education ‡ 0.006 (0.016)
Year 2004 -0.099 (0.112)
Intercept -16.541 (6.109)

Fixed Effects: Level 2

Credibility in competencies (decentralization) 2.310 (1.013) **
Administrative accountability (decentralization) 3.094 (1.421) **
Margin of victory (governor's race) -0.001 (0.008)

Random Effects
Level 2 (Intercept) Variance (standard deviation) 0.134 (0.366)

Notes: HLM random intercept model (restricted maximum likelihood) estimated with logit
link function; Coefficients shown with standard errors in parentheses;
Statistical significance denoted as: * p> 0.10 **p> 0.05 ***p> 0.01;
Level 1 variables: † uncentered ‡ centered around its grand mean.

24
Figure 1: The Positive Effect Optimism on Accountability Evaluations

Figure 1A

2.25

Evaluations of Consulting Citizens

2.02

1.78

1.54

1.30
0.00 1.00

Optimism towards Government

Figure 1B

2.49
Evaluations of Sharing Information

2.22

1.95

1.68

1.41
0.00 1.00

Optimism towards Government

25
Figure 2: The Positive Effect of Political Participation on Accountability Evaluations

Figure 2A

2.22
Cynical
NOT_CYN = 0

Evaluations of Consulting Citizens

Optimistic
NOT_CYN = 1

2.12

2.01

1.91

1.81
0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00

Subnational Political Participation

Figure 2B

2.37
Cynical
NOT_CYN = 0
Evaluations of Sharing Information

Optimistic
NOT_CYN = 1

2.28

2.18

2.09

1.99
0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00

Subnational Political Participation

26
 Figure 3: The Positive Effect of Political Knowledge on Fiscal Accountability

1.00
Cynical/ =
NOT_CYN No0,PARTC
participation
= 0

Evaluations of Fiscal Accountability

Cynical/ =
Participation=
0,PARTC = 1.6
* NOT_CYN
Optimistic/
NOT_CYN
1.600
No participation
= 1,PARTC = 0
Optimistic/
NOT_CYN Participation
= 1,PARTC = 1.6
= 1.600
0.75

0.50

0.25

0
-1.93 -0.93 0.07 1.07 2.07

Political Knowledge

Notes: The range of political participation represents averaged upper and lower quartiles of the
centered variable values.

27
 Figure 4: The Effect of Age and Income on Accountability

Figure 4A

0.72

Evaluations of Fiscal Accountability

0.59

0.47

0.34

0.21
-3.53 -1.03 1.47 3.97 6.47

Income

Figure 4B

2.33
INCOME = -3.527
Evaluations of Consulting Citizens

INCOME = 0.053
INCOME = 6.473

2.14

1.94

1.74

1.55
-19.05 -1.55 15.95 33.45 50.95

Age (in years)

Figure 4C

2.73
INCOME = -3.527
Evaluations of Sharing Information

INCOME = 0.052
INCOME = 6.474

2.41

2.09

1.77

1.45
-19.05 -1.55 15.95 33.45 50.95

Age (in years)

Notes: For Figure 4A, the x-axis is the range of centered income values. For Figures 4B and 4C, the
minimum, mean, and maximum centered values of income are shown across the range of centered age
values on the x-axis.

28
 Figure 5: The Positive Effect of Decentralization

Figure 5A

2.17

Evaluations of Consulting Citizens!

2.08

1.98

1.89

1.80
2.88 3.05 3.21 3.38 3.54

Decentralization Average

Figure 5B

2.35
Evaluations of Sharing Information

2.25

2.15

2.06

1.96
2.88 3.05 3.21 3.38 3.54

Decentralization Average

29
 Figure 6: Alternative Measures of Decentralization Influence Fiscal Accountability

1.00
ADMIN = 2.610

Evaluations of Fiscal Accountability

ADMIN = 2.780
ADMIN = 3

0.75

0.50

0.25

0
2.86 2.96 3.06 3.17 3.27

Credibility in Competencies

Notes: Credibility in competencies is one of the two alternative decentralization measures found to be
significantly related to evaluations of fiscal accountability; it is shown on the x-axis. The lines represent
the range of the change in intercepts due to administrative accountability (the second alternative
decentralization measure found to be significant). The thinnest line is the minimum value of this
variable; the medium thick line is the mean value; and the thickest line is the maximum value.

30
 Appendix A: Variable Coding

DEPENDENT VARIABLES (Source: LAPOP, The Political Culture of Democracy: Colombia 2004 and 2006)

Accountability of Fiscal Management

“Do you think that your Department is accountable in its management of fiscal resources?”

Coding: Yes (1), No (0)

Accountability of Consulting Citizens

“In your opinion, your Departmental government consults citizens before making decisions…”

Coding: Always (5) , Almost always (4), Some of the time (3), Almost never(2) , Never (1)

Source: LAPOP, The Political Culture of Democracy: Colombia 2004 and 2006

Accountability of Sharing Information

“In your opinion, your Departmental government shares information openly and in a timely manner…”

Coding: Always (5) , Almost always (4), Some of the time (3), Almost never(2) , Never (1)

Source: LAPOP, The Political Culture of Democracy: Colombia 2004 and 2006

LEVEL 1 VARIABLES (LAPOP, The Political Culture of Democracy: Colombia 2004 and 2006)

Optimism toward Government

Based on responses to the following:

“In your experience, corruption of public officials is…”

“In your experience, corruption of municipal officials is…”

“In your experience, corruption of departmental officials is…”

(Not widespread (1), Little widespread (2), Somewhat widespread (3), or Widesprad (4))

Coding: 0 if responded 3 or 4 to all three corruption questions; 1 otherwise

Subnational Political Participation

Additive index of the following indicators of local government participation:

31
 “Have you attended a meeting called by the mayor in the last 12 months?”

“Have your participated in some meeting to discuss or plan the budget or the annual plan of
your municipality?”

“Have you solicited help or presented a petition to some municipal office, official, or councilman
in the last 12 months?”

Coding: Participated in all 3 (3), Participated in 2 (2), Participated in 1 (1), Did not participate (0)

Political Knowledge
Additive index of the correct answers to the following questions:

“What is the name of the actual president of the United States?”

“How many departments does Colombia have?”

“How much time does the Colombian president’s term last?”

“What is the name of the president of Brazil?”

Coding: All 4 correct (4), 3 of 4 correct (3), 2 of 4 correct (2), 1 of 4 correct (1), no correct answers (0)

Income

Family monthly income range, including external remittances and the income of all adults and children
that work

Coding: None (0)

Less than $90,000 (1)
$91,000 - $180,000 (2)
$181,000 - $360,000 (3)
$361,000 - $720,000 (4)
$721,000 - $1,000,000 (5)
$1,000,000.01 - $1,500,000 (6)
$1,500,000.01 - $2,000,000 (7)
$2,000,000.01 - $3,000,000 (8)
$3,000,000.01 - $4,000,000 (9)
$4,000,000.01 and above (10)

Age

Coding: Respondent age in years

Education

Coding: Respondent years of education

32
LEVEL 2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Margin of Victory

Margin of victory of governor’s election (2004)

Coding: Difference between the winning party’s vote share and second place party’s vote share

Source: The National Electoral Organization of Colombia, voting records by department

Decentralization Average: Credibility in Rules

Average of the following components:

Credibility in Rules - The level of application of legal procedures in the administration of establishment
personnel, and of meritocratic criteria for the contracting of goods and services and in the links of
contract employees in the territorial entity.

Resource Credibility - Sufficiency and ownership of human, physical and budgetary resources in the
territorial entity.

Policy Credibility - Relevance and impartiality in internal directives and policies coming from the national
government.

Credibility in Competencies (Responsibilities) - Relevance of the functions given to the territorial entity
under the framework of the policy of decentralization.

Credibility in Sources of Financing - Sufficiency and relevance of the fiscal resources placed at the
disposition of the territorial entity for its development.

Administrative Accountability - Capacity of the territorial entity to give citizens clear, complete and
timely information and to counteract incidents of irregular practices.

Source: DANE 2007

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 Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics

Fiscal Accountability Consult Citizens Share Information

Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Fiscal Accountability 0 1 1548 0.366 0.482
Consult Citizens 1 5 1691 2.022 1.192
Share Information 1 5 1699 2.174 1.217
Optimistic toward government 0 1 1548 0.359 0.480 1691 0.357 0.479 1699 0.353 0.478
Subnational Political Participation 0 3 1548 0.424 0.740 1691 0.403 0.725 1699 0.403 0.724
Political Knowledge ‡ -1.929 2.071 1548 0.087 1.756 1691 0.044 1.039 1699 0.056 1.045
Income ‡ -3.527 6.474 1548 0.087 1.756 1691 0.052 1.748 1699 0.084 1.744
Age ‡ -19.046 50.954 1548 -0.613 13.915 1691 -0.872 13.812 1699 -0.629 13.927
Education ‡ -8.687 9.313 1548 0.275 4.484 1691 0.285 4.450 1699 0.312 4.464
Decentralization 1 5 1548 3.207 0.158 1691 3.211 0.159 1699 3.209 0.159
Margin of victory (governor's race) 0 99.99 1548 15.552 16.450 1691 15.489 16.260 1699 15.510 16.258

Notes: ‡ Variables centered on their grand means

34

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