SPOUSES DOMINGO v.

ROCES
DOCTRINE
The annotation at the title of a property pursuant to Rule 74, Sec. 4 is not confined to the heirs or original distributes of the
estate properties.

Facts:
1. Cesar and Lilia Roces were owners of two contiguous parcels of land. In 1962, the GSIS caused the annotation of
an adverse claim on their titles, alleging that the spouses had mortgaged the same to it. Later on, when the titles
were to be surrendered to GSIS, the spouses failed to do so, and the GSIS had such title duplicates in their
possession declared null and void.
2. Cesar Roces died intestate. He was survived by his widow and their children.
3. In 1992, a certain Reynaldo Montinola, a nephew of Lilia Roces, executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the
subject properties. A year later, he filed a petition against GSIS for the cancellation of the title which was in the
possession of GSIS. GSIS lost the case, and it’s titles were cancelled, and ownership awarded to Montinola.
4. Later in the same year, Montinola sold the property in favor of the Petitioners, the Domingo Spouses. Such sale
was subject to the provision of Section 4 of Rule 74:

“Subject to the provision of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the RoC with respect to the inheritance left by the deceased Sps.
Cesar Roces and Lilia Montinola”

5. Now came the Defendants Roces siblings. They alleged that the affidavit of selfadjudication Montinola executed
was null and void for Lilia Roces was not even dead. Because of this, the sale of the property was done without
authority, and therefore null and void as well.
6. But the Domingo Spouses, the buyers, contended that despite the annotation of the provision of Rule 74, they
were buyers in good faith, and by that very fact, in addition to the siblings’ being in estoppel and guilty of laches,
the sale was valid.

Issue:
Could the sale have been valid, in light of a fact that the Spouses Domingo were not covered by the Rule 74 annotation?
(AKA: Were the spouses buyers in good faith? )

Were the respondents guilty of laches and estoppel?

Held:
1. Rule 74 clearly covers transfers of real property to any person.
2. Contrary to petitioner's’ contention, the effects of this provision are not confined to the heirs or original distributes
of the estate properties;
3. As the provision provides, such effects affect any transferee of the property. There is no doubt the Spouses
Domingo were covered by ―any transferee
4. Therefore, buyers of real property the title of which contains an annotation pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 cannot
be considered innocent purchasers for value;
5. The presence of an irregularity in the title which excites or arouses suspicion should prompt the buyer to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor;
6. This the spouses did not do, and hence cannot at all be considered buyers in good faith.
7. As to the claim that the respondents were guilty of laches and estoppel, it is untenable.
8. Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
9. In the case at bar, only four months elapsed from the time respondents discovered Montinolas fraudulent acts,
sometime in May 1993, to the time they filed their complaint on September 6, 1993. This relatively short span of
time can hardly be called unreasonable, especially considering that respondents used this period of time to
investigate the transfers of the property
David v Malay

Facts:
- Andres Adona and Leoncia Abad were blessed with five children among them being Carmen Adona.
-Carmen married Filomeno Malay; three children namely: Cristito, Nora and Dionisio
-Following the death of Leoncia, Andres cohabited with Maria Espiritu
- Andres and Maria begot two children, one of them is Esperanza ( represented by her heirs all surnamed
David)
-Maria likewise had a child by her previous marriage- Fulgencio Lemque
-During his lifetime, Andres filed for a homestead patent over a parcel of agricultural landlocated at Dirita, Iba ,
Zambales containing an area of 22.5776 hectares
-When Andres died, Maria was able to obtained an OCT over the land in her name
-After Maria had died in 1945, the children, as well as the descendants of of Andres by his first marriage,
continued to be in peaceful and quiet possession of the subject land
- Sometime in 1989, petitioners executed a deed of "Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale" in favor of Ms.
Venancia Ungson, however, the sale was rescinded for failure on the part of the latter to pay in full the
consideration.
-Private respondents contested the sale claiming that they were the true owners of the land
-Subsequently, petitioners executed another Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale dated December 15,1990.
- Petitioners divided the land among themselves and sold their respective shares to their co petitioners,
Antonio de Ubago Jr, Milagros de Ubago-Umali, Felisa Guballo De Ubago, Vanessa De Ubago-Umali, and
Marietta De Ubago-Tan ang Joseph Guballa De Ubago.
-TCT was issued in favor the De Ubagos
-On December 7,1192, private respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale with Restraining Order,
Injunction and Damages against petitioners. They averred that the disputed land sold by the heirs of Maria was
the subject of a homestead patent and the OCT was fraudulently issued to Maria upon her false representation
that she was the widow of Andres
- In 25 July 1995, the TC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and on ground of prescription
-On appeal, the CA directed the cancellation of TCT No. T-42320 in the name of de Ubagos and the
reconveyance of the property to the estate of Andres Adona
-hence, the petitioners appeal to the SC.

Issue:Whether or not the complaint for reconveyance was timely filed in accordance with Section 4, Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court?

Held: YES. Section 4, Rule 74 states that: "Liability of distributees and estate. If it shall appear at any time
within (2) years after settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the
first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in
the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate i the courts in the manner
hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation."
- The record shows that the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale was executed on December 15,1990
and plaintiff's complaint was filed on December 7,1990. Hence, the two year period has not yet elapsed.
Tayag v Benguet

SUCCESSION: Ancillary Administration: The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a
country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for
his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.
SUCCESSION: Probate: Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the
stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

FACTS:

Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left among others, two stock certificates issued by
Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins’ estate in the
Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the
domiciliary administrator, refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced to issue an order
declaring the stock certificates as lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new stock certificates representing
Perkins’ shares. Benguet Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as they are in
existence and currently in the possession of County Trust Company of New York.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

HELD:

The appeal lacks merit.

Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the
jurisdiction of the Philippines

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier case, set forth by Justice
Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate
owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That
which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other
administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does
not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator
appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person
dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the
deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs."

Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the
actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock
certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...."
be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the
unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from
lawful court orders.

Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue finds application. "In the instant case, the
actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above
undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it
were so minded.