G.R. No.
L-409 January 30, 1947 sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the
petition for habeas corpusfiled by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during
the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the
Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an
absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and
obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent
allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which
a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides,
so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which
consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign.
(Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the
President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a
territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we
have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113)
and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to
the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the
sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which
governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished
from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and
transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of
possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the
occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a
territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the
former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the
"rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944,
p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague
Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not
suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the
inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there
is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric
of the petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was
suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4
Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co
Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons,
supra, in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a
government de factotherein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the
occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently
in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an enemy territory
does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word
"sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not
transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence
or divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said
conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has
become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore
it can not be applied to the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by
Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the
inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government
established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the
territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above
described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which
the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign;
that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for
and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an
inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit
treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the
enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a
citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to
its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a
citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso
factoacquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the
social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the
other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey
most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while
in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy
military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed
into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws
which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and
citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim
cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they
exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or
not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against
national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence
with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order,
such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are
of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our
Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended
or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed
against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses
against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable
as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him,
were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was not
responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet
article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed
against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of
the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the
enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in
force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce
public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has,
nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either
change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military
service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for
the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or
limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized
nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience
(Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76,
77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to
obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted,
as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws
and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and
binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity
and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not
demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from
adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no
power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the
operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed
by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give
aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the
exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants
and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically
transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or
sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were
compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to
give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a
hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would
lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be
repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it
would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the
occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring
the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them
in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely
subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own
independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action of invaders in
forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task
of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the
exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political
suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines
defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to
be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign
people of the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the
Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment
of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the
Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the
sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which
provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as
applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government,
though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence
Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not
only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the
Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which
contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive
Department of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of his
messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the
United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a
government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete and
respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it
is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases,
among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691,
696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the
determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any
government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and
subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which
provides that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the
United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United
States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people
retained by the United States, but these limitations do not away or are not
inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of
the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States
conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be committed
against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason
may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of
the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine
Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from
Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the
crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense
against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of
our Constitution provides that "The government established by this constitution shall
be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of
Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be
known as the Republic of the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to
deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth
and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring
opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate
opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace
time. While there is peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when
peace reigns. Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there
are no traitors until war has started.
As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-
defense and self-preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It
remains dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is
relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its enforcement will only be
consistent with national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they should
be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold their
country out to the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be
the case if he law cannot be enforced under the theory of suspension.
Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy
occupation is advanced in support of the proposition that, since allegiance is identical
with obedience to law, during the enemy occupation, the laws of the Commonwealth
were suspended. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, the law punishing treason,
under the theory, was one of the laws obedience to which was also suspended.
Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the
individual owes to his government or his sovereign in return for the protection which
he receives.
"Allegiance", as the return is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the
government of which the person is either a citizen or subject. Murray vs. The
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed., 208.
"Allegiance" was said by Mr. Justice Story to be "nothing more than the tie or duty
of obedience of a subject to the sovereign, under whose protection he is." United
States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 461; 169 U.S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890.
Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political duty
binding on him who enjoys the protection of the Commonwealth, to render service
and fealty to the federal government. It is that duty which is reciprocal to the right of
protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the
citizen. Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright), 492, 501.
By "allegiance" is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the
individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign, in
return for the protection which he receives. It may be an absolute and permanent
obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one. A citizen or subject owes an
absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign, or at least until,
by some open and distinct act, he renounces it and becomes a citizen or subject of
another government or sovereign, and an alien while domiciled in a country owes it a
temporary allegiance, which is continuous during his residence. Carlisle vs.United
States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426.
"Allegiance," as defined by Blackstone, "is the tie or ligament which binds the
subject to the King, in return for that protection which the King affords the subject.
Allegiance, both expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the one natural, the other
local, the former being perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as
is due from all men born within the King's dominions immediately upon their birth,
for immediately upon their birth they are under the King's protection. Natural
allegiance is perpetual, and for this reason, evidently founded on the nature of
government. Allegiance is a debt due from the subject upon an implied contract with
the prince that so long as the one affords protection the other will demean himself
faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of rights which they acquire by
being born within the King's liegance, which can never be forfeited but by their own
misbehaviour; but the rights of aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired
only by residence, and lost whenever they remove. If an alien could acquire a
permanent property in lands, he must owe an allegiance equally permanent to the
King, which would probably be inconsistent with that which he owes his natural
liege lord; besides, that thereby the nation might, in time, be subject to foreign
influence and feel many other inconveniences." Indians within the state are not
aliens, but citizens owing allegiance to the government of a state, for they receive
protection from the government and are subject to its laws. They are born in
allegiance to the government of the state. Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911.
(3 Words and Phrases, Permanent ed., 226-227.)
Allegiance. — Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a
citizen or subject; the duty which is due from every citizen to the state; a political
duty, binding on him who enjoys the protection of the commonwealth, to render
service and fealty to the federal government; the obligation of fidelity and obedience
which the individual owes to the government or to the sovereign under which he
lives in return for the protection he receives; that duty is reciprocal to the right of
protection he receives; that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising
from the political relations between the government and the citizen.
Classification. — Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance — that
which arises by nature and birth; (2) acquired allegiance — that arising through some
circumstance or act other than birth, namely, by denization or naturalization; (3)
local allegiance-- that arising from residence simply within the country, for however
short a time; and (4) legal allegiance — that arising from oath, taken usually at the
town or leet, for, by the common law, the oath of allegiance might be tendered to
every one upon attaining the age of twelve years. (3 C.J.S., p.885.)
Allegiance. — the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to
the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection
he receives. 15 R.C.L., 140. (Ballentine Law Dictionary, p. 68.).
"Allegiance," as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the
citizen to his state — the obligation of obedience and support which he owes to it.
The state is the political person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its substance is the
aggregate of persons owing this allegiance. The machinery through which it operates
is its government. The persons who operate this machinery constitute its magistracy.
The rules of conduct which the state utters or enforces are its law, and manifest its
will. This will, viewed as legally supreme, is its sovereignty. (W.W. Willoughby,
Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and International Law, 1 American
Journal of International Law, p. 915.).
The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are reciprocal in
character. This principle had been aptly stated by the Supreme Court of the United
States in its opinion in the case of Luria vs. United States:
Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on
the part of the member and a duty protection on the part of the society. These are
reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other. (3 Hackworth, Digest
of International Law, 1942 ed., p.6.)
Allegiance. — The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the
protection which the government affords him. The duty which the subject owes to
the sovereign, correlative with the protection received.
It is a comparatively modern corruption of ligeance (ligeantia), which is derived
from liege (ligius), meaning absolute or unqualified. It signified originally liege
fealty, i. e., absolute and qualified fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47.
xxx xxx xxx
Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified
and temporary one; the citizen or subject owes the former to his government or
sovereign, until by some act he distinctly renounces it, whilst the alien domiciled in
the country owes a temporary and local allegiance continuing during such residence.
(Carlisle vs. United States, 16 Wall. [U.S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 426. (1 Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, p. 179.).
The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine pattern
in view of the revolutionary insertion in our Constitution of the fundamental
principle that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them." (Section 1, Article II.) The authorities above quoted, judges
and juridical publicists define allegiance with the idea that sovereignty resides
somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than the people themselves. Although
it is possible that they had already discovered that the people and only the people are
the true sovereign, their minds were not yet free from the shackles of the tradition
that the powers of sovereignty have been exercised by princes and monarchs, by
sultans and emperors, by absolute and tyrannical rules whose ideology was best
expressed in the famous words of one of the kings of France: "L'etat c'est moi," or
such other persons or group of persons posing as the government, as an entity
different and in opposition to the people themselves. Although democracy has been
known ever since old Greece, and modern democracies in the people, nowhere is
such principle more imperative than in the pronouncement embodied in the
fundamental law of our people.
To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the
people, there may be some plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was
suspended during the enemy occupation, with the consequence that allegiance must
also have been suspended, because our government stopped to function in the
country. But the idea cannot have any place under our Constitution. If sovereignty is
an essential attribute of our people, according to the basic philosophy of Philippine
democracy, it could not have been suspended during the enemy occupation.
Sovereignty is the very life of our people, and there is no such thing as "suspended
life." There is no possible middle situation between life and death. Sovereignty is the
very essence of the personality and existence of our people. Can anyone imagine the
possibility of "suspended personality" or "suspended existence" of a people? In no
time during enemy occupation have the Filipino people ceased to be what they are.
The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our
Constitution.
There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's
loyalty to her husband. Because some external and insurmountable force precludes
the husband from exercising his marital powers, functions, and duties and the wife is
thereby deprived of the benefits of his protection, may the wife invoke the theory of
suspended loyalty and may she freely share her bed with the assailant of their home?
After giving aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing him to enjoy her charms
during the former's stay in the invaded home, may the wife allege as defense for her
adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity?
Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July 4,
1946, is unacceptable. We have already decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda.
de Escaler (p. 752, ante) that the Constitution of the Republic is the same as that of
the Commonwealth. The advent of independence had the effect of changing the
name of our Government and the withdrawal by the United States of her power to
exercise functions of sovereignty in the Philippines. Such facts did not change the
sovereignty of the Filipino people. That sovereignty, following our constitutional
philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to exist. It has been recognized
by the United States of America, at least since 1935, when President Roosevelt
approved our Constitution. By such act, President Roosevelt, as spokesman of the
American people, accepted and recognized the principle that sovereignty resides in
the people that is, that Philippine sovereignty resides in the Filipino people.
The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the
proclamation of independence on July 4, 1946. Since the early part of the Pacific
war, President Quezon had been sitting as representative of a sovereign people in the
Allied War Council, and in June, 1945, the same Filipino people took part —
outstanding and brilliant, it may be added — in the drafting and adoption of the
charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forerunner of the future democratic
federal constitution of the world government envisioned by all those who adhere to
the principle of unity of all mankind, the early realization of which is anxiously
desired by all who want to be spared the sufferings, misery and disaster of another
war.
Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is
lodged in Congress. Sometimes it is delegated to the Chief Executive, such as the
power granted by the Election Code to the President to suspend the election in
certain districts and areas for strong reasons, such as when there is rebellion, or a
public calamity, but it has never been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme Court has
the power to declare null and void all laws violative of the Constitution, but it has no
power, authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended any valid law, such
as the one on treason which petitioner wants to be included among the laws of the
Commonwealth which, by his theory of suspended allegiance and suspended
sovereignty, he claims have been suspended during the Japanese occupation.
Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead of going from Corregidor to
Australia, and later to Washington, had fled to the mountains of Luzon, and a group
of Filipino renegades should have killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese
imperial forces. By petitioner's theory, those renegades cannot be prosecuted for
treason or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws punishing them were suspended. Such
absurd result betrays the untenability of the theory.
"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of
that duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil
service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the Constitution provides: That duty of
defense becomes more imperative in time of war and when the country is invaded by
an aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of the citizens to the
sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation? The framers of the
Constitution surely did not entertain even for the moment the absurdity that when the
allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is more needed in the defense of the
survival of the state, the same should be suspended, and that upon such suspension
those who may be required to render personal, military or civil service may claim
exemption from the indispensable duty of serving their country in distress.
Petitioner advances the theory that protection in the consideration of allegiance. He
argues that the Commonwealth Government having been incapacitated during enemy
occupation to protect the citizens, the latter were relieved of their allegiance to said
government. The proposition is untenable. Allegiance to the sovereign is an
indispensable bond for the existence of society. If that bond is dissolved, society has
to disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is the result of the social
compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question that organized society
would be dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power of the citizen's
allegiance. Of course, the citizens are entitled to the protection of their government,
but whether or not that government fulfills that duty, is immaterial to the need of
maintaning the loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in the same way that the physical
forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if the life of an individual should
continue, irrespective of the ability or inability of his mind to choose the most
effective measures of personal protection.
After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes had during and
under the Japanese regime, whether executed by the Japanese themselves or by
Filipino officers of the puppet government they had set up, are null and void, as we
have done in our opinions in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil.,
113), in Peralta vs. Director of Prison (75, Phil., 285), and in several other cases
where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot consistently accept
petitioner's theory.
If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void,
and as we cannot imagine the existence of organized society, such as the one
constituted by the Filipino people, without laws of the Commonwealth were the ones
in effect during the occupation and the only ones that could claim obedience from
our citizens.
Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed
allegiance to the enemy. To give way to that paradoxical and disconcerting
allegiance, it is suggested that we accept that our allegiance to our legitimate
government was suspended. Petitioner's proposition has to fall by its own weight,
because of its glaring absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms, loyalty and fidelity,
is based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration, respect, veneration,
gratitude, amity, understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or some of the
feelings that bind us to our own people, and are the natural roots of the duty of
allegiance we owe them. The enemy only provokes repelling and repulsive feelings
— hate, anger, vexation, chagrin, mortification, resentment, contempt, spitefulness.
The natural incompatibility of political, social and ethical ideologies between our
people and the Japanese, making impossible the existence of any feeling of attraction
between them, aside from the initial fact that the Japanese invaded our country as our
enemy, was aggravated by the morbid complexities of haughtiness, braggadocio and
beastly brutality of the Nippon soldiers and officers in their dealings with even the
most inoffensive of our citizens.
Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the
other to be further slapped, may appear to be divinely charitable, but to make them a
reality, it is necessary to change human nature. Political actions, legal rules and
judicial decisions deal with human relations, taking man as he is, not as he should be.
To love the enemy is not natural. As long as human pyschology remains as it is, the
enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible to conceive an allegiance based on
hatred?
The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing
principles of international law, could not have established in our country any
government that can be legally recognized as de facto. They came as bandits and
ruffians, and it is inconceivable that banditry and ruffianism can claim any duty of
allegiance — even a temporary one — from a decent people.
One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the
citizens, in case of invasion, are free to do anything not forbidden by the Hague
Conventions. Anybody will notice immediately that the result will be the doom of
small nations and peoples, by whetting the covetousness of strong powers prone on
imperialistic practices. In the imminence of invasion, weak-hearted soldiers of the
smaller nations will readily throw away their arms to rally behind the paladium of
the invaders.
Two of the three great departments of our Government have already rejected
petitioner's theory since September 25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act No.
682 took effect. By said act, creating the People's Court to try and decide all cases of
crime against national security "committed between December 8, 1941 and
September 2, 1945," (section 2), the legislative and executive departments have
jointly declared that during the period above mentioned, including the time of
Japanese occupation, all laws punishing crimes against national security, including
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, punishing treason, had remained in full effect
and should be enforced.
That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said act and that no
one, at the time the act was being considered by the Senate and the House of
Representatives, ever dared to expose the uselessness of creating a People's Court to
try crime which, as claimed by petitioner, could not have been committed as the laws
punishing them have been suspended, is a historical fact of which the Supreme Court
may take judicial notice. This fact shows universal and unanimous agreement of our
people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not suspended and that the theory of
suspended allegiance is just an afterthought provoked by a desperate effort to help
quash the pending treason cases at any cost.
Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based on
generally accepted principles of international law, although this argument becomes
futile by petitioner's admission that the theory is advantageous to strong powers but
harmful to small and weak nations, thus hinting that the latter cannot accept it by
heart. Suppose we accept at face value the premise that the theories, urged by
petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty are based on generally
accepted principles of international law. As the latter forms part of our laws by virtue
of the provisions of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it seems that there is
no alternative but to accept the theory. But the theory has the effect of suspending
the laws, especially those political in nature. There is no law more political in nature
than the Constitution of the Philippines. The result is an inverted reproduction of the
Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own children. Here, under petitioner's theory,
the offspring devours its parent.
Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a
moment?
There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of
government, even since the Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated that
it would not accept the idea that our laws should be suspended during enemy
occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle of December, 1941, when
Manila and other parts of the archipelago were under constant bombing by Japanese
aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the
Second National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, which came into
effect on December 16, 1941. When we approved said act, we started from the
premise that all our laws shall continue in effect during the emergency, and in said
act we even went to the extent of authorizing the President "to continue in force laws
and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative," (section 2,
[d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to
carry out the national policy," (section 2), that "the existence of war between the
United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in
order to meet the resulting emergency." (Section 1.) To give emphasis to the
intimation, we provided that the rules and regulations provided "shall be in force and
effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide," foreseeing the
possibility that Congress may not meet as scheduled as a result of the emergency,
including invasion and occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then convinced that
we did not have available the necessary means of repelling effectivity the enemy
invasion.
Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of
suspended allegiance will cause a great injustice to those who, although innocent, are
now under indictment for treason and other crimes involving disloyalty to their
country, because their cases will be dismissed without the opportunity for them to
revindicate themselves. Having been acquitted upon a mere legal technicality which
appears to us to be wrong, history will indiscriminality classify them with the other
accused who were really traitors to their country. Our conscience revolts against the
idea of allowing the innocent ones to go down in the memory of future generations
with the infamous stigma of having betrayed their own people. They should not be
deprived of the opportunity to show through the due process of law that they are free
from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they acted as such during the
critical period of test.
HILADO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the so-
called Japanese occupation of the Philippines (which was nothing more than the
occupation of Manila and certain other specific regions of the Islands which
constituted the minor area of the Archipelago) the allegiance of the citizens of this
country to their legitimate government and to the United States was not suspended,
as well as the ruling that during the same period there was no change of sovereignty
here; but my reasons are different and I proceed to set them forth:
I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE.
(a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more than
a hundred-fold in World War II, the nations had evolved certain rules and principles
which came to be known as International Law, governing their conduct with each
other and toward their respective citizens and inhabitants, in the armed forces or
civilian life, in time of peace or in time of war. During the ages which preceded that
first world conflict the civilized governments had no realization of the potential
excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man" could be capable. Up to that time war
was, at least under certain conditions, considered as sufficiently justified, and the
nations had not on that account, proscribed nor renounced it as an instrument of
national policy, or as a means of settling international disputes. It is not for us now to
dwell upon the reasons accounting for this historical fact. Suffice it to recognize its
existence in history.
But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually
was, employed for entirely different reasons and from entirely different motives,
compared to previous wars, and the instruments and methods of warfare had been so
materially changed as not only to involve the contending armed forces on well
defined battlefields or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the air, but to spread death
and destruction to the innocent civilian populations and to their properties, not only
in the countries engaged in the conflict but also in neutral ones, no less than 61
civilized nations and governments, among them Japan, had to formulate and
solemnly subscribe to the now famous Briand-Kellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said
by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court, as chief counsel for the
United States in the prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in his report to President
Truman of June 7, 1945:
International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no
continuously sitting international legislature. Innovations and revisions in
international law are brought about by the action of governments designed to meet a
change circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, through decisions reached
from time to time in adopting settled principles to new situations.
xxx xxx xxx
After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked reversion
to the earlier and sounder doctrines of international law took place. By the time the
Nazis came to power it was thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war
or the institution of war by treachery was illegal and that the defense of legitimate
warfare was no longer available to those who engaged in such an enterprise. It is
high time that we act on the juridical principle that aggressive war-making is illegal
and criminal.
The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many steps.
One of the most significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 by which Germany,
Italy, and Japan, in common with the United States and practically all the nations of
the world, renounced war as an instrument of national policy, bound themselves to
seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific means, and condemned recourse to
war for the solution of international controversies.
Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at
all and comes close to being an act of deception. In 1932 Mr. Henry L. Stimson, as
United States Secretary of State, gave voice to the American concept of its effect. He
said, "war between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg
Treaty. This means that it has become illegal throughout practically the entire
world. It is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the
principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is
an illegal thing. . . . By that very act we have made obsolete many legal precedents
and have given the legal profession the task of re-examining many of its Codes and
treaties.
This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has
brought international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind —
that unjustifiable war is a crime.
Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva Protocol
of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed by the
representatives of forty-eight governments, which declared that "a war of aggression
constitutes .. an International crime. . . .
The Eight Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on unanimous resolution of
the representatives of forty-eight member-nations, including Germany, declared that
a war of aggression constitutes an international crime. At the Sixth Pan-American
Conference of 1928, the twenty-one American Republics unanimously adopted a
resolution stating that "war of aggression constitutes an international crime against
the human species."
xxx xxx xxx
We therefore propose to change that a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern
international law has abolished the defense that those who incite or wage it are
engaged in legitimate business. Thus may the forces of the law be mobilized on the
side of peace. ("U.S.A. — An American Review," published by the United States
Office of War Information, Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis supplied.).
When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder
doctrines of international law" and "the re-establishment of the principle of
justifiable war," he has in mind no other than "the doctrine taught by Grotius, the
father of international law, that there is a distinction between the just and the unjust
war — the war of defense and the war of aggression" to which he alludes in an
earlier paragraph of the same report.
In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above mentioned
Justice Jackson says that "international law as taught in the 19th and the early part of
the 20th century generally declared that war-making was not illegal and no crime at
law." But, as he says in one of the paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that report,
the Briand-Kellogg Pact constitutes a reversal of the view-point that all war is legal
and has brought international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind
— that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he mentions as other reversals of the same
viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; the
8th assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, declaring that a war of aggression
constitutes an international crime; and the 6th Pan-American conference of 1928,
which unanimously adopted a resolution stating that war of aggression constitutes an
international crime against the human species: which enumeration, he says, is not an
attempt at an exhaustive catalogue.
It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the United
States, and later, in rapid succession, against other allied nations, was a war of
aggression and utterly unjustifiable. More aggressive still, and more unjustifiable, as
admitted on all sides, was its attack against the Philippines and its consequent
invasion and occupation of certain areas thereof.
Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for
petitioner herein in support of his theory of suspended allegiance, have been evolved
and accepted during those periods of the history of nations when all war was
considered legal, as stated by Justice Jackson, and the others have reference to
military occupation in the course of really justifiable war.
Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the
aggressive war which threw the entire Pacific area into a seething cauldron from the
last month of 1941 of the first week of September, 1945, expressly agreed to outlaw,
proscribe and renounce war as an instrument of national policy, and bound herself to
seek the settlement of her disputes with other nations only by pacific means. Thus
she expressly gave her consent to that modification of the then existing rules and
principles of international law governing the matter. With the modification, all the
signatories to the pact necessarily accepted and bound themselves to abide by all its
implications, among them the outlawing, prescription and renunciation of military
occupation of another nation's territory in the course of a war thus outlawed,
proscribed and renounced. This is only one way of saving that the rules and
principles of international law therefore existing on the subject of military
occupation were automatically abrogated and rendered ineffective in all future cases
of war coming under the ban and condemnation of the pact.
If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international
crime; if such a war is an international crime against the human species: a nation
which occupies a foreign territory in the course of such a war cannot possibly, under
any principle of natural or positive law, acquire or posses any legitimate power or
right growing out or incident to such occupation. Concretely, Japan in criminally
invading the Philippines and occupying certain portions of its territory during the
Pacific war, could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense — and only this sense
should we speak here — with respect to this country and its citizens, any more than
could a burglar breaking through a man's house pretends to have or to exercise any
legal power or right within that house with respect either to the person of the owner
or to his property. To recognize in the first instance any legal power or right on the
part of the invader, and in the second any legal power or right on the part of the
burglar, the same as in case of a military occupant in the course of a justifiable war,
would be nothing short of legalizing the crime itself. It would be the most monstrous
and unpardonable contradiction to prosecute, condemn and hang the appropriately
called war criminals of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and at the same time recognize
any lawfulness in their occupation invaded. And let it not be forgotten that the
Philippines is a member of the United Nations who have instituted and conducted the
so-called war crimes trials. Neither should we lose sight of the further fact that this
government has a representative in the international commission currently trying the
Japanese war criminals in Tokyo. These facts leave no room for doubt that this
government is in entire accord with the other United Nations in considering the
Pacific war started by Japan as a crime. Not only this, but this country had six years
before the outbreak of the Pacific war already renounced war as an instrument of
national policy (Constitution, Article II, section 2), thus in consequence adopting the
doctrine of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.
Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for this
Court to apply to the occupation by Japan of certain areas of the Philippines during
that war the rules and principles of international law which might be applicable to a
military occupation occurring in the course of a justifiable war. How can this Court
recognize any lawfulness or validity in that occupation when our own government
has sent a representative to said international commission in Tokyo trying the
Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes against humanity and peace"
committed by them during World War II of which said occupation was but part and
parcel? In such circumstances how could such occupation produce no less an effect
than the suspension of the allegiance of our people to their country and government?
(b) But even in the hypothesis — and not more than a mere hypothesis — that when
Japan occupied the City of Manila and certain other areas of the Philippines she was
engaged in a justifiable war, still the theory of suspended allegiance would not hold
good. The continuance of the allegiance owed to a notion by its citizens is one of
those high privileges of citizenship which the law of nations denies to the occupant
the power to interfere with.
. . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. He is
thus forbidden to take certain measures which he may be able to apply, and that
irrespective of their efficacy. The restrictions imposed upon him are in theory
designed to protect the individual in the enjoyment of some highly important
privileges. These concern his allegiance to the de jure sovereign, his family honor
and domestic relations, religious convictions, personal service, and connection with
or residence in the occupied territory.
The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel the
inhabitants to swear allegiance to the hostile power. . . . (III Hyde, International Law,
2d revised ed., pp. 1898-1899.)
. . . Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of allegiance.
Since the authority of the occupant is not sovereignty, the inhabitants owe no
temporary allegiance to him. . . . (II Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 341-344.)
The occupant's lack of the authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the
inhabitants of the occupied territory is but a corollary of the continuance of their
allegiance to their own lawful sovereign. This allegiance does not consist merely in
obedience to the laws of the lawful sovereign, but more essentially consists in loyalty
or fealty to him. In the same volume and pages of Oppenheim's work above cited,
after the passage to the effect that the inhabitants of the occupied territory owe no
temporary allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the other hand, he may
compel them to take an oath — sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality' — . . .
willingly to submit to his 'legitimate commands.' Since, naturally, such "legitimate
commands" include the occupant's laws, it follows that said occupant, where the rule
is applicable, has the right to compel the inhabitants to take an oath of obedience to
his laws; and since according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants
an oath of obedience to his laws; and since, according to the same rule, he cannot
exact from the inhabitants an oath of allegiance, it follows that obedience to his laws,
which he can exact from them, does not constitute allegiance.
(c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that
when the one's country is unable to afford him in its protection, he ceases to be
bound to it by the sacred ties of allegiance, is to advocate the doctrine that precisely
when his country is in such distress, and therefore most needs his loyalty, he is
absolved from the loyalty. Love of country should be something permanent and
lasting, ending only in death; loyalty should be its worth offspring. The outward
manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented or thwarted by the
irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish nor
obliterate the invisible feelings, and promptings of the spirit. And beyond the
unavoidable consequences of the enemy's irresistible pressure, those invisible
feelings and promptings of the spirit of the people should never allow them to act, to
speak, nor even to think a whit contrary to their love and loyalty to the Fatherland.
For them, indicted, to face their country and say to it that, because when it was
overrun and vanquished by the barbarous invader and, in consequence was disabled
from affording them protection, they were released from their sacred obligation of
allegiance and loyalty, and could therefore freely adhere to its enemy, giving him aid
and comfort, incurring no criminal responsibility therefor, would only tend to
aggravate their crime.
II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY
Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them." The Filipino people are
the self-same people before and after Philippine Independence, proclaimed on July 4,
1946. During the life of the Commonwealth sovereignty resided in them under the
Constitution; after the proclamation of independence that sovereignty remained with
them under the very same fundamental law. Article XVIII of the said Constitution
stipulates that the government established thereby shall be known as the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final and complete withdrawal
of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine
independence, "The Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as
the Republic of the Philippines." Under this provision the Government of the
Philippines immediately prior to independence was essentially to be the identical
government thereafter — only the name of that government was to be changed.
Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the
Philippines were and are always the plaintiff in all criminal prosecutions, the case
being entitled: "The People of the Philippines vs. (the defendant or defendants)."
This was already true in prosecutions under the Revised Penal Code containing the
law of treason. "The Government of the Philippines" spoken of in article 114 of said
Code merely represents the people of the Philippines. Said code was continued,
along with the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the Constitution which
constitutional provision further directs that "all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as
applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
Constitution" — of course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before,
and the Republic of the Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII). Under both
governments sovereignty resided and resides in the people (Article II, section 1).
Said sovereignty was never transferred from that people — they are the same people
who preserve it to this day. There has never been any change in its respect.
If one committed treason againsts the People of the Philippines before July 4, 1946,
he continues to be criminally liable for the crime to the same people now. And if,
following the literal wording of the Revised Penal Code, as continued by the
Constitution, that accused owed allegiance upon the commission of the crime to the
"Government of the Philippines," in the textual words of the Constitution (Article
XVI, section 2, and XVIII) that was the same government which after independence
became known as the "Republic of the Philippines." The most that can be said is that
the sovereignty of the people became complete and absolute after independence —
that they became, politically, fully of age, to use a metaphor. But if the responsibility
for a crime against a minor is not extinguished by the mere fact of his becoming of
age, why should the responsibility for the crime of treason committed against the
Filipino people when they were not fully politically independent be extinguished
after they acquire this status? The offended party continues to be the same — only
his status has changed.
PARAS, J., dissenting:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the
Philippines were suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted
principles of the international law adopted by our Constitution(Article II, section 3)
as a part of the law of the Nation. Accordingly, we have on more than one occasion
already stated that "laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, . . . are
considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation" (Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and that the rule "that laws
of political nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in
abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil
inhabitants of the occupied territory." (Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, 75,
Phil., 875, 881.)
The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the
occupant will naturally suspends all laws of a political nature and all laws which
affect the welfare and safety of his command, such action to be made known to the
inhabitants.(United States Rules of Land Welfare, 1940, Article 287.) As allegiance
to the United States is an essential element in the crime of treason under article 114
of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its position in our political structure prior
to the independence of the Philippines, the rule as interpreted and practiced in the
United States necessarily has a binding force and effect in the Philippines, to the
exclusion of any other construction followed elsewhere, such as may be inferred,
rightly or wrongly, from the isolated cases 1 brought to our attention, which,
moreover, have entirely different factual bases.
Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the
proclamation of its Commander in chief of January 2, 1942, to the effect that as a
"result of the Japanese Military operations, the sovereignty of the United States of
America over the Philippines has completely disappeared and the Army hereby
proclaims the Military Administration under martial law over the district occupied by
the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said Commander in Chief of February 20,
1942, providing that "activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts in the
Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs
until further orders provided that they are not inconsistent with the present
circumstances under the Japanese Military Administration;" and, thirdly, in the
explanation to Order No. 3 reminding that "all laws and regulations of the
Philippines has been suspended since Japanese occupation," and excepting the
application of "laws and regulations which are not proper act under the present
situation of the Japanese Military Administration," especially those "provided with
some political purposes."
The suspension of the political law during enemy occupation is logical, wise and
humane. The latter phase outweighs all other aspects of the principle aimed more or
less at promoting the necessarily selfish motives and purposes of a military occupant.
It thus consoling to note that the powers instrumental in the crystallization of the
Hague Conventions of 1907 did not forget to declare that they were "animated by the
desire to serve . . . the interest of the humanity and the over progressive needs of
civilization," and that "in case not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the
inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public
conscience." These saving statements come to the aid of the inhabitants in the
occupied territory in a situation wherein, even before the belligerent occupant "takes
a further step and by appropriate affirmative action undertakes to acquire the right of
sovereignty for himself, . . . the occupant is likely to regard to himself as clothed
with freedom to endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit the area concerned
with his own political ideology, and to make that endeavor successful by various
forms of pressure exerted upon enemy officials who are permitted to retain the
exercise of normal governmental functions." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III,
Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1879.)
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole
authority of the invading power, whose interest and requirements are naturally in
conflict with those of the displaced government, if it is legitimate for the military
occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be
necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and order, and for
the proper administration of the country (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940,
article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such a nature as not to involve
the population in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own
country" (Hague Regulations, article 52);and if, as we have in effect said, by the
surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary allegiance to the government of the
occupant and are bound by such laws, and such only, as it chooses to recognize and
impose, and the belligerent occupant `is totally independent of the constitution and
the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance
and safety of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his
interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions."
(Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 295), citing United States vs. Rice, 4
Wheaton, 246, and quoting Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II. Sixth Edition,
Revised, 1944,p. 432.)
He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the people
in an occupied territory were required to obey two antagonistic and opposite powers.
To emphasize our point, we would adopt the argument, in a reverse order, of Mr.
Justice Hilado in Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in
the following passage:
To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never
submitted to the Japanese oppressors, by the laws, regulations, processes and other
acts of those two puppet governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and
downright illegal, but would have placed them in the absurd and impossible
condition of being simultaneously submitted to two mutually hostile governments,
with their respective constitutional and legislative enactments and institutions — on
the one hand bound to continue owing allegiance to the United States and the
Commonwealth Government, and, on the other, to owe allegiance, if only temporary,
to Japan.
The only sensible purpose of the treason law — which is of political complexion and
taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the
belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the
occupant (Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 494), — must be the
preservation of the nation, certainly not its destruction or extermination. And yet the
latter is unwittingly wished by those who are fond of the theory that what is
suspended is merely the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure government or the
latter's authority to impose penal sanctions or that, otherwise stated, the suspension
refers only to the military occupant. If this were to be the only effect, the rule would
be a meaningless and superfluous optical illusion, since it is obvious that the fleeing
or displaced government cannot, even if it should want, physically assert its authority
in a territory actually beyond its reach, and that the occupant, on the other hand, will
not take the absurd step of prosecuting and punishing the inhabitants for adhering to
and aiding it. If we were to believe the opponents of the rule in question, we have to
accept the absurd proposition that the guerrillas can all be prosecuted with illegal
possession of firearms. It should be borne in the mind that "the possession by the
belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to
obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven
therefrom, can not compete with it on an even plane. Thus, if the latter attempt
interference, its action is a mere manifestation of belligerent effort to weaken the
enemy. It has no bearing upon the legal quality of what the occupant exacts, while it
retains control. Thus, if the absent territorial sovereign, through some quasi-
legislative decree, forbids its nationals to comply with what the occupant has
ordained obedience to such command within the occupied territory would not
safeguard the individual from the prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde, International
Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1886.)
As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to prosecute
and punish the inhabitants for "war treason" or "war crimes," as an incident of the
state of war and necessity for the control of the occupied territory and the protection
of the army of the occupant, against which prosecution and punishment such
inhabitants cannot obviously be protected by their native sovereign, it is hard to
understand how we can justly rule that they may at the same time be prosecuted and
punished for an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code, but already taken out of
the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent
occupant.
In Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 296), we held that "the Constitution
of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the
Philippines by the Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war with the
United States," and the meaning of the term "suspended" is very plainly expressed in
the following passage (page 298):
No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts
of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of the accused under that
Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese
military occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied
upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the Philippines by the virtue of the
priciple of postliminium, because "a constitution should operate prospectively only,
unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective
effect," (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 97, and a case
quoted and cited in the foot-note), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to
cases already terminated completely.
In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed
during the Japanese military occupation against the United States or the
Commonwealth Government, because article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not
then in force. Nor may this penal provision be applied upon its revival at the time of
the reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium,
because of the constitutional inhibition against any ex post facto law and because,
under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall have a retroactive
effect only in so far as they favor the accused. Why did we refuse to enforce the
Constitution, more essential to sovereignty than article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code in the aforesaid of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons if, as alleged by the majority,
the suspension was good only as to the military occupant?
The decision in the United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports
our position. As analyzed and described in United States vs. Reiter (27 Fed. Cas.,
773), that case "was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States — the court
of highest human authority on that subject — and as the decision was against the
United States, and in favor of the authority of Great Britain, its enemy in the war,
and was made shortly after the occurrence of the war out of which it grew; and while
no department of this Government was inclined to magnify the rights of Great
Britain or disparage those of its own government, there can be no suspicion of bias in
the mind of the court in favor of the conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that
the law seemed to the court to warrant and demand such a decision. That case grew
out of the war of 1812, between the United States and Great Britain. It appeared that
in September, 1814, the British forces had taken the port of Castine, in the State of
Maine, and held it in military occupation; and that while it was so held, foreign
goods, by the laws of the United States subject to duty, had been introduced into that
port without paying duties to the United States. At the close of the war the place by
treaty restored to the United States, and after that was done Government of the
United States sought to recover from the persons so introducing the goods there
while in possession of the British, the duties to which by the laws of the United
States, they would have been liable. The claim of the United States was that its laws
were properly in force there, although the place was at the time held by the British
forces in hostility to the United States, and the laws, therefore, could not at the time
be enforced there; and that a court of the United States (the power of that
government there having since been restored) was bound so to decide. But this
illusion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by the court in the most
summary manner. Mr. Justice Story, that great luminary of the American bench,
being the organ of the court in delivering its opinion, said: 'The single question is
whether goods imported into Castine during its occupation by the enemy are liable to
the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon goods imported into the United States..
We are all of opinion that the claim for duties cannot be sustained. . . . The
sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the
laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be
obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By
the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance of the British
Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize
and impose. From the nature of the case no other laws could be obligatory upon
them. . . . Castine was therefore, during this period, as far as respected our revenue
laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were
subjects to such duties only as the British Government chose to require. Such goods
were in no correct sense imported into the Unites States.' The court then proceeded to
say, that the case is the same as if the port of Castine had been foreign territory,
ceded by treaty to the United States, and the goods had been imported there previous
to its cession. In this case they say there would be no pretense to say that American
duties could be demanded; and upon principles of public or municipal law, the cases
are not distinguishable. They add at the conclusion of the opinion: 'The authorities
cited at the bar would, if there were any doubt, be decisive of the question. But we
think it too clear to require any aid from authority.' Does this case leave room for a
doubt whether a country held as this was in armed belligerents occupation, is to be
governed by him who holds it, and by him alone? Does it not so decide in terms as
plain as can be stated? It is asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States with
entire unanimity, the great and venerated Marshall presiding, and the erudite and
accomplished Story delivering the opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is
so adjudged in this case. Nay, more: it is even adjudged that no other laws could be
obligatory; that such country, so held, is for the purpose of the application of the law
off its former government to be deemed foreign territory, and that goods imported
there (and by parity of reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct sense done
within the territory of its former sovereign, the United States."
But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the
United States vs. Rice should be construed to refer to the exercise of sovereignty, and
that, if sovereignty itself was meant, the doctrine has become obsolete after the
adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty
can have any important significance only when it may be exercised; and, to our way
of thinking, it is immaterial whether the thing held in abeyance is the sovereignty
itself or its exercise, because the point cannot nullify, vary, or otherwise vitiate the
plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of the United States could no longer
be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and
submitted to the conquerors." We cannot accept the theory of the majority, without
in effect violating the rule of international law, hereinabove adverted to, that the
possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the
laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one, and that the
territorial sovereign driven therefrom cannot compete with it on an even plane.
Neither may the doctrine in the United States vs. Rice be said to have become
obsolete, without repudiating the actual rule prescribed and followed by the United
States, allowing the military occupant to suspend all laws of a political nature and
even require public officials and inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States
Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309). In fact, it is a recognized doctrine of
American Constitutional Law that mere conquest or military occupation of a territory
of another State does not operate to annex such territory to occupying State, but that
the inhabitants of the occupied district, no longer receiving the protection of their
native State, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control
and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience.
(Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.364.)
The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not immaterial,
in trying to argue that the law of treason was obligatory on the Filipinos during the
Japanese occupation. Thus it is insisted that a citizen or subject owes not a qualified
and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, and that "temporary
allegiance" to the military occupant may be likened to the temporary allegiance
which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign to the territory wherein he
resides in return for the protection he receives therefrom. The comparison is most
unfortunate. Said foreigner is in the territory of a power not hostile to or in actual
war with his own government; he is in the territory of a power which has not
suspended, under the rules of international law, the laws of political nature of his
own government; and the protections received by him from that friendly or neutral
power is real, not the kind of protection which the inhabitants of an occupied
territory can expect from a belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that States, when
they concede to other States the right to exercise jurisdiction over such of their own
nationals as are within the territorial limits of such other States, should insist that
States should provide system of law and of courts, and in actual practice, so
administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice to alien residents. This does
not mean that a State must or should extend to aliens within its borders all the civil,
or much less, all the political rights or privileges which it grants to its own citizens;
but it does mean that aliens must or should be given adequate opportunity to have
such legal rights as are granted to them by the local law impartially and judicially
determined, and, when thus determined, protected." (Willoughby, The Fundamental
Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.)
When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and
convicted of treason committed in a foreign country or, in the language of article 114
of the Revised Penal Code, "elsewhere," a territory other than one under belligerent
occupation must have been contemplated. This would make sense, because treason is
a crime "the direct or indirect purpose of which is the delivery, in whole or in part, of
the country to a foreign power, or to pave the way for the enemy to obtain dominion
over the national territory" (Albert, The Revised Penal Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14);
and, very evidently, a territory already under occupation can no longer be
"delivered."
The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance
will enable the military occupant to legally recruit the inhabitants to fight against
their own government, without said inhabitants being liable for treason. This
argument is not correct, because the suspension does not exempt the occupant from
complying with the Hague Regulations (article 52) that allows it to demand all kinds
of services provided that they do not involve the population "in the obligation of
taking part military operations against their own country." Neither does the
suspension prevent the inhabitants from assuming a passive attitude, much less from
dying and becoming heroes if compelled by the occupant to fight against their own
country. Any imperfection in the present state of international law should be
corrected by such world agency as the United Nations organizations.
It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the
collaborators, an alarming number of Filipinos were killed or otherwise tortured by
the ruthless, or we may say savage, Japanese Army. Which leads to the conclusion
that if the Filipinos did not obey the Japanese commands and feign cooperation,
there would not be any Filipino nation that could have been liberated. Assuming that
the entire population could go to and live in the mountains, or otherwise fight as
guerrillas — after the formal surrender of our and the American regular fighting
forces, — they would have faced certain annihilation by the Japanese, considering
that the latter's military strength at the time and the long period during which they
were left military unmolested by America. In this connection, we hate to make
reference to the atomic bomb as a possible means of destruction.
If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in the
liberation of the Philippines, it was because the feigned cooperation of their
countrymen enabled them to get food and other aid necessary in the resistance
movement. If they were able to survive, it was because they could camouflage
themselves in the midst of the civilian population in cities and towns. It is easy to
argue now that the people could have merely followed their ordinary pursuits of life
or otherwise be indifferent to the occupant. The fundamental defect of this line of
thought is that the Japanese assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to notice any
such attitude. During belligerent occupation, "the outstanding fact to be reckoned
with is the sharp opposition between the inhabitants of the occupied areas and the
hostile military force exercising control over them. At heart they remain at war with
each other. Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter the inhabitants from
taking advantage of opportunities to interfere with the safety and success of the
occupant, and in so doing they may arouse its passions and cause to take vengeance
in cruel fashion. Again, even when it is untainted by such conduct, the occupant as a
means of attaining ultimate success in its major conflict may, under plea of military
necessity, and regardless of conventional or customary prohibitions, proceed to
utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a convenient means of military achievement."
(Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition [1945], p. 1912.) It
should be stressed that the Japanese occupation was not a matter of a few months; it
extended over a little more than three years. Said occupation was a fact, in spite of
the "presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the
Philippines whenever these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or by the
detachments of troops sent on patrol to those places." (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan
Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 371, 373.) The law of nations accepts belligerent
occupation as a fact to be reckoned with, regardless of the merits of the occupant's
cause. (Hyde, International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945], Vol. III, p. 1879.)
Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhere to will lead to an over-
production of traitors, have a wrong and low conception of the psychology and
patriotism of their countrymen. Patriots are such after their birth in the first place,
and no amount of laws or judicial decisions can make or unmake them. On the other
hand, the Filipinos are not so base as to be insensitive to the thought that the real
traitor is cursed everywhere and in all ages. Our patriots who fought and died during
the last war, and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were undoubtedly
motivated by their inborn love of country, and not by such a thing as the treason law.
The Filipino people as a whole, passively opposed the Japanese regime, not out of
fear of a treason statute but because they preferred and will prefer the democratic and
civilized way of life and American altruism to Japanese barbaric and totalitarian
designs. Of course, there are those who might at heart have been pro-Japanese; but
they met and will unavoidably meet the necessary consequences. The regular
soldiers faced the risks of warfare; the spies and informers subjected themselves to
the perils of military operations, likely received summary liquidation or punishments
from the guerrillas and the parties injured by their acts, and may be prosecuted as
war spies by the military authorities of the returning sovereign; those who committed
other common crimes, directly or through the Japanese army, may be prosecuted
under the municipal law, and under this group even the spies and informers,
Makapili or otherwise, are included, for they can be made answerable for any act
offensive to person or property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits
tax to reckon with. We cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous fact that, in the
majority of cases, those responsible for the death of, or injury to, any Filipino or
American at the hands of the Japanese, were prompted more by personal motives
than by a desire to levy war against the United States or to adhere to the occupant.
The alleged spies and informers found in the Japanese occupation the royal road to
vengeance against personal or political enemies. The recent amnesty granted to the
guerrillas for acts, otherwise criminal, committed in the furtherance of their
resistance movement has in a way legalized the penal sanctions imposed by them
upon the real traitors.
It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by
remembering that the obedience and cooperation of the Filipinos were effected while
the Japanese were in complete control and occupation of the Philippines, when their
mere physical presence implied force and pressure — and not after the American
forces of liberation had restored the Philippine Government — that we will come to
realize that, apart from any rule of international law, it was necessary to release the
Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the sense indicated herein.
Otherwise, one is prone to dismiss the reason for such cooperation and obedience. If
there were those who did not in any wise cooperate or obey, they can be counted by
the fingers, and let their names adorn the pages of Philippine history. Essentially,
however, everybody who took advantage, to any extent and degree, of the peace and
order prevailing during the occupation, for the safety and survival of himself and his
family, gave aid and comfort to the enemy.
Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of
the Philippines ineffective during the occupation, and restored to their full vigor and
force only after the liberation. Thus, in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, he
ordained that "the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines . . . are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," and that "all laws . . .
of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control." Repeating what we have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez
Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 133), "it is to be presumed that General Douglas
MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and
the President of the United States, constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the United
States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted
by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence,
applied by the President of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague
Conventions of 1907."
The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the
population to take oath to the hostile power," was inserted for the moral protection
and benefit of the inhabitants, and does not necessarily carry the implication that the
latter continue to be bound to the political laws of the displaced government. The
United States, a signatory to the Hague Conventions, has made the point clear, by
admitting that the military occupant can suspend all the laws of a political nature and
even require public officials and the inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United
States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309), and as already stated, it is a
doctrine of American Constitutional Law that the inhabitants, no longer receiving the
protection of their native state, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being
under the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty
and obedience. Indeed, what is prohibited is the application of force by the occupant,
from which it is fair to deduce that the Conventions do not altogether outlaw
voluntary submission by the population. The only strong reason for this is
undoubtedly the desire of the authors of the Conventions to give as much freedom
and allowance to the inhabitants as are necessary for their survival. This is wise and
humane, because the people should be in a better position to know what will save
them during the military occupation than any exile government.
"Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he
warned against the use of judicial process for non judicial ends, and attacked cynics
who "see no reason why courts, just like other agencies, should not be policy
weapons. If we want to shoot Germans as a matter of policy, let it be done as such,
said he, but don't hide the deed behind a court. If you are determined to execute a
man in any case there is no occasion for a trial; the word yields no respect for courts
that are merely organized to convict." Mussoloni may have got his just desserts, but
nobody supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in mind as we go about
punishing criminals. There are enough laws on the books to convict guilty Nazis
without risking the prestige of our legal system. It is far, far better that some guilty
men escape than that the idea of law be endangered. In the long run the idea of law is
our best defense against Nazism in all its forms." These passages were taken from
the editorial appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34, and convey ideas worthy
of some reflection.
If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience
during the Japanese military occupation, they were at most — borrowing the famous
and significant words of President Roxas — errors of the mind and not of the heart.
We advisedly said "feigning" not as an admission of the fallacy of the theory of
suspended allegiance or sovereignty, but as an affirmation that the Filipinos, contrary
to their outward attitude, had always remained loyal by feeling and conscience to
their country.
Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the
Japanese military occupation, the present Republic of the Philippines has no right to
prosecute treason committed against the former sovereignty existing during the
Commonwealth Government which was none other than the sovereignty of the
United States. This court has already held that, upon a change of sovereignty, the
provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, rebellion
and sedition are no longer in force (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887). It is true that,
as contended by the majority, section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the
Philippines provides that "sovereignty resides in the people," but this did not make
the Commonwealth Government or the Filipino people sovereign, because said
declaration of principle, prior to the independence of the Philippines, was subervient
to and controlled by the Ordinance appended to the Constitution under which, in
addition to its many provisions essentially destructive of the concept of sovereignty,
it is expressly made clear that the sovereignty of the United States over the
Philippines had not then been withdrawn. The framers of the Constitution had to
make said declaration of principle because the document was ultimately intended for
the independent Philippines. Otherwise, the Preamble should not have announced
that one of the purposes of the Constitution is to secure to the Filipino people and
their posterity the "blessings of independence." No one, we suppose, will dare allege
that the Philippines was an independent country under the Commonwealth
Government.
The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that
existing under the Jones Law, but its non-sovereign status nevertheless remained
unaltered; and what was enjoyed was the exercise of sovereignty over the Philippines
continued to be complete.
The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. — It has already been seen that the
exercise of sovereignty is conceived of as delegated by a State to the various organs
which, collectively, constitute the Government. For practical political reasons which
can be easily appreciated, it is desirable that the public policies of a State should be
formulated and executed by governmental agencies of its own creation and which are
not subject to the control of other States. There is, however, nothing in a nature of
sovereignty or of State life which prevents one State from entrusting the exercise of
certain powers to the governmental agencies of another State. Theoretically, indeed,
a sovereign State may go to any extent in the delegation of the exercise of its power
to the governmental agencies of other States, those governmental agencies thus
becoming quoad hoc parts of the governmental machinery of the State whose
sovereignty is exercised. At the same time these agencies do not cease to be
Instrumentalities for the expression of the will of the State by which they were
originally created.
By this allegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the delegating
State, and the legal hypothesis is that this State possesses the legal competence again
to draw to itself the exercise, through organs of its own creation, of the powers it has
granted. Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of
government and reserve to themselves a right of control of so slight and so negative a
character as to make its exercise a rare and improbable occurence; yet, so long as
such right of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is
conceded to be founded upon a grant and the continuing consent of the mother
countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is complete and they
are to be considered as possessing only administrative autonomy and not political
independence. Again, as will be more fully discussed in a later chapter, in the so-
called Confederate or Composite State, the cooperating States may yield to the
central Government the exercise of almost all of their powers of Government and yet
retain their several sovereignties. Or, on the other hand, a State may, without parting
with its sovereignty of lessening its territorial application, yield to the governing
organs of particular areas such an amplitude of powers as to create of them bodies-
politic endowed with almost all of the characteristics of independent States. In all
States, indeed, when of any considerable size, efficiency of administration demands
that certain autonomous powers of local self-government be granted to particular
districts. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74,
75.).
The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and
the States of the American Union which, it is alleged, preserve their own sovereignty
although limited by the United States. This is not true for it has been authoritatively
stated that the Constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, that such
autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or
by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty, and that the sovereignty
of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer
contested.
It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, and
that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the
express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty. The
Supreme Court of the United States has held that, even when selecting members for
the national legislature, or electing the President, or ratifying proposed amendments
to the federal constitution, the States act, ad hoc, as agents of the National
Government. (Willoughby, the Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.250.)
This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United States and the
non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer contested. (Willoughby,
The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 251, 252.)
Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this
Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final
and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines
shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." From this, the
deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of the Philippines and
under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the Commonwealth
Government possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the sovereignty
delegated by the United States and did not cease to be an instrumentality of the latter
(Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the
Republic of the Philippines is an independent State not receiving its power or
sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed against the United States or
against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth Government, which exercised, but
did not possess, sovereignty (id., p. 49), is therefore not treason against the sovereign
and independent Republic of the Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order,
merely, to make the Constitution applicable to the Republic.
Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all laws
of the Philippines Islands shall remain operative, unless inconsistent therewith, until
amended, altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and on
section 3 which is to the effect that all cases pending in courts shall be heard, tried,
and determined under the laws then in force, thereby insinuating that these
constitutional provisions authorize the Republic of the Philippines to enforce article
114 of the Revised Penal Code. The error is obvious. The latter article can remain
operative under the present regime if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The
fact remains, however, that said penal provision is fundamentally incompatible with
the Constitution, in that those liable for treason thereunder should owe allegiance to
the United States or the government of the Philippines, the latter being, as we have
already pointed out, a mere instrumentality of the former, whereas under the
Constitution of the present Republic, the citizens of the Philippines do not and are
not required to owe allegiance to the United States. To contend that article 114 must
be deemed to have been modified in the sense that allegiance to the United States is
deleted, and, as thus modified, should be applied to prior acts, would be to sanction
the enactment and application of an ex post facto law.
In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United
States has held in the case of Bradford vs. Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38),
that the Philippines had a sovereign status, though with restrictions, it is sufficient to
state that said case must be taken in the light of a subsequent decision of the same
court in Cincinnati Soap Co. vs. United States (301 U.S., 308), rendered in May,
1937, wherein it was affirmed that the sovereignty of the United States over the
Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that the earlier case only be
interpreted to refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the Philippines as delegated by
the mother country, the United States.
No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on
August 12, 1943, that "the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having
now the status as a government of other independent nations--in fact all the attributes
of complete and respected nationhood," since said statement was not meant as
having accelerated the date, much less as a formal proclamation of, the Philippine
Independence as contemplated in the Tydings-McDuffie Law, it appearing that (1)
no less also than the President of the United States had to issue the proclamation of
July 4, 1946, withdrawing the sovereignty of the United States and recognizing
Philippine Independence; (2) it was General MacArthur, and not President Osmeña
who was with him, that proclaimed on October 23, 1944, the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government; (3) the Philippines was not given official participation
in the signing of the Japanese surrender; (4) the United States Congress, and not the
Commonwealth Government, extended the tenure of office of the President and
Vice-President of the Philippines.
The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as
against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed
against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the
Philippine Commonwealth, is immaterial because, as we have already explained,
treason against either is not and cannot be treason against the new and different
sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.
G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant.
Mario Guariña for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a
citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in
the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the
administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a
number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's
head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our
independence." Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation
of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the
Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the
case to this court. The question presented for decision is, What crime, if any, did the
accused commit?
A logical point of departure is the information presented in this case. It reads in
translation as follows:
That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon,
Philippine Islands, the said accused, Isaac Perez, while holding a discussion with
several persons on political matters, did criminally, unlawfully and wilfully and with
knowledge that Honorable Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands and in the discharge of his functions as such authority, insult by
word, without his presence, said Governor-General, uttering in a loud voice and in
the presence of many persons, and in a public place, the following phrases: "Asin an
mangña filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an
payo ni Wood huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot con Filipinas," which in
English, is as follows: "And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off
Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines.
Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code.
At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on behalf of the prosecution and
three witnesses on behalf of the defense. According to the first witness for the
Government, Juan Lumbao, the municipal president of Pilar, what Perez said on the
occasion in question was this:
"The Filipinos, like myself, should get a bolo and cut off the head of Governor-
General Wood, because he has recommended a bad administration in these Islands
and has not made a good recommendation; on the contrary, he has assassinated the
independence of the Philippines and for this reason, we have not obtained
independence and the head of that Governor-General must be cut off." Higinio J.
Angustia, justice of the peace of Pilar, in a written statement, and Gregorio
Cresencio, another witness for the prosecution, corroborated the testimony of the
first witness. Cresencio understood that Perez invited the Filipinos including himself
to get their bolos and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood and throw it into
the sea.
The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place on the
morning of April 1, 1922, in which the accused participated. But they endeavored to
explain that the discussion was between Perez and one Severo Madrid, the latter
maintaining that the fault was due to the Nacionalista Party, while Perez argued that
the Governor-General was to blame. The accused testified that the discussion was
held in a peaceful manner, and that what he wished to say was that the Governor-
General should be removed and substituted by another. On the witness stand, he
stated that his words were the following: "We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party
which is in power but do not take into account that above the representatives there is
Governor-General Wood who controls everything, and I told him that the day on
which the Democrats may kill that Governor-General, then we, the Filipinos will
install the government we like whether you Democratas want to pay or not to pay
taxes."
The trial judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant reason, that it had been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made use of the language stated
in the beginning of this decision and set out in the information. The question of fact
thus settled, the question of law recurs as to the crime of which the accused should
be convicted.
It should be recalled that the fiscal named, in the information, article 256 of the Penal
Code as having been infringed and the trial judge so found in his decision. The first
error assigned by counsel for the appellant is addressed to this conclusion of the
lower court and is to the effect that article 256 of the Penal Code is no longer in
force.
In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No. 14705 1), the accused was
charged with having uttered the following language: "To hell with the President of
the United States and his proclamation!" Mr. Helbig was prosecuted under article
256, and though the case was eventually sent back to the court of origin for a new
trial, the appellate court by majority vote held as a question of law that article 256 is
still in force.
In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887), the accused was charged
with having published an article reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members
in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. In this court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted
by unanimous vote, with three members of the court holding that article 256 was
abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the
Philippines, and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of
repealing so much of article 256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult,
and that under the information and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the libel Law. In the course of the
main opinion in the Perfecto case, is found this significant sentence: "Act No. 292 of
the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected
article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement."
It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which those of us who retain a
contrary opinion must bow with as good grace as we can muster, that until otherwise
decided by higher authority, so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as does not
relate to ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under the Libel Law, exist and
must be enforced. To which proposition, can properly be appended a corollary,
namely: Seditious words, speeches, or libels, constitute a violation of Act No. 292,
the Treason and Sedition Law, and to this extent, both the Penal Code and the Libel
Law are modified.
Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of article 256
of the Penal Code, it is our opinion that the law infringed in this instance is not this
article but rather a portion of the Treason and Sedition Law. In other words, as will
later appear, we think that the words of the accused did not so much tend to defame,
abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they did to raise a disturbance in the
community.
In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily
against individuals, but rather against the existence of the State, the authority of the
Government, or the general public peace. The offenses created and defined in Act
No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is sedition, which is the raising
of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority.
Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least
such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and
open violence against the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouvier's
Law Dictionary, 974; U.S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437; People vs. Cabrera [1922],
43 Phil., 64.)
It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be
interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.
Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticism,
no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within
the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when
the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of
freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of
the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. (III Wharton's Criminal
Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U.S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422;
People vs. Perfecto, supra.)
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine
Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high
offices, under a democratic form of government, instead, of affording immunity from
promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance,
the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was
intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily
produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.
The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the
United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States,
and holds in his office at the pleasure of the President. The Organic Act vests
supreme executive power in the Governor-General to be exercised in accordance
with law. The Governor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in
the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-
General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American
sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599; U.S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2
Phil., 332.)
Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No.
1692, appears to have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a
situation. This section reads as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish
or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or against
the Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or
make any statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any
lawful officer in executing his office or in performing his duty, or which tends to
instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or
incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or
order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices from
the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both,
in the discretion of the court.
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement
and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for
unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and
incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which
tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement
and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or
order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the
action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as
amended.
A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act
No. 292 as amended, is, in effect, responsive to, and based upon, the offense with
which the defendant is charged. The designation of the crime by the fiscal is not
conclusive. The crime of which the defendant stands charged is that described by the
facts stated in the information. In accordance with our settled rule, an accused may
be found guilty and convicted of a graver offense than that designated in the
information, if such graver offense is included or described in the body of the
information, and is afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial.
(Guevarra's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9; De Joya's Code of Criminal
Procedure, p. 9.)
The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by the
Treason and Sedition Law, and will, we think, sufficiently punish the accused.
That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves, may be possible. Our
course is justified when it is recalled that only last year, Mr. Chief Justice Taft of the
United States Supreme Court, in speaking of an outrageous libel on the Governor of
the Porto Rico, observed: "A reading of the two articles removes the slightest doubt
that they go far beyond the "exuberant expressions of meridional speech," to use the
expression of this court in a similar case in Gandia vs. Pettingill (222 U.S. , 452,
456). Indeed they are so excessive and outrageous in their character that they suggest
the query whether their superlative vilification has not overleapt itself and become
unconsciously humorous." (Balzac vs. Porto Rico [1922], 258 U.S., 298.) While our
own sense of humor is not entirely blunted, we nevertheless entertain the conviction
that the courts should be the first to stamp out the embers of insurrection. The
fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be dealt
with firmly before it endangers the general public peace.
The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to
convict the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. With the
modification thus indicated, judgment is affirmed, it being understood that, in
accordance with the sentence of the lower court, the defendant and appellant shall
suffer 2 months and 1 day's imprisonment and pay the costs. So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
JOHNSON, J., concurring:
I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Villamor. I cannot give assent to a doctrine
which permits a complaint to be presented upon one theory and the trial to be carried
through upon that theory and then to condemn the defendant upon a theory which he
nor the prosecution ever dreamed of.
VILLAMOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree in that the accused should be sentenced to suffer two months and one day
of arresto mayor with costs, as imposed by the court a quo, under the provisions of
article 256 of the Penal Code, but not under section 8 of Act No. 292. The accused,
in my opinion, should not be convicted of the crime of sedition because there is no
allegation in the complaint nor proof in the record, showing that when the accused
uttered the words that gave rise to these proceedings, he had the intention of inciting
others to gather for an illicit purpose, or to incite any conspiracy or rebellion, or to
disturb the peace of the community or the safety and order of the Government which
are the acts penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292. On the contrary, having due
regard to the place and time when the discussion arose between Lodovice and the
accused, the political rivalry between them and the difference of opinion that they
entertained regarding the administration of the Governor-General, the Honorable
Leonard Wood, it would appear evident that the accused expressed himself in biting
and poignant language, unbecoming and improper of a law abiding citizen and
highly detrimental and insulting to the authority of the Governor-General which is
the thing prohibited and punished by article 256 of the Penal Code.

Avanceña and Johnson, JJ., concurs.

[G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997] boat. Eugene asked to be set free so he could help but was not allowed; he was
threatened with bodily harm instead.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO
CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant. Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the
open sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his
DECISION brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the
point of a tres cantos [4] held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were
boat that was and the Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito and
charged with violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and
that its engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to
Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a
approach the boat cautioning them however not to move or say anything.
firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of
violence and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new"
physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz,
seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat, to their damage and another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still
prejudice. [1] pull up his net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You
choose between the two, or I will kill you." [5] Juanito, obviously terrified,
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan
immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined
y Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and
Catantan.
sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. [2] Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan
appealed. But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front
part of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him
threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied
of piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the
his brother's legs and the two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately
Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.
another pumpboat passed by and towed them safely ashore.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of
1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some
any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment,
3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught
or the personal belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the
up with them. One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan,
value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun,
things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the
Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr.
complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The
to "dapa." [3] Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the
offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided." And
Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom of the
a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any vessel or
boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan
watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one place to another
Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other pumpboat which the
through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats
accused had earlier used together with its passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
used in fishing (underscoring supplied).
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code
they were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be
is committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of
killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row the
violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?
him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."
A: Only one.
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential
that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat?
did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or
A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (underscoring
intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on
supplied).
board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other
place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you?
possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they
saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to approach that boat so xxxx
they could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he
simply committed grave coercion and not piracy. A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (underscoring supplied).

We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave COURT:
coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?
within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were
compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was A: He aimed the revolver on me.
obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the
victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:
intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant and enlightening -
Q: What else did he do?
Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of
Tabogon at that time, was there anything unusual that happened? A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.

A: Yes. Q: What did he do with his revolver?

Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was? A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye.

A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do?
of that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.
A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.
Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in
Q: To what place did he order you to go?
that pumpboat?
A: To Daan Tabogon. [6]
A: Four.
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave
Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how did
coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine
they do that?
waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of
A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached them and
the pumpboat (underscoring supplied). boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered
complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and
then struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after
which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of
another pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the
Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the
marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full
control of his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to
submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the
case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters.Thus we cite the
succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree -
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are
still committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the
peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
progress of the people;
would take them back to their lair.Unfortunately for the pirates their "new"
pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended by the police soon after the
Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in
evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it
again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation
the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the
conviction of accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the
crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly
to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway

robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned
by the penal statutes of all countries; and,

Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating

such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end
in view of eliminating all obstacles tothe economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people.

The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in
sea waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with the unknown forces of
the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen that the
townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to
deprive them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the
purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people." Had it not been for the chance passing of another
pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering,
meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine in open sea,
could not be ascertained.

While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils
permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their
boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their
pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that
[G.R. No. 116488. May 31, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AARON FLORES @
RONITO, SULPECIO SILPAO y ORTEGA @ SULPING and EDGAR
VILLERAN y MAGBANUA, accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Detachment Commander of the 7 th Infantry Brigade detailed
at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental, and three (3) members of the local
Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) under his supervision, namely,
Aaron Flores alias Ronito, Sulpecio Silpao y Ortega alias Sulping and Edgar
Villeran y Magbanua, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental, Branch 61, with Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. The
Information charged as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of September, 1992, in the Municipality of Ilog,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with high powered firearms
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap,
detain and keep under guard one SAMSON SAYAM y GEPANAO from Km 117,
Hda. Shangrella (sic), Brgy. Tabu, of the above-named municipality, and bring the
latter to their detachment at Brgy. Tabu, under restraint and against his will, without
proper authority thereof, thereby depriving said victim of his civil liberty since then
up to the present.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
All the four accused pleaded Not Guilty when arraigned. Trial ensued and, based on
the testimonial evidence presented, the trial court found the following antecedent
facts to be undisputed.
On the night of September 29, 1992, the victim, Samson Sayam, was drinking beer at
the store owned by Terry Cabrillos located at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros
Occidental. Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran
were at the same store drinking beer. Sayam joined the four accused at their
table. Sometime later, all the accused and the victim left the store and walked
towards the direction of the military detachment headquarters. After the accused left
the store with Samson Sayam, witnesses heard a single gunshot followed by rapid
firing coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters. [2] That was the last
time Samson Sayam was seen, and despite diligent efforts of Sayams mother and
relatives, he has not been found.
It was the prosecutions contention that on that fateful evening, all four accused
hatched a conspiracy to kidnap the victim and thereafter detain him at the
detachment headquarters. They allegedly succeeded in their plot and, the prosecution
avers, to this day the accused have not released Samson Sayam. All the accused,
however, vehemently denied committing the acts charged.
The trial court held that the testimonial evidence failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the existence of a conspiracy among the four accused. More specifically, the
prosecution failed to show an apparent common design by and among the accused to
kidnap and detain Samson Sayam against his will. Thus, the trial court proceeded to
determine the individual liabilities of the four accused based on the degree of their
participation in the commission of the offense charged.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions evidence that Samson Sayam was
seen being forcibly dragged out of the store and pulled towards the direction of the
detachment headquarters by accused Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar
Villeran. Since Samson Sayam had not been seen nor heard from since then, the trial
court held that the three accused were responsible for the formers disappearance.
As regards Wennie Tampioc, the trial court found that he left the store ahead of the
three (3) co-accused and, thus, had nothing to do with the disappearance of Samson
Sayam. Notably, none of the prosecution witnesses specifically or categorically
mentioned Tampioc as among those who actively participated in bringing Samson
Sayam by force to their headquarters. Unlike his co-accused who are natives of the
place of the incident, Wennie Tampioc was newly assigned as Detachment
Commander and did not know Samson Sayam, such that no ill-motive was attributed
to him by the trial court.Likewise, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Nelson
Golez, on the one hand, and that of Carlos Manlangit, on the other hand, conflict as
to the kind of firearm allegedly carried by Tampioc. While Golez stated that he was
armed with an Armalite rifle,[3] Manlangit testified that Tampioc was armed with a
short firearm.[4]
More importantly, the trial court found that the identity of Sgt. Tampioc as one of the
perpetrators of the crime was doubtful, because notwithstanding the fact that Nelson
Golez knew Wennie Tampioc even before September 29, 1992, [5] the original
complaint filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ilog Candoni, dated
October 21, 1992, which was based on the affidavits of Golez and Carlito Manlingit,
did not mention Wennie Tampioc as one of the respondents. The said affidavits
merely mentioned an unidentified member of the 7th IB, Philippine Army, assigned
at Brgy. Tabu, detachment. At the time of the execution of the affidavits, the
witnesses could have known that Wennie Tampioc was a sergeant, and that he was
the commander of the detachment. Finally, the straightforward and emphatic manner
in which Wennie Tampioc testified inspired belief in the trial courts mind. [6]
On December 8, 1993, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Aaron Flores,
Edgar Villeran and Sulpecio Silpao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code and are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua; and there being no proof that Samson Sayam is dead, they are ordered to
pay him jointly and severally, or, in the alternative, his heirs the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs of this suit.
The accused Wennie Tampioc is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.
The bail bonds of the said accused are ordered cancelled and the convicted accused
ordered confined pending appeal if they so file an appeal, in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated January 20, 1992 of the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Two (2) separate appeals were brought before us. Accused-appellant Sulpecio Silpao
raised the following errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
SULPECIO SILPAO OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS
ILLEGAL DETENTION, UNDER ARTICLE 267, REVISED PENAL CODE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
CAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO, AS AMONG THOSE WHO FORCIBLY
BROUGHT SAMSON SAYAM TO THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN THE
EVENING OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1992 AND RESPONSIBLE FOR SAMSON
SAYAMS DISAPPEARANCE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU
SULPECIO SILPAO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED.
On the other hand, accused-appellants Aaron Flores and Edgar Villeran interposed a
joint appeal based on the sole error that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AARON
FLORES AND EDGAR VILLERAN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION
BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
After a thorough review of the facts and evidence adduced before the trial court, we
find that accused-appellants should be acquitted of the offense charged against them.
The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention is defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659. The elements of the offense are:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of
his liberty.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are
present:
(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;
(b) That it is committed simulating public authority;
(c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d) That the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer.[8]
Clearly, accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, since the first element of the said crime is
that the offender must be a private individual. In the case at bar, accused-appellants
were members of the local CAFGU at the time the alleged crime was committed.
The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the purpose of
complementing the operations of the regular force formations in a locality. [9] It was
composed of civilian volunteers who were tasked to maintain peace and order in
their localities, as well as to respond to threats to national security. As such, they
were provided with weapons, and given the authority to detain or order detention of
individuals.[10]
The Solicitor General recognizes the error of charging and convicting accused-
appellants of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention for the reason that the
appellants are not private individuals, but public officers. As such, the Solicitor
General submits that, under the facts alleged, accused-appellants can only be liable
for the crime of Arbitrary Detention, defined and penalized in Article 124 of the
Revised Penal Code. The prosecution maintains that inasmuch as all the other
elements of Arbitrary Detention were alleged in the criminal information filed
against the accused-appellants, they may still be convicted of said crime.
Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without
legal grounds, detains a person.[11] Since it is settled that accused-appellants are
public officers, the question that remains to be resolved is whether or not the
evidence adduced before the trial court proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily
detained by accused-appellants.
As far back as the case of U.S. v. Cabanag,[12] it was held that in the crime of illegal
or arbitrary detention, it is essential that there is actual confinement or restriction of
the person of the offended party.The deprivation of liberty must be proved, [13] just as
the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty must also be established
by indubitable proof.[14]1 In the more recent case of People v. Fajardo,[15] this Court
reiterated the ruling in U.S. v. Cabanag, i.e., there must be uncontroverted proof of
both intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, as well as actual confinement or
restriction.
Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or in any
manner detaining and depriving him of his liberty.[16] A careful review of the records
of the instant case shows no evidence sufficient to prove that Samson Sayam was
detained arbitrarily by accused-appellants. While the prosecution witnesses testified
that accused-appellants were seen walking with Samson Sayam toward the direction
of the detachment headquarters, there is no shred of evidence that he was actually
confined there or anywhere else. The fact that Samson Sayam has not been seen or
heard from since he was last seen with accused-appellants does not prove that he was
detained and deprived of his liberty. The prosecution, however, argues that Samson
Sayam was deprived of his liberty when accused-appellants forced him to go with
them when they left the store of Jerry Cabrillos and brought him to the detachment
headquarters.
We assayed the testimonies of the prosecutions main witnesses, namely, Carlito
Manlangit and his son Jerry Manlangit. Carlito Manlangits testimony was offered to
prove that Samson Sayam was forcibly taken from the store and that the latter tried
his best to free himself from his abductors. And yet, all that Carlito testified to was
that he saw Samson Sayam crossing the street alone from the store of a certain
Moleng; that the four accused, who were armed, followed Sayam and asked for his
residence certificate; that the four accused apprehended Samson Sayam and brought
him to the detachment headquarters; and that he went home after he saw Samson
Sayam talking to the accused.[17]
It is readily apparent that Carlito Manlangits testimony failed to prove the stated
purpose thereof, i.e., that Samson Sayam was taken forcibly to the detachment
headquarters. To be sure, the witness did not state that Samson Sayam was pulled,
dragged, or coerced to go with accused-appellants. Neither did he say that Samson
Sayam was taken at gunpoint. There is also no relevant testimony to the effect that
Samson Sayam tried his best to free himself from the clutches of accused-
appellants. For if that were the truth, the reactions of Carlito Manlangit do not
conform to human experience. If he really witnessed Samson Sayam being
apprehended, forcibly taken, and trying to free himself, it cannot be logically
explained why Carlito Manlangit just went home,[18] instead of doing anything to
help Samson Sayam. He admitted that he did not immediately report the incident to
the authorities.[19] More telling is the absence of testimony to the effect that Samson
Sayam was being taken to the detachment headquarters against his will, that he was
protesting his apprehension, or that he was asking for help, considering that there
were other people within hearing and seeing distance. Most damaging is Carlito
Manlangits statement that he did not see Samson Sayam in the detachment
headquarters with any or all of the accused.[20] In fine, Carlito Manlangits testimony
failed to prove that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained or deprived of his liberty.
Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the proseuction. According to him,
he and Samson Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on
September 29, 1992. At around six in the evening, while on their way home, they
passed by the store of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four
accused drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go home because he had to show
his residence certificate and barangay clearance to accused-appellant Aaron
Flores. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in Hacienda Shangrila,
located about half a kilometer away from the center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he told
his father that Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson. He also
testified that he heard gunshots coming from the direction of the detachment
headquarters.[21]
The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime of
arbitrary detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his
father, Carlito, for they dealt on a different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see
any of accused-appellant apprehend or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see if
accused-appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate and barangay
clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony comprised of hearsay
evidence,[22] which has no probative value.[23] In summary, Jerry Manlangits
testimony failed to establish that accused-appellants were guilty of arbitrary
detention.
The prosecution also presented the testimony of Nelson Golez, who identified the
four accused as the persons with Samson Sayam, drinking inside the store of Terry
Cabrillos. He also stated that following a heated argument, the accused and Samson
Sayam left the store and went towards the direction of the detachment
headquarters. He said that the accused were holding and pulling Samson Sayam
towards the road. Ten minutes later, Nelson Golez heard a single gunshot followed
by rapid firing.[24]
On cross-examination, however, Nelson Golez did not affirm his earlier statement
that the accused and Samson Sayam were engaged in a heated argument. Rather, he
said he did not hear them arguing as they were leaving the store. Although Nelson
Golez attested that Samson Sayam was protesting while the accused were dragging
him, he did not do anything to help Samson Sayam, who happened to be his
cousin.[25]
Again, no conclusion of guilt can be inferred from Nelson Golezs testimony. First of
all, he was unsure of his assertion that there was an argument. The mere fact that
Samson Sayam was being dragged towards the road does not constitute arbitrary
detention. There is no showing that Samson Sayam was completely deprived of his
liberty such that he could not free himself from the grip of the accused, if he was
indeed being held against his will. The incident transpired in a public place, where
there were people milling about, many of whom were his friends. It is puzzling that
Samson Sayam did not cry out for help. Nobody bothered to report the incident, if
indeed it happened, to the barangay authorities. No one else came forward to
corroborate the testimony of Nelson Golez.
The testimony of Nelson Golez, by itself, lacks credibility. He wavered on material
points, even as the prosecution failed to substantiate by direct or corroborative
evidence the bare testimony of Nelson Golez.
It is basic and elemental that in criminal prosecutions, before the accused may be
convicted of a crime, his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Although
the findings of fact made by trial courts are generally not disturbed on appeal, if
there are substantial facts which were overlooked but which may alter the results of
the case in favor of the accused, such facts should be taken into account by the
appellate court.[26] And where it appears that the trial court erred in the appreciation
of the evidence on record or the lack of it, the factual findings of the trial court may
be reversed.[27]
After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and weighing the testimonial
evidence on the scale of creditworthiness and materiality, this Court finds the
evidence of the prosecution grossly insufficient to sustain a conviction. Again, the
fact of detention, whether illegal or arbitrary, was not clearly established by credible
evidence. There was no showing that Samson Sayam was locked up, restrained of his
freedom, or prevented from communicating with anyone. Likewise, there was no
proof that there was actual intent on the part of accused-appellants to arbitrarily
deprive Samson Sayam of his liberty. It is necessary that there must be a purposeful
or knowing action by accused-appellants to restrain the victim by or with force,
because taking coupled with intent completes the crime of illegal or arbitrary
detention.[28]
The prosecution, however, maintains that the evidence, even though circumstantial,
sufficiently establishes the guilt of the accused-appellants. It cites the following
circumstances:
1. On September 29, 1992, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, accused-appellants,
together with their companions Sergeant Tampioc and fellow CAFGU Sulpecio
Silpao, were seen with Samson at the store of Terry Cabrillos. Accused-appellants
were having a drinking spree. Later, they were seen engaged in a heated argument.
2. Thereafter, Samson was forcibly brought out of the store by accused-appellants by
holding and pulling him towards the road. From another angle, another prosecution
witness saw accused-appellants on the road arresting Samson.
3. Accused-appellants brought Samson towards the direction of the detachment of
Brgy. Tabu.
4. Ten (10) minutes later, a gunshot was heard coming from the direction of the
detachment followed by rapid firing.
5. After the incident, Samson was never seen again or heard from. [29]
As already discussed, the above-enumerated circumstances were not established by
clear and convincing evidence. And even if these acts were proven to be true, the
combination of all these circumstances would still not be able to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To our mind, the totality of these circumstantial
evidence do not constitute an unbroken chain pointing to the fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused-appellants are
guilty, and inconsistent with the possibility that they are innocent. [30] Thus:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.[31]
The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances which in
complete sequence leads to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the
accused.[32] It is admitted that Samson Sayam was seen drinking with accused-
appellants on that fateful night. However, the circumstances that there was a heated
argument among them, and that the accused-appellants held and pulled Samson
Sayam to the road and brought him towards the direction of the detachment
headquarters was not sufficiently proven by material or relevant testimony.
Moreover, the circumstance that gunshots were heard on that night have no
relevancy to the case. Even if it were, it cannot be concluded that the gunshots came
from the direction of the detachment headquarters. The witnesses who testified that
they heard the gunshots were at least half a kilometer away from the center of the
barangay, while the detachment headquarters itself was also some distance from the
barangay. At night, especially in the rural areas when all is quiet, loud sounds such
as gunshots reverberate and would seem to come from every direction. An ordinary
person a kilometer away cannot, with certainty, point to the exact location where the
gunshots would be coming from. That would otherwise be attributing expertise on
such matters to the prosecution witnesses.
That Samson Sayam was never seen or heard from again cannot be the basis for the
trial court to render judgment convicting the accused-appellants. In fact, it has no
bearing in this case because it is not one of the elements of the crime of arbitrary
detention. Consequently, only one relevant circumstance was proved, i.e., that
accused-appellants were the last persons seen with Samson Sayam. However, said
circumstance does not necessarily prove that they feloniously abducted him, then
arbitrarily detained him.[33]
Moreover, mere suspicion that the disappearance of Samson Sayam was a result of
accused-appellants alleged criminal acts and intentions is insufficient to convict
them. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the required quantum of evidence. [34] An
uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction
when the evidence itself is in serious doubt.[35] The prosecution was not able to prove
a possible motive why accused-appellants would arbitrarily detain Samson Sayam. In
sum, there is no unbroken chain of circumstances leading to the conclusion that
accused-appellants are guilty. Since the pieces of circumstantial evidence do not
fulfill the test of moral certainty that is sufficient to support a judgment or
conviction, the Court must acquit the accused.[36]
In the recent case of People v. Comesario,[37]3 we had occasion to rule that:
Accused-appellants conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial
evidence. To validly invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that there is
more than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of
events that can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing to the accused to the
exclusion of all others as the author of the crime. Logically, it is where the evidence
is purely circumstantial that there should be an even greater need than usual to apply
with vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the
defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of
guilt of the accused. Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when
interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person.
Accused-appellants enjoy the presumption of innocence until the contrary is
proved. In the case at bar, the pieces of testimonial evidence relied on by the
prosecution and the trial court to support a conviction have failed to overcome the
constitutional precept of the presumed innocence of accused-appellants. Among
other grounds, not only is there a lot of room for reasonable doubt in regard to their
guilt, there is a virtual dearth of convincing evidence to prove that a crime had been
committed.
There is no need even to assess the evidence of the defense, for the prosecution bears
the onus to distinctly and indubitably prove that a crime had been committed by
accused-appellants.[38] It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish its case with
that degree of proof which leads to no other conclusion but conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits for it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.[39] Clearly, the prosecution in this case has failed to prove the guilt of
accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. In similar cases, this Court has often
and consistently ruled that it is better to acquit a guilty person than to convict an
innocent one.[40]

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-

appellants are ACQUITTED. Unless being held or detained for some lawful reason,
accused-appellants are ORDERED RELEASED immediately. The Director of
Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five (5) days from notice, of the
date and time when accused-appellants are released pursuant to this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11
th Judicial Region, Digos, Davao del Sur convicting defendant- appellant Ruben
Burgos y Tito of The crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of
Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos sufficiently established
beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 9, in relation to General Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General
Order No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation further to Presidential Decree No.
885, and considering that the firearm subject of this case was not used in the
circumstances as embraced in paragraph I thereof, applying the provision of
indeterminate sentence law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum
penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum penalty, pursuant to sub-paragraph B, of
Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory penalties, as provided
for by law.
As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this case (Homemade
revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered
confiscated in favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Likewise, the subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized are ordered
disposed of in accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal possession
of firearm in furtherance of subversion in an information which reads as follows:
That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above- named accused with
intent to possess and without the necessary license, permit or authority issued by the
proper government agencies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
keep, possess, carry and have in his possession, control and custody one (1)
homemade revolver, caliber .38, make Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221,
which firearm was issued to and used by the accused at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, his area of operations by one Alias Commander Pol for the New People's Army
(NPA), a subversive organization organized for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines through lawless and violent means, of
which the accused had knowledge, and which firearm was used by the accused in the
performance of his subversive tasks such as the recruitment of New Members to the
NPA and collection of contributions from the members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it appears
that by virtue of an intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and INP
units, stationed at Digos, Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok
personally and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at about 9:00 o'clock A.M.
at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the
use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice
and one peso (P1.00) per month, as his contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5,
Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units,
composed of fifteen (15) members, headed by Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC),
on the following day, May 13, 1982, was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to
arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at 1:30 P.M., and arrived
at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM where through the help of Pedro
Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate accused, who was plowing
his field. (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and Pat. Bioco asked
accused about his firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied
possession of said firearm but later, upon question profounded by Sgt. Alejandro
Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a place below their house
where a gun was buried in the ground. (TSN, page 8, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and dug the grounds,
after which he recovered the firearm, Caliber .38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for
the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive
documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of qqqcogon at a distance of three
(3) meters apart from his house. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said
cogon grass and likewise recovered documents consisting of notebook colored
maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the prosecution; a pamphlet consisting of
eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan
ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo
Kaisipang Mao qqqZedong dated December 31, 1980, marked as Exhibit "C", and
another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang Mindanao, March and
April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages, marked as Exhibit "D" for the
prosecution.
Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its recovery, readily
admitted the same as issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain
Alias Pedipol, allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's Army,
responsible in the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to NPA Ideological
movement, an example was the killing of the late Mayor Llanos and Barangay
Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16, Hearing-October
14,1982).
To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert
was presented, who declared that on March 7, 1972, in his former residence at
Tiguman Digos, Davao del Sur, accused Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his
companions Landrino Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his house
at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him downstair. Thereupon, accused told
Masamlok, their purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso from him, as his
contribution to their companions, the NPA of which he is now a member. (TSN,
pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their group otherwise, he
and his family will be killed. He was also warned not to reveal anything with the
government authorities. Because of the threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok
joined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a seminar scheduled on
April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation, accused pulled gut from his waistline a
.38 caliber revolver which Masamlok really saw, being only about two (2) meters
away from accused, which make him easily Identified said firearm, as that marked as
Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 72, 73, and 74, Hearing-January 4,
1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied by his father,
Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and
attended the seminar, Those present in the seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos,
Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and one alias Jamper.
The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very distinctly that he is an
NPA together with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he
encouraged the group to overthrow the government, emphasizing that those who
attended the seminar were already members of the NPA, and if they reveal to the
authorities, they will be killed.
Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then
finally shouted, the NPA will be victorious. Masamlok likewise Identified the
pamphlets as those marked as Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the prosecution.
(TSN, pages 75, 76 and 77, Hearing-January 4, 1983)
Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar Gomez, who
likewise expounded their own opinions about the NPA. It was also announced in said
seminar that a certain Tonio Burgos, will be responsible for the collection of the
contribution from the members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing- January 4, 1983)
On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to Captain Bargio of the
Provincial Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove that on May 19,
1982, he administered the subscription of th extra-judicial confession of accused
Ruben Burgos, marked as Exhibit "E " for the prosecution, consisting of five (5)
pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Fiscal
Lovitos, realizing that accused was not represented by counsel, requested the
services of Atty. Anyog, whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist
accused in the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from English to
Visayan language, resulting to the deletion of question No. 19 of the document, by
an inserted certification of Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his
having understood, the allegations of his extra-judicial statement.
Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to him his
constitutional rights to remain silent, right to counsel and right to answer any
question propounded or not.
With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty.
Anyog and Fiscal Lovitos, without the presence of military authorities, who escorted
the accused, but were sent outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the
accused. (TSN, pages 36-40, nearing November 15, 1982)
Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the subject firearm, Sgt.
Epifanio Comabig in-charge of firearms and explosives, NCO Headquarter,
Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, was presented and testified, that
among the lists of firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the name
of accused Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included among the lists of persons
who applied for the licensing of the firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1745.
After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its case and offered its
exhibits, which were all admitted in evidence, despite objection interposed by
counsel for accused, which was accordingly overruled.
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case against him is stated
in the decision as follows:
From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought
him to the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur, and arrived there at about 3:00
o'clock, on the same date. At about 8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was
investigated by soldiers, whom he cannot Identify because they were wearing a
civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)
The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was detained with
respect to the subject firearm, which the investigator, wished him to admit but
accused denied its ownership. Because of his refusal accused was mauled, hitting
him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him unconscious. Accused
in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity, crying and with emotional attachment,
described in detail how he was tortured and the ordeals he was subjected.
He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with subject
firearm, Exhibit "A", for him to admit and when he repeatedly refused to accept as
his own firearm, he was subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and physical agony.
Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black cloth with pungent effect on his
eyes. He was undressed, with only blindfold, pungent water poured in his body and
over his private parts, making his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle,
terribly irritating with pungent pain.
All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process of beating,
mauling, pain and/or ordeal was repeatedly done in similar cycle, from May 13 and
14, 1982. intercepted only whenever he fell unconscious and again repeated after
recovery of his senses,
Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal he
was seriously warned, if he will still adamantly refuse to accept ownership of the
subject firearm, he will be salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the pain
and agony, accused admitted ownership of subject firearm.
After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused was made to sign
his affidavit marked as Exhibit "E" for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages,
including the certification of the administering officer, (TSN, pages 141-148,
Hearing-June 15, 1983)
In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him, accused, by way of
explanation and commentary in details, and going one by one, the allegations and/or
contents of his alleged extrajudicial statement, attributed his answers to those
questions involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and intimidation of his
person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating pain he was subjected by an
investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot Identify and was able to obtain his
admission of the subject firearm, by force and violence exerted over his person.
To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive activities, and also
to support his denial to the truth of his alleged extra-judicial confession, particularly
questions Nos. 35, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, along with qqqs answers to
those questions, involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said Honorata
Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the above-questions embraced in
the numbers allegedly stated in the extrajudicial confession of accused, involving her
to such NPA personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true because on
the date referred on April 28, 1982, none of the persons mentioned came to her house
for treatment, neither did she meet the accused nor able to talk with him. (TSN,
pages 118- 121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and that she was
personally charged with subversion in the Office of the Provincial Commander,
Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, but said charge was dismissed
without reaching the Court. She likewise stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano, was
likewise charged for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao
del Sur, but was likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in relation to her cross-examination, Hearing-May
18, 1983)
To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay Captain of
Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador qqqGalaraga was presented, who declared,
he was not personally aware of any subversive activities of accused, being his
neighbor and member of his barrio. On the contrary, he can personally attest to his
good character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio, being a
carpenter and farmer thereat. (TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of arrests made by
the authorities in his barrio involving subversive activities but they were released and
were not formally charged in Court because they publicly took their oath of
allegiance with the government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation to page 136,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his wife, Urbana Burgos,
was presented and who testified that the subject firearm was left in their house by
Cesar Masamlok and one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It was night time, when the two
left the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that they will leave it behind,
temporarily for them to claim it later. They were the ones who buried it. She said, her
husband, the accused, was not in their house at that time and that she did not inform
him about said firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities, for fear of
the life of her husband. (TSN, page 24, November 22, 1983)
On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the recovery of the
firearm, was wearing a mask, she can still Identify him. (TSN, page 6, Hearing-
November 22, 1983)
After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally rested his case in
support of accused's through counsel manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of
the prosecution, or in the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal possession
of firearm, 'under the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4, reflected in the manifestation of counsel for accused. (TSN, pages 113-114,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following assignments of error, to
wit:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE HOUSE
OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT
TO BE LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN
RELATION TO GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and the
subsequent confiscation of a firearm and documents allegedly found therein
conducted in a lawful and valid manner? Does the evidence sustaining the crime
charged meet the test of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of
Ruben Burgos for the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar
Masamlok that the accused allegedly recruited him to join the New People's Army
(NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest or search warrant with them (TSN, p.
25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion
of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. This Court
explained in Villanueva vs. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be
also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's
home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293
[19661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is
allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert
itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of
objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such
have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616,
630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and
Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966], could fitly characterize this constitutional
right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no legs than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as
falling under one of the instances when arrests may be validly made without a
warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 * of the Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as
follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about
to commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact
that "the authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive
activities from a reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his
arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the ambit of Section 6-A of
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence on the matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged
subversive documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by
Rule 126, Section 12, which states:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his
presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was
possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the
appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described
as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule
which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed.
Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would
be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally
construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the
cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty
and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered
lawful under Section 6(b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that. the
information given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there
is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.
A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually
been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime
may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime.
They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent
recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a
frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an arrest without warrant is
unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at the
afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted. time of his arrest is evident from the records:

More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting A CALAMBA:
officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go
through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were not armed with an
ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing arrest warrant?
that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or
A None Sir.
escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were
unknown, Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by A No Sir.
Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was
no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when you went there?
prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982). Consequently, the need to go through
the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even more A But he was twenty meters away from his house.
clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest
Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?
being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not
likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest. A Yes Sir.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?
accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it
must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had A Yes Sir.
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?
Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his
A No Sir.
house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v.
Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Q What did you tell him?
Garcia V. Locsin (supra)
A That we received information that you have a firearm, you surrender that firearm,
xxx xxx xxx first he denied but when Sgt. Buncalan interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it
is buried, I dug the firearm which was wrapped with a cellophane.
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights under the
officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold constitution considering that he was purposely under arrest?
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56 A I did not.
C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).
Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence A Yes Sir.
in the loss of fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).
Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?
A It was buried down in his horse.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was buried?
A Yes Sir.
(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)
Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were
obtained in violation of the accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures, it follows that they are inadmissible as evidence.
There is another aspect of this case.
In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents,
the prosecution presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused
readily admitted ownership of the gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where it
was buried. The officers stated that it was the accused himself who voluntarily
pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed
of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused
allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and pointed to the location of the subversive
documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in violation of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the Bill of
Rights winch provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right
is inadmissible in evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as
to the admissions made by the appellant cannot be used against him.
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as
inadmissible in evidence. The court stated that the appellant's having been
exhaustively subjected to physical terror, violence, and third degree measures may
not have been supported by reliable evidence but the failure to present the
investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative
presumption" that indeed torture and physical violence may have been committed as
stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by
counsel during the custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that
the securing of counsel, Atty. Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed under
oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It could have no palliative
effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial investigation
when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents
inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to
sustain the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is
the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable
doubt. It is true that the trial court found Masamlok's testimony credible and
convincing. However, we are not necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial
court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in People vs.. Cabrera (100 SCRA
424):
xxx xxx xxx
. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question of credibility the
findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious
reason th+at it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the
witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this rule is not absolute for
otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must reject
the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and
substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to that found
in People vs. Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):
. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and the issue hinges
on how much credence can be accorded to him. The first consideration is that said
testimony stands uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who testified on the
mimeographing incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He knew his fate depended
upon how much he cooperated with the authorities, who were then engaged in a
vigorous anti-dissident campaign. As in the case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose
testimony We discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura cannot be considered
as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering
that Masamlok surrendered to the military certainly his fate depended on how
eagerly he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with
subversion. The trade-off appears to be his membership in the Civil Home Defense
Force. (TSN, p. 83, January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be considered as an interested
witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free from the opportunity and
temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his
freedom.
Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA
seminar of April 19, 1982 i.e., Masamlok's father ,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan
and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January 4, 1983) who could have corroborated Cesar
Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in furtherance of subversive
activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never presented any
other witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the
prosecution is insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):
It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v. Dramayo (42 SCRA
59), where after stressing that accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt, it was made clear: 'Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by
the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly
taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be
satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What
is required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81;
People v. Joven, 64 SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People vs.
Godov 72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205; People v. Poblador, 76 SCRA
634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People v. Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484; People
vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA 1; People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and People vs. Ibanga
124 SCRA 697).
We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in Davao del Sur where
there appears to be a well-organized plan to overthrow the Government through
armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a foreign ideology. The
open defiance against duly constituted authorities has resulted in unfortunate levels
of violence and human suffering publicized all over the country and abroad. Even as
we reiterate the need for all freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities
in their legitimate efforts to maintain peace and national security, we must also
remember the dictum in Morales vs. Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538, 569) when this Court
stated:
While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the
rebels, and the lawless with an the means at its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of
our Constitution and our laws.
Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude
towards constitutional liberties and protections will only fan the increase of
subversive activities instead of containing and suppressing them.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on
grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime with which he has been charged.
The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and
Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) and the alleged subversive documents are ordered
disposed of in accordance with law.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. P-01-1472 June 26, 2003
ADRIANO V. ALBIOR, Complainant,
vs.
DONATO A. AUGUIS, Clerk of Court II, 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC), Talibon-Getafe, Bohol,Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Respondent Donato Auguis, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Branch 4, Talibon-Getafe1 , Talibon, Bohol, is charged by Adriano Albior, of
usurpation of judicial function and negligence in the performance of official duties.
According to complainant, respondent usurped judicial functions when he issued the
order for the detention of one Edilberto Albior, the son of complainant. Further,
complainant alleged that respondent committed negligence when he failed to inform
Acting Presiding Judge Avelino N. Puracan of that court regarding the filing of cases
that necessitated issuance of the detention order.
The antecedent facts of this administrative matter are as follows:
On January 25, 1999, two complaints for rape2 were filed against Edilberto Albior
before the MCTC, Branch 4 in Talibon-Getafe, Talibon, Bohol. As clerk of court of
the said court, respondent Auguis received and filed the complaints which were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9144 and 9145. The following day, respondent
issued a detention order3 to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) in
San Jose, Talibon, Bohol, for the commitment of the accused Edilberto Albior. On
January 27, 1999, the BJMP duly issued a receipt of detainee 4 for the person of the
accused.
According to complainant, said order was issued without a prior preliminary
investigation and without a warrant of arrest. Neither was there any record in the
Police Blotter of the accused’s apprehension, or of his surrender. Nor was there proof
that he signed a waiver for his detention. What’s more, the respondent failed to
inform Acting Municipal Judge Avelino Puracan regarding the filing of the
complaints for rape before his sala.5
On February 23, 1999, counsel for the accused then filed an urgent motion to release
the accused.6 Two days later, respondent issued a subpoena, directing the accused to
submit counter-affidavits for the preliminary investigation of the charges of rape. But
no further action was taken by the court. Accused through counsel filed a second
motion7on March 1, 1999. Again, the motion was not acted upon.
Having no other recourse to regain his liberty, the accused filed a petition for habeas
corpus on March 15, 1999, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 52.
During the habeas corpus proceedings,8 the respondent testified that this was not the
first time he issued a detention order without a warrant of arrest. He testified that he
has done this action "many times already" 9 in the past, upon the request of the Chief
of Police of the Philippine National Police in Talibon. He reasoned out that it was in
the best interest of the detainees to be transferred from the PNP jail to the BJMP
because the former did not have meal provisions for detainees.
After due hearing, the RTC Judge Zeta V. Villamayor issued an order10 on March 25,
1999, finding that the accused was being illegally restrained of his liberty and
ordering his immediate release from confinement. On the same day, the MCTC
conducted a preliminary examination of the prosecution’s witnesses and issued an
Omnibus Order11confirming the arrest of the accused.
On April 12, 1999, counsel for the accused filed a motion for reinvestigation 12 with
the Department of Justice, assailing the validity of the Omnibus Order. He
maintained that no warrant of arrest was ever issued against his client and as such, no
confirmation of such arrest may be undertaken.
On June 2, 1999, the father of the accused, herein complainant Adriano Albior, filed
a letter-complaint13 with the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. Complainant
charged respondent of usurpation of judicial functions and negligence in the
performance of duties, in connection with the detention of his son, Edilberto Albior.
In a resolution dated June 3, 1999,14 the Deputy Ombudsman referred the letter-
complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action. On
May 8, 2000, the Ombudsman issued a resolution15 dismissing the criminal
complaint for usurpation of judicial function as defined under Article 241 of the
Revised Penal Code.16However, he recommended the filing of an information with
the proper court for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.17
Acting on the letter-complaint, the OCA required respondent to file a comment to the
complaint. Respondent filed his counter-affidavit.18 Respondent claims that he issued
the detention order only after the PNP Chief and PNP Trial Officer of Talibon
repeatedly requested him to do so. The respondent asserts that it was out of honest
conviction that he was only helping the accused and his relatives. He was merely
sparing them the trouble of having to bring meals to the accused, as the municipal
jail where the latter was detained did not serve food to its prisoners.
Respondent also appended the affidavit19 of Police Senior Inspector Lecarion P.
Torrefiel, the PNP Chief of Police of Talibon. In it the Police Chief stated that he
personally requested the respondent to immediately issue a detention order in order
to transfer the accused to the BJMP jail, where he is ensured of three square meals a
day. The Chief explained that the municipality did not have a budget for meals of
detainees at the PNP jail, hence, it is alleged that respondent’s action was intended
purely for humanitarian reasons. Nothing is said, however, why the local government
unit allows this inhumane practice. The Chief of Police himself appears blissfully
ignorant of the human rights aspects of the matter for which his command could be
held accountable.
On January 29, 2001, the OCA issued its report.20 It found respondent’s defense
unconvincing and held him administratively liable for issuing the said detention
order prior to a preliminary investigation conducted by a judge and before a warrant
of arrest was issued against the accused. It recommended that the case be re-
docketed as an administrative matter and that a fine in the amount of P3,000.00 be
imposed upon respondent with a warning that the commission of the same or similar
act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
We then required the parties to manifest if they were willing to submit the case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings filed.21 The respondent subsequently
manifested his conformity.22
The main issue for our resolution is whether the respondent should be held
administratively liable for the issuance of a detention order resulting in the actual
detention of the accused under the abovementioned circumstances.
The OCA report stresses that respondent clerk of court is not empowered to issue the
questioned detention order. The duties of a clerk of court in the absence of the judge
are defined under Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 5. Duties of the clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. - In the
absence of the judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving
applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and the issuance of all orders and notices
that follow as a matter of course under these rules, and may also, when directed so to
do by the judge, receive the accounts of executors, administrators, guardians,
trustees, and receivers, and all evidence relating to them, or to the settlement of the
estates of deceased persons, or to guardianships, trusteeships, or receiverships, and
forthwith transmit such reports, accounts, and evidence to the judge, together with
his findings in relation to the same, if the judge shall direct him to make findings and
include the same in his report.
Indeed nowhere in the Rules is the clerk of court authorized to issue an order of
detention, as such function is purely judicial. In fact, we already had occasion to rule
that a clerk of court, unlike a judicial authority, has no power to order the
commitment of a person charged with a penal offense. 23
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas aptly pointed out that where a judge is not
available, the arresting officer is duty-bound to release a detained person, if the
maximum hours for detention provided under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
had already expired. Failure to cause the release may result in an offense under the
Code, to wit:
ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding articles shall be imposed
upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal
ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within
the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties,
or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the accused and
his relatives. But as an officer of the court, he should be aware that by issuing such
detention order, he trampled upon a fundamental human right of the accused.
Because of the unauthorized order issued by respondent, the accused Edilberto
Albior was deprived of liberty without due process of law for a total of 56 days,
counted from his unlawful detention on January 27, 1999 until the issuance of the
appropriate order of commitment by the municipal judge on March 25, 1999.
Thus, the Court cannot condone nor take lightly the serious violation committed by
the respondent. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution mandates:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Underscoring ours)
Once again, it bears emphasizing that the behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the clerk
of lowest rank, should be circumscribed with a high degree of responsibility. 24 Their
conduct at all times must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but
above all else must be in accordance with the Constitution and the law. A clerk of
court, such as herein respondent, is a ranking and essential officer in the judicial
system. His office is the hub of activities. He performs delicate administrative
functions essential to the prompt and proper administration of justice. 25
Respondent needs no reminder that as an important officer in the dispensation of
justice, one of his primary duties is to uphold the fundamental law of the land. His
defense that he is not a lawyer or law graduate and so is excusably ignorant of the
legal implications of his detention order, deserves scant consideration. Ignorance of
the law excuses no one from compliance therewith, especially a clerk of court who
ought to know better than an ordinary layman.
This Court has assiduously condemned any omission or act which tends to
undermine the faith and trust of the people in the judiciary. 26 The Court cannot
countenance any act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would violate the norms of public accountability and
diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary. 27
The respondent’s issuance of the detention order not only deprived the accused of
liberty, it also considerably diminished the people’s faith in the judiciary. For the
very officer of the court on whom they depended to safeguard their human and
constitutional rights was also the one who violated these rights. Respondent should
be mindful of his ineluctable duty, as a ranking officer in the judicial system, to
ensure that basic rights are protected.
In conclusion, we agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is liable as
charged administratively. But we disagree with its recommendation that respondent
be merely meted out the penalty of a fine. We cannot treat lightly the actions of the
respondent for he has admitted doing them repeatedly, in fact many times in the past.
The implication of his action as an official of the court is not only disturbing but
shocking, for it involves no less than a violation of the constitutional right to liberty.
We hold that respondent’s unauthorized issuance of the detention order and his
failure to inform the Presiding Judge about said order constitute not merely gross
neglect of duty but outright grave misconduct.
Misconduct is a violation of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly unlawful behaviour as well as gross negligence by the public officer. To
warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be serious, important,
weighty, momentous and not trifling. It must also have direct relation to, and
connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of
the office.28 Because of the order for the arrest of the accused and resultant
confinement in police custody, the respondent unduly usurped the judicial
prerogative of the judge, and such usurpation is equivalent to grave misconduct. 29
In a previous case, we found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct for issuing a
Release Order without the knowledge and signature of the Presiding Judge
concerned.30 In another, we ruled that the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct
warranting dismissal from the service when he issued a warrant of arrest without any
order coming from the court that caused the accused to be illegally confined for three
(3) days.31 In both cases we held that though the respondents might have been moved
by compassion and might have acted in good faith, the respondent’s actuations could
not be condoned, for the committed acts constituted a serious infringement of, and
encroachment upon, judicial authority.
In our view, the present case cannot be treated with leniency, especially in light of
the fact that respondent herein admitted he issued detention orders countless times in
the past. In accordance with precedents and Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 19, series of 1999,32 the appropriate penalty to be imposed on
respondent is dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, respondent DONATO AUGUIS, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, Branch
4 at Talibon-Getafe, Talibon, Bohol, is hereby found administratively liable for
issuing the assailed detention order without lawful authority, as well as failing to
inform the Presiding Judge of that court regarding such order, thus committing
GRAVE MISCONDUCT in the discharge of official functions. He is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits and privileges,
except earned leave credits if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in the
government including government owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one
which this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be
expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all,
the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the
basic principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount
purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a government, were
constituted. The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of
the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which
might prove profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are
these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had
been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October
16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the
district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly
perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao,
Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At
any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the
chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban,
descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and
placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given
no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression
that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no
knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked
if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given
their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the
steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of
Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for
Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were
landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of
Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and
the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification
that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The
further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged
ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case.
Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or
less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities,
others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means
to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and
the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a
considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a
member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of
the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila
to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be
considered as including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need
not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty
by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of
the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable
before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and
Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and
prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper
parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for
Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any
of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not
extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached
to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good
salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal
admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been
sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of
November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the
province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacenderoof Davao, to bring before the
court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December
2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own
expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the
clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order,
December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were
produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had
been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the
police and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated
the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to
the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the
provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed
between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and
offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in
Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging
that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women
had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of
Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent
Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control
and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due
deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that
the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the
court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the
women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann,
Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written
statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk
of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some
other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the
question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be
decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women,
of certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was
taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of
the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13,
1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had
returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought
to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once
again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons
involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents,
through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with
their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on
notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced
the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by
other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located.
Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda.
The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando
Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo,
an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and
Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal
requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents'
memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ
of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy
women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and
without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were
forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite
the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was
not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the
constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the
shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible
to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority
of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by
duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine
Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an
Act of congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens
after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and
section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the
conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common
prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who
may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States
have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women
convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health
authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in
the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search
in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor
of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the
Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society
are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically
punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation,
compels any person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so
important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the
American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in
jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a
constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even
the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power
than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or
express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a
sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere
behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen
so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other
municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take
to themselves such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any
official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do
so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one
locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over
the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall
be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs,
or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him
nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We
will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right."
(Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no
matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to
safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said
Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is
the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by
accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to
submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the
exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.)
"The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case,
"that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any
material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to
be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery
itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the
motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very
beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a
government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine
Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies
of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may
recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an
action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation
as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands
provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than
two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the
judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and
twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a
general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change
his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less
than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and
fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting
officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these
prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they
have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a
crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the
instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later
be referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by
one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer
that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until
the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal
procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ
of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on
the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three
specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there
is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume
jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by
respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief
of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they
could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were
relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the
city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus.
It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf.
(Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law,
in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to
grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a
person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be
made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in
court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of
First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a
general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience,
petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of
first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the
Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or
before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent
on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of
First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which
to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the
petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney,
were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts
of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of
their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must
be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure
of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have
amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When
the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were
under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction
of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first
blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is
found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from
Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who
deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion
just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either
money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of
going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila
continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until
they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The
chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally
take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and
then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and
claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no
jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that,
if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey
the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally
parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no
authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the
same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to
Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to
restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to
avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright
of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily
evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for
decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities
fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are
however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date
as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to
a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child
under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in
another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was
notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and
Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided.
Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be
quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers,
with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the
opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the
English decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a
contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice
Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the
present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and
a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its
establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech
on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no
sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of
right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion
of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of
the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be
determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can
not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of
imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to
the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's
bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes
were not passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which
existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ
is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It
does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves
it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves
him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the
writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted
to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary
mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only
auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not
important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the
power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of
affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the
state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the
power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of
Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other
courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo.,
117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had
been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by
the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband
directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant
until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that
the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that
it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey
the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord
Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That
writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in
chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ,
together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command to bring
the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be
shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason
of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the
writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that might be an
answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child,
and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without
lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of
contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at
some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what
was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a
contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child in
obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See
also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N.
S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was
directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia
three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the
writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of
Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of
Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then
beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis
had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas
corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was
bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to
produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he
should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The
court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the
negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland.
Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis
[1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly
[1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered
by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas
corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders
of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they
did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco
Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court
on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents
were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far
as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of
November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According
to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief,
there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should
not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort
naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on
the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were
open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of
sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or
(3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They
did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they
did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that
waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped
affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in
Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to
the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at
least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in
the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own
expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been
warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in
sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-
production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein
pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude
a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the
Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that,
having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the
consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child
back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must
advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do
everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court would only
accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the
return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the
respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it
did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between
executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents
another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become
more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao,
placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding
up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While
charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and
while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with
our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our
finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this
unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it
should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still
restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas
corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance
with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of
Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo,
an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative
and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of
justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain
person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to
vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must
order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a
person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a
contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In
re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human
imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception
of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its
authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the
orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not
exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance.
The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a
misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto
Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal
representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the
court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for
the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted.
When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was
primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to
accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary,
who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head
of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the
unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila.
His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were
unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only
tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance
thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as
P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal
with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern
view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply
substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the
first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between
the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban
to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the
administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered
only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect
without being unduly oppressive — such an amount is P100.
In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is
necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz
are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of
court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days
the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila
to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January
25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express
the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly
government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.
Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.
Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The undersigned does not entirely agree to the opinion of the majority in the decision
of the habeas corpusproceeding against Justo Lukban, the mayor of this city.
There is nothing in the record that shows the motive which impelled Mayor Lukban
to oblige a great number of women of various ages, inmates of the houses of
prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, district of Sampaloc, to change their
residence.
We know no express law, regulation, or ordinance which clearly prohibits the
opening of public houses of prostitution, as those in the said Gardenia Street,
Sampaloc. For this reason, when more than one hundred and fifty women were
assembled and placed aboard a steamer and transported to Davao, considering that
the existence of the said houses of prostitution has been tolerated for so long a time,
it is undeniable that the mayor of the city, in proceeding in the manner shown, acted
without authority of any legal provision which constitutes an exception to the laws
guaranteeing the liberty and the individual rights of the residents of the city of
Manila.
We do not believe in the pomp and obstentation of force displayed by the police in
complying with the order of the mayor of the city; neither do we believe in the
necessity of taking them to the distant district of Davao. The said governmental
authority, in carrying out his intention to suppress the segregated district or the
community formed by those women in Gardenia Street, could have obliged the said
women to return to their former residences in this city or in the provinces, without
the necessity of transporting them to Mindanao; hence the said official is obliged to
bring back the women who are still in Davao so that they may return to the places in
which they lived prior to their becoming inmates of certain houses in Gardenia
Street.
As regards the manner whereby the mayor complied with the orders of this court, we
do not find any apparent disobedience and marked absence of respect in the steps
taken by the mayor of the city and his subordinates, if we take into account the
difficulties encountered in bringing the said women who were free at Davao and
presenting them before this court within the time fixed, inasmuch as it does not
appear that the said women were living together in a given place. It was not because
they were really detained, but because on the first days there were no houses in
which they could live with a relative independent from one another, and as a proof
that they were free a number of them returned to Manila and the others succeeded in
living separate from their companions who continued living together.
To determine whether or not the mayor acted with a good purpose and legal object
and whether he has acted in good or bad faith in proceeding to dissolve the said
community of prostitutes and to oblige them to change their domicile, it is necessary
to consider not only the rights and interests of the said women and especially of the
patrons who have been directing and conducting such a reproachable enterprise and
shameful business in one of the suburbs of this city, but also the rights and interests
of the very numerous people of Manila where relatively a few transients accidentally
and for some days reside, the inhabitants thereof being more than three hundred
thousand (300,000) who can not, with indifference and without repugnance, live in
the same place with so many unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution.
If the material and moral interests of the community as well as the demands of social
morality are to be taken into account, it is not possible to sustain that it is legal and
permissible to establish a house of pandering or prostitution in the midst of an
enlightened population, for, although there were no positive laws prohibiting the
existence of such houses within a district of Manila, the dictates of common sense
and dictates of conscience of its inhabitants are sufficient to warrant the public
administration, acting correctly, in exercising the inevitable duty of ordering the
closing and abandonment of a house of prostitution ostensibly open to the public,
and of obliging the inmates thereof to leave it, although such a house is inhabited by
its true owner who invokes in his behalf the protection of the constitutional law
guaranteeing his liberty, his individual rights, and his right to property.
A cholera patient, a leper, or any other person affected by a known contagious
disease cannot invoke in his favor the constitutional law which guarantees his liberty
and individual rights, should the administrative authority order his hospitalization,
reclusion, or concentration in a certain island or distant point in order to free from
contagious the great majority of the inhabitants of the country who fortunately do not
have such diseases. The same reasons exist or stand good with respect to the
unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution, and such reasons become stronger
because the first persons named have contracted their diseases without their
knowledge and even against their will, whereas the unfortunate prostitutes
voluntarily adopted such manner of living and spontaneously accepted all its
consequences, knowing positively that their constant intercourse with men of all
classes, notwithstanding the cleanliness and precaution which they are wont to adopt,
gives way to the spread or multiplication of the disease known as syphilis, a venereal
disease, which, although it constitutes a secret disease among men and women, is
still prejudicial to the human species in the same degree, scope, and seriousness as
cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, pest, typhoid, and other contagious diseases which
produce great mortality and very serious prejudice to poor humanity.
If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or works suitable to her sex,
which can give her sufficient remuneration for her subsistence, prefers to put herself
under the will of another woman who is usually older than she is and who is the
manager or owner of a house of prostitution, or spontaneously dedicates herself to
this shameful profession, it is undeniable that she voluntarily and with her own
knowledge renounces her liberty and individual rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, because it is evident that she can not join the society of decent women
nor can she expect to get the same respect that is due to the latter, nor is it possible
for her to live within the community or society with the same liberty and rights
enjoyed by every citizen. Considering her dishonorable conduct and life, she should
therefore be comprised within that class which is always subject to the police and
sanitary regulations conducive to the maintenance of public decency and morality
and to the conservation of public health, and for this reason it should not permitted
that the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution evade the just orders and
resolutions adopted by the administrative authorities.
It is regrettable that unnecessary rigor was employed against the said poor women,
but those who have been worrying so much about the prejudice resulting from a
governmental measure, which being a very drastic remedy may be considered
arbitrary, have failed to consider with due reflection the interests of the inhabitants of
this city in general and particularly the duties and responsibilities weighing upon the
authorities which administer and govern it; they have forgotten that many of those
who criticize and censure the mayor are fathers of families and are in duty bound to
take care of their children.
For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that when the petitioners, because
of the abnormal life they assumed, were obliged to change their residence not by a
private citizen but by the mayor of the city who is directly responsible for the
conservation of public health and social morality, the latter could take the step he had
taken, availing himself of the services of the police in good faith and only with the
purpose of protecting the immense majority of the population from the social evils
and diseases which the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street have been
producing, which houses have been constituting for years a true center for the
propagation of general diseases and other evils derived therefrom. Hence, in ordering
the dissolution and abandonment of the said houses of prostitution and the change of
the domicile of the inmates thereof, the mayor did not in bad faith violate the
constitutional laws which guarantees the liberty and the individual rights of every
Filipino, inasmuch as the women petitioners do not absolutely enjoy the said liberty
and rights, the exercise of which they have voluntarily renounced in exchange for the
free practice of their shameful profession.
In very highly advanced and civilized countries, there have been adopted by the
administrative authorities similar measures, more or less rigorous, respecting
prostitutes, considering them prejudicial to the people, although it is true that in the
execution of such measures more humane and less drastic procedures, fortiter in re et
suaviter in forma, have been adopted, but such procedures have always had in view
the ultimate object of the Government for the sake of the community, that is, putting
an end to the living together in a certain place of women dedicated to prostitution
and changing their domicile, with the problematical hope that they adopt another
manner of living which is better and more useful to themselves and to society.
In view of the foregoing remarks, we should hold, as we hereby hold, that Mayor
Justo Lukban is obliged to take back and restore the said women who are at present
found in Davao, and who desire to return to their former respective residences, not in
Gardenia Street, Sampaloc District, with the exception of the prostitutes who should
expressly make known to the clerk of court their preference to reside in Davao,
which manifestation must be made under oath. This resolution must be transmitted to
the mayor within the shortest time possible for its due compliance. The costs shall be
charged de officio.
ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:
I regret to dissent from the respectable opinion of the majority in the decision
rendered in these proceedings, with respect to the finding as to the importance of the
contempt committed, according to the same decision, by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the
city of Manila, and the consequent imposition upon him of a nominal fine of P100.
In the said decision, it is said:
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco
Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court
on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents
were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far
as the record disclosed, the mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of
November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According
to the response of the Attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief,
there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should
not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort
naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on
the day named.
In accordance with section 87 of General Orders No. 58, as said in the same
decision, the respondents, for the purpose of complying with the order of the court,
could have, (1) produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the
writ; (2) shown by affidavits that on account of sickness or infirmity the said women
could not safely be brought before this court; and (3) presented affidavits to show
that the parties in question or their lawyers waived their right to be present.
According to the same decision, the said respondents ". . . did not produce the bodies
of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; did not show impossibility of
performance; and did not present writings, that waived the right to be present by
those interested. Instead, a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the
women were contented with their life in Davao, some of which have since been
repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary
diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been
brought back to Manila is demonstrated by the fact that during this time they were
easily to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either
returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the
respondents."
The majority opinion also recognized that, "That court, at the time the return to its
first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the
respondent guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed
the order. Their excuses for the non production of the persons were far from
sufficient." To corroborate this, the majority decision cites the case of the
Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case ([1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283) and added "that the
return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the
respondents."
When the said return by the respondents was made to this court in banc and the case
discussed, my opinion was that Mayor Lukban should have been immediately
punished for contempt. Nevertheless, a second order referred to in the decision was
issued on December 10, 1918, requiring the respondents to produce before the court,
on January 13, 1919, the women who were not in Manila, unless they could show
that it was impossible to comply with the said order on the two grounds previously
mentioned. With respect to this second order, the same decision has the following to
say:
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become
more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao,
placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding
up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While
charges and countercharges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and
while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with
our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it.
I do not agree to this conclusion.
The respondent mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, let 17 days elapse from
the date of the issuance of the first order on November 4th till the 21st of the same
month before taking the first step for compliance with the mandate of the said order;
he waited till the 21st of November, as the decision says, before he sent a telegram to
the provincial governor o f Davao and naturally this half-hearted effort, as is so
qualified in the decision, resulted in that none of the women appeared before this
court on December 2nd. Thus, the said order was not complied with, and in addition
to this noncompliance there was the circumstances that seven of the said women
having returned to Manila at their own expense before the said second day of
December and being in the antechamber of the court room, which fact was known to
Chief of Police Hohmann, who was then present at the trial and to the attorney for
the respondents, were not produced before the court by the respondents nor did the
latter show any effort to present them, in spite of the fact that their attention was
called to this particular by the undersigned.
The result of the said second order was, as is said in the same decision, that the
respondents, on January 13th, the day fixed for the protection of the women before
this court, presented technically the seven (7) women above-mentioned who had
returned to the city at their own expense and the other eight (8) women whom the
respondents themselves brought to Manila, alleging moreover that their agents and
subordinates succeeded in bringing them from Davao with their consent; that in
Davao they found eighty-one (81) women who, when asked if they desired to return
to Manila with free transportation, renounced such a right, as is shown in the
affidavits presented by the respondents to this effect; that, through other means, fifty-
nine (59) women have already returned to Manila, but notwithstanding the efforts
made to find them it was not possible to locate the whereabouts of twenty-six (26) of
them. Thus, in short, out of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who, as
has been previously said, have been illegally detained by Mayor Lukban and Chief
of Police Hohmann and transported to Davao against their will, only eight (8) have
been brought to Manila and presented before this court by the respondents in
compliance with the said two orders. Fifty-nine (59) of them have returned to Manila
through other means not furnished by the respondents, twenty-six of whom were
brought by the attorney for the petitioners, Mendoza, on his return from Davao. The
said attorney paid out of his own pocket the transportation of the said twenty-six
women. Adding to these numbers the other seven (7) women who returned to this
city at their own expense before January 13 we have a total of sixty-six (66), which
evidently proves, on the one hand, the falsity of the allegation by the respondents in
their first answer at the trial of December 2, 1918, giving as one of the reasons for
their inability to present any of the said women that the latter were content with their
life in Mindanao and did not desire to return to Manila; and, on the other hand, that
the respondents, especially the first named, that is Mayor Justo Lukban, who acted as
chief and principal in all that refers to the compliance with the orders issued by this
court, could bring before December 2nd, the date of the first hearing of the case, as
well as before January 13th, the date fixed for the compliance with the second order,
if not the seventy-four (74) women already indicated, at least a great number of
them, or at least sixty (60) of them, as is said in the majority decision, inasmuch as
the said respondent could count upon the aid of the Constabulary forces and the
municipal police, and had transportation facilities for the purpose. But the said
respondent mayor brought only eight (8) of the women before this court on January
13th. This fact can not, in my judgment, with due respect to the majority opinion,
justify the conclusion that the said respondent has substantially complied with the
second order of this court, but on the other hand demonstrates that he had not
complied with the mandate of this court in its first and second orders; that neither of
the said orders has been complied with by the respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of
the city of Manila, who is, according to the majority decision, principally responsible
for the contempt, to which conclusion I agree. The conduct of the said respondent
with respect to the second order confirms the contempt committed by non-
compliance with the first order and constitutes a new contempt because of non-
compliance with the second, because of the production of only eight (8) of the one
hundred and eighty-one (181) women who have been illegally detained by virtue of
his order and transported to Davao against their will, committing the twenty-six (26)
women who could not be found in Davao, demonstrates in my opinion that,
notwithstanding the nature of the case which deals with the remedy of habeas
corpus, presented by the petitioners and involving the question whether they should
or not be granted their liberty, the respondent has not given due attention to the same
nor has he made any effort to comply with the second order. In other words, he has
disobeyed the said two orders; has despised the authority of this court; has failed to
give the respect due to justice; and lastly, he has created and placed obstacles to the
administration of justice in the said habeas corpus proceeding, thus preventing,
because of his notorious disobedience, the resolution of the said proceeding with the
promptness which the nature of the same required.
Contempt of court has been defined as a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity
of the court; and he is guilty of contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard. . . ." (Ruling
Case Law, vol. 6, p. 488.)
It is a general principle that a disobedience of any valid order of the court constitutes
contempt, unless the defendant is unable to comply therewith. (Ruling Case Law,
vol. 6, p. 502.)
It is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the judgment of the court, or to
obstruct or attempt to obstruct the service of legal process. If a person hinders or
prevents the service of process by deceiving the officer or circumventing him by any
means, the result is the same as though he had obstructed by some direct means.
(Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 503.)
While it may seem somewhat incongruous to speak, as the courts often do, of
enforcing respect for the law and for the means it has provided in civilized
communities for establishing justice, since true respect never comes in that way, it is
apparent nevertheless that the power to enforce decorum in the courts and obedience
to their orders and just measures is so essentially a part of the life of the courts that it
would be difficult to conceive of their usefulness or efficiency as existing without it.
Therefore it may be said generally that where due respect for the courts as ministers
of the law is wanting, a necessity arises for the use of compulsion, not, however, so
much to excite individual respect as to compel obedience or to remove an unlawful
or unwarranted interference with the administration of justice. (Ruling Case Law,
vol. 6, p. 487.)
The power to punish for contempt is as old as the law itself, and has been exercised
from the earliest times. In England it has been exerted when the contempt consisted
of scandalizing the sovereign or his ministers, the law-making power, or the courts.
In the American states the power to punish for contempt, so far as the executive
department and the ministers of state are concerned, and in some degree so far as the
legislative department is concerned, is obsolete, but it has been almost universally
preserved so far as regards the judicial department. The power which the courts have
of vindicating their own authority is a necessary incident to every court of justice,
whether of record or not; and the authority for issuing attachments in a proper case
for contempts out of court, it has been declared, stands upon the same immemorial
usage as supports the whole fabric of the common law. . . . (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6,
p. 489.)
The undisputed importance of the orders of this court which have been disobeyed;
the loss of the prestige of the authority of the court which issued the said orders,
which loss might have been caused by noncompliance with the same orders on the
part of the respondent Justo Lukban; the damages which might have been suffered by
some of the women illegally detained, in view of the fact that they were not brought
to Manila by the respondents to be presented before the court and of the further fact
that some of them were obliged to come to this city at their own expense while still
others were brought to Manila by the attorney for the petitioners, who paid out of his
own pocket the transportation of the said women; and the delay which was
necessarily incurred in the resolution of the petition interposed by the said petitioners
and which was due to the fact that the said orders were not opportunately and duly
obeyed and complied with, are circumstances which should be taken into account in
imposing upon the respondent Justo Lukban the penalty corresponding to the
contempt committed by him, a penalty which, according to section 236 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, should consist of a fine not exceeding P1,000 or imprisonment
not exceeding months, or both such fine and imprisonment. In the imposition of the
penalty, there should also be taken into consideration the special circumstance that
the contempt was committed by a public authority, the mayor of the city of Manila,
the first executive authority of the city, and consequently, the person obliged to be
the first in giving an example of obedience and respect for the laws and the valid and
just orders of the duly constituted authorities as well as for the orders emanating
from the courts of justice, and in giving help and aid to the said courts in order that
justice may be administered with promptness and rectitude.

I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there should
be imposed upon the respondent Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred pesos (P500),
and all the costs should be charged against him. Lastly, I believe it to be my duty to
state here that the records of this proceeding should be transmitted to the Attorney-
General in order that, after a study of the same and deduction from the testimony
which he may deem necessary, and the proper transmittal of the same to the fiscal of
the city of Manila and to the provincial fiscal of Davao, both the latter shall present
the corresponding informations for the prosecution and punishment of the crimes
which have been committed on the occasion when the illegal detention of the women
was carried into effect by Mayor Justo Lukban of the city of Manila and Chief of
Police Anton Hohmann, and also of those crimes committed by reason of the same
detention and while the women were in Davao. This will be one of the means
whereby the just hope expressed in the majority decision will be realized, that is, that
in the Philippine Islands there should exist a government of laws and not a
government of men and that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of
an orderly Government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
encroachments.
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J.
BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER,
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker
P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants
issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive
Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the
premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and
office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other
articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as
well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be
in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the
"We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents,
"particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge
Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives,
assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using
the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other
accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the
petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for
hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor
General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners'
prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents
"will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until
final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles.
..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was
rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that
petitioners had come to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of
the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning
the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash
said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and
urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest
generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel
7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special
circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In
the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza
v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its
rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of
justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches.
Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on
December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June
16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the
filing of the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation]
with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after
the petitioners' premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this
long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other
remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in
this country, from release of public funds to release of detained persons from
custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the
President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel
Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles.
And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief
Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were
further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to
Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system,
We find no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the
contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the
presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized
property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used
and marked as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q-
022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We
do not follow the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal
bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way
affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search
warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination
under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the
above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court .6 This objection, however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as
petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an
examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and
his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct
places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution
of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two
search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No.
20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing
the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and
concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search
warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search
two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to
have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses
of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and
since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search
warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is
more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20-
82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said
warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when
he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be
searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's
prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem
to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the
warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant
intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the
executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an
ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although
the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his
co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services,
Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that
may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by
the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned
by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the
properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be
owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the
search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient
that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the
property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in
relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized
under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the
owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v.
Castillo9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any
other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or
building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries
in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible
to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application
of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The
application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and
Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group
under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the
filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could
not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a
warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And
when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or
editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at
bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is
intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement
in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control
printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents
which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the
offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended
..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement
contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that
the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above-
mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are
continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote
the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement
for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less
than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which
the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First
Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making
the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before
respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in
Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters,
cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper
and any and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to
the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to
promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong
Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for
"books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings
and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was
declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner,
directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or
otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which
authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-
197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The
description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question
cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in
English history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English
Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where
they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic
and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is
not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that
speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger
to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of
the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the
search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result
that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the
freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a
virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of
being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even
militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the
ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person,
natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the government and its
duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and regulations
as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if
sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any implementing
rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no
less than President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to
sequester the property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of
the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information
Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in
Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the
premises.
Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at
the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further
confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated
February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President
Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated
February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our
authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and
materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b]
issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void
and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the
return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are
hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring
I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the same
time I wish to state my own reasons for holding that the search warrants which are
the subject of the petition are utterly void.
The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom for the
search warrants were issued in gross violation of the Constitution.
The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses
two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126
Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)
Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will
result in wiping "out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in
our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)
The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the
requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be alleged in the application;
abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing specifically subversive
has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being used as
instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the
decree. I n the words of Chief Justice C Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the
highest order, to convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any
determinate provision thereof.
The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants
authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and take possession, among other things, of
the following:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to promote
the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for
Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.
The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc.
subversive? What did they contain to make them subversive? There is nothing in the
applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore,
conclude that the warrants are general warrants which are obnoxious to the
Constitution.
In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as
there is nothing subversive which has been published in MALAYA which has
replaced the former and has the same content but against which no action has been
taken.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the warrants
should be returned to the owners and all of the items are subject to the exclusionary
rule of evidence.
Teehankee, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring
I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the same
time I wish to state my own reasons for holding that the search warrants which are
the subject of the petition are utterly void.
The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom for the
search warrants were issued in gross violation of the Constitution.
The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses
two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126
Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)
The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants
authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and take possession, among other things, of
the following:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to promote
the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for
Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.
The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc.
subversive? What did they contain to make them subversive? There is nothing in the
applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore,
conclude that the warrants are general warrants which are obnoxious to the
Constitution.
In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as
there is nothing subversive which has been published in MALAYA which has
replaced the former and has the same content but against which no action has been
taken.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the warrants
should be returned to the owners and all of the items are subject to the exclusionary
rule of evidence.
Teehankee, J., concur.

Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will
result in wiping "out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in
our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)

The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the
requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be alleged in the application;
abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing specifically subversive
has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being used as
instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the
decree. I n the words of Chief Justice C Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the
highest order, to convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any
determinate provision thereof.
G.R. No. 112235 November 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIAS LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, defendant-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from
the Daraga, Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a
.45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired.
The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot
the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun,
the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled. 1
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta,
a 25 year old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim
and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the
deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew (appellant's father was his first
cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the latter was a
resident of Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on
the face, the chest, and other parts of the body.2 On autopsy, the municipal health
officer established the cause of death as hypovolemic shock.3
As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay, on
November 6, 1992 filed an Information charging accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro
y Castro of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already charged in Crim. Case No. 5931
before RTC, Branch I, and three (3) others whose true identities are at present
unknown and remain at large, conniving, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga
Police Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing his death,
to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder. The dispositive portion of said decision, dated September 24,
1993 states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the
accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in
conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by
law; to pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs.
Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the
civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said
widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00)
Pesos, representing actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however, in
case of insolvency on the part of the said accused.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion of trial
court decision finding him guilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion.
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta,
as supporting his claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion,
not murder. In his Brief, he asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified
him as a member of the New People's Army. Additionally, he contends that because
the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends," 4 (said
killing) should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134
and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal
shot but merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he
should have been charged merely as a participant in the commission of the crime of
rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and should
therefore have been meted only the penalty of prison mayor by the lower court.
Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder, the
Solicitor General avers that the crime committed by appellant may be considered as
rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent
for the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive ends." 5 Moreover,
the Solicitor General contends that even if appellant were to be convicted of
rebellion, and even if the trial court had found appellant guilty merely of being a
participant in a rebellion, the proper imposable penalty is not prision mayor as
appellant contends, but reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as
amended by Republic Act
No. 6968, the Coup D'etat Law, prescribes reclusion temporal as the penalty
imposable for individuals found guilty as participants in a rebellion.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was murder and not
rebellion.
Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968,
rebellion is committed in the following manner:
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or partially,
of any of their powers or prerogatives.6
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the
government.7 By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or
multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a prioriwithin
predetermined bounds.8 One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that
other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself
because they acquire a political character. This peculiarity was underscored in the
case of People v. Hernandez,9 thus:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well
as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The
decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like
homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the
Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof," then it
becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of
the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave,
assumes a different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a
lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding if the crime committed is
rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or
not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act
should be conclusively demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense,
motive, being a state of mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows.
Thus, in People v. Gempes,10 this court stressed that:
Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused's) knowledge and since
moreover this is an affirmative defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least to
state, which they could easily do personally or through witnesses, that they killed the
deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement.
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of
rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of
the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does
not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc.,
were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it
has been held that the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and
would not be absorbed by the crime rebellion.11
Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a
common crime — alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable
penalty — could benefit from the law's relatively benign attitude towards political
crimes. Instructive in this regard is the case of Enrile v.
Amin,12 where the prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan Ponce Enrile with
violation of P.D. No. 1829,13 for allegedly harboring or concealing in his home Col.
Gregorio Honasan in spite of the senator's knowledge that Honasan might have
committed a crime. This Court held, against the prosecution's contention, that
rebellion and violation of P.D 1829 could be tried separately14 (on the principle that
rebellion is based on the Revised Penal Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that
the act for which the senator was being charged, though punishable under a special
law, was absorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated by, and related to the
acts for which he was charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164) a
case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor of Senator Enrile and holding that the
prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a separate
prosecution for rebellion had already been filed and in fact decided, the Court said:
The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that the
theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but
also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the
political offense.15
Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court in Enrile
vs. Amin further underscored that:
[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with
rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is
a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if
the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of
rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of
being punished separately.
It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused
should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion,
motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the
furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.
The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v. Ompad, Jr.,16 to the
instant case is striking. Two witnesses, both former NPA recruits identified the
accused Ompad, alias "Commander Brando," a known hitman of the NPA, as having
led three other members of the NPA in the liquidation of Dionilo Barlaan, a military
informer, also in a rebel infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA hitman,
Ompad was merely charged with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because
political motive was neither alleged nor proved.
As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a
political motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the
information.17 It must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence. In People
v. Paz and Tica we held:
That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or
defense that the accused has the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily. The
lone uncorroborated assertion of appellant that his superiors told him of Dayrit being
an informer, and his suspicion that he was one such, is neither sufficient or adequate
to establish that the motivation for the killing was political, considering appellant's
obvious interest in testifying to that effect.18
Similarly, in People v. Buco,19 the Court stressed that accused in that case failed to
establish that the reason for the killing of their victim was to further or carry out
rebellion. The evidence adduced by the defense therein simply showed that appellant
Francisco Buco was ordered by Tomas Calma, alias "Commander Sol" to kill
municipal mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence likewise showed that
Calma was induced by an acquaintance, a civilian, to order the killing on account of
private differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land. The court attributed no
political motive for the killing, though committed by known members of the
Hukbalahap movement.20
People v. Dasig21 has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant case. There, the
Court held that "the act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is
a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of a rebellion." In Dasig the Court however noted that the accused, who
was charged with murder, not only admitted his membership with the NPA but also
executed an extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a member of an NPA
"sparrow unit," a fact to which even the Solicitor General, in his brief therein was in
agreement. The Solicitor General's brief in Dasig which this Court favorably quoted,
noted that:
[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the
objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to
comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.22
By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different result in the case
at bench. He states that accused-appellant's belated claims to membership in the NPA
were not only insubstantial but also self serving23 an averment to which, given a
thorough review of the circumstances of the case, we fully agree. He states:
[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA, clearly overcame
the burden of proving motive or intent. It was shown that the political motivation for
the killing of the victim was the fact that Ragaul was suspected as an informer for the
PC. The perpetrators even left a letter card, a drawing on the body of Ragaul as a
warning to others not to follow his example. It is entirely different in the case at bar
where the evidence for the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and
denials not substantial enough as an indicia of political motivation in the killing of
victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo.24
In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his extrajudicial
confession to having participated in the killing of Lucilo as follows:
Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?
A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three male person a
certain alias ALWIN, ALIAS SAMUEL and the other one unknown to me, fetched
me and told me to go with them, so I asked them where, Alwin handed me a hand
gun and same he stopped/call a passenger jeepney and told me board on said
jeepney. (sic)
Q Please continue.
A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station, we alighted on
said jeep, so we walk towards Daraga Bakery we stopped walking due to it is
raining, when the rain stopped we continue walking by using the road near the
bakery. (sic)
Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q. 7 you used the road near
the bakery where did you proceed?
A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion continue walking, at
more less 4:30 P.M. July 27, 1992 one of my companion told us as to quote in Bicol
dialect, to wit: "AMO NA YADI AN TINAMPO PALUWAS" (This is the place
towards the poblacion), so, I placed myself just ahead of a small store, my three (3)
companions continue walking towards poblacion, later on a policeman sporting
white T-shirt and a khaki pant was walking towards me, while the said policeman is
nearly approaching me, ALWIN shot the said policeman in front of the small store,
when the said policeman fell on the asphalted road, ALWIN took the service firearm
of the said policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision, then my two (2)
companions commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a hill wherein there
is a small bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel took the handgun that was handed to me by
them at Pilar, Sorsogon. (sic)
Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your companion?
A I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard it radio, that he is
JESUS LUCILO. (sic)
Q What is your participation in the group?
A Look-out sir.
Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any? (sic)
A No more sir.25
It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did appellant
ever mention that he was a member of the New People's Army. A thorough reading
of the same reveals nothing which would suggest that the killing in which he was a
participant was motivated by a political purpose. Moreover, the information filed
against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any mention or allusion
as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo. 26 Even prosecution
eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn statement of
October 19, 1992.27
As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant's membership in the NPA
surfaced almost merely as an afterthought, something which the defense merely
picked up and followed through upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta's testimony
on cross-examination that he knew appellant to be a member of the NPA.
Interestingly, however, in the same testimony, Armenta admitted that he was
"forced" to pinpoint appellant as an NPA member.28The logical result, of course, was
that the trial court did not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The trial
court, after all, had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness' testimony
while upholding the rest of it.29While disbelieving the portion of Armenta's
testimony on appellant's alleged membership in the NPA, the trial court correctly
gave credence to his unflawed narration about how the crime was committed. 30 Such
narration is even corroborated in its pertinent portions, except as to the identity of the
gun wielder, by the testimony of the appellant himself.
In any case, appellant's claim regarding the political color attending the commission
of the crime being a matter of defense, its viability depends on his sole and
unsupported testimony. He testified that, upon the prodding of aliasAlwin
and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of the organization's
goals.31 He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo because he "had offended
our organization,"32 without, however, specifying what the "offense" was. Appellant
claimed that he had been a member of the NPA for five months before the shooting
incident.33
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's contentions are couched
in terms so general and non-specific34 that they offer no explanation as to what
contribution the killing would have made towards the achievement of the NPA's
subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere policeman, was never alleged to be an
informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have offended the NPA. Against
appellant's attempts to shade his participation in the killing with a political color, the
evidence on record leaves the impression that appellant's bare allegations of
membership in the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable
upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested areas, crimes have been
all-too-quickly attributed to the furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of
political color for the purpose of mitigating the imposable penalty when in fact they
are no more than ordinary crimes perpetrated by common criminals. In Baylosis
v. Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice Narvasa aptly observed:
The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous bandits, or
irresponsible or deranged individuals, is a reality that cannot be ignored or belittled.
Their activities, the killings and acts of destruction and terrorism that they perpetrate,
unfortunately continue unabated despite the best efforts that the Government
authorities are exerting, although it may be true that the insurrectionist groups of the
right or the left no longer pose a genuine threat to the security of the state. The need
for more stringent laws and more rigorous law-enforcement, cannot be gainsaid.35

In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the
killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly convicted
appellant of the crime of murder.36 It is of no moment that a single eyewitness,
Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is settled that the testimony of one witness, if
credible and positive, is sufficient to convict.37 Against appellant's claims that he
acted merely as a look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative, free from
any signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the
accused.38Moreover, neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate the
appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does not preclude
conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified
appellant as the perpetrator of the felony.39 In the case at bench, the strength of the
prosecution's case was furthermore bolstered by accused-appellant's admission in
open court that he and the eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges against each
other.40

Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by
appellant was sudden, and without warning of any kind. 41 The killing having been
qualified by treachery, the crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial
court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all the
accessories provided by law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated

September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in
toto.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-8936. October 23, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FEDERICO
GERONIMO alias Cmdr. OSCAR, ET AL., Defendants, FEDERICO
GERONIMO alias Cmdr. OSCAR, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
In an information filed on June 24, 1954 by the provincial Fiscal in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, Appellant Federico Geronimo, together with Mariano P.
Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony, alias Tony Collante alias Taoic, alias Mang Pacio,
alias Bonny Abundio Romagosa alias David, Jesus Polita alias Rex, Jesus Lava alias
Jessie alias NMT, alias Balbas, alias Noli, alias Noli Metangere, alias NKVD, Juan
Ocompo alias Cmdr. Bundalian, alias Tagle, Rosendo Manuel alias Cmdr. Sendong,
alias Ruiz, Ernesto Herrero alias Cmdr. Ed, alias Rene, alias Eddy, Santiago Rotas
alias Cmdr. Jessie, Fernando Principe alias Cmdr. Manding, Alfredo Saguni alias
Godo, alias Terry, alias Terpy, Andres Diapera alias Maclang, alias Berto, alias
Teny, Lorenzo Saniel alias Wenny, Silvestre Sisno alias Tomo, alias Albert, Teodoro
Primavera alias Nestor, Lorenzo Roxas alias Argos, Vivencio Pineda alias Marquez,
Pedro Anino alias Fernandez, Mauro Llorera alias Justo, Richard Doe alias Cmdr.
Danny and John Doe alias Cmdr. Berion, alias Mayo, alias Cmdr. Paulito and many
others, were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies,
and kidnapping committed as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx xxx xxx
“That on or about May 28, 1946 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto
continuously up to the present time in the province of Camarines Sur, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and in other municipalities, cities
and provinces and other parts of the country where they have chosen to carry out
their rebellious activities, the above-named accused being then ranking officers
and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or otherwise
known as the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter being the armed force of said
Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) having come to an agreement and decide
to commit the crime of Rebellion, and therefore, conspiring together and
confederating among themselves with all of the thirty-one accused in criminal case
Nos. 14071, 14282, 14315, 14270, 15344 and with all the accused in criminal case
No. 19166 of the Court of First Instance of Manila with the other members, officers
and/or affiliates of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan and with many others whose identities and whereabouts are
still unknown, acting in accordance with their conspiracy and in furtherance thereof,
and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, help, support, promote, maintain, direct and/or command the
Hukbalahaps (HUKS) or the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB), to rise
publicly and take arms against the government of the Republic of the Philippines, or
otherwise participate in such public armed uprisings for the purpose of removing the
territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof as
in fact the said ‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps’
(HUKS) pursuant to such conspiracy, have risen publicly and taken arms against the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines to attain said purpose, by then and
there making armed raids, sorties, and ambuscades, attacks against the Philippine
Constabulary, the civilian guards, the Police and the Army Patrols and other
detachments as well as upon innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit
the crime of Rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then
and there committed wanton acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, kidnapping
and planned destructions of private and public property and plotted the liquidation of
government officials, to create and spread disorder, terror, confusion, chaos and fear
so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, among which are as
follows, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
‘1. That on or about April 28, 1949 at Kilometer 62 at Barrio Salubsob, municipality
of Nueva Ecija, an undetermined number of HUKS led by Commanders Viernes,
Marzan, Lupon and Mulong did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
ambush, assault, attack and fired upon the party of Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon and her
PC escort whom they considered as their enemies resulting in the killing of Mrs.
Aurora A. Quezon, Baby Quezon, Mayor Bernardo of Quezon City, Major P. San
Agustin, Lieutenant Lasam, Philip Buencamino III, and several soldiers and the
wounding of General Jalandoni and Captain Manalang.
‘2. That on or about August 26, 1950 in Santa Cruz, Laguna, about one hundred
armed HUKS with intent to gain and for the purpose of securing supplies and other
materials for the support and meintenance of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan
(HMBS) did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and forcibly
bringing the Cashier of the Provincial Treasury, Mr. Vicente Reventar from his
house to the Provincial Capitol and at the point of guns forced him to open the
Treasury Vault and took therefrom Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000) consisting of
various denominations and including Fifty, One hundred and Five-Hundred Peso
Bills and also took away with them type- writers and other Office supplies which
they found in the Provincial Capitol Building, burning and looting private buildings
in towns.
‘3. That on or about the years 1951 to 1952 in the municipality of Pasacao,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, a group of Armed Huks under Commander Rustum
raided the house of one Nemesio Palo, a police sergeant of Libmanan, Camarines Sur
and as a result, said HUKS were able to capture said Nemesio Palo and once
captured, with evident premeditation, treachery and intent to kill, stab, shot and cut
the neck of said Nemesio Palo thereby causing the instantaneous death of Nemesio
Palo.
‘4. That on or about January 31, 1953, at barrio of Santa Rita, Del Gallego,
Camarines Sur a group of HMBS with Federico Geronimo alias Commander Oscar
ambushed and fired upon an Army Patrol headed by Cpl. Bayrante, resulting in
seriously wounding of Pfc. Paneracio Torrado and Eusebio Gruta a civilian.
‘5. That on or about February 1954 at barrio Cotmo, San Fernando, Camarines Sur,
a group of four HMBS led by accused Commander Oscar with evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed one Policarpio Tipay a
barrio lieutenant.’“ (Appellee’s brief, pp. 1-8)
Accused Federico Geronimo first entered a plea of not guilty to the information.
When the case was called for trial on October 12, 1954, however, he asked the
permission of the court to substitute his original plea with one of guilty, and was
allowed to change his plea. On the basis of the plea of guilty, the fiscal
recommended that the penalty of life imprisonment be imposed upon the accused, his
voluntary plea of guilty being considered as a mitigating circumstance. Geronimo’s
counsel, on the other hand, argued that the penalty imposable upon the accused was
only prision mayor, for the reason that in his opinion, there is no such complex crime
as rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping, because the crimes of murders
robberies, and kidnapping being the natural consequences of the crime of rebellion,
the crime charged against the accused should be considered only as simple rebellion.
On October 18, 1954, the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of
the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand giving him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
pay a fine of P10,000, to indemnify the heirs of the various persons killed, as listed
in the information, in the sum of P6,000 each, and to pay the proportionate costs of
the proceedings. From this judgment, accused Federico Geronimo appealed, raising
the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is the complex crime of
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, or simple rebellion.
After mature consideration, a majority of seven justices 1 of this Court are of the
opinion that the issue posed by Appellant has been already decided in the recent
resolution of this Court in the case of People vs. Hernandez et al., (99 Phil.,
529; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary21 Lawyers Journal, No. 7 [July 31, 1956], p. 316).
As in treason, where both intent and overt act are necessary, the crime of rebellion is
integrated by the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes expressed
in article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence described in
the first paragraph of article 135. That both purpose and overt acts are essential
components of one crime, and that without either of them the crime of rebellion
legally does not exist, is shown by the absence of any penalty attached to article 134.
2 It follows, therefore that any or all of the acts described in article 135, when
committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends described in article
134, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and cannot be regarded or penalized
as distinct crimes in themselves. In law they are part and parcel of the rebellion itself,
and cannot be considered as giving rise to a separate crime that, under article 48 of
the Code, would constitute a complex one with that of rebellion.
The terms employed in the first paragraph of article 135 of the Revised Penal Code
to describe the component of violence in the crime of rebellion are broad and
general. The Spanish text (which is the one controlling, People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil.
665) states that the acts of the rebels may consists of —
“Sosteniendo combate 3 con la fuerza leal, causando estragos en las propiedades,
ejerciendo violencia grave, exigiendo contribuciones, o distroyendo caudales
publicos de su inversion legitima.”
If all the overt acts charged in the information against herein Appellant were
committed for political ends or in furtherance of the rebellion, they come within the
preceding description. Thus, count 4 (ambushing and firing upon army patrol)
constitutes engaging in combat with the loyal troops; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarycount 2 (taking funds and equipment from the Provincial
Treasury of Laguna) is diverting public funds from their ligitimate purpose; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarywhile the killings outlined in the other counts (1, 3 and 5) are
instances of committing serious violence.
The majority of the Court found no cogent reason for limiting “commission of
serious violence” in article 135 to hostilities against the Government’s armed forces
exclusively; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryfor in that case, the former expression would
be redundant and mere duplication of “engaging in combat” with loyal troops, also
described in the same article. If the infliction of “serious violence” was separately
expressed in the law, it is because the violence referred to is that inflicted upon
civilians. Again, to restrict “serious violence” to acts short of homicide, is to
unwarrantedly assume that the broad term “violencia grave” is used in the limited
sense of “lesiones graves”, which in our Penal Code has a specialized signification.
In truth, if physical injuries constitute grave violence, so would killing necessarily
be, if not more. Additionally, it may be observed that rebellion is by nature a crime
of masses or multitudes, involving crowd action, that cannot be confined a priori
within predetermined bounds. (People vs. Hernandez, supra; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Almazan, C. A., 31 Off. Gaz. 1932). Hence the
broad terms employed by the statute.
The prosecution insists that the “more serious” crime of murder cannot be justifiably
regarded as absorbed by the lesser crime of rebellion. In the first place, it is not
demonstrated that the killing of an individual is intrinsically less serious or less
dangerous to society than the violent subversion of established government, which
emperils the lives of many citizens, at least during the period of the struggle for
superiority between rebels and loyalists. If, on the other hand, murder is punished by
reclusion perpetua to death, and rebellion only by prision mayor, this leniency is due
to the political purpose that impels every rebellious act. As noted by Groizard
(“Codigo Penal de 1870”, Vol. 3, p. 239) —
“El analisis de toda clase de delitos politicos ofrece para el jurisconsulto un resultado
precioso, pues pone de relieve las diferencias cardinales que existen entre esta clase
de hechos y los delitos comunes; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryentre los reos de
aquellos crimenes y los reos de estos otros. Para los delitos comunes, la sociedad
tiene una constante y energica reprobacion que no atenua ni el trascurso de tiempo ni
el cambio de las ideas. Para los delitos politicos, no. Quien se atrevera si de honrado
se precia, a hacer alarde de la amistad de un hombre condenado por robo o por
asesinato? Y quien no ha tendido la mano cariñosa sin perder nada de respetabilidad,
a algun reo de un delito politico en la serie continuada de revoluciones y
contrarevoluciones que constituyen desgraciadamente los ultimos periodos de
nuestra historia? La consumacion del delito y el exito de la rebelion, ya lo hemos
dicho, para el reo politico, es mas que la impunidad, es el triunfo, es el poder, es el
Gobierno, es casi la gloria. Pero no sucede lo mismo tratandose de delitos
comunes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary la consumacion del delito ni apaga el
remordimiento, ni aleja del criminal el peligro de la pena, ni mejora en nada su
condicion respecto de la justicia. Hay, pues, entre el delito comun y el delito politico,
entre las personas responsables de unos y otros diferencias sustanciales, y el mayor
error que en el estado actual de los estudios juridicos puede cometer el legislador es
no apreciar eses diferencias, sobre todo en la aplicacion de las penas.”
And our history of three centuries of uninterrupted rebellions against sovereign
Spain, until she was finally driven from our shores, suffices to explain why the
penalty against rebellion, which stood at reclusion temporal maximum to death in the
Spanish Penal Code of 1870, was reduced only prision mayor in our revised Penal
Code of 1932.
In addition, the government counsel’s theory that an act punished by more serious
penalty cannot be absorbed by an act for which a lesser penalty is provided, is not
correct. The theory is emphatically refuted by the treatment accorded by the Penal
Code to the crime of forcible abduction, for which the law imposes only reclusion
temporal (article 342), notwithstanding that such crime necessarily involves illegal
detention of the abducted woman for which article 267 of the same Penal Code fixes
the penalty of reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to death. The same
situation obtains in the crime of slavery defined in article 272, whereby the
kidnapping of a human being for the purpose of enslaving him is punished with
prision mayor and a fine of not more than P10,000.00, when kidnapping itself is
penalized by article 267 with a much higher penalty.
And we have already pointed out in the Hernandez resolution that to admit the
complexing of the crime of rebellion with the felonies committed in furtherance
thereof, would lead to these undesirable results:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) to
make the punishment for rebellion heavier than that of treason, since it has been
repeatedly held that the latter admits no complexing with the overt acts committed in
furtherance of the treasonous intent, and, in addition, requires two witnesses to every
overt act which is not true in the case of rebellion; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) to
nullify the policy expressed in article 135 (R.P.C.) of imposing lesser penalty upon
the rebel followers as compared to their leaders, because under the complexing
theory every rebel, leader or follower, must suffer the heavier penalty in its
maximum degree; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) to violate the fundamental rule
of criminal law that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “in dubiis reus est absolvendus”; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary“nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege.”
Of course, not every act of violence is to be deemed absorbed in the crime of
rebellion solely because it happens to be committed simultaneously with or in the
course of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or
profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable
and would not be absorbed by the rebellion. But ever then, the individual misdeed
could not be taken with the rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the
constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand the individual crime would not be a means necessary for
committing the rebellion as it would not be done in preparation or in furtherance of
the latter. This appears with utmost clarity in the case where an individual rebel
should commit rape; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarycertainly the latter felony could not
be said to have been done in furtherance of the rebellion or facilitated its commission
in any way. The ravisher would then be liable for two separate crimes, rebellion and
rape, and the two could not be merged into a juridical whole.
It is argued that the suppression in the present Penal Code of article 244 of the old
one (article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870) indicates the intention of the
Legislature to revive the possibility of the crime of rebellion being complexed with
the individual felonies committed in the course thereof, because the suppressed
article prohibited such complexing. The text of the suppressed provision is as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ART. 244. Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion, o con
motivo de ellas, seran castigados respectivamente segun las disposiciones de este
codigo.
Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores, seran penados como tales los jefes
principales de la rebelion o sedicion.”
The first paragraph is to the effect that the “delitos particulares” (meaning felonies
committed for private non-political ends, as held by the commentators Cuello Calon
and Viada, since the Penal Code does not classify crimes into “general” and
“particular”) are to be dealt with separately from the rebellion, punishment for each
felony to be visited upon the perpetrators thereof. This paragraph has no bearing on
the question of complex crimes, but is a mere consequence of the fact that the delicts
committed for private ends bear no relation to the political crime of rebellion (other
than a coincidence of time) and therefore must be separately dealt with. This is so
obvious that, as Groizard pointed out (Vol. 3, p. 650), such action (their punishment
as a private misdeed) would be taken by the courts even if this first paragraph of
article 244 had not been written.
Far more significant, in the opinion of the majority, is that our Revised Penal Code
of 1932 did not revive the rule contained in the second paragraph of article 244 of
the old Penal Code (Article 259 of the Spanish), whereby the rebel leaders were
made criminally responsible for the individual felonies committed during the
rebellion or on occasion thereof, in case the real perpetrators could not be found. In
effect that paragraph established a command responsibility; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand in suppressing it, the Legislature plainly revealed a policy
of rejecting any such command responsibility. It was the legislative intent, therefore,
that the rebel leaders (and with greater reason, the mere followers) should be held
accountable solely for the rebellion, and not for the individual crimes (delitos
particulares) committed during the same for private ends, unless their actual
participation therein was duly established. In other words, the suppression of article
244 of the old Penal Code virtually negates the contention that the rebellion and the
individual misdeeds committed during the same should legally constitute one
complex whole. Whether or not such policy should be maintained is not for the
courts, but for the Legislature, to say.
But while a majority of seven justices 4 are agreed that if the overt acts detailed in
the information against the Appellant had been duly proved to have been committed
“as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and
in furtherance thereof”, then the accused could only be convicted of simple rebellion,
the opinions differ as to whether his plea of guilty renders the accused amenable to
punishment not only for rebellion but also for murder or other crimes.
Six justices 5 believe that conceding the absence of a complex crime, still, by his
plea of guilty the accused-Appellant has admitted all the acts described in the five
separate counts of the information; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that if any of such
counts constituted an independent crime committed within the jurisdiction of the
lower court as seems to be the case under the facts alleged in Count No. 5 (the killing
of Policarpio Tibay), then the avertment in the information that it was perpetrated in
furtherance of the rebellion, being a mere conclusion, cannot be a bar to Appellant’s
conviction and punishment for said offense, he having failed, at the arraignment, to
object to the information on the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged. Hence, the
acts charged in Counts 1 to 4 cannot be taken into consideration in this case, either
because they were committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court below
(Count 1), or because the allegations do not charge the Appellant’s participation
(Count 3), or else the acts charged are essentially acts of rebellion, with out private
motives (Counts 2 and 4).
Five justices, 6 on the other hand, hold that by his plea of guilty, the accused avowed
having committed the overt acts charged in all five counts; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut that he only admitted committing them in fact “as a
necessary means”, “in connection and in furtherance of the rebellion”, as expressly
alleged by the prosecution. This is not only because the information expressly
alleged the necessary connection between the overt acts and the political ends
pursued by the accused, but in addition, it failed to charge that the Appellant was
impelled by private motives. Wherefore, such overt acts must be taken as essential
ingredients of the single crime of rebellion, and the accused pleaded guilty to this
crime alone. Hence, there being no complex crime, the Appellant can only be
sentenced for the lone crime of rebellion. Even more, the minority contends that
under the very theory of the majority, the circumstances surrounding the plea are
such as to at least cast doubt on whether the accused clearly understood that he was
pleading guilty to two different crimes or to only one; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryso
that in fairness and justice, the case should be sent back for a rehearing by the Court
of origin, to ascertain whether or not the accused fully realized the import of his plea
(U.S. vs. Patala, 2 Phil., 752; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. Agcaoili, 31 Phil.,
91; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil., 305).
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused
convicted for the simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the
accused-Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years
of prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment
pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand, as above explained, for the murder, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor
and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto
indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and
Felix, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After stating the facts and the issues in this case, the learned majority opinion
declares that the majority of seven Justices of the Court are of the opinion that the
issue posed by the Appellantshas been already decided in the recent resolution of this
Court in the case of People vs. Hernandez, et al., (99 Phil., 529). Had the
considerations ended there and the case was decided of the basis of said Hernandez
resolution, which the majority of Justices apparently ratified, I would have contended
myself with merely citing and making as part of my concurrence and dissent, my
dissenting opinion in that same case of Hernandez, supra. However, the majority not
only ratifies and emphasizes the considerations and doctrine laid down in the
Hernandez case, but makes further considerations, additional and new, and even
quote authorities, for which reason, I again find myself in a position where I am
constrained not only to cite my dissenting opinion in the Hernandez case, but also
make further observations not only to discuss the new point raised, but also in an
endeavor to clarify and present a clear picture of our present law on rebellion and its
origin.
For purposes of ready reference, I deem it convenient to reproduce articles 134 and
135 of the Revised Penal Code, reading as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection. — How committed. — The crime of rebellion
or insurrection is committed by being publicly and taking arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or
its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof of any body of
land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
“ART. 135. Penalty for rebellion or insurrection. — Any person who promotes,
maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection, or who, while holding any public
office or employment takes part therein, engaging in war against the forces of the
Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting
contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have
been appropriated, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
20,000 pesos.
“Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
“When the rebellion or insurrection shall be under the command of unknown leaders,
any person who in fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts and other
documents issued in their name, or performed similar acts, on behalf of the rebels
shall be deemed the leader of such rebellion.”
I am also reproducing the Spanish text of the above Article 135 because as well
stated in the majority opinion on the strength of the case People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil.,
665, the Spanish text of the Rev. P. Code was the one approved by the Legislature
and so is controlling.
“ART. 135. Pena para la rebelion o insurreccion. — Sera castigado con prision
mayor y multa que no exceda de 20,000 pesos el promovedor, sostenedor o jefe de la
rebelion o insurreccion o el que hubiere tomado parte en ella siendo funcionario o
empleado publico, sosteniendo combate contra la fuerza leal, causando estragos en
las propiedades, ejerciendo violencia grave, exigiendo contribuciones, o distrayendo
caudales publicos de su inversion legitima.
“Los meros afiliados o ejecutores de la rebelion seran castigados con prision mayor
en su grado minimo.
“Cuando los jefes de una rebelion o insurreccion fueran desconocidos, se reputaran
por tales los que de hecho hubieren dirigido a los demas, llevado la voz por ellos,
firmado recibos y otros escritos expedidos a su nombre o ejercitado otros actos
semejantes en representacion de los rebeldes.”
The majority says, and I quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“As in treason, where both intent and overt acts are necessary, the crime of rebellion
is integrated by the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes
expressed in article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence
described in the first paragraph of article 135. That both purpose and overt acts are
essential components of one crime, and that without either of them the crime of
rebellion legally does not exist, is shown by the absence of any penalty attached to
article 134.”
I cannot agree wholly to the correctness of the above proposition. It is true that in
treason as well as in rebellion both intent and overt acts are necessary, excluding of
course conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion where overt acts are not
necessary (article 136), but what I consider the flaw in the thesis is the claim that in
rebellion, the armed uprising is the intent and the overt acts are those act of violence
described in the first paragraph of article 135, namely, engaging the Government
forces in combat, causing damage to property, committing serious violence, etc. To
me, the intent in rebellion is the purpose, the intention and the objective of the rebels
to remove from the allegiance of the government or its laws the territory of the
Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or any armed forces, etc.,
and the overt act or acts are the rising publicly and taking arms against said
Government. Article 134 contains and includes both elements, intent and overt acts
to constitute a complete crime. Said article 134, without making any reference to any
other article, described the manner rebellion is committed, not partially but fully and
completely, without any qualification whatsoever, and said description is complete in
order to render persons included therein as having consummated the crime of
rebellion. Article 134 in part reads.
“ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection. — How committed. — The crime of rebellion
or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the
Government” etc.
It is necessary to consider the origin and history of the provisions of articles 134 and
135 of the Revised Penal Code as I have previously reproduced. This, in order to
have a clearer understanding of the meaning of both articles and the spirit and
intention behind them. Our present Revised Penal Code is a revision of our Penal
Code promulgated in the Philippines on July 14, 1887 (later referred to as the Penal
Code of 1887), based upon and taken almost bodily from the Spanish Penal Code of
1870 (later referred to as the Penal Code of 1870). Our Penal Code of 1887 adopted
in great measure the provisions of the Penal Code of 1870. However, the provisions
of our Penal Code of 1887 on rebellion, were superseded and replaced by the
provisions of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, which governed rebellion
up to 1932 when the Revised Penal Code went into effect. In dealing with the crime
of rebellion, the Committee on Revision abandoned the provisions of Act No. 292
and went back to and adopted those of the Penal Code of 1870, although it included
the more benign and lighter penalties imposed in Act No. 292. The provisions of the
Penal Code of 1870 on rebellion are rather complicated for the reason that in
defining and penalizing acts of rebellion, they make reference to the provisions
regarding crimes against the form of government. For this reason, to have an over all
picture of the law on rebellion, we have to make reference to and cite, even
reproduce, portions of the codal provision on crimes against the form of government.
For the sake of brevity and so as not to unduly lengthen this opinion, I shall confine
myself to the reproduction of the pertinent provisions of the Spanish Penal Code of
1870, for being the source of our Penal Code of 1887, besides the likelihood if not a
fact that since as already stated, the provisions of our Penal Code of 1887 on
rebellion were not in force at the time of the revision, the Committee revising said
Penal Code of 1887, must have considered mainly the provisions of the Penal Code
of 1870.
Art. 184 of the Sp. P. Code of 1870 reads, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Delitos contra la forma de Gobierno
“ART. 184. Los que se alzaren publicamente en armas y en abierta hostilidad para
perperar cualquiera de los delitos previstos en el articulo 181, seran castigados con
las penas siguientes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“1.° Los que hubieren promovido el alzamiento o lo sostuvieren o lo dirigieren o
aparecieren como sus principales autores, con la pena de reclusion temporal en su
grado maximo a muerte.
“2.° Los que ejercieren un mando subalterno, con la de reclusion temporal a muerte,
si fueren personas constituidas en Autoridad civil o eclesiastica, o si hubiere habido
combate entre la fuerza de su mando y la fuerza publica fiel al Gobierno, o aqu;lla
hubiere causado estragos en las propiedades de los particulares, de los pueblos o del
Estado, cortado las lineas telegraficas o las ferreas, ejercido violencias graves contra
las personas, exigido contribuciones o distraido los candales publicos de su legitima
inversion.
“Fuera de estos casos, se impondra al culpable la pena de reclusion temporal.
“3.° Los meros ejecutores del alzamiento con la pena de prision mayor en su grado
medio a reclusion temporal en su grado medio a reclusion temporal en su grado
minimo, en los casos previstos en el parrafo primero del numero anterior, y con la de
prision mayor en toda su extension, en los comprendidos en el parrafo segundo del
propio numero.”
Art. 243 of the same code reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Delitos contra el Orden Publico
“ART. 243. Son resos de rebelion los que se alzaren publicamente y en abierta
hostilidad contra el Gobierno para cualquiera de los objetos
siguientes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“1.° Destronar al Rey, deponer el Regente o Regencia del Reino, o privarles de su
libertad personal u, obligarles a ejecutar un acto contrario a su voluntad.
“2.° Impedir la celebracion de las elecciones para Diputados a Cortes o Senadores
en todo el Reino, o la reunion legitima de las mismas.
“3.° Disolver las Cortes o impedir la deliberacion de alguno de los Cuerpos
Colegisladores o arrancarles alguna resolucion.
“4.° Ejecutar cualquiera delos delitos previstos en el art. 165.
“5.° Sustraer el Reino o parte de el o algun cuerpo de tropa de tierra o de mar, o
cualquiera otra clase de fuersa armada, de la obediencia al supremo Gobierno.
“6.° Usar y ejercer por si o despojar a los Ministros de la Corona de sus facultades
constitucionales, o impedirles o coartarles su libre ejercicio.
ARTS. 244, 245 and 246 of the same code read as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ART. 244. — Los que induciendo y determinando a los rebeldes, hubieron
promovido o sostuvieren la rebellion, y los candillos principales de esta, seran
castigados con la pena de reclusion temporal en su grado maximo a muerte.
“ART. 245. — Los ejerciaren un mando subalterno en la rebelion incurriran en la
pena de reclusion temporal a muerte, si se encontraren en alguno de los casos
previstos en el parrafo primero del numero 2.° del articulo 184; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryy con la de reclusion temporal si no se encontraren incluidos
en ninguno de ellos.
“ART. 246. — Los meros ejecutores de la rebelion seran castigados con la pena de
prision mayor en su grado medio a reclusion temporal en su grado minimo, en los
casos previstos en el parrafo primero del numero 2.° del articulo 184; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryy con la de prision mayor en toda su extension no estando en el
mismo comprendidos.
It will be observed that in drafting Art. 134 of our Revised Penal Code, the
Committee on Revision (later referred to as Code Committee) adopted, with the
exclusion of numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 of Art. 243 which refer to the King and the
legislative bodies of the Kingdom of Spain, the provisions of said art. 243 of the
Penal Code of 1870, particularly, the first part thereof and also No. 5, even their
phraseology —
“son reos de rebelion los que se alzaren publicamente y en abierta hostilidad contra
el Gobierno” cralawand “sustraer el Reino o parte de el o algun cuerpo de tropa de
tierra o de mar, o cualquiera otra clase de fuerza armada, de la obediencia al supremo
Gobierno”, (the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly
and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or
any part thereof of any body of land, naval or other armed forces), (our article 134).
Now, as regards the penalty for rebellion, it will be seen that under article 244 (Penal
Code of 1870), persons who by inciting and encouraging the rebels shall have
brought about or shall sustain a rebellion as well as the principal leaders of such
rebellion as are penalized with reclusion temporal in its maximum degree of death.
Under article 245, same code, those holding a subordinate command in the rebellion
are penalized with reclusion temporal to death, if they are included in any of the
cases provided for in paragraph 1 of No. 2 of article 184, which for purposes of
ready reference we again reproduce, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ cralaw si fueren personas constituidas en Autoridad civil o eclesiastica, o si hubiere
habido combate entre la fuerza de su mando y la fuerza publica fiel al Gobierno, o
aguella hubiere causado estragos en las propiedades de los particulares, de los
pueblos o del Estado, cortado las lineas telegraficas o las vias ferreas, ejercido
violencias graves contra las personas, exigido contribuciones o distraidos los
caudales publicos de su legitima inversion.”;
or if not so included, the penalty is reclusion temporal.
Under article 246, those persons merely participating in the rebellion are penalized
with prision mayor in its medium degree to reclusion temporal in its minimum
degree, in the cases provided for in paragraph 1 of No. 2 of article 184 as above
reproduced, but those not so included, will suffer the penalty only of prision mayor.
As I have stated in my dissenting opinion in the Hernandez case, supra, one of the
purposes of the revision of our old Penal Code of 1887 was simplification and
elimination of provisions considered unnecessary, in proof of which, while the old
Penal Code contained 611 articles, the Revised Penal Code has but 367 articles.
There is every reason to believe that the code Committee in its endeavor at
simplification did not deem it necessary to provide a special penalty for those who
promote, maintain, or head a rebellion as does article 244, and it made a merger or
combination of articles 244 and 245, so as to impose the same penalty on (1) the
promoters and leaders of the rebellion and (2) on those who are either holding any
public office or employment (instituida en autoridad civil o eclesiastica) or if not so
holding any public office, that their forces have engaged the forces of the
Government in combat, or have caused damage to Government or private property,
or committed serious violence, etc. (“sosteniendo combate contra la fuerza leal,
causendo estragos en las propeidades, ejerciendo violencia grave, exigiendo,
contribuciones, o distrayendo caudales publicos de su enversion legitima”). (Spanish
text of article 135 of our revised Penal Code). I cannot believe that the Code
Committee in making the merger abandoned the idea of punishing the promotion,
maintenance, and leadership of a rebellion in itself, and that to penalize the same, it
must be connected and coupled with the commission of any or all of the acts above
mentioned, which under the Penal Code of 1870, refers only to those holding a
subordinate command in the rebellion. I am convinced that the whole aim and
intention of the Code Committee was merely to equalize the penalty for both sets of
rebels — those leaders, promoters, and maintainers of the rebellion on the one hand,
and those holding a subordinate command under the qualification stated in paragraph
1 of article 135, but that the former, because of their more serious and heavier
criminal responsibility their promotions, maintenance, and leadership of the rebellion
were sufficiently deserving of the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not, to exceed
P20,000; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut for those rebels with lesser responsibility, to
deserve the same penalty, they must either be holding any public office or
employment, or if not, that their forces have engaged Government troops in combat,
or have caused damage to property, etc. Stated differently, the clause “sosteniendo
combate contra la fuerza leal, causando estragos en las propeidades, ejerciendo
violencia grave,” etc., refers to and qualifies not the leaders, promoters, and
maintainers of the rebellion, but only those rebels of lesser responsibility. In other
words for the leaders, promoters and maintainers of the rebellion, the rebellion is
consummated and subject to punishment under article 134. It may be that the Code
Committee that drafted article 135 in its endeavors to achieve a phraseology as
simple and concise as possible, did not convey its purpose and intent any too plainly
and clearly, but I venture to assert that that was what it meant. In case of doubt as to
the real meaning of article 135, recourse should be had to its source, namely, articles
244 and 245 in relation with No. 2 paragraph 1 of article 184 of the Spanish Penal
Code of 1870, for which reason I deemed it necessary to reproduce as I did said
articles.
For the foregoing reasons, I cannot agree with the majority that the commission of
the acts mentioned in Article 134 alone, even by the leaders and promoters of the
rebellion, carry no penal sanction. Besides the considerations or conclusions already
adduced against said holding and theory of the majority, there are other reasons. For
instance, the second paragraph of article 135 provides
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.”
Under this provision, one merely participating in a rebellion, that is rising publicly
and taking arms against the government under article 134, is penalized with prision
mayor in its minimum period. But under the theory of the majority, the leaders of the
rebellion who perform the same acts defined in the same article 134 may not be
punished, unless they or their forces engage Government troops or cause damage to
property, commit serious violence, etc. That would seem to be unjust and illogical.
Again, articles 136 and 138 of the Revised Penal Code penalize conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion and inciting to rebellion. I reproduce said two
articles:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection. — The
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished,
respectively, by prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall
not exceed P5,000, and by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not
exceeding P2,000.”
“ART. 138. — Inciting to rebellion or insurrection. — The penalty of prision mayor
in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking arms
or being in open hostility against the Government, shall incite others to the execution
of any of the acts specified in article 134 of this Code, by means of speeches,
proclamations, writings, emblems, banners or other representations tending to the
same end.”
Under article 136, if two or more persons merely conspire and come to an agreement
to commit rebellion or insurrection, which is defined in article 134, without actually
committing it or performing the acts mentioned in said article 134, they are already
guilty and are punished with prision correcional in its maximum period and a fine
not exceeding P5,000; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand if the same two or more
persons just propose to some other person or persons the commission of rebellion
under article 134, they are punished with prision correccional in its medium period
and a fine of not exceeding P2,000. In fine, persons merely agreeing and deciding
among themselves to rise publicly and take arms against the Government for the
purpose mentioned in article 134, without actually rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government, or if they merely propose the commission of said acts to
other persons without actually performing those overt acts under article 134, they are
already subject to punishment. But under the theory of the majority, if those same
persons, not content with merely conspiring and agreeing to commit the acts of
rebellion or proposing its commission to others, actually go out and actually carry
out their conspiracy and agreement, and rise publicly and take arms against the
Government, under article 134 there is no penalty. That seems to me rather
unreasonable and hard to understand.
Then, under article 138 of the Revised Penal Code, persons who, without taking
arms or being in open hostility against the Government under article 134, merely
incite others to the execution of any of the acts specified in said article, by means of
speeches, proclamations, writings, etc., they are punished with prision mayor in its
minimum period. But according to the interpretation by the majority of articles 134
and 135, if those same persons, not content with merely making speeches, issuing
proclamations, etc., intended to incite others to commit the acts specified in article
134, actually commit those acts themselves, they incur no penalty. I confess I fail to
follow the reasoning of the majority on the point.
“Rebellion or insurrection. — How committed. — The crime of rebellion or
insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the
Government”. (Article 134)
It is true that article 134 of our Revised Penal Code itself does not impose any penal
sanction; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe reason is that it is a mere definition, just as
article 243 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870 from which it was taken, merely
defines and does not penalize the acts therein enumerated. The fact that the article
defining a crime or describing how it is committed does not itself impose the penalty
does not necessarily mean that the act or acts so defined do not constitute a
crime; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryotherwise, all the definition and all the detailed
description of the commission of said crime would become empty, meaningless and
useless. The penalty for rebellion is found in the following article of 135, just as it is
found in articles 244, 245 and 246 of the Penal Code of 1870.
I believe that when a group of dissidents or Hukbalahaps armed and determined to
overthrow the Government raid, say, an isolated town, scare away the two or three
policemen on guard at the presidencia, take possession of the building even for a few
hours, raise the rebel flag, call and herd the residents before the presidencia, and
make speeches proclaiming the regime of the dessidents and advising the gathering
to transfer their allegiance and loyalty from the constituted Government to the rebels
and stop paying taxes to said government and instead contribute the funds to the
Huks, without firing a single shot or committing any of the acts enumerated in article
135, the crime of rebellion is complete and consummated and is subject to penalty.
In my modest research for authorities on the subject of rebellion, I came across the
case of People of the Philippines vs. Benito Cube of the Court of Appeals, G. R. No.
1069-R, decided by that court on November 24, 1948. There it was held
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ cralaw The mere fact that Appellant knowingly identified himself with an
organization that was openly fighting to overthrow the Government was enough to
make him guilty of the crime of rebellion. Under our laws it is not necessary that one
has engaged the Government in a clash of arms to commit the crime of rebellion. It is
not even necessary that there be a clash of arms between the rebels and the
Government. (U. S. vs. Sadian, 3 Phil., 323.) “
Incidentally, it may be stated that said decision penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez
David was concurred in and signed by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the writer of the
present majority decision.
The same Court of Appeals, in the case of People vs. Geronimo Perez, G. R. No.
9196-R, involving rebellion cited with favor its previous decision in the case of
People vs. Cube, supra, and apparently affirmed and ratified the doctrine laid therein.
Now, as to the nature and application of penalty of rebellion under our Revised Penal
Code, I have already endeavored to show that our Art. 135 is based upon and taken
from articles 244, 245 and 246 of this Penal Code of 1870, though drastically
reducing and mitigating the severity of the penalties found in the Spanish Penal
Code, and that the Code Committee in its effort at simplification, made a merger of
Arts. 244, 245 and 246. The Code Committee, I feel certain, adopted in principle the
scientific and equitable classification of the different persons taking part in the
rebellion, scaling punishments according to their position in the rebellion and extent
and seriousness of their responsibility. The Code Committee may not have made
itself entirely clear, and in case of doubt we should interpret Art. 135 in relation to
and considering the philosophy of the Spanish Penal Code provisions on the subject
of penalties on rebellion in order to avoid the unreasonable, unequitable, even absurd
results I have already pointed out. To achieve this, we may have recourse to the rules
of statutory construction.
If a literal interpretation of any part of a statute would operate unjustly or lead to
absorb results, or be contrary to the evident meaning of the Act taken as a whole, it
should be rejected (In Re:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryAllen, 2 Phil. 630, 643); chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarycourts permit the elimination of a word and its substitution for
others when it is necessary to carry out the legislative intent, where the word is found
in the statute due to the inadvertence of the legislature or reviser, or where it is
necessary to give the act meaning, effect, or intelligibility, or where it is apparent
from the context of the act that the word is surplusage, or where the maintenance of
the word, would lead to an absurdity or irrationality, or where the use of the word
was a mere inaccuracy, or clearly apparent mishap, or where it is necessary to avoid
inconsistencies and to make the provisions of the act harmonize (Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Third Edition, Vol. II, pp. 458 464); chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryin the construction of laws, whether constitutional or statutory,
the court is not bound to a literal interpretation, where it would lead to an absurdity
or a plain violation of the spirit and purpose of the enactment (McCarty v.
Goodsman, 167 N. W. 503 cited in L. R. A. Digest, Vol. 7, p. 8892)
I agree with the majority that any or all the acts described in article 135 when
committed as a means to or in furtherance of the rebellion become absorbed in said
rebellion. The question now is to determine the meaning and scope of said acts. The
first act is “sosteniendo combate contra la fuerza leal”, which was erroneously
translated into English in article 135 to “engaging in war against the forces of the
Government”. In the case of Hernandez, supra, we all accepted and followed that
English translation, but later found that it was the Spanish text of the Revised Penal
Code that was approved by the Legislature. Naturally, we are bound by the Spanish
text.
Incidentally, if I be permitted a little digression, the majority resolution in that case
of Hernandez laid much emphasis on the phrase “engaging in war”, and would have
included and absorbed in the rebellion the killings of and other outrages to civilians.
I quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said article
135, is by “engaging in war against the forces of the government” and ‘committing
serious violence’ in the prosecution of said ‘war’. These expressions imply
everything that war connotes, namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary resort to arms,
requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of
liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness
and unhappiness that war carries in its wake — except that, very often, it is worse
than war in the international sense, for it involves internal struggle, a fight between
brothers, with a bitterness and passion or ruthlessness seldom found in a contest
between strangers. Being within the purview of “engaging in war” and ‘committing
serious violence’, said resort to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of
life and property, constitutes not two or more offenses, but only one crime — that of
rebellion plain and simple.”
Now that we find that what article 135 provides is not engaging in war, but merely
engaging in combat, and knowing the vast difference between war and mere combat,
there is the possibility that some of the considerations and conclusions made in that
majority resolution in the Hernandez case may be affected or enervated. In other
words, our law in rebellion contemplates on only armed clashes, skirmishes,
ambuscade, and raids, not the whole scale conflict of civil war like that between the
Union and Confederate forces in the American Civil War, where the rebels were
given the status of belligerency under the laws of war, and consequently, were
accorded much leeway and exemption in the destruction of life and property and the
violation of personal liberty and security committed during the war.
I agree with the majority opinion in the present case that if the dissidents attack or
are attacked by the Government forces, and deaths are caused by the rebels, said
combat, provided that the killings are of Government troops or of civilians attached
to said troops, like informers, guides, etc. But when innocent civilians far from the
scene of combat are murdered either because they failed or refuse to sympathize or
cooperate with dissidents, or because they are wealthy landowners, or because they
failed to pay the amount of the ransom for those kidnapped by the dissidents, said
killings cannot and may not be included and absorbed in the rebellion.
The majority says that the term “violencia grave” (grave violence) enumerated in
article 135 is broad and may include the killing of civilians. Again, I disagree. There
is a vast difference between violence, even serious violence, and murder or killing.
In committing the crime of robbery, the robber may use violence, even serious
violence, on his victim; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut if the violence results in
death, the robber is held guilty not only of robbery but also homicide, or even
murder, unless the two crimes can be considered as a complex crime of robbery with
homicide. In other words, the violence, even serious violence, supposed to be
included in robbery does not extend to, and include killing. The same thing may be
said of the crime of coercion where force and violence is contemplated. If the
violence used does not result in death, the offender answers only for the crime of
coercion, but if the victim dies as a result of the violence to which he was subjected,
then said violence contemplated by the law does not extend to or cover the death,
and the offender answer for both homicide and coercion. The idea I wish to convey
is that the serious violence mentioned in article 135 can by no means be interpreted
to include killings.
In the revised or consolidated (refundido) Penal Code of Spain of 1944, I have found
the phrase “violencia grave” used in article 144, in connection with article 142, both
under the title Delitos Contra el Jefe del Estado. I quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ART. 142. Al quematare al Jefe del Estado se impondra la pena de reclusion mayor
a muerte.
“Con igual pena se castigara el delito frustrado y la tentativa del mismo delito.”
“ART. 144. Se castigara con la pena de reclusion mayor a
muerte:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“1.° Al que privare al Jefe del Estado de su libertad personal.
“2.° Al que con violencia o intimidacion graves le obligare a ejecutar un acto contra
su voluntad.
“3.° Al que le causare lesiones graves no estando comprendidas en el parrafo
segundo del art. 142.”
From the above articles we can gather that the Spanish legislators made the
necessary and important distinction between the mere use of serious violence
(violencia grave) on the Chief of State and causing his death, by treating of the two
act separately in articles 142 and 144.
In fine, serious violence is one thing and killing or murder is another, entirely
different from each other, one certainly more serious and a graver offense than the
other. If serious violence results in death, then said violence changes in aspect and
becomes homicide or murder. I therefore conclude that the serious violence
mentioned in article 135, which I agree with the majority that it refers to civilians
and not to members of the armed forces of the Government, cannot include killings
of said civilians. Otherwise, where we to hold that the serious violence (violencia
grave) extends to and includes killings and murders, then we would be converting,
though unwittingly, every rebellion into an open season for hunting as it were,
innocent civilians who have the misfortune of living within raiding distance from the
dissident hideouts.
The majority explains and gives reasons for the great difference between murder on
the one hand, penalized with reclusion temporal to death, and rebellion on the other,
punished with mere prision mayor, due to the political purpose that impels every
rebellious act and quotes Groizard, Vol. III, p. 239, who discusses the great
difference between the crime of, say, murder or robbery, and the offense of
rebellion; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat no one would care to befriend one
convicted as an assassin or robber, but on the other hand would gladly, even fondly,
shake the hand of one convicted of rebellion, and that when the rebellion succeeds,
the rebel not only secures impunity to his rebellious act, but also attains power, even
the government itself and the glory. I agree. It is no less true, however, that Groizard
must be referring to a rebel with clean hands and a clean conscience, for it is gravely
to be doubted whether one would shake the hand of a rebel dripping and stained with
the blood of innocent civilians, a hand responsible for the devastation and desolation
cause to those very persons and communities which the rebellion pretended to help
and liberate from oppression. That is why Groizard in his next paragraph, in
advocating for the reduction of the very severe penalty attached to rebellion under
the Spanish Penal Code distinguishes between simple rebellion and one in which the
common crimes like murder, robbery, etc., and committed. I
quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Con esto queremos dar a entender que las penas fulminadas en el texto que
comentamos nos parcen ante la razon y la ciencia injustificadas por su dureza. La
pena de muerte, tan combatida hoy en todos terrenos, solo puede defenderse, como
tipo maximo de represion, para aquellos delitos que revisten en todas sus
circumstancias el grado mayor juridico concebible de criminalidad. Ahora mite
maximo de la depravacion humana?” (Supplied)
bien; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarypueden ser los meros delitos politicos, aun los
delitos de rebelion por graves que sean, no estando unidos con otros delitos comunes,
como robos, incendios, asesinatos, etc., etc.; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarypueden ser,
decimos, calificados, en abstractos principios de justicia, como el limite maximo de
la depravacion humana?” (Emphasis supplied.)
Then the majority makes a reference to our history of long, uninterrupted rebellion
against Spain. A rebellion whose purpose is to overthrow a corrupt and tyrannical
government, redeem the people from oppression, exploitation and injustice, and free
them from a foreign yoke is a movement deserving of sympathy and
admiration; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut a rebellion aimed at overthrowing not a
foreign and monarchical government but its very own, to substitute it not with a
democratic and republic form of government for it is already a republic, but to
institute in its place a new regime under an entirely new and foreign ideology,
godless and absolute, to be subject to the orders and control of a foreign power, such
a rebellion assumes an entirely different aspect, and I am afraid that for it there
cannot be the sympathy, the admiration and glory that Groizard and we have in
mind.
The majority further says that as pointed out in the Hernandez resolution, to admit
the complexing of the crime of rebellion with other crimes, would result in making
the punishment for rebellion heavier than that of treason. That claim is not entirely
correct. The penalty for simple rebellion is still prision mayor. Now, if the rebels
besides committing the crime of rebellion, commit other crimes more serious from
the standpoint of the penalty, like murder or kidnapping, the penalty for the complex
crime necessarily must be more serious than that of prision mayor, but it does not
mean that the penalty for rebellion has been raised to say reclusion perpetua to death
because the penalty for the complex crime of rebellion with murder is not the penalty
for rebellion but the penalty for the more serious crime of murder, in its maximum
degree. Let us take the crime of estafa involving an amount not exceeding P200.00,
to which the law attaches the relatively light penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods. If one is convicted of simple estafa, he can be sentenced to
only a few months. But if in committing said estafa he also commits the crime of
falsification of a public document, then the resulting crime is a complex one and he
may be sentenced to from four to six years imprisonment, a penalty which does not
belong to estafa but to the more serious offense of falsification, and in its maximum
degree. I want to make it clear that we who have dissented in the Hernandez case
have neither the desire nor intention to increase the penalty of rebellion. It may stand
as it is, prision mayor; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut if other crimes like murder,
robbery and kidnapping are committed as a means to commit rebellion, that is
entirely a different matter.
In addition to the considerations I made in my dissenting opinion in the Hernandez
case about the complex crime of rebellion with murder, kidnapping, etc., I wish to
emphasize the fact that according to the several informations filed in different Courts
of First Instance, particularly the different counts contained therein and the
arguments adduced by counsel for the government, the murders, kidnappings, arsons,
etc., committed by the rebels were so committed not just in outbursts of
irresponsibility or for fun or for private motives but that they had an intimate relation
with the rebellion itself; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat kidnappings and robberies
were committed to raise funds to finance the rebellion, not only to secure food and
clothing for the rebels, but also firearms and ammunitions; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat murders were committed in order to institute a reign of
terror and panic so that the residents of the outlying barrios finding themselves
beyond the protection of the army, would have no choice but to join the rebel
movement or cooperate and sympathize with them were it only for purposes of
survival; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat houses of innocent civilians are razed to the
ground either as an act of reprisal or punishment for disobedience to orders of the
rebels and to serve as an example to others; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat wealthy
landowners and members of their families were liquidated in line with the idea and
doctrine that the landed properties will eventually be distributed among the rebels or
become public property under the new regime. Under this aspect of the case, there
emerges the picture of the intimate and direct relation between these acts of atrocity
and rebellion. From the standpoint of the rebels these acts are means necessary in
their effort to overthrow the government and achieve the goal of the rebellion. From
this standpoint, I reiterate the contention that the complex crime of rebellion with
murder, kidnapping, robbery, etc. can and does exist.
I also agree with the majority that the taking of public funds and equipment from the
Provincial Treasury of Laguna under count No. 2 of the information
against Appellant, may be absorbed in the rebellion for the reason that it comes
within the phrase “distrayendo caudales publicos de su inversion legitima” (diverting
of public funds from the legal purpose for which they have been appropriated).
For the foregoing reasons and considerations, I hold that Defendant-Appellant herein
should beheld to answer for the killings under count No. 1 of the members of the
party of Mrs. Quezon, including herself, a beloved and revered citizen, who had no
connection whatsoever with the Government, much less of its armed forces; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryfor the treacherous killing and cutting of the neck of Nemesei
Palo under count No. 3, for the reason that he was not a member of the government
forces, but a mere policeman a local peace officer of the town of Linmanan,
Camarines Sur; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand for the killing of Policarpio Tipay,
barrio lieutenant, under count No. 5, because he was a mere civilian official of the
lowest category, expected only to help the residents of his barrio voice their needs
and interests before the town officials, and receiving no compensation for this civic
service. The above mentioned killing under counts 1, 3, and 5 should be complexed
with rebellion and the corresponding penalty imposed. In so far as the majority fails
to do this, I am constrained to dissent as I do. And failing to secure a conviction for
rebellion complexed with the killing of Policarpio Tipay under count 5, I concur with
the majoritY in finding Defendant under said count 5 guilty of murder as a separate
crime.
Endencia, J., concurs. every opportunity to realize the ultimate objective. For that reason a crime
committed such as murder, robbery, kidnapping, arson and the like, though not
indispensable for or to the commission of that of rebellion is nonetheless a means
necessary to the attainment of their ultimate finality or end. To create chaos and
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
confusion, to weaken the morale of the populace, to sow terror and infuse into the
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor except as to the inclusion of mind of the people panic and fear so that they would submit meekly to the
count No. 1 of the information over which the trial court (the Court of First Instance Communist importunities, demands, imposition, rule, doctrine, political philosophy
of Camarines Sur) had no jurisdiction because it was committed in Nueva Ecija, and policy, are but a means to an end. Viewed in that light I fail to see any juridical
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, unless it is intended as an objection or obstacle to the application of the provisions of article 48 of the Revised
expression of an opinion or a statement of a postulate that the crime of rebellion may Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 4000.
be complexed with murder. I wish to add the codifiers of the penal laws of Spain, as
As stated in the majority opinion, and without foresaking my view on the point of
embodied in the Penal Codes of 1870 and 1887, could not or did not foresee the
complexity of rebellion with murder, I agree to the penalties imposed upon
development and progress of the Communist movement, as mapped out in the
the Defendant for two crimes upon his plea of guilty, for the reason that without my
Communist Manifesto of December 1847, which aimed at world revolution and
concurrence there would be no sufficient number of votes to impose the penalty for
domination and turned more violent since 1917 after the overthrow of the Kerenski
the more serious crime.
Government in Russia that succeeded the Czarist regime. The first edition of Das
Kapital by Karl Marx was published in 1867. It is the first volume containing Book 1
which concerns with The Process of Capitalist Production; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand although he had the essential facts or materials of Volume
II which was to be Book II aimed at expounding on the Process of Capitalist
Circulation, and Book III intended to analyze The Process of Capitalist Production as
a Whole, and of Volume III to contain Book IV which was to relate a History of
Theories of Surplus Value, his death on 14 March 1883 prevented him from
completing the work. Frederick Engels, his collaborator, took over and published in
May 1885 Volume II, The Process of Capitalist Circulation, and in October 1894
Volume III, the Capitalist Process of Production as a Whole. On 6 August 1895
Engels died and Book IV originally planned as Volume III was not completed. These
volumes and books were published by Engels after 1870, the year when the Spanish
Penal Code was enacted or promulgated. The turn from exposition of the defects,
faults and evils of capitalism and persuasion to forsake it into violent and ruthless
means to achieve its discard were not anticipated. The provisions of article 90 of the
Penal Code of 1870 and of article 89 of the Penal Code of 1887 were due to the
vision and foresight of the Spanish codifiers of their penal laws. Where an
indispensable crime is committed to perpetrate another the result is one crime. Where
a crime is committed as a means necessary to consummate another the result is a
complex one and the penalty provided for the most serious has to be imposed.
Rebellion as perpetrated and pursued relentlessly by the Communist is a continuing
crime, the ultimate aim of which is to overthrow the existing governments and to set
up their own. To attain that end it is not enough for them to achieve partial or local
success. They always look forward to and avail themselves of every means and seize