CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No.

14355; 31 Oct 1919]

Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion
private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims
that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the
private cemeteryand that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other
routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would
create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested
in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the
particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to
exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and
determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of
the expropriation.

Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the
actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The
moment the municipal corporation or
Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. PEZA

FACTS:
In 1981, PEZA, initiate before the RTC of Cavite expropriation proceedings on thee parcels of irrigated lands. One of
the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez. More than ten years later, the trial court upheld
PEZA's right to expropriate, among others, the lot of petitioner. Petitioner sought reconsideration alleging that the lot
would only be transferred to a private corporation, and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose. The trial
court reconsidered the order and released Lot 1406 A from expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406 B was
maintained. PEZA appealed the order to the CA.Later on, the petitioner and PEZA entered into a compromise
agreement whereby (1) PEZA agrees to withdraw its appeal while Salud agrees to waive, quitclaim and forfeit its
claim for damages and loss of income which it sustained by reason of the possession of said lot by PEZA from 1981-
1993; and (2) the parties agree to swap Lot 1406B with Lot434 and that instead of being paid the just compensation for
Lot 1406B, the estate of Salud shall be paid with Lot434. The compromise agreement is immediately final and
executory. The CA remanded the case to the trial court for the approval of the said compromise agreement. The trial
court approved the same.
However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot434 inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the said lot.
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion to partially annul the order. The trial court then annulled the compromise
agreement and ordered the turnover of Lot1406B to petitioner. The CA upheld the rescission of the compromise
agreement, however, set aside the order of the trial court regarding the turnover of the lot and ordered the trial judge
to proceed with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings regarding the determination of just compensation. This
is in accordance with Art 2041 of the Civil Code which states that "if one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the
compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand.

ISSUE:
Whether the phrase "original demand" pertains to the return of Lot 1406 B which is sought to be expropriated or the
determination of just compensation for the lot.

RULING:
Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The first phase ends either with an order of expropriation (where
the right of plaintiff to take the land and the public purpose to which they are to be devoted are upheld) or an order of
dismissal. Either order would be a final one since it finally disposes of the case. The second phase concerns the
determination of just compensation to be ascertained by three (3) commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the
amount to be paid to the defendant. Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be done, this order finally disposes of
the second stage. To both orders the remedy there from is an appeal. In the case at bar, the first phase was terminated
when the July 11, 1991 order of expropriation became final and the parties subsequently entered into a compromise
agreement regarding the mode of payment of just compensation. When respondent failed to abide by the terms of the
compromise agreement, petitioner filed an action to partially rescind the same. Obviously, the trial court could
only validly order the rescission of the compromise agreement anent the payment of just compensation
inasmuch as that was the subject of the compromise. It is crystal clear from the contents of the agreement
that the parties limited the compromise agreement to the matter of just compensation to petitioner. Said
expropriation order is not closely intertwined with the issue of payment such that failure to pay by respondent
will also nullify the right of respondent to expropriate. No statement to this effect was mentioned in the agreement.
The Order was mentioned in the agreement only to clarify what was subject to payment. Hence, the "original
demand" referred to means the fixing of just compensation. When PEZA failed to fulfill its obligation to
deliver Lot 434, petitioner can again demand for the payment but not the return of the expropriated Lot 1406-B.

Case Digest on NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)

Plaintiff National Power Corporation (Napocor), for the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines,
its lines have to pass the lands belonging to respondents Matias Cruz, heirs of Natalie Paule and spouses
Misericordia Gutierrez and Recardo Malit. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the acquisition of the right of way
easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. Trial court’s ordered that the defendant
spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00 deposited by
the plaintiff to cover the provisional value of the land to proceed their construction and for the purpose of
determining the fair and just compensation due the defendants, the court appointed three commissioners,
comprised of one representative of the plaintiff, one for the defendants and the other from the court, who then
were empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare their
appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to be paid to the owners of the lots. The lower court rendered
judgement ordered Napocor to pay defendant spouses the sum of P10.00 per square meter as the fair and
reasonable compensation for the right-of-way easement of the affected area and P800.00 as attorney's fees'.
Napocor filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the Court of Appeals committed gross error by adjudging
the petitioner liable for the payment of the full market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines, and that
it overlooks the undeniable fact that a simple right-of-way easemen transmits no rights, except that of the
easement.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land
traversed by its transmission lines.

RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, but no cogent reason appears why said
power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of
title or possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement
of right of way." In this case, the easement is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering
the nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, the limitations imposed by the NPC against the use
of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation which should neither be more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the
money equivalent of said property. Just equivalent has always been understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The
price or value of the land and its character at the time of taking by the Govt. are the criteria for determining just
compensation.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE

PHILS. VS. COMELEC [289 SCRA 337; G.R. NO. 132922; 21 APR 1998]
Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.

(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies.
It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons,
it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of
the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to
bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast
stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as
the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of
campaign.”

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure
print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air
time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92
singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial
election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this
year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television
stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free
air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992
it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s
elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it
provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issues:

(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due
process of law and without just compensation.

Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by

television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies
to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do
not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise
of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of
some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and
supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in
licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free
air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation
of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the
case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for
COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is
taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO,) vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 109338,
November 20,2000
FACTS: On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste filed with the Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte, a complaint
for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter Corporation (PSC). For
failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court declared PSC in default and allowed plaintiff Leviste to
present evidence ex-parte. A copy of the writ of possession was served on petitioner as owner of the power lines
standing on certain portions of the subject property. Later, on August 12, 1992, Vines Realty filed an amended
motion for an order of demolition and removal of improvements on the subject land. Among the improvements for
removal were the power lines and electric posts belonging to petitioner. Petitioner opposed the motion on the
ground, among other reasons, that petitioner was not a party to the case and therefore not bound by the judgment
of the trial court and that it had subsisting right-of-way agreements over said property. The sheriff, at the request of
Vines Realty demolished the remaining electric posts resulting in the cutting off of power supply to various business
establishments and barangays. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power
lines located in the land sold at public auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage. RULLING: Yes. To
exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the exercise of such power by other
corporations constructing or operating electric generating plants and electric transmission and distribution lines or
systems."

G.R. No. 125704. August 28, 1998]

PHILEX MINING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

FACTS:

On August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its excise tax liabilities
amounting to P123,821,982.52. Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities
stating that it has pending claims for VAT input credit/refund for the taxes it paid for the years 1989
to 1991 in the amount of P119,977,037.02 plus interest. Therefore, these claims for tax
credit/refund should be applied against the tax liabilities.

In reply, the BIR held that since these pending claims have not yet been established or determined
with certainty, it follows that no legal compensation can take place. Hence, the BIR reiterated its
demand that Philex settle the amount plus interest within 30 days from the receipt of the letter.

Philex raised the issue to the Court of Tax Appeals and in the course of the proceedings, the BIR
issued a Tax Credit Certificate SN 001795 in the amount of P13,144,313.88 which, applied to the
total tax liabilities of Philex of P123,821,982.52; effectively lowered the latter’s tax obligation of
P110,677,688.52.

Despite the reduction of its tax liabilities, the CTA still ordered Philex to pay the remaining balance
of P110,677,688.52 plus interest, elucidating its reason that “taxes cannot be subject to set-off on
compensation since claim for taxes is not a debt or contract.

Philex appealed the case before the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the Court of Tax Appeals observation. Philex filed a motion for reconsideration which was again
denied. However, a few days after the denial of its motion for reconsideration, Philex was able to
obtain its VAT input credit/refund not only for the taxable year 1989 to 1991 but also for 1992 and
1994, computed amounting to 205,595,289.20.

In view of the grant of its VAT input credit/refund, Philex now contends that the same should, ipso
jure, off-set its excise tax liabilities since both had already become “due and demandable, as well
as fully liquidated;” hence, legal compensation can properly take place.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is correct in its contention that tax liability and VAT input
credit/refund can be subjected to legal compensation.

HELD:
The Supreme Court has already made the pronouncement that taxes cannot be subject to
compensation for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are not creditors and
debtors of each other. There is a material distinction between a tax and debt. Debts are due to the
Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign
capacity.

Philex’s claim is an outright disregard of the basic principle in tax law that taxes are the lifeblood of
the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. Evidently, to
countenance Philex’s whimsical reason would render ineffective our tax collection system.

Philex is not allowed to refuse the payment of its tax liabilities on the ground that it has a pending
tax claim for refund or credit against the government which has not yet been granted. It must be
noted that a distinguishing feature of a tax is that it is compulsory rather than a matter of bargain.
Hence, a tax does not depend upon the consent of the taxpayer.If any payer can defer the
payment of taxes by raising the defense that it still has a pending claim for refund or credit, this
would adversely affect the government revenue system. A taxpayer cannot refuse to pay his taxes
when they fall due simply because he has a claim against the government or that the collection of
the tax is contingent on the result of the lawsuit it filed against the government. Moreover, Philex's
theory that would automatically apply its VAT input credit/refund against its tax liabilities can easily
give rise to confusion and abuse, depriving the government of authority over the manner by which
taxpayers credit and offset their tax liabilities.

"The power of taxation is sometimes called also the power to destroy. Therefore it should be
exercised with caution to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a taxpayer. It must be
exercised fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the 'hen that lays the golden egg.'
And, in the order to maintain the general public's trust and confidence in the Government this
power must be used justly and not treacherously."

The petition is hereby dismissed.

CHAVEZ VS PCGG
G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998

FACTS: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former government official
asked the court to prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into,
perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . .
relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or
abroad — including the so-called Marcos gold hoard.

Chavez assailed the validity of the General and Supplemental Agreement executed by the government
(through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs on December 28,1993.

Item No. 2 of the General Agreement states that the assets of the PRIVATE PARTY (Marcos heirs) shall be
net of and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUE: W/N the compromise agreement entered into by the PCGG and the Marcos heirs which committing
to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs is valid.

HELD: The petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993,
which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to
law and the Constitution.

Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the
properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Construction. The power to tax
and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative
bodies. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution, specifically provides: "No law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Member of the Congress." The
PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to
compromise ill-gotten wealth cases.

Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses form paying taxes on their properties,
such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special
grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate
the constitutional rule that "taxation shall be uniform and equitable."

Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internal revenue to
compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when (1) there is reasonable doubt as to the
validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayer's financial position demonstrates a clear
inability to pay. Definitely, neither requisite is present in the case of the Marcoses, because under the
Agreement they are effectively conceding the validity of the claims against their properties, part of which
they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the power of the
commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears
to be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs involved do not justify
the collection of the tax due. In this instance, the cancellation of tax liability is done even before the
determination of the amount due. In any event, criminal violations of the Tax Code, for which legal actions
have been filed in court or in which fraud is involved, cannot be compromised.

PBM Employees Asso. v PBM 51 SCRA 189 (1973)

Facts: Petitioners informed the respondent employers of their schedule for a mass demonstration in protest for the
alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Respondent invoke that the demonstration is a violation of their CBA agreement
however petitioners contend it is an exercise of their freedom to peaceable assembly to seek redress of their
grievances against the abusive Pasig police and not a strike against their employer. Respondent dismissed the
petitioners and the court sustained their demonstration is one of bargaining in bad faith. Issue: Whether or not there
was a restraint in the exercise of the right to peaceable assembly of the petitioners. Held: The court held that the
primacy of human rights such as freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances over property rights has been sustained. The obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the
workers of the respondent firm was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of
which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better
shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the
eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work,
constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN et al . 402 SCRA 84(2003)

The PCGG cannot vote sequestered shares to elect the ETPI Board of Directors or to amend the
Articles of Incorporation for the purpose of increasing the authorized capital stock unless there is
a prima facie evidence showing that said shares are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger
of dissipation.

Two sets of board and officers of Eastern Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) were
elected, one by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the other by the
registered ETPI stockholders.Victor Africa, a stockholder of ETPI filed a petition for Certiorari
before the Sandiganbayan alleging that the PCGG had been “illegally exercising the rights of
stockholders of ETPI,” in the election of the members of the board of directors. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that only the registered owners, their duly authorized representatives or their
proxies may vote their corresponding shares. The PCGG filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition before the Court which was granted. The Court referred the PCGG’s petition to
hold the special stockholders’ meeting to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and
resolution. The Sandiganbayan granted the PCGG “authority to cause the holding of a special
stockholders’ meeting of ETPI and held that there was an urgent necessity to increase ETPI’s
authorized capital stock; there existed a prima facie factual foundation for the issuance of the writ
of sequestration covering the Class “A” shares of stock; and the PCGG was entitled to vote the
sequestered shares of stock. The PCGG-controlled ETPI board of directors held a meeting and the
increase in ETPI’s authorized capital stock from P250 Million to P2.6 Billion was “unanimously
approved”. Africa filed a motion to nullify the stockholders meeting, contending that only the
Court, and not the Sandiganbayan, has the power to authorize the PCGG to call a stockholders
meeting and vote the sequestered shares. The Sandiganbayan denied the motions for
reconsideration of prompting Africa to file before the Court a second petition, challenging the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions authorizing the holding of a stockholders meeting and the one denying
the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering the holding of a
stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI board of directorswithout first setting in place, through
the amendment of the articles of incorporation and the by-laws of ETPI 2. Whether the PCGG can
vote the sequestered ETPI Class “A” shares in the stockholders meeting for the election of
the board of directors.

HELD:

First Issue :
On the PCGG’s imputation of grave abuse of discretion upon the Sandiganbayan for ordering the
holding of a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI board of directors without first setting in place,
through the amendment of the articles of incorporation and the by-laws of ETPI, the safeguards
prescribed in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Roxas. The Court laid down those safeguards because of the
obvious need to reconcile the rights of the stockholder whose shares have been sequestered and
the duty of the conservator to preserve what could be ill-gotten wealth. There is nothing in the
Cojuangco case that would suggest that the above measures should be incorporated in the articles
and by-laws before a stockholders meeting for the election of the board of directors is held. The
PCGG nonetheless insists that those measures should be written in the articles and by-laws before
such meeting, “otherwise, the {Marcos] cronies will elect themselves or their representatives,
control the corporation, and for an appreciable period of time, have every opportunity to disburse
funds, destroy or alter corporate records, and dissipate assets.” That could be a possibility, but the
peculiar circumstances of the case require that the election of the board of directors first be held
before the articles of incorporation are amended. Section 16 of the Corporation Code requires the
majority vote of the board of directorsto amend the articles of incorporation. At the time Africa
filed his motion for the holding of the annual stockholders meeting, there were two sets of
ETPI directors, one controlled by the PCGG and the other by the registered stockholders. Which of
them is the legitimate board of directors? Which of them may rightfully vote to amend the articles
of incorporation and integrate the safeguards laid down in Cojuangco? It is essential, therefore, to
cure the aberration of two boards of directors sitting in a single corporation before the articles of
incorporation are amended to set in place the Cojuangco safeguards. The danger of the so-called
Marcos cronies taking control of the corporation and dissipating its assets is, of course, a
legitimate concern of the PCGG, charged as it is with the duties of a conservator. Nevertheless,
such danger may be averted by the “substantially contemporaneous” amendment of the articles
after the election of the board.

Second Issue :
The principle laid down in Baseco vs. PCGG was further enhanced in the subsequent cases of
Cojuangco v. Calpo and Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Cojuangco, Jr., where
the Court developed a “two-tiered” test in determining whether the PCGG may vote sequestered
shares. The issue of whether PCGG may vote the sequestered shares in SMC necessitates a
determination of at least two factual matters: a.) whether there is prima facie evidence showing
that the said shares are ill-gotten and thus belong to the state; and b.) whether there is an
immediate danger of dissipation thus necessitating their continued sequestration and voting by the
PCGG while the main issue pends with the Sandiganbayan. The two-tiered test, however, does not
apply in cases involving funds of “public character.” In such cases, the government is granted the
authority to vote said shares, namely: (1) Where government shares are taken over by private
persons or entities who/which registered them in their own names, and (2) Where
the capitalization or shares that were acquired with public funds somehow landed in private
hands. In short, when sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities
are alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied.
However, when the sequestered shares in the name of private individuals or entities are shown,
prima facie, to have been (1) originally government shares, or (2) purchased with public funds or
those affected with public interest, then the two-tiered test does not apply. The rule in the
jurisdiction is, therefore, clear. The PCGG cannot perform acts of strict ownership of sequestered
property. It is a mere conservator. It may not vote the shares in a corporation and elect members
of the board of directors. The only conceivable exception is in a case of a takeover of a business
belonging to the government or whose capitalization comes from public funds, but which landed in
private hands as in BASECO. In short, the Sandiganbayan held that the public character exception
does not apply, in which case it should have proceeded to apply the two-tiered test. This it failed to
do. The questions thus remain if there is prima facie evidence showing that the subject shares are
ill- gotten and if there is imminent danger of dissipation. The Court is not, however, a trier of facts,
hence, it is not in a position to rule on the correctness of the PCGG’s contention. Consequently, the
issue must be remanded to the Sandiganbayan for resolution.

Due Process

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, GR 139465 (Jan. 18, 2000)

FACTS:

Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. a request for the
extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. for violation of Conspiracy to Commit Offense, Attempt
to Evade Tax, Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television, False Statement, and Election Contribution in Name of Another.

During the evaluation process of the extradition, the private respondent, requested the petitioner, Secretary
of Justice, to furnish him copies of the extradition request from the U.S. government, that he be given ample time to
comment regarding the extradition request against him after he shall have received copies of the requested papers,
and to suspend the proceeding in the meantime.

The petitioner, Secretary of Justice denied the request in consistent with Art. 7 of the RP – US Extradition
Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the U.S. in any proceedings
arising from an extradition request.

The private respondent filed with the RTC against the petitioner Hon. Ralph Lantion (presiding judge RTC
Manila Branch 25) a mandamus, a certiorari, and a prohibition to enjoin the petitioner, the Secretary of DFA, and NBI
from performing any acts directed to the extradition of the respondent, for it will be a deprivation of his rights to
due process of notice and hearing.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Mark Jimenez is entitled to the basic rights of due process over the
government’s duties under a treaty?

RULING:

Yes. According to the principle of “Pacta Sunt Servanda”, parties to a treaty should keep their agreements to
good faith. However, Sec. 2 of Art. 2 of the Constitution (incorporation clause) provides that the Philippines “adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land”.

Incorporation clause is applied when there is a conflict between the international law and local/municipal
law. However, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal court.

The fact that the international law has been made part of the law of the land does not imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. Rules of international law are given an
equal standing with, but not superior to, the national legislative enactment. The principle of “Lex Posterior Derogat
Priori” clarifies that a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. And the Republic of the
Philippines considers its Constitution as the highest law of the land, therefore, both statutes and treaty may be
invalidated if they are conflict with the constitution.

GOVERNMENT OF THE USA VS PURGANAN

G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, petitioner,
Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42;
and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.

Facts:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42.
The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent
Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A
hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the
trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings

Discussions:
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.

Ruling/s:
No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do
not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been
conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process
now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to
impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line
which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the
said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are:
combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of
the mentioned law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial
challenge.

Ruling:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioner’s
contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be
plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance since
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against
that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction
cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity.
Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict
scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.
Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With
respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be
heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in
striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more
imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress’ decision to
include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder
law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.

95 SCRA 392 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – “Equal Protection” – Eligibility to Office after Being
65
Judicial Review; Requisites thereof
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
CO MMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

P atricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office
and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted.
This law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for
office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general,
Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have
different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and
the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the
provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never
been merged. Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case
does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have
to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity
that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public
office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been
validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be
more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not
be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law
should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other
hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local
officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It
may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good
local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city
or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he
had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, PETITIONERS, VS.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., RESPONDENTS.
69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process in Administrative Bodies

Facts:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due
to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the
National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees
laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood
(NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting
NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:

Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they
attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal
of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by
Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of
Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies,
due process can be complied with by observing the following:

 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof.
 Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending
to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
 While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
 Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
 The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
 The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
 The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

Gov’t of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extradite in an extradition1 proceeding.

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong
signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20,
1997.

The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by
the Philippine Department of Justice

The Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan Antonio Muñoz

Facts: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3)
counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense
of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were
issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each
charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for
the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest
against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge
Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law
granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr.
inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by
respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge.

Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge.
Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee.

Held: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of
the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee.
This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the
prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and
should be granted bail.

Ratio:

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right
of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and

1
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an
accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed
on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is
it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to
prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the
state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that
in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed,
not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party.
We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno, proposed that a new standard which
he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher
than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he
is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not,
the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

[G. R. No. 170723, March 03, 2008]

GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, Petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MICHELINA S.
AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B. PASCUAL,
Respondents.

FACTS:

On June 11,2002 petitioner Gloria Aguirre instituted a criminal complaint for the violation of Revised Penal
Code particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act No.7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre,
Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several John/Jane Doe alleging that John/Jane Doe upon the apparent
instructions of respondents Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz and Pedro Aguirre actually scouted, prospected, facilitated
solicited and/or procured the medical services of respondents Dr. Pascual and Dr. Agatep on the intended mutilation
via bilateral vasectomy of Laureano Aguirre.
Olondriz denied that the prospected, scouted, facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement
mutilated or abused his common law brother, Laureano Aguirre. She further contends that his common law brother
went through a vasectomy procedure but that does not amount to mutilation.
Dr. Agatep contends that the complainant has no legal personality to file a case since she is only a common
law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre. He further contends that Vasectomy does
not in any way equate to castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context of law
and medicine.
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged did not amount to mutilation, the vasectomy
operation did not deprived Larry of his reproductive organ.
Gloria Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor dismissed the petition
stating that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any
reversible error in the questioned resolution.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the respondents are liable for the crime of mutilation

RULING:

No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code provides that

Art. 262. Mutilation. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for
reproduction.

Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements [55] of mutilation under the first paragraph of
Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for
generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of
some essential organ for reproduction.

According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and
penalized above, i.e., “[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ,
which is still very much part of his physical self.

Santiago v. Garchitorena (G.R. No. 109266)

Facts:

On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan
with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the
benefits of the Alien Legalization Program.

On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as
G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was
intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. The petition was
dismissed on January 13, 1992.

On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice
Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992. The
Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the arraignment. Petitioner filed a
motion for a bill of particulars. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names
and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.

On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting
the 32 Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds. Hence,
the filing of the instant petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the 32 Amended Informations may be admitted?

Held:

The petition is denied.

The Court find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's
case, and hence, there should only be one information to be file against her.The 32 Amended
Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes
referred to as "continuous crime."

The original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act - that of her
approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such
privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner
was in violation of a law - Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was
done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The 32 Amended Informations
reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word
"aliens" in the original information each amended information states the name of the individual
whose stay was legalized.

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period
of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of
the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the
pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document. Likewise, the public prosecutors
manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single
harm or injury.

The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) is affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is
modified in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is
directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into
one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.

NAMIL VS. COMELEC [414 SCRA 553; G.R. NO. 150540; 28 OCT
2003]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang, Sultan
Kudarat proclaimed the petitioners as winning candidates for their Sangguniang Bayan.
The following day, herein private respondents were proclaimed winners as well. Private
respondents claimed that they should be recognized as the winners, and not the
petitioners. Upon receipt of such letter, the Commissioner-in-charge for Region XII asked
the Law Department, the Regional Election Registrar and the Provincial Elections
Supervisor to submit their reports on the matter. All of them found the second
proclamation valid. Hence, the COMELEC issued a Resolution ordering the immediate
installation of the private respondents as the newly elected members of the Sangguniang
Bayan, even though petitioners herein have already taken their oath and have assumed
office. Petitioners contend that such Resolution is null and void because they were not
accorded due notice and hearing, hence constituting a violation of the due process
principle.

Issue: Whether or Not due the COMELEC has the power to suspend a proclamation or
the effects thereof without notice and hearing.

Held: No. The COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or
suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing. The proclamation on
May 20, 2001 enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity since no contest or
protest was even filed assailing the same. The petitioners cannot be removed from office
without due process of law. Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the
COMELEC requires due notice and hearing. Furthermore, the proclamation of a winning
candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any motion to set aside his
proclamation. Hence, as ruled in Fariñas vs. COMELEC, Reyes vs. COMELEC and Gallardo
vs. COMELEC, the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation
or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.