G.R. No.

86421 May 31, 1994

SPS. THELMA R. MASINSIN and MIGUEL MASINSIN, SPS. GILBERTO and ADELINA, ROLDAN, petitioners,

vs.

THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, DEPUTY SHERIFF JESS ARREOLA, VICENTE
CAÑEDA and THE HON. LEONARDO CRUZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge Regional Trial of Manila, Branch XXV, respondents.

Gregorio T. Fabros for petitioners.

Isidro F. Molina for private respondent.

RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.:

Spouses Miguel and Thelma Masinsin, et al., instituted this petition for certiorari, prohibition, relief from judgment, as well as declaratory relief,
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, asking us to order the Metropolitan Trial Court ("MTC") of Manila, Branch X, to cease and
desist from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 107203-CV.

This case emerged from an ejectment suit (docketed Civil Case No. 107203-CV) filed by private respondent Vicente Cañeda ("Cañeda"), then as
plaintiffs, against herein petitioners, as defendants, with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch X). After trial, the MTC, on 01 July 1985,
rendered judgment; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and all persons claiming right under them to vacate the premises
and to remove their house/apartment and surrender possession of the subject land to the plaintiff; to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P100.00 a
month from January 1987 as the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises until the land is actually vacated, and the
costs of suit. 1

No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. On 22 August 1985, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXXII) seeking the annulment of the aforesaid decision in the ejectment case and to set aside
an order of its execution. The petition was in due time dismissed. Again, no appeal was taken therefrom.

On 07 October 1985, a complaint for "Annulment of Judgment, Lease Contract and Damages" was filed by petitioners before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch XLI) asking, in main, for the nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint was dismissed on the
ground of res judicata. This time, petitioners appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, a writ of execution was issued by the
MTC for the enforcement of its decision. The writ, however, was held in abeyance when petitioners deposited with the Court of Appeals the sum
of P3,000.00 in cash plus an amount of P100.00 to be paid every month beginning February 1987. On 11 March 1987, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the order of dismissal of the lower court. Petitioners' recourse to this Court was to be of no avail. The petition was denied, and an entry
of judgment was made on 14 July 1987.

Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTC for execution. When petitioners refused to remove their house on the premises in
question, upon motion of private respondent, an order of demolition was issued. Shortly thereafter, the demolition began. Before the
completion of the demolition, a restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XIX) following a petition for certiorari,
with preliminary injunction and restraining order, filed by petitioners. On 23 February 1988, the trial court dismissed the petition.

Unfazed by the series of dismissals of their complaints and petitions, petitioners assailed anew the MTC decision in a petition for certiorari, with
preliminary injunction, and for declaratory relief (docketed Civil Case No. 88-43944) before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXV),
which, again, issued a restraining order. 2

Private respondent then filed a motion for an alias writ of execution with the MTC. An ex-parte motion of petitioners for the issuance of a
second restraining order was this time denied by the RTC (Branch XXV). 3 On 23 August 1990, 4 the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the petition
with costs against petitioners.
In this petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila (Branch X) has lost jurisdiction to enforce its decision, dated 01 July 1985, in Civil
Case No. 107203, when the property in question was proclaimed an area for priority development by the National Housing Authority on 01
December 1987 by authority of Presidential Decree 2016.

The petition is totally without merit.

In resolving this issue, we only have to refer to our resolution of 01 February 1993 in G.R. No. 98446, entitled, "Spouses Thelma R. Masinsin, et
al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," to which this case is intimately related, where we ruled:

. . . The singular question common to both cases submitted for resolution of this court is the implication of Presidential Decree No. 1517,
otherwise known as the "Urban Land Reform Law," and its amendments or ramifications embodied in Proclamation No. 1893, as amended by
Proclamation No. 1967 and Presidential Decree No. 2016. All the above statutes are being implemented by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, Office of the President.

There is a prejudicial issue the answer to which hangs the resolution of this case. On May 20, 1992, this Court required the National Housing
Authority to submit a Comment on the status of the program of acquisition by the Government of the land area which includes the disputed
property, as part of the Areas for Priority Development (APD), under the aforementioned decrees and proclamations.

In compliance with said order of this Court, Mr. Andres C. Lingan, Manager of the Metro Manila Project Department of the National Housing
Authority, submitted the following report on the status of Lot 6-A, Block 1012, located at No. 1890 Obesis Street, Pandacan, Manila, known as
the Carlos Estate, an APD site. Pertinent portions of the report read:

Please be informed that Lot 6-A, Block 1012 located at No. 1890 Obesis St., Pandacan, Manila which is the subject matter of the case and located
within the Carlos Estate declared as APD site pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 1967, is not for acquisition by NHA.
The Carlos Estate is located outside of the NHA projects under the Zonal Improvement Project (ZIP) and Community Mortgage Program (CMP).
The site, however, is under the administration of the Presidential Commission on Urban Poor (PCUP) for acquisition and upgrading. (Emphasis
Supplied.)

The above information answers the uncertainty concerning the status of the alleged negotiation for the acquisition by the government of certain
areas in Metro Manila. The NHA is definitely NOT acquiring the said lot for its program.

It appearing that the purpose of this Petition for Review is to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the lower courts, in order to avoid eviction from the disputed premises and to be allowed to acquire the same allegedly under the
Community Mortgage Program of the National Housing Authority, we find the petition without merit and deny the same. Consequently, the
petition is DISMISSED. 5

What immediately catches one's attention to this case is the evident predilection of petitioners, through different counsel, to file pleadings, one
after another, from which not even this Court has been spared. The utter lack of merit of the complaints and petitions simply evinces the
deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has long become final and executory.

Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of counsel, try to nullify the same MTC decision before different branches of the court, trifling
with judicial processes. Never, again, should this practice be countenanced. 6

The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in solemn agreement in dedicating ourselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere fictile of
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that we must uphold and keep inviolable. Perhaps, it is time we are here reminded of that pledge;
thus -

LAWYER'S OATH

I, . . ., do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to its commission; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any man's cause
for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD. (Emphasis supplied.)

We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct,
pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is contumacious calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting
application of the contempt power. 7

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby strongly CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction of the
lawyer's oath in the future will be dealt with most severely. Double costs against petitioners.

This resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 2837 October 7, 1994

ESTEBAN M. LIBIT, complainant, vs. ATTYS. EDELSON G. OLIVA and FLORANDO A. UMALI, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In civil Case No. 84-24144 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Pedro Cutingting, plaintiff versus Alfredo Tan, defendant", the
Honorable Presiding Judge Domingo Panis issued the following order:

The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is hereby ordered to conduct an investigation with the end in view of determining the
author of the Sheriff's Return which appears to have been falsified and to institute such criminal action as the evidence will warrant. (p. 1, Final
Report.)

After conducting the necessary investigation, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), through herein complainant, charged respondents as
follows:

That sometime in May 1984 in the City of Manila, at the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLI, Manila, Philippines, the above-named Respondents, as
Counsels for PEDRO CUTINGTING in Civil Case No. 84-24144, entitled PEDRO CUTINGTING, Plaintiff vs. ALFREDO TAN, Defendant, did then and
there, knowingly, willfully introduced/presented in evidence before the aforesaid Regional Trial Court, a falsified Sheriff's Return of Summons
during the hearing of the aforesaid Civil Case thereby impending and/or obstructing the speedy administration and/or dispensation of Justice. (p.
2, Final Report, ff. p. 69, Record.)

Respondents in their respective answers denied having any hand in the falsification of the said sheriff's return.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court En Banc of April 12, 1988, the case was referred to the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In view, however, of the report of the National Bureau of Investigation to the effect that the signature above the typewritten name Florando
Umali on the last page of the complaint in said civil case is not his signature, complainant, through counsel, agreed to the dismissal of the case
with respect to Atty. Umali.

With respect to Atty. Edelson G. Oliva, the IBP submitted the following report and recommendation:

There is ample evidence extant in the records to prove that

Atty. Oliva has something to do with the falsification of the Sheriff's Return on the Summons in said Civil Case No. 84-24144.

The oral and documentary evidence of the complainant strongly tend to show the following: (1) The Sheriff's Return of the Summon in the said
civil case was falsified as it was not signed by Deputy Sheriff Rodolfo Torella (Exh. "J" — Sworn Statement of Rodolfo Torella dated February 1,
1985, and Exh. "S", which is the falsified Sheriff's Return); (2) The summons was received from the clerk of the Court of the Manila

RTC-Branch LXI by Ronaldo Romero, a messenger in the law office of Attys. Umali and Oliva and said messenger brought the summons to the law
office of the respondents (Exh. "H" — Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Ronaldo Romero, and Exh. "G", Exh. "I" — Sworn Statement dated February 28,
1985 of Mariano Villanueva, Chief Staff Asst. 2, RTC, Manila; (3) On the basis of the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons, Atty. Oliva,
counsel for the defendant [should be plaintiff] in said civil case, filed a typewritten Motion to Declare Defendant in Default (Exh.) "R" — Motion
to Declare Defendant In Default in said civil case signed and filed by Atty. Oliva);

(4) On March 29, 1984, Atty. Oliva, in his capacity as Operations Manager of Judge Pio R. Marcos Law Office, sent a final demand letter on
Alfredo Tan, the defendant in said Civil case, for payment of the sum of P70,174.00 (Exh. "T" — Demand Letter dated March 28, 1984 of Atty.
Oliva addressed to Alfredo Tan); (5) The demand letter of Atty. Oliva (Exh. "T"), the complaint in said civil case (Exh. "Q", "Q-1", and "Q-2"), the
falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons (Exh. "S"), the Motion To Declare Defendant In Default dated October 30, 1984 signed and filed by

Atty. Oliva (Exh. "R" and "R-1") were typed on one and the same typewriter, as shown in the Questioned Document Report No. 198-585 dated
19 June 1985 (Exh. "Q", "Q-1" and "Q-2"; Exh. "V", "V-1" and

"V-2").
After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the IBP, the Court finds that respondent Atty. Edelson
G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by the
evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably reveal respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the
lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.

At this juncture, it is well to stress once again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. It can not be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious
administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them.
A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy the expectation. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their
first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all court officers sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all
and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court (Chavez vs. Viola, 196 SCRA 10 [1991].

In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer that he shall not do any falsehood. He has
likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the
Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty. Florando Umali.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,

vs.

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for petitioners.

Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.

Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October 20,
1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.

The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular
Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW),
entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter
referred to as the Companies).
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and
acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular
issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National
Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.

Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the
Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department, and he was soon
receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel
manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the
Unions.

In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a modified renewal of their respective
collective bargaining contracts which were then due to expire on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make whatever
benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective October 1, 1957.

Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on the Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a
deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective
bargaining." Several conciliation conferences were held under the auspices of the Department of Labor wherein the conciliators urged the
Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals en toto so that the said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for
union security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that the
Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money benefits if this was done. Thereupon, and prior to April 15, 1958, the
petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU dropped this particular demand, and requested the Companies to answer its
demands, point by point, en toto. But the respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. still refused to make any counter-proposals. In a letter
addressed to the two other Unions by the joint management of the Companies, the former were also asked to drop their union security demand,
otherwise the Companies "would no longer consider themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits retroactive to October 1,
1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two petitioner unions likewise dropped their demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then
was set by the parties to meet and discuss the remaining demands.

From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of
salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the Unions demanded from the Companies final counter-proposals on their economic demands, particularly
on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals, the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and figures and requested the Unions
to submit a workable formula which would justify their own proposals, taking into account the financial position of the former. Forthwith the
Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.

Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were
going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.

On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga.

On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the respondent Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:

We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.

However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:

1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.

2. Take your meals within the office.

3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office where comfortable cots have been prepared.

4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.

5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.

6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.

The decision to make is yours — whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in the fairness of the Management.

The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21,
1958.

From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some management men tried to break thru the
Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958 Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section,
respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line,
tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries. The Companies
organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, who with the said respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket
lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by
some picketers.

Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed criminal charges against the
strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise filed a petition
for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila which, on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against
striking members of the Unions, issued on May 31, 1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the said court, from stopping,
impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and
vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' building.

On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to the strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted hereunder in
its entirety:
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.

Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our decision.

We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for long. We have continued to operate and will
continue to do so with or without you.

If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal charges pending against you, we are
giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your
replacement.

Before, the decisions was yours to make.

So it is now.

Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's
office and by the courts. These three cases involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two others.

At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them
until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on
June 2, 1958.

However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but
also to be screened by a management committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee initially
rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough
incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office. Subsequently,
when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused
readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they committed "acts inimical to
the interest of the respondents," without however stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission
are Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life Building Employees' Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU
Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively
as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been
readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them.

On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint
specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by
sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee
and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be
replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union
membership and degree of participation in the strike.

On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of the complaint, stating special defenses therein, and
asking for the dismissal of the complaint.

After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered on August 17, 1965 a decision
dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack of merit. On August 31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of the said
decision, and their supporting memorandum on September 10, 1965. This was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution
promulgated on October 20, 1965.

Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower court erred:

1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in sending out individually to the strikers the letters marked Exhibits A and B;
2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in the matter of
readmission of employees after the strike;

3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing officials and members of the Unions without giving them the
benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side in regard to activities undertaken by them in the legitimate exercise of their
right to strike; and

4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages, from June 2, 1958 to the date of their
actual reinstatement to their usual employment.

I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a legitimate exercise of their freedom of speech.
We do not agree. The said letters were directed to the striking employees individually — by registered special delivery mail at that — without
being coursed through the Unions which were representing the employees in the collective bargaining.

The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the
plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor
practice, as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their
collective bargaining representatives. (31 Am. Jur. 563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676, 146 ALR 1045)

Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate
with his employees individually in connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining
with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees'
bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332).

Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of interference. Thus, the act of a company president in writing
letters to the strikers, urging their return to work on terms inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as constituting interference
with the exercise of his employees' right to collective bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621). It is likewise an act of interference
for the employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified therein, otherwise new employees would
be engaged to perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his representative urging
the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor
practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the
employer's molestation.1

Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to return to work, it is not
protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution (NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is true with exhibit B since
it contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event they did not report for work on June 2, 1958. The free speech
protection under the Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or
threats, or reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB vs. Goigy Co., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422).

Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional
movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon the strike
and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an
attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since
the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of returning to work would be.

Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal"
employees of a company shortly after the making of a request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of mollifying
employees after the employer has refused to bargain with the union, or for the purpose of inducing striking employees to return to work; the
employer's promises of benefits in return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the employer's statement,
made about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the strikers returned to work, they would
receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to work in.2

Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which states that "the officers and members of the
complainant unions decided to call off the strike and return to work on June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila Court of
First Instance," the respondents contend that this was the main cause why the strikers returned to work and not the letters, exhibits A and B.
This assertion is without merit. The circumstance that the strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ
issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters, which were calculated, or which tended, to
interfere with the employees' right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a strike. Interference constituting unfair labor practice
will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended.
For success of purpose is not, and should not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes unfair labor practice.
The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer
has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under section 3 of the Act,
and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the
employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and
collective bargaining. (Francisco, Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p. 323, citing NLRB v. Ford, C.A., 1948, 170 F2d 735).

Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone but should be read in the light of the preceding and
subsequent circumstances surrounding them. The letters should be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine,"

... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on the basis of their implicit implications, but were to be
appraised against the background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances. Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion by an
employer which, though innocent in themselves, frequently were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they were
uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection with an established collateral
plan of coercion or interference. (Rothenberg on Relations, p. 374, and cases cited therein.)

It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal of their respective collective bargaining
agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager
and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. After the notice to strike was served on the Companies and
negotiations were in progress in the Department of Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or
in responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions. And during the negotiations in the Department of Labor,
despite the fact that the petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the former drop their demand for union shop and in spite of urgings
by the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the respondents adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage
was the chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining between the former and the Unions. After the
petitioners went to strike, the strikers were individually sent copies of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to
return to work upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes,
brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings
occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in
front of the premises of the Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers.lâwphî1.ñèt Then
the respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight
misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance
restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and
the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On the same day that the injunction was
issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent — again individually and by registered special delivery mail — to the strikers, threatening them with
dismissal if they did not report for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners reported for work, the respondents thru a
screening committee — of which Ramon Garcia was a member — refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of "pending
criminal charges." However, when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused
admission to 34 officials and union members. It is not, however, disputed that all-non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from
the breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending criminal
charges who were readmitted were Generoso Abella, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Federico Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and
Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office found no probable cause against the petitioning strikers, the Companies adamantly
refused admission to them on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without stating specifically the
inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to admit, however, that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which
were dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts..

Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the
said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them.

To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in order to protect and continue their business, the
CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an economic strike on the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that there was a "deadlock in
collective bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed testimonies of some union men who did not actually know the very reason for the
strike. It should be noted that exhibit 4, which was filed on January 27, 1958, states, inter alia:

TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

MANILA

Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic] unions intends to go on strike against

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.

Plaza Moraga, Manila

THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP

Plaza Moraga, Manila

INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATION

Plaza Moraga, Manila .

for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING...

However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned from January 27, 1958. This simply proves that the reason
for the strike was not the deadlock on collective bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958, the
respondents categorically stated what they thought was the cause of the "Notice of Strike," which so far as material, reads:

3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop, you filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations
on 27 January 1958, citing `deadlock in collective bargaining' which could have been for no other issue than the union shop." (exhibit 8, letter
dated April 15, 1958.)

The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. And the actual and main reason for the strike was,
"When it became crystal clear the management double crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal collectively and
considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime being committed by the management such as the sudden resignation of some unionists
and [who] became supervisors without increase in salary or change in responsibility, such as the coercion of employees, decided to declare the
strike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958, p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved by the following circumstances: (1) it took the respondents six (6)
months to consider the petitioners' proposals, their only excuse being that they could not go on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not
drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7, respondents' letter dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for union shop,
the respondents did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec. 14 of Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to
the petitioners' demands within ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well reasoned, workable formula
which takes into account the financial position of the group companies." (tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)

II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the employee must be interested in continuing his work
with the group companies; (2) there must be no criminal charges against him; and (3) he must report for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he
would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the employees reported back to work at the respondents' head office on June 2, 1953, they
must be considered as having complied with the first and third conditions.

Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the second condition. It is not denied that when the
strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal charges.
However, despite the fact that they were able to secure their respective clearances 34 officials and union members were still refused
readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to the Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non-strikers who
also had criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal's office, arising from the same incidents whence the criminal charges against the
strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. This is a clear act of discrimination practiced by the
Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a violation of sec. 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act.

The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated the active from the less active unionists on the
basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after they were
able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against them. It is significant to note in this
connection that except for one union official who deserted his union on the second day of the strike and who later participated in crashing
through the picket lines, not a single union officer was taken back to work. Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the record shows that the
union activity of the rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied reinstatement.

So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who
participated in an illegal strike, dismissed only the leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of discrimination against those dismissed
and constituting a waiver of the employer's right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation of the fault committed by them." (Carlos
and Fernando, Labor and Social Legislation, p. 62, citing Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Air Lines Emloyees Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.)

It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers
returning to work — the respondents delegated the power to readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had chosen Vicente Abella,
chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, to screen the unionists reporting back to work. It is not
difficult to imagine that these two employees — having been involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike — were
hostile to the strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of reinstatement, is a
form of discrimination in rehiring.

Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to
the strikers, and reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a unionized plant, to a job in another mill, which was imperfectly organized.
(Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p. 473, citing Sunshine Mining Co., 7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43 NLRB 545; emphasis supplied.)

Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening committee admitted the discrimination committed
against the strikers, they tossed back and around to each other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted that in exercising
for the management the authority to screen the returning employees, the committee admitted the non-strikers but refused readmission to the
strikers (tsn., Feb. 6, 1962, pp. 15-19, 23-29). Vicente Abella, chairman of the management's screening committee, while admitting the
discrimination, placed the blame therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept. 20, 1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But the management, speaking
through the respondent Olbes, head of the Companies, disclaimed responsibility for the discrimination. He testified that "The decision whether
to accept or not an employee was left in the hands of that committee that had been empowered to look into all cases of the strikers." (tsn., Sept.
6, 1962, p. 19.)

Of course, the respondents — through Ramon Garcia — tried to explain the basis for such discrimination by testifying that strikers whose
participation in any alleged misconduct during the picketing was not serious in nature were readmissible, while those whose participation was
serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). But even this distinction between acts of slight misconduct and acts of serious misconduct
which the respondents contend was the basis for either reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered upon a cursory examination of the
evidence on record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent to the other strikers cited the alleged commission by them
of simple "acts of misconduct."

III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the opportunity to defend himself
against the supposed charges against him. As earlier mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the
respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but when all, except three, were able to secure and
subsequently present the required clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later received letters
from the respondents in the following stereotyped tenor:
This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular Life-FGU Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958.

The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed acts of misconduct while picketing during the last strike. Because
this may not constitute sufficient cause under the law to terminate your employment without pay, we are giving you the amount of P1,930.32
corresponding to one-half month pay for every year of your service in the Group Company.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JOSE M. OLBES

President, Insurance Life

Acting President, FGU.

The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the dismissed strikers were the same acts with which
the said strikers were charged before the fiscal's office and the courts. But all these charges except three were dropped or dismissed.

Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.

Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement
allegedly because he did not report for duty on June 2, 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the overwhelming evidence adduced at
the trial and which the respondents failed to rebut, negates the respondents' charge that he had abandoned his job. In his testimony,
corroborated by many others, Tabasondra particularly identified the management men to whom he and his group presented themselves on June
2, 1958. He mentioned the respondent Olbes' secretary, De Asis, as the one who received them and later directed them — when Olbes refused
them an audience — to Felipe Enage, the Companies' personnel manager. He likewise categorically stated that he and his group went to see
Enage as directed by Olbes' secretary. If Tabasondra were not telling the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the respondents to
produce De Asis and Enage — who testified anyway as witnesses for the respondents on several occasions — to rebut his testimony. The
respondents did nothing of the kind. Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents' attention to his non-admission and asked
them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of doing so, the respondents dismissed him by their letter dated July 10, 1958.
Elementary fairness required that before being dismissed for cause, Tabasondra be given "his day in court."

At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does not constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement.
In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the taking back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination although the five strikers who were
not reinstated, all of whom were prominent in the union and in the strike, reported for work at various times during the next three days, but
were told that there were no openings. Said the Court:

... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking back six union men, the respondent's officials discriminated
against the latter on account of their union activities and that the excuse given that they did not apply until after the quota was full was an
afterthought and not the true reason for the discrimination against them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904,
82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 725, 728)

The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused readmission on June 2, 1958, is not persuasive. When the
employer puts off reinstatement when an employee reports for work at the time agreed, we consider the employee relieved from the duty of
returning further.

Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the Companies spent more than P80,000 for the vacation
trips of officials, they refused to grant union demands; hence, he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies. We do not find this
allegation convincing. First, this accusation was emphatically denied by Tongos on the witness stand. Gonzales, president of one of the
respondent Companies and one of the officials referred to, took a trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were then in force, and an outgoing
traveller on a combined business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank, per its Circular 52 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks)
dated May 9, 1952, an allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the official rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket money; hence, this was the
only amount that would appear on the books of the Companies. It was only on January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized
Agent Banks), that the Central Bank lifted the exchange controls. Tongos could not therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the above
sum. And his competence in figures could not be doubted considering that he had passed the board examinations for certified public
accountants. But assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of Gonzales' trip — which the respondents never denied or
tried to
disprove — his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and advertise the facts involved in a labor dispute, in
accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic Act 875 which guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right to give
"publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved in any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling or by any method not
involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only the right, it is as well the duty, of every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute for the
purpose of informing all those affected thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are expected to expose the truth before the public to justify
their respective demands. Being a union man and one of the strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on whether or not the
respondent Companies were justified in refusing to accede to union demands. After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of
management. And his statement, if indeed made, is but an expression of free speech protected by the Constitution.

Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor relation is to me a constitutional and useful right. Labor is free ... to turn
its publicity on any labor oppression, substandard wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working conditions. The employer, too, should
be free to answer and to turn publicity on the records of the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of his men ... (Concurring opinion
of Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430.) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 591.)

The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information, Tongos committed not only a betrayal of trust but also a violation
of the moral principles and ethics of accountancy. But nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under the Revised Rules
and Regulations of the Board of Accountancy formulated in 1954, is this stated. Moreover, the relationship of the Companies with Tongos was
that of an employer and not a client. And with regard to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo, both vice-presidents of the Trust
Insurance Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made by Tongos, the lower court should not have given them much weight. The firm of
these witnesses was newly established at that time and was still a "general agency" of the Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that
they were more inclined to favor the respondents rather than Tongos.

Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Daño, Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo Ramirez, opined the lower court, were constructively
dismissed by non-readmission allegedly because they not only prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief
of the personnel records section of the Companies, from entering the Companies' premises on May 21, 1958, but they also caused bruises and
abrasions on Garcia's chest and forehead — acts considered inimical to the interest of the respondents. The Unions, upon the other hand, insist
that there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took part in pushing Garcia; that it was Garcia who elbowed his way through the picket lines and
therefore Ner shouted "Close up," which the picketers did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino Bugay's placard and a fight ensued between them in
which both suffered injuries. But despite these conflicting versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958, there are grounds to believe
that the picketers are not responsible for what happened.lâwphî1.ñèt The picketing on May 21, 1958, as reported in the police blotter, was
peaceful (see Police blotter report, exh. 3 in CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where Ner was acquitted). Moreover, although the
Companies during the strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at Escolta, Manila; Tuason Building at San Vicente Street, Manila;
and Ayala, Inc. offices at Makati, Rizal, Garcia, the assistant corporate secretary, and Abella, the chief of the personnel records section, reported
for work at the Insular Life Building. There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were sent to work at the latter building to create such
an incident and have a basis for filing criminal charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction from the court of
first instance. Besides, under the circumstances the picketers were not legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw from the picket lines.
Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate exercise of their rights, they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights
from any assault or unlawful transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to, attests that they did not resort to violence.

The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or diminish the right to strike. Persuasive on this point is
the following commentary: .

We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is essentially a
battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth hot
words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest is
difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this nature, however much it is to be regretted, must have been in the
contemplation of the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing therein should be construed so as to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights afforded to employees by the Act would indeed be
illusory. We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by the Act that minor disorders of this nature would deprive a striker of the
possibility of reinstatement. (Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F2d 472, cited in Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 378)

Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary incident of the strike and should not be considered
as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it has been held that:

Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective
Bargaining, Vol. II, p. 855 citing Stackpole Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.)

Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law, they amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors
and are not a bar to reinstatement.

In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and
Collective Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford Motor Company, 23 NLRB No. 28.)
Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-striking employees before the fiscal's office, they were
readily admitted, but those strikers who had pending charges in the same office were refused readmission. The reinstatement of the strikers is
thus in order.

[W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with those whose reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives rise to
the inference that union activities rather than misconduct is the basis of his [employer] objection, the Board has usually required
reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the Third Annual Report of NLRB [1938], p. 211.)

Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly because he committed acts inimical to the interest of the
respondents when, as president of the FGU Workers and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the strikers that they could use force and
violence to have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely intended to prevent the non-strikers and company clients and customers
from entering the Companies' buildings. Even if this were true, the record discloses that the picket line had been generally peaceful, and that
incidents happened only when management men made incursions into and tried to break the picket line. At any rate, with or without the advice
of Ibarra, picketing is inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket line is an explosive front, charged with the emotions
and fierce loyalties of the union-management dispute. It may be marked by colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights
between the pickets and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 752). The picket line being the natural result of the
respondents' unfair labor practice, Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to reinstatement. Besides, the only evidence
presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike was the testimony of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of
the board of directors of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-NATU, who became a "turncoat" and who likewise
testified as to the union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex C, Decision, p. 27) — another matter which emphasizes the
respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the circumstances, there is good ground to believe that Encarnacion was made to spy on the
actvities of the union members. This act of the respondents is considered unjustifiable interference in the union activities of the petitioners and
is unfair labor practice.

It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of
interference, restraint or coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize, form and join unions as to constitute unfair labor
practice.

... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization than such
activity even where no discharges result. The information obtained by means of espionage is in valuable to the employer and can be used in a
variety of cases to break a union." The unfair labor practice is committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional labor spy or
detective, by officials or supervisory employees of the employer, or by fellow employees acting at the request or direction of the employer, or an
ex-employee..." (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766, and cases cited.) .

IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages from June 2,
1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment. Because all too clear from the factual and environmental milieu of this
case, coupled with settled decisional law, is that the Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor practices committed by the respondents,
and that when the strikers reported back for work — upon the invitation of the respondents — they were discriminatorily dismissed. The
members and officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement with back pay.

[W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of an employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the
strikers are entitled to reinstatement with back pay. (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 418.)

[A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of the Act is entitled to reinstatement with back pay upon an adjudication
that the discharge was illegal." (Id., citing Waterman S. S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d 760; N. L. R. B. v. Richter's Bakery, 140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v.
Southern Wood Preserving Co., 135 F. 2d 606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v. American Mfg. Co., 106 F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v.
Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 99 F2d 99.)

And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the positions of these union members have already been filled by
replacements.

[W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the strike or where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an "unfair
labor practice," the employer cannot successfully urge as a defense that the striking or lock-out employees position has been filled by
replacement. Under such circumstances, if no job sufficiently and satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved employee
can be found, the employer must discharge the replacement employee, if necessary, to restore the striking or locked-out worker to his old or
comparable position ... If the employer's improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike, all the strikers are entitled to reinstatement and the
dismissal of replacement employees wherever necessary; ... . (Id., p. 422 and cases cited.)
A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date should the backpay payable to the unionists be computed? It is now a
settled doctrine that strikers who are entitled to reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the period of the strike, even though it is
caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if they offer to return to work under the same conditions just before the strike, the refusal to re-
employ or the imposition of conditions amounting to unfair labor practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act and the
employer is liable for backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
L-19778, Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 124; Id., Resolution on motion for reconsideration, 13 SCRA 258; see also Mathews, Labor Relations
and the Law, p. 730 and the cited cases). We have likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive backpay from the date
of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, supra).

The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2, 1958, which the latter did. A great number of them, however,
were refused readmission because they had criminal charges against them pending before the fiscal's office, although non-strikers who were
also facing criminal indictments were readily readmitted. These strikers who were refused readmission on June 2, 1958 can thus be categorized
as discriminatorily dismissed employees and are entitled to backpay from said date. This is true even with respect to the petitioners Jose Pilapil,
Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were found guilty only of misdemeanors which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement
(Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 854), especially so because their unlawful acts arose during incidents which were provoked
by the respondents' men. However, since the employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service of the Companies (for more
than ten years) during which they may have found other employment or other means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that whatever
they may have earned during that period should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate somewhat the liability of the company, pursuant
to the equitable principle that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another (Macleod & Co. of the Philippines v. Progressive
Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205 [1955]).

The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by the dismissed employees of separation pay. This Court has
ruled that while employers may be authorized under Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of employees by serving the required notice,
or, in the absence thereof, by paying the required compensation, the said Act may not be invoked to justify a dismissal prohibited by law, e.g.,
dismissal for union activities.

... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate the employment of its employee by serving notice on him
one month in advance, or, in the absence thereof, by paying him one month compensation from the date of the termination of his employment,
such Act does not give to the employer a blanket authority to terminate the employment regardless of the cause or purpose behind such
termination. Certainly, it cannot be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final order of the court or a scheme to trample upon the right of an
employee who has been the victim of an unfair labor practice. (Yu Ki Lam, et al. v. Nena Micaller, et al., 99 Phil. 904 [1956].)
Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations are supported by substantial and
credible proof. This Court is not therefore precluded from digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of Philippine Education
Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134
[1964]).

V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of
Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private respondents, on the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject of
the instant petition for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: .

... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:

In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as to whether or not the acts of the employees concerned justified the
adoption of the employer of disciplinary measures against them, the mere fact that the employees may be able to put up a valid defense in a
criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or neutralize the employer's right to impose discipline on said employees. For it is settled
that not even the acquittal of an employee of the criminal charge against him is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its
employees, should the act upon which the criminal charged was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest...
The act of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs.
Chronicle Publication Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-20179-81, December 28, 1964.) (emphasis supplied)

The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored portions of the above citation read however as
follows:

Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are inclined to uphold the action taken by the employer as
proper disciplinary measure. A reading of the article which allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that it really contains an insinuation albeit
subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure by the Manila Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in the non-filing
of the case against the employer. In rejecting the employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente and Aquino was justified, the lower court
considered the article as "a report of some acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his official functions" and, therefore, does
away with the presumption of malice. This being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter should not have been viewed or gauged in
the light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the Penal Code. We are not here to determine whether the employees' act could
stand criminal prosecution, but only to find out whether the aforesaid act justifies the adoption by the employer of disciplinary measure against
them. This is not sustaining the ruling that the publication in question is qualified privileged, but even on the assumption that this is so, the
exempting character thereof under the Penal Code does not necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the employer's interest which may
warrant employment of disciplinary measure. For it must be remembered that not even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges
against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges was based
constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest.

In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his "suspicion," which actually amounts to a public accusation, that his
employer is exerting political pressure on a public official to thwart some legitimate activities on the employees, which charge, in the least,
would sully the employer's reputation, can be nothing but an act inimical to the said employer's interest. And the fact that the same was made in
the union newspaper does not alter its deleterious character nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the ground that it is a union activity,
because such end can be achieved without resort to improper conduct or behavior. The act of the employees now under consideration may be
considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours)

It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent
paragraph of this Court's decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For it is settled
..." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second and last underlined sentence in the quoted
paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision, appears not in the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other sentence is, but in the
immediately succeeding paragraph.

This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the respondent Judge and the respondents'
counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the
respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine
that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the
respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision, to copy it verbatim,
and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is
substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee,
of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal
charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest."
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and
lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary
reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their
bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no
uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or
doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court
may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior
courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this
Court's decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark,
appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations are
correct.

Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there was no substantial change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling
which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be more careful when
citing jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 is reversed and set
aside, and another is entered, ordering the respondents to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their former or
comparatively similar positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of their actual reinstatements. Costs against the respondents.
G.R. No. L-25291 March 10, 1977

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKER & EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, petitioners,

vs.

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J:

The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd., FGU Insurance Group, and Jose M. Olbes, through a motion for reconsideration filed on April 21, 1971,
ask this Court to re-examine its decision dated January 30, 1971.

In the main, the respondents question the review made by this Court of the determination of facts reached by the Court of Industrial Relations
and the consequent revision of the said findings of fact. The respondents allege that this Court "swept into unmerited oblivion the voluminous
documentary and testimonial evidence" they proffered which evidence consisted of

Exhibits "1" to "38", and the testimony of Messrs. Felipe Enage, Enrique Clemente, Vicente Abella, Rodolfo R. Encarnacion, Nestor Cipriano,
Mauro Blardoni, Sr., Ramon Garcia, Ramon M. Zosa, Vicente R. Ayllon, Antonio L. Castillo, Carlos Valencia, Juan S. Raymundo, Jose Olbes, Calixto
S. Fernandez, Detective Lieutenant Felino Singh of the Manila Police Department Sergeant Crisanto Lorenzo of the Manila Police Department,
and Feliciano Morada. 1

Concededly, the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations, if supported by substantial evidence, bind this Court. 2 This, for the reason
that the rule of substantial evidence, rather than the rule of preponderance of evidence applicable in ordinary civil cases, governs the Court of
Industrial Relations in its findings of fact. 3 And substantial evidence refers to "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." 4 There too, the substantiality, of the evidence depends on its quantitative as well as its qualitative aspects.
For, to be considered as substantial, Evidence should primarily be credible. 5

However, findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations unsupported by substantial and credible evidence do not bind this Court. 6 And,
certainly, the failure of substantial and credible proof to sustain the findings of fact of the Court of industrial Relations justifies the review by this
Court of the said factual determination. Conmitantly, the need to revise, reverse or modify the factual findings of the Court of Industrial
Relations arises to enable this court to draw the appropriate and correct conclusions for the proper resolution of the questions on the rights and
obligations of the parties involved.

Thus, before coming to the numerous errors which respondents claim have been committed by this Court in reviewing and reversing the factual
determination reached by the Court of Industrial Relations, we reiterate what we stated in the decision of January 10, 1971: we deemed it
necessary to review the entire factual milieu of the case in controversy and to reverse the factual findings arrived at by the Court of Industrial
Relations because we found the sa same unsupported by Substantial evidence and much more, by credible proof.

The errors allegedly committed by this Court in its factual findings and its conclusions derived therefrom, properly summed up and grouped, fall
into three categories (1) those pertaining to findings and conclusions without basis on record or contrary to the evidence on records (2) those
referring to findings and conclusions contrary to the factual determination made by and conclusions arrived at by the Court of Industrial
Relations, and (3) those relating to issues not raises or errors not assigned by the parties.

To the respondents' first cauldron of steaming objections belong the following factual findings and conclusions of this Court purportedly
unsupported by the records or contrary to what appears in the same: (1) that the respondents instructed Ramon Garcia and Vicente Abella to
create the disturbance which occurred on May 21, 1958; (2) that Garcia issued a circular to dissuade the members of the Unions from
disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the NATU; (3) that the respondents did not make counter-proposals to the Unions' demands and that the
said respondents insisted on the Unions' dropping their demands for union security, "promising money benefits if this was done;" (4) that the
Court of First Instance of Manila issued the restraining order "on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking
members of the Unions;" (5) that "more than 120 criminal charges" were filed against the members of the Unions; (6) that the respondents
hired Felipe Enage and Garcia, "former legal counsels of the petitioner, as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary respectively,
with attractive compensations," and (7) that Jose M. Olbes "brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who,
despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide
and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building."

1. Anent the first point raised by the respondents, this Court, in the decision of January 30, 1971, stated:

There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were sent to work at the latter building to create such an incident and have a basis for filing
criminal charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction from the court of first instance. 7

Earlier in the decision (Page 4) and in the preceding statements, this Court briefly recounted the circumstances attending the occurrence. To
claim that this Court, in the above-quoted portion of the decision, found and categorically stated that Garcia and Abella participated in some
sort of a pre- planned scheme to "create the disturbance" constitutes but a mistaken impression of the statement of this Court. The statement
simply express that in the circumstances already mentioned — which circumstances the records unraveled — lurked the distinct likelihood that
Garcia and Abella purposely provided the provocation for the incident.

2. We find the second objection of the respondents well-taken, for the records offer little to provide sufficient clarity on whether or not
Garcia, as acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association, "in a circular issued in his name
and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade
Unions (NATU)." The transcript of the proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations reveals only Garcia's apparent adeptness at evasion
and inability to recall, among other things, whether or not he issued the circular aforementioned. Nonetheless, the foregoing questioned
statement of this Court in the narration of facts in the decision bears no materiality to the conclusions finally arrived at.

3. The respondents claim the statement of this Court that "the Companies did not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that
the Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money benefits if this was done" as "truly false" and "an unwarranted deviation
from the truth." Far from being so, we find that the records precisely support the finding. The thrust of the testimony of Enage (Pages 13 to 65,
tsn, March 30, 1960; pages 7 to 13, tsn, April 29, 1960) — the chairman of the negotiating committee for the respondents — verily points out
that the said respondents omitted, without sufficient reasons, to present counter-proposals to the Unions' demands. This, in addition to the
testimonial evidence offered by Ignacio Lacsina (Pages 56 to 62, tsn, September 8, 1958) — chairman of the negotiating panel for the Unions, —
supports the finding that, indeed, the respondents offered no counter-proposals to the demands of the said Unions. At most, the records reveal,
the respondents, to placate the Unions, indulged in the superficial discussion of the demands, requiring the said Unions to explain and clarify the
import of their demands. Then, too, the totality of the testimonial evidence of Lacsina (pages 35 to 38, tsn, October 14, 1958) and the Unions'
panel members Villaruel (Pages 60 to 61, tsn, November 21, 1958) and Du Timbol (Pages 25 to 26 and 30, tsn, November 18, 1959) clearly
indicates that the respondents more than persuaded the Unions to drop their union security demands with the promise of monetary benefits.

4. We consider the objection of the respondents to the statement of this Court that the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the
restraining order "on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions" as well-founded. The
records show that the respondents predicated their petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction (Exhibit "32-B") upon certain
acts which the said respondents claimed the picketing members of the striking Unions committed through "force, threats, intimidation, coercion
and violence." The restraining order (Exhibit "33-C") issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila on May 31, 1958 makes no express mention
of the pendency of the various criminal charges already filed against the picketing members of the striking Unions. Nevertheless, the fact
remains that on the day the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the restraining order, several criminal charges (Exhibits "19," "20", "23" to
"29," inclusive and "31") had been filed already with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila against many of the picketing members of the Unions.

5. The respondents also question the statement of this Court giving the impression of the filing of "more than 120 criminal charges" against
the members of the striking Unions. The evidence at hand (Exhibits "19", "20," "23", to "31," inclusive) show, as of June 2, 1958, four complaints
for coercion and seven for grave coercion already filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. Each of the preliminary investigation
memoranda, however, except three (Exhibits "26," "29" and "30") names several members of the striking Unions collectively as accused.
Counting the charges individually — prescinding from the fact that a number of the members of the striking Unions then faced two or more
charges, having been named as accused in more than one memorandum the charges add up to eighty-four. On this point, we sustain the
objection of the respondents.

6. The respondents also allege as objectionable the following statement of this Court:

It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal of their respective collective bargaining
agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager
and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. 8
The respondents claim the "falsity of the finding" that Enage and Garcia worked as "legal counsels of the petitioners" and alleged this Court as
"unduly unkind" in giving the impression that they enticed Enage and Garcia "from their positions as 'legal counsels of the petitioners' with high
salaries." The records, however, evince that Garcia served as Secretary-Treasurer of the Federation of Free Workers (Pages 59 to 61, tsn, August
4, 1961) and that Garcia handled cases for the Federation of Free Workers (Page 58, tsn, August 4, 1961) with which the Unions then formed an
affiliation (Pages 59 to 62, tsn, August 4, 1961; page 62, tsn, January 16, 1962). With respect to Enage, the records show that he worked with the
Federation of Free Workers (Page 25, tsn, April 29, 1960). Even the respondents, in their brief (Page 46), stated that Garcia and Enage worked as
counsels for the Federation of Free Workers. Nevertheless, assuming the truth of the respondents' assertion that neither Garcia nor Enage
served as counsel, directly or indirectly through the Federation of Free Workers, for the Unions, this passing mention of the disputed former
connection of Garcia and Enage to the said Unions bears no relevance to the principal merits of the case at bar. As to the other observations of
the respondents, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the same for only a misreading of the aforequoted portion of the decision gives, in the
words of the respondents themselves, "the unkind impression that respondents enticed them (Enage and Garcia) from their position as 'legal
counsels of the petitioners' with high salaries."

7. The respondents' allegation that no evidence supports the statement of this Court that they, through their president and manager Jose
Olbes,

brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings
occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in
front of the premises of the Insular Life Building.9

rounds up the objections of the said respondents properly falling under the first group, The respondents claim the absence of Evidence showing
that: (1) Olbes held the position of manager; (2) Olbes brought three truckloads of "non-strikers and others;" (3) armed men escorted the non-
strikers and others;" (4) eight entrances provided access to the three buildings; and (5) that the gate through which the non-strikers and others
entered measured "less than two meters wide."

Object number one deals with an inconsequential detail — whether or not Olbes held, in any capacity, the position of manager — which bears
no materiality to the main issues raised by the case at hand.

As to number two, the evidence of the respondents' own witnesses — Ramon Zosa (Page 38, tsn, December 5, 1960), Nestor Cipriano (Pages 18,
19 and 26, tsn, February 1, 1961) and Olbes (Pages 7 to 13, 33, 34 and 45 to 50, tsn, October 2, 1962) — more than sufficiently indicate the truth
that Olbes led three busloads of non-strikers and others to the picketed buildings. To this effect too, testified some witnesses of the Unions,
particularly Ponciano Abesamis (Pages 57 to 66, tsn, January 20, 1959) and Jose Victorio (Pages 19 to 25, tsn, June 11, 1959).

Regarding number three, the records miss to evince clearly whether or not armed men escorted the three JD buses filled with non-strikers and
others to the respondents' picketed premises.

On number four, a collation of all the evidence bearing on this objection ion reveal the following means of access of the office premises of the
respondents comprised of almost one block bounded by Plaza Cervantes, Plaza Moraga, Muelle de la Industria and Juan Luna: (1) the Plaza
Cervantes entrance to the Insular Life Building (Page 8, tsn, February 8, 1961); (2) the two Plaza Moraga entrances to the Insular Life Building
(Page 8, tsn, September 13, 1960); (3) the basement entrance to the Insular Life Building (Page 29, tsn, October 2, 1962); (4) the Juan Luna
entrance to the Ayala Building (Page 11, tsn, August 4, 1961); (5) the Muelle de la Industria entrance to the Ayala Building (Page 27, tsn, August
4, 1961); (6) the Plaza Moraga entrance to the Filipinas Building (Page 21, tsn, August 18, 1959); and (7) the entrance to the National City Bank of
New York the premises of which have a connecting door to the lobby of the Ayala Building (Page 30, tsn, October 2, 1962).

As to objection number five, not one of the parties offers any specific evidence showing the exact measurement of the gate through which the
non-strikers and others entered. The evidence on record relevant to this point disclose that the gate measures about two to three meters wide.

The respondents further unleash their vigorous exception to the following findings arrived at by this Court; (1) that the respondents
discriminated against the strikers in the re-admission; (2) that the respondents dismissed thirty-four strikers without lawful cause; (3) that the
respondents omitted to give the dismissed strikers the opportunity to defend themselves against the supposed charges against them; and (4)
that the respondents' letter of May 21, 1959 (Exhibit "A") contained "promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to return to
work" and that the said respondents' letter of May 31, 1958 (Exhibit "B") contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees' in
the event of their failure to report for work on June 2, 1958. The respondents strongly protest against the alteration and reversal made by this
Court of the factual determination reached by the Court of Industrial Relations on these salient points.

Setting aside the incisive dissection performed by the respondents on the statements of this Court relevant and related to the aforementioned
findings, the arguments of the said respondents all but lead to their primary objection that this Court erred in finding that they committed unfair
labor practice. For, admittedly, the foregoing findings provided this Court with the unshakeable bases in arriving at the inescapable conclusion
that the respondents committed unfair labor practice.
In the decision of January 30, 1971, this Court, fully cognizant that the findings now questioned by the respondents constituted the
considerations of importance to the issues involved in the case at bar, sufficiently and clearly, albeit lengthily, discussed all of them. And a
consultation with and a combing of the voluminous records disclose the evidence, substantial and credible, in support of the said findings.

The respondents labor under the impression that, in the controversy at hand, the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations deserve
much weight and consideration. The said findings of fact, the respondents argue, should remain conclusive. However, the want of substantial
evidence, nay, credible proof, to uphold the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations on the matters now disputed by the respondents,
brought about by the mistaken appreciation of the facts, prompted this Court to review the facts on record and to alter and reverse the
determination reached by the said Court of Industrial Relations. These, consequently, resulted in a view rather different from that of the Court
of Industrial Relations.

Not infrequently, the Court of Industrial Relations misapprehends the facts and, eventually, arrives at erroneous conclusions. For in the Court of
Industrial Relations, only one judge hears the case and usually, not even a judge hears the same. Instead, a hearing examiner — an employee of
the Court of Industrial Relations — takes charge of the proceedings and receives the evidence. After hearing, the hearing examiner submits his
report on the case to the judge. The judge then studies the case and, relying on the ability and integrity of the hearing examiner who saw and
heard the witnesses and submitted the report, renders the decision. More often than not, the proceedings before the Court of Industrial
Relations drag through years before the case finally becomes subject to study and decision by the judge.

And even in the reconsideration of the decision asked for by the aggrieved party, no rehearing takes place before the Court of Industrial
Relations en banc. The individual judges, if they have the disposition and the time to do so, review the evidence on record or merely read and
rely upon the memoranda submitted by the respective parties and the decision subject of reconsideration, giving due consideration to the
capability, competency and probity of the judge who penned the said decision. And almost invariably, the Court of Industrial Relations en banc
upholds the decision for reconsideration. 10

The case at bar, this Court notes, passed from the hands of one hearing examiner — Arsenio Adriano — to another — Guillermo Medina. This
case also took more than seven years before its determination by the Court of Industrial Relations. These factors, we opine, contributed to the
misapprehension of facts committed by the Court of Industrial Relations warranting a review of the factual determination in its totality.
Thus, this Court finds it neither important nor imperative to pursue any further discussion and resolution of the matters claimed by the
respondents as contrary to the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations. And for the satisfaction of the respondents, an examination of the
entire evidence on record makes it more apparent that evidence of quantity and quality sustain, the findings of this Court on the
aforementioned matters now disputed by them.

To the third group of the respondents' objections appertain those findings of this Court on issues not raised or errors not assigned by the parties.
The respondents question the action taken by this Court in discussing and resolving the following: (1) the question as to the nature of the strike
staged by the Unions; (2) the issue as to whether or not the respondents refused to bargain collectively in good faith; and (3) the question as to
the reclassification of eighty-seven employees as supervisors.

Concededly, the Rules of Court, in proceedings before the appellate courts, namely, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, require the
party seeking the review of a judgment to set out in his brief the errors upon which he relies for reversal. Otherwise, the appellate courts would
not consider those errors not properly assigned or specified. 11 However, the Supreme Court has ample authority to review and resolve matters
not assigned and specified as errors by either of the parties in the appeal if it finds the consideration and determination of the same essential
and indispensable in order to arrive at a just decision in the case. 12 This Court, thus, has the authority to waive the lack of proper assignment of
errors if the unassigned errors closely relate to errors properly pinpointed out or if the unassigned errors refer to matters upon which the
determination of the questions raised by the errors properly assigned depend. 13

The same also applies to issues not specifically raised by the parties. The Supreme Court, likewise, has broad discretionary powers, in the
resolution of a controversy, to take into consideration matters on record which the parties fail to submit to the Court as specific questions for
determination. 14 Where the issues already raised also rest on other issues not specifically presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance
and close relation to the former and as long as they arise from matters on record, the Court has the authority to include them in its discussion of
the controversy as well as to pass upon them. In brief, in those cases wherein questions not particularly raised by the parties surface as
necessary for the complete adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties and such questions fall within the issues already framed by
the parties, the interests of justice dictate that the Court consider and resolve them.

In the case at hand, the questions as to the nature of the strike staged by the Unions, the refusal of the respondents to bargain collectively in
good faith, and the reclassification of eighty-seven employees as supervisors relate closely to the determination of whether or not the
respondents committed unfair labor practice. Thus, this Court found it necessary to resolve these issues, without confining itself to those
tendered by the parties.
In the same vein, we are also constrained to reassess the ruling in our decision of January 30, 1971 to the effect that the strikes must receive
backwages from the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge or their offer to return to work up to the date of
their actual reinstatement, deducting therefrom whatever they have earned pending readmission.

Significant changes have since supervened as to the method of awarding backwages. In a line of cases, the court has established a policy of fixing
the amount of backwages to a just and reasonable level without qualification or deduction.

Blazing the trail is Mercury Drug Co. vs. CIR, 15 L-23357, April 30, 1974, which enunciated the policy. The doctrine is not without justification, for,
in the same case, it was stated that the evident aim is "to avoid protracted delay in the execution of the award of backwages due to extended
hearings and unavoidable delays and difficulties encountered in determining the earnings of the laid-off employees ordered to be reinstated
with backwages during the pendency of the case for purposes of deducting the same from the gross backwages awarded."

Feati University Club vs. Feati University, L-35103, August 25, 1974, adopted a consensus policy of pegging the amount of backwages to their
total equivalent for three years (depending on the circumstances) without deduction or qualification. The rationale for the policy was stated in
the following words:

As has been noted, this formula of awarding reasonable net backwages without deduction or qualification relieves the employees from proving
or disproving their earnings during their lay-off and the employers from submitting counterproofs, and obviates the twin evils of Idleness on the
part of the employee who would "with folded arms, remain inactive in the expectation that a windfall would come to him" (Itogon Suyoc Mines,
Inc. vs. Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union, 24 SCRA 873 (1968), cited in Diwa ng Pagkakaisa vs. Filtex International Corp., 43 SCRA 217 (1972)) and
attrition and protracted delay in satisfying such award on the part of unscrupulous employers who have seized upon the further proceedings to
determine the actual earnings of the wrongfully dismissed or laid-off employees to hold unduly extended hearings for each and every employee
awarded backwages and thereby render practically nugatory such award and compel the employees to agree to unconscionable settlements of
their backwages award in order to satisfy their dire need. (See La Campana Food Products, Inc. vs. CIR, 28 SCRA 314 (1969) and Kaisahan ng Mga
Manggagawa vs. La Campana Food Products, Inc., 36 SCRA 142 (1970)).

The above judicial policy became entrenched in our jurisprudence when the Court, in Luzon Stevedoring Corporation and B.H. Tenefrancia vs.
CIR, et al., L-34300, November 22, 1974, reiterated the same way of computation, decreeing the grant of backwages not exceeding three years
without requiring the parties to submit proof of compensation received from other sources from the time of the illegal dismissal until actual
reinstatement. 16
We must now respond to the pronouncements in the above and related cases if we are to give our law on the matter order, direction and light.

Here, a total of eighteen (18) years has elapsed from June 2, 1958, date of the commencement of the backwages. Considering all the
commencement of the backwages. Considering all the circumstances at bar, viz., the lengthy procedural and technical manipulations of the
parties, the delay in the resolution of the case by the court below, the complexity of the issues raised by the parties which were resolved only on
January 30, 1971, etc., the Court considers the fixing and limitation of the backwages award to their total equivalent of three years without
qualification and deduction as applicable to and fully justified in the case at bar.

The Court finds no sufficient or compelling reason to further depart from its judgment as embodied in the decision of January 30, 1971.

ACCORDINGLY, subject to the above modification as to backwages, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied, and the judgment of the
Court as embodied in its decision of January 30, 1971 is affirmed in all other respects. This denial is immediately executor.
G.R. No. 132365 July 9, 1998

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS B. NOYNAY, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Allen,
Northern Samar, and DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL CHUA, and RUBEN MAGLUYOAN, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari with mandamus is whether R.A. No. 7691 1 has divested Regional Trial Courts of
jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years.

The antecedents are not disputed.

In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for violation of
Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben
Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having engaged in partisan political activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in
Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases.

Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Alien,
Northern Samar, and docketed therein as follows:

a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against private respondents Diosdada Amor, Esbel Chua, and Ruben Magluyoan.

b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private respondents Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan.
c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against private respondent Esbel Chua only;

d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against private respondent Diosdada Amor only.

In an Order 2 issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records
of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the
ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 3 the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases
since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment. Pertinent portions of the Order read as
follows:

[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged for [sic] Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which under
Sec. 264 of the same Code carries a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject to
Probation plus disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.

Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.) Blg. 129 as Amended by Rep. Act. 6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32.
Jurisdiction — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal Cases — Except [in] cases falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and
the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinance committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction;
and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with an imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount
or fine and regardless of other imposable accessory and other penalties including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of time [sic], nature, value and amount thereof, Provided, However, that in offenses including damages to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction over the cases filed considering that the maximum penalty imposable did not
exceed six (6) years.

The two motions 4 for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC Regional Director of Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through its
Legal Department having been denied by the public respondent in the Order of 17 October 1997, 5 the petitioner filed this special civil action. It
contends that public respondent "has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses" because pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code and this Court's
ruling in "Alberto [sic] vs. Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.," Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over election offenses.

On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.

In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General informs us that it is "adopting" the instant petition on the ground that
the challenged orders of public respondent "are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence."

In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents interested in sustaining the
challenged orders to appear for and defend him.

In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the
imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders
inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then conclude that since the election offense in question is
punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.

We resolved to give due course to the petition.

Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action
or proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote. 6 It reads as follows:

Sec. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. — The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action
or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the
jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.

Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those enumerated in Section 261 thereof. The offense allegedly committed by private
respondents is covered by paragraph (i) of said Section, thus:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. — Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices; any
officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police forces, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-
defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any
election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.

Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election offense under the Code, except that of failure to register or failure to vote, is
"imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years" and the offender shall not be subject to probation and shall suffer
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage.

Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, provides as follows:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. — Except in cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction;
and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals 7 that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32, the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal
cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan,
regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding
six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the
Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.

Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1)
Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual Property; 8 and (4) the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, 9 as amended.

Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also fall within the exception.

As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII
of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus
provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law would be a special law and must
be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law
intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does nut have the effect of repealing laws
vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified. That
Congress never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch at all
the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception.

It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune
time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, 10 to administer his office with due regard
to the integrity of the system of the law itself, 11 to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence. 12

Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of petitioner's Law Department, must also be admonished for his utter carelessness in
his reference to the case against Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr. In the motion for Reconsideration 13 he filed, with the court below, Atty. Balbuena
stated:

As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled issue in the
case of Alberto Naldeza -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996, where the Supreme Court succinctly held:

A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that pursuant to Sec. 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, has the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Code and the RTC shall have the exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan, or MTC, by way of
exception exercises jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stand together with the
provisions that any election offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be
subject to probation (Sec. 263, Omnibus Election Code), we submit that it is the special intention of the Code to vest upon the RTC jurisdiction
over election cases as a matter of exception to the general provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. 129 by RA 7691 does
not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction. (Emphasis ours)

Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:

16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of "Alberto -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.," 245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of jurisdiction
between the lower courts and Regional Trial Court on election offenses, has ruled, thus:

With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent Provision of Law would show that pursuant to Section 265 and 267 of the Omnibus
Election Code the Comelec has the power to conduct preliminary investigations all election offenses punishable under the code and the Regional
Trial Court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, by way of exception exercise jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these
provisions stands together with the provision that any election offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment for one (1) year to
six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Section 264, Omnibus Election Code). We submit that it is the special intention of the code to
vest upon the Regional Trial Court jurisdiction over election cases as matter of exemption to the provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases
found under B.P. Reg. 129, as amended. Consequently, the amendment of B.P. Reg. 129 by Republic Act. No. 7691 does not vest upon the MTC
jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction.

If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is neither Alberto
Naldeza as indicated in the motion for reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case
was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but
in volume 254 of the SCRA.

Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were
findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our own words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court
Administrator quoted in the decision.

Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 14 mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
text of a decision or authority.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders of public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25
August 1997 and 17 October 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and
decide said cases with purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100643 December 12, 1995

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br.
79, Morong Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and AGUEDO EUGENIO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material fact in a decision of the Court of
Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of
misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law.1

On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer Evidence Re Charge of Unauthorized Intercalation in a
Judicial Record dated 18 November 1992. He claimed that the inserted words were written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the
draft of the petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the latter formalized the
petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which he was found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the
Judicial and Bar Council to the President for appointment as regional trial judge.2 But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied the motion for want
of a compelling reason to justify a reversal of the questioned resolution.3

On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62 years old, has learned his lesson from
his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and in all candor promised that if given another chance he would live up to the exacting
demands of the legal profession. He appended to his motion certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar,
Parish of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM,
Chairperson, Center for Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College of Law, San Sebastian College-
Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P.
Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon City.4 However, on 11 August 1994 the Court denied the
motion.5
On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging among others that he had been deprived of his means to
life; he had pursued civic, religious and community work, especially for the poor and the underprivileged short of extending legal assistance
because of his incapacity; he had admitted "with profound regret and with utmost humility his commission of an unpardonable mistake and
ask(ed) that he be given another chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what he has done and comes to this Honorable Court with a contrite
heart."6

His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that while she did not condone what her husband had done, it
had been her fervent wish that the Court took a second look into its decision disbarring her husband as her entire family had been traumatized
by his disbarment.7

On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court reiterating his Ex-Parte Motion to
Lift Disbarment of 1 December 1994. Thus —

I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full responsibility for it. I realize it was dishonest and unfair to pass the blame
to my secretary who was merely following my instructions. The intercalation was my own act and I am justly punished for it.

Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I have a wife and children to support but my only means of livelihood
has been withdrawn from me. I am destitute and desperate and can only turn to you for relief . . . .

Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening the law profession, to which I owe so much. Please let me redeem
myself by admitting me back to its precincts, where I swear to live strictly according to its canons . . . .8

On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay.

On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement —

It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I have been struggling to make both ends meet to provide for my wife and
three children. Please give me the chance to prove that I am a reformed offender who will henceforth do nothing whatsoever to dishonor the
legal profession.9

On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August 1995 letter.10

On 17 November, 1995 movant once more wrote the Court —

I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for which I was justly punished at the time with the extreme sanction of
disbarment.
I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months ago, but it is my wife and children who have suffered more for my
transgression. Although innocent, they bear with me the stigma and burden of my punishment.11

The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him sufficient time and occasion to soul-search
and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the
dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more to
meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M.
Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that —

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good
standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect
and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . .12

WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of
law upon payment of the required legal fees. This resolution is effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22320 July 29, 1968

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners, vs.HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila,

RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.

Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners.

Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically directed against the following observation
therein made:

We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some
stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long
become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from
viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.

Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.".

The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek
reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs
adjudged against their clients.

At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of
the case, however, we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was
designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the
levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be
overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.

Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were conjugal property, why did they not adopt this
position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order
to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement
of the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be
satisfied.

In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary
injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as
expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following the
rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an
ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the said
court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the
respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts of first instance have no power to
restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the
respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to
have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and,
anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic
civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied
shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still
pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion,
as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order:

When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the
fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence
in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution.

Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be
enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of
another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ
of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by
the Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction
sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already
prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of
execution.

The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez
could not legally do for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely
an offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter
of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends
within five days, but the promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for
reconsideration.

The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the
various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the
judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by
their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally
obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before, one remedy had been
exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one
member of this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.

The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that.

In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the
respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with
the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a
permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already
availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of
thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .

And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having been instituted for delay.

The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be considered out of context. We said that the
petitioners incidentally had already availed of the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently
instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their
incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases
were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance
of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did
not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the
settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree
of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532
and 55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to
continue with the said cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted
the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced
in the former case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez
spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on
the same grounds proffered in the said civil case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties
because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.

The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the
lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do
not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his
case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's
oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation of each counsel was rather limited implying
that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear.
The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the
petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407, after the Court of
Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas,
upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the
petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-
mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case
No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion
to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the
law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed
above, which, curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin
D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.
G.R. No. 133090 January 19, 2001

REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners,

vs.

HON. DOLORES S. ESPAÑOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals1 affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of
court.1âwphi1.nêt

The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil Case NO. 1266-96 entitled "Royal Becthel2
Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.", for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent judge Dolores S. Español of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.

Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register
of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis
pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis
pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was opposed by the defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed a
Rejoinder to Opposition and Motion for Contempt of Court.3

During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following incident transpired:
ATTY. BUGARING: For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.

ATTY. CORDERO: Same appearance for the defendant, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the prosecution of our motion for contempt, your Honor. May we know
from the record if the Register of Deeds is properly notified for today's hearing.

COURT: Will you call on the Register of Deeds.

INTERPRETER: Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready, your Honor.

COURT: There is a motion for contempt in connection with the order of this Court which directed your office to register lis pendens of the
complaint in connection with this case of Royal Becthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.

ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten o'clock [in the morning] the subpoena.

ATTY. BUGARING: May we put in on record that as early as November 6, 1996, the Office of the Register of Deeds was furnished with a
copy of our motion, your Honor please, and the record will bear it out. Until now they did not file any answer, opposition or pleadings or
pleadings with respect to this motion.

ATTY. CONCEPCION: Well I was not informed because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am only the Deputy Register of Deeds and I was not
informed by the receiving clerk of our office regarding this case. As a matter of fact I was surprised when I received this morning the subpoena,
your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we put that on record that the manifestation of the respondent that he was not informed.

COURT: That is recorded. This is a Court of record and everything that you say here is recorded.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we will be [filing] a case against this receiving
clerk who did not [inform] him your Honor please, with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds that is irregularity in the
performance of the official duty of the clerk not to inform the parties concerned.

COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the video recording at this proceedings. There is no permission
from this Court that such proceedings should be taken.

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just accompanied me this morning.

COURT: Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the permission of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.

COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that shots should be done.

ATTY. BUGARING: This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from an occasion last night and I am not yet come
home, your Honor please. I could prove your Honor please, that the contents of that tape is other matters your Honor please. I was just
surprised why he took video tape your Honor please, that we ask the apology of this Court if that offend this Court your Honor please.

COURT: It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary authority or permission should be secured.

ATTY. BUGARING: In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.

COURT: After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please, that is personal to that guy your Honor
please if this representation is being ….

COURT: That is very shallow, don't give that alibi.

ATTY. BUGARING: At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary evidence as part of our motion for contempt,
your Honor please.

COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?

ATTY. CONCEPCION: Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this contempt you are talking. I am willing now to
testify.

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a criminal proceedings, contempt
proceedings is a criminal.

ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.

COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the Register of Deeds.

ATTY. CONCEPCION: Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your Honor.

COURT: That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider that you should be amply represented.

ATTY. CONCEPCION: As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing….

ATTY. BARZAGA4: Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.
ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just mark our documentary exhibits which are part
of the record of the case and thereafter your Honor please….

COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by newly appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is
considered as the privately hired counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of this contempt proceedings. How much time do you
need to go over the record of this case so that we can call the other case in the meanwhile.

ATTY. BARZAGA: Second call, your Honor.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?

ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the case your Honor, I noticed that the motion
for contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1966 and in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, 'the record of the case shows up
to the filing of this motion, the Register as well as the Deputy Register Diosdado Concepcion of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cavite, did not comply with the Court Orders dated February 27, 1996, March 29, 1996, respectively.' However, your Honor, Atty.
Diosdado Concepcion has shown to me a letter coming from Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated September 18, 1996 addressed to the Register
regarding this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to TCT Nos. T-519248, 519249 and 519250 and this letter request, your Honor for the annotation
of the lis pendens clearly shows that it has been already entered in the book of primary entry. We would like also to invite the attention of the
Hon. Court that the Motion for Contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1996. The letter for the annotation of the lis pendens was made by
the counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18, 1996, your Honor. However, your Honor, as early as August 16, 1996 an Order has already
been issued by the Hon. Court reading as follows, 'Wherefore in view of the above, the motion of the defendant is GRANTED and the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite, is hereby directed to CANCEL the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of Certificate of Title Nos. 519248,
51949 (sic) and 51950 (sic).'

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our documentary evidence.

COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The counsel has just made manifestation, he has not prayed for
anything. So let us wait until he is finished and then wait for the direction of this Court what to do to have an orderly proceedings in this case.

ATTY. BUGARING: Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated your Honor, considering that the order
regarding the annotation of the lis pendens has already been revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just request that we be given a period
of ten days from today your Honor, within which to submit our formal written opposition your Honor.

COURT: Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation filed earlier by Atty. Tutaan in connection with the refusal of the Register of
Deeds to annotate the lis pendens because of certain reasons. According to the manifestation of Atty. Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier
part of the record of this case, the reason for that is because there was a pending subdivision plan, it is so stated. I think it was dated March,
1996. May 1 have the record please.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor.

COURT: This Court would like to be enlightened with respect to that matter.

ATTY. BUGARING: Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain this, your Honor.

COURT: Have it properly addressed as part of the manifestation so that this court can be guided accordingly. Because this Court believes that the
root of the matter started from that. After the submission of the …. What are you suppose to submit?

ATTY. BUGARING: Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in contempt of Court.

COURT: After the submission of the Comment and furnishing a copy of the comment to the counsel for the plaintiff, this Court is going to give
the counsel for the plaintiff an equal time within which to submit his reply.

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor please, that we will be marking first our
documentary evidence because this is set for hearing for today, your Honor please.

COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment yet what are we going to receive as evidence.

ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please …

COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the submission of the comment.

ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion for contempt was copy furnished with the
Register of Deeds and Diosdado Concepcion.

COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to do. This should be an orderly proceedings and considering
that this is a Court of record the comment has to be in first then in your reply you can submit your evidence to rebut the argument that is going
to be put up by the respondent and so we will be able to hear the case smoothly.

ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time furnished of this contempt proceedings.
With a copy of the motion they should have filed it in due time in accordance with the rules and because it is scheduled for trial, we are ready to
mark our evidence and present to this Court, your Honor

COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen.

ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor.

COURT: And this Court declares that you are out of order.

ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all officers of the Court, your Honor, please, we
have also ---- and we know also our procedure, your Honor.
COURT: If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first and then do whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of the Court of this representation ever since I
appeared your Honor please and I put on record that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.

COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)

ATTY. BUGARING: Because we could not find any sort of justice in town.

COURT: Do that right away.

ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our witness.

COURT: You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was presented.

ATTY. BUGARING: I did not….

COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file his comment.

ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at this point in time I don't want to comment on anything but I reserve my right to inhibit this
Honorable Court before trying this case.

COURT: You can do whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor.

COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.

COURT: Yes, you know your rules that's why you are putting the cart ahead of the horse.

ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, I've been challenged by this Court that I know better than this Court. Modestly (sic) aside your Honor
please, I've been winning in many certiorari cases, your Honor.

COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court. (Banging the gavel) You call the police and I am going to send
this lawyer in jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)

ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please.

COURT: You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is one way I am protecting my client, your
Honor.

COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff) "Will you see to it that
this guy is put in jail." (pp. 29-42. Rollo)

Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Español cited petitioner in direct contempt of court, thus:

During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one (1) operating a video camera who was taking pictures of
the proceedings of the case while counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that he was ready to mark his
documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.

The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the appearance of the cameraman to take pictures, however,
he admitted that they came from a function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow with him and the plaintiffs.
Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out the cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that although the
proceedings are open to the public and that it being a court of record, and since its permission was not sought, such situation was an abuse of
discretion of the Court.

When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed the services of counsel and right then and there
appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to present him, the case was allowed to be called again. On the second call, Atty. Burgaring started to insist that
he be allowed to mark and present his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to
submit a written pleading for his client, considering that the Motion has so many ramifications and the issues are complicated.

At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already
perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears to disregard orderly
procedure, the Court directed him to listen and wait for the ruling of the Court for an orderly proceeding.

While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so. Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point,
Atty. Bugaring flared up the uttered words insulting the Court; such as: 'that he knows better than the latter as he has won all his cases of
certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the Rules of Court; that he was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for
allegedly being antagonistic to his client,' and other invectives were hurled to the discredit of the Court.

Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the Court's sheriff to arrest and place him under detention.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring committed an open defiance, even challenging the Court in a
disrespectful, arrogant, and contumacious manner, he is declared in direct contempt of Court and is sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment
and payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His detention shall commence immediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite.5

Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal Jail, and paid the fine of P3,000.00.6

While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order citing him in direct
contempt of court. The next day, December 6, 1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration.
Both motions were never resolved and petitioner was released on December 8, 1996.7

To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of
the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him in direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on grounds that
respondent Judge Dolores S. Español had no factual and legal basis in citing him in direct contempt of court, and that said Order was null and
void for being in violation of the Constitution and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence.8

The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing held on December 5, 1996, it was
obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and
sarcastic towards the court.9 It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00
prescribed by the Rules of Court,10 and ordered the excess of P1,000.00 returned to petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed order dated December 5, 1996 issued by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the petitioner.

Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S
SUBMISSIONS SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE IT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED
DECISION.11

Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject proceedings would reveal that the contempt
order issued by respondent judge had no factual and legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful towards the court as he
always addressed the court with the phrase "your honor please."

We disagree.

Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95 provides:

Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or
to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by
such court or judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a
superior court, or a judge thereof, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an
inferior court.

We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged deference to the trial court in consistently addressing the
respondent judge as "your Honor please" throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule
11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts".

2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-
41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge "motives
not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case".

3. behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo)
I in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer's duty to "maintain towards the courts (1) respectful
attitude" in order to maintain its importance in the administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others".

4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was making representations in behalf of the other party,
was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39,
Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and

5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (Ibid)
is against Section 1 of Article III, 1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse witness "with fairness and due consideration," and Canon 12 of Code of Professional
Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to "exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice."

The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of the phrase "your honor please." For, after using said phrase he
manifested utter disrespect to the court in his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should not be
countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings.12
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and
the court showed disrespect to said counsel and the court, was defiant of the court's system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the
administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administrative of justice.13
Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without
hearing.14 Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside
her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration. The records show that
petitioner was cited in contempt of court during he hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration of
the contempt order on the same day.15

Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the case of his client – by persisting to have his
documentary evidence marked despite the respondent judge's contrary order – he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to protect the
interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.

The Court of Appeals aptly stated:

But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he
is an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice
Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of
justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid).

"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay,
impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty."16

Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred in imposing a fine in the amount of P3,000.00
which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995. It was
not established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside
from the fine, the three days imprisonment meted out to petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, as amended.
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch
90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original fine of
P3,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.