G.R. No.

L-29075 June 10, 1971

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, ELDRED FEWKES, applicant-appellant,

vs.
NACITA VASQUEZ, DOMINGO VASQUEZ, TRINIDAD GERARTE, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO
ARAMBURO, SIMEON ARAMBURO, RAMON VELASCO, JOSEFINA VELASCO ISAAC, EMILIA
VELASCO SAMSON, HEIRS OF JUAN VELASCO, SEGUNDO CERDENIA, MAURICIO SAYSON,
PACITA SAMSON and FLORENCIO DYCOCO, oppositors-appellees.

FACTS:

Eldred Fewkews, an American citizen, commenced in the Court of First Instance of Albay a
proceeding for the registration of 2 lots and the improvements thereon. It was alleged in the
application that Fewkes acquired by purchase such lands; that applicant was in actual possession of
the lots, and that said properties were free from any encumbrance.

The court issued an order dismissing the application for warrant of jurisdiction, based on the finding
that the properties sought to be registered only formed part of a bigger tract, of land which was
described in the plan attached to the application, and that the notice of initial hearing did not
delineate accurately the portions of the land involved in the registration proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the jurisdiction over the subject property was acquired by publication of the bigger
land.

HELD:

No.

It must be remembered that the application in this case filed in the court below was for registration,
not of the big parcel of land but of certain portions thereof designated by applicant-appellant as Lots
Nos. 21-A and 21-B. It is the technical description of these 2 smaller lots, therefore, that must be
published in order that the persons who may be affected by their registration may be notified thereof.
For, considering that the adjoining owners of Lot No. 21 would not be the same as the owners of the
properties adjoining Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B, the notification of the adjoining owners of the big lot
would not be the notice to the adjoining owners or occupants of the smolder lots required by law. In
short, it is the publication of the specific boundaries of Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B that would actually
put the interested parties on notice of the registration proceeding, and would confer authority on the
land registration court to pass upon the issue of the registerability of said lots in favor of the
applicant.

G.R. No. 85515 June 6, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
FLORENCIA MARASIGAN, and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

FACTS:
Private respondent, claiming to be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano, registered owner of a parcel
of land located in Canubing, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for the reconstitution of "the
original and duplicate copy (sic)" of the said Transfer Certificate of Title on the basis of the owner's
duplicate copy.6 She alleged therein that she is in possession "of the title subject matter of" the
petition but she, however, did not allege the reason why she asked for the reconstitution.

The trial court set the petition for hearing and required its publication in the Official Gazette, which
was done. Required notices, except to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the
land,were given.

The trial court handed down an Order7 granting reconstitution of the original and the owner's
duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title on the basis of the existing owner's duplicate copy
thereof. The Court of appeals affirmed the trial court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land are mandatory and
jurisdictional in judicial reconstitution of certificates of title.

HELD:

Yes.

Since the requirement therein of service of notice of the initial hearing to the adjoining owners and
the actual occupants of the land was not complied with in this case, the court below did not,
therefore, acquire jurisdiction over the petition for the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 66062. Accordingly, the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the Order of the
trial court granting the petition and in holding that said Section 13 has been "at least impliedly
amended" by Section 23 in relation to Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529 which took effect on 11 June
1978. There is absolutely nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even
remotely, an intention to amend said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either misapprehended or
read out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 reading as follows:

The requirements of Section 12 and Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 are mandatory and jurisdictional and
non-compliance therewith would render all proceedings utterly null and void.

The Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in
the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided,
however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court .There is sufficient compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette, although the
law mandates that it be published "once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines." However, publication in the latter alone would not suffice. If the
intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements
of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include
owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land.

G.R. No. 94033 May 29, 1995

FELICIANO RAMOS, Substituted by his heirs through VALERIANA VDA. DE

RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO C. RODRIGUEZ, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 77, San Mateo,
Rizal and LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondents.

FACTS:

Feliciano Ramos applied for the registration of a parcel of land in San Jose, Rodriguez, Montalban,
Rizal. Upon his death and during the pendency of said application, Feliciano was substituted by his
heirs, petitioners herein.

Respondent judge then adjudicated the said lot to the petitioners and directed the Administrator of
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) to prepare the decree and
certificate of registration.

Instead of issuing the said decree, NLTDRA submitted a report recommending that decision be set
aside after due hearing because the subject lot was part of a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
8816 in the name Payatas Estate Improvement Company.

NLTDRA then filed a motion for reconsideration and denied petitioner's application for registration.
The court noted that the subject lot was already covered by an existing certificate of title and that no
final decree has yet been issued by the LRA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not trial court erred in reversing its decision adjudicating the lot to petitioner.

HELD:

No.

As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now
NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the
title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under
the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.

The duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is
ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in
conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no
discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation
and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court.

In the case at bench, NLTDRA filed the report to inform the latter that the NLTDRA cannot comply
with the order to issue a decree because the subject lot sought to be registered was discovered to
have been already decreed and titled in the name of the Payatas Estate. Under these
circumstances, the LRA is not legally obligated to follow the court's order.

The other reason is that the one-year period stated in section 32 of P.D. 1529 within which a petition
to re-open and review the decree of registration clearly refers to the decree of registration described
in Section 31 of the said P.D., which decree is prepared and issued by the Commissioner of Land
Registration.
Also petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate
was spurious, without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having
been issued under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. The
application for registration of the petitioners in this case would, under the circumstances, appear to
be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under Section 48 of P.D. 1529.

The court should have rendered its decision only "after considering the evidence and the reports of
the commissioner of Land Registration and the Director of Lands," as mandated by Section 29 of
P.D. 1529, instead of precipitately adjudicating the land in question to the applicant and directing the
Commissioner to issue a decree of registration and certificate of title when the report of the LRA was
still forthcoming.