Topic: Section 1. Institution of Criminal Actions and Prescription.
abroad at the time having arrived in the Philippines only on December
People of the Philippines vs. Clemente Bautista (GR. No. 168641 April
27, 2007)
Facts:
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-
accused Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and private complainant
Felipe Goyen, Jr., on the other. On August 16, 1999, private
complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) a
Complaint for slight physical injuries against herein respondent and
his co-accused. The information was, however, filed with the MeTC of
Manila only on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the
ground that by the time the Information was filed, the 60-day period
of prescription from the date of the commission of the crime, that is,
on June12, 1999 had already elapsed. The MeTC ruled that the
offense had not yet prescribed.
Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC, but the latter denied said
petition. CA, on June 22, 2005, held that, the said period was
interrupted when offended party filed a Complaint with the OCP of
Manila on August 16, 1999. Hence this petition.
Issue:
WON the prescriptive period had already lapsed.
Held:
No. Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. – The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime
is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
It is a well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s
office suspends the running of the prescriptive period. The
proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City
Prosecutor’s approval of the investigating prosecutor’s
recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The
prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was
filed with Office Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either
convicted or acquitted by the proper court.
FromMeWithKeir
Topic: Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions.
People of the Philippines vs. Arturo F. Duca (GR No. 171175 October
30, 2009)
Facts:
It appears that Arturo Duca, together with his mother, Cecellia Duca,
were charged of the crime of Falsification of Official Document. They
were alleged to cause the preparation of Declaration of Real Property
over a bungalow type residential house by making it appear that the
signature appearing on the sworn statement of owner is that Aldrin
F. Duca when the truth of the matter is not because the latter was
12, 2001, and it was accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his own
signature thereon to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned
private complainant Pedro Calanayan. However, Arturo testified that
the signature atop the name Adlrin Duca was his. However, he
interposed the defense that he was duly authorized by the latter to
procure the said tax declaration.
Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when
that CA resolved the respondent’s appeal without notifying the
People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the
pendency of the same and without requiring the SG to file his
comment. Petitioner contends that once the case is elevated to the
CA or this Court, it is only the SG who is authorized to bring or defend
the actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely abused its
discretion when it acted on respondent’s appeal.
MCTC convicted Arturo Duca, which was reversed by the RTC.
However, said decision was later overturned and affirmed the
decision of the MCTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion by not requiring the SG
to file his Comment on Duca’s petition.
Held:
Yes. Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal
actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal. The fiscal represents the
People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the
trial courts at the MeTC, MTC, MCTC and the RTC. However, when
such criminal actions are brought to the CA or this Court, it is the SG
who must represent the People not the fiscal.
The records show that the CA failed to require the SG to file his
Comment on Duca’s petition. The failure of the CA to require the SG
to file his Comment deprived the prosecution of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case.
The service of a copy of the petition on the People, through the
Prosecutor would be inefficacious for the reason that the SG is the
sole representative of the People in appeals before the CA and the SC.
Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to dismiss the petition. We,
thus, find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed decision.
FromMeWithKeir
Topic: Section 9. Cause of the accusation? Section 11. Date of the
commission of the offense.
People of the Philippines vs. Willam Ching (GR No. 177150 November
22, 2007)
Facts:
Accused-appellant William Ching is a father of eight children. AAA is
the third child in a brood of eight children born to appellant and BBB.
She was 12 years of age in the year 1996 when the alleged incidents
of rape took place. Accused-appellant with force and intimidation
raped AAA three times in the years 1996 and 1998, and because of
her fear that appellant would kill her she did not inform BBB, her
mother.
From June 1998 to February 1999, appellant was arrested and
detained for drug pushing. In the meantime, AAA was employed as a
house helper. After his release from jail, appellant would go to see
AAA at her employer’s house demanding money and creating a scene
when AAA refused to give him any. Fed up, AAA sneaked out of her
employer’s house and proceeded to the nearby barangay hall to
report, not just the commotion caused by appellant in front of her
employer’s house when she did not give him money, but also that
appellant previously raped her several times. Hence, appellant was
arrested by PO3 Deduque and PO3 Baldeswis, and charged with
rape.6
Appellant singly testified in his own behalf and denied the foregoing
accusations. He admitted that AAA is his daughter and third child with
his wife, BBB. From 1992 to 1996, he worked as a driver, but he was
detained for selling drugs in 1997. He was released on 29 March 1998,
but he was again imprisoned for robbery and drug cases. While he
was in jail, he learned that BBB asked AAA to find a job and that BBB
was subsequently detained for drugs. Upon his release from jail in
February 1999, appellant immediately went home and found his
eldest son taking care of his other children. On several occasions, he
would see AAA at her employers’ house to ask for money. This
purportedly irked AAA and the latter’s employer. It was AAA’s
employer and BBB who coached AAA to file rape charges against
appellant.
Issue:
WON approximate time of the commission of the offense must be
stated in the complaint or information.
Held:
No. With respect to the date of the commission of the offense,
Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
specifically provides that it is not necessary to state in the information
the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a
material ingredient of the offense, and that the offense may be
alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission.
In rape cases, failure to specify the exact dates or times when the
rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on
its face. The reason is obvious. The date or time of the commission of
rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the
gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and
intimidation. The precise time when the rape took place has no
substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need
not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the
complaint or information states that the crime has been committed
at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.
FromMeWithKeir
Topic: Section 13. Duplicity of the Offense.
Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan vs. People of the Philippines,
BSP, and PDIC (GR No. 159517-18 June 30, 2009)
Facts:
Hilarion P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan were the President and
General Manager, respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel
Bulacan (RBSM). Allegedly, on June 27, 1997 and August 21, 1997,
during their incumbency as president and general manager of the
bank, petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They falsified
the loan applications and other bank records, and made it appear that
Virgillo J. Malang and Rogelio Manaol obtained loans of
P15,000,000.00 each, when in fact they did not.
Petitioners pointed out that the charges being filed upon them
namely, violation of DOSRI Rules and estafa thru falsification of
commercial document are duplicitous, hence, they should be
quashed.
Issue:
WON petitioners are right in invoking duplicity of charges as a ground
to quash the informations.
Held:
No. By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information
that charges more than one offense. Section 13 of the Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly states: Duplicity of Offense.-
A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only
in those cases in which existing law prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses.
In this case, Soriano was faced not with one information charging
more than one offense, but with more than one information, each
charging a different offense, violation of DOSRI rules in one, and
estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the other. Ilagan,
on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners
erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the
informations.
There are differences between the two offenses. A DOSRI violation
consists in the failure to observe and comply with procedural,
reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a
loan to a director, officer, stockholder and other related interests in
the bank. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false
pretenses, and damage, which are essential to the prosecution for
estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several
charges against petitioners were, therefore, proper.
FromMeWithKeir
Topic: Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
People of the Philippines vs. Magallanes October 11, 1995
Facts:
In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses Dumancas, under the
direction and cooperation of P/Col. Nicolas Torres who took
advantage of his position as station commander of the PNP, with
Police Inspector Abeto’s cooperation, induced other police officers,
namely: Canuday, Pahayupan, Lamis, civilian agents: Fernandez,
Divinagracia, Delgado and Gargallano, to abduct kidnap and detain,
Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumangyao, with the use of a motor vehicle
and then shot and killed the victims with evident premeditation,
treachery and nocturnity. The other accused secretly buried the
victims in a makeshift shallow grave to conceal the crime of murder
for a fee of P500.00 each.
The cases were consolidated and the accused pleaded not guilty and
filed motions for bail. The prosecution presented Moises Grandeza,
the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the offense. After
the prosecution rested its case, the trial court received evidence for
the accused, but the reception of evidence was suspended because
of the motions for inhibition of judge Garvilles filed by several
accused. Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself and the case was re-
raffled. However, the prosecution moved for the transmittal of the
recors to the Sandiganbayan because the offenses charged were
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. The
trial court ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction
because the informations do not state that the offenses were
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers and
denied the Motion for the Transfer of Records to Sandiganbayan. The
prosecution moved to reconsider but the same was denied.
The reception of evidence was resumed but the judge later inhibited
himself. The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of tne Regional
Trial Court of Bacolod. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order, challenging the refusal of the judge to transfer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan. The private respondents were required to comment
on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondent judge to desist from proceeding with the trial of the case.
ISSUE:
WON the offenses committed in relation to the office of the accused
PNP officers and thus under the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
No. The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the law in force
at the time of the commencement of the action. When the
informations in the cases were filed, the law governing the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was P.D. 1861 , which provides that
the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases
involving: 1) violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; 2)
offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, where
the penalty prescribed is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment of six (6) years, or a fine of P 6,000.00.
If the penalty for the offense charged does not exceed imprisonment
of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00, it shall be tried by the Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court or the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
Jurisdiction is also determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information and not by the result of the evidence after the trial. In the
present case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction
over the cases. The allegations in the complaint or information of
“taking advantage of his position” is not sufficient to bring the
offenses within the definition of “offenses committed in relation to
public office.” It is considered merely as an aggravating circumstance.
Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly lost its jurisdiction over
cases involving violations of R.A. 3019, as amended in R.A. 1379
because it only retains jurisdiction on cases enumerated in subsection
(a) when the public officers rank is classified as Grade “27” or higher.
In the case at bar, none of the PNP officers involved occupy a position
classified as Grade “27” or higher. Accused Torres, who is highest in
rank among the accused, only has a rank classified as Grade “18”.
Lastly, the courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction which was already
acquired before the subsequent enactment of R.A. 7975 which
limited the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to officers whose rank is
Grade “27” or higher, be4cause the courts retain its jurisdiction until
the end of litigation. Hence, cases already under the jurisdiction of
the courts at the time of the enactment of R.A. 7975 are only referred
to the proper courts if trial has not yet begun at that time. Petition is
DENIED and the challenged orders are AFFIRMED.
FromMeWithKeir
Topic: Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
Bondoc vs. Sandiganbayan January 9, 1990
Facts:
Two (2) employees of the Central Bank -- Manuel Valentino and Jesus
Estacio -- and nine (9) private individuals, were charged with several
felonies of estafa thru falsification of public documents in three (3)
separate informations filed by the Tanodbayan with the
Sandiganbayan on April 15, 1982. The actions were docketed as
Criminal Cases Numbered 5949 to 5951. They were assigned to the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Before the prosecution rested its case, the Tanodbayan filed with the
Sandiganbayan on August 23, 1984, another set of three (3)
indictments, this time against Carlito P. Bondoc (Assistant Manager of
the Greenhills Branch of CITIBANK) and Rogelio Vicente, also a private
individual, charging them with the same crimes involved in Cases No.
5949 to 5951 as principals by indispensable cooperation. The actions
against Bondoc and Vicente were docketed as Criminal Cases
Numbered 9349 to 9351. They were assigned to the Third Division of
the Sandiganbayan.
Bondoc moved to quash the informations on January 3, 1985 on the
basic theory that as a private individual charged as co-principal with
government employees, he should be tried jointly with the latter
pursuant to Section 4 (paragraph 3) of PD 1606, as amended, supra;
hence, the separate proceedings commenced against him were
invalid, for lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses
and his person.
Issue:
WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction of the case at bar.
Held:
To construe the law in the manner indicated, however, would be
unreasonable, if not absurd (what of the case, for instance, where the
accused public officers or employees have already been convicted
and have appealed, or are already serving sentence, or have been
acquitted), and settled is the rule that courts should not give a statute
a meaning that would lead to absurdities;[11] general terms of a
statute should be so limited in their application as precisely to avoid
absurdities, and it will always be presumed that the legislature
intended exceptions to its language which would avoid consequences
of this character.[12] The provision in question should thus be read as decision is still possible on ground of prescription or lack of
requiring that private individuals accused in the Sandiganbayan, jurisdiction.
together with public officers or employees, must be tried jointly with
the latter unless the attendant circumstances have made impossible Issue:
or impracticable such a joint trial, as in the cases at bar, in which event WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.
the trial of said private persons may proceed separately from the
public officers or employees whose own trials have been concluded. Held:

Besides, there is nothing so sacrosanct or important about a joint trial No. Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the duration of the
as to justify a radical deviation from ordinary, orderly court processes penalty and the fine imposed as prescribed by law to the offense
in order to have it, or as to affect the very jurisdiction of the Court charged. Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries and
required to conduct it. The evidence of the State or of the accused reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is within the
does not become weaker or stronger whether presented at a joint or jurisdiction of the MTC. The case was dismissed due to lack of
separate trial; the rights of the accused are not enhanced or diluted jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati and the decision of the CA was set
by the character of a trial as joint or separate; the procedure aside.
prescribed in either situation is essentially the same. Indeed, it is a
gauge of the importance of a joint trial, in the eyes of trial attorneys FromMeWithKeir
and of the law itself, that there are as many lawyers moving for a
separate trial as there are for a joint trial, and that courts are granted
the discretion, in case where two or more accused are jointly charged
with an offense, to order separate trials instead of a joint trial, on
motion of the fiscal or any accused.[13]

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc's cases to

the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would
not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated,
the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc's
cases and those of the government employees separately charged for
the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged,
as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00,
committed by government employee in conspiracy with private
persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive,
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be
taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that
even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would
nonetheless not be possible.

FromMeWithKeir

Topic: Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan

Rodica vs. CA 292 SCRA 87

Facts:

Isabelita Reodica was allegedly recklessly driving a van and hit Bonsol
causing him physical injuries and damage to property amounting to P
8,542.00. Three days after the accident a complaint was filed before
the fiscal’s office against the petitioner. She was charged of "Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical
Injury." After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati rendered
the decision convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless
imprudence, resulting in damage to property with slight physical
injuries" with arresto mayor of 6 months imprisonment and a fine of
P 13,542.00. Petitioner made an appeal before the CA which re-
affirmed the lower court’s decision. In its motion for reconsideration,
petitioner now assails that the court erred in giving its penalty on
complex damage to property and slight physical injuries both being
light offenses over which the RTC has no jurisdiction and it can’t
impose penalty in excess to what the law authorizes the reversal of