RULE 45

Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Section 2. Time for filing; extension.

[G.R. No. 194128. December 7, 2011.]

WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION,
vs. AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., CECILIA ZAMORA, BENJAMIN FRANCIA, and
PEARLBANK SECURITIES, INC.

[G.R. No. 140150. August 22, 2005.]

ASSOCIATION OF INTEGRATED SECURITY FORCE OF BISLIG (AISFB)-ALU,
petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PAPER INDUSTRIES
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari.

9. Sawadjaan v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 141735, 08 June 2005.

10. Supra.
11. Paa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126560, 04 December 1997, 282 SCRA
448, citing Vda. De Espina v. Abaya, G.R. No. 45142, 26 April 1991, 196 SCRA
312; Sy v. Romero, G.R. No. 83580, 23 September 1992, 214 SCRA 187, Hipolito
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 108478-79, 21 February 1994, 230 SCRA 191;
Fajardo v. Bautista, G.R. Nos. 102193-97, 10 May 1994, 232 SCRA 291; De la
Paz v. Panis, G.R. No. 57023, 22 June 1995, 245 SCRA 242.
.
14. Heirs of Lourdes Potenciano Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147205,
10 March 2004, 425 SCRA 236, citing MMDA v. JANCOM Environment Corp.,
G.R. No. 147465, 30 January 2002, 375 SCRA 320, citing Ruiz, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 101566, 26 March 1993, 220 SCRA 490.
21. CBL Transit, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 128425, 11 March 2004, 425
SCRA 367.
25. Progressive Development Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 138826, 30 October
2000, 344 SCRA 512.
26. Magellan Capital Management Corporation v. Zosa, G.R. No. 129916, 26
March 2001, 355 SCRA 157.
28. Maya Farms Employees Organization, et al. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
106256, 28 December 1994, citing Union Carbide Labor Union v. Union Carbide
Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 41314, 13 November 1992, 215 SCRA 554; National
Federation of Labor Unions v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90739, 03 October 1991, 202
SCRA 346; Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v. Laplana, G.R. No.
76645, 23 July 1991, 199 SCRA 485; Cruz v. Medina, G.R. No. 73053, 15
September 1989, 177 SCRA 565; San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union
(PTGWO) v. Ople, G.R. No. 53515, 08 February 1989, 170 SCRA 25.

A.M. No. MTJ-04-1566 August 22, 2005

Melecio v. Tan

[A.M. No. MTJ-04-1566. August 22, 2005.]

RITA M. MELECIO, complainant, vs. TYRONE V. TAN, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court-Office of the Clerk of Court, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, respondent.

Heirs of Jose F. Escaño, et al. v. Datu Gregorio Dagon, et al., for Forcible Entry,
Damages, and Attorney's Fees with Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order.

[G.R. No. 169067. October 6, 2010.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ANGELO B. MALABANAN, PABLO B. MALABANAN,

GREENTHUMB REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF
BATANGAS, respondents.

SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Resolution of the Court En Banc in UDK-9748 dated March 1, 1990 as cited in Macababbad, Jr. v.
Masirag, G.R. No. 161237, January 14, 2009, 576 SCRA 70, 83.

Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, supra note 20, at 83-84; see also Abedes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 174373,
October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 268, 285-286; and Suarez v. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 124512, June 27, 2006,
493 SCRA 74, 80.

G.R. No. 168313 October 6, 2010

BPI v. Court of Appeals

[G.R. No. 168313. October 6, 2010.]

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO BARZA, in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 61, FIRST UNION GROUP
ENTERPRISES and LINDA WU HU, respondents.

35. Id. at 42-43, citing Sec. 1, Rule 41, RULES OF COURT and Casapunan v. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391,
August 26, 2002, 388 SCRA 28.

37. Id. at 44, citing Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001, 354 SCRA 100.

38. G.R. No. 128550, March 16, 2000, 328 SCRA 286.

G.R. No. 163091 October 6, 2010

Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Del Villar

[G.R. No. 163091. October 6, 2010.]

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. ANGEL U. DEL VILLAR, responden

22. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v. Tiamson, G.R. Nos. 164684-85, November
11, 2005, 474 SCRA 761, 770-771.

23. Philippine Industrial Security Agency Corporation v. Aguinaldo, 499 Phil. 215, 225 (2005).

24. Mendoza v. Rural Bank of Lucban, G.R. No. 155421, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 756, 766.

25. The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Co. v. Gramaje, G.R. No. 156963, November
11, 2004, 442 SCRA 274, 288.

33. San Miguel Corporation v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 168194, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 604, 614.

34. AMA Computer College, Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 166703, April 14, 2008, 551 SCRA 254, 264.

40. General Milling Corporation v. Casio and Pino, G.R. No. 149552, March 10, 2010; Mt. Carmel
College v. Resuena, G.R. No. 173076, October 10, 2007, 535 SCRA 518, 541.

G.R. No. 161934 October 6, 2010

Varorient Shipping Co., Inc. v. Flores

[G.R. No. 161934. October 6, 2010.]

VARORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC., and ARIA MARITIME CO., LTD., petitioners, vs. GIL A. FLORES,
respondent.

by the POEA and effective on January 1, 1997) and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96, issued by
Administrator Felicisimo O. Joson, Jr. and adopted on December 16, 1996.

G.R. No. 153998 October 6, 2010

Tiangco v. LBP

[G.R. No. 153998. October 6, 2010.]

JORGE L. TIANGCO, THE HEIRS OF ENRIQUE L. TIANGCO, GLORIA T. BATUNGBACAL, NARCISO L. TIANGCO
and SILVINO L. TIANGCO, petitioners, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

are attached to the record, seven (7) copies of his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief,
with proof of service of two (2) copies thereof upon the appellee.

30. 136 Phil. 212 (1969).

31. Id. at 215. (Emphasis supplied.)

32. Yuchengco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165793, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 716, 721, citing
Philippine National Bank v. Philippine Milling Co., Inc., supra note 29.

33. Trinidad Go, etc. v. Vicente Velez Chaves, etc., G.R. No. 182341, April 23, 2010.

34. G.R. No. 164150, April 14, 2008, 551 SCRA 223.

35. Id. at 241-242.

36. G.R. No. 147011, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 199.

37. Id. at 204-205.

38. 388 Phil. 587 (2000).

39. Id. at 595.

40. G.R. No. 136972, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 60.

41. Id. at 67-69.

* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, per
Special Order No. 897, dated September 28, 2010.

** Per Special Order No. 898, dated September 28, 2010.

*** Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special
Order No. 903, dated September 28, 2010.

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 1 0 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.

G.R. No. 152866 October 6, 2010

Heirs of Saves v. Heirs of Saves

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 152866. October 6, 2010.]

THE HEIRS OF ROMANA SAVES, namely: FIDELA ALMAIDA, EMILIANO ALMAIDA, JESUS ALMAIDA,
CATALINA ALMAIDA, ALFREDO RAMOS, GINA RAMOS, LUZ ALMAIDA, ANITA ALMAIDA, PETRA GENERAL,
EDNA GENERAL, ESTHER ALMAIDA, DIONISIA ALMAIDA, CORNELIA ALMAIDA, FELIMON ALMAIDA
(represented by SINFROSA ALMAIDA); THE HEIRS OF RAFAELA SAVES, namely: JULIANA DIZON, HILARIA
DIZON, JOVENCIO DIZON, MAURA DIZON, BABY DIZON & ULDARICO AMISTOSO (represented by
ULDARICO AMISTOSO); THE HEIRS OF JANUARIA SAVES, namely: FELICIDAD MARTINEZ, MARLOU
MARTINEZ, ROWENA MARTINEZ, BABY LOU MARTINEZ, BOBERT MARTINEZ, JERRY MARTINEZ
(represented by FELICIDAD MARTINEZ); THE HEIRS OF MAXIMO SAVES, namely: ELPIDIO AMIGO,
CELESTINA DEMETRIA AMIGO, MEREN (daughter of SEVERA SAVES), FRUTO ROSARIO (represented by
ELPIDIO AMIGO); THE HEIRS OF BENEDICTA SAVES, namely: AUTEMIA JUCOM, CATALINA JUCOM,
DOLORES JUCOM, SERGIA JUCOM, BENEDICTA JUCOM, JOSEFINA JUCOM, FLORDIVIDA REMETILLO,
FELINA REMETILLO and ANNA MARIE REMETILLO, (represented by AUTEMIA JUCOM), petitioners, vs.
THE HEIRS OF ESCOLASTICO SAVES, namely: REMEDIOS SAVES-ADAMOS, LUZ SAVES-HERNANDEZ and
DODONG SAVES, and ENRIQUETA CHAVES-ABELLA, respon

Section 3. Docket and other lawful fees; proof of service of petition. — Unless he has theretofore
done so, the petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court of
the Supreme Court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.
Proof of service of a copy, thereof on the lower court concerned and on the adverse party shall be
submitted together with the petition. (1a)

Section 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the
original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner and shall (a) state the full
name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading
the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates
showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was
received; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments
relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or
a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the
court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record
as would support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided
in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. (2a)

Section 5. Dismissal or denial of petition. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs,
proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
The Supreme Court may on its own initiative deny the petition on the ground that the appeal is without
merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration. (3a)

Section 6. Review discretionary. — A review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons thereof. The
following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of
the reasons which will be considered:

(a) When the court a quo has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court; or

(b) When the court a quo has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of the power
of supervision. (4a)

Section 7. Pleadings and documents that may be required; sanctions. — For purposes of
determining whether the petition should be dismissed or denied pursuant to section 5 of this Rule, or
where the petition is given due course under section 8 hereof, the Supreme Court may require or allow
the filing of such pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents as it may deem necessary within such
periods and under such conditions as it may consider appropriate, and impose the corresponding
sanctions in case of non-filing or unauthorized filing of such pleadings and documents or non-
compliance with the conditions therefor. (n)

Section 8. Due course; elevation of records. — If the petition is given due course, the Supreme
Court may require the elevation of the complete record of the case or specified parts thereof within
fifteen (15) days from notice. (2a)

Section 9. Rule applicable to both civil and criminal cases. — The mode of appeal prescribed in this
Rule shall be applicable to both civil and criminal cases, except in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. (n)
NOTES:

Rule 45

CERTIORARI CANNOT BE AVAILED OF IF THE REMEDY OF APPEAL IS AVAILABLE

Special civil action for certiorari cannot be availed of if it is based upon the lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion when the remedy of appeal is available. Certiorari is proper only if there is no
appeal, or when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Regis, Jr.
v. CA, Gr 153914, July 31, 2007.

TWO-HEADED PETITION, PROSCRIBED

A petition cannot be subsumed simultaneously under Rule 45 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
nor may it delegate upon the court the task of determining under which rule the petition should fail. It is
a firm judicial policy that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive. In not granting imprimatur to this type of unorthodox strategy, the Supreme
Court ruled, in similar case, that a party should not join both petitions in one pleading. Ortiga v. SSC and
SSS, Gr. 176150, June 25, 2008.

[G.R. No. 166408. October 6, 2008.]

QUEZON CITY and THE CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners, vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J p:

CLAIMS for tax exemption must be based on language in law too plain to be mistaken. It cannot be made
out of inference or implication. ACTISD

The principle is relevant in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) and that 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ordering the refund and declaring invalid the imposition
and collection of local franchise tax by the City Treasurer of Quezon City on ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation (ABS-CBN).
The Facts

Petitioner City Government of Quezon City is a local government unit duly organized and existing by
virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 537, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of Quezon City. Petitioner
City Treasurer of Quezon City is primarily responsible for the imposition and collection of taxes within
the territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City.

Under Section 31, Article 13 of the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993, 3 a franchise tax was imposed on
businesses operating within its jurisdiction. The provision states:

Section 31. Imposition of Tax. — Any provision of special laws or grant of tax exemption to the
contrary notwithstanding, any person, corporation, partnership or association enjoying a franchise
whether issued by the national government or local government and, doing business in Quezon City,
shall pay a franchise tax at the rate of ten percent (10%) of one percent (1%) for 1993-1994, twenty
percent (20%) of one percent (1%) for 1995, and thirty percent (30%) of one percent (1%) for 1996 and
the succeeding years thereafter, of gross receipts and sales derived from the operation of the business
in Quezon City during the preceding calendar year. SICaDA

On May 3, 1995, ABS-CBN was granted the franchise to install and operate radio and television
broadcasting stations in the Philippines under R.A. No. 7966. 4 Section 8 of R.A. No. 7966 provides the
tax liabilities of ABS-CBN which reads:

Section 8. Tax Provisions. — The grantee, its successors or assigns, shall be liable to pay the same
taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons
or corporations are now hereafter may be required by law to pay. In addition thereto, the grantee, its
successors or assigns, shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of
the radio/television business transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors or assigns,
and the said percentage tax shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof; Provided
that the grantee, its successors or assigns shall continue to be liable for income taxes under Title II of the
National Internal Revenue Code pursuant to Section 2 of Executive No. 72 unless the latter enactment is
amended or repealed, in which case the amendment or repeal shall be applicable thereto. (Emphasis
added)

ABS-CBN had been paying local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City. However, in view of the above
provision in R.A. No. 9766 that it "shall pay a franchise tax . . . in lieu of all taxes", the corporation
developed the opinion that it is not liable to pay the local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City.
Consequently, ABS-CBN paid under protest the local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City on the dates,
in the amounts and under the official receipts as follows: cIECTH

O.R. No. Date Amount Paid

2464274 07-18-95 P1,489,977.28

2484651 10-20-95 1,489,977.28

2536134 1-22-96 2,880,975.65

8354906 1-23-97 8,621,470.83

0048756 1-23-97 2,731,135.81

0067352 4-03-97 2,731,135.81

———————

Total P19,944,672.66 5

============

On January 29, 1997, ABS-CBN filed a written claim for refund for local franchise tax paid to Quezon City
for 1996 and for the first quarter of 1997 in the total amount of Fourteen Million Two Hundred Thirty-
Three Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Two and 29/100 centavos (P14,233,582.29) broken down as
follows: aATESD

O.R. No Date Amount Paid

2536134 1-22-96 P2,880,975.65

8354906 1-23-97 8,621,470.83

0048756 1-23-97 2,731,135.81

———————

Total P14,233,582.29 6

=============

In a letter dated March 3, 1997 to the Quezon City Treasurer, ABS-CBN reiterated its claim for refund of
local franchise taxes paid.

On June 25, 1997, for failure to obtain any response from the Quezon City Treasurer, ABS-CBN filed a
complaint before the RTC in Quezon City seeking the declaration of nullity of the imposition of local
franchise tax by the City Government of Quezon City for being unconstitutional. It likewise prayed for
the refund of local franchise tax in the amount of Nineteen Million Nine Hundred Forty-Four Thousand
Six Hundred Seventy-Two and 66/100 centavos (P19,944,672.66) broken down as follows: DEcTIS

O.R. No. Date Amount Paid

2464274 7-18-95 P1,489,977.28

2484651 10-20-95 1,489,977.28

2536134 1-22-96 2,880,975.65

8354906 1-23-97 8,621,470.83

0048756 1-23-97 2,731,135.81

0067352 4-03-97 2,731,135.81

———————

Total P19,944,672.66 7

=============

Quezon City argued that the "in lieu of all taxes" provision in R.A. No. 9766 could not have been
intended to prevail over a constitutional mandate which ensures the viability and self-sufficiency of local
government units. Further, that taxes collectible by and payable to the local government were distinct
from taxes collectible by and payable to the national government, considering that the Constitution
specifically declared that the taxes imposed by local government units "shall accrue exclusively to the
local governments". Lastly, the City contended that the exemption claimed by ABS-CBN under R.A. No.
7966 was withdrawn by Congress when the Local Government Code (LGC) was passed. 8 Section 193 of
the LGC provides: CHcTIA

Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. — Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly
registered under R.A. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. (Emphasis added)

On August 13, 1997, ABS-CBN filed a supplemental complaint adding to its claim for refund the local
franchise tax paid for the third quarter of 1997 in the amount of Two Million Seven Hundred Thirty-One
Thousand One Hundred Thirty-Five and 81/100 centavos (P2,731,135.81) and of other amounts of local
franchise tax as may have been and will be paid by ABS-CBN until the resolution of the case.

Quezon City insisted that the claim for refund must fail because of the absence of a prior written claim
for it. cTSHaE

RTC and CA Dispositions

On January 20, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment declaring as invalid the imposition on and collection
from ABS-CBN of local franchise tax paid pursuant to Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, after the
enactment of R.A. No. 7966, and ordered the refund of all payments made. The dispositive portion of
the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the imposition on and collection from plaintiff ABS-
CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION of local franchise taxes pursuant to Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-
91, S-93 after the enactment of Republic Act No. 7966 to be invalid, and, accordingly, the Court hereby
orders the defendants to refund all its payments made after the effectivity of its legislative franchise on
May 3, 1995.

SO ORDERED. 9

In its decision, the RTC ruled that the "in lieu of all taxes" provision contained in Section 8 of R.A. No.
7966 absolutely excused ABS-CBN from the payment of local franchise tax imposed under Quezon City
Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93. The intent of the legislature to excuse ABS-CBN from payment of local
franchise tax could be discerned from the usage of the "in lieu of all taxes" provision and from the
absence of any qualification except income taxes. Had Congress intended to exclude taxes imposed from
the exemption, it would have expressly mentioned so in a fashion similar to the proviso on income
taxes. HTDcCE

The RTC also based its ruling on the 1990 case of Province of Misamis Oriental v. Cagayan Electric Power
and Light Company, Inc. (CEPALCO). 10 In said case, the exemption of respondent electric company
CEPALCO from payment of provincial franchise tax was upheld on the ground that the franchise of
CEPALCO was a special law, while the Local Tax Code, on which the provincial ordinance imposing the
local franchise tax was based, was a general law. Further, it was held that whenever there is a conflict
between two laws, one special and particular and the other general, the special law must be taken as
intended to constitute an exception to the general act.

The RTC noted that the legislative franchise of ABS-CBN was granted years after the effectivity of the
LGC. Thus, it was unavoidable to conclude that Section 8 of R.A. No. 7966 was an exception since the
legislature ought to be presumed to have enacted it with the knowledge and awareness of the existence
and prior enactment of Section 137 11 of the LGC.

In addition, the RTC, again citing the case of Province of Misamis Oriental v. Cagayan Electric Power and
Light Company, Inc. (CEPALCO), 12 ruled that the imposition of the local franchise tax was an
impairment of ABS-CBN's contract with the government. The imposition of another franchise on the
corporation by the local authority would constitute an impairment of the former's charter, which is in
the nature of a private contract between it and the government. AIHTEa

As to the amounts to be refunded, the RTC rejected Quezon City's position that a written claim for
refund pursuant to Section 196 of the LGC was a condition sine qua non before filing the case in court.
The RTC ruled that although Fourteen Million Two Hundred Thirty-Three Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-
Two and 29/100 centavos (P14,233,582.29) was the only amount stated in the letter to the Quezon City
Treasurer claiming refund, ABS-CBN should nonetheless be also refunded of all payments made after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7966. The inaction of the City Treasurer on the claim for refund of ABS-CBN legally
rendered any further claims for refund on the part of plaintiff absurd and futile in relation to the
succeeding payments.

The City of Quezon and its Treasurer filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied
by the RTC. Thus, appeal was made to the CA. On September 1, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition of
Quezon City and its Treasurer. According to the appellate court, the issues raised were purely legal
questions cognizable only by the Supreme Court. The CA ratiocinated:

For another, the issues which appellants submit for this Court's consideration are more of legal query
necessitating a legal opinion rather than a call for adjudication on the matter in dispute. ISDCaT

xxx xxx xxx

The first issue has earlier been categorized in Province of Misamis Oriental v. Cagayan Electric and
Power Co., Inc. to be a legal one. There is no more argument to this.

The next issue although it may need the reexamination of the pertinent provisions of the local franchise
and the legislative franchise given to appellee, also needs no evaluation of facts. It suffices that there
may be a conflict which may need to be reconciled, without regard to the factual backdrop of the case.

The last issue deals with a legal question, because whether or not there is a prior written claim for
refund is no longer in dispute. Rather, the question revolves on whether the said requirement may be
dispensed with, which obviously is not a factual issue. 13

On September 23, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration. The motion was, however, denied by the
CA in its Resolution dated December 16, 2004. Hence, the present recourse. AIHTEa

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:

I.

Whether or not the phrase "in lieu of all taxes" indicated in the franchise of the respondent appellee
(Section 8 of RA 7966) serves to exempt it from the payment of the local franchise tax imposed by the
petitioners-appellants.

II.

Whether or not the petitioners-appellants raised factual and legal issues before the Honorable Court of
Appeals. 14

Our Ruling

The second issue, being procedural in nature, shall be dealt with immediately. But there are other
resultant issues linked to the first.

I. The dismissal by the CA of petitioners' appeal is in order because it raised purely legal issues,
namely: cDCSTA
1) Whether appellee, whose franchise expressly provides that its payment of franchise tax shall be
in lieu of all taxes in this franchise or earnings thereof, is absolutely excused from paying the franchise
tax imposed by appellants;

2) Whether appellants' imposition of local franchise tax is a violation of appellee's legislative

franchise; and

3) Whether one can do away with the requirement on prior written claim for refund. 15

Obviously, these are purely legal questions, cognizable by this Court, to the exclusion of all other courts.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a
certain state of facts. 16

Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal taken to the CA under Rule 41 raising
only questions of law is erroneous and shall be dismissed, issues of pure law not being within its
jurisdiction. 17 Consequently, the dismissal by the CA of petitioners' appeal was in order. HCITDc

In the recent case of Sevilleno v. Carilo, 18 this Court ruled that the dismissal of the appeal of petitioner
was valid, considering the issues raised there were pure questions of law, viz.:

Petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed for being the wrong mode
of appeal. The appellate court held that since the issue being raised is whether the RTC has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, which is a question of law, the appeal should have been elevated to
the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Section 2, Rule 41 of
the same Rules which governs appeals from judgments and final orders of the RTC to the Court of
Appeals, provides:

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. —

(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule
42. DSAacC

(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

In Macawili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we summarized the rule on
appeals as follows:
(1) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to
the Court of Appeals by mere notice of appeal where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law;

(2) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction where the appellant
raises only questions of law, the appeal must be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45;

(3) All appeals from judgments rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
regardless of whether the appellant raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact
and law, shall be brought to the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review under Rule 42. aDcETC

It is not disputed that the issue brought by petitioners to the Court of Appeals involves the jurisdiction of
the RTC over the subject matter of the case. We have a long standing rule that a court's jurisdiction over
the subject matter of an action is conferred only by the Constitution or by statute. Otherwise put,
jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law. Consequently, issues
which deal with the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a case are pure questions of law. As
petitioners' appeal solely involves a question of law, they should have directly taken their appeal to this
Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not an ordinary appeal with the Court of
Appeals under Rule 41. Clearly, the appellate court did not err in holding that petitioners pursued the
wrong mode of appeal.

Indeed, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing petitioners' appeal. Section 2, Rule 50 of the same
Rules provides that an appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be
dismissed; and that an appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall be dismissed outright, . . .
. 19 (Emphasis added) ISDHEa

However, to serve the demands of substantial justice and equity, the Court opts to relax procedural
rules and rule upon on the merits of the case. In Ong Lim Sing Jr. v. FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation,
20 this Court stated:

Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of
the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to due
process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would
serve the demands of substantial justice and equity. In Aguam v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:

"The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a power conferred
on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case." Technicalities,
however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's
primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities". "Lawsuits
unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an
aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned
upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to
help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends
of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving
a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage
of justice. 21 ACIDSc

II. The "in lieu of all taxes" provision in its franchise does not exempt ABS-CBN from payment of
local franchise tax.

A. The present controversy essentially boils down to a dispute between the inherent taxing power
of Congress and the delegated authority to tax of local governments under the 1987 Constitution and
effected under the LGC of 1991.

The power of the local government of Quezon City to impose franchise tax is based on Section 151 in
relation to Section 137 of the LGC, to wit:

Section 137. Franchise Tax. — Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special
law, the province may impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, at the rate not exceeding fifty
percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on
the incoming receipt, or realized within its territorial jurisdiction. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Section 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. — Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city may levy
the taxes, fees and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the
taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and component cities shall accrue to
them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code. SIcEHD

The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates allowed for the province or
municipality by not more than fifty percent (50%) except the rates of professional and amusement
taxes. (Emphasis supplied)

Such taxing power by the local government, however, is limited in the sense that Congress can enact
legislation granting exemptions. This principle was upheld in City Government of Quezon City, et al. v.
Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. 22 Said this Court:

This thus raises the question of whether or not the City's Revenue Code pursuant to which the city
treasurer of Quezon City levied real property taxes against Bayantel's real properties located within the
City effectively withdrew the tax exemption enjoyed by Bayantel under its franchise, as amended.
Bayantel answers the poser in the negative arguing that once again it is only "liable to pay the same
taxes, as any other persons or corporations on all its real or personal properties, exclusive of its
franchise." IaEScC

Bayantel's posture is well-taken. While the system of local government taxation has changed with the
onset of the 1987 Constitution, the power of local government units to tax is still limited. As we
explained in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority:

"The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised
by local legislative bodies, no longer merely be virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to
direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. Under the latter, the exercise of
the power may be subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide which,
however, must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. . . ."

Clearly then, while a new slant on the subject of local taxation now prevails in the sense that the former
doctrine of local government units' delegated power to tax had been effectively modified with Article X,
Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution now in place, the basic doctrine on local taxation remains essentially
the same. For as the Court stressed in Mactan, "the power to tax is [still] primarily vested in the
Congress."

This new perspective is best articulated by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., himself a Commissioner of the
1986 Constitutional Commission which crafted the 1987 Constitution, thus: aEAcHI

"What is the effect of Section 5 on the fiscal position of municipal corporations? Section 5 does not
change the doctrine that municipal corporations do not possess inherent powers of taxation. What it
does is to confer municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of
revenue. They no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. The power of the legislative
authority relative to the fiscal powers of local governments has been reduced to the authority to impose
limitations on municipal powers. Moreover, these limitations must be "consistent with the basic policy
of local autonomy". The important legal effect of Section 5 is thus to reverse the principle that doubts
are resolved against municipal corporations. Henceforth, in interpreting statutory provisions on
municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. It is understood,
however, that taxes imposed by local government must be for a public purpose, uniform within a
locality, must not be confiscatory, and must be within the jurisdiction of the local unit to pass."

In net effect, the controversy presently before the Court involves, at bottom, a clash between the
inherent taxing power of the legislature, which necessarily includes the power to exempt, and the local
government's delegated power to tax under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution. DTESIA

Now to go back to the Quezon City Revenue Code which imposed real estate taxes on all real properties
within the city's territory and removed exemptions theretofore "previously granted to, or presently
enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical [. . .]" there can really be no dispute that the power
of the Quezon City Government to tax is limited by Section 232 of the LGC which expressly provides that
"a province or city or municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem
tax on real property such as land, building, machinery, and other improvement not hereinafter
specifically exempted." Under this law, the Legislature highlighted its power to thereafter exempt
certain realties from the taxing power of local government units. An interpretation denying Congress
such power to exempt would reduce the phrase "not hereinafter specifically exempted" as a pure
jargon, without meaning whatsoever. Needless to state, such absurd situation is unacceptable.

For sure, in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. (PLDT) vs. City of Davao, this Court has
upheld the power of Congress to grant exemptions over the power of local government units to impose
taxes. There, the Court wrote: SHCaDA

"Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and the LGC does
not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a declared
national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply means that in
interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of
municipal corporations." 23 (Emphasis supplied)

In the case under review, the Philippine Congress enacted R.A. No. 7966 on March 30, 1995, subsequent
to the effectivity of the LGC on January 1, 1992. Under it, ABS-CBN was granted the franchise to install
and operate radio and television broadcasting stations in the Philippines. Likewise, Section 8 imposed on
ABS-CBN the duty of paying 3% franchise tax. It bears stressing, however, that payment of the
percentage franchise tax shall be "in lieu of all taxes" on the said franchise. 24

Congress has the inherent power to tax, which includes the power to grant tax exemptions. On the other
hand, the power of Quezon City to tax is prescribed by Section 151 in relation to Section 137 of the LGC
which expressly provides that notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law,
the City may impose a franchise tax. It must be noted that Section 137 of the LGC does not prohibit
grant of future exemptions. As earlier discussed, this Court in City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan
Telecommunications, Inc. 25 sustained the power of Congress to grant tax exemptions over and above
the power of the local government's delegated power to tax. aIEDAC

B. The more pertinent issue now to consider is whether or not by passing R.A. No. 7966, which
contains the "in lieu of all taxes" provision, Congress intended to exempt ABS-CBN from local franchise
tax.

Petitioners argue that the "in lieu of all taxes" provision in ABS-CBN's franchise does not expressly
exempt it from payment of local franchise tax. They contend that a tax exemption cannot be created by
mere implication and that one who claims tax exemptions must be able to justify his claim by clearest
grant of organic law or statute.

Taxes are what civilized people pay for civilized society. They are the lifeblood of the nation. Thus,
statutes granting tax exemptions are construed stricissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor
of the taxing authority. A claim of tax exemption must be clearly shown and based on language in law
too plain to be mistaken. Otherwise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption is the exception. 26 The
burden of proof rests upon the party claiming the exemption to prove that it is in fact covered by the
exemption so claimed. 27

The basis for the rule on strict construction to statutory provisions granting tax exemptions or
deductions is to minimize differential treatment and foster impartiality, fairness and equality of
treatment among taxpayers. 28 He who claims an exemption from his share of common burden must
justify his claim that the legislature intended to exempt him by unmistakable terms. For exemptions
from taxation are not favored in law, nor are they presumed. They must be expressed in the clearest
and most unambiguous language and not left to mere implications. It has been held that "exemptions
are never presumed, the burden is on the claimant to establish clearly his right to exemption and cannot
be made out of inference or implications but must be laid beyond reasonable doubt. In other words,
since taxation is the rule and exemption the exception, the intention to make an exemption ought to be
expressed in clear and unambiguous terms. 29 CAacTH

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7966 imposes on ABS-CBN a franchise tax equivalent to three (3) percent of all
gross receipts of the radio/television business transacted under the franchise and the franchise tax shall
be "in lieu of all taxes" on the franchise or earnings thereof.

The "in lieu of all taxes" provision in the franchise of ABS-CBN does not expressly provide what kind of
taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from. It is not clear whether the exemption would include both local,
whether municipal, city or provincial, and national tax. What is clear is that ABS-CBN shall be liable to
pay three (3) percent franchise tax and income taxes under Title II of the NIRC. But whether the "in lieu
of all taxes provision" would include exemption from local tax is not unequivocal.

As adverted to earlier, the right to exemption from local franchise tax must be clearly established and
cannot be made out of inference or implications but must be laid beyond reasonable doubt. Verily, the
uncertainty in the "in lieu of all taxes" provision should be construed against ABS-CBN. ABS-CBN has the
burden to prove that it is in fact covered by the exemption so claimed. ABS-CBN miserably failed in this
regard. EaHIDC

ABS-CBN cites the cases Carcar Electric & Ice Plant v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 30 Manila Railroad v.
Rafferty, 31 Philippine Railway Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 32 and Visayan Electric Co. v. David
33 to support its claim that that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause includes exemption from all taxes.

However, a review of the foregoing case law reveals that the grantees' respective franchises expressly
exempt them from municipal and provincial taxes. Said the Court in Manila Railroad v. Rafferty: 34

On the 7th day of July 1906, by an Act of the Philippine Legislature, a special charter was granted to the
Manila Railroad Company. Subsection 12 of Section 1 of said Act (No. 1510) provides that:

"In consideration of the premises and of the granting of this concession or franchise, there shall be paid
by the grantee to the Philippine Government, annually, for the period of thirty (30) years from the date
hereof, an amount equal to one-half (1/2) of one per cent of the gross earnings of the grantee in respect
of the lines covered hereby for the preceding year; after said period of thirty (30) years, and for the fifty
(50) years thereafter, the amount so to be paid annually shall be an amount equal to one and one-half (1
1/2) per cent of such gross earnings for the preceding year; and after such period of eighty (80) years,
the percentage and amount so to be paid annually by the grantee shall be fixed by the Philippine
Government. CaDSHE

Such annual payments, when promptly and fully made by the grantee, shall be in lieu of all taxes of
every name and nature — municipal, provincial or central — upon its capital stock, franchises, right of
way, earnings, and all other property owned or operated by the grantee under this concession or
franchise." 35 (Underscoring supplied)

In the case under review, ABS-CBN's franchise did not embody an exemption similar to those in Carcar,
Manila Railroad, Philippine Railway, and Visayan Electric. Too, the franchise failed to specify the taxing
authority from whose jurisdiction the taxing power is withheld, whether municipal, provincial, or
national. In fine, since ABS-CBN failed to justify its claim for exemption from local franchise tax, by a
grant expressed in terms "too plain to be mistaken" its claim for exemption for local franchise tax must
fail.

C. The "in lieu of all taxes" clause in the franchise of ABS-CBN has become functus officio with the
abolition of the franchise tax on broadcasting companies with yearly gross receipts exceeding Ten
Million Pesos. IAcDET

In its decision dated January 20, 1999, the RTC held that pursuant to the "in lieu of all taxes" provision
contained in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7966, ABS-CBN is exempt from the payment of the local franchise tax.
The RTC further pronounced that ABS-CBN shall instead be liable to pay a franchise tax of 3% of all gross
receipts in lieu of all other taxes.

On this score, the RTC ruling is flawed. In keeping with the laws that have been passed since the grant of
ABS-CBN's franchise, the corporation should now be subject to VAT, instead of the 3% franchise tax.

At the time of the enactment of its franchise on May 3, 1995, ABS-CBN was subject to 3% franchise tax
under Section 117 (b) of the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended, viz.:

SEC. 117. Tax on franchises. — Any provision of general or special laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, there shall be levied, assessed and collected in respect to all franchise, upon the gross
receipts from the business covered by the law granting the franchise, a tax in accordance with the
schedule prescribed hereunder: HAICcD

(a) On electric utilities, city gas, and water supplies Two (2%) percent

(b) On telephone and/or telegraph systems, radio and/or broadcasting stations Three (3%) percent

(c) On other franchises Five (5%) percent. (Emphasis supplied)

On January 1, 1996, R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax Law, 36 took
effect and subjected to VAT those services rendered by radio and/or broadcasting stations. Section 3 of
R.A. No. 7716 provides:

Section 3. Section 102 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

SEC. 102. Value-added tax on sale of services and use or lease of properties. — (a) Rate and base
of tax. — There shall be levied, assessed and collected, as value-added tax equivalent to 10% of gross
receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services, including the use or lease of properties. CaATDE

The phrase "sale or exchange of services" means the performance of all kinds of services in the
Philippines, for others for a fee, remuneration or consideration, including those performed or rendered
by construction and service contractors; . . . services of franchise grantees of telephone and telegraph,
radio and television broadcasting and all other franchise grantees except those under Section 117 of this
Code; . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Notably, under the same law, "telephone and/or telegraph systems, broadcasting stations and other
franchise grantees" were omitted from the list of entities subject to franchise tax. The impression was
that these entities were subject to 10% VAT but not to franchise tax. Only the franchise tax on "electric,
gas and water utilities" remained. Section 12 of R.A. No. 7716 provides:

Section 12. Section 117 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

SEC. 117. Tax on Franchises. — Any provision of general or special law to the contrary
notwithstanding there shall be levied, assessed and collected in respect to all franchises on electric, gas
and water utilities a tax of two percent (2%) on the gross receipts derived from the business covered by
the law granting the franchise. (Emphasis added) cCSDTI

Subsequently, R.A. No. 8241 37 took effect on January 1, 1997 38 containing more amendments to the
NIRC. Radio and/or television companies whose annual gross receipts do not exceed P10,000,000.00
were granted the option to choose between paying 3% national franchise tax or 10% VAT. Section 9 of
R.A. No. 8241 provides:

SEC. 9. Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7716 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 12. Section 117 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 117. Tax on franchise. — Any provision of general or special law to the contrary,
notwithstanding, there shall be levied, assessed and collected in respect to all franchises on radio and/or
television broadcasting companies whose annual gross receipts of the preceding year does not exceed
Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00), subject to Section 107(d) of this Code, a tax of three percent (3%)
and on electric, gas and water utilities, a tax of two percent (2%) on the gross receipts derived from the
business covered by the law granting the franchise: Provided, however, That radio and television
broadcasting companies referred to in this section, shall have an option to be registered as a value-
added tax payer and pay the tax due thereon: Provided, further, That once the option is exercised, it
shall not be revoked. (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, radio and/or television companies with yearly gross receipts exceeding
P10,000,000.00 were subject to 10% VAT, pursuant to Section 102 of the NIRC. ADCETI

On January 1, 1998, R.A. No. 8424 39 was passed confirming the 10% VAT liability of radio and/or
television companies with yearly gross receipts exceeding P10,000,000.00.

R.A. No. 9337 was subsequently enacted and became effective on July 1, 2005. The said law further
amended the NIRC by increasing the rate of VAT to 12%. The effectivity of the imposition of the 12% VAT
was later moved from January 1, 2006 to February 1, 2006.

In consonance with the above survey of pertinent laws on the matter, ABS-CBN is subject to the
payment of VAT. It does not have the option to choose between the payment of franchise tax or VAT
since it is a broadcasting company with yearly gross receipts exceeding Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00).

VAT is a percentage tax imposed on any person whether or not a franchise grantee, who in the course of
trade or business, sells, barters, exchanges, leases, goods or properties, renders services. It is also levied
on every importation of goods whether or not in the course of trade or business. The tax base of the
VAT is limited only to the value added to such goods, properties, or services by the seller, transferor or
lessor. Further, the VAT is an indirect tax and can be passed on to the buyer. SECAHa

The franchise tax, on the other hand, is a percentage tax imposed only on franchise holders. It is
imposed under Section 119 of the Tax Code and is a direct liability of the franchise grantee.

The clause "in lieu of all taxes" does not pertain to VAT or any other tax. It cannot apply when what is
paid is a tax other than a franchise tax. Since the franchise tax on the broadcasting companies with
yearly gross receipts exceeding ten million pesos has been abolished, the "in lieu of all taxes" clause has
now become functus officio, rendered inoperative.

In sum, ABS-CBN's claims for exemption must fail on twin grounds. First, the "in lieu of all taxes" clause
in its franchise failed to specify the taxes the company is sought to be exempted from. Neither did it
particularize the jurisdiction from which the taxing power is withheld. Second, the clause has become
functus officio because as the law now stands, ABS-CBN is no longer subject to a franchise tax. It is now
liable for VAT.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
petition in the trial court for refund of local franchise tax is DISMISSED. ASHICc

SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario and Nachura, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 56-67. Dated August 31, 2004. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon,
with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Mariano C. Del Castillo, concurring. ICTaEH

2. Id. at 46-54. Dated January 20, 1999. Penned by then Judge, now CA Associate Justice, Lucas P.
Bersamin.

3. Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93.

4. "An Act Granting the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation a Franchise to Construct, Install,
Operate and Maintain Television and Radio Broadcasting Stations in the Philippines, and for Other
Purposes." Enacted on March 30, 1995 and date of effectivity on May 3, 1995.

5. Rollo, p. 17.

6. Id.

7. Id. at 17-18.

8. Id. at 46-60.

9. Id. at 54.

10. G.R. No. 45355, January 12, 1990, 181 SCRA 38.

11. Section 137. Franchise Tax. — Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other
special law, the province may impose a tax on business is enjoying a franchise, at the rate not exceeding
fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year
based on the incoming receipt, or realized, within its territorial jurisdiction. . . .

12. Supra.

13. Rollo, pp. 64-65.

14. Id. at 23.

15. Id. at 65. CTaIHE

16. Calvo v. Vergara, G.R. No. 134741, December 19, 2001, 372 SCRA 650, as cited in Lavides v. Pre,
G.R. No. 127830, October 17, 2001, 367 SCRA 382.

17. Rule 50, Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. — An appeal under Rule
41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be
dismissed, issues of pure law not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal
instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be
dismissed.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court but shall be dismissed outright.

18. G.R. No. 146454, September 14, 2007.

19. Sevilleno v. Carilo, id.

20. G.R. No. 168115, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 333.

21. Ong Lim Sing Jr. v. FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation, id. at 343-344.

22. G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA 169.

23. City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunications, Inc., id. at 183-186.

24. Section 8. Tax Provisions. — The grantee, its successors or assigns, shall be liable to pay the
same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other
persons or corporations are now hereafter may be required by law to pay. In addition thereto, the
grantee, its successors or assigns, shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross
receipts of the radio/television business transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors or
assigns, and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof;
Provided that the grantee, its successors or assigns shall continue to be liable for income taxes under
Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 72 unless the
latter enactment is amended or repealed, in which case the amendment or repeal shall be applicable
thereto.

25. Supra note 20. cHAIES

26. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, G.R. No. 120082, September 11, 1996,
261 SCRA 667, 680.

27. Agpalo, R.E., Statutory Construction, 2003 ed., p. 301.

28. Maceda v. Macaraeg, Jr., G.R. No. 88291, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 771, 799, citing Sands, C.D.,
Statutes and Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, p. 207.

29. See note 27, at 302.

30. 53 O.G. (No. 4) 1068.

31. 40 Phil 224 (1919).

32. 91 Phil 35 (1952).

33. 92 Phil. 969 (1953).

34. Supra.

35. Manila Railroad v. Rafferty, id. at 226.

36. Approved on May 5, 1994.

37. Entitled "An Act Amending Republic Act No. 7716, Otherwise Known as the Expanded Value-
Added Tax Law and Other Pertinent Provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended."
Approved on December 20, 1996.

38. Published in the Philippine Star on January 9, 1997. Published in the Official Gazette, Vol. 93, No.
6, p. 1463, on March 10, 1997.

39. Otherwise known as the Tax Reform Act of 1997, amended some provisions of the 1977 NIRC by
renumbering Section 117 as 119 and Section 102 as 108. DEcITS

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 0 5 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.

G.R. No. 161219 October 6, 2008

Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 161219. October 6, 2008.]

MARINDUQUE MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC.,

petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case

This petition for review 1 seeks the reversal of the 27 February 2003 Decision 2 and 17 November 2003
Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72402. In its 27 February 2003 Decision, the Court
of Appeals set aside the 15 May 2002 4 and 24 June 2002 5 Orders of Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 1, Iligan City (trial court), and
ordered the trial court to give due course to respondent National Power Corporation's (NAPOCOR)
appeal. In its 17 November 2003 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration
of petitioners Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation and Industrial Enterprises, Inc.
(petitioners). cAaTED
The Facts

On 1 June 1999, NAPOCOR filed a complaint 6 for expropriation against petitioners for the construction
of the AGUS VI Kauswagan 69 KV Transmission Line Project. NAPOCOR sought to expropriate 7,875
square meters of petitioners' property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-955 and T-956. 7
AEIDTc

Petitioners filed their answer 8 with counterclaim and alleged that the expropriation should cover not
only 7,875 square meters but the entire parcel of land. Petitioners claimed that the expropriation would
render the remaining portion of their property valueless and unfit for whatever purpose.

In its 5 December 2001 Decision, 9 the trial court fixed the fair market value of the 7,875-square meter
lot at P115 per square meter. 10 The trial court also directed the commissioners to submit a report and
determine the fair market value of the "dangling area", consisting of 58,484 square meters, affected by
the installation of NAPOCOR's transmission lines.

NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order dated 4 February 2002, 11 the trial court
denied NAPOCOR's motion. cEATSI

In its 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision, 12 the trial court declared that the "dangling area"
consisted of 48,848.87 square meters and fixed its fair market value at P65 per square meter. The trial
court ruled that petitioners are entitled to consequential damages because NAPOCOR's expropriation
impaired the value of the "dangling area" and deprived petitioners of the ordinary use of their property.

NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order dated 24 June 2002, 13 the trial court denied
the motion for being moot and academic because on 2 April 2002, NAPOCOR filed a Notice of Appeal 14
of the 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision. CASaEc

On the other hand, petitioners moved for the execution of the trial court's 5 December 2001 Decision
and 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision. In its 26 April 2002 Order, the trial court partially granted
petitioners' motion and, on 2 May 2002, issued the writ of execution for the 5 December 2001 Decision.

On 29 April 2002, petitioners filed a "motion to strike out or declare as not filed the notice of appeal
dated April 2, 2002; to declare the supplemental decision as final and executory; and to issue the
corresponding writ of execution thereon". Petitioners argued that NAPOCOR violated Section 11, Rule
13 15 of the Rules of Court because NAPOCOR filed and served the notice of appeal by registered mail.
According to petitioners, NAPOCOR had all the vehicles and manpower to personally serve and file the
notice of appeal.

NAPOCOR opposed petitioners' motion and alleged that its legal office is "severely undermanned" with
only one vehicle and one employee, acting as secretary, handling 300 active cases in Mindanao.
NAPOCOR also added that it was highly irregular for petitioners to question its mode of service and filing
only at this stage of the proceedings because since the inception of the case, NAPOCOR had resorted to
registered mail instead of personal service. THaDEA
In its 15 May 2002 Order, the trial court granted petitioners' motion and denied NAPOCOR's notice of
appeal. The trial court gave more credence to petitioners' allegations and declared that NAPOCOR's
explanation was a "patent violation" of the Rules. The trial court considered the notice of appeal as not
filed at all and, since the period of appeal had already expired, declared its 19 March 2002 Supplemental
Decision final and executory.

NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration. 16 In its 24 June 2002 Order, the trial court denied
NAPOCOR's motion. cESDCa

On 23 August 2002, NAPOCOR filed a special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order before the Court of Appeals. NAPOCOR argued that the trial court acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction and gravely abused its discretion when it denied NAPOCOR's notice of appeal of
the 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision on the sole ground that it was not filed and served
personally. cDIHES

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 27 February 2003 Decision, the Court of Appeals ruled in NAPOCOR's favor and set aside the trial
court's 15 May 2002 and 24 June 2002 Orders. The Court of Appeals also ordered the trial court to give
due course to NAPOCOR's appeal. The Court of Appeals declared that the trial court acted whimsically
and capriciously when it denied the notice of appeal and declared the 19 March 2002 Supplemental
Decision final and executory. The Court of Appeals noted that service by registered mail was previously
resorted to by both parties and yet, this was the first time petitioners questioned NAPOCOR's mode of
service. The Court of Appeals added that the trial court should have given due course to NAPOCOR's
appeal because of the large amount of public funds involved considering the significant disparity
between the area sought to be expropriated and the "dangling area". The Court of Appeals also said that
the Rules should be liberally construed to effect substantial justice. SEHaDI

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 17 November 2003 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied petitioners' motion.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues: CIHTac

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court's issuance of the 15 May 2002
and 24 June 2002 Orders was attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
and

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision is
not final and executory. SaHcAC

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

On NAPOCOR's failure to comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court

Petitioners maintain that the trial court had the "wide latitude of discretion" to consider the notice of
appeal as not filed at all because NAPOCOR failed to comply with the Rules. EHSAaD

On the other hand, NAPOCOR argues that the Rules allow resort to other modes of service and filing as
long as the pleading was accompanied by a written explanation why service or filing was not done
personally. NAPOCOR maintains that it complied with the Rules because the notice of appeal contained
an explanation why NAPOCOR resorted to service and filing by registered mail — due to lack of
manpower to effect personal service. 17 NAPOCOR also insists that petitioners are estopped from
questioning its mode of service and filing because since the inception of the case, NAPOCOR had
resorted to registered mail and yet, petitioners only raised this issue when the notice of appeal was
filed. ESCTaA

Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules, personal service of pleadings and other papers is the general rule
while resort to the other modes of service and filing is the exception. When recourse is made to the
other modes, a written explanation why service or filing was not done personally becomes
indispensable. 18 If no explanation is offered to justify resorting to the other modes, the discretionary
power of the court to expunge the pleading comes into play. 19 cTAaDC

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, 20 we ruled:

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing,
the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the
circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal
service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied
by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject
matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11. 21 aCHcIE

In this case, NAPOCOR complied with the Rules. NAPOCOR's notice of appeal sufficiently explained why
the notice of appeal was served and filed by registered mail — due to lack of manpower to effect
personal service. This explanation is acceptable for it satisfactorily shows why personal service was not
practicable. 22 Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly considered the importance of the issue
involved in the case. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the 15 May 2002 and 24 June 2002 Orders. aDIHCT

On NAPOCOR's failure to file a record on appeal

Petitioners maintain that NAPOCOR's appeal should be dismissed because NAPOCOR failed to file a
record on appeal and consequently, it failed to comply with the material data rule. 23
NAPOCOR argues that in this case the filing of a record on appeal is "superfluous" because the trial court
had nothing else to resolve as the 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision finally disposed of the case.
Moreover, NAPOCOR states that petitioners only raised this issue in petitioners' comment before the
Court of Appeals. HcaDTE

No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or the Rules of Court so require. 24 The reason for multiple appeals in
the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue
is resolved by the trial court and held to be final. 25 In such a case, the filing of a record on appeal
becomes indispensable since only a particular incident of the case is brought to the appellate court for
resolution with the rest of the proceedings remaining within the jurisdiction of the trial court. SECAHa

Jurisprudence recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint for expropriation because
there are two stages in every action for expropriation. 26 The first stage is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. 27 The order of expropriation
may be appealed by any party by filing a record on appeal. 28 The second stage is concerned with the
determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated. 29 A
second and separate appeal may be taken from this order fixing the just compensation. 30 HcDaAI

In this case, since the trial court fully and finally resolved all conceivable issues in the complaint for
expropriation, there was no need for NAPOCOR to file a record on appeal. In its 5 December 2001
Decision, the trial court already determined NAPOCOR's authority to exercise the power of eminent
domain and fixed the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated. NAPOCOR filed a
motion for reconsideration. But after the trial court denied the motion, NAPOCOR did not appeal the
decision anymore. Then, in its 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision, the trial court fixed the just
compensation for the "dangling area". NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration and the trial court
denied the motion. NAPOCOR then filed a notice of appeal. At this stage, the trial court had no more
issues to resolve and there was no reason why the original records of the case must remain with the trial
court. Therefore, there was no need for NAPOCOR to file a record on appeal because the original
records could already be sent to the appellate court. aATESD

Moreover, petitioners did not raise this issue in their "motion to strike out or declare as not filed the
notice of appeal dated April 2, 2002; to declare the supplemental decision as final and executory; and to
issue the corresponding writ of execution thereon" before the trial court. It is settled that an issue not
raised during the trial could not be raised for the first time on appeal as to do so would be offensive to
the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process. 31 IAETSC

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 February 2003 Decision and 17 November 2003
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72402.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Azcuna, Reyes * and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. STcDIE

2. Rollo, pp. 31-37. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, with Associate Justices
Teodoro P. Regino and Mariano C. del Castillo concurring.

3. Id. at 39.

4. Id. at 67-68.

5. Id. at 69.

6. CA rollo, pp. 28-33.

7. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-955 covers a total of 87,465 square meters, with 2,550 square
meters included in the area sought to be expropriated. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-956 covers a
total of 152,147 square meters, with 5,325 square meters included in the area sought to be
expropriated. IDSaEA

8. CA rollo, pp. 34-38.

9. Rollo, pp. 49-58.

10. The Commissioner's Report dated 18 September 2001 recommended that the 7,875-square
meter lot had a fair market value of P106 per square meter.

11. Rollo, p. 59.

12. CA rollo, pp. 70-72. The Commissioner's Report dated 11 February 2002 recommended that the
58,484.275-square meter "dangling area" had a fair market value of P90 per square meter.

13. Id. at 27. ECTSDa

14. Id. at 74.

15. Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. — Whenever practicable, the service and filing
of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from
the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or
filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.

16. CA rollo, pp. 90-92.

17. Id. at 74.

18. Marohomsalic v. Cole, G.R. No. 169918, 27 February 2008, 547 SCRA 98.
19. See United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. v. United Pulp and Paper Chapter-Federation of Free
Workers, G.R. No. 141117, 25 March 2004, 426 SCRA 329 and Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc., 406 Phil. 543
(2001).

20. 355 Phil. 404 (1998).

21. Id. at 413-414. ETHaDC

22. See Public Estates Authority v. Judge Caoibes, Jr., 371 Phil. 688 (1999).

23. Section 1 (a), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals,
on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:

(a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was taken
within the period fixed by these Rules.

24. RULES OF COURT, Rule 41, Sec. 2 (a).

25. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111324, 5 July 1996, 258
SCRA 186.

26. Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, G.R. No. 69260, 22 December 1989, 180 SCRA 576.

27. Id. ISCcAT

28. Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 170740, 25 May 2007, 523 SCRA 203.

Rule 45

FACTUAL ISSUE BAR RULE

Factual issues are precluded under the factual issue bar rule under Section 1, Rule 4 which
provides that the petition shall issue only questions of law. An appeal under 45 should be limited to
questions of law only, not questions of facts.

This rule, however, is not absolute and admits of certain exceptions, namely:
 1. When the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjecture;
2. When the interference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3. When there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. When there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;
7. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record;
8. When the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the RTC;
9. When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
10. When the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issue of the case, and
11. Such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. (Cirelo v. Hernandez, Gr. 146523,
June 15, 2006)

[G.R. No. 186487. August 15, 2011.]

ROSITO BAGUNU, vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO
AGGABAO & ROSENDA ACERIT

FACTS:

The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who sold it (first
sale) to Felisimo Bautista, who in turn sold it (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag
who in turn sold it (third sale) to petitioner Rosita Bagunu.

Previously Atty. Binag applied for free patent over the subject land with
the Bureau of Lands (now Land Management Bureau). He was substituted by
vendee petitioner Bagunu as free patent applicant which was stated in their deed
of sale.

Spouses Francisco and Rosenda Aggabao filed a protest against the

application asserting ownership over lot 322 based on a deed of extrajudicial
settlement with sale from the heirs of certain Rafael Bautista. The Office of the
Executive Director of the DENR in an ocular inspection and investigation found
out that petitioner Baguno wrongfully included lot 322 in his free patent
application since this lot belongs to the respondents.

During this pendency of Aggabao’a protest, Atty. Binag filed a complaint

for reformation of instruments in the RTC against Baganu contending that sale
of the Land correctly identified the boundaries of the land sold, although
erroneously identified as lot 322, instead of Lot 258.

With the favorable ruling from the DENR Regional Office, respondent
Aggabao filed a complaint-in-intervention against Bagunu. The complaint-in-
intervention raised captioned the cause of action as one for Quieting of Title and
Reinvindication, claiming that Bagunu’s claim is a cloud on their title and
ownership of lot 322. The DENR Secretry affirmed the ruling of the DENR
Regional Office.

Likewise, the CA affirmed the DENR Secretary applying the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction, since the question on the identity of a land require a
technical determination by the appropriate administrative body which findings
are entitled great respect, if not finality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DENR Secretary has jurisdiction to resolve the

conflicting claims of ownership of Lot 322, notwithstanding that the same issue
is pending with the RTC.

RULING:

The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact
are generally barred under a Rule 45 petition. In the present case, the identity
of Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The determination of the identity
of these lots involves the task of delineating their actual boundaries in
accordance with the parties' respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among
others. While there are instances where the Court departs from the general rule
on the reviewable issues under Rule 45, the petitioner did not even attempt to
show that his case falls within the recognized exceptions. 21 On top of this legal
reality, the findings and decision of the Director of Lands 22 on questions of fact,
when approved by the DENR Secretary, are generally conclusive on the courts,
23 and even on this Court, when these factual findings are affirmed by the
appellate court. We shall consequently confine our discussions to the petitioner's
twin legal issues.

G.R. No. 171238. February 2, 2011.]

F.A.T. KEE COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner, vs. ONLINE

NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL, INC., respondent.

DECISION
 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:

For consideration of the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to challenge the Decision 2 dated
September 26, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71910. The
appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision 3 dated November 7, 2000 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 148, in Civil Case No. 99-
167, which dismissed the complaint filed by herein respondent Online Networks
International, Inc. (ONLINE). acCTSE

Petitioner F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc. (FAT KEE) is a domestic

corporation engaged in the business of selling computer equipment and
conducting maintenance services for the units it sold.

ONLINE is also a domestic corporation principally engaged in the business

of selling computer units, parts and software.

On January 25, 1999, ONLINE filed a Complaint 4 for Sum of Money

against FAT KEE docketed as Civil Case No. 99-167. ONLINE alleged that
sometime in November 1997, it sold computer printers to FAT KEE for which the
latter agreed to pay the purchase price of US$136,149.43. The agreement was
evidenced by Invoice Nos. 4680, 4838, 5090 and 5096 5 issued by ONLINE to
FAT KEE. The invoice receipts contained a stipulation that "interest at 28% per
annum is to be charged on all accounts overdue" and "an additional sum equal
to 25% of the amount will be charged by vendor for attorney's fees plus cost of
collection in case of suit." 6 It was further asserted in the Complaint that
thereafter, FAT KEE, through its President Frederick Huang, Jr., offered to pay
its US dollar obligations in Philippine pesos using the exchange rate of
P40:US$1. ONLINE claimed to have duly accepted the offer. The amount payable
was then computed at P5,445,977.20. FAT KEE then made several payments
amounting to P2,502,033.06 between the periods of March and May 1998. 7 As
of May 12, 1998, the balance of FAT KEE purportedly amounted to
P2,943,944.14. As the obligations of FAT KEE matured in December 1997,
ONLINE applied the 28% interest on the unpaid amount. However, in view of the
good business relationship of the parties, ONLINE allegedly applied the interest
on the balance for a period of three months only. Thus, the total amount due,
plus interest, was P3,012,636.17. 8 FAT KEE subsequently made additional
payments in the amount of P2,256,541.12. A balance of P756,095.05, thus,
remained according to ONLINE's computations. Despite repeated demands, FAT
KEE failed to pay its obligations to ONLINE without any valid reason. ONLINE
was allegedly constrained to send a final demand letter for the payment of the
aforementioned balance. As FAT KEE still ignored the demand, ONLINE
instituted the instant case, praying that FAT KEE be ordered to pay the principal
amount of P756,095.05, plus 28% interest per annum computed from July 28,
1998 until full payment. ONLINE likewise sought the payment of 25% of the total
amount due as attorney's fees, as well as litigation expenses and costs of suit.
aIcDCH

FAT KEE duly answered 9 the complaint alleging, inter alia, that it did not
reach an agreement with ONLINE for the payment of its obligations in US dollars.
FAT KEE claimed that the invoice receipts of the computer printers, which
quoted the purchase price in US dollars, were unilaterally prepared by ONLINE.
While FAT KEE admitted that it offered to pay its obligations in Philippine pesos,
it averred that the amount owing to ONLINE was only P5,067,925.34, as reflected
in the Statement of Account (SOA) sent by ONLINE dated December 9, 1997. 10
FAT KEE stated that payments in Philippine pesos were tendered to ONLINE, in
accordance with the SOA, and the latter accepted the same. FAT KEE denied
that it agreed to the conversion rate of P40:US$1 and claimed that it had already
fully paid its total obligations to ONLINE. FAT KEE, thus, prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint and, by way of counterclaim, sought the payment of
P250,000.00 as attorney's fees.

The trial of the case ensued thereafter.

ONLINE first called Peter Jeoffrey Goco to the witness stand. Goco testified
that he was the Legal Officer of ONLINE, whose duty was to monitor the
outstanding or unpaid accounts of ONLINE's clients, as well as to send demand
letters and recommend the filing of cases should the clients fail to pay. 11 FAT
KEE was one of the clients of ONLINE, which had an outstanding balance of a
little over P756,000.00. 12 Goco stated that the invoice receipts sent to FAT KEE
were denominated in US dollars as the business of ONLINE was to sell imported
computer products, in wholesale and retail. In view of the currency fluctuations
during those times, ONLINE deemed that the better business policy was to bill
their clients in US dollars. 13 FAT KEE allegedly had an outstanding balance of
roughly around US$136,000.00. 14 When ONLINE demanded payment, FAT
KEE negotiated that it be allowed to pay in Philippine pesos. Goco attested that
the parties subsequently agreed to a conversion rate of P40:US$1. FAT KEE was
able to remit partial payments to ONLINE, but as of May 1998, the amount of
P756,095.05 remained unpaid. 15 As FAT KEE failed to settle its obligations,
ONLINE included the payment of interests on the latter's claim. 16 FAT KEE then
sent a letter to ONLINE, insisting that there was no agreement as to the exchange
rate to be used in converting the unpaid obligations of FAT KEE and that the
latter could not pay because of the extraordinary currency fluctuations. 17 The
lawyers of ONLINE eventually sent a demand letter 18 to FAT KEE for the
payment of the outstanding balance, but this too went unheeded. ONLINE, thus,
filed the instant case. 19 ESCacI

The next witness to be presented by ONLINE was James Payoyo, an

Account Manager for the said company. Payoyo testified, among others, that
sometime in November 1997, FAT KEE submitted their Purchase Order 20 for
Hewlett Packard computers and printers, which was quoted in US dollars. 21
Prior to this, FAT KEE likewise sent ONLINE a Purchase Order 22 dated October
23, 1997 and the same was denominated in US dollars. 23 Payoyo related that,
on January 15, 1998, the officials of ONLINE met with Frederick Huang, Jr., the
President of FAT KEE, and the latter's lawyer. The parties discussed the payment
scheme for the outstanding balance of FAT KEE. ONLINE proposed that the total
unpaid amount of more than US$136,000.00 shall be divided in two, such that
50% of the amount was to be paid in US dollars and the other half was to be
settled in Philippine pesos. The exchange rate to be applied to the Philippine peso
component was P41:US$1. 24 FAT KEE then offered to renegotiate the exchange
rate, offering to pay P35:US$1, but ONLINE rejected the same. According to
Payoyo, the parties subsequently agreed to a P40:US$1 conversion rate. 25

Lastly, ONLINE called on Sonia Magpili to likewise testify to the fact that
FAT KEE renegotiated with ONLINE for the conversion rate of P40:US$1. Magpili
stated that she was then the Executive Vice President of ONLINE 26 and was
among the company officials who met with FAT KEE President Huang on
January 15, 1998. 27 Discussed in the meeting was the proposal to split the
payment to be made by FAT KEE. 28 Frederick Huang, Jr. subsequently called
the office of ONLINE to request for the lowering of the exchange rate to P40:US$1,
to which ONLINE agreed. 29 FAT KEE made partial payments from March 1998,
but later tried to negotiate again for a lower exchange rate. Magpili testified that
ONLINE no longer agreed to this proposal as the account of FAT KEE had already
fallen due as of December 1997. 30 On cross-examination, however, Magpili
admitted that FAT KEE did not execute any written confirmation to signify its
agreement to the proposal to split its outstanding balance and the conversion
rate of P40:US$1. 31

FAT KEE, afterwards, presented its testimonial evidence, calling forth

Frederick Huang, Jr. to the witness stand. Pertinently, Huang testified that the
exchange rate they used in order to compute their total unpaid obligation to
ONLINE was P34:US$1. Huang explained that this figure was arrived at by taking
into account the SOA dated December 9, 1997. Therein, the unpaid dollar
amounts in the assailed Invoice Nos. 4680 and 4838 32 were denominated in
Philippine pesos as P2,343,414.33 and P1,502,033.06, respectively. A simple
computation 33 then revealed that the rate of exchange rate thereon was
P34:US$1. 34 FAT KEE also applied the said rate on Invoice Nos. 5090 and 5096,
35 such that the dollar amounts stated thereon were respectively converted to
P384,107.52 and P466,480.00. DcITHE

Huang also stated that FAT KEE quoted in US dollars the Purchase Order
dated November 26, 1997, since the same was upon the instructions of Payoyo.
During that time, the fluctuations of the Philippine peso were rapid and the
Accounting Department of ONLINE informed Huang that the computer
equipment ordered by FAT KEE would not be delivered unless FAT KEE issued
a Purchase Order in US dollars. Huang also said that there was no agreement
between FAT KEE and ONLINE for the payment in US dollars, nor did the parties
agree to a specific exchange rate. 36 On January 15, 1998, the parties met, but
they failed to reach any agreement regarding the exchange rate and the payment
in US dollars. The next day, ONLINE, through Payoyo, wrote a letter to FAT KEE,
confirming their supposed agreement on an exchange rate of P41:US$1. 37 On
February 23, 1998, Payoyo again wrote to Huang, informing him that the new
exchange rate to be applied was P40:US$1. On March 2, 1998, Huang
communicated to Payoyo, stating that the Board of Directors of FAT KEE agreed
to settle the outstanding balance of the company at the rate of P37:US$1. 38
Huang then testified that FAT KEE continued to pay its obligation in Philippine
pesos until its obligation was fully paid. 39 Later, FAT KEE received demand
letters from ONLINE, directing the former to pay the amount of P756,095.05. 40

Mayumi Huang also testified for FAT KEE. Being the Operations Manager
41 of FAT KEE, she admitted that she was the one who issued the Purchase
Order dated November 26, 1997 to ONLINE for $13,720.00. 42

As rebuttal evidence, ONLINE offered the testimony of Melissa Tan to prove

that the SOA dated December 9, 1997 that was purportedly issued by ONLINE
was in fact unauthorized and FAT KEE was duly informed of the same. Tan
stated that she was the Credit and Collection Supervisor for ONLINE. 43
Sometime in December 1997, Magpili showed her a copy of the SOA dated
December 9, 1997, asking Tan if she approved the said document. Tan declared
that she did not issue the SOA, nor was she even aware of its issuance. 44 Tan
explained that the absence of her signature on the SOA meant that the same
was not authorized by ONLINE. The standard procedure was for Tan to review
and approve such documents first before the same were issued. 45 Tan noted
that the SOA was prepared by Edwin Morales, an Accountant of ONLINE. When
confronted about the SOA, Morales reasoned that he merely wanted to give FAT
KEE an initial computation of the latter's outstanding balance, but he
mistakenly included the billings that were denominated in US dollars. 46 At the
meeting between ONLINE and FAT KEE on January 15, 1998, the latter was
informed that the SOA was not official and the parties negotiated the applicable
conversion rate. 47 Upon cross-examination, Tan revealed that ONLINE did not
rectify or correct the entries contained in the SOA. No disciplinary action was
likewise taken against Morales for the unauthorized issuance of the said
document. 48 ACTISD

Finally, FAT KEE presented the testimony of Frederick Huang, Jr. as

surrebuttal evidence. Huang again maintained that the parties failed to reach an
agreement as regards the payment of FAT KEE's obligations to ONLINE, as well
as the proposal to apply the exchange rate of P37:US$1. 49

In a Decision dated November 7, 2000, the RTC dismissed the complaint

of ONLINE, ratiocinating thus:

After assessing the evidence presented by both parties, the court is of the
belief that [ONLINE] failed to establish its claim against [FAT KEE]. While indeed
[FAT KEE] purchased computer printers from [ONLINE], [the latter] has not
established the fact that at the time when the obligation became due and
demandable, there was an agreement as to the conversion rate between [ONLINE]
and [FAT KEE] as to the rate of exchange from US dollars into Philippine Peso in
the payment of purchase price of printers. When there is no agreement between
[ONLINE] and [FAT KEE] as to the rate of exchange from US dollars to Philippine
peso, while it is correct to say that it is the prevailing rate of exchange at the
time when the obligation became due and demandable, the prevailing rate
should be used that prevailing rate, is the rate pegged by [ONLINE], which was
contained in the Statement of Account dated 9 December 1997.

. . . Edwin Morales in the Statement of Account he sent to [FAT KEE] dated

9 December 1997 computed the obligation of [FAT KEE] in Philippine currency
and after computing the total obligation, by simple mathematical computation,
it appears indeed that the exchange rate used by [ONLINE] is PHP34.00 for every
US$1.00. [ONLINE], therefore, is estopped from claiming that the rate of
exchange rate should be at the rate of either PHP41.50 or PHP40.00 per
US$1.00, as the rate which [ONLINE] itself used is PHP34.00 for every US$1.00
by [ONLINE's] own computation. [FAT KEE] even paid an excess of
PHP62,539.24.
 Considering that [FAT KEE] have fully paid the amount and there being
really no dispute as to the exchange rate by [ONLINE's] own admission in its
Statement of Account dated 9 December 1997, it is but proper to consider that
[FAT KEE] has fully paid its obligation with [ONLINE] as evidenced by various
receipts presented during the trial. CDScaT

xxx xxx xxx

With all these, considering that [ONLINE] failed to prove through

preponderance of evidence its claim against [FAT KEE] and therefore [ONLINE's]
complaint must be dismissed.

However, [FAT KEE] in its counterclaim claimed among others that [FAT
KEE] is entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of P250,000.00. It having been
satisfactorily proven by [FAT KEE] that [it] is entitled to attorney's fees, the court,
in its discretion, awards to [FAT KEE] the amount of PHP100,000.00 for and as
attorney's fees, which [ONLINE] must pay to [FAT KEE] considering that the
claim of [ONLINE] is incorrect and its complaint baseless.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [judgment] is hereby rendered in

favor of [FAT KEE] and as against [ONLINE]. As a consequence, [ONLINE's]
Complaint is dismissed, and [ONLINE] is therefore adjudged to pay [FAT KEE]
the amount of P100,000.00 for and as attorney's fees.

Costs against [ONLINE]. 50

On February 20, 2001, ONLINE filed a Motion for Reconsideration 51 of

the above decision. ONLINE argued that estoppel may not be invoked against it
as FAT KEE did not act or rely on the representations in the SOA dated December
9, 1997. ONLINE maintained that FAT KEE was informed that the SOA was
erroneous and unauthorized and the parties subsequently met and negotiated
on the exchange rate to be applied. Likewise, ONLINE challenged the award of
attorney's fees in favor of FAT KEE.

In an Order dated July 25, 2001, the RTC denied ONLINE's motion for lack
of merit. Said the RTC:

The principle of Estoppel properly applies to [ONLINE] brought about by

the Statement of Account dated December 9, 1997 which was sent to [FAT KEE]
through [ONLINE's] own collection clerk employee, Mr. Edwin Morales. While,
indeed, there is no exchange rate agreed upon between [ONLINE] and [FAT KEE],
[the latter] actually made payments using the exchange rate of P34 for every US
dollar after the Statement of Account dated December 9, 1997 was received by
[FAT KEE]. Neither was there any formal action to correct the alleged
unauthorized Statement of Account received by [FAT KEE] nor was the employee,
Mr. Edwin Morales meted appropriate disciplinary action for the acts. On the
contrary, it was only during the rebuttal stage of the case when [ONLINE] tried
to rectify the alleged mistake committed and not at the time when the same was
discovered. Moreover, [ONLINE's] claim that [FAT KEE] did not reply on the
Statement of Account aforestated is not entirely correct as the payments made
by [FAT KEE] which [ONLINE] accepted were actually based on the Statement of
Account using the rate of exchange of P34 for every US Dollar. STIEHc

In the matter of the award for Attorney's fees, the same is justified and
reasonable under the circumstances. The complaint being unfounded and
baseless, [FAT KEE] was forced to litigate and to engage the services of counsel
for the protection of its interest. The Court therefore finds justifiable and
equitable reason for attorney's fees to be awarded.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for lack of substantial merit and for

reasons stated above, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 52

ONLINE thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal, 53 elevating the case to the

Court of Appeals.

On September 26, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision,

reversing the judgment of the RTC in this wise:

We find the appeal meritorious.

In the proceedings below, both parties harped on the propriety of using

the exchange rate of P40:$1 as against the stated rate contained in the December
SOA which the court a quo fixed at P34.00. However, after scrutinizing the pieces
of evidence submitted by the contending parties, We found the pronouncement
of the court a quo wanting of bases and support. Thus, in light of this conclusion,
this Court is constrained to take exception from the findings of the trial court
considering that there were pieces [of] evidence which had been misappreciated
that will compel a contrary conclusion if properly taken into account. 54

On the issue of estoppel on the part of ONLINE, the Court of Appeals

adjudged that:

As borne by the records, ONLINE and FAT KEE had previous dealings with
each other. Out of all their transactions in the month of November 1997, six of
these were transacted using the US Currency in their price quotations; two of
these were actually paid in said notes. While We agree that Invoice Nos. 4680
and 4838 were included in the December SOA, it should not however, be
assumed that the same was the applicable conversion rate upon which FAT KEE
relied on. HTSAEa

xxx xxx xxx

Even granting that FAT KEE was of the impression that P34:$1 was the
applicable rate for its obligation, this was however, immediately rectified by
ONLINE when the parties met on January 1998, barely two months from FAT
KEE's receipt of the subject statement of account and before any payment for
the same was advanced by FAT KEE, in order to negotiate the conversion rate of
its obligation. . . . The fact that FAT KEE started paying its obligation under the
dollar denominated invoices only on March 1998 fortifies the fact that both
parties did not intend to be bound by the December SOA with respect to the
subject invoices.

Clearly, no estoppel as regards the December SOA may be ascribed to

ONLINE because FAT KEE was not misled by ONLINE's actuations, and even
assuming arguendo that it was in fact misled, it still cannot invoke the principle
as it was clearly negligent in not fully scrutinizing the receipts issued to it, which
on their face made specific reference as to where payment was to be applied. . .
. In pegging the amount at P34:$1, a peculiar situation will result where FAT
KEE will be allowed to gain from defaulting payment despite absolute knowledge
of its transactions with ONLINE. . . . .

. . . Other than its bare assertion, there were no indications to show that
[FAT KEE] sought to correct the alleged irregular transactions. Neither is there
any evidence on record demonstrating that sometime after making the purchase
order, it made known its intention to take exception from the currency to be
used. By and large, FAT KEE cannot now be permitted to escape liability by
simply alleging that the subject transactions were made solely upon the
insistence of ONLINE.

xxx xxx xxx

In this present recourse, it is undeniable that FAT KEE had given its assent
to the foreign currency-based transaction with full knowledge of its probable
effects and consequences that may spring therefrom. This is evident from its
acquiescence to the varying rates of exchange that ONLINE was charging the
dollar transactions and its willingness to negotiate on the conversion rate. . . .
And while this single proof of payment may not be regarded as a customary
business practice, this however, may be taken as an indicium of FAT KEE's
concurrence to enter into a transaction that involves a foreign currency. 55
(Emphases ours.) HSATIC

As regards the applicable conversion rate, the appellate court held that:

Nevertheless, despite the above findings, this Court does not agree that
the rate of conversion has been pegged by the parties at P40:$1. It is evident that
when the parties met on 15 January 1999, ONLINE's proposal to FAT KEE to
use the exchange rate of P41:$1 was declined by the latter and instead, FAT KEE
made a counter offer of P35:$1. Further renegotiations then ensued with ONLINE
proposing a rate of P40:$1. On the other hand, FAT KEE, in a correspondence
dated 2 March 1998, offered to use the exchange rate of P37:$1 for the
satisfaction of its remaining obligation. Thereafter, no further negotiations took
place. Significantly, on 17 March 1998, FAT KEE started to make payments for
its remaining obligations, which ONLINE accepted without any protest.

In fine, if ONLINE is to be held in estoppel, it is not from the issuance of

the December SOA but rather from the last offer which pegged the exchange rate
at the ratio of 37:1. To Our mind, the silence of ONLINE and its receipt of the
FAT KEE's payment fifteen (15) days after the last correspondence may be taken
as an implied acquiescence to the latter's offer to pay in Philippine currency
pegging the exchange rate at P37.00 to a US dollar.

Thereby, from its actions subsequent to FAT KEE's last offer, ONLINE is
now barred from adopting an inconsistent position that would eventually cause
loss or injury to another. . . .

On the other hand, ONLINE's bare denial that this last offer was refused
by the company simply contradicts the course of its action and at best, self
serving. Accordingly, utilizing the ratio of 37:1, FAT KEE's obligation under
Invoice Nos. 4680, 4838, 5090 and 5096 stands in the total amount of
P5,148,528.91. Admittedly, FAT KEE had already made payments for these
invoices in the total amount of P4,758,574.18 from 17 March to 19 May 1998
and thus, only the amount of P389,954.73 remains unpaid. 56

Thus, the Court of Appeals resolved the case as follows:

The only issue now left for resolution is where ONLINE's claim should be
computed at the fixed rate of exchange or the rate prevailing at the time of
payment of the obligation. CScTED

Under Republic Act No. 8183, repealing Republic Act No. 529, parties to a
contract may now agree that the obligation or transaction shall be settled in any
currency other than the Philippine Currency at the time of payment. The repeal
of R.A. No. 529 by R.A. No. 8183 has the effect of removing the prohibition on
the stipulation of currency other than Philippine currency, such that obligations
or transactions may now be paid in the currency agreed upon by the parties.
Just like R.A. No. 529, however, the new law does not provide for the applicable
rate of exchange for the conversion of foreign currency-incurred obligations in
their peso equivalent. It follows, therefore, that the jurisprudence established in
R.A. No. 529 regarding the rate of conversion remains applicable.

Thus, in Asia World Recruitment, Inc. v. National Labor Relations

Commission, the High Court, applying R.A. No. 8183, sustained the ruling of the
NLRC that obligations in foreign currency may be discharged in Philippine
currency based on the prevailing rate at the time of payment. The wisdom on
which the jurisprudence interpreting R.A. No. 529 is based, equally holds true
with R.A. No. 8183. Verily, it is just and fair to preserve the real value of the
foreign exchange-incurred obligation to the date of its payment.

In this present recourse, We observed that ONLINE failed to sufficiently

establish that the obligation was payable in US currency. On the other hand, its
actuations of negotiating for the mode of payment and allowing FAT KEE to settle
its obligation in pesos are indicia of the want of any unequivocal agreement
between the parties. With no definite agreement that the transaction shall be
settled in US Currency at the time of payment and considering the agreement of
the parties to peg the rate at P37:$1, it now becomes an ineluctable conclusion
that FAT KEE's unpaid obligation shall be based at the rate of P37:$1 for the
reasons discussed above. Further validating this is ONLINE's insistence that FAT
KEE was liable to pay the amount of P756,095.05 and its allegations that the
remaining unsettled controversy was confined to the amount of the applicable
exchange rate. Thus, it now becomes indubitable that the obligation was payable
in a fixed rate.

Prescinding from the foregoing, We find that the exchange rate to be

applied on FAT KEE's obligation is the ratio of 37:1, and after deducting the
amounts already paid, FAT KEE still owes ONLINE the amount of P389,954.73
excluding interest at the rate of 28% per annum, as stated on the face of the
pertinent invoices, commencing from July 1998. In the same manner and for
having been compelled to institute this suit to vindicate its rights, attorney's fees
are also awarded to the [ONLINE] but the same is reduced to 10% of the total
award. IEHDAT
 WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED
and the decision of the court a quo REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the [FAT KEE] is ordered to pay the amount of P389,954.73 to [ONLINE] with
interest at the rate [of] 28% per annum from July 1998 until paid, plus 10% of
the total award representing attorney's fees. 57

FAT KEE filed a Motion for Reconsideration 58 of the above decision, but
the Court of Appeals denied the same in a Resolution dated January 26, 2006.

Hence, this petition.

FAT KEE invokes for resolution the following legal issues, to wit:

THE PETITION IS COMPLETE IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE

II

F.A.T. KEE DID NOT AGREE TO ENTER INTO A FOREIGN CURRENCY

TRANSACTION

III

THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT TO USE A 1:37 PESO TO DOLLAR

EXCHANGE RATE

IV

ONLINE WAS ESTOPPED BY THE 9 DECEMBER 1997 STATEMENT OF

ACCOUNT.

The Court shall determine the procedural questions first.

FAT KEE contests the argument of ONLINE that the instant petition is
fatally defective for the failure of the former to attach the transcript of
stenographic notes (TSN) of the RTC proceedings. FAT KEE counters that there
is no need to annex the said TSN given that ONLINE does not dispute the
accuracy of the quoted portions of the transcripts and the petition does not
request for a reevaluation of the evidence of the parties. Assuming arguendo that
the TSN should have been attached to the petition, FAT KEE begs for the
relaxation of the rules so as not to frustrate the ends of substantive justice. FAT
KEE also rejects the contention of ONLINE that the petition raises only factual
issues, which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. FAT KEE
argues that the Court of Appeals likewise erred in re-evaluating the evidence and
substituted its own interpretation of the testimonies of the witnesses. TSacAE

On this preliminary procedural issue, we rule that the non-attachment of

the relevant portions of the TSN does not render the petition of FAT KEE fatally
defective.

Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court indeed requires the attachment to
the petition for review on certiorari "such material portions of the record as would
support the petition." 59 However, such a requirement was not meant to be an
ironclad rule such that the failure to follow the same would merit the outright
dismissal of the petition. In accordance with Section 7 of Rule 45, "the Supreme
Court may require or allow the filing of such pleadings, briefs, memoranda or
documents as it may deem necessary within such periods and under such
conditions as it may consider appropriate." 60 More importantly, Section 8 of
Rule 45 declares that "[i]f the petition is given due course, the Supreme Court
may require the elevation of the complete record of the case or specified parts
thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice." 61 Given that the TSN of the
proceedings before the RTC forms part of the records of the instant case, the
failure of FAT KEE to attach the relevant portions of the TSN was already cured
by the subsequent elevation of the case records to this Court. This
pronouncement is likewise in keeping with the doctrine that procedural rules
should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective and assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action
or proceeding. 62

As to the substantive issues raised in the instant petition, the Court finds
that, indeed, questions of fact are being invoked by FAT KEE. A question of law
arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or
any of them. 63

Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court dictates that a petition for review
on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth." 64 This rule is, however, subject to exceptions, 65 one of which is when
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the RTC are conflicting. Said
exception applies to the instant case.

Substantially, FAT KEE primarily argues there was neither any agreement
to enter into a foreign currency-based transaction, nor to use a dollar exchange
rate of P37:US$1. The invoice receipts denominated in US dollars were
unilaterally prepared by ONLINE. Similarly, the Accounting Department of
ONLINE required that the Purchase Order to be submitted by FAT KEE be
denominated in US dollars and Frederick Huang, Jr. merely complied with the
same upon the instructions of Payoyo. Contrary to ONLINE's claim, it issued the
SOA dated December 9, 1997 with the alleged unpaid obligation of FAT KEE
quoted in Philippine pesos. FAT KEE also takes issue with the ruling of the Court
of Appeals that it assented to the payment in US dollars of the transactions
covered under Invoice Nos. 4680, 4838, 5090 and 5096. Lastly, FAT KEE
reiterates the ruling of the RTC that ONLINE was estopped from seeking payment
in US dollars since the outstanding obligation of FAT KEE was denominated in
Philippine pesos in the SOA dated December 9, 1997. Claiming that the SOA was
its only basis for payment, FAT KEE allegedly paid its obligations in accordance
therewith and ONLINE duly accepted the payments. aScIAC

After a meticulous review of the records, we resolve to deny the petition.

FAT KEE subscribes to the rulings of the RTC in the Decision dated
November 7, 2000 and the Order dated July 25, 2001. The trial court found that
there was no agreement as to the exchange rate for the conversion of the
outstanding balance of FAT KEE to Philippine pesos. A reading of the RTC rulings
reveals that the trial court principally relied on the SOA dated December 9, 1997
and the testimony of Frederick Huang, Jr. in setting the exchange rate at
P34:US$1. The RTC ruled that ONLINE was estopped from claiming otherwise
since FAT KEE actually paid its outstanding balance in accordance with the SOA.
Furthermore, the RTC determined that ONLINE failed to undertake any action
to correct the SOA, which the latter claimed was unauthorized. No disciplinary
action was likewise taken against Edwin Morales, the employee who allegedly
issued the SOA without authority.

In British American Tobacco v. Camacho, 66 the Court emphasized the

doctrine of estoppel as follows:

Estoppel, an equitable principle rooted in natural justice, prevents persons

from going back on their own acts and representations, to the prejudice of others
who have relied on them. The principle is codified in Article 1431 of the Civil
Code, which provides:

Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive

upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying thereon.
 Estoppel can also be found in Rule 131, Section 2 (a) of the Rules of Court,
viz.:

Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of

conclusive presumptions:

(a) Whenever a party has by his own declaration, act or omission,

intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and
to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission be permitted to falsify it.

The elements of estoppel are: first, the actor who usually must have
knowledge, notice or suspicion of the true facts, communicates something to
another in a misleading way, either by words, conduct or silence; second, the
other in fact relies, and relies reasonably or justifiably, upon that
communication; third, the other would be harmed materially if the actor is later
permitted to assert any claim inconsistent with his earlier conduct; and fourth,
the actor knows, expects or foresees that the other would act upon the
information given or that a reasonable person in the actor's position would
expect or foresee such action. 67 AHCTEa

In the instant case, we find that FAT KEE cannot invoke estoppel against
ONLINE for the latter's issuance of the SOA on December 9, 1997. The Court
agrees with the Court of Appeals' ruling that any misconception on the part of
FAT KEE engendered by the issuance of the SOA should have already been
rectified when the parties subsequently met on January 15, 1998. The
testimonial evidence of both ONLINE and FAT KEE establish that, during the
meeting, the parties tried but failed to reach an agreement as regards the
payment of FAT KEE's outstanding obligation and the exchange rate to be
applied thereto. Whether or not FAT KEE was duly informed of the fact that the
SOA was unauthorized is no longer of much importance. By their act of
submitting their respective proposals and counter-proposals on the mode of
payment and the exchange rate, FAT KEE and ONLINE demonstrated that it was
not their intention to be further bound by the SOA, especially with respect to the
exchange rate to be used. Moreover, FAT KEE only started making payments vis-
à-vis the subject invoice receipts on March 17, 1998, or two months after the
aforementioned meeting.

At this point, Mijares v. Court of Appeals 68 is instructive in declaring that:

One who claims the benefit of an estoppel on the ground that he has been
misled by the representations of another must not have been misled through his
own want of reasonable care and circumspection. A lack of diligence by a party
claiming an estoppel is generally fatal. If the party conducts himself with careless
indifference to means of information reasonably at hand, or ignores highly
suspicious circumstances, he may not invoke the doctrine of estoppel. Good faith
is generally regarded as requiring the exercise of reasonable diligence to learn
the truth, and accordingly estoppel is denied where the party claiming it was put
on inquiry as to the truth and had available means for ascertaining it, at least
where actual fraud has not been practised on the party claiming the estoppel.
69

Thus, after participating in the meeting on January 15, 1998, submitting

its own proposals and further renegotiating for the lowering of the exchange rate,
FAT KEE cannot anymore insist that it was completely under the impression
that the applicable exchange rate was P34:US$1 as purportedly indicated in the
December 9, 1997 SOA.

Anent the proper exchange rate to be applied in this case, we likewise

uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals that estoppel finds application in this
case as regards the implied acquiescence of ONLINE to the use of the P37:US$1
exchange rate. On March 2, 1998, after a series of proposals on the conversion
rate to be applied, FAT KEE finally offered to settle its outstanding balance at
the rate of P37:US$1. To this offer, ONLINE did not respond. Thereafter, on
March 17, 1998, FAT KEE began remitting payments continuously, which
ONLINE duly accepted. Following the dictum stated in British American Tobacco,
ONLINE communicated, through its silence and acceptance of payments, that it
was agreeable to the P37:US$1 rate. Indeed, ONLINE should not be allowed to
adopt a contrary position to the detriment of FAT KEE. TEIHDa

Premises considered, we find therefore that the applicable exchange rate

to determine the outstanding balance of FAT KEE is P37:US$1. We note,
however, that the Court of Appeals inadvertently erred in computing the
remaining balance to be paid by FAT KEE. According to Invoice Nos. 4680, 4838,
5090 and 5096, the total unpaid amount is US$136,149.43. By applying
P37:US$1 rate on the unpaid amount, the resulting balance is P5,037,528.91,
not P5,148,528.91 as determined by the Court of Appeals. As FAT KEE has
already paid a total amount of P4,758,574.18, 70 the total unpaid amount owed
to ONLINE is P278,954.73.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The

Decision dated September 26, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
71910 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that F.A.T. Kee Computer
Systems, Inc. is ordered to pay the amount of P278,954.73 to Online Networks
International, Inc., with interest at the rate of 28% per annum from July 1998
until fully paid, plus 10% of the total award as attorney's fees. No costs.
TDCaSE

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 159564. November 16, 2011.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES LEON

GUILALAS and EULALIA SELLERA GUILALAS, respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision 1 dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 64867. TEIHDa

The procedural and factual antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines is the registered owner of two (2)

parcels of land known as the "Tala Estate," covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) Nos. 34629 and 34599. The TCTs were issued in the name of then
Commonwealth of the Philippines and were derived from Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 543, originally registered on July 23, 1913 pursuant to Decree
No. 4974 issued in G.L.R.O. Record No. 6563 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. 2

Under Proclamation No. 843, 3 a 598-hectare portion of the Tala Estate

was reserved for housing, resettlement sites and related purposes by the
government under the administration of the National Housing Authority (NHA).

On the other hand, respondents, spouses Leon Guilalas and Eulalia

Guilalas, are the registered owners of a 30,000-square-meter parcel of land
under TCT No. T-194289 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, designated as Lot
433-B-2 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-196244, located at Barrio Gaya-Gaya,
San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. HSEIAT

Eventually, the NHA started the development of the 598-hectare portion of

the Tala Estate for its intended purpose. However, respondents resisted the
development of the area claiming that a portion of their land was encroached
upon by the government. After an investigation was conducted by the
representatives of the NHA, it was found that the land owned by the respondents
was part and parcel of the Tala Estate.

Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for Cancellation of Title against the

respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. C-12726, 4 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Caloocan City.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, 5 respondents claimed that the RTC of

Caloocan City had no jurisdiction over the case since their lot is situated in San
Jose Del Monte, Bulacan and not Caloocan City. Further, respondents
maintained that they have been in open, adverse and continuous possession of
the subject lot since birth and have been actually tilling the same in the concept
of an owner.

After due trial, the RTC, on July 14, 1999, rendered a Decision 6 in favor
of the respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads: STHAID

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is HEREBY

RENDERED:

1. Dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiff; and

2. Denying the application for writ of preliminary injunction.

SO ORDERED. 7

Aggrieved, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),

sought recourse before the CA. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 64867.

In its Brief, 8 petitioner raised the following errors committed by the RTC:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT IT HAS NO

JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AS THE LAND SUBJECT OF THE ACTION LIES
IN THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN. DcCEHI

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT IT HAS NO

JURISDICTION TO ANNUL THE JUDGMENT OF A CO-EQUAL COURT IN A
LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING DECREEING IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES LOT 433-B-2.
 III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-

APPELLEES' LAND FALLS OUTSIDE OF TALA ESTATE OF THE REPUBLIC ON
THE BASIS OF EXHIBITS 6 AND 7 WHICH ARE MERE SKETCH PLANS
PREPARED BY A PRIVATE LAND SURVEYOR AND WHICH PLANS ARE NOT
DULY APPROVED BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS. EcTIDA

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE

PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT PARTICULARLY EXHIBITS "M,"
"N" AND "O-1," ALL SHOWING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES' LAND FALLS
INSIDE THE TALA ESTATE OF THE REPUBLIC AND WHICH REPORTS/SKETCH
PLANS WERE PREPARED BY THE GOVERNMENT AGENCY TASKED BY THE
COURT FOR THE PURPOSE.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS NO

ADEQUATE BASIS FOR PLOTTING THE PLAINTIFF'S LOTS. 9

On August 14, 2003, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the
decision of the RTC, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the July 14, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 128, is AFFIRMED. HTASIa

SO ORDERED. 10

In concurring with the RTC, the CA concluded that based on the evidence
submitted by the respective parties, it is apparent that respondents' lot is beyond
the boundaries of the Tala Estate. Thus, outside the jurisdiction of the RTC
Caloocan City.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOT

OWNED BY THE GUILALAS SPOUSES IS LOCATED IN BULACAN AND DOES
NOT ENCROACH ON THE LOTS OF THE PETITIONER WHICH ARE LOCATED
IN CALOOCAN CITY. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE
CREDENCE TO THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY ENGINEER ROMEO SAYCON, A
PRIVATE GEODETIC ENGINEER, OVER THE REPORT RENDERED BY ENGR.
ERNESTO ERIVE OF THE LAND SURVEY DIVISION OF [THE] DENR-NCR.
CTEacH

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TCT NOS.

34629 AND 34599 AND PROCLAMATION 843 CANNOT BE THE BASES FOR
PLOTTING THE PETITIONER'S LOT BECAUSE SAID DOCUMENTS FAILED TO
INDICATE THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SUBJECT LOTS. 11

Petitioner maintains that respondents' lot encroaches upon and falls

within the Tala Estate. Petitioner argues that the testimony and Report 12 of
Engr. Ernesto S. Erive, Chief of Land Surveys Division of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources-NCR (DENR-NCR), confirming that the lot
involved in the instant case is within the boundaries of the Tala Estate and that
there was overlapping of lots, should be given greater weight than the sketch 13
prepared by Engr. Romeo Saycon, a private geodetic engineer. In the said sketch,
it shows that respondents' lot does not overlap the Tala Estate in Caloocan City,
because their property is located in San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. Petitioner
posits that it is the report of Engr. Erive that should prevail. Being a public
official, he is presumed to have regularly performed his official function.
CSaITD

Petitioner also contends that while TCT Nos. 34629 and 34599 do not
indicate complete technical descriptions, still there are other reliable sources
that may be used in order to plot the pertinent portions of the Tala Estate.

On their part, respondent maintains that the issues raised by petitioner

are both questions of fact, which is improper in the present petition. Moreover,
it is patent that the trial court had no jurisdiction considering that the land
subject matter of the case lies and is within the territorial boundaries of San
Jose Del Monte, Bulacan and outside that of Caloocan City. Further, the findings
made by the trial court, which was affirmed by the CA, are supported by
sufficient evidence.

The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, petitioner primarily sought the cancellation of respondents'

TCT over the lot in question, which is clearly a real action. Section 1, 14 Rule 14
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that actions affecting title to or
possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions) shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the
area where the real property or any part thereof is situated. Considering that the
lot in question was not within the territorial jurisdiction of RTC of Caloocan City,
it was but proper for the RTC to have dismissed the complaint. aSIDCT

However, in both the decisions of the RTC and the CA, both tribunal made
determinations regarding the actual location of respondents' lot and petitioner's
Tala Estate. Therein, both categorically concluded in their respective decisions
that indeed, respondents' lot is located in San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, while
that of petitioner is situated in Caloocan City and that respondents' lot did not
encroach petitioner's property. Considering that the RTC had conducted the trial
and both parties actively participated in the proceedings by submitting and
presenting their respective evidence and witnesses, it would be just and proper
to settle the dispute once and for all based on the findings of the RTC and the
CA. Otherwise, it would not only be impractical, it would cause more injustice to
the parties and protract an already long and dragging litigation.

It must be stressed that the issues raised by the petitioner involves

questions of fact which are not proper subjects of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It is
axiomatic that in an appeal by certiorari, only questions of law may be reviewed.
15 IEHDAT

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a

certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 16 Thus Court's ruling in Velayo-Fong
v. Velayo 17 is instructive:

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a

certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the
same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is
one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the
appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a
question of fact. 18 CDISAc
 The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction that only questions of law may
be entertained by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari is not ironclad
and admits certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;
(7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence
on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the
case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. 19

After a careful review of the records, this Court finds no just reason to
warrant the application of any of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule.
aDTSHc

In the case at bar, respondents sufficiently established from the evidence

submitted that indeed, their property lies within the boundaries of San Jose Del
Monte, Bulacan. Moreover, the pieces of evidence submitted by the petitioner
could not be made basis to determine their claim that respondents' property is
within the boundaries of the Tala Estate, which is in Caloocan City, considering
that even TCT Nos. T-34629 and T-34599 contain insufficient technical
description to make it as bases of any sketch or plan of the said lot. Not even
Proclamation No. 843, which is petitioner's basis for maintaining that the
Marilao River is the northern boundary of its parcels of land, lacked the technical
description of the area covered by it.

The trial court's meticulous assessment of the probative values of the

respective evidence submitted by both parties is worthy of note, to wit:

It is of paramount importance that the exact location of Marilao River be

ascertained in view of plaintiff's allegation that aforementioned river is the
northern boundary of its lots. SEHaDI

In this connection, it is noteworthy that the Municipality of San Jose Del

Monte, Bulacan initiated the move to ascertain its boundary with Caloocan City.
In Resolution No. 20-02-94 (Exhibit 11), its municipal council stated that said
town conformed with the boundary indicated by the cadastral survey of
Caloocan, Rizal to be [the] boundary between said town and city. This was
followed by a letter dated April 19, 1994 addressed to Secretary Rafael Alunan
III, Department of the Interior and Local Government (Exhibit 11-C) involving his
assistance in finding the true boundary between said municipality and the City
of Caloocan. In DILG's first endorsement dated May 11, 1994 (Exhibit 11-B), the
Lands Management Bureau, DENR, was requested to relocate the true boundary
between the two political units. Pursuant to this request, the DENR, Lands
Management Bureau, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement dated November 23, 1994 with San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan (Exhibit 12), whereby said office agreed to undertake a relocation survey
to establish the boundary in question, expenses to be paid by aforesaid town.
cCHITA

After the actual relocation survey by personnel of the Lands Management

Bureau, Region III, Mr. Eriberto Almasan sent a letter dated November 10, 1995
(Exhibits 13, 13-A, 13-B, 13-C, 13-D and 13-E and 13-F).

Relocation plan REL-03-000527 of MBM 22 to 33 Cad. 267 Caloocan

(Exhibit 13-F) pinpointed not only the boundary monuments between the
aforementioned Municipality and City, but also identified and indicated the
location and course of the Marilao River. The boundary monuments are identified
by letters MBM followed by the corresponding number.

The line in red pencil connecting MBM 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28
(Exhibit 13-F-1) indicates the boundary line between San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan and Caloocan City. Said red line touches no part of the Marilao River.

A green-colored line (Exhibits 13-F-2), beginning at a point below MBM 22

on the left side, describes the course of the Kipungoc River which, in plaintiff's
SWO 41785, was labeled erroneously as the Marilao River. STIcaE

San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan's town mayor, Eduardo Roquero, wrote a
letter to the Lands Management Bureau, Manila (Exhibit 14-B), requesting that
a sketch plan be prepared showing the relation between MBM 22 to 33 Cad. 267
Caloocan as against boundary monuments BM 11 to 24 of the Tala Estate. This
is the area where the land in dispute is located. In response, Mr. Privadi Dalire,
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Lands Management Bureau, Manila, sent a
sketch plan (Exhibit 14-C) which indicated the relative position of MBM 22 to 33
Cad. 267 Caloocan with BM 18 to 24, inclusive of the Tala Estate.

Additionally, defendants wrote a letter dated January 4, 1996 (Exhibit 15)

to the Regional Technical Director, Region 3, Lands Management Bureau, San
Fernando, Pampanga, requesting for a certified copy of the relocation to
defendants' Lot 433-B-2-A.
 In reply, said office sent to defendants an approved sketch plan SK-03-
001828 of Lot 433-B-2-A Psd-03-046016 (Exhibit 15-B). In this sketch plan, a
pink colored line beginning from MBM 27 to MBM 28 indicates the boundary line
of Caloocan City relative to defendants' lot.

A green line from BM 16 to BM 17 of the Tala Estate shows that

defendants' Lot 433-B-2-A falls outside the Tala Estate (Exhibit 15-B-2).
cTSDAH

The date culled from the relocation survey plan should prevail over
plaintiff's claim that the Marilao River is the northern boundary of its lots
inasmuch as the relocation survey plan was the product of actual survey recently
conducted.

With respect to plaintiff's claim on the Marilao River boundary, its TCT
Nos. T-34629 and T-34599 contain inadequate technical description to make it
as bases of any plan or sketch of said lot. Only the cadastral lot number, the
boundary owner's cadastral lot number and the area are included in the
technical description found in aforementioned certificates of title. There are no
bearings, distance and degrees that may furnish an adequate basis for plotting
the plaintiff's lot on a sketch or plan.

As regards Proclamation No. 843, which is plaintiff's basis for claiming

that the Marilao River is the northern boundary of its parcels of land, it should
be noted that the proclamation likewise contain no technical description of the
area covered by it. Beyond stating that the area included in the proclamation is
the Marilao River, no other technical data appear to qualify it as adequate basis
for the preparation of any plan of plaintiff's property. Moreover, in said
proclamation, private property such as that owned by the defendants [must] be
recognized. The requirement that a survey of the area covered by the
proclamation is likewise mandated but never complied with by the plaintiff.
These defects impair plaintiff's insistence, that the Marilao River is the boundary
of the lots owned by it. 20 ScEaAD

This finding of the RTC was also arrived at by the CA when it concluded,
thus:

We disagree. Firstly, on the face of the title of the lot owned by the Guilalas
spouses, the same is located in Bulacan. Secondly, a perusal of TCT Nos. 34629
and 34599 shows that the said titles lack the necessary technical descriptions.
Thirdly, under Proclamation No. 843 which was also made as basis of plaintiff
in claiming that the northern boundary of the Tala Estate is the Marilao River,
cannot also be made basis in preparing the sketch plan since no technical data
or description appeared on the said Proclamation. Thus, the trial court was
correct in ruling that these documents cannot be made as bases for plotting
plaintiff-appellant's lot. Consequently, the report of Engr. Ernesto Erive to the
effect that the lot of the Guilalas spouses is inside the Tala Estate, using as bases
the above-named documents cannot be given due credence. aSACED

On the contrary, the claim of the Guilalas spouses that their land is
outside the Tala Estate is clearly supported by the evidence on record. The
Sketch Plan (Exhibits 6 and 6-A) as well as the Sketch of the entire area of
Caloocan City (Exhibits 7 and 7-A) would show that the couple's lot is outside of
the Tala Estate and contrary to the report of Engr. Erive, there appears no
Marilao River as boundary between Caloocan City and Bulacan. The Contoured
Map 3222-IV-2 Edition 1 (1987) and Contoured Map with No. 3230-N-2 Edition
1 (1987) (Exhibits 2, 2-A, 2-B and 2-C) prepared and issued by the Bureau of
Coast and Geodetic Survey showing the boundary between Bulacan and
Caloocan City as depicted by the broken lines would also reveal that no part of
the broken line passes through Marilao River. The position of the Guilalas
spouses' lot on the said contoured maps was plotted thereon and said plotting
was even admitted by Engr. Erive as correct (See TSN, September 27, 1993, p.
5). Moreover, the probative value of the maps cannot be questioned since these
were issued by the Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, which is a government
agency tasked with preparing maps indicating the various political units of the
country. 21 aHSTID

Based on the findings of fact of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, the
property of the respondents does not encroach the Tala Estate and correctly falls
within the territorial jurisdiction of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and not
Caloocan City. This factual finding binds this Court and is no longer subject to
review. Thus, absent a showing of an error of law committed by the court below,
or of whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, or a demonstrable lack of
basis for its conclusions, this Court may not disturb its factual findings. 22
Moreover, well-established is the rule that factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the said
court affirms the factual findings of the trial court. 23

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision

of the Court of Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 64867 is
AFFIRMED. CDTSEI

SO ORDERED.
 Velasco, Jr., Abad, Perez * and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 175291. July 27, 2011.]

THE HEIRS OF NICOLAS S. CABIGAS, NAMELY: LOLITA ZABATE

CABIGAS, ANECITA C. CANQUE, DIOSCORO CABIGAS, FIDEL CABIGAS, and
RUFINO CABIGAS, petitioners, vs. MELBA L. LIMBACO, LINDA L. LOGARTA,
RAMON C. LOGARTA, HENRY D. SEE, FREDDIE S. GO, BENEDICT Y. QUE,
AWG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETROSA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, and UNIVERSITY OF CEBU BANILAD, INC., respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J p:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by Lolita Cabigas,

Anecita Canque, Dioscoro Cabigas, Fidel Cabigas, and Rufino Cabigas
(petitioners), heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas, to reverse and set aside the resolutions
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01144 dated May 31, 2006 2 and
October 4, 2006, 3 dismissing their ordinary appeal for being the wrong recourse.

THE FACTS

On February 4, 2003, the petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment

of titles of various parcels of land registered in the names of Melba Limbaco,
Linda Logarta, Ramon Logarta, Eugenio Amores, New Ventures Realty
Corporation, Henry See, Freddie Go, Benedict Que, AWG Development
Corporation (AWG), Petrosa Development Corporation (Petrosa), and University
of Cebu Banilad, Inc. (UCB) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 28585. CHATcE

The complaint alleged that petitioner Lolita Cabigas and her late husband,
Nicolas Cabigas, purchased two lots (Lot No. 742 4 and Lot No. 953) 5 from
Salvador Cobarde on January 15, 1980. Cobarde in turn had purchased these
lots from Ines Ouano 6 on February 5, 1948.

Notwithstanding the sale between Ouano and Cobarde, and because the
two lots remained registered in her name, 7 Ouano was able to sell these same
lots to the National Airports Corporation on November 25, 1952 for its airport
expansion project. The National Airports Corporation promptly had the titles of
these properties registered in its name.
 When the airport expansion project fell through, respondents Melba
Limbaco, Ramon Logarta, and Linda Logarta, the legal heirs of Ouano, succeeded
in reclaiming title to the two lots through an action for reconveyance filed with
the lower court; 8 the titles over these lots were thereafter registered in their
names. 9 They then subdivided the two lots 10 and sold them to New Ventures
Realty Corporation, Eugenio Amores, Henry See, Freddie Go, Benedict Que,
Petrosa, and AWG. AWG, in turn, sold one of the parcels of land to UCB. All the
buyers registered the titles over their respective lots in their names.

After the respondents had filed their individual Answers, respondents

Henry See, Freddie Go and Benedict Que filed a motion to set the case for hearing
on special affirmative defenses on July 8, 2004. On the other hand, respondents
AWG, Petrosa, and UCB filed a motion for summary judgment on April 13, 2005,
admitting as true the facts stated in the petitioners' complaint, but claiming that
the petitioners had no legal right to the properties in question.

THE RTC RESOLUTION

On August 23, 2005, the RTC issued a resolution, 11 granting the motion
for summary judgment filed by AWG, Petrosa and UCB, and dismissing the
petitioners' complaint. According to the RTC, while the petitioners alleged bad
faith and malice on the part of Ouano when she sold the same properties to the
National Airports Corporation, they never alleged bad faith on the part of the
buyer, the National Airports Corporation. Since good faith is always presumed,
the RTC concluded that the National Airports Corporation was a buyer in good
faith and its registration of the properties in its name effectively transferred
ownership over the two lots, free from all the unrecorded prior transactions
involving these properties, including the prior sale of the lots to Cobarde.
AEIHaS

As the RTC explained, the unregistered sale of the lots by Ouano to

Cobarde was merely an in personam transaction, which bound only the parties.
On the other hand, the registered sale between Ouano and the National Airports
Corporation, a buyer in good faith, was an in rem transaction that bound the
whole world. Since Cobarde's rights to the properties had already been cut off
with their registration in the name of the National Airports Corporation, he could
not sell any legal interest in these properties to the Cabigas spouses. Hence,
under the Torrens system, the petitioners are strangers to the lots and they had
no legally recognized interest binding it in rem that the courts could protect and
enforce against the world. 12
 The petitioners filed a notice of appeal to question the RTC resolution. In
response, respondents AWG, Petrosa, and UCB filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal, claiming that the petitioners raised only questions of law in their appeal;
thus, they should have filed an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court, and
not an ordinary appeal with the appellate court.

THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLUTIONS

In its May 31, 2006 resolution, the CA ruled that the petitioners should
have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
with the Supreme Court instead of an ordinary appeal since they only raised a
question of law, i.e., the propriety of the summary judgment. Accordingly, insofar
as the respondents who filed the motion for summary judgment are concerned,
namely, AWG, Petrosa, and UCB, the CA dismissed the petitioners' appeal.

However, the CA remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings on
the Motion to Set Case for Hearing on Special and Affirmative Defenses filed by
respondents Henry See, Freddie Go, and Benedict Que.

In its October 4, 2006 resolution, the CA resolved the petitioners' motion

for reconsideration, as well as the Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondents Henry See, Freddie Go, and Benedict Que. The CA observed that it
did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since it raised a pure question
of law. Since it dismissed the appeal based on a technicality, it did not have the
jurisdiction to order that the case be remanded to the RTC.

Furthermore, the trial court had already dismissed the case in its entirety
when it held that the petitioners had no enforceable right as against the
respondents, since they had no registered legal interest in the properties. There
was thus no need to remand the case to the RTC.

Hence, the petitioners seek recourse with this Court via the present
petition, raising the following grounds:

(1) The Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in

dismissing the appeal and in holding that a summary judgment is appealable
only through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to the Supreme
Court.

(2) The paramount and overriding considerations of substantial justice

and equity justify the reversal and setting aside of the questioned resolutions.

THE RULING
 We AFFIRM the assailed CA resolutions.

Petitioners availed of the wrong mode of appeal

Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides the three modes of appeal,
which are as follows:

Section 2. Modes of appeal. —

(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases

decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall
be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In
such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
cEaDTA

(b) Petition for review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are
raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

The first mode of appeal, the ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.
The second mode of appeal, the petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC, acting in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.
The third mode of appeal, the appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, is brought to the Supreme Court and resolves only questions of law.

Where a litigant files an appeal that raises only questions of law with the
CA, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court expressly mandates that the CA
should dismiss the appeal outright as the appeal is not reviewable by that court.

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. 13 On the other hand, there is a question of fact
when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

While the petitioners never filed their appellants' brief, we discern from the
petitioners' submissions to the CA, 14 as well as from their petition with this
Court, their perceived issues with respect to the RTC's summary judgment, and
they are as follows:

a) Whether or not the National Airports Corporation acted with good

faith when it purchased the properties from Ouano;

b) Whether the heirs of Ouano acted with good faith in recovering the
properties from the National Airports Corporation; and

c) Whether the subsequent buyers of the properties acted with good

faith in purchasing the properties from the heirs of Ouano.

Given that the question of whether a person acted with good faith or bad
faith in purchasing and registering real property is a question of fact, 15 it
appears, at first glance, that the petitioners raised factual issues in their appeal
and, thus, correctly filed an ordinary appeal with the CA. After reviewing the RTC
resolution being assailed, however, we find that the petitioners actually raised
only questions of law in their appeal.

We quote the pertinent portions of the RTC decision:

The main issue to be resolved is who between [the] plaintiffs and the
defendants have a better right to the subject lots.

In selling the land in favor of the National Airports Corporation[,] plaintiffs

alleged bad faith and malice on the part of the seller Ine[s] Ouano but have not
pleaded bad faith on the part of the buyer. Since good faith is always presumed
under Article 427 of the Civil Code, the National Airports Corporation was
therefore a buyer in good faith. Being [a] purchaser in good faith and for value,
it is axiomatic that the right of [the] National Airports Corporation must be
upheld and its titles protected over the claim of the plaintiffs. In the case of
Flordeliza Cabuhat vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122425,
September 28, 2001, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the title of an
innocent purchaser in good faith and for value and at the same time invoked the
principle of stability of our Torrens system and indefeasibility of title
guaranteeing the integrity of land titles once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. DTSaIc
 "However, it is well-settled that even if the procurement of a certificate of
title was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation, such defective title may be
the source of a completely legal and valid title in the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value. Thus: where innocent third persons, relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property
the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the
certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public
confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered
under [the] Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance whether the
title has been regularly or irregularly issued. This is contrary to the evident
purpose of the law. Every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely
on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore and the law will in
no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the
property."

The subject lots being registered land under the Torrens [s]ystem the
recordation of the sale by the National Airports Corporation, a buyer in good faith
gave National Airports Corporation a title free of all unrecorded prior
transactions, deeds, liens and encumbrances, and conversely forever erased or
cut off the unrecorded interest of Salvador Cobarde. Section 50 of Article 496 of
the Land Registration Act (now sec. 51 of PD 1529) reads: "No deed, mortgage,
lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will, purporting to convey or affect
registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land . . . . The act of
registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect [the] land." In the case
of National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 380, the Supreme Court ruled,
thus, the possession by plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest is irrelevant
to this case because possession of registered land can never ripen into
ownership. "No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." (Sec. 46 of Act
496, now Sec. 47 of PD 1529).

In the eyes of the Torrens system, the unregistered sale of the property by
Ine[s] Ouano to Salvador Cobarde did not bind the land or the whole world in
rem; it bound, in personam, only the parties. On the other hand, the registered
sale by Ine[s] Ouano to National Airports Corporation, a buyer in good faith,
bound the land in rem, meaning that the whole world was put on constructive
notice that thenceforth the land belonged to National Airports Corporation free
of all prior transactions, deeds and encumbrances, such as the claim of Salvador
Cobarde, which were at the very moment National Airports Corporation
registered its title free of prior claims — forever erased or cut off by operation of
law.

xxx xxx xxx

Salvador Cobarde, whose rights to the property had been erased or cut off
by operation of law, had nothing or had no legally recognized interest in the
property that he could sell — when he "sold" the property to Nicolas and Lolita
Cabigas. Nicolas and Lolita Cabigas having bought nothing could transmit
nothing to their successors-in-interest, the plaintiffs herein. Under the Torrens
system, herein plaintiffs are strangers to the property; they possess no legally
recognized interest binding the property in rem that courts could protect and
enforce against the world. 16

As astutely observed by the CA, the RTC resolution merely collated from
the pleadings the facts that were undisputed, admitted, and stipulated upon by
the parties, and thereafter ruled on the legal issues raised by applying the
pertinent laws and jurisprudence on the matter. In other words, the RTC did not
resolve any factual issues, only legal ones.

When there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not

the conclusion drawn from these facts is correct is a question of law. 17 When
the petitioners assailed the summary judgment, they were in fact questioning
the conclusions drawn by the RTC from the undisputed facts, and raising a
question of law.

In light of the foregoing, jurisdiction over the petitioners' appeal properly

lay with this Court via an appeal by certiorari, and the CA was correct in
dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. cDCSET

Rendition of summary judgment was proper

Even if we overlook the procedural lapse and resolve the case on the
merits, we still affirm the assailed CA resolutions.

Under the Rules of Court, a summary judgment may be rendered where,

on motion of a party and after hearing, the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
depositions and admissions on file show that, "except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 18 The Court explained the
concept of summary judgment in Asian Construction and Development
Corporation v. Philippine Commercial International Bank: 19
 Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at
weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby
avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.

Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no

genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown
trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the
affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine,
then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of
law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is
the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. [Emphasis
supplied.]

The petitioners assert that the RTC erred in rendering a summary

judgment since there were factual issues that required the presentation of
evidence at a trial.

We disagree with the petitioners.

At the outset, we note from the respondents' pleadings that several

respondents 20 denied that the sale between Ouano and Cobarde ever occurred.
It would, therefore, appear that a factual issue existed that required resolution
through a formal trial, and the RTC erred in rendering summary judgment.

A closer examination of the parties' submissions, however, makes it

apparent that this is not a genuine issue of fact because, as will be discussed
below, the petitioners do not have any legally enforceable right to the properties
in question, as their predecessors-in-interest are not buyers in good faith.

i. Cabigas spouses are not buyers in good faith

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property, and
pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he
has notice of the claim of another person. 21 It is a well-settled rule that a
purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man
upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that
there was no defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that
such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the
existence of a defect in his vendor's title, will not make him an innocent
purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective,
and it appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its
discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably
be required of a prudent man in a like situation. 22

We are dealing with registered land, a fact known to the Cabigas spouses
since they received the duplicate owner's certificate of title from Cobarde when
they purchased the land. At the time of the sale to the Cabigas spouses, however,
the land was registered not in Cobarde's name, but in Ouano's name. By itself,
this fact should have put the Cabigas spouses on guard and prompted them to
check with the Registry of Deeds as to the most recent certificates of title to
discover if there were any liens, encumbrances, or other attachments covering
the lots in question. As the Court pronounced in Abad v. Sps. Guimba: 23
IHEaAc

[The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the
registered owner himself. Corollarily, it] requires a higher degree of prudence
from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner, although the
land object of the transaction is registered. While one who buys from the
registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one who
buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only
the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for [one] to
determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in [the] capacity
to transfer the land. (emphasis supplied)

Instead, the Cabigas spouses relied completely on Cobarde's

representation that he owned the properties in question, and did not even bother
to perform the most perfunctory of investigations by checking the properties'
titles with the Registry of Deeds. Had the Cabigas spouses only done so, they
would easily have learned that Cobarde had no legal right to the properties they
were acquiring since the lots had already been registered in the name of the
National Airports Corporation in 1952. Their failure to exercise the plain common
sense expected of real estate buyers bound them to the consequences of their
own inaction.

ii. No allegation that the National Airports Corporation registered the

lots in bad faith

All the parties to this case trace their ownership to either of the two
persons that Ouano sold the properties to — either to Cobarde, who allegedly
purchased the land in 1948, or to the National Airports Corporation, which
bought the land in 1952. Undoubtedly, the National Airports Corporation was
the only party that registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds. For this
registration to be binding, we now have to determine whether the National
Airports Corporation acted with good faith when it registered the properties, in
accordance with Article 1544 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first
taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person

acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person

who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the
person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

Based on this provision, the overriding consideration to determine

ownership of an immovable property is the good or bad faith not of the seller,
but of the buyer; specifically, we are tasked to determine who first registered the
sale with the Registry of Property (Registry of Deeds) in good faith.

As accurately observed by the RTC, the petitioners, in their submissions

to the lower court, never imputed bad faith on the part of the National Airports
Corporation in registering the lots in its name. This oversight proves fatal to their
cause, as we explained in Spouses Chu, Sr. v. Benelda Estate Development
Corporation:

In a case for annulment of title, therefore, the complaint must allege that
the purchaser was aware of the defect in the title so that the cause of action
against him will be sufficient. Failure to do so, as in the case at bar, is fatal for
the reason that the court cannot render a valid judgment against the purchaser
who is presumed to be in good faith in acquiring the said property. Failure to
prove, much less impute, bad faith on said purchaser who has acquired a title
in his favor would make it impossible for the court to render a valid judgment
thereon due to the indefeasibility and conclusiveness of his title. 24

Since the petitioners never alleged that the National Airports Corporation
acted with bad faith when it registered the lots in its name, the presumption of
good faith prevails. Consequently, the National Airports Corporation, being a
registrant in good faith, is recognized as the rightful owner of the lots in question,
and the registration of the properties in its name cut off any and all prior liens,
interests and encumbrances, including the alleged prior sale to Cobarde, that
were not recorded on the titles. Cobarde, thus, had no legal rights over the
property that he could have transferred to the Cabigas spouses. SIaHTD
 Since the Cabigas spouses have no legally recognizable interest in the lots
in question, it follows that the petitioners, who are subrogated to the rights of
the former by virtue of succession, also have no legally recognizable rights to the
properties that could be enforced by law. The petitioners clearly have no cause
of action against the respondents, and the RTC correctly dismissed their
complaint for annulment of title.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of

merit, and AFFIRM the Resolutions, dated May 31, 2006 and October 4, 2006,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01144. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Leonardo-de Castro, * Peralta ** and Perez, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 171038. June 20, 2012.]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LOPEZ,

namely: MONSERRAT LOPEZ-MARCHAN, LYDIA LOPEZ-DAMASCO, THELMA
LOPEZ-GERONA, ELSA FELY LOPEZ-REBUSTILLO, JOSE LOPEZ, and
HERMINIO LOPEZ, respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J p:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by the petitioner, Land

Bank of the Philippines (LBP), assailing the September 29, 2005 decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. SP No. 80918. 2 The LBP also assails the
December 23, 2005 resolution 3 of the CA denying its motion for reconsideration.
4 The CA dismissed the LBP's appeal for lack of merit. HDICSa

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

The respondent heirs of the deceased Juan Lopez owned a parcel of

coconut land situated in San Vicente, Castilla, Sorsogon, with an area of 23.1301
hectares and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-32. In July 2000,
Monserrat L. Marchan, together and in behalf of her co-respondents, 5
voluntarily offered to sell the parcel of land to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988."
 After conducting a field investigation, only 21.6101 out of the 23.1301
hectares was found subject for acquisition. 6 The LBP valued the property at
P14,101.51 per hectare or for a total amount of P304,735.09. 7 The LBP's offer
was reduced to P298,101.21, 8 after the value of the 0.3643 hectare legal
easement on the property was deducted.

The respondents rejected the LBP's offer and elevated the matter to the
DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Sorsogon City who
conducted a summary administrative proceeding for the determination of just
compensation. ESCcaT

The PARAD's Ruling

On January 8, 2002, Provincial Adjudicator Manuel M. Capellan fixed 9

the just compensation for the respondents' 21.6101-hectare property at
P928,330.17, which was P630,228.96 more than the amount offered by the LBP.
The huge difference from the LBP's estimate arose from the PARAD's use of the
average selling price of P16.00 per kg. of copra instead of the average selling price
of P5.86 per kg. of copra used by the LBP. The average selling price data is
required in computing for the capitalized net income (CNI), 10 which is a
necessary factor in the equation for determining the amount of just
compensation. 11

The LBP moved to reconsider the PARAD's ruling, but its motion was
denied in an order dated March 21, 2002. 12

Hence, on April 1, 2002, the LBP filed before Branch 52 of the Regional
Trial Court, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC), of Sorsogon City a
petition for the judicial determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil
Case No. 2002-6986. 13 DScTaC

In its petition, the LBP contended that the PARAD gravely abused his
discretion in valuing the respondents' property at P928,330.17. It mainly argued
that the average selling price of P16.00 per kg. of copra used by the PARAD is
contrary to DAR regulations; that under DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 5,
series of 1998, the selling price is defined as "[t]he average of the latest available
12-months' selling prices prior to the date of receipt of the [claim folder] by LBP
for processing, such prices to be secured from the Department of Agriculture . .
. and other appropriate regulatory bodies or, in their absence, from the Bureau
of Agricultural Statistics." Thus, the selling price to be applied in this case should
be the average price of copra for the 12-month period prior to the LBP's receipt
of the respondents' claim folder in July 2001; 14 and that based on the pricing
schedule supplied by the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), the average selling
price within the months of July 2000 and June 2001 was P5.86 per kg. 15

The RTC-SAC's Ruling

In a decision dated August 15, 2003, 16 the RTC-SAC affirmed the

PARAD's decision. From the evidence presented, it considered the PARAD's
valuation to be fair, just and realistic, based not only on the property's yield of
copra, but also on its condition, its proximity to roads and the market place, the
comparable sales in the area or the current value of like properties, the
improvements thereto, its actual use, the social and economic benefits that the
property contributed to the community, the landowner's sworn valuation thereof,
and the tax declarations and assessments made by government assessors on the
property. 17 AEcIaH

Thereafter, the RTC-SAC denied the LBP's motion for reconsideration in

an order dated October 27, 2003. 18 The LBP appealed to the CA.

The CA's Ruling

In a decision dated September 29, 2005, 19 the CA affirmed the RTC-SAC's

ruling. It was unconvinced with the LBP's unsubstantiated claims that the RTC-
SAC erred in considering then prevailing circumstances in the valuation of the
respondents' property and not those at the time the property was taken by the
government, and in adopting the PARAD's valuation, because it was not arrived
at strictly in accordance with the formula and guidelines provided by the DAR.

On the contrary, the CA observed that while the LBP and the PARAD
arrived at different valuations of the respondents' property, both of them used
the same formula provided under DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998. 20 The CA
affirmed the valuation adopted by the RTC-SAC as there was nothing to show
that the trial court, as well as the PARAD, failed to consider the factors
enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the guidelines provided by DAR
A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, in arriving at its valuation. ATcaEH

As for the LBP's valuation, the CA found it to be unrealistic and far from
being the "just" compensation envisioned by the Constitution. 21

The LBP moved to reconsider the CA's decision, but its motion was denied
in a resolution dated December 23, 2005. 22

The Petition
 In the present petition for review on certiorari, the LBP insists that the
PCA-supplied average selling price data of P5.86 per kg. of copra should have
been used in computing the just compensation for the respondents' property, as
their data and computation were in accordance with the formula and guidelines
provided under DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998.

OUR RULING

We DENY the present petition.

In the determination of just compensation, the RTC-SACs are guided by

the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, which provision states:
IacHAE

Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. — In determining just

compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner,
the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall
be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-
payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

The DAR, as the administrative agency tasked with the implementation of

the agrarian reform program and pursuant to its rule-making power under R.A.
No. 6657, translated the factors in Section 17 into a basic formula in DAR A.O.
No. 6, series of 1992, 23 and those found in succeeding DAR administrative
regulations. In various cases, we emphasized the mandatory application of these
formulas and imposed upon the RTC-SACs the duty to apply, and not to
disregard, them in determining just compensation. 24

In the present case, no dispute exists with respect to the formulas used by
the LBP and the PARAD in arriving at their valuations. Both correctly applied
the formula provided by DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, 25 the then governing
regulation applicable to the respondents' land. However, the resulting valuations
varied due to the different average selling price data used, which led to the
question of which between the two average selling prices of P5.86 per kg. and
P16.00 per kg. of copra should be adopted as the true and correct selling price
in determining the amount of just compensation for the respondents' land.
SIcEHD

Questions of fact not reviewable

 We find the present issue to be a question of fact that is not reviewable by
this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 thereof provides that
"[t]he petition . . . shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth." To differentiate, a question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts while a question of law exists if the doubt
centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts; 26 there is a question of fact
if the issue requires a review of the evidence presented or requires the re-
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, and there is a question of law if the
issue raised is capable of being resolved without the need of reviewing the
probative value of the evidence. 27 The issue of the correctness of the average
selling price data used in this case is clearly a question of fact that can only be
determined by a review of the evidence presented by the parties.

In the absence of proof to show that the RTC-SAC acted arbitrarily in the
appreciation and weighing of the evidence, we respect the RTC-SAC's findings.
Factual findings and determinations made by the RTC, or in this case the RTC-
SAC, are generally binding on the Court, particularly when affirmed by the CA.
28 EcAHDT

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition for review on

certiorari is hereby DENIED. We AFFIRM the September 29, 2005 decision and
the December 23, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No.
80918.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Perez, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[G.R. Nos. 153714-20. August 15, 2003.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MARIO K. ESPINOSA,

respondent.

Solicitor General for petitioner.

Roque Butuyan Gangoso Law Offices for respondent.

SYNOPSIS
 Initially, cases of estafa, etc. were filed before the Sandiganbayan by the
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against respondent Espinosa, et al. Later, the
OMB moved to withdraw ex parte the two cases filed against Espinosa and the
Sandiganbayan the same. Thereafter, however, the OMB filed in the same court
seven Informations for Malversation of Public Funds against Espinosa, et al. In
his Motion to Quash the Informations, Espinosa argued that double jeopardy
had already attached. He had been arraigned in the previous estafa cases and
the motion filed to withdraw them had been granted without his express consent.
Petitioner countered, that the arraignment for the two previous cases was
"conditional," made solely to accommodate Espinosa's request to travel abroad
pending reinvestigation of said earlier cases. Ruling in favor of Espinosa, the
Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 24622 to 24628 for Malversation
of Public Funds. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari filed by the people.
ESAHca

While the Court ruled that indeed, double jeopardy had already set in, it
noted that the proper action filed should have been an appeal to the Supreme
Court by a petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. At any rate, the Court also ruled
that the practice of "conditionally arraigning the accused pending the
Ombudsman's reinvestigation of the case is not provided for in the regular rules
of procedure. THIASE

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NOT

PROPER WHERE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION STILL AVAILABLE. — Prior
to submitting the instant Petition to this Court, petitioner should have filed a
motion for reconsideration before the SBN. The extraordinary remedy of
certiorari will lie only if there is "no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Here, the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy expressly provided by law is a motion for reconsideration to be
filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or
judgment. The purpose of the motion is " . . . to afford public respondent an
opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of a re-
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case." Explaining further, the
Court said: ". . . Petitioner's inaction or negligence under the circumstances is
tantamount to a deprivation of the right and opportunity of the respondent
commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly committed or to vindicate
itself of an act unfairly imputed. An improvident resort to certiorari cannot be
used as a tool to circumvent the right of public respondent to review and purge
its decision of an oversight, if any. . . . " acHDTE

2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT;

PROPER REMEDY FOR DECISIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN. — The proper
remedy is appeal under Rule 45, not certiorari under Rule 65. Section 7 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, provides
that "[d]ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to
the Supreme Court by [a] petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions
of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." Section 1, Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, likewise provides that a judgment or final order or resolution
of the Sandiganbayan may be appealed to the Supreme Court via a verified
petition for review on certiorari. IDATCE

3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA;

"CONDITIONAL ARRAIGNMENT," NOT PROVIDED BY LAW. — Previous cases
have mentioned the SBN practice of "conditionally" arraigning the accused
pending the Ombudsman's reinvestigation of the case. This practice is not
mentioned or provided for in the regular rules of procedure. Section 9 of PD 1606,
as amended by RA 7975, provides: "Sec. 9. Rules of Procedure. — The Rules of
Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and
proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan shall have no
power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, except to adopt internal rules
governing the allotment of cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices
among them, and other matters relating to the internal operations of the court
which shall be enforced until repealed or modified by the Supreme Court." The
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, promulgated by this Court, do not
mention any "conditional arraignment." Neither do the regular Rules of Court.
ACTISD

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARRAIGNMENT; ELUCIDATED. — Arraignment is an

indispensable requirement of due process. It consists of the judge's or the clerk
of court's reading of the criminal complaint or information to the defendant. At
this stage, the accused is granted, for the first time, the opportunity to be
officially informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation. Thus,
arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily. CTDacA

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUSPENSION OF ARRAIGNMENT WHEN

REINVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED; COURT DOES NOT LOSE CONTROL
OF THE PROCEEDINGS. — Under Section 11(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, the arraignment shall be suspended for a period not exceeding 60 days
when a reinvestigation or review is being conducted at either the Department of
Justice or the Office of the President. However, we should stress that the court
does not lose control of the proceedings by reason of such review. Once it had
assumed jurisdiction, it is not handcuffed by any resolution of the reviewing
prosecuting authority. Neither is it deprived of its jurisdiction by such resolution.
The principles established in Crespo v. Mogul still stands, as follows: "Whether
the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a
motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits
proceed for the proper determination of the case. . . . "The rule therefore in this
jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case
is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is
the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination
of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court which has
the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation." aCTHEA

6. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT

AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY; WHEN THE SAME IS SUBSTANTIATED. — The
right against double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 21 of Article III of the
Constitution, which reads: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act." This constitutionally mandated right is
procedurally buttressed by Section 17 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following
must be demonstrated: ". . . (1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. And legal jeopardy
attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused."
It has been the unwavering position of this Court that substantial rights cannot
be trifled with or cast aside on the basis of mere suppositions and conjectures.
The relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid out convincingly. Such
waiver must be clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent. caDTSE

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:

A waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy must be clear,

categorical, knowing and intelligent. Corollary to this rule, the alleged conditions
attached to an arraignment must be unmistakable, express, informed and
enlightened. Otherwise, the plea should be deemed to be simple and
unconditional. caCSDT

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

seeking to nullify the April 10, 2002 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan (SBN) in
Criminal Case Nos. 26422-26428. The anti-graft court dismissed the criminal
cases against Respondent Mario K. Espinosa on the ground of double jeopardy
as follows:

"That being the case, the Court is constrained to concur with the accused
that jeopardy has set in and that he is now at peril of punishment twice for the
same offense in violation of the protection afforded by Sec. 21, Art. III of the
Constitution.

"WHEREFORE, these cases are DISMISSED as against accused Mario K.

Espinosa alone." 3

The Antecedents

On February 4, 1998, separate cases of estafa and attempted corruption

of public officers were filed before the SBN by the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) against (1) Respondent Espinosa, then provincial administrator of
Masbate; (2) Emma Vasquez; and (3) Romeo Sanano. The cases were docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 24438 and 24439.

Prior to his arraignment, Espinosa filed a Motion for Reinvestigation of the

cases. The SBN Fourth Division granted the Motion in an Order 4 dated March
23, 1988, and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to evaluate the
evidence against the accused.

While the cases were being reevaluated, Espinosa filed with the SBN a
Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad for the period May 2–13, 1999.

On the date set for the hearing of the Motion, the SBN (Fourth Division)
issued an Order resetting the hearing to April 22, 1999. It required private
respondent to be "conditionally arraigned on that date" 5 before it would act on
his Motion to Travel.

As ordered, private respondent was arraigned, and thereafter granted his

Motion to Travel. The Order of Arraignment dated April 22, 2000, stated that
"upon being duly arraigned, [he] entered a plea of 'Not Guilty' to both
Informations in Crim. Case Nos. 24438 and 24439." 6 The Court also ordered
the deferment of the pretrial of the cases, pending the reinvestigation then being
conducted by the Ombudsman.

On December 28, 2000, the OMB — through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor — moved to withdraw ex parte the two cases against private
respondent. The SBN granted the Motion in a Resolution dated January 9, 2001.

Thereafter, the OMB filed in the same court seven Informations for
Malversation of Public Funds against Espinosa and several others. These
Informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24622 to 24628 and raffled
to the SBN First Division.

On January 22, 2001, Espinosa filed a Motion to Quash the Informations.

He argued that double jeopardy had already attached, because (1) he had been
arraigned in the previous estafa cases; and (2) the Motion to Withdraw the two
earlier ones had been granted without his express consent.

Petitioner countered that the arraignment for the two previous cases was
"conditional," because it was made solely for the purpose of accommodating
private respondent's request to travel abroad while the matters were pending
reinvestigation.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

In its assailed Resolution, the SBN First Division ruled that jeopardy had
attached in the first instance when Criminal Case Nos. 24438-24439 were
dismissed upon the prosecution's "ex parte motion to withdraw the information."
It noted that the dismissal had been sought and obtained without respondent's
knowledge, much less express consent.

It likewise held private respondent's actual arraignment to be

straightforward and unqualified. The records did not disclose any circumstance
showing that the accused knew that his arraignment was subject to certain
conditions.

Hence this recourse. 7

Issue

Petitioner submits the following issue for the Court's consideration:

"Whether or not [the SBN] acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or . . . excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. 24622 to
24628 as against Respondent Espinosa." 8

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is unmeritorious.

Preliminary Issue:

Procedural Lapses

Before tackling the main issue raised by petitioner, the Court will point
out some procedural lapses.

First, prior to submitting the instant Petition to this Court, petitioner

should have filed a motion for reconsideration before the SBN. The extraordinary
remedy of certiorari will lie only if there is "no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 9

Here, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy expressly provided by law 10
is a motion for reconsideration to be filed within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment. 11 The purpose of the
motion 12 is ". . . to afford public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual
or fancied error attributed to it by way of a re-examination of the legal and factual
aspects of the case." Explaining further, the Court said:

". . . . Petitioner's inaction or negligence, under the circumstances is

tantamount to a deprivation of the right and opportunity of the respondent
commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly committed or to vindicate
itself of an act unfairly imputed. An improvident resort to certiorari cannot be
used as a tool to circumvent the right of public respondent to review and purge
its decision of an oversight, if any . . . ." 13 (Italics supplied)

Second, the proper remedy is appeal under Rule 45, not certiorari under
Rule 65. Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act
No. 8249, provides that "[d]ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall
be appealable to the Supreme Court by [a] petition for review on certiorari raising
pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." Section
1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, likewise provides that a judgment or final order
or resolution of the Sandiganbayan may be appealed to the Supreme Court via
a verified petition for review on certiorari.

Clearly then, the remedy of appeal was available to petitioner. For

unexplained reasons, it chose not to pursue this recourse. Neither has it cited
grounds to exempt the Petition from the stringent rule forbidding a substitution
of remedies. Verily, its cavalier disregard of procedural requirements, especially
its erroneous choice of remedy, is indeed enough reason to throw out this Petition
summarily.

Main Issue:

Attachment of Legal Jeopardy

Even if we are to gloss over these procedural infirmities, the Petition should
nonetheless be dismissed for its lack of substantive merit.

Petitioner argues that the dismissal of the later Informations against

private respondent on the ground of double jeopardy had no factual or legal
basis, 14 because his arraignment in the earlier cases was only "conditional."

We are unconvinced.

Previous cases 15 have mentioned the SBN's practice of "conditionally"

arraigning the accused pending the Ombudsman's reinvestigation of the case.
16 This practice is not mentioned or provided for in the regular rules of
procedure.

Section 9 of PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975, 17 provides:

"Sec. 9. Rules or Procedure. — The Rules of Court promulgated by the

Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan shall have no power to promulgate its own
rules of procedure, except to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of
cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices among them, and other
matters relating to the internal operations of the court which shall be enforced
until repealed or modified by the Supreme Court."

The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, 18 promulgated by this

Court, do not mention any "conditional arraignment." Neither do the regular
Rules of Court.

Arraignment is an indispensable requirement of due process. It consists of

the judge's or the clerk of court's reading of the criminal complaint or information
to the defendant. At this stage, the accused is granted, for the first time, the
opportunity to be officially informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation. 19 Thus, arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside
peremptorily.

Espinosa pleaded simply and unconditionally on April 22, 1999. No

unusual ceremony punctuated his arraignment. The SBN itself found this simple
process inconsistent with its studied manner of "conditionally" arraigning the
accused pending reinvestigation in other cases. We quote from its assailed
Resolution as follows:

"Since it is the accused who wishes to travel even while his case is pending
review, and in order that the Court might not lose jurisdiction over him while he
is abroad, the accused and counsel are advised as part of the arraignment
process, that the arraignment is 'conditional' i.e., that arraignment is without
prejudice to the results of the reinvestigation or review; that if the prosecution
should recommend the filing of new charges, in lieu of the present charge, which
would necessarily include or be included in the present accusation, the accused
would now be understood as having waived his right against double jeopardy;
and that if the prosecution sought to withdraw the information, the arraignment
would be deemed to have been of no effect. If the accused accepts these
conditions for arraignment, then he is arraigned and allowed to travel. In other
words, in this instance, the accused is clearly aware of what is going on; at the
time of his arraignment, there is an explicit waiver against the protection against
double jeopardy as a condition for his travel. 20 (Italics supplied)

Under Section 11(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the arraignment
shall be suspended for a period not exceeding 60 days when a reinvestigation or
review is being conducted at either the Department of Justice or the Office of the
President. However, we should stress that the court does not lose control of the
proceedings by reason of such review. Once it had assumed jurisdiction, it is not
handcuffed by any resolution of the reviewing prosecuting authority. 21 Neither
is it deprived of its jurisdiction by such resolution. 22 The principles established
in Crespo v. Mogul 23 still stands, as follows:

"Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due
to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby
a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits
proceed for the proper determination of the case.

xxx xxx xxx

"The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or

information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court which has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions
of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation." 24
(Emphasis supplied)

In any event, petitioner insists that private respondent has waived his right
to invoke double jeopardy in the light of his allegedly "conditional" arraignment.

Again, the Court is not persuaded.

The right against double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 21 of Article III

of the Constitution, which reads:

"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act."

This constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by Section

17 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 25 To substantiate a
claim for double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated:

". . . (1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must
be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the
same or is a frustration thereof.

"And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered;
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused." 26

It has been the unwavering position of this Court that substantial rights
cannot be trifled with or cast aside on the basis of mere suppositions and
conjectures. The relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid out
convincingly. Such waiver must be clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent.
27

As can be gleaned from the Memorandum of petitioner, the alleged waiver

falls short of the above requirement:

"Unfortunately, the records reveal that a lawyer for respondent Espinosa

was present when the April 19, 1999 Order of the Fourth Division was issued in
open court. Thus, said lawyer must have heard that the hearing of the motion to
travel was reset to April 22, 1999 so that the movant could be conditionally
arraigned." 28

xxx xxx xxx

". . . . As stressed in the petition, the arraignment was conditional for if it

was not so, respondent Espinosa would have been deemed to have abandoned
his recourse for the reevaluation of his cases before the Office of the
Ombudsman." 29 (italics supplied)

As correctly pointed out in the challenged Resolution, the dismissal of the

estafa and the corruption cases was made upon petitioner's ex parte Motion for
the withdrawal of the Informations. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that
private respondent was not notified of this Motion. Neither was a hearing held
thereon.

On the other hand, private respondent has amply shown that he learned
of the Motion only after the cases had been dismissed. It is clear that the
dismissal, having been secured by petitioner without the express consent of the
accused, does not amount to a waiver of the right against double jeopardy. But
it does unequivocally show the fourth requisite for the proper invocation of such
right.
 In a nutshell, the alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must be
unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. They must be expressly stated
in the Order disposing of the arraignment. Otherwise, the plea should be deemed
to be simple and unconditional. CSaIAc

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 10-22.

2. Penned by former Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and

concurred in by Justices Catalino R. Castañeda Jr. and Gr

G.R. No. 171038. June 20, 2012.]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LOPEZ,

namely: MONSERRAT LOPEZ-MARCHAN, LYDIA LOPEZ-DAMASCO, THELMA
LOPEZ-GERONA, ELSA FELY LOPEZ-REBUSTILLO, JOSE LOPEZ, and
HERMINIO LOPEZ, respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J p:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by the petitioner, Land

Bank of the Philippines (LBP), assailing the September 29, 2005 decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. SP No. 80918. 2 The LBP also assails the
December 23, 2005 resolution 3 of the CA denying its motion for reconsideration.
4 The CA dismissed the LBP's appeal for lack of merit. HDICSa

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

The respondent heirs of the deceased Juan Lopez owned a parcel of

coconut land situated in San Vicente, Castilla, Sorsogon, with an area of 23.1301
hectares and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-32. In July 2000,
Monserrat L. Marchan, together and in behalf of her co-respondents, 5
voluntarily offered to sell the parcel of land to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988."

After conducting a field investigation, only 21.6101 out of the 23.1301

hectares was found subject for acquisition. 6 The LBP valued the property at
P14,101.51 per hectare or for a total amount of P304,735.09. 7 The LBP's offer
was reduced to P298,101.21, 8 after the value of the 0.3643 hectare legal
easement on the property was deducted.

The respondents rejected the LBP's offer and elevated the matter to the
DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Sorsogon City who
conducted a summary administrative proceeding for the determination of just
compensation. ESCcaT

The PARAD's Ruling

On January 8, 2002, Provincial Adjudicator Manuel M. Capellan fixed 9

the just compensation for the respondents' 21.6101-hectare property at
P928,330.17, which was P630,228.96 more than the amount offered by the LBP.
The huge difference from the LBP's estimate arose from the PARAD's use of the
average selling price of P16.00 per kg. of copra instead of the average selling price
of P5.86 per kg. of copra used by the LBP. The average selling price data is
required in computing for the capitalized net income (CNI), 10 which is a
necessary factor in the equation for determining the amount of just
compensation. 11

The LBP moved to reconsider the PARAD's ruling, but its motion was
denied in an order dated March 21, 2002. 12

Hence, on April 1, 2002, the LBP filed before Branch 52 of the Regional
Trial Court, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC), of Sorsogon City a
petition for the judicial determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil
Case No. 2002-6986. 13 DScTaC

In its petition, the LBP contended that the PARAD gravely abused his
discretion in valuing the respondents' property at P928,330.17. It mainly argued
that the average selling price of P16.00 per kg. of copra used by the PARAD is
contrary to DAR regulations; that under DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 5,
series of 1998, the selling price is defined as "[t]he average of the latest available
12-months' selling prices prior to the date of receipt of the [claim folder] by LBP
for processing, such prices to be secured from the Department of Agriculture . .
. and other appropriate regulatory bodies or, in their absence, from the Bureau
of Agricultural Statistics." Thus, the selling price to be applied in this case should
be the average price of copra for the 12-month period prior to the LBP's receipt
of the respondents' claim folder in July 2001; 14 and that based on the pricing
schedule supplied by the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), the average selling
price within the months of July 2000 and June 2001 was P5.86 per kg. 15

The RTC-SAC's Ruling

In a decision dated August 15, 2003, 16 the RTC-SAC affirmed the

PARAD's decision. From the evidence presented, it considered the PARAD's
valuation to be fair, just and realistic, based not only on the property's yield of
copra, but also on its condition, its proximity to roads and the market place, the
comparable sales in the area or the current value of like properties, the
improvements thereto, its actual use, the social and economic benefits that the
property contributed to the community, the landowner's sworn valuation thereof,
and the tax declarations and assessments made by government assessors on the
property. 17 AEcIaH

Thereafter, the RTC-SAC denied the LBP's motion for reconsideration in

an order dated October 27, 2003. 18 The LBP appealed to the CA.

The CA's Ruling

In a decision dated September 29, 2005, 19 the CA affirmed the RTC-SAC's

ruling. It was unconvinced with the LBP's unsubstantiated claims that the RTC-
SAC erred in considering then prevailing circumstances in the valuation of the
respondents' property and not those at the time the property was taken by the
government, and in adopting the PARAD's valuation, because it was not arrived
at strictly in accordance with the formula and guidelines provided by the DAR.

On the contrary, the CA observed that while the LBP and the PARAD
arrived at different valuations of the respondents' property, both of them used
the same formula provided under DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998. 20 The CA
affirmed the valuation adopted by the RTC-SAC as there was nothing to show
that the trial court, as well as the PARAD, failed to consider the factors
enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the guidelines provided by DAR
A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, in arriving at its valuation. ATcaEH

As for the LBP's valuation, the CA found it to be unrealistic and far from
being the "just" compensation envisioned by the Constitution. 21

The LBP moved to reconsider the CA's decision, but its motion was denied
in a resolution dated December 23, 2005. 22
 The Petition

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the LBP insists that the
PCA-supplied average selling price data of P5.86 per kg. of copra should have
been used in computing the just compensation for the respondents' property, as
their data and computation were in accordance with the formula and guidelines
provided under DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998.

OUR RULING

We DENY the present petition.

In the determination of just compensation, the RTC-SACs are guided by

the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, which provision states:
IacHAE

Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. — In determining just

compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner,
the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall
be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-
payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

The DAR, as the administrative agency tasked with the implementation of

the agrarian reform program and pursuant to its rule-making power under R.A.
No. 6657, translated the factors in Section 17 into a basic formula in DAR A.O.
No. 6, series of 1992, 23 and those found in succeeding DAR administrative
regulations. In various cases, we emphasized the mandatory application of these
formulas and imposed upon the RTC-SACs the duty to apply, and not to
disregard, them in determining just compensation. 24

In the present case, no dispute exists with respect to the formulas used by
the LBP and the PARAD in arriving at their valuations. Both correctly applied
the formula provided by DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, 25 the then governing
regulation applicable to the respondents' land. However, the resulting valuations
varied due to the different average selling price data used, which led to the
question of which between the two average selling prices of P5.86 per kg. and
P16.00 per kg. of copra should be adopted as the true and correct selling price
in determining the amount of just compensation for the respondents' land.
SIcEHD
 Questions of fact not reviewable

We find the present issue to be a question of fact that is not reviewable by

this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 thereof provides that
"[t]he petition . . . shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth." To differentiate, a question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts while a question of law exists if the doubt
centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts; 26 there is a question of fact
if the issue requires a review of the evidence presented or requires the re-
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, and there is a question of law if the
issue raised is capable of being resolved without the need of reviewing the
probative value of the evidence. 27 The issue of the correctness of the average
selling price data used in this case is clearly a question of fact that can only be
determined by a review of the evidence presented by the parties.

In the absence of proof to show that the RTC-SAC acted arbitrarily in the
appreciation and weighing of the evidence, we respect the RTC-SAC's findings.
Factual findings and determinations made by the RTC, or in this case the RTC-
SAC, are generally binding on the Court, particularly when affirmed by the CA.
28 EcAHDT

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition for review on

certiorari is hereby DENIED. We AFFIRM the September 29, 2005 decision and
the December 23, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No.
80918.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Perez, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 166803. October 11, 2012.]

CREWLINK, INC. and/or GULF MARINE SERVICES, petitioners, vs.

EDITHA TERINGTERING, for her behalf and in behalf of minor EIMAEREACH
ROSE DE GARCIA TERINGTERING, respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J p:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated July 8, 2004 and Resolution
2 dated January 17, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79966,
setting aside the Resolutions dated February 20, 2003 3 and July 31, 2003 4 of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed in toto the
Decision 5 dated February 12, 2002 of the Labor Arbiter.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: DHaECI

Respondent Editha Teringtering (Teringtering), spouse of deceased Jacinto

Teringtering (Jacinto), and in behalf of her minor child, filed a complaint against
petitioner Crewlink, Inc. (Crewlink), and its foreign principal Gulf Marine
Services for the payment of death benefits, benefit for minor child, burial
assistance, damages and attorney's fees.

Respondent alleged that her husband Jacinto entered into an overseas

employment contract with Crewlink, Inc. for and in behalf of its foreign principal
Gulf Marine Services, the details of which are as follows:

Duration of Contract : 12 months

Position : Oiler

Basic Monthly Salary : US$385.00

Hours of Work : 48 hrs./wk.

Overtime : US$115.50

Vacation Leave with pay : 1 mo. leave after 12 months

Point of Hire : Manila, Philippines

xxx xxx xxx

Teringtering claimed that before her husband was employed, he was

subjected to a pre-employment medical examination wherein he was pronounced
as "fit to work." Thus, her husband joined his vessel of assignment and
performed his duties as Oiler.

On or about April 18, 2001, a death certificate was issued by the Ministry
of Health of the United Arab Emirates wherein it was stated that Jacinto died on
April 9, 2001 due to asphyxia of drowning. Later on, an embalming and sealing
certificate was issued after which the remains of Jacinto was brought back to
the Philippines. IECAaD

After learning of the death of Jacinto, respondent claimed from petitioners

the payment of death compensation in the amount of US$50,000.00 and burial
expenses in the amount of US$1,000.00, as well as additional death
compensation in the amount of US$7,000.00, for the minor Eimaereach Rose de
Gracia Teringtering but was refused without any valid cause. Hence, a complaint
was filed against the petitioners.

Respondent claimed that in order for her husband's death to be

compensable it is enough that he died during the term of his contract and while
still on board. Respondent asserted that Jacinto was suffering from a psychotic
disorder, or Mood Disorder Bipolar Type, which resulted to his jumping into the
sea and his eventual death. Respondent further asserted that her husband's
death was not deliberate and not of his own will, but was a result of a mental
disorder, thus, compensable.

For its part, petitioner Crewlink alleged that sometime on April 9, 2001,
around 8:20 p.m. while at Nasr Oilfield, the late Jacinto Teringtering suddenly
jumped into the sea, but the second engineer was able to recover him. Because
of said incident, one personnel was directed to watch Jacinto. However, around
10:30 p.m., while the boat dropped anchor south of Nasr Oilfield and went on
standby, Jacinto jumped off the boat again. Around 11:00 p.m., the A/B
watchman reported that Jacinto was recovered but despite efforts to revive him,
he was already dead from drowning. HISAET

Petitioner asserted that Teringtering was not entitled to the benefits being
claimed, because Jacinto committed suicide. Despite the non-entitlement,
however, Teringtering was even given burial assistance in the amount of
P35,800.00 and P13,273.00 on May 21, 2001. She likewise received the amount
of US$792.51 representing donations from the GMS staff and crew. Petitioner
likewise argued that Teringtering is not entitled to moral and exemplary
damages, because petitioner had nothing to do with her late husband's untimely
demise as the same was due to his own doing.

As part of the record, respondent submitted Ship Captain Oscar C.

Morado's report on the incident, which we quote:

At around 2000 hrs. M/V Raja 3404 still underway to Nasr Complex w/ 1
passenger. 2018 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding to drop 1 passenger At
2020 hrs. Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering suddenly jump to the sea, while the boat
cast off from Nasr Complex boatlanding. And the second Engr. Mr. Sudarto jump
and recover Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering the oiler.

2040 hrs. Dropped anchor south of Nasr oilfield and standby. And that
time informed to GMS personnel about the accident, And we informed to A/B on
duty to watch Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering. 2230 hrs. The A/B watch man informed
that Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering jump again to the sea. And that time the wind NW
10-14 kts. and strong current. And the second Engr. jump to the sea with life
ring to recover Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering. 2300 hrs. We recovered Mr. Jacinto
Tering Tering onboard the vessel and apply Respiration Kiss of life Mouth to
Mouth, And proceed to Nasr Complex to take doctor.

2320 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding and the doctor on-board to
check the patient. 2330 hrs. As per Nasr Complex Doctor the patient was already
dead. Then informed to GMS personnel about the accident. HTCIcE

I Captain Oscar C. Morado certify this report true and correct with the best
of my knowledge and reserve the right, modify, ratify and/or enlarge this
statement at any time and place, According to the law. 6 *

In a Decision dated February 12, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, after hearing,
dismissed the case for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter held that, while it is true
that Jacinto Teringtering died during the effectivity of his contract of employment
and that he died of asphyxiation, nevertheless, his death was the result of his
deliberate or intentional jumping into the sea. Thus, his death was directly
attributable to him.

Teringtering then appealed before the NLRC which affirmed in toto the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter.

Unsatisfied, Teringtering filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before

the Court of Appeals and sought the nullification of the NLRC Resolution, dated
February 20, 2003, which affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision dated February
12, 2002.

On July 8, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed Resolution of
the NLRC, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated February 20,

2003 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Crewlink, Inc. and
Gulf Marine Services are hereby DECLARED jointly and severally liable and,
accordingly, are directed to pay deceased Jacinto Teringtering's beneficiaries,
namely respondent Editha Teringtering and her daughter Eimaereach Rose de
Gracia, the Philippine Currency equivalent to US$50,000.00, and an additional
amount of US$7,000, both at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of
payment. CSTDIE

SO ORDERED. 7
 Thus, before this Court, Crewlink, Inc. and/or Gulf Marine Services, as
petitioner, raised the following issues:

WHETHER A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI INCLUDES

CORRECTION OF THE NLRC'S EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND
FACTUAL FINDINGS BASED THEREON OR CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF
FACTS IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE NLRC;

II

WHETHER THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF SUPPOSEDLY FAILING TO TAKE

SUCH MEASURES FOR THE COMFORT AND SAFETY OF THE DECEASED
SEAFARER, AMONG OTHERS, WHICH WERE ESPECIALLY EMPHASIZED IN
THE ASSAILED CA DECISION AND WHICH ACTUALLY REFERRED TO ACTS
COMMITTED BY THE SHIPMATES OF THE DECEASED, BUT POSITIVELY
ATTRIBUTED TO PETITIONERS AND FOR WHICH THE LATTER ARE NOW
BEING HELD LIABLE — ARE IN THE NATURE OF AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT
SOURCE OF OBLIGATION THAT IS PREDICATED ON QUASI-DELICT OR TORT
AS PROVIDED UNDER OUR CIVIL LAWS AND, THUS, HAS NO REFERENCE TO
OUR LABOR CODE; ITAaHc

III

WHETHER THE DEATH OF SEAFARER IN THIS CASE WAS A RESULT OF

A DELIBERATE/WILLFUL ACT ON HIS OWN LIFE, AN ACT DIRECTLY
ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE DECEASED, AND NO OTHER, AS FOUND AND SO
RULED BY THE LABOR ARBITER AND NLRC, AS TO RENDER HIS DEATH NOT
COMPENSABLE.

Petitioner claimed that Jacinto's death is not compensable, considering

that the latter's death resulted from his willful act. It argued that the rule that
the employer becomes liable once it is established that the seaman died during
the effectivity of his employment contract is not absolute. The employer may be
exempt from liability if he can successfully prove that the seaman's death was
caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act, as in this
case.

We find merit in the petition.

In a petition for review on certiorari, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing

errors of law in the absence of any showing that the factual findings complained
of are devoid of support in the records or are glaringly erroneous. We are not a
trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact
of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this
Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly
shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence
on record. This case is no different. cTSHaE

As found by the Labor Arbiter, Jacinto's jumping into the sea was not an
accident but was deliberately done. Indeed, Jacinto jumped off twice into the sea
and it was on his second attempt that caused his death. The accident report of
Captain Oscar Morado narrated in detail the circumstances that led to Jacinto's
death. The circumstances of Jacinto's actions before and at the time of his death
were likewise entered in the Chief Officer's Log Book and were attested to by
Captain Morado before the Philippine Embassy. Even the A/B personnel, Ronald
Arroga, who was tasked to watch over Jacinto after his first attempt of
committing suicide, testified that despite his efforts to prevent Jacinto from
jumping again overboard, Jacinto was determined and even shoved him and
jumped anew which eventually caused his death.

Considering the foregoing, we do not find any reason to discredit the

evidence presented as well as the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Settled is the rule
that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise
in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but
even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion. More so, when there is no showing that said findings were
arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record.

Likewise, the provisions of the Code of Commerce are certainly

inapplicable in this case. For precisely, the issue for resolution here is the
obligation of the employer to its employee should the latter die during the term
of his employment. The relationship between the petitioner and Jacinto is one
based on contract of employment and not one of contract of carriage. HTIEaS

Under No. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA "Standard Employment

Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen On-Board Ocean-
Going Vessels" (POEA-SEC), it is provided that:

xxx xxx xxx

 6. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury,
incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the
seaman, provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury,
incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to him. (Emphasis ours)

Indeed, in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should
occur during the effectivity of the employment contract. The death of a seaman
during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death
compensation benefits. This rule, however, is not absolute. The employer may be
exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman's death was
caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. TSIDaH

In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that

Jacinto's death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping
into the sea. Meanwhile, respondent, other than her bare allegation that her
husband was suffering from a mental disorder, no evidence, witness, or any
medical report was given to support her claim of Jacinto's insanity. The record
does not even show when the alleged insanity of Jacinto did start. Homesickness
and/or family problems may result to depression, but the same does not
necessarily equate to mental disorder. The issue of insanity is a question of fact;
for insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of the usual means of
proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or
condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.
Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may
be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the person claimed to
be insane, or who has rational basis to conclude that a person was insane based
on the witness' own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an expert,
such as a psychiatrist. 8 No such evidence was presented to support
respondent's claim.

The Court commiserates with the respondent, but absent substantial

evidence from which reasonable basis for the grant of benefits prayed for can be
drawn, the Court is left with no choice but to deny her petition, lest an injustice
be caused to the employer. Otherwise stated, while it is true that labor contracts
are impressed with public interest and the provisions of the POEA-SEC must be
construed logically and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their
employment on board ocean-going vessels, still the rule is that justice is in every
case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the
applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. 9
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79966, dated July 8, 2004, and its January 17, 2005
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The February 20, 2003 and July 31, 2003 Resolutions of the National
Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR OFW Case No. (M) 01-06-1144-00,
affirming the February 12, 2002 Decision of the Labor Arbiter, are hereby
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. ICaDHT

Velasco, Jr., Abad, Perez * and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 167938. February 19, 2009.]

HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD.

(FORMERLY HANJIN ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD.),
petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. RAUL T. AQUINO in his
capacity as Pres. Commissioner, Commissioners VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY
and ANGELITA A. GACUTAN of the 2nd Division of the NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION-Quezon City, MULTILINE RESOURCES
CORPORATION Represented by its owner JOSE DELA PEÑA and LAURO B.
RAMOS, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J p:

This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to set aside and nullify
the Decision 1 dated August 27, 2004 and Resolution 2 dated March 9, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74536. The appellate court modified the
Resolution 3 dated July 30, 2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) finding petitioner Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Company,
Ltd. (Hanjin) guilty of illegal dismissal and awarding private respondent Lauro
B. Ramos a full year of salaries. EDISTc

The facts are as follows:2009jur

Private respondent Multiline Resources Corporation (Multiline) is a

recruitment agency engaged in the deployment of workers to Saudi Arabia.
Hanjin is the Saudi-based principal of Multiline which also holds office in the
Philippines.
 On October 29, 1992, Ramos applied with Multiline for overseas
employment as a barber. After passing the examination and interview conducted
by Multiline and submitting the necessary travel documents, he signed his
contract and job order. The contract specified that Ramos was to work as a
barber for twelve months for a monthly salary of US$265.

Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, Ramos proceeded to the office of Hanjin.

However, he was informed that the position he applied for had already been filled
up and there was no more vacancy. Ramos was thus forced to beg for food and
to share sleeping quarters with other Filipinos in Saudi Arabia. After five days,
he returned to the Philippines. ASIDTa

Ramos then filed a Complaint 4 with the Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration (POEA) against Hanjin and Multiline for illegal dismissal/illegal
termination of contract.

In a Decision 5 dated September 26, 1995, the POEA Administrator ruled:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents Multiline Resources

Corporation, Hanil Development Corporation and Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay complainant Lauro
Ramos, the amount of USDollars: THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY
(US$3,180.00) or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the prevailing rate of
exchange at the time of payment, representing his salaries for the period of one
(1) year, plus ten percent (10%) thereof, as and by way of attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED. 6

Subsequently, Multiline appealed to the NLRC. Finding no merit in

Multiline's petition, the same was denied in an Order dated March 28, 1996.

However, in an Order 7 dated August 28, 1996, the NLRC set aside the
Order of March 28, 1996, as follows: THEcAS

On second look, however, we note that the POEA Administrator rendered

his decision on the above-entitled case on September 26, 1995. Considering that
at said time, the said Administrator already lost jurisdiction over this case
(pursuant to Republic Act No. 8042) it therefore becomes imperative that the
said decision, which was brought to us on appeal by respondent Multiline
Resources Corporation, be set aside and forwarded to Labor Arbiter Teresita C.
Lora. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

 The case was re-assigned to another Labor Arbiter who issued an Order 8
on February 18, 1997 dismissing the case for failure of both parties to appear
on several scheduled meetings despite due notice.

Ramos filed a motion to re-open the case. Subsequently, on August 14,

1997, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order 9 dismissing the case without prejudice.
Ramos re-filed the case on August 18, 1997 and the same was given due course.
AEDHST

On February 9, 1999, 10 the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint of

Ramos after finding that his dismissal was legal.2009jur

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in a

Resolution dated July 30, 2002. The NLRC ruled:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Complainant's appeal is GRANTED.

The Labor Arbiter's decision in the above-entitled case is hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. A new one is entered declaring that Complainant was illegally
dismissed from his employment. Respondent Hanjin Engineering & Construction
Corp., formerly Hanil Development Corp., Ltd., is hereby ordered to pay
Complainant the following: US$795.00 at its peso equivalent at the time of
payment, representing his salaries for three (3) months; P25,000.00 as moral
damages; and attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of his total
monetary award. IcCEDA

SO ORDERED. 11

Ramos appealed the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that he is
entitled to a salary equivalent to the full unexpired portion of his employment
contract, which is one year. Hanjin and Multiline for their part, did not appeal.

In a Decision dated August 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals granted Ramos'
petition and modified the assailed NLRC resolution by awarding Ramos his
salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his contract. The dispositive portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed NLRC Resolutions

are MODIFIED in that petitioner is hereby awarded his full salaries for one year,
instead of three months only. HCaEAT

SO ORDERED. 12

Hence, this petition by Hanjin, on the following grounds:

 I.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY ENTERTAINING THE PETITION FILED BEFORE
IT BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE LATTER TO FURNISH
THE UNDERSIGNED COUNSEL A COPY OF THE PETITION.

II.

PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
PETITIONER LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL DESPITE ABSENCE OF
EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIVATE RESPONDENT
AND PETITIONER. cDCSET

III.

ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYER

RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND PETITIONER,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR AN EXCESS IN THE
EXERCISE THEREOF IN NOT FINDING THE DISMISSAL OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT VALID.

IV.

ASSUMING EX GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT THERE WAS ILLEGAL

DISMISSAL, THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN MODIFYING THE NLRC RESOLUTION
PROMULGATED ON JULY 30, 2002 BY AWARDING IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT FULL SALARIES FOR ONE YEAR, INSTEAD OF THREE MONTHS
ONLY. aESIHT

V.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
NOT REVERSING THE RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION PROMULGATED ON JULY 30, 2002 AWARDING
MORAL DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT SINCE THE
DISMISSAL IF THERE WAS ANY, WAS NOT ATTENDED BY BAD FAITH, FRAUD
OR EFFECTED IN A WANTON, OPPRESSIVE, OR MALEVOLENT MANNER. 13

In essence, the issues presented by the petition are: (1) Did the Court of
Appeals err in giving due course to the case despite failure of Ramos to furnish
the counsel of Hanjin a copy of the petition? (2) Was Ramos illegally dismissed?
(3) Is Ramos entitled to a one-year salary? (4) Is Ramos entitled to moral
damages? SCETHa

Before delving into the merits of the petition, we shall first deal with the
threshold procedural questions raised herein. Respondents aver that the petition
must be dismissed since Hanjin elevated the case via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, instead of under Rule 45.
15

Time and again, we said that the special civil action for certiorari is not
and cannot be made a substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal under Rule 45.
16 Here, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Hanjin failed to prove
that it had no appeal or any other efficacious remedy against the decision of the
Court of Appeals and the proper remedy of a party aggrieved is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As
provided in Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals
in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved,
may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review on certiorari, which would
be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other
hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent civil action based
on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed
of as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. 17 TSCIEa

Moreover, petitioner should have appealed the NLRC's adverse ruling of

illegal dismissal to the Court of Appeals. This, petitioner failed to do. The records
reveal that only private respondent Ramos appealed the NLRC's decision to the
Court of Appeals praying for the award of the full monetary value of the
unexpired portion of his employment contract, and not merely his three months
salary as provided under Republic Act No. 8042. 18 Thus, with regard to
petitioner, the factual findings of illegal dismissal by the NLRC had already
become final.2009jur

In Asuncion v. National Labor Relations Commission, 19 we ruled that

perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned
decision final and executory, thus depriving the appellate court jurisdiction to
alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal. 20 As we said,
although Hanjin had the opportunity to appeal its case, it did not. acADIT

Likewise, by availing of a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, the

petition merits an outright dismissal pursuant to Circular No. 2-90 21 which
provides that, "an appeal taken to either Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals
by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed." 22

Moreover, a perusal of the issues raised by petitioners, although alleging

grave abuse of discretion, are clearly for the correction of errors of judgment, not
errors of jurisdiction. 23 If indeed errors of facts and erroneous appreciation of
facts had been committed by the appellate court, still these would not amount
to grave abuse of discretion. Where the issue or question involved affects the
wisdom of the decision — not the jurisdiction of the court to render the decision
— the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. 24

Neither can we treat the instant petition as one having been filed under
Rule 45. We can only treat a petition wrongly filed under Rule 65 as one filed
under Rule 45 if petitioner had alleged grave abuse of discretion in its petition
under the following circumstances: (1) If the petition is filed within 15 days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from; or (2) If the
petition is meritorious. 25 The instant case, however, does not fall under either
of the two exceptions because Hanjin's petition was filed 60 days after notice of
the assailed judgment and in our considered view, the issues presented by the
petition lacks merit. cTaDHS

Conformably then, we are constrained to dismiss the instant petition for

utter lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated

August 27, 2004 and the Resolution dated March 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 74536 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura * and Brion, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 203605. April 23, 2014.]

P/C INSP. LAWRENCE B. CAJIPE, P/C INSP. JOEL L. MENDOZA, P/C

INSP. GERARDO B. BALATUCAN, PO3 JOLITO P. MAMANAO, JR., PO3
FERNANDO REY S. GAPUZ, PO2 EDUARDO G. BLANCO, PO2 EDWIN SANTOS
and PO1 JOSIL REY I. LUCENA, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J p:

As narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA), on July 28, 2009 Lilian I. de

Vera (Lilian) filed a complaint before the Department of Justice (DOJ) charging
with multiple murder the following Philippine National Police (PNP) officers
connected with the PNP Highway Patrol Group (HPG): petitioners P/C Insp.
Lawrence B. Cajipe, P/C Insp. Joel L. Mendoza, P/C Insp. Gerardo B. Balatucan,
PO3 Jolito P. Mamanao, Jr., PO3 Fernando Rey S. Gapuz, PO2 Eduardo G.
Blanco, PO2 Edwin Santos, and PO1 Josil Rey I. Lucena (collectively, petitioner
HPG officers). The other HPG members were P/C Supt. Perfecto Palad and P/C
Supt. Eleuterio Gutierrez, Jr. Another group of accused consisted of police
officers from the PNP Special Action Force (SAF). 1 HAICET

In her complaint Lilian alleged that joint elements of the SAF and the HPG
conspired in carrying out a plan to kill her husband, Alfonso "Jun" S. de Vera
(Jun) and their 7-year-old daughter, Lia Allana. Lilian said that at around 9:30
p.m. on December 5, 2008 she called Jun to tell him that she was on her way to
Pasay City to meet him and their daughter. She got to Pasay City but the two did
not show up. After an hour, Lilian called their house helper who assured her
that Jun and Lia had already left. Lilian tried calling Jun but she got no answer.
She again called their house helper, who informed her that there had been a
shootout in their subdivision. 2

Lilian decided to go home. When she arrived at the entrance of their

subdivision, the police had blocked the area and did not allow civilians to pass
through. She got a call from her house helper who told her that Jun and Lia had
been involved in the shootout. A certain Hilario Indiana approached Lilian and
advised her to go to the hospital where Lia had been rushed. When she got there,
she learned that Lia had died of gunshot wound on the head. Jun was found
dead near a passenger jeepney with a gunshot wound on his head. 3

Witnesses to the shootout said that Jun and Lia were riding in his Isuzu
Crosswind van when police officers wearing Regional SAF vests suddenly fired at
the van. Jun got out, went to the passenger side, and tried to carry Lia out to
safety as she had been wounded. The police officers went after Jun, however,
and shot him on the head.
 On December 28, 2009 the DOJ issued a resolution after preliminary
investigation finding probable cause to indict all the police officers involved in
the police action that led to the shooting of Jun and Lia for two counts of murder.
On March 15, 2010 the DOJ filed the information before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Parañaque City in Criminal Cases 10-0280 and 10-0281. On the
following day, March 16, petitioner HPG officers filed an omnibus motion for
judicial determination of probable cause with a prayer to hold in abeyance the
issuance of the warrants for their arrest. They also sought the annulment of the
DOJ resolution on the ground of violation of their constitutional rights. Further,
they asked that the information be quashed on the ground that the facts it
alleged did not constitute an offense. 4 DTAHEC

On June 16, 2010 the RTC dismissed the case against petitioner HPG
officers for lack of probable cause against them, given that the witnesses made
no mention of seeing anyone from the HPG group taking part in the shooting and
killing of Jun and his daughter. Instead, the RTC found that the evidence tends
to show that petitioner HPG officers were requested and acted merely as blocking
force in a legitimate police operation and Lilian had not refuted this. On the other
hand the RTC issued an arrest warrant for the accused SAF officers, having
found probable cause against them. Lilian moved for reconsideration of the
dismissal order covering petitioner HPG officers but the RTC denied the same on
September 24, 2010. 5

On January 21, 2011 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP 117756 alleging grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's part. 6 On June 15,
2012 the CA granted the petition. It ruled that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in failing to evaluate the sworn statements of the witnesses on whom
the DOJ relied on. The RTC based its finding of lack of probable cause primarily
on the absence of evidence directly linking the petitioner HPG officers to the
shooting of the victim and their physical presence at the crime scene. 7

In a special civil action filed before it, however, the CA pointed out that
Indiana and Ronald Castillo executed affidavits stating that petitioner HPG
officers joined the SAF officers in pursuing and shooting Jun while he was
bringing Lia to a safer place. The CA said that, with this evidence, it is for the
petitioner HPG officers to rebut such testimonies at the trial. 8 The CA thus
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioner HPG officers. 9
On October 5, 2012 the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of its decision
and the urgent motion to quash warrants of arrest and/or motion to suspend
the implementation of the warrants of arrest, 10 hence, this petition.
 The Issues Presented

The case presents the following issues:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in granting the OSG's petition for

certiorari under Rule 65, given that the RTC's order of dismissal is a final and
appealable order; acHITE

2. Whether or not the CA erred in counting the prescriptive period for

filing a Rule 65 petition from the time of receipt of the court order by the OSG
rather than by the city prosecutor's office; and

3. Whether or not the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on

the part of the RTC judge in holding that no probable cause exists against
petitioner HPG officers and in dismissing the criminal charge against them.

The Court's Rulings

The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.

The RTC judge was within his powers to dismiss the case against petitioner
HPG officers. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that the judge "may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause." The CA should have denied the People's
petition for special civil action of certiorari that assails the correctness of the
order of dismissal since Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that such action is
available only when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."

The fact, however, is that Section 1, Rule 122 of the same rules provides
that an appeal may be taken in a criminal action from a judgment or final order
like the RTC's order dismissing the case against petitioner HPG officers for lack
of probable cause. It is a final order since it disposes of the case, terminates the
proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing further to do with respect to the
case against petitioner HPG officers. The Court had made a similar
pronouncement in Santos v. Orda, Jr. 11 Of course, the People may refile the
case if new evidence adduced in another preliminary investigation will support
the filing of a new information against them. But that is another matter. For now,
the CA clearly erred in not denying the petition for being a wrong remedy.
ACEIac

Petitioner HPG officers point out that, assuming the propriety of the filing
of a special civil action of certiorari against the RTC's order of dismissal, the
People had sixty days from receipt of such order within which to file the action.
Here, the People filed its petition for certiorari 112 days from receipt of the
dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Parañaque, clearly beyond the 60-day
period allowed for such action.

The OSG contends, however, that the reckoning point should be from the
date the Department of Justice or the court gave it notice of the order of dismissal
since, as held in Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan, 12 the OSG alone has the
authority to represent the People before the CA. But such a proposition is unfair.
There is no reason for the RTC to serve copy of its judgments or final orders upon
the OSG since it does not enter its appearance in criminal cases before it.

In case of permissible appeals from a final order in a criminal action, the

public prosecutor who appears as counsel for the People in such an action and
on whom a copy of the final order is thus served, may file a notice of appeal
within the appropriate time since it is a notice addressed to the RTC and not to
the CA. Only the Office of the Solicitor General, however, may pursue the appeal
before the CA by filing the required appellant's brief or withdraw the same.

In special civil actions such as that taken by the OSG before the CA, the
public prosecutor's duty, if he believes that a matter should be brought by special
civil action before an appellate court, is to promptly communicate the facts and
his recommendation to the OSG, advising it of the last day for filing such an
action. There is no reason the OSG cannot file the petition since the People is
given sixty days from notice to the public prosecutor within which to file such
an action before the CA or this Court.

Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of
the People 112 days from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of
Parañaque, the petition was filed out of time. The order of dismissal is thus
beyond appellate review. TcDHSI

Although a purely academic exercise in view of its above rulings, the Court
has taken a look into the merit of the RTC's order of dismissal since it clashes
with the findings of the DOJ investigating prosecutors.

The OSG relies on the affidavits of Indiana and Ronald V. Castillo (Castillo)
in claiming that probable cause exists against petitioner HPG officers.

In the sworn statement he made before the police on December 9, 2008

Indiana said: ". . . . Tapos narinig ko ang sigaw 'Bro ang driver tumakas andyan
sa jeep, duon nilapitan ng isang naka-Vest na meron pangalan sa likod RSAF at
nakabunet at pinutukan ang driver sa ulo. Tapos nagsalita ang nagsabing RSAF
'Bro may bata pala.' Kinuha ng RSAF ang bata at dinala sa kanilang sasakyan
na kulay puti ng sasakyan. . . . ." 13

On the other hand, witness Castillo said in his sworn statement: ". . . .
May dumaang sasakyang papuntang gate ng UPS IV, mayroong sumigaw na mga
pulis 'PLATIN NYO, PLATIN NYO.' Biglang hinabol ng dalawang pulis ang
nasabing sasakyan at pinagbabaril. May ilang sandali ay bumalik ang dalawang
pulis at sinabi nila ng 'NAPATAY NA NAMIN ANG DRIVER NG GATE AWAY CAR,
ANDOON SA TABI NG JEEP'." 14

It is clear from Indiana's testimony that the man he saw shoot Jun was an
RSAF officer, identified by his assault vest and accompanied by another RSAF
officer who also wore such a vest. Castillo did not see the act of shooting but
confirmed that two police officers gave chase and took shots at the fleeing vehicle
then turned back to announce to their companions that they had killed the driver
of the get-away car.

The HPG men belonged to another unit and there is no claim that they
wore another unit's vest. More telling is the crime laboratory report which
revealed that none of the HPG operatives discharged their firearms during the
shootout. 15 It did not also help the prosecution's case that, per Indiana's
testimony, the SAF police officers involved in the shootout carried long firearms,
specifically M16 rifle, M16 baby armalite, and M14. 16 But the National Police
Commission issued two certifications dated January 14 and 19, 2010 to the
effect that the petitioner HPG officers had not been issued long firearms from
2007 up to 2010. 17 CHDaAE

Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as

such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial. 18 The prosecution evidence fails to establish probable cause
against petitioner HPG officers.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the Court of Appeals Decision dated

June 15, 2012 and Resolution dated October 5, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP 117756 and
AFFIRMS the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City in Criminal
Cases 10-0280 and 10-0281 that dismissed the case against petitioners. The
Court ORDERS the DISMISSAL of the charge against the petitioners P/C Insp.
Lawrence B. Cajipe, P/C Insp. Joel L. Mendoza, P/C Insp. Gerardo B. Balatucan,
PO3 Jolito P. Mamanao, Jr., PO3 Fernando Rey S. Gapuz, PO2 Eduardo G.
Blanco, PO2 Edwin Santos, and PO1 Josil Rey I. Lucena. The Court further
ORDERS the withdrawal of the warrants for their arrest.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 135715. April 13, 2011.]

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST

LOANS, represented by MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, PCGG CHAIRMAN AND
ORLANDO C. SALVADOR AS CONSULTANT OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING
GROUP OF THE AD-HOC COMMITTEE, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE ANIANO
A. DESIERTO AS OMBUDSMAN, PANFILO O. DOMINGO, CONRADO S. REYES,
ENRIQUE M. HERBOZA, MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, ABDULLAH DIMAPORO
AND AMER DIANALAN, respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J p:

This petition for review on certiorari 1 is one among the 17 cases filed
before us by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans,
charging public respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto (Ombudsman) for
grave abuse of discretion, when, on the ground of prescription and insufficiency
of evidence, he dismissed all of these cases then pending before him, including
this case in OMB-0-97-1718.

The Facts

Respondents Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, Abdullah Dimaporo, and Amer

Dianalan, were stockholders and officers of the Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills
(MINCOCO), a domestic corporation established in 1974, 2 while respondents
Panfilo O. Domingo, Conrado S. Reyes, Enrique M. Herboza, and Ricardo Sunga,
were then officers of the National Investment and Development Corporation
(NIDC).

On 10 May 1976, MINCOCO applied for a Guarantee Loan Accommodation

with the NIDC for the amount of approximately P30,400,000.00, which the
NIDC's Board of Directors approved on 23 June 1976.

The guarantee loan was, however, both undercapitalized and under-

collateralized because MINCOCO's paid capital then was only P7,000,000.00 and
its assets worth is P7,000,000.00.
 This notwithstanding, MINCOCO further obtained additional Guarantee
Loan Accommodations from NIDC in the amount of P13,647,600.00 and
P7,000,000.00, 3 respectively.

When MINCOCO's mortgage liens were about to be foreclosed by the

government banks due its outstanding obligations, Eduardo Cojuangco issued a
memorandum dated 18 July 1983, bearing the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos' (President Marcos) marginal note, disallowing the foreclosure of
MINCOCO's properties. 4 The government banks were not able to recover any
amount from MINCOCO and President Marcos' marginal note was construed by
the NIDC to have effectively released MINCOCO, including its owners, from all of
its financial liabilities. 5

The above mentioned transactions, were, however, discovered only in 1992

after then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos), in an effort to recover the
ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his family, and cronies, issued
Administrative Order No. 13 6 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans (the Committee), with the Chairman of the
Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as the Committee's head.
The Committee was directed, inter alia, to inventory all behest loans, and identify
the lenders and borrowers, including the principal officers and stockholders of
the borrowing firms, as well as the persons responsible for the granting of loans
or who influenced the grant thereof. 7 Subsequently, then President Ramos
issued Memorandum Order No. 61 8 outlining the criteria which may be utilized
as a frame of reference in determining a behest loan, viz.:

a. It is under-collateralized;

b. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;

c. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like

presence of marginal note;

d. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are

identified as cronies;

e. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;

f. Use of corporate layering;

g. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought;

h. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.

 The Committee found that twenty-one (21) corporations, including
MINCOCO, obtained behest loans. It claimed that the fact that MINCOCO was
under-collateralized and undercapitalized; that its officers were identified as
cronies; that the late President Marcos had marginal note, effectively waiving the
government's right to foreclose MINCOCO's mortgage liens; and, that the
Guarantee Loan Accommodation were approved in an extraordinary speed of one
month, bore badges of behest loans.

Subsequently, the Committee filed with the Ombudsman a sworn

complaint against MINCOCO's Officers and NIDC's Board of Directors for
violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, 9 as amended.

By Resolution dated 9 July 1998, the Ombudsman motu prorio dismissed

the complaint on the grounds that, first, there was insufficient evidence to
warrant the indictment of the persons charged; and, second, the alleged offenses
had prescribed. 10 The Ombudsman explained:

Being undercapitalized, standing alone is meaningless. The approval of the

loans/guarantees was still based on sound lending practice, otherwise,
MINCOCO would have been disqualified from obtaining the same. If MINCOCO's
equity was more than the amount of the loans, there was no need for it to obtain
the latter.

Anent the claim that Mohammad Ali Dimaporo was a crony of the late
President Marcos, no evidence was adduced to prove the same, hence, remains
a bare allegation. . . . .

On the issue that the notation by President Marcos in the Memorandum

of July 18, 1983 is a behest order, suffice it to state that these marginal notes,
if they meant endorsement as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61,
endorsed the recommendation regarding the mortgage liens of the government
banks of the Mothballed Coconut Oil Mills and not the approval/grant of the
loans/guarantees in 1976. It is in effect approved the release of the liabilities of
the former owners of coconut oil mills, one of which was MINCOCO, but not the
acquisition of the said loans/guarantees.

The take over of MINCOCO by UNICOM without the consent of NIDC is not
a characteristic of a behest loan. It is a mere violation of procedures that does
not warrant a criminal action.

xxx xxx xxx

 For the perpetration of the acts being complained of, the respondents are
charged of violations of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019. The instant
case however will no longer prosper for the offenses have already prescribed.

Be it remembered that MINCOCO applied for and was granted

loans/guarantees way back in 1976. Thus, these acts are governed by the law
in force at the time of their commission, which is the old R.A. No. 3019 before its
amendment by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 in March 1982. Offenses perpetrated
prior to the enactment of this latter law prescribed ten (10) years later. And since
the case was filed against the herein respondents only in September 1997, the
offenses have long prescribed in 1986.

Prescription commenced to run in 1976 when the assailed transaction

happened. . . . . 11

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. 12

The petitioner argued that the right of the State to recover behest loans as
ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible under Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution; 13 and, assuming that the period to file criminal charges herefore
is subject to prescription, the prescriptive period should be counted from the
time of discovery of behest loans or sometime in 1992 when the Committee was
constituted. 14

The Ombudsman, in his Comment, countered that his office has the
discretionary power during preliminary investigation to determine the sufficiency
of evidence for indictment; 15 that it is beyond the ambit of the Court to review
this exercise of discretion; 16 that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
applies only to civil suits and not to criminal proceedings; 17 and, that the crime
under which the respondents herein were charged had already prescribed. 18

Private respondents Panfilo O. Domingo and Enrique M. Herboza, filed

their respective Comments mainly reiterating the Ombudsman's contentions.
The other respondents did not file their Comments, and, thus, considered to
have waived their chance thereto.

The Court's Ruling

The remedy from an adverse resolution of the Ombudsman is a petition

for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; what was filed with the Court,
however, was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Nevertheless, the
Court will treat this petition as one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its
contents shows that the Committee imputes grave abuse of discretion to the
Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint. 19 This was how we also treated the
previous cases marred by the same procedural lapse, the latest of which is the
2009 Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
(G.R. No. 135703). 20

At the core of the controversy is the Ombudsman's Resolution holding that

prescription had already set-in effectively barring the institution of charges
against the private respondents. The Ombudsman claimed that the alleged
behest loans, transpired in 1976, 21 and, thus, the complaint filed after more
than two decades from the commission thereof or on 8 October 1997, was well
beyond the 10-year prescriptive period provided for under the old Republic Act
No. 3019. 22

In resolving the issue of prescription, the following shall be considered: (1)

the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription started to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was
interrupted. 23

At the outset, the provision found in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution that "the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired
by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees,
shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppels," has already been settled
in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R.
No. 130140), 24 where the Court held that the above cited constitutional
provision "applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not
to criminal cases." 25

The period of prescription for

the crime charged in this

petition, committed in 1976

and prior to the amendment of

Republic Act No. 3019, is ten

(10) years.

Section 11 26 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa

Blg. 195, provides that the offenses committed under Republic Act No. 3019 shall
prescribe in fifteen (15) years; prior to this amendment, however, under the old
Republic Act No. 3019, this prescriptive period was only ten (10) years. In People
v. Pacificador, 27 the Court held that the longer prescriptive period of 15-years
does not apply in crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195, which was approved on 16 March 1982, because, not being favorable
to the accused, it cannot be given retroactive effect. Considering that the alleged
crime was committed in 1976, and in line with the Court's ruling in Pacificador,
the prescription period should be ten (10) years.

Prescription of crime shall

begin to run from the day of its

commission, and if the same

be not known at the time, from

the discovery thereof and the

institution of judicial

proceedings for its

investigation and punishment.

While we sustain the Ombudsman's contention that the prescriptive

period for the crime charged herein is 10 years and not 15 years, we are not
persuaded that in this specific case, the prescriptive period began to run in 1976,
when the loans were transacted.

The time as to when the prescriptive period starts to run for crimes
committed under Republic Act No. 3019, a special law, is covered by Act No.
3326, 28 Section 2 of which provides that:

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted

against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.

Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the
crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no
knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does
not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. 29 An exception to this rule
is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the
fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words,
the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff
does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause
of action." 30 It was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on the
running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque 31 which became the
cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), 32 and the subsequent cases 33
which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of
prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, 34 that if the violation of
the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription
begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful
nature of the constitutive act or acts.

Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime
which is the subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992
after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. 35 When the complaint
was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not
yet set in. The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, 36 that "it was well-high
impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes
committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance
and conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the
loans." 37 In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), 38 the Court
held that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the
legality of these transactions.

While the Ombudsman has the

full discretion to determine

whether a criminal case is to

be filed, the Court is not

precluded from reviewing the

Ombudsman's action when

there is a grave abuse of

 discretion.

True, the Ombudsman is a constitutionally created body with

constitutionally mandated independence. Despite this, however, the
Ombudsman comes within the purview of the Court's power of judicial review 39
— a peculiar concept of Philippine Ombudsman, embodied in Article VIII, Section
1 of the 1987 Constitution 40 — which serves as a safety net against its
capricious and arbitrary acts. 41 Thus, in Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, 42 the
Court held that "while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case is to be filed, the Court is not precluded from
reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is grave abuse of discretion." 43
This is because, "while the Ombudsman enjoys, as it must, complete
independence, it cannot and must not lose track of the law, which it is bound to
uphold and obey." 44

After reviewing the case's records, the Court finds that the present petition
calls for the exercise of its power of judicial review.

Private respondents are charged with violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of
Republic Act No. 3019 which states:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

xxx xxx xxx

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or

transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not
the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

From the 1999 landmark case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding

Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130140), 45 to the 2008
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Tabasondra
(G.R. No. 133756), 46 and to the 2009 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 135703), 47 the same issues
confronted the Court as the one presented in the present petition, in that the
Ombudsman similarly dismissed these cases not only on the ground of
prescription but also for insufficiency of evidence. 48

Interestingly, the facts in Tabasondra 49 are squarely on all fours as the

present case. Tabasondra, 50 involved Coco-Complex Philippines, Inc., (CCPI), a
domestic corporation primarily incorporated for the manufacture of coconut oil.
51 CCPI applied for Guarantee Loan Accommodation thru the National
Investment Development Corporation amounting to P9,277,080.00, allegedly for
the purchase of an oil mill to be supplied by Krupp Germany. The NIDC Board
approved the loan in 1969, 52 notwithstanding the fact that CCPI was
undercapitalized with only P2,111,000.00 paid-up capital, 53 and under-
collateralized with only P495,300.00 assets. 54 Thus, with the NIDC's Guarantee
Loan Accommodation, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted the loan. Still,
with NIDC's guarantee, CCPI obtained additional loans from PNB in 1972, which,
as of 1992, ballooned to P205,889,545.76.

When the Committee filed criminal complaints against the CCPI's Officers
and PNB's Board of Directors for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act
No. 3019, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription. For this, the Committee charged the Ombudsman for grave abuse
of discretion, but pending its resolution before us, the Ombudsman, taking cue
from the Court's 1999 ruling in G.R. No. 130140, 55 motu proprio reinvestigated
the complaint it earlier dismissed (and was still pending before us), only to
dismiss it anew, in a Resolution dated 16 October 2000, opining that NIDC's
Board of Directors, who approved the loans in favor of CCPI, should have been
the ones indicted. 56 Subsequently, the Court dismissed Tabasondra for being
moot and academic.

Similarly, in the present petition, MINCOCO was also granted by NIDC a

Guarantee Loan Accommodation amounting initially to P30.4 million pesos,
despite its being undercapitalized and under-collateralized. 57

As the Ombudsman admitted, when MINCOCO's mortgage liens were

about to be foreclosed by the government banks, the late President Marcos
intervened and through a marginal note, in connivance with the NIDC's officers,
waived the liabilities of its owners to the detriment of the government. 58 It
behooves the Court that while the Ombudsman admitted this fact, it saw nothing
wrong in President Marcos' intervention, and the involvement therein of the
NIDC's officers. This intervention alone, by no less than the highest official of the
land, waiving a multi-million peso liability of a private corporation, should have
alarmed the Ombudsman.

It surprises us that while the Ombudsman dismissed Tabasondra for not

impleading therein the NIDC's Board of Directors, now that they (NIDC's Board
of Directors) have been impleaded, the Ombudsman still dismissed the
complaint, allegedly for insufficiency of evidence. 59

Applying mutatis mutandis G.R. No. 133756 60 in this petition, it is

apparent that there can be liability for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic
Act No. 3019.

Violation of Section 3 (e) 61 of Republic Act No. 3019 requires that there
be injury caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences to
private parties who conspire with public officers. In contrast, Section 3 (g) 62
does not require the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences
to private parties, its core element being the engagement in a transaction or
contract that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

The waiver of MINCOCO's multi-peso loan should have been enough basis
in finding that probably Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was violated and
the fact that NIDC extended a loan guarantee to MINCOCO, despite its being
undercapitalized and under-collateralized, should have also been enough ground
in finding probable cause for violation of Section 3 (g) of the above-cited law.

More importantly, the finding of the Committee that MINCOCO obtained

behest loans because of the following circumstances: MINCOCO was under-
collateralized and undercapitalized; its officers were identified as cronies;
President Marcos had marginal note, effectively waiving the government's right
to foreclose MINCOCO's mortgage liens; and, NIDC approved MINCOCO's
Guarantee Loan Accommodation in an extraordinary speed of one month, should
have been accorded a proper modicum of respect by the Ombudsman.

Considering the membership of the Committee — representatives from the

Department of Finance, The Philippine National Bank, the Asset Privatization
Trust, the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation and even
the Development Bank of the Philippines — its recommendation should be given
great weight. No doubt, the members of the Committee are experts in the field of
banking. On account of their special knowledge and expertise, they are in a
better position to determine whether standard banking practices are followed in
the approval of the loan/guarantee or what would generally constitute as
adequate security for a given loan. 63

The duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a preliminary investigation

is to establish whether there exists probable cause to file information in court
against the accused. 64 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not, the accused committed the crime.
65 Considering the quantum of evidence needed to support a finding of probable
cause, the Court holds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion when
it dismissed the complaint against herein respondents.

Preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the parties' evidence. 66 It is for the presentation of such evidence only
as may engender a well founded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 67 The validity and merits of a party's
accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
better ventilated during the trial proper. 68

In conclusion, the offenses ascribed to respondents "involve behest loans

which bled white the economy of the country, one of the excesses of the
authoritarian regime that led to the EDSA revolution, a serious evil that the 1987
Constitution aimed to extirpate." 69 It involves nothing less than the interest of
the people whose transgressed rights are supposed to be vindicated by their
protector — the Ombudsman. 70 As protector of the people, the Ombudsman
should be pro-active in making use of its vast arsenal of powers to "bring the
lamp of scrutiny to otherwise dark places even over the resistance of those who
would draw the blinds." 71

The criminal liability of Conrado S. Reyes is hereby extinguished in

accordance with Article 89 (1) 72 of the Revised Penal Code as confirmed by his
death certificate. 73 With respect to respondents Panfilo O. Domingo and
Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, the facts of their deaths have to be confirmed to
determine the application to them of the same provision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby

ORDERED to:

1. DISMISS the complaint against deceased respondent Conrado S.

Reyes;

2. REQUIRE the counsels of respondents Panfilo O. Domingo and

Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to submit proof of their deaths; and
 3. FILE with the Sandiganbayan the necessary Information against
respondents Abdullah Dimaporo, Amer Dianalan, Enrique M. Herboza, and
Ricardo Sunga.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta * and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Per Raffle dated 12 April 2011, Associate Justice Diosdado M.

Peralta is designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr. inhibition.

1. Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, but treated by the Court
as a Petition f