G.R. No.
81006 May 12, 1989 Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the present charter, Section 14 has been in force
VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
WINAI PERMSKUL and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
An important constitutional question has been injected in this case which started out as an ordinary complaint for a
sum of money. The question squarely presented to the Court is the validity of the memorandum decision authorized
under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 in the light of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the private respondent for a period of one year
for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private respondent deposited with
the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased premises except
when caused by reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the property. He
thereafter requested the refund of his deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional
ten days of his occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the lessee
still owed him for other charges, including the electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of
the leased premises to restore them to their original condition. 1
The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. After the submission of position papers by the
parties, a summary judgment was rendered on October 11, 1985, sustaining the complainant and holding that the
repainting was not chargeable to him. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P7,750.00,
representing the balance of the deposit after deducting the water and electricity charges. The plaintiff was also
awarded the sum of P1,250.00 as attorney's fees, plus the Costs.2
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on
January 14, 1987. This was done in a memorandum decision reading in full as follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court
hereby adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no
cogent reason to disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.3
When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for review was denied on September 29, 1987, as so
too was his motion for reconsideration, on December 1, 1987. 4 He is now before us to fault the respondent court,
principally for sustaining the memorandum decision of the regional trial court. His contention is that it violates Article
VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
This provision reads as follows:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
since the Constitution of 1935. The provision was recast in affirmative terms in the 1973 Constitution but has been
virtually restored to its original form in the Constitution of 1987, to apply to all courts, including the municipal
courts. The purpose has always been the same, viz., to inform the person reading the decision, and especially the
parties, of how it was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the
applicable laws.
The parties are entitled to no less than this explanation if only to assure them that the court rendering the decision
actually studied the case before pronouncing its judgment. But there are more substantial reasons. For one thing,
the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate what he
may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For another, the decision, if well-presented and reasoned,
may convince the losing party of its merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging
the litigation with a useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the facts and the law on
which they are based, especially those coming from the Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law
that can serve as useful references and even as precedents in the resolution of future controversies. As the Court
said in Rosales v. Court of First Instance. 5
Precedents are helpful in deciding cases when they are on all fours or at least substantially
Identical with previous litigations. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. Earlier decisions are
guideposts that can lead us in the right direction as we tread the highways and byways of the
law in the search for truth and justice. These pronouncements represent the wisdom of the past.
They are the voice of vanished judges talking to the future. Except where there is a need to
reverse them because of an emergent viewpoint or an altered situation, they urge us strongly
that, indeed, the trodden path is best.
According to the petitioner, the memorandum decision rendered by the regional trial court should be revoked for
non-compliance with the above-quoted constitutional mandate. He asks that the case be remanded to the regional
trial court for a full blown hearing on the merits, to be followed by a decision stating therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based. For his part, the private respondent demurs. He justifies the memorandum
decision as authorized by B.P. Blg. 129 and invokes the ruling of this Court in Romero v. Court of Appeals, 6 Which
sustained the said law.
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as follows:
Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. — Every decision or final resolution of a court in
appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on
which it is based which may be contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by
reference from those set forth in the decision, order or resolution appealed from.
The above section was applied in the Romero case, together with a similar rule embodied in Section 18 of P.D. No.
946, providing that:
All cases of the Court of Agrarian Relations now pending before the Court of Appeals shall
remain in the Division to which they have been assigned, and shall be decided within sixty (60)
days from the effectivity of this Decree; Provided, however, That if the decision or order be an
affirmance in toto of the dispositive conclusion of the judgment appealed from, then the Court of
Appeals may, instead of rendering an extended opinion, indicate clearly the trial court's findings
of fact and pronouncements of law which have been adopted as basis for the affirmance.
In the said case, Justice Jose Y. Feria, speaking for a unanimous Court, declared:
As previously stated, the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations consisted of thirteen pages,
single space. The above-quoted decision of the respondent Court of Appeals consists of four
pages, three of which contains verbatim the dispositive portion of the decision appealed from.
The remaining page is devoted to an explanation of why "for judicial convenience and
expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt, by way of reference, the findings of facts and
conclusions of the court a quo spread in its decision, as integral part of this Our decision." The
 said decision may be considered as substantial compliance with the above-quoted provisions in
Section 18 of P.D. No. 946 and Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129.
Nevertheless, he was quick to add a tenable misgiving and to express the following reservation:
The authority given the appellate court to adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law from those set forth in the appealed decisions should be exercised with
caution and prudence, because the tendency would be to follow the line of least resistance by
just adopting the findings and conclusions of the lower court without thoroughly studying the
appealed case.
This caveat was necessary because, as he correctly observed:
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that just as important as the intrinsic validity of a decision
is the perception by the parties-litigants that they have been accorded a fair opportunity to be
heard by a fair and responsible magistrate before judgment is rendered. It is this perception,
coupled with a clear conscience, which enables the members of the judiciary to discharge the
awesome responsibility of sitting in judgment on their fellowmen.
There is no question that the purpose of the law in authorizing the memorandum decision is to expedite the
termination of litigations for the benefit of the parties as well as the courts themselves.
Concerned with the mounting problem of delay in the administration of justice, the Constitution now contains a
number of provisions aimed at correcting this serious difficulty that has caused much disaffection among the people.
Thus, Section 16 of the Bill of Rights reiterates the original provision in the 1973 Constitution guaranteeing to all
persons "the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies."
Section 14(2) of the same Article III retains the rule that the accused shall be entitled to a trial that shall not only be
public and impartial but also speedy. In Article VIII, Section 5(3), the Supreme Court is expressly permitted to
temporarily assign a judge from one station to another when the public interest so requires, as when there is a
necessity for less occupied judge to help a busier colleague dispose of his cases. In paragraph 5 of the same section,
it is stressed that the rules of court to be promulgated by the Supreme Court "shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." In Section 15, of the same article, maximum periods are
prescribed for the decision or resolution of cases, to wit, twenty-four months in the case of Supreme Court and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other
lower courts.
The courts of justice are really hard put at coping with the tremendous number of cases in their dockets which, to
make matters worse, continues to grow by the day despite the efforts being taken to reduce it. In the Supreme
Court alone, an average of 400 cases is received every month as against the average of 300 cases disposed of
during the same month, leaving a difference of 100 cases monthly that is added to some 5,000 still unresolved cases
that have accumulated during the last two decades or so. At this rate, the backlog will increase by 1,200 cases every
year on top of the earlier balance, much of which, despite its age, is still viable and have still to be resolved.
Considering that the Court spends four days of the week for studying and deliberating on these cases in its en
banc and division sessions, one can appreciate the limited time allowed its members for the actual writing of its
decisions. (This particular decision, while extended, happens fortunately to be less complicated than many of the
other cases submitted to it, which require more time to write, not to mention the antecedent research that may
have to be made.)
Viewed in the light of these practical considerations, the memorandum decision can be welcomed indeed as an
acceptable method of dealing expeditiously with the case load of the courts of justice, But expediency alone, no
matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the Constitution; or to put it more familiarly, the end
does not justify the means. It is plain that if Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 is unconstitutional, it must be struck down.
In the case at bar, we find that a judgment was made by the metropolitan trial court in compliance with the rule on
summary procedure. The decision consisted of three typewritten pages, single space, and stated clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it was based. It was a concise and well-written decision, and a correct one
to boot, for which Judge Paciano B. Balita is to be commended.
The problem, though, as the petitioner sees it, is that in affirming this judgment, the regional trial court of Makati
rendered a mere memorandum decision that simply adopted by reference the findings of fact and law made by
Judge Balita and then concluded, without saying more, that "there was no cogent reason to disturb the same." It is
claimed that as Judge de la Rama did not make his own statement of the facts and the law as required by the
Constitution, his memorandum decision was a total nullity. Worse, when the appeal was taken to the respondent
court, what it reviewed was not the memorandum decision of the regional trial court but the decision rendered by
the metropolitan trial court which, legally speaking, was not before the appellate court.
It is not really correct to say that the Court of Appeals did not review the memorandum decision of the regional trial
court which was the subject of the petition for review. A reading of its own decision will show that it dealt
extensively with the memorandum decision and discussed it at some length in the light of the observations — and
reservations — of this Court in the Romero case. Moreover, in reviewing the decision of the metropolitan trial court,
the Court of Appeals was actually reviewing the decision of the regional trial court, which had incorporated by
reference the earlier decision rendered by Judge Balita.
The question, of course, is whether such incorporation by reference was a valid act that effectively elevated the
decision of the metropolitan trial court for examination by the Court of Appeals.
To be fair, let it be said that when Judge dela Rama availed himself of the convenience offered by Section 40 of B.P.
Blg. 129, he was only acting in accordance with the ruling announced in Romero permitting the use of the
memorandum decision. It must also be observed that even if the respondent court appeared to be partial to the
reservation rather than the rule in the said case, it nevertheless had the duty — which it discharged — to abide by
the doctrine announced therein by the highest tribunal of the land. The respondent court could not have acted
otherwise.
This Court is not hampered by such inhibitions. As we may re-examine our own rulings and modify or reverse them
whenever warranted, we take a second look at the memorandum decision and the Romero case and test them on
the touchstone of the Constitution.
The law does not define the memorandum decision and simply suggests that the court may adopt by reference the
findings of fact and the conclusions of law stated in the decision, order or resolution on appeal before it. No
particular form is prescribed; the conditions for its use are not indicated. In fact, B.P. Blg. 129 does not even employ
the term "memorandum decision" in Section 40 or elsewhere in the rest of the statute. This phrase appears to have
been introduced in this jurisdiction not by that law but by Section 24 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, reading as
follows:
Sec. 24. Memorandum decisions. — -The judgment or final resolution of a court in appealed
cases may adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the
decision or final order appealed from.
It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually reproduces the findings of fact or the conclusions of
law of the court below, it is not a memorandum decision as envisioned in the above provision. The distinctive
features of the memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, and second, it incorporates by
reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order or ruling under review. Most
likely, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the approval of the findings of fact by
the lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court. At any rate, the reason for allowing the
incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or
portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. The Idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter
decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are being approved or adopted anyway.
Parenthetically, the memorandum decision is also allowed in the United States, but its form (at least) differs from
the one under consideration in this case. Such a decision is rendered in that country upon a previous' determination
by the judge that there is no need for a published opinion and that it will have no precedential effect. The judgment
is usually limited to the dispositive portion but a memorandum is attached containing a brief statement of the facts
and the law involved, mainly for the information of the parties to the case.
When a law is questioned before the Court, we employ the presumption in favor of its constitutionality. As we said
inPeralta v. Commission of Elections, "to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication." 7 Courts will bend over backward to
sustain that presumption. In case of doubt, it is the duty of the judiciary to exert every effort to prevent the
invalidation of the law and the nullification of the will of the legislature that enacted it and the executive that
approved it. This norm is based on a becoming respect that the judiciary is expected to accord the political
departments of the government which, it must be assumed in fairness, thoroughly studied the measure under
challenge and assured themselves of its constitutionality before agreeing to enact it.
The Court has deliberated extensively on the challenge posed against the memorandum decision as now authorized
by law. Taking into account the salutary purpose for which it is allowed, and bearing in mind the above-discussed
restraint we must observe when a law is challenged before us, we have come to the conclusion that Section 40 of
B.P. Blg. 129, as we shall interpret it here, is not unconstitutional.
What is questioned about the law is the permission it gives for the appellate court to merely adopt by reference in its
own decision the judgment of the lower court on appeal. It is easy to understand that this device may feed the
suspicion feared by Justice Feria that the court has not given the appeal the attention it deserved and thus deprived
the parties of due process. True or not, this impression is likely to undermine popular faith in the judiciary as an
impartial forum which hears before it decides and bases its decision on the established facts and the applicable law.
judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved.
The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the
appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.
Despite the convenience afforded by the memorandum decision, it is still desirable that the appellate judge exert
some effort in restating in his own words the findings of fact of the lower court and presenting his own interpretation
of the law instead of merely parroting the language of the court a quo as if he cannot do any better. There must be
less intellectual indolence and more pride of authorship in the writing of a decision, especially if it comes from an
appellate court.
It ill becomes an appellate judge to write his rulings with a pair of scissors and a pot of paste as if he were a mere
researcher. He is an innovator, not an echo. The case usually becomes progressively simpler as it passes through
the various levels of appeal and many issues become unimportant or moot and drop along the way. The appellate
judge should prune the cluttered record to make the issues clearer. He cannot usually do this by simply mimicking
the lower court. He must use his own perceptiveness in unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in discovering
the law. No less importantly, he must use his own language in laying down his judgment. And in doing so, he should
also guard against torpidity lest his pronouncements excite no more fascination than a technical tract on the values
of horse manure as a fertilizer. A little style will help liven the opinion trapped in the tortuous lexicon of the law with
all its whereases and wherefores. A judicial decision does not have to be a bore.

No less objectionable is the inconvenience involved in having to search for the decision referred to, which, having
been incorporated by reference only, does not have to be attached to the memorandum decision. The Court had
occasion earlier to complain about this difficulty in the case of Gindoy v. Tapucar, 8 where we said:
. . . True it is that the Court of First Instance may adopt in toto either expressly or impliedly the
findings and conclusions of the inferior court, and as a rule, such adoption would amount to a
substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate discussed herein, but where, as in this
case, the specific arguments presented against the decision of the inferior court are of such
nature that a blanket affirmance of said decision does not in fact adequately dispose of the
strictures against it, it is but proper, if only to facilitate the action to be taken by the appellate
court on the petition for review, that the concrete bases of the impugned decision should appear
on its face, instead of the appellate court having to dig into the records to find out how the
inferior court resolved the issues of the case.
As to this problem, the Solicitor General correctly points out that it does not exist in the case at bar because the
decision of the Court of Appeals extensively quoted from the decision of the metropolitan trial court. Although only
incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of the regional trial court, Judge Balita's decision was
nevertheless available to the Court of Appeals. It is this circumstance, or even happenstance, if you will, that has
validated the memorandum decision challenged in this case and spared it from constitutional infirmity.
The interpretation we make today will not apply retroactively to the memorandum decision rendered by the regional
trial court in the case at bar, or to the decision of the respondent court such decision on the strength of Romero v.
Court of Appeals. As earlier observed, there was substancial compliance with Section 40 because of the direct
availability and actual review of the decision of Judge Balita incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision
of Judge de la Rama. The memorandum decision as then understood under the Romero decision was a valid act at
the time it was rendered by Judge de la Rama and produced binding legal effect. We also affirm the finding of the
respondent court that the summary judgment without a formal trial was in accord with the Rule on Summary
Procedure and that the award of attorney's fees is not improper.
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both as to the form
prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of
Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. This decision is immediately executory. It is
so ordered.

That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the following requirement, as a condition for the
proper application of Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129. The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the
findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the
challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the
incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision
authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of
the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court
and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it was
based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been
undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with
Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.

The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an
addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be
resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the
G.R. No. 101041 November 13, 1991
HON. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE BERNARDO LL. SALAS and GEORGE CARLOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 101296 November 13, 1991
HON. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO T. GUERRERO and HON. PEARY G. ALEONAR, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 21, Region VII,
Cebu City, respondents.
Ramon Ve Salazar for petitioner.
Antonio T. Guerrero for private respondent.
Henry R. Savellon for respondent.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
In 1977, Civil Case No. B-398 (Gloria Naval vs. George Carlos) for recovery of ownership of a parcel of coconut land
was filed and subsequently raffled to the sala of the petitioner, Judge Adriano Villamor. While the civil case was
pending there, respondent Carlos filed Criminal Cases Nos. N-989, N-990, N-991, N-992 and N-993 for qualified
theft against Gloria Naval and her helpers. The criminal cases were also assigned to the sala of Judge Villamor.
Due to the pendency of Civil Case No. B-398, the criminal cases were temporarily archived.
After trial in Civil Case No. B-398, a decision was rendered in favor of Naval who was declared the lawful owner and
possessor of the disputed land. Carlos was ordered to vacate the land.
Thereafter, respondent Carlos, through counsel, moved to activate the archived criminal cases. Having declared
Naval the lawful owner and possessor of the contested land in Civil Case No. B-398, Judge Villamor dismissed the
criminal cases against her and her co-accused.
Judge Villamor likewise granted execution pending appeal of his decision in Civil Case No. B-398. This order was
challenged by Carlos in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, both without success.
Afterwards, Carlos filed an administrative case, A.M. No. RTJ-87-105, against Judge Villamor, charging him with
having issued illegal orders and an unjust decision in Civil Case No. B-398. On November 21, 1988, this Court, in
anEn Banc resolution, summarily dismissed the administrative case.
Dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative case, respondent Carlos filed a civil action for damages (Civil
Case No. CEB-6478) against Judge Villamor for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment when he dismissed the five
(5) criminal cases against Naval, et al.
The summons in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 was served upon Judge Villamor on December 10, 1987. The next day
(December 11, 1987), instead of answering the complaint, Judge Villamor issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to
0993 an order of direct contempt against Carlos and his lawyer. Attorney Antonio T. Guerrero, "for degrading the
respect and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptous language before the court," and
sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P500.
Carlos immediately filed in this Court a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against the Judge (G.R. Nos. 82238-42). We promptly restrained Judge Villamor from enforcing his Order
of Contempt against Carlos and Attorney Guerrero. On November 13, 1989, we annulled the contempt order. (See
pp. 26-34, Rollo of G.R. No. 101041.)
Back to Civil Case No. CEB-6478; Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The
trial court granted the motion. The order of dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 20657,
June 26, 1990). Carlos appealed to this Court which also denied the petition. (p. 125, Rollo of G.R. No. 101296.)
Unfazed by these setbacks, Carlos and his counsel, Attorney Antonio Guerrero, filed separate complaints for
damages against Judge Villamor for knowingly rendering an unjust order of contempt.
Attorney Guerrero's complaint for damages (Civil Case No. CEB-8802) was raffled to Branch 21, Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City, presided over by Judge Peary G. Aleonar. Carlos' complaint for damages was docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-8823 and raffled to Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City presided over by Judge Bernardo LL. Salas.
On March 30, 1990, Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8802 but it was denied by Judge
Aleonar (p. 33, Rollo of G.R. No. 101296).
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order docketed as G.R. No. 101296.
On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order against Judge Aleonar to stop him from
proceeding in Civil Case No. CEB-8802 (pp. 45-46, Rollo of G.R. No. 101296).
On May 20, 1991, a Manifestation was filed by Judge Villamor praying Judge Salas to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-
8823 but the motion was denied by respondent Judge on July 2, 1991 (pp. 13-16, Rollo of G.R. No. 101041).
Hence, this second petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order (G.R. No. 101041).
On August 21, 1991, a Resolution was issued by this Court: 1) temporarily restraining Judge Salas from further
proceeding in Civil Case No. CEB-8823; and 2) granting the petitioner's prayer that this case be consolidated with
G.R. No. 101296 (pp. 37-39, Rollo of G.R. No. 101041).
The sole issue here is: whether or not Judges Aleonar and Salas may take cognizance of the actions for damages
against Judge Villamor for allegedly having rendered an unjust order of direct contempt against Carlos and Attorney
Guerrero which this Court subsequently annulled.
The answer is no.
As very aptly held by this Court in a Resolution it issued in connection with a previous case filed by respondent
Carlos against Judge Villamor, over a similar action for "Damages and Attorney's Fees Arising From Rendering an
Unjust Judgment," in dismissing the five (5) criminal cases for qualified theft which he (respondent Carlos) had filed
against Gloria P. Naval and others —
Indeed, no Regional Trial Court can pass upon and scrutinize, and much less declare as unjust a judgment
of another Regional Trial Court and sentence the judge thereof liable for damages without running afoul
with the principle that only the higher appellate courts, namely, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court, are vested with authority to review and correct errors of the trial courts. (George D. Carlos vs. CA,
G.R. No. 95560, November 5, 1990; p. 125, Rollo of G.R No. 101296.)
To allow respondent Judges Aleonar and Salas to proceed with the trial of the actions for damages against the
petitioner, a co-equal judge of a co-equal court, would in effect permit a court to review and interfere with the
judgment of a co-equal court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review. The various branches of
a Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) being co-equal, may not interfere with each other's cases,
judgments and orders (Parco vs. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 262).

This Court has already ruled that only after the Appellate Court, in a final judgment, has found that a trial judge's
errors were committed deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be
levelled against the latter (Garcia vs. Alconcel, 111 SCRA 178; Sta. Maria vs. Ubay, 87 SCRA 179; Gahol vs.
Riodique, 64 SCRA 494).

Nowhere in this Court's decision annulling Judge Villamor's order of direct contempt (G.R. Nos. 82238-42, November
13, 1989) can there be found a declaration that the erroneous order was rendered maliciously or with conscious and
deliberate intent to commit an injustice. In fact, a previous order of direct contempt issued by Judge Villamor
against Carlos' former counsel was sustained by this Court (Jaynes C. Abarrientos, et al. vs. Judge Villamor, G.R. No.
82237, June 1, 1988).

At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only be considered an error of judgment for which
Judge Villamor may not be held criminally or civilly liable to the respondents.

A judge is not liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in rendering it (Barroso
vs. Arche, 67 SCRA 161).

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for certiorari are GRANTED, Civil Cases Nos. CEB-8802 and CEB-8823,
respectively, pending in the salas of respondents Judge Peary G. Aleonar and Judge Bernardo LL. Salas, are hereby
dismissed. The temporary restraining orders issued by this Court in these cases are hereby made permanent. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Hence, this petition for review.[12]

The Court notes that in the decision of the Regional Trial Court which the Court of Appeals affirmed
peremptorily without noticing its nullity, the Regional Trial Court merely quoted the decision of the Municipal Trial
[G.R. No. 113006. November 23, 2000] Court in full and added two paragraphs, thus:

This Court, in accordance with the rules, required the parties to submit their corresponding memorandum or
brief. The prosecution filed its memorandum, and also with the defense.

ONG CHIU KWAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. After a careful perusal of the record of the case and evaluating the evidence thereto and exhibits thereof, this Court
finds no ground to modify, reverse or alter the above-stated decision and hereby affirms the decision of the lower
court in toto.[13]
DECISION

PARDO, J.: The Constitution requires that [N]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.[14]The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
provides that [T]he judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge
What is before the Court for consideration is the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the
accused Ong Chiu Kwan, for unjust vexation.[1] accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.[15]

On January 31, 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Andres M. Bayona of Bacolod filed with the Municipal Trial Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it cannot merely refer to the findings
Court, Bacolod City an information charging petitioner with unjust vexation for cutting the electric wires, water pipes of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court. The court must make a full findings of fact and conclusions of
and telephone lines of Crazy Feet, a business establishment owned and operated by Mildred Ong. [2] law of its own.[16]

On April 24, 1990, at around 10:00 in the morning, Ong Chiu Kwan ordered Wilfredo Infante to relocate the
telephone, electric and water lines of Crazy Feet, because said lines posed as a disturbance. [3] However, Ong Chiu
Kwan failed to present a permit from appropriate authorities allowing him to cut the electric wires, water pipe and
telephone lines of the business establishment.[4]
After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the Municipal Trial Court found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust
vexation,[5] and sentenced him to imprisonment for twenty days.[6] The court also ordered him to pay moral
damages, finding that the wrongful act of abruptly cutting off the electric, water pipe and telephone lines of Crazy
Feet caused the interruption of its business operations during peak hours, to the detriment of its owner, Mildred
Ong. The trial court also awarded exemplary damages to complainant as a deterrent to the accused not to follow
similar act in the future and to pay attorneys fees.[7] The trial court disposed of the case as follows:
IN VIEW THEREOF, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of unjust vexation
provided under Article 287 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to suffer a penalty of imprisonment
of twenty (20) days and to pay private complainant the following:
P10,000.00 - moral damages
Consequently, the decision of the regional trial court is a nullity. Very recently, speaking of a similarly worded
decision of a regional trial court, we said:
[I]t is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted
at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.[17]
Judges similarly disposed to pay lip service to their work must rethink their place in the judiciary or seriously
take refresher courses on decision writing. We warn them of stiff sanctions for such lackadaisical performance.
Consequently, the case may be remanded to the lower court for compliance with the constitutional
requirement of contents of a decision. However, considering that this case has been pending for sometime, the ends
of justice will be fully served if we review the evidence and decide the case.
Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone lines of complainants
business establishment because these lines crossed his property line. He failed, however, to show evidence that he
had the necessary permit or authorization to relocate the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric, water and
telephone services during peak hours of the operation of business of the complainant. Thus, petitioners act unjustly
annoyed or vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation.

P 5,000.00 - exemplary damages Regarding damages, we find the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees to be without
basis. Moral damages may be recovered if they were the proximate result of defendants wrongful act or
omission.[18] An award of exemplary damages is justified if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
P 5,000.00 - attorneys fees and to pay the cost of this suit.
circumstances.[19] There is no evidence to support such award. Hence, we delete the award of moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the lower courts are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, accused Ong
Chiu Kwan is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00, and the costs. The award of moral and exemplary damages
Bacolod City, Philippines, September 1, 1992. and attorneys fees is hereby deleted.

SO ORDERED.
(SGD.)RAFAEL O. PENUELA
Judge[8]

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, the latter court in a decision dated December 8, 1992,
simplistically adopted the decision of the lower court in toto, without stating the reasons for doing so.[9]

On April 22, 1993, by petition for review, Ong Chiu Kwan elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. [10] On
August 16, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the appeal, [11] agreeing with the lower
courts finding that petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of unjust vexation.