OSG Memorandum On Martial Law Extension Petitions

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C.
LAGMAN, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
-versus- G.R. No. 235935

SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO
PIMENTEL III, ET AL.,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------x
EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, ET

AL.,
Petitioners,
- versus - G.R. No. 236061

PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, ET
AL.,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------x
LORETA ANN ROSALES,
Petitioner,
- versus - G.R. No. 236145
PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, ET

AL.,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------x
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
- versus - G.R. No. 236155
SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO

PIMENTEL, ET AL.,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------x
Memorandum
G.R. No. 235935, G.R. No. 236061, G.R. No. 236145, and G.R. No. 236155
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
MEMORANDUM
Respondents President Rodrigo Duterte, Senate

President Aquilino Pimentel III, Speaker Pantaleon D.
Alvarez, Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, Defense
Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana, Budget Secretary Benjamin
F. Diokno, Interior and Local Government Secretary (OIC)
Eduardo M. Año, National Security Adviser Hermogenes C.
Esperon Jr., the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippine Congress, Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of
Staff Rey Leonardo Guerrero, and Philippine National Police
Director-General Ronaldo Dela Rosa, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, respectfully submit this Memorandum
in compliance with this Honorable Court’s Order dated
January 12, 2018.
PREFATORY STATEMENT
The petitions harangue this Honorable Court with

lessons of Martial Law Past, unmindful that the proclamation
of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus under the 1987 Constitution is a defanged version of
the provision in the 1935 Constitution. Their fears are
baseless and cannot controvert the finding by the President
and both houses of the Congress that the rebellion in
Mindanao persists, and that public safety requires the
extension of the proclamation and suspension. Neither can
their conjectures and unsubstantiated allegations overthrow
the presumption of constitutionality accorded the assailed
act of the Congress.
STATEMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE AND

PROCEDURAL FACTS
1. On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte

issued Proclamation No. 216 entitled “Declaring a State of
Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of Writ of Habeas
corpus in the Whole of Mindanao” for a period not exceeding
sixty days, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.1
1
Proclamation No. 216 dated 23 May 2017, attached as Annex “1” of the Comment dated January 13,
2018.
2
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
2. At 9:55 p.m. of May 25, 2017, the President

submitted to the Congress his Report on the declaration of
martial law in Mindanao, in compliance with the reportorial
requirement under the Constitution. The report stated the
factual basis for the President’s issuance of Proclamation No.
216.
3. After the President submitted his Report, the

Senate adopted Senate P.S. Resolution No. 388 expressing
full support for the martial law proclamation after finding
Proclamation No. 216 “satisfactory, constitutional, and in
accordance with law.”2
4. On the following day, the House of

Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050,
“EXPRESSING THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE AS
IT FINDS NO REASON TO REVOKE PROCLAMATION NO. 216,
ENTITLED ‘DECLARING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND
SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO.’”3
5. Thereafter, three petitions were filed before this

Honorable Court assailing the factual basis of Proclamation
No. 216. The cases were docketed as G.R. Nos. 231658,
231771, and 231774.4
6. In its Decision promulgated on July 4, 2017, the

Court En Banc found sufficient factual basis for the issuance
of Proclamation No. 216, declared it as constitutional, and
dismissed the consolidated petitions.
7. On July 22, 2017, the Congress extended the

period of martial law in Mindanao to December 31, 2017,
pursuant to the Resolution of Both Houses No. 2.
2
Senate P.S. Resolution No. 388 dated May 30, 2017, attached as Annex “2” of the Comment dated
January 13, 2018; Resolution No. 49 dated May 30, 2017, attached as Annex “3” of the Comment dated
January 13, 2018.
3
House Resolution No. 1050 dated May 31, 2017, attached as Annex “4” of the Comment dated January
13, 2018.
4
Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017.
3
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
8. Before the end of December 31, 2017, AFP

General Rey Leonardo B. Guerrero wrote a letter to
President Duterte recommending the further extension of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Mindanao for twelve months, beginning on
January 1, 2018. The request was based on the AFP’s
current security assessment. General Guerrero cited the
following reasons for the extension of martial law:
The AFP strongly believes that on the basis of the

foregoing assessment, the following are cited as
justification for the recommended extension, to wit:
The DAESH-Inspired DIWM groups and allies

continue to visibly offer armed resistance in other parts of
Central, Western, and Eastern Mindanao in spite of the
neutralization of their key leaders and destruction of their
forces in Marawi City;
Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups

such as BIFF, AKP, DI-Maguid, DI-Toraype, and the ASG
remain capable of staging similar atrocities and violent
attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao, including
the cities of Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos,
Zamboanga and Cotabato;
The CTs have been pursuing and intensifying their

political mobilization (army, party and mass base building,
rallies, pickets and demonstrations, financial and logistical
build up), terrorism against innocent civilians and private
entities, and guerilla warfare against the security sector,
and public government infrastructures;
The need to intensify the campaign against the CTs

is necessary in order to defeat their strategy, stop their
extortion, defeat their armed component, and to stop their
recruitment activities;
The threats being posed by the CTs, the ASG, and

the presence of remnants, protectors, supporters and
sympathizers of the DAESH/DIWM pose a clear and
imminent danger to public safety and hinders the speedy
rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in
Marawi City, and the attainment of lasting peace, stability,
economic development and prosperity in Mindanao;
The 2nd extension of the implementation of Martial

Law coupled with the continued suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao will significantly
help not only the AFP, but also the other stakeholders in
4
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
quelling and putting an end to the on-going DAESH-

inspired DIWM groups and CT-staged rebellion, and in
restoring public order, safety, and stability in Mindanao;
and
In seeking for another extension, the AFP is ready,

willing and able to perform anew its mandated task in the
same manner that it had dutifully done so for the whole
duration of Martial Law to date, without any reported
human rights violation and/or incident of abuse of
authority.5
9. Secretary Delfin Lorenzana also wrote a letter to

President Duterte dated December 1, 2017 asking for the
extension of martial law based on the reasons cited by
General Guerrero.6
10. Acting on the recommendations of General

Guerrero and Secretary Lorenzana, President Duterte wrote
to Senate President Aquilino Pimentel III and House Speaker
Pantaleon Alvarez requesting a further extension of the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao for an
additional year.7
11. Both houses of the Congress approved President

Duterte’s request. In a joint session on December 13, 2017,
the Senate and the House of Representatives issued a Joint
Resolution approving a motion to extend the proclamation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Mindanao from January 1, 2018 to
December 31, 2018.8
12. The overwhelming approval by the Congress of

the extension did not sit well with some of the solons who
voted against it: Congressmen Edcel Lagman, Tomasito S.
Villarin, Edgar R. Erice, Teddy Brawner Baguilat Jr., Gary C.
Alejano, and Emmanuel A. Billones filed on December 28,
2017 a petition to assail the factual basis of the martial law
extension in Mindanao, claiming that the extension of
5
AFP General Rey Leonardo B. Guerrero’s letter to President Duterte.
6
Secretary Delfin Lorenzana’s letter to President Duterte dated December 1, 2017.
7
Letter of President Duterte to Senate President Pimentel and House Speaker Alvarez dated December 8,
2017.
8
Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, attached as Annex “5” in Comment dated January 13, 2018.
5
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
martial law is vitiated by grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.9
13. On December 29, 2017, the Court required the

respondents to comment on the Lagman, et al. petition.
14. On January 8, 2018, Eufemia Campos Cullamat, et

al. also filed a petition questioning the factual basis for the
extension of the proclamation and suspension,10 claiming
that: (1) the extension of martial law is unwarranted and
unjustified as this would extend human rights violations11;
(2) that the extension was granted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of Congress12; (3) the communist rebellion in Mindanao
does not endanger public safety13; (3) there is no actual
rebellion in Mindanao14; (4) the combat has ended in
Mindanao because Marawi has been liberated15; and (5) the
NPA attacks do not constitute rebellion.16 The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 236061.
15. On January 10, 2017, the Court required the

respondents to comment on the petition of Cullamat, et al.
not later than 5:00 p.m. of January 13, 2018.
16. On January 12, 2018, Loreta Ann Rosales and

Christian Monsod, et al. also filed petitions disputing the
factual basis for the extension.17 The Court required the
respondents to file a Consolidated Comment on or before
5:00 p.m. of January 13, 2018.
17. Before 5:00 p.m. of January 13, 2018, the

respondents filed their Consolidated Comment on the
petitions of Cullamat, et al., Rosales, and Monsod, et al.
9
Petition in G.R. No. 235935, pp. 5-6; the petitioners shall be called Lagman, et al for brevity.
10
Petition in G.R. No. 236061, pp. 8, 19; Petition in G.R. No. 236145, pp. 8, 23; Petition in G.R. No.
236155, p. 18.
11
Petition in G.R. No. 236061, p. 19; the petitioners shall be called Cullamat, et al, for brevity.
12
Petition in G.R. No. 236061, pp. 28-29.
13
Petition in G.R. No. 236155, p. 31.
14
Petition in G.R. No. 236061, pp. 28-29; Petition in G.R. No. 236061, p. 15.
15
Petition in G.R. No. 236155, p. 30; Petition in G.R. No. 236145, p. 6; Petition in G.R. No. 236061, p. 7.
16
Petition in G.R. No. 236155, p. 33; Petition in G.R. No. 236061, pp. 18-19.
17
Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 236145 and 236155; the petitioners shall be called Rosales and Monsod et al.,
for brevity.
6
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
18. The Court conducted the oral arguments on the

four petitions on January 16 and 17, 2018.
19. In compliance with the order of the Court, the

respondents are submitting this Memorandum.
PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS
THE PETITIONS QUESTIONING THE

EXTENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION OF
MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENSION OF THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS SUFFER FROM PROCEDURAL
INFIRMITIES.
a. The President is immune from suit.
b. Lagman, et al. failed to attach a copy of

the Joint Resolution which is indispensable
for this Honorable Court to exercise its
power of judicial review.
c. The expanded jurisdiction of the Court

under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution cannot be invoked to challenge
the extension.
d. The extension may not be impugned on

the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
e. The petitioners bear the burden to

prove that the rebellion has been quelled.
7
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS
THE JOINT RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS

FURTHER EXTENDING THE PROCLAMATION
OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE SUSPENSION OF
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS IN THE ENTIRE MINDANAO FOR ONE
YEAR, FROM JANUARY 1, 2018 TO DECEMBER
31, 2018 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
a. The Constitution allows the Congress to

extend the proclamation and suspension
more than once.
b. The Joint Resolution has sufficient factual

basis and satisfies the conditions prescribed
by the Constitution for the extension.
c. The principle of conclusiveness of

judgment bars the relitigation of the issue of
actual rebellion in Mindanao.
d. The sixty-day period prescribed in Section

18, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to the extension of the proclamation of
and suspension.
e. The Congress has the absolute

discretion to determine the period of
extension.
f. Allegations of abuse and human rights

violations cannot nullify the extension.
f.1. The extension does not intend to

violate human rights or quell legitimate
redress of grievances against the
government.
8
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
f.2. Fear of abuse does not invalidate

laws and government actions.
II
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION CAN BE

ASCRIBED TO THE LEADERSHIP AND
SUPERMAJORITY OF CONGRESS FOR
FURTHER EXTENDING THE PROCLAMATION
OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENSION OF THE
CORPUS IN THE ENTIRE MINDANAO FOR ONE
YEAR.
III
THE COURT CANNOT REVIEW THE MANNER

IN WHICH CONGRESS DELIBERATED UPON
AND APPROVED THE PRESIDENT’S REQUEST
FOR EXTENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION OF
MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENSION OF THE
CORPUS.
a. The period of extension of Congress was

not unduly constricted.
b. The extension was not approved with

undue haste.
c. No grave abuse of discretion can be

attributed to the Congress for the manner by
which it approved the extension because the
Court itself recognized that such power is a
sovereign act of the legislature.
d. The Court’s review does not extend to

determine which of the commander-in-chief
powers under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution the President can exercise given
a set of facts and conditions.
d.1. Compared to the Anti-Terrorism

Council, the armed forces are better
9
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
equipped to address the persisting

rebellion in Mindanao.
d.2. The constitutionality of the

extension must be understood in light of
the President’s prerogative under
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
d.3. Ex Parte Milligan’s martial law is

under “theater of military operations”
and not “theater of war.”
d.4. The Constitution does not require

the existence of a “theater of war” for a
valid proclamation and suspension and
the extension thereof.
d.5. Placing “public safety” on a scale

unduly expands the concept of rebellion.
IV
THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO

THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PRAYED FOR.
a. The petitioners have no clear legal right as

there is no violation of the Constitution.
Thus, there is no material and substantial
invasion of a right sought to be protected.
b. The petitioners failed to show that they

will suffer any grave and irreparable injury if
any injunctive relief is not issued.
c. A TRO or writ of injunction interferes with

and impedes the martial law power granted
to the President.
10
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DISCUSSION
I. THE PETITIONS QUESTIONING

THE EXTENSION OF MARTIAL
LAW SUFFER FROM PROCEDURAL
INFIRMITIES.
a. The President is immune

from suit.
20. The petitions questioning the extension of martial

law should be dismissed as against President Duterte, in
view of his immunity from suit.
21. The President may not be impleaded as a

respondent in a civil or criminal case.18 Although there is no
specific constitutional provision granting presidential
immunity from suit, it is beyond dispute that such protection
is granted to a sitting President. In Rubrico v. Arroyo,19 the
Court recognized that the immunity accorded to the
President is a useful tool:
Petitioners first take issue on the President’s

purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of
office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed
such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity

from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present
constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in
the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an
express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.
observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence
that the President may not be sued during his or her
tenure….
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his

tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in
any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide
for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of
the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can
18
Rubrico v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010; David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3,
2006.
19
Supra.
11
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.

Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form
of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only
one constitutes the executive branch and anything which
impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great
and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government….20
22. Immunity from suit ensures the exercise of

Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction. The arduous task of being the Chief Executive of
the Government is a burden that, aside from requiring all of
the office holder's time, also demands his undivided
attention.21 Without this protection, the President would be
devoting his time and attention to cases rather than
performing his duties, to the prejudice of the public.
23. In David v. Arroyo,22 the Court held that there is

even no need to provide for the immunity in the Constitution
or law:
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President

Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form
of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only
one constitutes the executive branch and anything which
impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great
and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.
However, this does not mean that the President is not
accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains
accountable to the people but he may be removed from
office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment.23
20
Citations omitted.
21
Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988.
22
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006.
23
Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.
12
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
24. Although Rosales and Cullamat, et al. claim that

the Congress violated the Constitution by extending martial
law, they themselves displayed a wanton disregard for the
rules by impleading President Duterte in the present case.
Ironically, the petitioners have impleaded a President who
enjoys an excellent trust rating from the Filipino people,
especially those from Mindanao.24
b. Lagman, et al. failed to

attach a copy of the Joint
Resolution which is
indispensable for this
Honorable Court to exercise its
power of judicial review.
25. The petition of Lagman, et al. should have been

dismissed because the petitioners failed to attach a copy of
the Joint Resolution which is indispensable for this Honorable
Court to exercise its power of judicial review.
26. Lagman, et al. invoke the certiorari jurisdiction of

the Court by contending that the “the second martial law
extension was vitiated by grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
respondents Senate President Pimentel III and House
Speaker Alvarez, together with the supermajority of the
Congress, upon the errant initiative of the President.”25
27. Without a copy of the assailed resolution of the

Congress being attached to the petitions, there is no valid
reason for the Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction
over the petition. Such omission violated the formal
requirements under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the same Rules: the
written resolution granting the extension alleged to have
been issued with grave abuse of discretion is indispensable
before the Court can exercise its expanded power of judicial
review. As the Court held in Quintano v. National Labor
24
https://www.sws.org.ph/swsmain/artcldisppage/?artcsyscode=ART-20180111180300, last accessed on
January 13, 2018 at 3:00 pm.
25
13
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Relations Commission, the submission of a certified copy of

the assailed resolution is no trifling matter:
The submission of the duplicate original or certified

true copy of the judgment, order, resolution or ruling
subject of a petition for certiorari is essential to determine
whether the court, body or tribunal, which rendered the
same, indeed, committed grave abuse of discretion. The
provision states that either a legible duplicate original or
certified true copy thereof shall be submitted. If what is
submitted is a copy, then it is required that the same is
certified by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency
or office involved or his duly-authorized representative.
The purpose for this requirement is not difficult to see. It is
to assure that such copy is a faithful reproduction of the
judgment, order, resolution or ruling subject of the
petition. 26
c. The expanded jurisdiction of

the Court under Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution
cannot be invoked to challenge
the extension.
28. The petitions are based on the third paragraph of

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Some of the
petitioners in the same breath invoke Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, or the expanded jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, and ascribe grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the majority of the members of Congress who
approved the extension of the proclamation of martial law.
29. The reliance on the Court’s expanded jurisdiction

is misplaced.
30. The Court already settled this question in Lagman

v. Medialdea27 where it ruled that the “appropriate
proceeding” mentioned in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution does not refer to a petition for certiorari filed
under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII. The Court said:
26
G.R. No. 144517, December 13, 2004.
27
G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017.
14
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
It could not have been the intention of the framers of

the Constitution that the phrase "in an appropriate
proceeding" would refer to a Petition
for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article
VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is
whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the
proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must be
emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the
Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the President's exercise of
emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court
applies the standard of review used in a petition
for certiorari, the same would emasculate its
constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII.28
31. There is only one standard in the Constitution that

allows judicial review of the proclamation of martial law, or
its extension, and that is through a sui generis proceeding
based on the “sufficiency of factual basis test” under Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, additionally invoking the
expanded jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is erroneous.
32. Indeed, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution

does not provide “grave abuse of discretion” under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court as the standard of review for the
determination of the sufficiency of factual basis. Thus, the
reliance of Cullamat, et al. on the alleged commission by the
Congress of grave abuse of discretion as a ground for
nullifying the extension of martial law and the continued
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
misplaced. As the Court in Lagman appropriately held, the
phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” does not refer to a
petition for certiorari, which is not the proper tool to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension.29
28
Emphasis supplied.
29
Supra.
15
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
d. The extension may not be

impugned on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
33. A certiorari proceeding cannot be used to impugn

the exercise by the Congress of its power to consider and
approve the President’s request for the extension. Such acts
involve the exercise of the wisdom of the legislature; they
raise a political question not subject to judicial review.
34. The power of judicial review is the power of the

courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts for
their conformity to the Constitution. For a court to exercise
this power, the following requirements must be met:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the

exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have

“standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised

at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis

mota of the case.30
35. An actual case or controversy is one that involves

a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot
or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice. Stated otherwise, it is not
the mere existence of a conflict or controversy that will
authorize the exercise by the courts of its power of review.
More importantly, the issue involved must be susceptible of
judicial determination. Excluded from these are questions of
policy or wisdom, otherwise referred to as political
questions.31
30
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009.
31
Id.
16
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
36. Political questions refer to those questions which,

under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of government.32 Thus, if an issue is
clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters
for discretionary action by a particular branch of government
or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political
question.33 The reason is that, under our system of
government, policy issues are within the domain of the
political branches of government and of the people
themselves as the repository of all state power.34 In short,
the judiciary does not settle policy issues.35 Prominent on
the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it. It involves the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion or the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking an independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government.36
37. Although Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution expands judicial power to include the duty “to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government”
and thereby “limits resort to the political question
doctrine,”37 the Court has recognized issues “the
determination of which is exclusively for the President, for
Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite
or referendum.”38
38. Thus, Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to

do away with “truly political questions.” Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion himself clarified this point during the
32
Nuclear Free Phils. Coalition vs. NPC, 141 SCRA 307 (1986); Torres vs. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272
(1987); Citizen’s Alliance for Consumer Protection vs. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521 (1988).
33
Garcia v. Executive Secretary supra.
34
Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 (1989).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989.
38
Id.
17
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and

from this clarification it was gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) “truly political questions”
and (2) those which “are not truly political questions.”39
Truly political questions are beyond judicial review, the
reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to
be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature. 40
39. Recourse to the political question doctrine

necessarily raises the underlying doctrine of separation of
powers among the three great branches of government that
our Constitution has entrenched.41 The political question
being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will
not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal
branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to
step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.42 One
department must not encroach upon nor interfere with acts
done within the constitutional competence of the other
where full discretionary authority has been delegated by the
Constitution to said department. That department alone, to
the exclusion of the others, has both right and duty to
exercise it free from any encroachment or interference of
whomsoever.43
40. In this jurisdiction, the determination of a truly

political question from a justiciable political question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then courts are
duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within
such limits.44
41. Lagman, et al. and Monsod, et al. argue that

Congress approved the extension of martial law with undue
haste. They question the manner by which the debates and
39
See Francisco Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit ng mga Manananggol, 415 SCRA 44 (2003) citing Record of the
Constitution Commission, Vol. 1, July 10, 1986 at 439-443.
40
Id.
41
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, supra.
42
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000).
43
Mr. Justice Concepcion in Tanada vs. Mariano Jesus Cuenco., 100 Phil. 101 (1957).
44
Francisco Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit ng mga Manananggol, supra.
18
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
the voting were conducted. Nevertheless, there are no

constitutional parameters for the exercise of those acts. The
Congress has full discretionary authority to decide how to go
about the debates and the voting. In other words, the issues
that the petitioners raise are political and non-justiciable.
The questions presented essentially go into the wisdom of
the Congressional action.
42. Understandably, the Court ruled in Garcia v.

Executive Secretary45 that it cannot act on a dispute
involving the wisdom of an act of a co-equal department
because it would violate the principle of separation of
powers:
This legislative determination was a lawful exercise

of Congress’ prerogative and one that this Honorable Court
must respect and uphold. Regardless of the individual
opinions of the Members of this Honorable Court, we
cannot, acting as a body, question the wisdom of a co-
equal department’s acts. The courts do not involve
themselves with or delve into the policy or wisdom of a
statute. It sits, not to review or revise legislative action,
but to enforce the legislative will. For the Court to resolve
a clearly non-justiciable matter would be to debase the
principle of separation of powers that has been tightly
woven by the Constitution into our republican system of
government.46
e. The petitioners bear the

burden to prove that the
rebellion has been quelled.
43. The petitioners ask the Court to test the

constitutionality of the extension in accordance with the
meaning and purpose of martial law as intended by the
Constitutional Commission and as articulated in Lagman.
44. It should not escape notice that every

constitutional inquiry into the official acts of the government
begins with the presumption of constitutionality and validity.
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,47 the Court
45
Supra.
46
Id.
47
G.R. No. L-25246, September 12, 1974
19
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
laid the principle on the presumption of validity and

constitutionality of laws, viz:
(A)ll presumptions are indulged in favor of

constitutionality; one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity
beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work
hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any
reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the
statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate
all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with
the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute;
and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor
of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.48
45. The same principle was affirmed by the Court in

Drilon v. Lim,49 where it held:
(T)he presumption of constitutionality can be

overcome only by the clearest showing that there
was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only
when such a conclusion is reached by the required
majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the
duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be
struck down.50
46. Gerochi v. Department of Energy51 therefore

emphasized that to overturn the presumption of
constitutionality, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful,
speculative, or argumentative.
47. Reckoned from the preceding yardstick, the

petitioners have not overturned the presumption of
constitutionality: they have not demonstrated that there is a
clear breach of the Constitution in the extension of martial
law and the extension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. The petitioners failed to rebut the presumption that
the members of the Congress performed their duties in a
regular manner. It cannot be denied that public officers
enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of
48
Emphasis supplied.
49
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994.
50
Emphasis supplied.
51
G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007.
20
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
their duties. They are presumed to have acted in good faith

in the performance of their duties.
48. The existence of an ongoing rebellion in Mindanao

is undeniable. The validity of the Proclamation No. 216
grounded on the existence of rebellion in Mindanao was
affirmed by the Congress in two separate instances. The
validity of Proclamation No. 216 became conclusive when it
was affirmed by the Court in Lagman.
SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS
I. THE JOINT RESOLUTION OF

CONGRESS FURTHER
EXTENDING THE
PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL
LAW AND THE SUSPENSION OF
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE
ENTIRE MINDANAO FOR ONE
YEAR, FROM JANUARY 1, 2018
TO DECEMBER 31, 2018, IS
CONSTITUTIONAL.
49. The Joint Resolution dated December 13, 2017

approving President Duterte’s request to extend Martial Law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Mindanao from December 31, 2017 to December
31, 2018 is valid and not unconstitutional.
50. At the outset, the proclamation of martial law is a

matter entirely different from its extension. The
requirements for the declaration of martial law are different
from the requirements for its extension.
51. The power to grant an extension of martial law

and a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is vested in
both Houses of Congress voting jointly under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution.
21
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
52. A proclamation of martial law takes effect

immediately at the President’s instance when he determines
that there is a rebellion or invasion and public safety
requires that the Philippines or any part thereof be placed
under martial law. On the other hand, an extension of
martial law is initiated by the President but it takes effect
upon Congress’ issuance of a resolution that rebellion and
invasion persists and public safety requires that the
Philippines or any part thereof be placed under martial law.
53. Thus, in Lagman,52 the Court explained the nature

of extensions of martial law in this wise:
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides

that ''the President … may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippine or any part thereof under martial
law…. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,
if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it."
From the foregoing, it is clear that the President's

declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is effective for 60
days. As aptly described by Commissioner Monsod, "this
declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a maximum
of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically
terminates." Any extension thereof should be determined
by Congress. The act of declaring martial law and/or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by
the President, however, is separate from the approval of
the extension of the declaration and/or suspension by
Congress. The initial declaration of martial law and/or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is determined
solely by the President, while the extension of the
declaration and/or suspension, although initiated by the
President, is approved by Congress.
In this case, Proclamation No. 216 issued on May 23,

2017 expired on July 23, 2017. Consequently, the issue of
whether there were sufficient factual for the issuance of
the said Proclamation has been rendered moot by its
expiration. We have consistently ruled that a case
becomes moot and academic when it "ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
52
Supra.
22
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value.”

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, "the martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
now in effect in Mindanao no longer finds basis in
Proclamation No. 216" but in Resolution of Both Houses
No. 11 (RBH No. 11) adopted on July 22, 2017. RBH No.
11 is totally different and distinct from Proclamation No.
216. The former is a joint executive-legislative act while
the latter is purely executive in nature.
54. Considering that there are differences between a

declaration of martial law and extension thereof, it follows
that the scope of judicial review of the proclamation of
martial law is different from a judicial review of the
extension thereof.
55. According to Lagman,53 the scope of judicial

review of martial law is limited to three points of inquiry, to
wit: (1) Is there an actual rebellion or invasion? (2) Does
public safety require the declaration of martial law? and (3)
Is there probable cause for the President to believe that
there is an actual rebellion or rebellion? In contrast, the
Congress’ extension of martial law only requires that the
rebellion persists and that public safety requires the
extension of martial law. In other words, the extension of
martial law is premised on the existence of an ongoing
rebellion which cannot be disputed.
56. The findings and justifications of the Congress in

approving the request of the President are stated in
Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, viz.:
WHEREAS, in a communication addressed to the Senate

and the House of Representatives, President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte requested the Congress of the Philippines "to further
extend the proclamation of Martial Law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao for a period of one (1) year, from 01 January 2018 to
31 December 2018, or for such other period of time as the
Congress may determine, in accordance with Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution[;]"
WHEREAS, the President informed the Congress of the

Philippines of the remarkable progress made during the period
of Martial Law, but nevertheless reported the following essential
53
Supra.
23
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
facts, which as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the

Philippines, he has personal knowledge of: First, despite the
death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their
groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the
recruitment and training of new members and fighters to carry
on the rebellion; Second, the Turaifie Group has likewise been
monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably
targeting the Cotabato area; Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic
Freedom Fighters continue to defy the government by
perpetrating at least fifteen (15) violent incidents during the
Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato; Fourth,
the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-
Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain a serious security
concern; and last, the New People's Army took advantage of the
situation and intensified their decades-long rebellion against the
government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent
civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against
the security sector and public and government infrastructure,
purposely to seize political power through violent means and
supplant the country's democratic form of government with
Communist rule;
….
WHEREAS, on December 13, 2017, after thorough

discussion and extensive debate, the Congress of the Philippines
in a Joint Session, by two hundred forty (240) affirmative votes
comprising the majority of all its Members, has determined that
rebellion persists, and that public safety indubitably requires the
further extension of the Proclamation of Martial Law and the
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas corpus in the
Whole of Mindanao:
Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and the

House of Representatives in a Joint Session Assembled, To
further extend Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, entitled
"Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas corpus in the Whole of Mindanao" for a
period of one (1) year from January 1, 2018 to December 31,
2018.
57. As stated in Resolution of Both Houses No. 4,

dated December 13, 2017, the decision of Congress to
extend martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is based on the finding by two
hundred forty members of all members of both houses of
the Congress that rebellion persists in Mindanao, and that
public safety requires the further extension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao, for a period of one year or from January 1, 2018
to December 31, 2018.
24
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
58. Simply put, the rebellion persists in Mindanao. The

rebels are committing atrocities and causing civilian
casualties. Public safety requires the extension for one year.
In any event, the Court had already declared that there is
rebellion in Mindanao, the onus lies on the petitioners to
show that the rebellion has been completely quelled. Since
they have not shown facts to the contrary, they cannot ask
the Court to set aside the extension of the proclamation and
suspension.
a. The Constitution allows

Congress to extend the
proclamation of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus
more than once.
59. There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits

the legislature from extending martial law more than once.
60. The intendment of the last sentence of Section 18

of Article VII is unmistakable: it authorizes the Congress to
extend the President’s proclamation or suspension “if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires
it.” Pursuant to the plain-meaning rule, the word “persist”
means in its ordinary acceptation “to continue to exist
especially past a usual, expected, or normal time,”54 or to
“[c]ontinue to exist; be prolonged.”55
61. Therefore, for as long as the Congress believes

that the invasion or rebellion continues to exist, and the
public safety requires it, the proclamation of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
may be extended, subject only to the condition that any
such extension be upon the initiative of the President and for
a period to be determined by the Congress.
62. It is well-settled that what is not expressly or

impliedly prohibited may be done.56 The Court cannot, in the
54
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/persist.
55
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/persist.
56
Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 42317, September 21, 1934.
25
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
absence of any express or implied prohibition in the 1987

Constitution, prevent the Congress from granting further
extensions of the proclamation or suspension. To rule
otherwise would be engaging in judicial legislation.
63. This position is supported by legislative history.

The deliberations in the Constitutional Commission reveal
that the framers did in fact intend to grant Congress the
power and discretion to grant further extensions of the
proclamation and suspension.
64. Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, who later

became a member of the Court, was adamant in his position
that the Constitution should not fix any length of time for
the extension. Twice he emphasized that such a limitation
will require Congress to convene each time the fixed period
expires, thereby recognizing that further extensions are
indeed allowed under the Constitution. He also reasoned out
that the clause “if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it” serves as an adequate gauge for
the extension of the proclamation or suspension, viz.:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
May we suggest that on line 7, between the words “same”

and “if,” we insert the phrase FOR A PERIOD OF NOT
MORE THAN SIXTY DAYS, which would equal the initial
period for the first declaration just so it will keep on going.
THE PRESIDENT. What does the Committee say?
MR. REGALADO. May we request a clarification from

Commissioner Suarez on this proposed amendment? This
extension is already a joint act upon the initiative of the
President and with the concurrence of Congress. It is
assumed that they have already agreed not only on the
fact of extension but on the period of extension. If we put
it at 60 days only, then thereafter, they have to meet
again to agree jointly on a further extension.
MR. SUAREZ. That is precisely intended to safeguard

the interests and protect the lives of citizens.
MR. REGALADO. In the first situation where the President

declares martial law, there had to be a prescribed period
because there was no initial concurrence requirement. And
if there was no concurrence, the martial law period ends at
26
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
60 days. Thereafter, if they intend to extend the same

suspension of the privilege of the writ or the proclamation
of martial law, it is upon the initiative of the President this
time, and with the prior concurrence of Congress. So, the
period of extension has already been taken into account by
both the Executive and the Legislative, unlike the first
situation where the President acted alone without prior
concurrence. The reason for the limitation in the first does
not apply to the extension.
MR. SUAREZ. We are afraid of a situation that may

develop where the extended period would be even longer
than the initial period, Madam President. It is only
reasonable to suggest that we have to put a restriction on
the matter of the exercise of this right within a reasonable
period.
….
MR. OPLE. May I just pose a question to the Committee in
connection with the Suarez amendment? Earlier,
Commissioner Regalado said that that point was going to
be a collective judgment between the President and the
Congress. Are we departing from that now in favor of
giving Congress the plenipotentiary power to determine
the period?
FR. BERNAS. Not really, Madam President, because

Congress would be doing this in consultation with the
President, and the President would be outvoted by about
300 Members.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, following that is the

clause “extend the same if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.” That by itself
suggests a period within which the suspension shall be
extended, if the invasion is still going on. But there is
already the cutoff of 60-day period. Do they have to meet
all over again and agree to extend the same?57
65. Similarly, Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion, a

former Chief Justice of the Court, acknowledged that the
President may ask “for another extension, if necessary.”58
66. Analyzed from any perspective, the 1987

Constitution empowers the Congress to further extend the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, and it has the absolute
57
Record of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, Vol. II, pp. 508 – 509; Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.
58
Id. at 510.
27
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
discretion to determine the length of this period of extension

without need of judicial fiat.
b. The Joint Resolution has

sufficient factual basis and
satisfies the conditions
prescribed by the constitution
for the extension.
67. Monsod, et al., erroneously assail the extension of

martial law for being unwarranted and unnecessary.59
Allegedly, (i) the alleged bases for Proclamation No. 216
have already been resolved and no longer persist;60 and (ii)
the rebellion in Mindanao does not endanger public safety.61
The petitioners erroneously claim that there is no more
cause to re-extend martial law in Mindanao since combat in
Mindanao has been terminated.62 In support of their stance,
they allege that the Secretary of National Defense
announced the cessation of armed combat and the liberation
of Marawi, as well as the death of the key leaders of the
rebellion, therefore, martial law must be deemed to have
lost its basis and its extension is no longer justified.63
68. Rosales posits that the extension of Martial Law in

Mindanao is unconstitutional because the factual bases, as
narrated in the Letter of the President to both Houses dated
December 8, 2017, do not amount to actual rebellion.64 At
most, they allegedly only constitute imminent danger that
does not justify the imposition or extension of Martial Law.65
She adds that the President’s enumerated factual
antecedents in the letter seem to “only show capacity to
rebel and/or imminent act of rebelling” instead.66 And since
it is the President’s onus to show sufficient factual basis,67
59
60
Id. at 8.
61
Id. at 11.
62
63
Id. at 30, par. 69.
64
65
Id. at 29-31.
66
Id. at 27.
67
Id. at 31-32.
28
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
his alleged failure to do so will not lend any legitimacy to his

initiative to extend Martial Law.
69. Significantly, Rosales conveniently quoted only a

few paragraphs that would favor her proposition that the
facts relied upon for the extension are a mere series of
movements that do not amount to actual rebellion.
70. Her contention that some phrases in the

President’s letter constitute an admission of the absence of
rebellion in Mindanao cannot be given currency: she
nitpicked certain phrases and interpreted them in isolation
without regarding the bigger picture set out by the entirety
of the letter.68
71. Marawi is not the entire Mindanao. The liberation

of Marawi did not signal the end of the rebellion in of
Mindanao. Lagman recognized that there are other rebel
groups in Mindanao that have launched offensives:
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that

Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion,
both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may
not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As
mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have
historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape
routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;" there is also
the plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the
siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017,
Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his men to
various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and
Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and
the murder of military and police personnel, must also be
considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to
the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao
the end.69
....
There were also intelligence reports from the military

about offensives committed by the ASG and other local
rebel groups. All these suggest that the rebellion in Marawi
has already spilled over to other parts of Mindanao.
68
Id. at 28-29.
69
Id.
29
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in

Mindanao and the linkages established among rebel
groups, the armed uprising that was initially staged in
Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marawi. The
Court therefore will not simply disregard the events that
happened during the Davao City bombing, the
Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and
the countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu,
and Basilan, among others. The Court cannot simply take
the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime without
predetermined bounds, the President has reasonable basis
to believe that the declaration of martial law, as well as
in the whole of Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and
called for by the circumstances.70
72. Although the leadership of the Mautes was

decimated in Marawi, the rebellion in Mindanao persists as
the surviving members of the militant group have not laid
down their arms. The remnants remain a formidable force to
be reckoned with, especially since they have established
linkage with other rebel groups. These rebel groups – which
include the NPAs – are waging rebellion in Mindanao.
73. Contrary to Rosales’ suppositions, these rebel

groups and their concerted destabilizing activities and
actions pose not just mere threats or imminent danger of an
invasion or rebellion. In fact, they constitute the very
rebellion in Mindanao. These purported remnants are
capable of launching retaliatory attacks against the
Government and sowing acts of terrorism against the civilian
population to wrest control of Mindanao and continue their
bid to establish a wilayah in the region. In addition, they
have established linkages with other rebel groups such as
the BIFF, AKP, ASG, DI Maguid, DI Turaifie who are capable
of perpetrating strategic and well-coordinated mass casualty
attacks to overthrow the present government. With the
persistence of rebellion in the region, the extension of
martial law is, therefore, not just for preventive reasons.
74. Nonplussed, Rosales also points out that the cited

NPA attacks were not a consideration in the President’s
original declaration and could not constitute as basis for the
extension. Her contention is misleading.
70
Id.
30
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
75. Proclamation No. 216 referred to the violent acts

and attacks committed by the Maute terrorist group and
“other rebel groups.”71 Lagman72 accurately stated that
there are other rebel groups in Mindanao that have launched
offensives:
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that

Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion,
both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may
not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As
mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have
historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape
routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;" there is also
the plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the
siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017,
Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his men to
various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and
Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and
the murder of military and police personnel, must also be
considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to
the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao
the end.73
....
There were also intelligence reports from the military

about offensives committed by the ASG and other local
rebel groups. All these suggest that the rebellion in Marawi
has already spilled over to other parts of Mindanao.
76. Because of the widespread atrocities in Mindanao

and the linkages established among rebel groups, the armed
uprising in Marawi cannot be equated with the rebellion in
the other parts of Mindanao. The Court should not simply
disregard the events that happened during the Davao City
bombing, the Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City
siege, and the countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others. It should not take
the rebellion in Marawi as an isolated incident. As a crime
without predetermined boundaries, the rebellion in various
parts of Mindanao justified the extension of martial law, as
well as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
71
Proclamation No. 216.
72
Supra.
73
Id.
31
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
77. It bears stressing that even as the National

Democratic Front was engaged in peace talks with the
Government, the communist terrorists have been launching
offensives in certain parts of Mindanao. The NPAs forged a
common front with the Muslim rebels to remove the
allegiance of Mindanao to the duly-constituted government.
The aforementioned letter of the President also cited the
atrocities the NPAs committed even against civilians:
The NPA has perpetrated a total of at least three

hundred eighty-five (385) atrocities (both terrorism and
guerilla warfare) in Mindanao, which resulted in forty-one
(41) Killed-in-Action and sixty-two (62) Wounded-in-Action
on the part of government forces. On the part of the
civilians, these atrocities resulted in the killing of twenty-
three (23) and the wounding of six (6) persons. The most
recent was the ambush in Talakag, Bukidnon on 09
November 2017, resulting in the killing of one (1) PNP
personnel and the wounding of three (3) others, as well as
the killing of a four (4)- month-old infant and the
wounding of two (2) civilians.
78. Rosales also hazards the opinion that the

government’s ability to respond to the threats posed by
these various groups is appropriately and sufficiently
covered by the President’s calling out power.74
79. What she omits acknowledging is that the

declaration of martial law is a prerogative of the President,
as the Court stressed in Lagman.75
80. The same principle applies, as far as the request

for extension of martial law is concerned. The President has
broad powers to ascertain the most appropriate measure to
deal with the rebellion plaguing Mindanao. Those powers
should not be niggardly construed. After all, it is a Martial
Law far removed from its old version. The President as the
commanding general has the authority to issue orders that
have the effect of law but strictly in a theater of war. He
exercises police power with the military’s assistance to
74
Petition in G.R. No. 236145, p. 32
75
Supra, citing Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary Reyes, G.R. Nos. 159085, 159103, 159185, and 159196,
February 3, 2004.
32
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
ensure public safety, among others. He would not be able to

do this by just exercising his “calling out” power.
81. For their part, Cullamat, et al. claim that public

safety does not require the further extension of martial law.
They allege that the instances cited for the extension show
several protracted incidents of violence and lawlessness that
is well within the powers and authority of government armed
forces and police force to suppress without resort to
extraordinary powers.76 This is wrong.
82. The effect on public safety of the rebellion being

waged by the various rebel groups in Mindanao cannot be
peremptorily dismissed. Public safety “involves the
prevention of and protection from events that could
endanger the safety of the general public from significant
danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or
disasters.”77 Deference and respect should be accorded to
the President’s decisions on military affairs as he is in the
best position to make these decisions in our constitutional
structure of government. Apart from a wide array of
information before him, the President also has the right,
prerogative, and the means to access vital, relevant, and
confidential data, concomitant with his position as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.78 The petitioners
failed to show that the NPA attacks caused only military
casualties and avoided harming civilians or destroying
private property.
83. The existence of sufficient facts to justify the

approved extension is not even contested by the petitioners,
who cited some of these facts in their petition, viz:
53. A litany of alleged “skirmishes” does not

necessarily constitute armed public uprising against the
government.
54. They may only indicate banditry, lawless violence

and terroristic acts of remnants or residue of vanquished
combatants.
76
Petition in G.R. No. 236061, p. 31, par. 73.
77
Lagman v. Medialdea, supra.
78
Id.
33
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
55. They could also be indicative of the revival of

acts of violence by CCP-NPA cabals reliving their fifty-year
old “rebellion” which appears to be doomed for lack of
popular support and the necessary wherewithal against the
superior armaments of government forces.79
….
115. It is well settled that the President need not

immediately declare martial law or seek its extension
because he is empowered as Commander-in-Chief
“whenever it becomes necessary” to “call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. (Section 18 of Article VII)
116. There is more reason for the President to

exercise his “calling out” power to prevent and subdue the
threats of lawless violence by mere remnants or residue of
vanquished terrorist groups.
118. The extension of martial law and the

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
against remnants of terrorists groups is akin to killing a fly
with a sledgehammer.80
84. Since Cullamat, et al. admit the existence of

rebellion in Mindanao, they cannot begrudge the Congress
from agreeing to the extension of the proclamation and
suspension in the interest of public safety. The danger posed
by rebellion on public safety cannot be discounted. The
crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.
Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion, though crimes in
themselves, are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
rebellion.81 As rebellion is a continuing offense, the armed
hostilities and the acts in furtherance thereof are equally
part of the continuing rebellion until quashed.82
85. It is not as if the Congress can throw caution to

the winds and just dismiss the persistence of rebellion as
something that has existed for decades. The following
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution Commission
recognized that the legislature cannot refuse to extend
Martial Law if the rebellion persists:
79
Petition in G.R. No. 236061 at pars. 53 – 55, pp. 14 & 15.
80
Id. at pars. 114, 115, & 118, p. 27.
81
Id.
82
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-61388, April 20, 1983.
34
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
MR. MAAMBONG: Just one inquiry. I do not want to engage

in nitpicking, but when we say "FOR A PERIOD TO BE
DETERMINED BY CONGRESS," can Congress do it by law or
by resolution, because there are certain acts to be done by
Congress which may be done by resolution and some done
by law?
FR. BERNAS: By resolution, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you very much.
FR. BERNAS: If it is done by law, it would need a

cumbersome process of three Readings plus the approval
of the President.
MR. PADILLA: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA: According to Commissioner Concepcion,

our former Chief Justice, the declaration of martial law or
is essentially an executive act. If that be so, and especially
under the following clause: "if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it," I do not see
why the period must be determined by the Congress. We
are turning a purely executive act to a legislative act.
FR. BERNAS: I would believe what the former Chief

Justice said about the initiation being essentially an
executive act, but what follows after the initiation is
something that is participated in by Congress.
MR. CONCEPCION: If I may add a word. The one who

will do the fighting is the executive but, of course, it is
expected that if the Congress wants to extend, it will
extend for the duration of the fighting. If the fighting
goes on, I do not think it is fair to assume that the
Congress will refuse to extend the period, especially
since in this matter the Congress must act at the
instance of the executive. He is the one who is
supposed to know how long it will take him to fight.
Congress may reduce it, but that is without prejudice to
his asking for another extension, if necessary.83 (Emphasis
supplied)
86. It is not the place of the petitioners to dictate on

the President which of the three Commander-in-Chief
83
July 31, 1986, R.C.C. No. 44.
35
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
powers is most appropriate in dealing with the ongoing

rebellion. Neither can the petitioners ask the Court to nullify
the extension on the flimsy ground that they believe that the
exercise of a more benign Commander-in-Chief power would
suffice. Lagman84 already debunked the argument in this
wise:
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President,

as Commander-in- Chief, a 'sequence' of 'graduated
power[s]'. From the most to the least benign, these are:
the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare
martial law." It must be stressed, however, that the
graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and
effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence,
arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief
must follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does
not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President
decides which power to choose.
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the

Constitution with the President as Commander-in-Chief; it
therefore necessarily follows that the power and
prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a
mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether the
situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of
martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President.
The power to choose, initially, which among these
extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions
is a judgment call on the part of the President. As
Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to
include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats
that endanger the government, and the very integrity of
the State.
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial

review does not extend to calibrating the President's
decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to
avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so
would be tantamount to an incursion into the
exclusive domain of the Executive and an
infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least
initially, lies with the President.85
84
Supra.
85
Id.
36
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
87. Moreover, the claim of the petitioners that the

rebellion that justifies an extension of martial law must
pertain to exactly the same rebellion that was used as the
basis for the initial proclamation of martial law results from a
patently wrong understanding of Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution. 86
88. Under Section 18, the extension of the martial

law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is justified as a long as there is rebellion and the
public safety requires them. The terms "the" and "persists"
do not require that the group that started the rebellion
should be the same group that should continue the uprising.
Otherwise, it would lead to an absurd situation where the
President has to proclaim martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus each time a new group
of rebels emerge during the course of the initial
proclamation of martial law.
89. Indisputably, Section 18 of Article VII grants the

Congress the authority to determine the period of time for
which the martial law proclamation and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be extended.
The mere fact that the Congress extended the period to one
year, or until December 31, 2018, is not a valid basis for
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Congress: no less
than the Constitution grants the Congress the power to
determine the period of extension.
90. It is patent from the Resolution of Both Houses

No. 4, which was adopted by the House of Representatives
and the Senate in a Joint Session on December 13, 2017,
that the decision to extend martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was reached by
both houses of the Congress only after a thorough
discussion and extensive debate on the matter, to wit:
WHEREAS, on December 13, 2017, after thorough

discussion and extensive debate, the Congress of the
Philippines in a Joint Session, by two hundred forty (240)
affirmative votes comprising the majority of all its
Members, has determined that rebellion persists, and that
86
Petition in G.R. No. 236155, pars. 79-82, pp. 32-33.
37
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
public safety indubitably requires the further extension of

the Proclamation of Martial Law and the Suspension of the
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and the House of

Representatives in a Joint Session Assembled, To further
extend Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, entitled
"Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao" for a period of one (1) year from January 1,
2018 to December 31, 2018. 87
91. Judicial power to stay an act of Congress, like

judicial power to hold an act unconstitutional, is an awesome
responsibility calling for the utmost circumspection in its
exercise."88 Thus, the petitions should have at the very least
provided the Court sufficient evidence for the exercise of its
awesome power to revoke the acts of its two other co-equal
branches of Government.
c. The principle of
conclusiveness of judgment
bars the relitigation of the
issue of actual rebellion in
Mindanao.
92. In Lagman v. Medialdea89 and Padilla v.

Congress,90 the Court held that “the President, in issuing
Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to
show that actual rebellion exists.”
93. The rulings in Lagman and Padilla should have laid

to rest the issue of whether rebellion exists in Mindanao.
Unperturbed, the petitioners again question the sufficiency
of the President’s factual basis in determining the existence
of rebellion in Mindanao. They claim that “[t]he President
and his advisers failed to present validated and verifiable
facts evincing the existence of actual rebellion,”91 in
87
6th and 7th paragraphs of the Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 dated December 13, 2017.
88
Vera vs. Hon. Arca, G.R. No. L-25721, May 26, 1969.
89
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017 [Decision]; December 5, 2017 [Resolution]
90
G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017.
91
Petition in G. R. No. 235935, p. 23.
38
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
disregard of the principle of res judicata under Section 47,

Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
94. Section 47(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court

states:
In any other litigation between the same parties or

their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have
been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which
was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.
95. Section 47(c) has the effect of preclusion of

issues.92 Elaborating on this provision, the Court ruled that
by the doctrine of “conclusiveness of judgment,” otherwise
known as the rule of auter action pendant, “issues actually
and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised
in any future case between the same parties involving a
different cause of action.”93
96. Otherwise stated, any fact directly adjudicated

before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on
the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein
and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their
privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two actions is the same.94
97. Inasmuch as the Court already ruled in Lagman95

and Padilla96 that the President had sufficient factual basis to
show that actual rebellion does exist in Mindanao, such issue
can no longer be raised in the present Petition. Relitigating
the same issue sets a bad precedent for endless suits and
runs counter to the principle of judicial economy. This is
especially true considering that the petitioners in the 2017
Lagman case are the same ones now before this Honorable
Court.
92
Enriqueta Rasdas v. Jaime Estenor, G.R. No. 157605, December 13, 2005.
93
Id. citing Chua v. Victorio, G.R. No. 157568, May 18, 2004, and Section 47(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.
94
Id. citing Dapar v. Biascan, G.R. No. 141880, September 27, 2004.
95
G.R. No. 231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017 [Decision]; December 5, 2017 [Resolution].
96
G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017.
39
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
98. Indeed, any resolution of the Court should no

longer touch on the existence of rebellion. In resolving the
instant case, the Court should confine itself to the issue of
whether the rebellion in Mindanao has been completely
quelled. The petitioners themselves admit that the activities
of the communist rebel groups like the NPA constitute a
rebellion.97 This is a judicial admission. It requires no proof.
What the Court has to resolve is the issue of whether public
safety requires the extension of martial law.
d. The sixty-day period

prescribed in Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution does not
apply to the extension.
99. Contrary to the stance of the petitioners, the

sixty-day period imposed by Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution upon the President’s initial proclamation
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not similarly apply to the period of
extension that the Congress may grant on such proclamation
or extension,98 and the proclamation or suspension may be
extended more than once.99
100. The petitioners admit that the proposal to limit the

period of extension to sixty days made by Commissioner
Suarez was not even adopted by the plenary. 100 Besides,
Commissioner Suarez explained that his concern in
proposing a definite period of extension was not so much
that Congress would be extending martial law “in
perpetuity,” as the petitioners make it appear, but that there
was no certainty as to who between the President and the
Congress will determine the period of extension.
101. This led present-day constitutionalist,

Commissioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, to suggest the addition
of the clause “for a period to be determined by the
Congress” to accentuate Congress’ role and absolute
97
Petition in G.R. No. 236061, par. 47, p. 13.
98
Id., p. 20.
99
Id. at 22.
100
Id., p. 21 citing Record of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, Vol. II, p. 509.
40
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
discretion in determining the period of extension.

Interestingly, the learned Commissioner Blas F. Ople
cautioned against unnecessarily emasculating the martial
law powers of the President and empowering “an intractable
Congress that may be dominated by opposition parties.” In
the end, Commissioner Suarez acceded to the position of
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, subject only to
Commissioner Bernas’ suggested amendment which the
plenary adopted, thus:
MR. SUAREZ. That is correct. I think the two of them

must have to agree on the period; but it is theoretically
possible that when the President writes a note to the
Congress, because it would be at the instance of the
President that the extension would have to be granted by
Congress, it is possible that the period for the
extension may be there. It is also possible that it
may not be there. That is the reason why we want to
make it clear that there must be a reasonable period
for the extension. So, if my suggestion is not acceptable
to the Committee, may I request that a voting be held on
it, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, may I just propose

something because I see the problem. Suppose we were to
say “or extend the same FOR A PERIOD TO BE
DETERMINED BY CONGRESS” - that gives Congress a little
flexibility on just how long the extension should be.
MR. OPLE. Yes, but still the idea is to preserve the

principle of collective judgment of that point upon the
expiration of the 60 days when, upon his own initiative,
the President seeks for an extension of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, the participation of the President is

there but by giving the final decision to Congress, we
are also preserving the idea that the President may not
revoke what Congress has decided upon.
MR. OPLE. The reason for my concern, Madam

President, is that when we put all of these encumbrances
on the President and Commander-in-Chief during an actual
invasion and rebellion, given an intractable Congress that
may be dominated by opposition parties, we may be
actually impelling the President to use the sword of
Alexander to cut the Gordian knot by just declaring a
revolutionary government that sets him free to deal with
41
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
the invasion or the insurrection. That is the reason I am in

favor of the present formulation. However, if
Commissioner Suarez insists on his amendment, I do not
think I will stand in the way. Thank you, Madam President.
MR. SUAREZ. We will accept the committee

suggestion, subject to style later on….101
102. The first principle of constitutional construction

demands that when the statute, or in this case, the
Constitution, is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.102 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from
the words of the Constitution, there should be no
departure.103
103. Pursuant to the verba legis rule, the period for

which the Congress can extend the proclamation of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is a matter that the august body can itself define,
unshackled by any predetermined length of time, contrary to
the petitioners’ erroneous submission.
104. In other words, the Congress is given a free hand

in determining the period of extension, and did exercise its
wise discretion in extending the proclamation of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao until December 31, 2018. In
fact, the Resolution that called for both houses of Congress
to convene in joint session on December 13, 2017 at 9:00
a.m. in the session hall of the House of Representatives
stated that both Houses of Congress will “deliberate on the
request of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to extend further
the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus until 31 December
2018 or for such other period of time as the Congress may
determine.”104
101
Record of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, Vol. II, pp. 508 – 509.
102
Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017.
103
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003; Chavez v. Judicial and
Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
104
See Annex “A” of the Petition in G.R. No. 235935.
42
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
105. Surprisingly, the petitioners claim that the clause

“in the same manner” found in Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution imposes a limitation of sixty days on the
Congress’ extension of martial law in the same manner as
the sixty-day limitation on the President’s initial
proclamation and suspension. This is a misreading of the
Constitution and is contrary to the principle of reddendo
singula singulis.
106. By the maxim reddendo singula singulis, or

“referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression
to its appropriate object,” or “let each be put in its proper
place, that is, the words should be taken
distributively,”105
the words in different parts of a statute
must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to
each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible,
rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict
grammatical construction demands otherwise.106
107. Properly construed, the phrase “in the same

manner” in the last sentence of the first paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution must be
understood as referring to the immediately preceding
sentence on the manner by which Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension. In other words, in granting an
extension of the proclamation or suspension, Congress must
observe the same manner of voting as in revocation, that is,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session.
108. The Congress indubitably voted jointly in regular

session, and by a vote of 240-27, more than the required
minimum number of votes required by the Constitution,
granted the extension sought by the President. In the
House, 226 voted for an extension, and 23 voted against it.
In the Senate, 14 senators voted in favor of the extension
and 4 voted against it. The extension, thus, was arrived at
by Congress in compliance with the manner of voting
required by the 1987 Constitution.
105
People v. Tamani, G.R. Nos. L-22160 & L-22161, January 21, 1974 citing 76 C. J. S. 175.
106
City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005.
43
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
109. Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado sufficiently

explained during the deliberations on the difference between
the period for the President’s initial proclamation or
suspension, and the Congressional concurrence on the
period of extension thereof, to wit:
MR. REGALADO. In the first situation where the President

declares martial law, there had to be a prescribed period
because there was no initial concurrence requirement. And
if there was no concurrence, the martial law period ends at
60 days. Thereafter, if they intend to extend the same
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the proclamation
of martial law, it is upon the initiative of the President this
time, and with the prior concurrence of Congress. So, the
period of extension has already been taken into
account by both the Executive and the Legislative,
unlike the first situation where the President acted
alone without prior concurrence. The reason for the
limitation in the first does not apply to the
extension.107
110. That said, the petitioners’ apprehension that the

extension of the proclamation and suspension would be
“inordinately long” and “in perpetuity” is obviated by two
constitutional mechanisms that safeguard against any
possible abuse of authority on the part of the Executive. As
sufficiently explained during the constitutional deliberations,
legislative imprimatur is indispensable before an extension
can be granted. Moreover, the extension is subject to
judicial scrutiny upon the exercise of any citizen of his or her
right to question the sufficiency of its factual basis, as
exemplified by the very action now before this Honorable
Court.
e. The Congress has the

absolute discretion to determine
the period of extension.
111. The proclamation of martial law is a matter

entirely different from its extension. Its declaration is an act
of the President; on the other hand, its extension is the
prerogative of the Congress.
107
Record of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, Vol. II, pp. 508 – 509; Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.
44
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
112. A proclamation of martial law takes effect

immediately at the President’s instance when he determines
that there is a rebellion or invasion and public safety
requires that the Philippines or any part thereof be placed
under martial law. On the other hand, an extension of
martial law is initiated by the President but takes effect upon
the Congress’ issuance of a resolution that rebellion and
invasion persists and public safety requires that the
Philippines or any part thereof be placed under martial law.
113. Lagman108 explained that the proclamation of

Martial Law has a maximum period of sixty days; however,
the Congress may revoke or extend it:
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides

that ''the President … may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippine or any part thereof under martial
law…. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,
if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it."
From the foregoing, it is clear that the President's

declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is effective for 60
days. As aptly described by Commissioner Monsod, "this
declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a maximum
of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically
terminates." Any extension thereof should be determined
by Congress. The act of declaring martial law and/or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by
the President, however, is separate from the approval of
the extension of the declaration and/or suspension by
Congress. The initial declaration of martial law and/or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is determined
solely by the President, while the extension of the
declaration and/or suspension, although initiated by the
President, is approved by Congress.
In this case, Proclamation No. 216 issued on May 23,

2017 expired on July 23, 2017. Consequently, the issue of
whether there were sufficient factual for the issuance of
the said Proclamation has been rendered moot by its
expiration. We have consistently ruled that a case
becomes moot and academic when it "ceases to present a
108
Supra.
45
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so

that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value.”
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, "the martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus now in effect in Mindanao no longer finds
basis in Proclamation No. 216" but in Resolution of
Both Houses No. 11 (RBH No. 11) adopted on July
22, 2017. RBH No. 11 is totally different and distinct
from Proclamation No. 216. The former is a joint
executive-legislative act while the latter is purely
executive in nature.109
114. The determination of the length of the extension is

a power vested only in the Congress. It involves the exercise
of its wisdom. The issue is a political question that judicial
review cannot delve into. As the Court aptly stated in the
case of Angara v. Electoral Commission:110
115. [W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate

constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them ... the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because
the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative departments of the
governments of the government.
109
Id.; Emphasis supplied.
110
G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936.
46
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
f. Allegations of abuse and

human rights violations cannot
nullify the extension.
116. Cullamat, et al., mistakenly claim that there is no

need for the proclamation of martial law because the
absence thereof has not restrained the AFP from bombing,
killing or arresting the Maute, BIFF and other armed
groups.111 Allegedly, martial law is not intended for these
armed groups but is actually directed against civilians who
are critical of the incumbent administration.112 Human rights
violations supposedly intensified and escalated when
President Duterte imposed martial law and suspended the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.113
117. In an attempt to substantiate the alleged human

rights violations, Cullamat, et al. mention a report prepared
by Kalinaw Mindanaw114 and by Karapatan.115 Nevertheless,
the petitioners did not attach any document to support their
claim and thus cannot substantiate the alleged human rights
violations. Basic is the rule in evidence that the burden of proof
lies upon him who asserts it, not upon him who denies, since,
by the nature of things, he who denies a fact cannot produce
any proof of it.116
118. The allegations of the leftist organizations above are

also contradicted by the facts. In the letter of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Chief of Staff Rey Leonardo Guerrero to
the President requesting the extension of the proclamation
of martial law,117 there was a categorical statement that
“[i]n seeking for another extension, the AFP is ready, willing
and able to perform anew its mandated task in the same
manner that it had dutifully done so for the whole duration
of Martial Law to date, without any reported human rights
violation and/or incident of abuse of authority.”118 According
to the Armed Forces of the Philippines Human Rights Office,
there are no formal complaints filed in their office for
111
112
Id., par. 76 at 20; par. 84, at 23.
113
Id. at 22, par. 80.
114
115
Id. at 24, par. 87.
116
MOF Company, Inc. v. Shin Yang Brokerage Corporation, G.R. No. 172822, December 18, 2009.
117
See Annex C-2 of the Petition in G.R. No. 235935.
118
Id. at 4; emphasis supplied.
47
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
violation of human rights against any member or personnel

of the AFP during the implementation of martial law in
Mindanao.119 The categorical statement of the AFP, who have
in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties which the records failed to rebut,120 should
prevail over any baseless and unsubstantiated allegation of
the petitioners.
119. Assuming that there were human rights violations

during the period of effectivity of martial law, the Court
already categorically ruled in Lagman121 that the alleged
violations must be addressed in a separate proceeding:
Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as

vague, and thus void, on the ground that it has no
guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters
within the entire Mindanao region. Besides, operational
guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the
implementation of the proclamation. In Part III, we
declared that judicial review covers only the sufficiency of
information or data available to or known to the President
prior to, or at the time of, the declaration or suspension.
And, as will be discussed exhaustively in Part VII, the
review will be confined to the proclamation itself and the
Report submitted to Congress.
Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to

determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or
operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and
other orders issued after the proclamation for being
irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under
the said orders in violation of the Constitution and
the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights
violations, should be resolved in a separate
proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court
wades into these areas, it would be deemed as
trespassing into the sphere that is reserved
exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power
to revoke.”122
120. No currency can likewise be given to the argument

of Cullamat, et al., that the President asked for the
119
Letter from AFPHRO to Office of the Judge Advocate General dated January 11, 2018, attached as
Annex “6” of the Comment.
120
G.R. No. 160718, 12 May 2010.
121
G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017.
122
Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
48
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
extension of martial law as a subterfuge to quell legitimate

dissent. The petitioners cite as “proof” online news articles
of the President’s supposed pronouncements before the
press against groups such as Piston, Karapatan, Tindig
Pilipino and Kilusang Mayo Uno.123 The petitioners also cite a
news article by Inquirer entitled “Makabayan flags rights
violations under martial law in Mindanao” in support of the
allegation that Kabataan Partylist representative Sarah Jane
Elago submitted a report to President Duterte about human
rights violations as a consequence of martial law in
Mindanao.124
121. The Court had already settled in Lagman125 that

“news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are
thus without any probative value, unless offered for a
purpose other than proving the truth of the matter
asserted.” In fact, the Court stated in Lagman that online
news articles are without probative value. The same well-
settled ruling should apply with equal force now.
122. In any event, the question of whether the

Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend the
proclamation and suspension may be resolved without
delving into matters outside of what was considered by the
Congress, including, among others, the President’s
pronouncements before the press. Stated otherwise, any
such statement or act on the part of the President is
irrelevant in arriving at the determination of whether
rebellion does persist, and that public safety requires
extension.
123. It is also specious for Cullamat, et al. to assert

that the inclusion of the phrase, “coddlers, supporters, and
financiers” of armed rebel groups (in the Letter of the
Secretary of National Defense to the President
recommending the extension of the proclamation of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Mindanao) further evinces the lack of any
legitimate aim for such extension.126
123
Petition in G.R. No. 236061, pars. 79 and 80, pp. 20 – 21.
124
Id. at 22, par. 80.
125
Supra.
126
Petition in G.R. No. 236061, p. 23, pars. 85 and 86.
49
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
124. The Court already pronounced in Lagman127 that

“rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could only refer
to rebellion as defined under Article 134 of the [Revised
Penal Code].” In this regard, Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, provides for
those persons who may be held liable for rebellion, as
follows:
Art. 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup

d'etat. — Any person who promotes, maintains, or
heads rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Any person merely participating or executing

the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion temporal.
Any person who leads or in any manner directs or

commands others to undertake a coup d'etat shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Any person in the government service who

participates, or executes directions or commands of others
in undertaking a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its maximum period.
Any person not in the government service who

participates, or in any manner supports, finances, abets or
aids in undertaking a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period.
When the rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat shall

be under the command of unknown leaders, any person
who in fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed
receipts and other documents issued in their name, as
performed similar acts, on behalf of the rebels shall be
deemed a leader of such a rebellion, insurrection, or coup
d'etat.128
125. It is in the context of the Revised Penal Code that

the term “coddlers, supporters, and financiers”129 of armed
rebel groups in Secretary Lorenzana’s letter should be
understood. Thus, even those who are merely participating
or executing the commands of others in a rebellion as
coddlers, supporters and financiers should be penalized
127
Supra.
128
Emphasis supplied.
129
Petition in G.R. No. 236061, p. 23, pars. 85 and 86; See Letter dated 4 December 2017.
50
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
under the crime of rebellion. The President, after all, has the
solemn duty to faithfully execute all laws,130 and may seek
the prosecution and arrest of anyone whose acts constitute
rebellion.
126. As the Court held in Lagman,131 “the importance of

martial law in the context of our society should outweigh
one's prejudices and apprehensions against it. The
significance of martial law should not be undermined by
unjustified fears and past experience. After all, martial law is
critical and crucial to the promotion of public safety, the
preservation of the nation's sovereignty and ultimately, the
survival of our country. It is vital for the protection of the
country not only against internal enemies but also against
those enemies lurking from beyond our shores. As such,
martial law should not be cast aside, or its scope and
potency limited and diluted, based on bias and
unsubstantiated assumptions.”
f.1. It is not the intention of the

extension to violate human
rights or quell legitimate
redress of grievances against
the government.
127. The government does not intend to violate human

rights or quell the legitimate redress of grievances through
the extension of the proclamation and suspension.
128. The fear of Cullamat, et al. of intensified human

rights violations arising from the declaration and extension
of martial law is unfounded. The 1987 Constitution itself lays
down the safeguards to protect human rights in a state of
martial law. For one, the Constitution, particularly the Bill of
Rights, continues to operate. For another, the functioning of
civil courts is not supplanted. The suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus applies only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
130
1987 Constitution, Article VII, Sec. 17.
131
Supra.
51
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
connected with the invasion. Finally, any person arrested or

detained shall be judicially charged within three days.132
129. Apart from the constitutional safeguards, there are

various statutes that protect and uphold human rights
during martial law. These include R.A. No. 7438 on persons
under custodial investigation, R.A. No. 9372 on persons
detained for the crime of terrorism, and R.A. No. 9745 on
the non-employment of physical or mental torture on an
arrested individual, among others.
130. In his Separate Concurring Opinion in Lagman,133

Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr. enumerated other statutes
intended for the protection of human rights. His list of laws
was not confined to the rights of the accused: R.A. No. 8371
or the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997, R.A. No. 9201
or the National Human Rights Consciousness Week Act of
2002, R.A. No. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2003, R.A. No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women
and their Children Act of 2004, R.A. No. 9344 or the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, R.A. No. 9710 or the Magna
Carta of Women, R.A. No. 9851 or the Philippine Act on
Crimes Against Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other
Crimes Against Humanity, R.A. No. 10168 or the Philippine
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2012, R.A.
No. 10353 or the Anti-Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearance Act of 2012, R.A. No. 10364 or the Expanded
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012, R.A. No. 10368 or
the Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of
2013, and R.A. No. 10530 or the Red Cross and Other
Emblems Act of 2013. These laws remain in full force and
effect during a state of martial law. There is nothing in the
1987 Constitution that prescribes the suspension of their
effectivity during martial law.
131. Human rights safeguards against abuses during

martial law are undeniably in place. This is precisely how the
framers envisioned a state of martial law under the 1987
Constitution. Thus Lagman elucidated:
132
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.
133
Supra.
52
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the

Constitution placed several safeguards which effectively
watered down the power to declare martial law. The 1987
Constitution "[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-
Chief because of [the] experience with the previous
regime." Not only were the grounds limited to actual
invasion or rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at
60 days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at
the same time, it is subject to the veto powers of the Court
and Congress.
Commissioner Monsod, who, incidentally, is a

counsel for the Mohamad Petition, even exhorted his
colleagues in the Constitutional Convention to look at
martial law from a new perspective by elaborating on the
sufficiency of the proposed safeguards:
MR. MONSOD…
Second, we have been given a spectre of non

sequitur, that the mere declaration of martial
law for a fixed period not exceeding 60 days,
which is subject to judicial review, is going to
result in numerous violations of human rights,
the predominance of the military forever and in
untold sufferings. Madam President, we are
talking about invasion and rebellion. We may
not have any freedom to speak of after 60
days, if we put as a precondition the
concurrence of Congress. That might prevent
the President from acting at that time in order
to meet the problem. So I would like to
suggest that, perhaps, we should look at this
in its proper perspective. We are only looking
at a very specific case. We are only looking at
a case of the first 60 days at its maximum.
And we are looking at actual invasion and
rebellion, and there are other safeguards in
those cases.
Even Bishop Bacani was convinced that the 1987

Constitution has enough safeguards against presidential
abuses and commission of human rights violations. In
voting yes for the elimination of the requirement of prior
concurrence of Congress, Bishop Bacani stated, viz.:
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, just two sentences. The

reason I vote II yes is that despite my concern
for human rights, I believe that a good
President can also safeguard human rights and
human lives as well. And I do not want to
53
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
unduly emasculate the powers of the

President….
Commissioner Delos Reyes shared the same sentiment, to

wit:
MR. DE LOS REYES. May I explain my vote,

Madam President.
…. The power of the President to impose

martial law is doubtless of a very high and
delicate nature. A free people are naturally
jealous of the exercise of military power, and
the power to impose martial law is certainly
felt to be one of no ordinary magnitude. But as
presented by the Committee, there are many
safeguards: 1) it is limited to 60 days; 2)
Congress can revoke it; 3) the Supreme Court
can still review as to the sufficiency of factual
basis; and 4) it does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution. To repeat what I have
quoted when I interpellated Commissioner
Monsod, it is said that the power to impose
martial law is dangerous to liberty and may be
abused. All powers may be abused if placed in
unworthy hands. But it would be difficult, we
think, to point out any other hands in which
this power will be more safe and at the same
time equally effectual. When citizens of the
State are in arms against each other and the
constituted authorities are unable to execute
the laws, the action of the President must be
prompt or it is of little value….
132. There is also no basis in the assertion of Cullamat,

et al. that martial law is directed against critics of the
regime. In fact, the President’s letter134 to Congress did not
refer to the “critics of the regime”135 and “civilians who are
critical of the present government”136 as the targets of
martial law.
133. On the contrary, the President’s letter identified

the following groups that need to be eradicated: “DAESH-
inspired Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other
like-minded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and
134
Annex “A,” Petition in G.R. No. 236061.
135
Petition in G.R. No. 236061, par. 83.
136
Id. at par. 84.
54
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist terrorists

(CTs), and their coddlers, supporters, and financiers ….”137
f.2. Fear of abuse does not

invalidate laws and
government actions.
134. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network,

Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, leftist organizations who
petitioned the nullification of R.A. 9372 complained of
surveillance and tagging. The Court ruled thus:
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out
that petitioners have yet to show
any connection between the
purported surveillance and the implementation of RA
9372.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE,

KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA,
ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-
organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to
take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of
tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed
wing, the New People’s Army (NPA). The tagging,
according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of
proscription without following the procedure under the
law. The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461
pleads the same allegations.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged

tagging of petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have

three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well
and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially
known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
137
Annex “A,” Petition in G.R. No. 236061.
55
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial

court; or(2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take

judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally
in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they
may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind
as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known,
and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or
other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they
are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of
the common knowledge of every person. As the common
knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of
particular facts have been judicially noticed as being
matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take
judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is
dependent on the existence or non-existence of a
fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge.
No ground was properly established by petitioners

for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners apprehension is
insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific
charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed
against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any
claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating
from the so-called tagging.
The same is true with petitioners KMU,

NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp
as well on their supposed link to the CPP and
NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of
specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury
to their organization and members.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially

declared terrorist organization, the United States of
America (US) and the European Union (EU) have both
classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign
terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint
statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and
Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo
Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of
the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. Such
statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed
before the courts an application to declare the CPP
and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or
outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA
56
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July
2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have
conducted their activities fully and freely without any
threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription
under RA 9372.
….
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions

have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory
actions characterized by double contingency, where both
the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the
anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely
theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA

9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the
realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility
is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power
granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must
be anchored on real events before courts may step in to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.138
II. NO GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION CAN BE ASCRIBED
TO THE LEADERSHIP AND
SUPERMAJORITY OF CONGRESS
FOR FURTHER EXTENDING THE
PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL
LAW AND THE SUSPENSION OF
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS IN THE ENTIRE
MINDANAO FOR ONE YEAR.
135. The Congress did not commit grave abuse of

discretion in extending the proclamation and suspension.
136. To be sure, Cullamat, et al. assert that the Senate

and the House of Representatives committed grave abuse of
discretion when they voted to extend martial law and to
continue the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Mindanao until December 31, 2018.139 On
138
G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010; Emphases and underscoring in the original; citations omitted.
139
57
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
the basis of the imputed arbitrariness, the petitioners ask

the Court to nullify the extension of martial law and the
continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
137. In turn, Monsod, et al. assail the decision of

Congress to extend martial law, arguing that it was reached
perfunctorily, "highlighted by the very limited time given to
legislators to propound searching questions to respondent
Chief of Staff or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
Secretary of National Defense and other resource persons of
the government during the deliberations to actually
determine the factual basis for the extension of martial law
in Mindanao.”140
138. Assuming that the remedy of the writ of certiorari

jurisdiction may be resorted to by the petitioners, the Court
cannot be compelled to exercise its power of judicial review
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which
reads:
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate

proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
139. Section 18 uses the word “may.” In statutory

construction, the word "may" has generally been construed
as permissive. 141 It imports a directory and not
mandatory nature.142 When used in a statute, it is
permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the
word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which
may be enforced.143
140. Cullamat, et al. did not provide the facts showing

the supposed arbitrariness of the Congress. Monsod, et al.,
for their part, failed to provide specific details as to the
140
Petition in G.R. No. 236155, p. 31 (paragraph 75).
141
Vivares v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155408, February 13, 2008.
142
See Office of the Ombudsman vs. Andutan, Jr., G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011.
143
Id.
58
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
alleged "limited time" given to the legislators to propound

searching questions to respondent Chief of Staff or the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Secretary of National
Defense and other resource persons of the government.
III. THE COURT CANNOT REVIEW

THE MANNER IN WHICH CONGRESS
DELIBERATED UPON AND
APPROVED THE PRESIDENT’S
REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF THE
PROCLAMATION AND SUSPENSION.
a. The period of extension of

Congress was not unduly
constricted.
141. The petitioners baselessly decry the ”constricted”

period allocated for the interpellation and deliberation of
Executive’s resource panel.144 They also bewail that under
the Joint Session Rules, only a maximum of one minute is
given for any member of congress to explain his or her
vote.145 Allegedly, this amounted to grave abuse of
discretion and inordinate alacrity.146
142. This is much ado about nothing. The

determination of the factual basis of the extension or
revocation of Martial Law is within the sphere of power of
the Congress. The power necessarily includes the process
and rules for its deliberation which is governed by Section
16(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
143. Section 16(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

provides:
Each House may determine the rules of its

proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
144
145
Section 14, Rule VIII
146
59
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
144. In Pimentel, et al. v. Senate Committee of the

Whole, etc.,147 citing Dela Paz v. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations,148 the Court held that “[t]his provision has
been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary
authority to the House of Congress in the formulation,
adoption and promulgation of its own rules,” viz:
First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine

Constitution states: "Each House shall determine the rules
of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a

grant of full discretionary authority to the House of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of
its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is
generally exempt from judicial supervision and
interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use of the power as will constitute a
denial of due process.
The issue partakes of the nature of a political

question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government.
Further, pursuant to his constitutional grant of virtually
unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the
Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any
time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of
quorum, voting and publication.
145. Each house of the Congress has the innate power

to promulgate its own rules of procedure; both houses
decided to come up with the Joint Rules. These Rules were
the subject of several deliberations in both Houses prior to
their adoption. It cannot therefore be said that the Rules
were the result of a swift and wanton action from the
supermajority to silence the “authentic minority.”
146. It cannot therefore be said that the interpellation

and deliberation of Executive’s resource panel is constricted.
There is also no need to explain one’s vote: it is not a
constitutional requirement. What is undeniable is that the
Congress deals with the wisdom of the extension and the
147
G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
148
G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009.
60
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
way by which it considers the request for extension is

unfettered.
147. In his Separate Opinion in Lagman,149 Justice

Leonen stated that recognized that there are no constraints
when the Congress reviews the recommendation of the
President for the extension:
The framers also intended for the Congress to have a

considerably broader review power than the Judiciary and
to play an active role following the President's
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. Unlike the Court which can
only act upon an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, Congress may, by voting jointly and upon a
majority vote, revoke such proclamation or suspension.
The decision to revoke is not premised on how factually
correct the President's invocation of his Commander-in-
Chief powers are, rather, Congress is permitted a wider
latitude in how it chooses to respond to the President's
proclamation or suspension. While the Court is limited to
reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis behind the
President's proclamation or suspension, Congress does not
operate under such constraints and can strike down the
President's exercise of his Commander-in-Chief powers as
it pleases without running afoul of the Constitution.
With its veto power and power to extend the

duration of martial law upon the President's initiative and
as a representative of its constituents, Congress is also
expected to continuously monitor and review the situation
on the areas affected by martial law. Unlike the Court
which is mandated to promulgate its decision within thirty
(30) days from the time a petition questioning the
proclamation is filed, Congress is not saddled with a similar
duty. While the Court is mandated to look into the
sufficiency of the factual basis and whether or not the
proclamation was attended with grave abuse of discretion,
Congress deals primarily with the wisdom behind the
proclamation or suspension. Much deference is thus
accorded to Congress and is treated as the President's co-
equal when it comes to determining the wisdom behind the
imposition or continued imposition of martial law or
suspension of the writ.150
149
Supra.
150
Underscoring supplied.
61
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
148. Ineluctably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution

considered the Congress as the President’s co-equal in
determining the wisdom behind the imposition or continued
imposition of martial law. Thus, it is only proper that the
Congress be given wider latitude decide how it should
respond to the President’s extension of the proclamation and
suspension. This includes deciding the length of the
interpellation and debate and the explanation of votes.
b. The extension was not

approved with undue haste.
149. The Congress did not approve the extension of the

proclamation and suspension with undue haste. Seeing
differently, the petitioners anchor their claim of “inordinate
haste” on the Rules of the Joint Session adopted by both
Houses. They contend that the interpellation of resource
persons for “not more than three (3) minutes”151 is an
inordinately short period compared to ordinary legislation
that provides for one to two hours of interpellation and
debate.
150. Their argument is specious. There are no

constitutional parameters for the exercise of those acts. As
discussed above, the Congress has full discretionary
authority to decide how to go about the debates and the
voting. In other words, the issues that the petitioners raise
are political and non-justiciable. The questions presented
essentially go into the wisdom of the congressional action.
151. Furthermore, the extension or revocation of

Martial Law cannot be equated with the process of ordinary
legislation, as this is a direct, if not a special Constitutional
mandate. Under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution only Congress, voting jointly, has the sole
power to extend martial law.152
152. Speed in the conduct of proceedings should not

automatically be attributed to an injudicious performance of
functions:
151
Section 7, Rule IV
152
Section 18, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
62
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s undue

haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the
paramount and constant consideration, with particular
regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case. The
presumption of regularity includes the public officers
official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with
such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to
present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying
of days or numerical calculation.153
153. To follow the petitioners’ logic, if every incumbent

legislative member were to ask probing questions, it would
mean that 24 Senators and at 250 House Representatives
could potentially ask questions. If they were to be given an
hour each to interpellate the resource speakers, it would
take months before the issue could be resolved. It is
misleading to say that the “three-minute rule” is inordinately
short, as the time cap excludes the time within which the
resource persons can answer the questions propounded by
the members of Congress. Given the time sensitive nature of
martial law or its extension, the time cap was necessary in
the interest of expediency.
c. No grave abuse of discretion

can be attributed to the
Congress for the manner by
which it approved the
extension because the Court
itself recognized that such
power is a sovereign act of the
legislature.
154. In Baguilat v. Alvarez,154 the Court recognized the

sole authority of the House of Representatives to determine
the rules of its proceedings, viz:
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI of the

Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole
authority to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its
proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike statutory
laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
153
Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 175057, January 29, 2008; Underscoring supplied.
154
G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017.
63
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are

subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them.' Being merely matters
of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the
courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority
[of the House of Representatives]. " Hence, as a general
rule, "[t]his Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is bound
to protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal
workings of the [House of Representatives]."
155. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,155 the Court also

emphasized that it does not concern itself with
parliamentary rules, which may be waived or disregarded by
the legislature:
In the decided cases,156 the constitutional provision

that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not
successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of
the legislative branch to conduct its business free from
interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision
for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying

forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to
inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the
absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,157 it was held: "At any rate,
courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And
it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken
by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
155
G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997.
156
Citing E.g., United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. 1, 36 L.ED. 321 (1862); Exxon Corp. v.
FTC, 589 F. 2d 582 (1978); Murray v. Buchanan, 674 F. 2d 14 (1982); Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Com'n. 675 F. 2d 1282 (1982). See also Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).
157
Citing 109 Phil. at 870-71. See also EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA 630.
64
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,158 the rules

was stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house
to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its
rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between
the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of
the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed
and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules
is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist,159 it was held: "The

provision that each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere
formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the
body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of
constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority
of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a
determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it
is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any
power, in the transaction of any business, or in the
performance of any duty conferred upon it by the
Constitution."
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore,160

the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The provision for
reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is
therefore entirely within the control of the General
Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded,
but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of
judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last
resort of many states, and also by the United States
Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared
invalid for noncompliance with rules."
In State v. Savings Bank,161 the Supreme Court of

Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: "The
Constitution declares that each house shall determine the
rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers
necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and
158
Citing 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25.
159
Citing 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 (1912).
160
Citing 124 Ohio St. 256, 177 N.E. 910, 911 (1931).
161
Citing 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 (1906).
65
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants

of the House and subject to its authority. This authority
may be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter
clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted
invasion of the independence of the legislative department
for the court to set aside such action as void because it
may think that the House has misconstrued or departed
from its own rules of procedure."
In McDonald v. State,162 the Wisconsin Supreme

Court held: "When it appears that an act was so passed,
no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two
houses have or have not complied strictly with their own
rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its
introduction and final passage. The presumption is
conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has
ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-
compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself, or
the respective branches thereof, and which it or they may
change or suspend at will. If there are any such
adjudications, we decline to follow them."
Schweizer v. Territory163 is illustrative of the rule in

these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for
three readings on separate days before a bill may be
passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso
that in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by
two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff
was convicted in the district court of violation of a law
punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the
gambling statute was not properly passed by the
legislature because the suspension of the rule on three
readings had not been approved by the requisite two-
thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme
Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision

requiring that the legislature should read a bill in
any particular manner. It may, then, read or
deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in
accordance with its own rules, or in violation
thereof, or without making any rules. The
provision of section 17 referred to is merely a
statutory provision for the direction of the
legislature in its action upon proposed measures.
It receives its entire force from legislative
sanction, and it exists only at legislative
pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly
weigh and consider an act, its passage through
the legislature in a hasty manner, might be
162
Citing 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185, 186 (1891).
163
Citing 5 Okl. 297, 47 Pac. 1094 (1897).
66
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
reasons for the governor withholding his

signature thereto; but this alone, even though it
is shown to be a violation of a rule which the
legislature had made to govern its own
proceedings, could be no reason for the court's
refusing its enforcement after it was actually
passed by a majority of each branch of the
legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The
courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself to govern its
deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50
N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187;
State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641;
Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of

the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting
on the power of each House of Congress to determine its
rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character.

The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken
if the requisite number of members have agreed
to a particular measure. The above principle is
subject, however, to this qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects person
other than members of the legislative body the
question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in
a case where private rights are involved.164
In this case no rights of private individuals are

involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute
to this Court. We have no more power to look into the
internal proceedings of a House than members of that
House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no
violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three

departments of our government has its separate sphere
which the others may not invade without upsetting the
164
Citing Fernando, Enrique M., CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED, 188-189
(1977); Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58 (1971).
67
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests.

Due regard for the working of our system of government,
more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to
enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules
of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to
exercise our power.
156. Parliamentary rules being subject to revocation,

modification, or waiver at the pleasure of Congress, their
observance or non-observance is exempt from judicial
scrutiny, being the sovereign act of a co-equal branch of
government.
d. The Court’s review does not

extend to determining which of
the commander-in-chief
powers under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution
the President can exercise
given a set of facts and
conditions.
157. It is within the President’s prerogative which

Commander-in-Chief power to exercise in the event of actual
rebellion, as the Court stressed in Lagman:


situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of
68
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

the State.

decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail
given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be
tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of
the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that
solely, at least initially, lies with the President.165
158. The same principle applies insofar as the

extension of the proclamation and suspension is concerned.
The President has broad powers to ascertain the most
appropriate measure to deal with the rebellion plaguing
Mindanao. Those powers should not be niggardly construed.
After all, it is a martial law far removed from its old version.
The President as the commanding general has the authority
to issue orders that have the effect of law but strictly within
the areas covered by martial law. He exercises police power
with the military’s assistance to ensure public safety, among
others. He would not be able to do this by just exercising his
“calling out” power.
159. During the oral arguments, much of the

interpellation revolved on the question of what specific
martial law powers are needed by the President which
cannot be exercised if the President merely calls out the
armed forces.
160. While the respondents maintain their position that

the choice of which Commander-in-Chief power the
President should exercise is a purely political question, and
thus, outside the ambit of judicial review, the extension of
the proclamation of martial law in the whole of Mindanao is
justified by the need for the armed forces to keep the peace
and enforce the laws therein.
165
Supra, citing Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary Reyes, supra; underscoring supplied.
69
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
161. To better understand the difference between the

calling out power and the power to proclaim martial law,
reference must be made to the dichotomy between civilian
authority and military authority, the former being supreme
over the latter at all times,166 with the President as the head
of both.
162. The duty to maintain general peace and order is

ordinarily lodged in civilian authorities, particularly the PNP
which, under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6975, has the duty to
“[e]nforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection
of lives and properties,” and “[maintain] peace and order
and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety.”
163. On the other hand, Section 3, Article II of the

1987 Constitution provides that the duty of the armed forces
is to secure the sovereignty of the State, and the integrity of
the national territory. When the President calls out the
armed forces in order to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion under Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, the President does exactly what is
expected of the armed forces, i.e., to engage in combat to
secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of its
national territory.
164. When the President declares martial law, he, in

effect, asks the armed forces to assist him in the execution
of civilian functions, except of course, the performance of
legislative and judicial functions which are beyond the pale
of martial law by the express terms of Section 18, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution.
165. This interpretation finds support in the opinion of

former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile167 when he declared, citing American sources, that
“[t]he right to call out the military forces to maintain order
and enforce the law is simply part of the police power.” More
recently, Justice Dante O. Tinga opined in David v. Arroyo168
that “martial law involves the substitution of the military in
the civilian functions of government.”
166
1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 3.
167
G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974.
168
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006.
70
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
166. This is not to suggest, however, that the

proclamation of martial law requires a priori the collapse of
civilian government. As Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro opined
in Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,169 “the fact that courts are open
cannot be accepted as proof that the rebellion and
insurrection, which compellingly called for the declaration of
martial law, no longer imperil the public safety.”
167. More importantly, martial law is a tool precisely to

ensure the survival of the State. As such, while the
proclamation of martial law under the 1987 Constitution
requires the existence of actual rebellion, the validity for its
exercise should not be made to depend upon the actual
dismemberment of the Philippine territory or the actual
deprivation of the President of his powers and prerogatives;
the exercise of martial law at that point would already be too
late.
168. Aside from keeping the peace, martial law enables

the President to order the AFP to perform other functions
that the PNP, under ordinary circumstances, should perform,
for instance:170
a. Investigate and prevent crimes, effect the

arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders
to justice and assist in their prosecution;
b. Exercise the general powers to make arrest,
search and seizure in accordance with the
Constitution and pertinent laws; and
c. Detain an arrested person for a period not
beyond what is prescribed by law, informing
the person so detained of all his rights under
the Constitution.
169. Thus, under martial law, military officers are

considered as proper officers who may serve warrants of
arrest and may effect warrantless arrests under Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court.
169
G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974.
170
See Section 24 of R.A. No. 6975.
71
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
170. In times of peace, police officers may arrest

members of a rebel group on the ground that they are
committing a crime in their presence pursuant to Rule 113,
Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court. Considering that under
martial law, members of the armed forces perform the
functions expected of the police force, i.e., effecting
arrests,171 the martial law implementor may issue arrest
orders the purpose of which is to alert and inform the entire
armed forces of the identity of members of the rebel groups
for which martial law was proclaimed, and enable them to
arrest these rebels on sight for a continuing crime. This
function, among others, cannot be performed by the armed
forces when the President has only called them out to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
171. The issuance of such arrest orders does not offend

Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. After all, the
said provision only guards against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Reasonableness depends on the
circumstances. Allowing the warrantless arrest of individuals
identified as members of rebel groups minimizes their
possibility of escape and the propagation of their ideology,
and prevents the commission of more crimes in furtherance
of the rebellion. Therefore, such warrantless arrests based
on the arrest orders are not unreasonable as they are only
limited in purpose and may be effected only during the
period of martial law.
172. Under martial law, the President may exercise his

police power thru the issuance of "General or Special
Orders"172 directing the military, due to exigent
circumstances, to carry out the functions of government
agencies in a locality, including law enforcement activities, in
order to ensure that the delivery of basic public services will
not be disrupted. The President's power to issue such orders
allows him to respond swiftly to an emergency situation
where time is of the essence.
See Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, Umil v. Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, October 3, 1991
and Garcia v. Enrile, G.R. No. 61388, April 20,1983.
172
See Section 7, Chapter 2, Title 1, Book III, E.O. No. 292.
72
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
173. In conjunction with the President's power to issue

the above orders, a state of martial law authorizes the Office
of Civil Defense to "coordinate the activities and functions of
various government agencies and instrumentalities, as well
as of private institutions and civic organization devoted to
public welfare to maximize the utilization of the facilities and
resources of the entire nation for the protection and
preservation of the civilian population and property."173
174. In addition, a state of martial law facilitates the

mobilization of the reserve force. Section 59, Article X of
Republic Act No. 7077 provides:
Section 59. Mobilization. – The utilization of the

Reserve Force in times of emergency to meet threats to
national security shall be through mobilization:
(1) Full Mobilization. - Full mobilization shall be

through the joint act of Congress and the President. When
full mobilization is ordered, all units of the Ready and
Standby Reserves will be activated, the reservists
constituting them are called to active duty, and the units
activated are placed on operational readiness. All other
reservist not assigned to any unit or those assigned to
reserve pools shall be organized into replacement units;
(2) Partial Mobilization. - Partial Mobilization shall be

through the joint act of Congress and the President. When
partial mobilization is ordered, only the units of the Ready
Reserve are necessary to meet the threat will be activated,
the reservists assigned to these units are called to active
duty and the activated units are placed on operational
readiness. The president will specify the units to be
activated; and
(3) Selective Mobilization. - Selective mobilization

shall be by authority of the President. Selective
mobilization may be ordered to meet a local threat or
emergency situation. When so ordered, only selected units
of the Ready Reserve of the Localities involved are
activated and the reservist assigned to them are called to
active duty; or active auxiliary units are organized and
volunteer reservists are called to active auxiliary service
for the purpose, under such rules and regulations as the
Secretary of national Defense may prescribed.
173
See Section 28(1), Chapter 4, Title VII, Book IV, E.O. 292.
73
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
175. A state of martial law also enables the faster

procurement of needed goods, infrastructure and consulting
services for the affected areas. Section 53 of the 2016
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. 9184 (“Government Procurement Reform Act”)
pertinently states:
Section 53. Negotiated Procurement. Negotiated

Procurement is a method of procurement of Goods,
Infrastructure Projects and Consulting services, whereby
the Procuring Entity directly negotiates a contract with a
technically, legally and financially capable supplier,
contractor or consultant in any of the following cases: …
53.2. Emergency Cases. In case of imminent danger

to life or property during a state of calamity, or when time
is of the essence arising from natural or man-made
calamities or other causes where immediate action is
necessary to prevent damage to or loss of life or property,
or to restore vital public services, infrastructure facilities
and other public utilities. In the case of Infrastructure
Projects, the Procuring Entity has the option to undertake
the project through negotiated procurement or by
administration or, in high security risk areas, through the
AFP.
176. Not to be overlooked is the psychological value of

martial law. As noted by AFP Chief of Staff Rey Leonardo
Guerrero during the oral arguments, martial law creates a
favorable mindset to society. The psychological impact of a
state of martial law reaches not just authorities, but civilians
as well. Martial law compels compliance and cooperation. It
ensures the full support of the public in terms of data
gathering and intelligence operations, which are vital to the
pursuit and apprehension of rebels situated in Mindanao.
d.1. Compared to the Anti-

Terrorism Council, the armed forces
are better equipped to address the
persisting rebellion in Mindanao.
74
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
177. The existence of the Anti-Terrorism Council does

not mean that there can be no proclamation of martial law
or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
178. Admittedly, the ATC has powers that can be used

to fight terrorism. But this fact cannot be considered as a
diminution of the powers of the Executive. The Court was
aware of this, as it held in Lagman174 that:
In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in

Marawi City can also be characterized as terrorism, the
same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No. 216.
Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known
as the Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides
that "[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a
curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally
recognized powers of the executive branch of the
government." Thus, as long as the President complies
with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the
existence of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising
his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial ' law or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. After all, the extraordinary powers of the
President are bestowed on him by the Constitution. No act
of Congress can, therefore, curtail or diminish such
powers.
179. The powers of the ATC are defined under the law.
It shall “formulate and adopt comprehensive, adequate,
efficient, and effective anti-terrorism plans, programs, and
counter-measures to suppress and eradicate terrorism in the
country and to protect the people from acts of terrorism.
Nothing herein shall be interpreted to empower the Anti-
Terrorism Council to exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial
power or authority.”175 On the other hand, during martial
law, the military does not confine itself to policy-making and
coordination. It actually participates in protecting the people
to maintain peace and order.
180. Moreover, the ATC becomes relevant only in cases

of terrorism. Rebellion is only one of the possible means to
commit terrorism under R.A. No. 9372.176 The Court, in
174
Supra.
175
Sections 53 and 54, R.A. No. 9372.
176
Section 3(b), R.A. No. 9372.
75
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Lagman177 observed that terrorism under R.A. No. 9372 has

a “broader scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes.”
For purposes of involving itself in during a state of martial
law, the ATC must first associate an act of rebellion with
terrorism.
181. Unlike rebellion in the context of martial law,

terrorism under R.A. No. 9372 requires the presence of the
element of “sowing and creating a condition of widespread
and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in
order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand.”178
182. Additionally, considering its extraordinary

character, martial law deals with the public safety element.
On the other hand, the mandate of the ATC to quell
terrorism is not dependent on the presence of “public
safety.” The urgency of martial law highlights the necessity
of prompt action on the part of the armed forces. The same
thing cannot be said with just fighting terrorism.
183. In fact, several provisions of R.A. No. 9372

suggest that the ATC’s function is a preliminary step in anti-
terrorism operations. The ATC grants authority to law
enforcement officials applying for judicial authorization for
an order to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or
spoken or written words of any person suspected of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.179 Also, the
ATC grants the same authority to examine deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records and to
gather relevant information about such deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in a bank or
financial institution.180 It is not directly involved in
maintenance of peace and order.
184. Aside from this, the ATC consists of several

officials: the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of National Defense,
177
Supra.
178
Section 3, R.A. No. 9372.
179
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9372.
180
Section 27 of R.A. No. 9372.
76
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, Secretary of

Finance, and the National Security Advisor. The National
Intelligence Coordinating Agency serves as the Secretariat of
the ATC. For the ATC to promptly act on a terrorism
concern, full cooperation of all members must be ensured.
This is in stark contrast to a state of martial law. In his
capacity as the Commander-in-Chief, the President can
immediately issue directives to the armed forces.
185. In view of the limited authority of the ATC, as well

as numerous officials participating therein, invoking R.A. No.
9372 instead of martial law under Section 18, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution will not address the continuing
rebellion in Mindanao.
d.2. The constitutionality of the

extension must be understood
in light of the President’s
prerogative under Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
186. Rosales suggests that the President should not

have resorted to martial law. She draws a distinction
between martial law and military force, or the calling out
power. She then enumerates the differences between the
two, in terms of the conditions, purposes, targets, and
Constitutional restraints. According to her, the Constitution
imposes upon the President an obligation to be very careful
in the imposition of martial law, considering the potential
impact on civil liberties of those not involved in invasion or
rebellion.181 The contentions of petitioner lack merit.
187. As Commander-in-Chief, the President is

authorized to exercise powers, one of which is the martial
law powers.182 Martial law is a flexible concept. Depending
on the conditions, the President may issue the
corresponding orders to address a particular situation.183
181
Petition in G.R. No. 236145, paras. 41-60.
182
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary Reyes, supra.
183
See Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Jose C. Mendoza in Lagman vs. Medialdea, supra..
77
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
188. On account of the persistence of terrorist groups,

extending the proclamation and suspension, instead of
invoking the calling out power, is necessary to protect the
security of the nation. It ensures public safety, particularly
in a situation where terrorist groups, ranging from DIWM,
L/FTGs, ALGs, CTs, BIFF, and ASG, continue to cause harm
to communities in Mindanao.
189. At the same time, Rosales’ discussion regarding
the distinction between martial law and the calling out power
is irrelevant. She did not even advance the better course of
action between the two powers. Despite the “graduated”
powers of the President, martial law powers do not depend
on the prior exercise of the calling out power. There is no
Constitutional or jurisprudential requirement that the calling-
out power should be resorted to ahead of martial law.184
190. It is gratuitous for her to paint a negative picture

of martial law as compared to the calling out power. Her
stance that the effects of the calling out power are directed
against the enemies of the State, while the effects of martial
law are directed towards the civilian population and their
liberties,185 is unfounded. The martial law of today is
emasculated: it is not even a splitting image of martial law
past. It is for all intents and purposes, a defanged martial
law.
191. The supposed gravity of the implications of martial

law, as set forth by Rosales, does not constitute a bar to the
President’s exercise of discretion. Contrary to her fears,186
martial law does not automatically equate to curtailment and
suppression of civil liberties and individual freedom. After all,
a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.187
192. The President’s course of action cannot be

examined within the prism of judicial review.188 Taking into
consideration the differences between martial law and the
calling out power, in terms of magnitude and impact, the
President has a choice at his disposal. The prevailing
184
Lagman vs. Medialdea, supra.
185
Petition in G.R. No. 236145, para 58.
186
Petition in G.R. No. 236145, para. 46.
187
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.
188
Petition in G.R. No. 236145, para. 44.
78
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
scenario and the level of necessity serve as reference points

for the invocation of the appropriate power. That there are
“practically no restraints on the power of the President”189
should not necessarily confine the President’s discretion to
the calling out power only.
193. The proclamation of martial law is a course of

action within the prerogative of the President. As Lagman
aptly stated:


situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of
the State.

decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail
given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be
tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of
the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that
solely, at least initially, lies with the President.190
189
Id., para. 54.
190
G.R. No. 236158, 4 July 2017, citing Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary Reyes, supra; underscoring
supplied.
79
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
194. The same principle applies, as far as the request

for extension of martial law is concerned. The President has
broad powers to ascertain the most appropriate measure for
the country, which is being prejudiced by the unlawful
activities of terrorist and rebel groups in Mindanao.
195. At bottom, the petitioners cannot insist that the

Court impose upon the President the proper measure to
defeat a rebellion.191 In light of the wide array of information
in the hands of the President, as well the extensive
coordination between him and the armed forces regarding
the situation in Mindanao, it would be an overreach for the
Court to encroach on the President’s discretion.
d.3. Ex Parte Milligan’s martial

law is under “theater of
military operations” and not
“theater of war.”
196. Another issue discussed during the oral

arguments is the concept of theater of war in relation to
martial law. War may be simply understood as “a state of
forcible contention”; “an armed contest”; “a state of
hostility.”192 In our jurisdiction, war is declared by the
Congress under Section 23 (1), Article VI of the Constitution
which provides, as follows:
SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-

thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the

Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
191
IBP vs. Zamora, GR No. 141284, August 15, 2000.
192
https://thelawdictionary.org/war/, last accessed on January 19, 2018 at 3:30 p.m
80
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
197. While the Constitution, verbose as it is, does not

provide for a definition of “war”, it should be understood in
the traditional Grotian sense, where the late legal
philosopher refused to limit the concept between two nations
in armed disagreement. Hugo Grotius, in his treatise On the
Law of War and Peace, wrote as follows:
II. In treating of the rights of war, the first point,

that we have to consider, is, what is war, which is the
subject of our inquiry, and what is the right, which we seek
to establish. Cicero styled war a contention by force. But
the practice has prevailed to indicate by that name, not an
immediate action, but a state of affairs; so that war is the
state of contending parties, considered as such. This
definition, by its general extent, comprises those wars of
every description, that will form the subject of the present
treatise. Nor are single combats excluded from this
definition. For, as they are in reality more ancient than
public wars, and undoubtedly, of the same nature, they
may therefore properly be comprehended under one and
the same name. This agrees very well with the true
derivation of the word. For the Latin word, Bellum, war,
comes from the old word, Duellum, a duel, as Bonus from
Duonus, and Bis from Duis. Now Duellum was derived from
Duo; and thereby implied a difference between two
persons, in the same sense as we term peace, unity, from
Unitas, for a contrary reason. So the Greek word,
πΟλεμΟς, commonly used to signify war, expresses in its
original, an idea of multitude. The ancient Greeks likewise
called it λυη, which imports a disunion of minds; just as by
the term δυη, they meant the dissolution of the parts of
the body. Nor does the use of the word, war, contradict
this larger acceptation of it. For though sometimes it is
only applied to the quarrels of states, yet that is no
objection, as it is evident that a general name is often
applied to some particular object, entitled to peculiar
distinction. Justice is not included in the definition of war,
because the very point to be decided is, whether any war
be just, and what war may be so called. Therefore we
must make a distinction between war itself, and the justice
of it.193
198. Understanding the concept of “war”, therefore, in

accordance with the petitioners’ argument that there is no
“theater of war” where actual hostilities are absent is unduly
restricting. War involves armed conflict. When two entities
cease firing at one another does that mean that war has
193
Full translated text is available at https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/grotius/Law2.pdf,
last accessed on January 19, 2018 at 4:00 p.m.
81
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
ended? South and North Korea are still technically at war

since the two countries never signed any peace treaty or
similar instrument though they agreed to an armistice where
they agreed that “cessation of hostilities” will eventually
result in a “final peaceful settlement.” In the same manner,
during a period where no hostilities are staged by rebels and
there is apparent peace, the resulting condition does not
mean the rebellion has ended.
199. The petitioners’ invocation of the prior existence of

“theater of war,” as purportedly worded in Ex Parte Milligan
(71 U.S. 2 (1866)), before the declaration or extension of
Martial Law is warranted, is inaccurate. The relevant portion
of the U.S. Supreme Court decision states:
It will be borne in mind that this is not a question of

the power to proclaim martial law when war exists in a
community and the courts and civil authorities are
overthrown. Nor is it a question what rule a military
commander, at the head of his army, can impose on states
in rebellion to cripple their resources and quell the
insurrection. The jurisdiction claimed is much more
extensive. The necessities of the service during the late
Rebellion required that the loyal states should be placed
within the limits of certain military districts and
commanders appointed in them, and it is urged that this,
in a military sense, constituted them the theater of
military operations, and as, in this case, Indiana had
been and was again threatened with invasion by the
enemy, the occasion was furnished to establish martial
law. The conclusion does not follow from the premises. If
armies were collected in Indiana, they were to be
employed in another locality, where the laws were
obstructed and the national authority disputed. On her soil
there was no hostile foot; if once invaded, that invasion
was at an end, and, with it, all pretext for martial law.
Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The
necessity must be actual and present, the invasion real,
such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil
administration.
….
It follows from what has been said on this subject

that there are occasions when martial rule can be properly
applied. If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are
actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal
justice according to law, then, on the theater of active
military operations, where war really prevails, there is a
82
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus

overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and
society, and as no power is left but the military, it is
allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have
their free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits
its duration, for, if this government is continued after the
courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power.
Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open and
in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their
jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual war.
Because, during the late Rebellion, it could have been
enforced in Virginia, where the national authority was
overturned and the courts driven out, it does not follow
that it should obtain in Indiana, where that authority was
never disputed and justice was always administered. And
so, in the case of a foreign invasion, martial rule may
become a necessity in one state when, in another, it would
be "mere lawless violence." (emphases added)
200. Although the venue of a martial law can be

described as “theater of war” for brevity as what the
Supreme Court did in Lagman, the broader concept of
military operations involve the whole gamut of military
strategies, actions, and missions (e.g., campaign, battle,
engagement, strike, assassination, peacekeeping,
reinforcement, covert operation, psychological warfare, civil-
military operation, evacuation, intelligence gathering, etc.)
201. Abraham Lincoln’s declaration of martial law

during the American Civil War is best understood in relation
to the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field (General Order No. 100), also
known as the Lieber Code194 in honor of Lincoln’s adviser
Franz Lieber, which governed the conduct of Union soldiers
in the battlefield, relevant parts of which provide as follows:
1. A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy

stands, in consequence of the occupation, under the
Martial Law of the invading or occupying army, whether
any proclamation declaring Martial Law, or any public
warning to the inhabitants, has been issued or not. Martial
Law is the immediate and direct effect and consequence of
occupation or conquest. The presence of a hostile army
proclaims its Martial Law.
194
Full text available at https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Lieber_Collection/pdf/Instructions-gov-
armies.pdf , last accessed on January 19, 2018 at 11:06 p.m.
83
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
2. Martial Law does not cease during the hostile

occupation, except by special proclamation, ordered by the
commander in chief; or by special mention in the treaty of
peace concluding the war, when the occupation of a place
or territory continues beyond the conclusion of peace as
one of the conditions of the same.
3. Martial Law in a hostile country consists in

the suspension, by the occupying military authority,
of the criminal and civil law, and of the domestic
administration and government in the occupied place
or territory, and in the substitution of military rule
and force for the same, as well as in the dictation of
general laws, as far as military necessity requires
this suspension, substitution, or dictation. The
commander of the forces may proclaim that the
administration of all civil and penal law shall continue
either wholly or in part, as in times of peace, unless
otherwise ordered by the military authority.
4. Martial Law is simply military authority

exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of
war. Military oppression is not Martial Law; it is the abuse
of the power which that law confers. As Martial Law is
executed by military force, it is incumbent upon those who
administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of
justice, honor, and humanity-virtues adorning a soldier
even more than other men, for the very reason that he
possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.
5. Martial Law should be less stringent in places and

countries fully occupied and fairly conquered. Much greater
severity may be exercised in places or regions where
actual hostilities exist, or are expected and must be
prepared for. Its most complete sway is allowed-even in
the commander's own country-when face to face with the
enemy, because of the absolute necessities of the case,
and of the paramount duty to defend the country against
invasion. To save the country is paramount to all other
considerations.
….
14. Military necessity, as understood by modern

civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those
measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of
the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law
and usages of war.
15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction

of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons
whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed
contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of every
84
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the

hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it
allows of all destruction of property, and obstruction of the
ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and
of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the
enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy's
country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of
the army, and of such deception as does not involve the
breaking of good faith either positively pledged, regarding
agreements entered into during the war, or supposed by
the modern law of war to exist. Men who take up arms
against one another in public war do not cease on this
account to be moral beings, responsible to one another
and to God.
16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty that

is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for
revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor
of torture to extort confessions. It does not admit of the
use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of
a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of
perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does not include
any act of hostility which makes the return to peace
unnecessarily difficult.
17. War is not carried on by arms alone. It is

lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed,
so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy.
18. When a commander of a besieged place expels

the noncombatants, in order to lessen the number of those
who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though
an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten
on the surrender.
19. Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the

enemy of their intention to bombard a place, so that the
noncombatants, and especially the women and children,
may be removed before the bombardment commences.
But it is no infraction of the common law of war to omit
thus to inform the enemy. Surprise may be a necessity.
20. Public war is a state of armed hostility between

sovereign nations or governments. It is a law and requisite
of civilized existence that men live in political, continuous
societies, forming organized units, called states or nations,
whose constituents bear, enjoy, and suffer, advance and
retrograde together, in peace and in war. (emphases
added)
85
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
202. Indubitably, Lieber’s concept of Martial Law

involves the supplanting of civilian authorities, including the
courts, by the military ruler who, by necessity, may govern
by dictation. The concept of “war” has since evolved, but
without losing its Groatian essence to include, after 9/11,
the “war on terror.”
d.4. The Constitution does not

require the existence of a “theater
of war” for a valid proclamation or
extension of martial law.
203. During the interpellations, the counsel of Rosales

posited that the continued existence of martial law requires
the identification of a “theater of war”, which would limit the
territorial scope of martial law. In support thereof, he
invokes the rulings in Ex parte Milligan195 and Duncan v.
Kahanamoku.196
204. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Jardeleza, however,

the U.S. Federal Supreme Court ruled in Ex Parte Milligan
and Duncan v. Kahanamoku on the propriety of the
governmental acts during a state of martial law. In those
cases, the existence of the conditions necessary to trigger
martial law was not put into issue. In other words, the
validity of the state of martial law in those cases was not
questioned.
205. The petitioner cannot take refuge in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission because Fr.
Bernas’ use of the term “theater of war” during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission referred
solely to the scope of the powers that the President may
exercise during the martial law, as explicitly shown below:
FR. BERNAS: (...)
The question now is: During martial law, can the

President issue decrees? The answer we gave to that
question in the Committee was: During martial law,
the President may have the powers of a commanding
general in a theater of war. In actual war when there is
195
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
196
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
86
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
fighting in an area, the President as the commanding

general has the authority to issue orders which have the
effect of law but strictly in a theater of war, not in the
situation we had during the period of martial law. In other
words, there is an effort here to return to the traditional
concept of martial law as it was developed especially in
American jurisprudence, where martial law has reference
to the theater of war.197 (emphasis supplied)
206. Neither the cases of Ex parte Milligan and Duncan

v. Kahanamoku nor the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission support Rosales’ contention that there must be
a theater of war as a condition precedent to the declaration
of martial law. Furthermore, the petitioners may not
capitalize on the phrase “theater of war” which according to
them was mentioned by the ponencia in Lagman with a
citation of Fr. Bernas’ interpellation in the Constitutional
Commission.
207. To clarify, the term “theater of war” was explained

by Carl Von Clausewitz in his book On War:198
By "theater of operations"199 we mean, strictly

speaking, a sector of the total war area which has
protected boundaries and so a certain degree of
independence. This protection may consist in
fortifications or great natural barriers, or even in a
substantial distance between it and the rest of the
war area. A sector of this kind is not just a part of the
whole, but a subordinate entity in itself-depending on the
extent to which changes occurring elsewhere in the war
area affect it not directly but only indirectly. A definitive
criterion might be found by imagining an advance in one
theater simultaneous with a withdrawal in the other, or a
defensive action in one simultaneous with an offensive in
the other. We cannot always be so precise; we merely
wish to indicate the essential point here.200
208. Moreover, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice

Burton of the Supreme Court of the United States in Duncan
quoted the portions of the transcript of stenographic notes
197
Records of the Constitutional Commission No. 42, July 29, 1986.
198
Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War, Princeton University Press, 1984 Ed. translated by Howard and Paret.
199
Some translations of On War use the term “theater of operations” instead of “theater of war.” The term
“theater of war” was used in the J.J. Graham translation, while the term “theater of operations” was used in
the Howard and Paret translation.
200
Id. at 280; Emphasis supplied.
87
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
making a distinction between the “theater of war” and “area

of operations,” viz:
In the present cases, the records have incorporated

the following testimony of Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson,
Jr., U.S.A. Commanding General of the Central Pacific
Area:
"A. . . . this whole area under the command of the

Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Area, Admiral
Nimitz, is an active theater of war, and within that theater
of war is the theater of operations, of which the Hawaiian
Department is a part."
"Q. Will you explain what you mean, from the

military viewpoint, by the terms 'active theater of war' and
'theater of operations?'"
"A. Well, an active theater of war is that area which

is or may become actively involved in the conduct of the
war. A theater of operations is that part of an active war
theater which is needed for the operations either
offensively or defensively, according to the missions
assigned or a combination of the missions, and it includes
also the administrative agencies which are necessary for
the conduct of those operations."
209. Plainly, the phrase “theater of war” does not mean

actual war or hostilities since it covers not only the “war
areas” but also “protected boundaries” and substantial areas
between them.
210. At the risk of being repetitive, the Constitution is

explicit in stating that “(u)pon the initiative of the President,
the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by
the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.”201 Limitations not found in
the text of the Constitution cannot be used to restrain or
limit the exercise of martial law.
211. Accordingly, the only limits on the power to

extend martial law are those that are expressly found in the
text, namely: that the rebellion or invasion persists, and
201
Constitution, Article VII, Section 18; emphasis supplied.
88
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
public safety requires the continued enforcement of martial

law.
d.5. Placing “public safety” on

a scale unduly expands the
concept of rebellion.
212. After 9/11, states were constrained to address a

new and unique crime – terrorism. Under the Human
Security Act R.A. 9372, the crime is defined as follows:
SEC. 3. Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act

punishable under any of the following provisions of the
Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the

High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c. Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts
committed by private persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention);
f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or
under
1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law
on Arson);
2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic
Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear
Waste Control Act of 1990);
3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy
Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);
4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking
Law);
5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law
of 1974); and,
6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as
amended (Decree Codifying the Laws
on Illegal and Unlawful Possession,
Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or
Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions
or Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of

widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in
to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of
terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of
89
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for

under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.202
213. In Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-

Terrorism Council, the Court stated the elements of the
crime as follows:
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the

earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements
may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable
under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws;
(2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and
creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is
actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in
to an unlawful demand.203
214. Since the laws on rebellion and terrorism are

considered in pari materia, the public safety requirement
maybe understood in the context of what is expressly
provided in R.A. 9372, particularly the second element of the
crime, i.e., the rebellion in Mindanao has not only inflicted
civilian casualties, but also had the effect of sowing and
creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace. Understanding public safety
that way is consistent with the Court’s (a) statement in
Lagman that rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of
terrorism and (b) recognition that the siege of Marawi has
caused displacement among thousands of its residents.
215. In the oral arguments during which AFP Gen. Rey

Leonardo Guerrero served as a resource person, he was
asked by Members of the Honorable Court what exactly was
the effect of Martial Law in Mindanao. He replied, among
others, that the general population expressed elation and
peace of mind from the declaration of Martial Law. For lack
of a better word, he was constrained to state that the effect
is “psychological.” But the effect is obviously more than
psychological as the perception of public safety heightened
with increased military presence, unabated checkpoints, and
202
Emphasis supplied.
203
G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010
90
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
undeterred offensives against rebels or terrorists. The

actions of the military have, in effect, addressed the
widespread fear and panic among peace-loving Filipinos in
Mindanao.
216. There is no need to show the magnitude of the

rebellion.204 Placing the requirement of public safety on a
scale, or even continuum, will not only prevent the
application of the laws but undermine the Constitution.
Martial law as an option of the President exists precisely to
address a rebellion that endangers public safety. The fact
that our countrymen, both Christians and Moslems, have
somehow managed to go about their daily lives in Mindanao
does mean that there is no need for the extension of the
proclamation and suspension.
IV. THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT

ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF PRAYED FOR.
217. All the petitioners are applying for injunctive relief

before the Court allegedly “in order to protect their
substantive rights and interests while this case is pending
before the Honorable Court”.205 They pin their hopes on the
general statement that “[f]rom all the foregoing, Petitioners
were able to show that they are entitled to the to the
issuance of an injunctive relief for having complied with the
requirements set forth under the Rules, to wit: (a) the
invasion of right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.”
218. A writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary

restraining order are preservative remedies for the
protection of substantive rights and interests. Essential to
the grant of injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent
necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A
TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency
204
See Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus (2009), p. 395.
205
Petition in G.R. No. 236061, par. 98, pp. 30-31.
91
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
that grave injustice and irreparable injury would arise unless

it is issued immediately.206
219. Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a

preliminary injunction may be granted if the following
grounds are established: (a) That the applicant is entitled to
the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the
act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of
an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b)
That the commission, continuance or non-performance of
the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; and (c) That the
party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do or is procuring or suffering to be done
some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding,
and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
220. In other words, to be entitled to the injunctive

writ, the petitioners must show that (1) there exists a clear
and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is
directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the
invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4)
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious and irreparable damage.207
a. The petitioners have no clear

legal right as there is no
violation of the Constitution.
Thus, there is no material and
substantial invasion of a right
sought to be protected.
221. The petitioners failed to show a clear and

unmistakable right to a TRO and writ of injunction.
222. As a strong arm of equity, a temporary restraining

order should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied
206
Australian Professional Realty, Inc., et al. vs. Municipality of Padre Garcia Batangas Province, G.R. No.
183367, March 14, 2012.
207
Id.
92
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.208

The onus probandi is on the pleader to prove the existence
of these requisites.209 Indeed, before an injunction may be
issued, the legal right of the applicant to said relief must not
only exist, but must be clear and unmistakable and that the
acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of
the said right.210
223. Thus, in Arcega v. Court of Appeals, the Court

pronounced:211
For the issuance of the writ of preliminary

injunction to be proper, it must be shown that
the invasion of the right sought to be protected
is material and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable and that
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage.
In the absence of a clear and legal right, the

issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave
abuse of discretion [;] injunction is not designed to
protect contingent or future rights. Where the
complainant’s right or title is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper. The
possibility of irreparable damage, without
proof of actual existing right is no ground for an
injunction.”212
224. In other words, the right of the applicant must be

clear and unmistakable, that is, that the right is actual, clear
and positive especially calling for judicial protection.
225. The petitioners have run smack into an

insuperable obstacle. A TRO or a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the implementation or extension of
martial law is not provided for under the Constitution. No
law permits it. The petitioners also failed to present and
prove their clear and unmistakable right to prevent possible
the alleged human rights violations.
208
China Banking Corporation v. Sps. Harry Ciriaco and Esther Ciriaco, G.R. No. 170038, July 11, 2012.
209
Tanduay Distillers, Inc. v. Ginebra San Miguel, Inc., G.R. No. 164324, August 14, 2009.
210
Government Service Insurance System v. Florendo, G.R. No. 48603, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA76.
211
275 SCRA 176, July 7, 1997.
212
Id. at 180; emphasis supplied.
93
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
226. Some of the petitioners are legislators who

actively participated and cast their votes as members of
Congress during the consideration, deliberation, and voting
on the resolution approving the request for extension of
martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by
the President. They cannot run to the courts to defeat the
wisdom of the majority of the members of the Congress. If
they have any right, that is merely to file a petition directly
asking the Court to review the sufficiency of the basis of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in an appropriate
proceeding.
b. The petitioners failed to show

that they will suffer any grave
and irreparable injury if any
injunctive relief is not issued.
227. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the

requirement for grave or irreparable injury must be
established by an applicant for injunctive relief:
No preliminary injunction shall be granted without

hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to
be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before
the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the
application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue
a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a
period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or
person sought to been joined, except as herein
provided….”213
228. An injury will only be considered irreparable if the

same cannot be measured with reasonable accuracy and it is
not susceptible of mathematical computation. In Australian
Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia
Batangas Province,214 the Court explained:
213
Emphasis supplied.
214
G.R. No. 183367, 14 March 2012.
94
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Damages are irreparable where there is no standard

by which their amount can be measured with reasonable
accuracy. In this case, petitioners have alleged that the
loss of the public market entails costs of about
₱30,000,000 in investments, ₱100,000 monthly revenue in
rentals, and amounts as yet unquantified – but not
unquantifiable – in terms of the alleged loss of jobs of
APRI’s employees and potential suits that may be filed by
the leaseholders of the public market for breach of
contract. Clearly, the injuries alleged by petitioners are
capable of pecuniary estimation. Any loss petitioners may
suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if
proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a
preliminary injunction is not warranted. With respect to
the allegations of loss of employment and potential suits,
these are speculative at best, with no proof adduced to
substantiate them.215
229. In Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. De

los Angeles,216 the Court explained that injury is irreparable
if:
[I]t is of such constant and frequent recurrence that

no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court
of law or where there is no standard by which their amount
can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is
not susceptible of mathematical computation.217
230. It is not sufficient for the petitioners to just make

a general averment that they are entitled to injunctive relief.
The injunctive writ is conditioned on the existence of a clear
and positive right of the applicant which should be
protected, the writ being the strong arm of equity and an
extraordinary peremptory remedy which can only be
availed of only upon the existence of well-defined
circumstances. Be that as it may, the writ must be used
with extreme caution, affecting as it does the respective
rights of the parties. In fine, the writ should be granted only
when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and
the emergency demands it, for the very foundation of the
jurisdiction to issue writ of injunction rests in the existence
of a cause of action, probability of irreparable injury,
inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention
of the multiplicity of suits. Where the facts are not shown to
215
Id. at 264.
216
G.R. No. L-27829, 19 August 1988.
217
Citations omitted.
95
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
bring the case within these conditions, the relief of

injunction should be refused.218
231. While Cullamat, et al., claim that human rights

violations intensified when President Duterte imposed
martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus,219 they miserably failed to substantiate such
allegation. The alleged human rights violations cited in the
petition are based on unverified and hearsay reports which
cannot be made the basis by the Court of its grant of
injunctive relief to petitioners. Besides, the petitioners
miserably failed to show that the alleged human rights
violations are directly attributable to President Duterte's
imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus as there is in fact no proof that
criminal cases had been actually instituted against the state
agents who were allegedly responsible therefor. Certainly, a
mere allegation, in the absence of any support in the record,
does not meet the standard proof that would warrant the
issuance of injunctive relief.220 An application for injunctive
relief is construed strictly against the pleader. Also, the
possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual
existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction to
issue.221
232. The petitioners' fears that martial law “will target

civilians who have no participation at all in any armed
uprising or struggle”222 and “that the inclusion of alleged
'coddlers', 'supporters' and 'financiers' will open the
floodgates to further attacks against anybody,”223 are more
imagined than real. Injunction, whether preliminary or final,
is designed to protect contingent or future rights. An
injunction will not issue to protect a right in esse and which
may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give
rise to a cause of action. The possibility of irreparable
damage, without proof of violation of an actual existing
right, is no ground for an injunction being mere damnum
absque injuria.224 Consequently, there is no urgent and
218
St. James College of Parañaque vs. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 179441, August 9, 2010.
219
220
Sales and Agonias, et al. vs. SEC, State Investment House, Inc., G.R. No. L-53330, January 13, 1989.
221
Palm Tree Estates, Inc. Vs, Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 159370, October 3, 2012.
222
223
Id.
224
Mamba, et al. vs. Lara, et al., G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009.
96
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
paramount necessity for the injunctive writ to prevent

serious and irreparable damage to petitioners in this case.
233. Besides, as a remedy anchored on equity, a TRO

or writ of injunction cannot override, prevent or diminish an
express power granted to the President of the Republic of
the Philippines by no less than the Constitution. Indubitably,
the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as vested
by the Constitution can only be balanced by an Act of the
Congress.
c. A TRO or writ of injunction

interferes with and impedes the
martial law power granted to
the President.
234. A TRO or injunctive relief is not available to the

petitioners in this case as the Honorable Court's power of
review is limited only to the determination of whether is
there is sufficient factual basis for the extension of the
President's martial law proclamation. Although they are
remedies anchored on equity, a TRO and an injunctive relief
cannot override, prevent or diminish an express power
granted to the President of the Republic of the Philippines by
no less than the Constitution.
235. The declaration or extension of Martial Law and

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is an
extraordinary power of the President granted unto him by
the Constitution to quell a prevailing rebellion or invasion. As
the Court emphasized in Kulayan v. Gov. Tan,225 the
Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as vested by
the Constitution can only be balanced by the act of
Congress:
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional

precept of One President is the notion that there are
certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be
performed by the president as the Head of the State. One
of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-
in-Chief powers to which the "calling-out" powers
constitutes a portion. The President’s Emergency
225
G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012.
97
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the

legislative act of Congress …:
…
Article 7, Sec 18. The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon
the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for
a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion
or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-

four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The power to declare a state of martial law is subject

to the Supreme Court’s authority to review the factual
basis thereof. By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers,
which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial
law, is bestowed upon the President alone. As noted in
Villena, "(t)here are certain constitutional powers
and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation
which must be exercised by him in person and no
amount of approval or ratification will validate the
exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law.226
236. A TRO or writ of injunction enjoining the

proclamation of Martial Law or its extension would constitute
an amendment of the Charter. It would also be tantamount
to judicial legislation as it would fashion a remedy other than
the power of review established under Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution. The impact of such judicial action cannot
be minimized: nothing can be more detrimental to public
226
G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012; emphasis and underlining supplied; citations omitted.
98
Memorandum
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
weal than a TRO or an injunctive writ tying the hands of the

President and preventing him from addressing the dangers
or emergencies confronting the nation. As Justice Mendoza
stated in his Concurring Opinion in Lagman:
It must be borne in mind that it is the people,

through the Constitution, who entrusted to the president
their safety and security. They gave him enough latitude
and discernment on how to execute such emergency
powers. If the Framers did not so cramp him, it is not for
the Court to impose restrictions. To do so is
dangerous for it would tie up the hands of future
presidents facing the same, if not more serious,
critical situations. At any rate, the Framers have put in
place several safeguards to prevent violations of the
constitutional and other human rights.227
PRAYER
The respondents consequently pray that this Honorable

Court DISMISS the four petitions for lack of merit.
The respondents also pray for other just and equitable

relief.
Makati City, January 24, 2018.
227
Separate Concurring Opinion, Lagman v. Medialdea, supra, p. 7.
99

OSG Memorandum On Martial Law Extension Petitions

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

OSG Memorandum On Martial Law Extension Petitions

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Republic of the Philippines

-versus- G.R. No. 235935

EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, ET

- versus - G.R. No. 236061

- versus - G.R. No. 236145

PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, ET

- versus - G.R. No. 236155

SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO

Respondents President Rodrigo Duterte, Senate

The petitions harangue this Honorable Court with

STATEMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE AND

1. On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte

2. At 9:55 p.m. of May 25, 2017, the President

3. After the President submitted his Report, the

4. On the following day, the House of

5. Thereafter, three petitions were filed before this

6. In its Decision promulgated on July 4, 2017, the

7. On July 22, 2017, the Congress extended the

8. Before the end of December 31, 2017, AFP

The AFP strongly believes that on the basis of the

The DAESH-Inspired DIWM groups and allies

Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups

The CTs have been pursuing and intensifying their

The need to intensify the campaign against the CTs

The threats being posed by the CTs, the ASG, and

The 2nd extension of the implementation of Martial

quelling and putting an end to the on-going DAESH-

In seeking for another extension, the AFP is ready,

9. Secretary Delfin Lorenzana also wrote a letter to

10. Acting on the recommendations of General

11. Both houses of the Congress approved President

12. The overwhelming approval by the Congress of

martial law is vitiated by grave abuse of discretion

13. On December 29, 2017, the Court required the

14. On January 8, 2018, Eufemia Campos Cullamat, et

15. On January 10, 2017, the Court required the

16. On January 12, 2018, Loreta Ann Rosales and

17. Before 5:00 p.m. of January 13, 2018, the

18. The Court conducted the oral arguments on the

19. In compliance with the order of the Court, the

THE PETITIONS QUESTIONING THE

a. The President is immune from suit.

b. Lagman, et al. failed to attach a copy of

c. The expanded jurisdiction of the Court

d. The extension may not be impugned on

e. The petitioners bear the burden to

THE JOINT RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS

a. The Constitution allows the Congress to

b. The Joint Resolution has sufficient factual

c. The principle of conclusiveness of

d. The sixty-day period prescribed in Section

e. The Congress has the absolute

f. Allegations of abuse and human rights

f.1. The extension does not intend to

f.2. Fear of abuse does not invalidate

NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION CAN BE

THE COURT CANNOT REVIEW THE MANNER

a. The period of extension of Congress was

b. The extension was not approved with

c. No grave abuse of discretion can be

d. The Court’s review does not extend to

d.1. Compared to the Anti-Terrorism

equipped to address the persisting