Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Case
Digest:
Dante
O.
Casibang
vs.
Honorable
Narciso
A.
Aquino
20
August
1979
FACTS:
Yu
was
proclaimed
on
November
1971
as
the
elected
mayor
of
Rosales,
Pangasinan.
Casibang,
his
only
rival,
filed
a
protest
against
election
on
the
grounds
of
rampant
vote
buying,
anomalies
and
irregularities
and
others.
During
the
proceedings
of
this
case,
the
1973
Constitution
came
into
effect.
Respondent
Yu
moved
to
dismiss
the
election
protest
of
the
petitioner
on
the
ground
that
the
trial
court
had
lost
jurisdiction
over
the
same
in
view
of
the
effectivity
of
the
new
Constitution
and
the
new
parliamentary
form
of
government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether
Section
9,
Article
XVII
of
the
1973
Constitution
rendered
the
protest
moot
and
academic;
and
2. Whether
Section
2,
Article
XI
thereof
entrusted
to
the
National
Assembly
the
revamp
of
the
entire
local
government
structure.
RULING:
1. As
stated
in
Santos
vs.
Castaneda,
“the
constitutional
grant
of
privilege
to
continue
in
office,
made
by
the
new
Constitution
for
the
benefit
of
persons
who
were
incumbent
officials
or
employees
of
the
Government
when
the
new
Constitution
took
effect,
cannot
be
fairly
construed
as
indiscriminately
encompassing
every
person
who
at
the
time
happened
to
be
performing
the
duties
of
an
elective
office,
albeit
under
protest
or
contest"
and
that
"subject
to
the
constraints
specifically
mentioned
in
Section
9,
Article
XVII
of
the
Transitory
Provisions,
it
neither
was,
nor
could
have
been
the
intention
of
the
framers
of
our
new
fundamental
law
to
disregard
and
shunt
aside
the
statutory
right
of
a
candidate
for
elective
position
who,
within
the
time-‐frame
prescribed
in
the
Election
Code
of
1971,
commenced
proceedings
beamed
mainly
at
the
proper
determination
in
a
judicial
forum
of
a
proclaimed
candidate-‐elect's
right
to
the
contested
office.”
2. Section
2
of
Article
XI
does
not
stigmatize
the
issue
in
that
electoral
protest
case
with
a
political
color.
For
simply,
that
section
allocated
unto
the
National
Assembly
the
power
to
enact
a
local
government
code
"which
may
not
thereafter
be
amended
except
by
a
majority
of
all
its
Members,
defining
a
more
responsive
and
accountable
local
government
allocating
among
the
different
local
government
units
their
powers,
responsibilities,
and
resources,
and
providing
for
their
qualifications,
election
and
removal,
term,
salaries,
powers,
functions
and
duties
of
local
officials,
and
all
other
matters
relating
to
the
organization
and
operation
of
the
local
units"
but
"...
any
change
in
the
existing
form
of
local
government
shall
not
take
effect
until
ratified
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
cast
in
a
plebiscite
called
for
the
purpose."
Vera
vs
Avelino
Case
Digest
FACTS:
Commission
on
Elections
submitted
last
May
1946
to
the
President
and
the
Congress
of
the
Philippines
a
report
regarding
the
national
elections
held
the
previous
month.
It
stated
that
by
reason
of
certain
specified
acts
of
terrorism
and
violence
in
the
province
of
Pampanga,
Nueva
Ecija,
Bulacan
and
Tarlac,
the
voting
in
said
region
did
not
reflect
the
true
and
free
expression
of
the
popular
will.
During
the
session,
when
the
senate
convened
on
May
25,
1946,
a
pendatum
resolution
was
approved
referring
to
the
report
ordering
that
Jose
O.
Vera,
Ramon
Diokno
and
Jose
E.
Romero
–
who
had
been
included
among
the
16
candidates
for
senator
receiving
the
highest
number
of
votes,
proclaimed
by
the
Commissions
on
Elections
–
shall
not
be
sworn,
nor
seated,
as
members
of
the
chamber,
pending
the
termination
of
the
of
the
protest
lodged
against
their
election.
Petitioners
thus
immediately
instituted
an
action
against
their
colleagues
responsible
for
the
resolution,
praying
for
an
order
to
annul
it
and
compelling
respondents
to
permit
them
to
occupy
their
seats
and
to
exercise
their
senatorial
prerogative.
They
also
allege
that
only
the
Electoral
Tribunal
had
jurisdiction
over
contests
relating
to
their
election,
returns
and
qualifications.
Respondents
assert
the
validity
of
the
pendatum
resolution.
ISSUES:
1.Whether
the
Commission
on
Elections
has
the
jurisdiction
to
determine
whether
or
not
votes
cast
in
the
said
provinces
are
valid.
2.Whether
administration
of
oath
and
the
sitting
of
Jose
O.
Vera,
Ramon
Diokno
and
Jose
Romero
should
be
deferred
pending
hearing
and
decision
on
the
protests
lodged
against
their
elections.
RULING:
The
Supreme
Court
refused
to
intervene,
under
the
concept
of
separation
of
powers,
holding
that
the
case
was
not
a
“contest”,
and
affirmed
the
inherent
right
of
the
legislature
to
determine
who
shall
be
admitted
to
its
membership.
Case
dismissed.
ABUEVA
vs
WOOD
G.R.
No.
L-‐21327
January
14,
1924
The
parties:
Petitioners
are
members
of
the
Independence
Commission.
The
creation
of
the
commission
was
ratified
and
adopted
by
the
Philippine
Legislature
on
the
8th
day
of
March,
1919.
Twenty
six
of
the
petitioners
are
members
of
the
House
of
Representatives
and
four
are
members
of
the
Senate
of
the
Philippine
Islands
and
they
all
belong
to
the
democratic
party;
Respondents
are
Leonard
Wood,
the
Governor-‐General
of
the
Philippine
Islands,
Manuel
L.
Quezon
and
Manuel
Roxas,
Presidents
of
the
Independence
Commission.
Sued
as
well
are
the
Acting
Auditor,
the
Executive
Secretary
and
the
Secretary
of
the
Independence
Commission.
This
is
an
original
action
commenced
in
the
Supreme
Court
by
the
petitioners
for
the
writ
of
mandamus
to
compel
the
respondents
to
exhibit
to
the
petitioners
and
to
permit
them
to
examine
all
the
vouchers
and
other
documentary
proofs
in
their
possession,
showing
the
disbursements
and
expenditures
made
out
of
the
funds
of
the
Independence
Commission.
FACTS:
By
Act
No.
2933
the
Legislature
of
the
Philippine
Islands
provided
for
a
standing
appropriation
of
one
million
pesos(P1,000,000)
per
annum,
payable
out
of
any
funds
in
the
Insular
Treasury,
not
otherwise
appropriated,
to
defray
the
expenses
of
the
Independence
Commission,
including
publicity
and
all
other
expenses
in
connection
with
the
performance
of
its
duties;
that
said
appropriation
shall
be
considered
as
included
in
the
annual
appropriation
for
the
Senate
and
the
House
of
Representatives,
at
the
rate
of
P500,000
for
each
house,
although
the
appropriation
act
hereafter
approved
may
not
make
any
specific
appropriation
for
said
purpose;
with
the
proviso
that
no
part
of
said
sum
shall
be
set
upon
the
books
of
the
Insular
Auditor
until
it
shall
be
necessary
to
make
the
payment
or
payments
authorized
by
said
act
Petitioners
averred
that
as
members
of
the
Independence
Commission
they
are
legally
obliged
to
prevent
the
funds
from
being
squandered,
and
to
prevent
any
investments
and
illicit
expenses
in
open
contravention
of
the
purposes
of
the
law.
Petitioners
have
verbally
and
by
writing
requested
the
respondents
to
permit
them
to
examine
the
vouchers
and
other
documentary
proofs
relating
to
the
expenditures
and
payments
made
out
of
the
funds
appropriated
for
the
use
of
the
Independence
Commission.
Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit the petitioners from examining said vouchers and documentary proofs.
ISSUE: Can the Court compel the respondents to address the claims of the petitioners
HELD:
1. Leonard
Wood,
as
Governor-‐General
of
the
Philippine
Islands
and
head
of
the
executive
department
of
the
Philippine
Government,
is
not
subject
to
the
control
or
supervision
of
the
courts.
2. Manuel
L.
Quezon
and
Manuel
Roxas,
as
Chairman
of
the
Independence
Commission,
are
mere
agents
of
the
Philippine
Legislature
and
cannot
be
controlled
or
interfered
with
by
the
courts.
3. As
for
the
auditor,
the
court
has
no
jurisdiction
of
the
subject
of
the
action
because
section
24
of
the
Jones
Law
provides
that:
“The
administrative
jurisdiction
of
the
Auditor
over
accounts,
whether
of
funds
or
property,
and
all
vouchers
and
records
pertaining
thereto,
shall
be
exclusive”
The
determination
of
whether
the
accounts
of
the
expenses
of
the
Commission
of
Independence
should
be
shown
to
the
plaintiffs
or
not
is
a
question
of
policy
and
administrative
discretion,
and
is
therefore
not
justiciable.
Tanada
vs
Cuenco,
103
Phil.
1051
After
the
1955
national
elections,
the
membership
in
the
Senate
was
overwhelmingly
occupied
by
the
Nacionalista
Party.
The
lone
opposition
senator
was
Lorenzo
Tañada
who
belonged
to
the
Citizen’s
Party.
Diosdado
Macapagal
on
the
other
hand
was
a
senatorial
candidate
who
lost
the
bid
but
was
contesting
it
before
the
Senate
Electoral
Tribunal
(SET).
But
prior
to
a
decision
the
SET
would
have
to
choose
its
members.
It
is
provided
that
the
SET
should
be
composed
of
9
members
comprised
of
the
following:
3
justices
of
the
Supreme
Court,
3
senators
from
the
majority
party
and
3
senators
from
the
minority
party.
But
since
there
is
only
one
minority
senator
the
other
two
SET
members
supposed
to
come
from
the
minority
were
filled
in
by
the
NP.
Tañada
assailed
this
process
before
the
Supreme
Court.
So
did
Macapagal
because
he
deemed
that
if
the
SET
would
be
dominated
by
NP
senators
then
he,
as
a
member
of
the
Liberalista
Party
will
not
have
any
chance
in
his
election
contest.
Senator
Mariano
Cuenco
et
al
(members
of
the
NP)
averred
that
the
Supreme
Court
cannot
take
cognizance
of
the
issue
because
it
is
a
political
question.
Cuenco
argued
that
the
power
to
choose
the
members
of
the
SET
is
vested
in
the
Senate
alone
and
the
remedy
for
Tañada
and
Macapagal
was
not
to
raise
the
issue
before
judicial
courts
but
rather
to
leave
it
before
the
bar
of
public
opinion.
HELD:
No.
The
SC
took
cognizance
of
the
case
and
ruled
that
the
issue
is
a
justiciable
question.
The
term
Political
Question
connotes
what
it
means
in
ordinary
parlance,
namely,
a
question
of
policy.
It
refers
to
those
questions
which,
under
the
Constitution,
are
to
be
decided
by
the
people
in
their
sovereign
capacity;
or
in
regard
to
which
full
discretionary
authority
has
been
delegated
to
the
legislative
or
executive
branch
of
the
government.
It
is
concerned
with
issues
dependent
upon
the
wisdom,
not
legality,
of
a
particular
measure.
In
this
case,
the
issue
at
bar
is
not
a
political
question.
The
Supreme
Court
is
not
being
asked
by
Tañada
to
decide
upon
the
official
acts
of
Senate.
The
issue
being
raised
by
Tañada
was
whether
or
not
the
elections
of
the
5
NP
members
to
the
SET
are
valid
–
which
is
a
judicial
question.
Note
that
the
SET
is
a
separate
and
independent
body
from
the
Senate
which
does
not
perform
legislative
acts.
The
nomination
of
the
last
two
members
(who
would
fill
in
the
supposed
seat
of
the
minority
members)
must
not
come
from
the
majority
party.
In
this
case,
the
Chairman
of
the
SET,
apparently
already
appointed
members
that
would
fill
in
the
minority
seats
(even
though
those
will
come
from
the
majority
party).
This
is
still
valid
provided
the
majority
members
of
the
SET
(referring
to
those
legally
sitting)
concurred
with
the
Chairman.
Besides,
the
SET
may
set
its
own
rules
in
situations
like
this
provided
such
rules
comply
with
the
Constitution.
Daza
v.
Singson
G.R.
No.
86344
December
21,
1989
Cruz,
J.
Facts:
The
House
of
Representatives.
Twenty
four
members
of
the
Liberal
Party
formally
resigned
from
that
party
and
joined
the
LDP,
thereby
swelling
its
number
to
159
and
correspondingly
reducing
their
former
party
to
only
17
members.
On
the
basis
of
this
development,
the
House
of
Representatives
revised
its
representation
in
the
Commission
on
Appointments
by
withdrawing
the
seat
occupied
by
the
petitioner
and
giving
this
to
the
newly-‐formed
LDP.
On
December
5,
1988,
the
chamber
elected
a
new
set
of
representatives
consisting
of
the
original
members
except
the
petitioner
and
including
therein
respondent
Luis
C.
Singson
as
the
additional
member
from
the
LDP.
The
petitioner
came
to
the
Supreme
Court
to
challenge
his
removal
from
the
Commission
on
Appointments
and
the
assumption
of
his
seat
by
the
respondent.
Acting
initially
on
his
petition
for
prohibition
and
injunction
with
preliminary
injunction,
we
issued
a
temporary
restraining
order
that
same
day
to
prevent
both
the
petitioner
and
the
respondent
from
serving
in
the
Commission
on
Appointments.
Briefly
stated,
the
contention
of
the
petitioner
is
that
he
cannot
be
removed
from
the
Commission
on
Appointments
because
his
election
thereto
is
permanent.
His
claim
is
that
the
reorganization
of
the
House
representation
in
the
said
body
is
not
based
on
a
permanent
political
realignment
because
the
LDP
is
not
a
duly
registered
political
party
and
has
not
yet
attained
political
stability.
Issue:
whether
the
question
raised
by
the
petitioner
is
political
in
nature
and
so
beyond
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Supreme
Court
Held:
No.
The
Court
has
the
competence
to
act
on
the
matter
at
bar.
The
issue
involved
is
not
a
discretionary
act
of
the
House
of
Representatives
that
may
not
be
reviewed
by
us
because
it
is
political
in
nature.
What
is
involved
here
is
the
legality,
not
the
wisdom,
of
the
act
of
that
chamber
in
removing
the
petitioner
from
the
Commission
on
Appointments.
The
term
political
question
connotes,
in
legal
parlance,
what
it
means
in
ordinary
parlance,
namely,
a
question
of
policy.
In
other
words,
it
refers
to
those
questions
which,
under
the
Constitution,
are
to
be
decided
by
the
people
in
their
sovereign
capacity,
or
in
regard
to
which
full
discretionary
authority
has
been
delegated
to
the
Legislature
or
executive
branch
of
the
Government.
It
is
concerned
with
issues
dependent
upon
the
wisdom,
not
legality,
of
a
particular
measure.
Even
if
we
were
to
assume
that
the
issue
presented
before
us
was
political
in
nature,
we
would
still
not
be
precluded
from
resolving
it
under
the
expanded
jurisdiction
conferred
upon
us
that
now
covers,
in
proper
cases,
even
the
political
question.
Article
VII,
Section
1,
of
the
Constitution
clearly
provides:
Section
1.
The
judicial
power
shall
be
vested
in
one
Supreme
Court
and
in
such
lower
courts
as
may
be
established
by
law.
Judicial
power
includes
the
duty
of
the
courts
of
justice
to
settle
actual
controversies
involving
rights
which
are
legally
demandable
and
enforceable,
and
to
determine
whether
or
not
there
has
been
a
grave
abuse
of
discretion
amounting
to
lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction
on
the
part
of
any
branch
or
instrumentality
of
the
Government.
TANADA
v.
ANGARA
Facts
:
This
is
a
petition
seeking
to
nullify
the
Philippine
ratification
of
the
World
Trade
Organization
(WTO)
Agreement.
Petitioners
question
the
concurrence
of
herein
respondents
acting
in
their
capacities
as
Senators
via
signing
the
said
agreement.
The
WTO
opens
access
to
foreign
markets,
especially
its
major
trading
partners,
through
the
reduction
of
tariffs
on
its
exports,
particularly
agricultural
and
industrial
products.
Thus,
provides
new
opportunities
for
the
service
sector
cost
and
uncertainty
associated
with
exporting
and
more
investment
in
the
country.
These
are
the
predicted
benefits
as
reflected
in
the
agreement
and
as
viewed
by
the
signatory
Senators,
a
“free
market”
espoused
by
WTO.
Petitioners
on
the
other
hand
viewed
the
WTO
agreement
as
one
that
limits,
restricts
and
impair
Philippine
economic
sovereignty
and
legislative
power.
That
the
Filipino
First
policy
of
the
Constitution
was
taken
for
granted
as
it
gives
foreign
trading
intervention.
Issue
:
Whether
or
not
there
has
been
a
grave
abuse
of
discretion
amounting
to
lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction
on
the
part
of
the
Senate
in
giving
its
concurrence
of
the
said
WTO
agreement.
Held:
In
its
Declaration
of
Principles
and
state
policies,
the
Constitution
“adopts
the
generally
accepted
principles
of
international
law
as
part
of
the
law
of
the
land,
and
adheres
to
the
policy
of
peace,
equality,
justice,
freedom,
cooperation
and
amity
,
with
all
nations.
By
the
doctrine
of
incorporation,
the
country
is
bound
by
generally
accepted
principles
of
international
law,
which
are
considered
automatically
part
of
our
own
laws.
Pacta
sunt
servanda
–
international
agreements
must
be
performed
in
good
faith.
A
treaty
is
not
a
mere
moral
obligation
but
creates
a
legally
binding
obligation
on
the
parties.
Through
WTO
the
sovereignty
of
the
state
cannot
in
fact
and
reality
be
considered
as
absolute
because
it
is
a
regulation
of
commercial
relations
among
nations.
Such
as
when
Philippines
joined
the
United
Nations
(UN)
it
consented
to
restrict
its
sovereignty
right
under
the
“concept
of
sovereignty
as
autolimitation.”
What
Senate
did
was
a
valid
exercise
of
authority.
As
to
determine
whether
such
exercise
is
wise,
beneficial
or
viable
is
outside
the
realm
of
judicial
inquiry
and
review.
The
act
of
signing
the
said
agreement
is
not
a
legislative
restriction
as
WTO
allows
withdrawal
of
membership
should
this
be
the
political
desire
of
a
member.
Also,
it
should
not
be
viewed
as
a
limitation
of
economic
sovereignty.
WTO
remains
as
the
only
viable
structure
for
multilateral
trading
and
the
veritable
forum
for
the
development
of
international
trade
law.
Its
alternative
is
isolation,
stagnation
if
n ot
economic
self-‐destruction.
Thus,
the
people
be
allowed,
through
their
duly
elected
officers,
make
their
free
choice.
Petition
is
DISMISSED
for
lack
of
merit.
3
The
first
doubt
that
naturally
would
occur
is
whether,
if
a
right
of
action
had
vested
previously,
it
could
be
taken
away
by
such
a
statute.
But
it
generally
is
recognized
that
in
cases
like
the
present,
where
the
act
originally
purports
to
be
done
in
the
name
and
by
the
authority
of
the
state,
a
defect
in
that
authority
may
be
cured
by
the
subsequent
adoption
of
the
act.
The
person
who
has
assumed
to
represent
the
will
and
person
of
the
superior
power
is
given
the
benefit
of
the
representation
if
it
turns
out
that
his
assumption
was
correct.
O’Reilly
de
Camara
v.
Brooke,
209
U.
S.
45,
52,
52
L.
ed.
676,
678,
28
Sup.
Ct.
Rep.
439;
United
States
v.
Heinszen,
206
U.
S.
370,
382,
51
L.
ed.
1098,
1102,
27
Sup.
Ct.
Rep.
742,
11
Ann.
Cas.
688;
The
Paquete
Habana,
189
U.
S.
453,
465,
47
L.
ed.
901,
903,
23
Sup.
Ct.
Rep.
593;
Phillips
v.
Eyre,
L.
R.
6
Q.
B.
1,
23,
10
Best
&
S.
1004,
40
L.
J.
Q.
B.
N.
S.
28,
22
L.
T.
N.
S.
869;
Secretary
of
State
v.
Kamachee
Boye
Sahaba,
13
Moore,
P.
C.
C.
22,
86,
7
Moore,
Ind.
App.
476.
Compare
West
Side
Belt
R.
Co.
v.
Pittsburgh
Constr.
Co.
219
U.
S.
92,
55
L.
ed.
107,
31
Sup.
Ct.
Rep.
196;
Dunbar
v.
Boston
&
P.
R.
Corp.
181
Mass.
383,
385,
386,
63
N.
E.
916.
4
Therefore
the
deportation
is
to
be
considered
as
having
been
ordered
by
the
governor
general
in
pursuance
of
a
statute
of
the
Philippine
legislature
directing
it,
under
their
combined
powers,
and
it
is
unnecessary
to
consider
whether
he
had
authority,
by
virtue
of
his
office
alone,
as
declared
by
the
statute,
or
whether,
if
he
had
not,
he
had
immunity
from
suit
for
such
an
official
act
done
in
good
faith.
The
former
matter
now
is
regulated
by
a
later
statute
providing
for
a
hearing,
etc.
No.
2113.
February
1,
1912.
On
the
question
thus
narrowed
the
preliminaries
are
plain.
It
is
admitted
that
sovereign
states
have
inherent
power
to
deport
aliens,
and
seemingly
that
Congress
is
not
deprived
of
this
power
by
the
Constitution
of
the
United
States.
Fong
Yue
Ting
v.
United
States,
149
U.
S.
698,
707,
728,
37
L.
ed.
905,
911,
918,
13
Sup.
Ct.
Rep.
1016;
Wong
Wing
v.
United
States,
163
U.
S.
228,
231,
41
L.
ed.
140,
141,
16
Sup.
Ct.
Rep.
977;
Fok
Yung
Yo
v.
United
States,
185
U.
S.
296,
302,
46
L.
ed.
917,
920,
22
Sup.
Ct.
Rep.
686;
United
States
ex
rel.
Turner
v.
Williams,
194
U.
S.
279,
289,
290,
48
L.
ed.
979,
983,
984,
24
Sup.
Ct.
Rep.
719.
Furthermore,
the
very
ground
of
the
power
in
the
necessities
of
public
welfare
shows
that
it
may
have
to
be
exercised
in
a
summary
way
through
executive
officers.
Fong
Yue
Ting
v.
United
States,
supra;
United
States
v.
Ju
Toy,
198
U.
S.
253,
263,
49
L.
ed.
1040,
1044,
25
Sup.
Ct.
Rep.
644;
Moyer
v.
Peabody,
212
U.
S.
78,
84,
85,
53
L.
ed.
410,
29
Sup.
Ct.
Rep.
235.
So
that
the
question
is
narrowed
further
to
the
inquiry
whether
the
Philippine
government
cannot
do
what
unquestionably
Congress
might.
5
As
Congress
is
not
prevented
by
the
Constitution,
the
Philippine
government
cannot
be
prevented
by
the
Philippine
Bill
of
Rights
alone.
Act
of
July
1,
1902,
chap.
1369,
§
5,
32
Stat.
at
L.
691,
692.
Deporting
the
plaintiffs
was
not
depriving
them
of
liberty
without
due
process
of
law,
unless
on
other
grounds
the
local
government
was
acting
beyond
its
powers.
But
the
local
government
has
all
civil
and
judicial
power
necessary
to
govern
the
Islands.
Act
of
March
2,
1901,
chap.
803,
31
Stat.
at
L.
895,
910,
act
of
July
1,
1902,
chap.
1369,
§
1,
32
Stat.
at
L.
691.
The
forms
are
different,
but
as
in
Hawaii,
the
proximate
source
of
private
rights
is
local,
whether
they
spring
by
inheritance
from
Spain
or
are
created
by
Philippine
legislation.
See
Kawananakoa
v.
Polyblank,
205
U.
S.
349,
354,
51
L.
ed.
834,
836,
27
Sup.
Ct.
Rep.
526;
Perez
v.
Fernandez,
202
U.
S.
80,
91,
92,
50
L.
ed.
942,
945,
946,
26
Sup.
Ct.
Rep.
561.
It
would
be
strange
if
a
government
so
remote
should
be
held
bound
to
wait
for
the
action
of
Congress
in
a
matter
that
might
touch
its
life
unless
dealt
with
at
once
and
on
the
spot.
On
the
contrary,
we
are
of
opinion
that
it
had
the
power
as
an
incident
of
the
self-‐
determination,
however
limited,
given
to
it
by
the
United
States.
6
By
§
86
of
the
act
of
July
1,
1902,
all
laws
passed
by
the
Philippine
government
are
to
be
reported
to
Congress,
which
reserves
power
to
annul
them.
It
is
worthy
of
mention
that
the
law
under
consideration
was
reported
to
Congress
and
has
not
been
annulled.
The
extension
of
the
Chinese
exclusion
and
immigration
laws
to
the
Philippine
Islands
has
no
bearing
on
the
matter.
The
right
to
remain,
for
instance,
under
the
act
of
April
29,
1902,
chap.
641,
§
4,
32
Stat.
at
L.
176,
U.
S.
Comp.
Stat.
Supp.
1911,
p.
524,
does
not
prevail
over
a
removal
as
an
act
of
state.
7
It
is
held
in
England
that
an
act
of
state
is
a
matter
not
cognizable
in
any
municipal
court.
Musgrave
v.
Pulido,
L.
R.
5
App.
Cas.
103,
108,
49
L.
J.
P.
C.
N.
S.
20,
41
L.
T.
N.
S.
629,
28
Week.
Rep.
373.
And
that
was
the
purport
of
the
Philippine
act
declaring
the
deportation
not
subject
to
question
or
review.
As
the
Bill
of
Rights
did
not
stand
in
the
way,
and
the
implied
powers
of
the
government
sanctioned
by
Congress
permitted
it,
there
is
no
reason
why
the
statute
should
not
have
full
effect.
It
protected
the
subordinates
as
well
as
the
governor
general,
and
took
jurisdiction
from
the
court
that
attempted
to
try
the
case.
8
Whether
prohibition
is
technically
the
proper
remedy,
historically
speaking,
we
need
not
inquire.
On
such
a
matter
we
should
not
interfere
with
local
practice
except
for
good
cause
shown.
In
substance
the
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
was
right.
9
Judgment
affirmed.
AYTONA
VS
CASTILLO
4
SCRA
1
G.R.
No.
L-‐19313
January
19
1962
[Midnight
Appointment]
FACTS:
On
December
29,
1961,
Outgoing
President
Carlos
Garcia
appointed
petitioner
Dominador
Aytona
as
ad
interim
Governor
of
the
Central
Bank.
Aytona
took
the
corresponding
oath.
On
the
same
day,
at
noon,
President-‐elect
Diosdado
Macapagal
assumed
office;
and
on
the
next
day,
he
issued
administrative
order
no.
2
recalling,
withdrawing,
and
cancelling
all
ad
interim
appointments
made
by
former
President
Garcia.
There
were
all-‐in
all,
350
midnight
or
last
minute
appointments
made
by
the
former
President
Garcia.
On
January
1,
President
Macapagal
appointed
Andres
Castillo
as
ad
interim
Governor
of
the
Central
Bank.
Aytona
instituted
a
case
(quo
warranto)
against
Castillo,
contending
that
he
was
validly
appointed,
thus
the
subsequent
appointment
to
Castillo
by
the
new
President,
should
be
considered
void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.
RULING:
No.
After
the
proclamation
of
the
election
of
President
Macapagal,
previous
President
Garcia
administration
was
no
more
than
a
care-‐taker
administration.
He
was
duty
bound
to
prepare
for
the
orderly
transfer
of
authority
the
incoming
President,
and
he
should
not
do
acts
which
he
ought
to
know,
would
embarrass
or
obstruct
the
policies
of
his
successor.
It
was
not
for
him
to
use
powers
as
incumbent
President
to
continue
the
political
warfare
that
had
ended
or
to
avail
himself
of
presidential
prerogatives
to
serve
partisan
purposes.
The
filling
up
vacancies
in
important
positions,
if
few,
and
so
spaced
to
afford
some
assurance
of
deliberate
action
and
careful
consideration
of
the
need
for
the
appointment
and
the
appointee's
qualifications
may
undoubtedly
be
permitted.
But
the
issuance
of
350
appointments
in
one
night
and
planned
induction
of
almost
all
of
them
a
few
hours
before
the
inauguration
of
the
new
President
may,
with
some
reason,
be
regarded
by
the
latter
as
an
abuse
Presidential
prerogatives,
the
steps
taken
being
apparently
a
mere
partisan
effort
to
fill
all
vacant
positions
irrespective
of
fitness
and
other
conditions,
and
thereby
deprive
the
new
administration
of
an
opportunity
to
make
the
corresponding
appointments.
Alejandrino
v
Quezon
G.R.
No.
L-‐22041.
September
11,
1924
Facts:
"Resolved:
That
the
Honorable
Jose
Alejandrino,
Senator
for
the
Twelfth
District,
be,
as
he
is
hereby,
declared
guilty
of
disorderly
conduct
and
flagrant
violation
of
the
privileges
of
the
Senate
for
having
treacherously
assaulted
the
Honorable
Vicente
de
Vera,
Senator
for
the
Sixth
District
on
the
occasion
of
certain,
phrases
being
uttered
by
the
latter
in
the
course
of
the
debate
regarding
the
credentials
of
said
Mr.
Alejandrino.
Issue:
Whether
resolution
above
quoted
is
unconstitutional
and
entirely
of
no
effect,
for
five
reasons.
He
prays
the
court:
(1)
To
issue
a
preliminary
injunction
against
the
respondents
enjoining
them
from
executing
the
resolution;
(2)
to
declare
the
aforesaid
resolution
of
the
Senate
null
and
void;
and
(3)
as
a
consequence
of
the
foregoing,
to
issue
a
final
writ
of
mandamus
and
injunction
against
the
respondents
ordering
them
to
recognize
the
rights
of
the
petitioner
to
exercise
his
office
as
Senator
Held:
As
it
is
unlikely
that
the
petition
could
be
amended
to
state
a
cause
of
action,
it
must
be
dismissed
without
costs.
Such
is
the
judgment
of
the
court.
So
ordered.
Ratio:
We
rule
that
neither
the
Philippine
Legislature
nor
a
branch
thereof
can
be
directly
controlled
in
the
exercise
of
their
legislative
powers
by
any
judicial
process.
The
court
accordingly
lacks
jurisdiction
to
consider
the
petition
and
the
demurrer
must
be
sustained.
The
power
to
control
is
the
power
to
abrogate
and
the
power
to
abrogate
is
the
power
to
usurp.
Each
department
may,
nevertheless,
indirectly
restrain
the
others.
It
is
peculiarly
the
duty
of
the
judiciary
to
say
what
the
law
is,
to
enforce
the
Constitution,
and
to
decide
whether
the
proper
constitutional
sphere
of
a
department
has
been
transcended.
The
courts
must
determine
the
validity
of
legislative
enactments
as
well
as
the
legality
of
all
private
and
official
acts.
To
this
extent,
do
the
courts
restrain
the
other
departments.
In
view
of
the
propriety
of
mandamus
Mandamus
will
not
lie
against
the
legislative
body,
its
members,
or
its
officers,
to
compel
the
performance
of
duties
purely
legislative
in
their
character
which
therefore
pertain
to
their
legislative
functions
and
over
which
they
have
exclusive
control.
The
final
arbiter
in
cases
of
dispute
is
the
judiciary,
and
to
this
extent
at
least
the
executive
department
may
be
said
to
be
dependent
upon
and
subordinate
to
the
judiciary.
.
.
.
It
is
not
the
office
of
the
person
to
whom
the
writ
of
mandamus
is
directed,
but
the
nature
of
the
thing
to
be
done,
by
which
the
propriety
of
issuing
a
mandamus
is
to
be
determined."
In
view
of
the
Organic
Law
vs
Power
to
Discipline
House
Members
On
the
merits
of
the
controversy,
we
will
only
say
this:
The
Organic
Act
authorizes
the
Governor-‐General
of
the
Philippine
Islands
to
appoint
two
senators
and
nine
representatives
to
represent
the
non-‐Christian
regions
in
the
Philippine
Legislature.
These
senators
and
representatives
"hold
office
until
removed
by
the
Governor-‐General."
(Organic
Act,
secs.
16,
17.)
They
may
not
be
removed
by
the
Philippine
Legislature.
However,
to
the
Senate
and
the
House
of
Representatives,
respectively,
is
granted
the
power
to
"punish
its
members
for
disorderly
behavior,
and,
with
the
concurrence
of
two-‐thirds,
expel
an
elective
member."
(Organic
Act,
sec.
18.)
Either
House
may
thus
punish
an
appointive
member
for
disorderly
behavior.
Neither
House
may
expel
an
appointive
member
for
any
reason.
As
to
whether
the
power
to
"suspend"
is
then
included
in
the
power
to
"punish,"
a
power
granted
to
the
two
Houses
of
the
Legislature
by
the
Constitution,
or
in
the
power
to
"remove,"
a
power
granted
to
the
Governor-‐General
by
the
Constitution,
it
would
appear
that
neither
is
the
correct
hypothesis.
The
Constitution
has
purposely
withheld
from
the
two
Houses
of
the
Legislature
and
the
Governor-‐General
alike
the
power
to
suspend
an
appointive
member
of
the
Legislature.
In
view
of
effects
of
punishment
Punishment
by
way
of
reprimand
or
fine
vindicates
the
outraged
dignity
of
the
House
without
depriving
the
constituency
of
representation;
expulsion,
when
permissible,
likewise
vindicates
the
honor
of
the
legislative
body
while
giving
to
the
constituency
an
opportunity
to
elect
anew;
but
suspension
deprives
the
electoral
district
of
representation
without
that
district
being
afforded
any
means
by
which
to
fill
the
vacancy.
By
suspension,
the
seat
remains
filled
but
the
occupant
is
silenced.
Suspension
for
one
year
is
equivalent
to
qualified
expulsion
or
removal.
In
view
of
no
remedy
Conceding
therefore
that
the
power
of
the
Senate
to
punish
its
members
for
disorderly
behavior
does
not
authorize
it
to
suspend
an
appointive
member
from
the
exercise
of
his
office
for
one
year,
conceding
what
has
been
so
well
stated
by
the
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner,
conceding
all
this
and
more,
yet
the
writ
prayed
for
cannot
issue,
for
the
all-‐conclusive
reason
that
the
Supreme
Court
does
not
possess
the
power
of
coercion
to
make
the
Philippine
Senate
take
any
particular
action.
If
it
be
said
that
conclusion
leaves
the
petitioner
without
a
remedy,
the
answer
is
that
the
judiciary
is
not
the
repository
of
all
wisdom
and
all
power.
Osmena
vs
Pendatun
(G.R.
No.
L-‐17144)
FACTS:
Congressman
Osmena
petitioned
for
declaratory
relief,
certiorari
and
prohibition
with
preliminary
injunction
against
Congressman
Pendatun
and
14
others
in
their
capacity
as
member
of
the
Special
Committee
created
by
House
Resolution
#
59.
Specifically,
petitioner
asked
for
the
annulment
of
the
resolution
on
the
ground
of
infringement
of
his
parliamentary
immunity;
and
asked
the
member
of
the
Special
Committee
be
enjoined
from
proceeding,
as
provided
by
Resolution
#
59,
requiring
the
petitioner
to
substantiate
his
charges
against
the
President
during
his
privilege
speech
entitled
“A
Message
to
Garcia”
wherein
he
spoke
of
derogatory
remarks
of
the
President’s
administration
selling
pardons.
For
refusing
to
provide
evidence
as
the
basis
of
his
allegations,
Osmena
was
suspended
for
15
months
for
the
serious
disorderly
behavior.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether
or
not
petitioner
has
complete
parliamentary
immunity
as
provided
by
the
Constitution.
2.
Whether
or
not
petitioner’s
words
constitute
disorderly
conduct.
3.
Whether
or
not
the
taking
up
of
other
business
matters
bars
the
House
from
investigating
the
speech
and
words
of
Osmena.
4.
Whether
or
not
the
House
has
the
power
to
suspend
its
members.
HELD:
1.
Petitioner
has
immunity
but
it
does
not
protect
him
from
responsibility
before
the
legislative
body
itself
as
stated
in
the
provision
that
“xxx
shall
not
be
questioned
in
any
other
place”.
2.
What
constitutes
disorderly
conduct
is
within
the
interpretation
of
the
legislative
body
and
not
the
judiciary,
because
it
is
a
matter
that
depends
mainly
on
the
factual
circumstances
of
which
the
House
knows
best.
Anything
to
the
contrary
will
amount
to
encroachment
of
power.
3.
Resolution
#
59
was
unanimously
approved
by
the
House
and
such
approval
amounted
to
the
suspension
of
the
House
Rules,
which
according
to
the
standard
parliamentary
practice
may
be
done
by
unanimous
consent.
4.
For
unparliamentary
conduct,
members
of
the
Congress
have
been,
or
could
be
censured,
committed
to
prison,
even
expelled
by
the
votes
of
their
colleagues.
Arnault
v.
Nazareno,
G.R.
No.
L-‐3820,
July
18,
1950
I.
THE
FACTS
The
Senate
investigated
the
purchase
by
the
government
of
two
parcels
of
land,
known
as
Buenavista
and
Tambobong
estates.
An
intriguing
question
that
the
Senate
sought
to
resolve
was
the
apparent
irregularity
of
the
government’s
payment
to
one
Ernest
Burt,
a
non-‐resident
American
citizen,
of
the
total
sum
of
Php1.5
million
for
his
alleged
interest
in
the
two
estates
that
only
amounted
to
Php20,000.00,
which
he
seemed
to
have
forfeited
anyway
long
before.
The
Senate
sought
to
determine
who
were
responsible
for
and
who
benefited
from
the
transaction
at
the
expense
of
the
government.
Petitioner
Jean
Arnault,
who
acted
as
agent
of
Ernest
Burt
in
the
subject
transactions,
was
one
of
the
witnesses
summoned
by
the
Senate
to
its
hearings.
In
the
course
of
the
investigation,
the
petitioner
repeatedly
refused
to
divulge
the
name
of
the
person
to
whom
he
gave
the
amount
of
Php440,000.00,
which
he
withdrew
from
the
Php1.5
million
proceeds
pertaining
to
Ernest
Burt.
Arnault
was
therefore
cited
in
contempt
by
the
Senate
and
was
committed
to
the
custody
of
the
Senate
Sergeant-‐at-‐Arms
for
imprisonment
until
he
answers
the
questions.
He
thereafter
filed
a
petition
for
habeas
corpus
directly
with
the
Supreme
Court
questioning
the
validity
of
his
detention.
II.
THE
ISSUE
1.
Did
the
Senate
have
the
power
to
punish
the
petitioner
for
contempt
for
refusing
to
reveal
the
name
of
the
person
to
whom
he
gave
the
Php440,000.00?
2.
Did
the
Senate
have
the
authority
to
commit
petitioner
for
contempt
for
a
term
beyond
its
period
of
legislative
session?
3.
May
the
petitioner
rightfully
invoke
his
right
against
self-‐incrimination?
III.
THE
RULING
[The
Court
DENIED
the
petition
for
habeas
corpus
filed
by
Arnault.]
1.
Yes,
the
Senate
had
the
power
to
punish
the
petitioner
for
contempt
for
refusing
to
reveal
the
name
of
the
person
to
whom
he
gave
the
Php440,000.00.
Although
there
is
no
provision
in
the
[1935]
Constitution
expressly
investing
either
House
of
Congress
with
power
to
make
investigations
and
exact
testimony
to
the
end
that
it
may
exercise
its
legislative
functions
as
to
be
implied.
In
other
words,
the
power
of
inquiry
–
with
process
to
enforce
it
–
is
an
essential
and
appropriate
auxiliary
to
the
legislative
function.
A
legislative
body
cannot
legislate
wisely
or
effectively
in
the
absence
of
information
respecting
the
conditions
which
the
legislation
is
intended
to
effect
or
change;
and
where
the
legislative
body
does
not
itself
possess
the
requisite
information
–
which
is
not
infrequently
true
–
recourse
must
be
had
to
others
who
do
possess
it.
Experience
has
shown
that
mere
requests
for
such
information
are
often
unavailing,
and
also
that
information
which
is
volunteered
is
not
always
accurate
or
complete;
so
some
means
of
compulsion
is
essential
to
obtain
what
is
needed.
xxx
xxx
xxx
[W]e
find
that
the
question
for
the
refusal
to
answer
which
the
petitioner
was
held
in
contempt
by
the
Senate
is
pertinent
to
the
matter
under
inquiry.
In
fact,
this
is
not
and
cannot
be
disputed.
Senate
Resolution
No.
8,
the
validity
of
which
is
not
challenged
by
the
petitioner,
requires
the
Special
Committee,
among
other
things,
to
determine
the
parties
responsible
for
the
Buenavista
and
Tambobong
estates
deal,
and
it
is
obvious
that
the
name
of
the
person
to
whom
the
witness
gave
the
P440,000
involved
in
said
deal
is
pertinent
to
that
determination
—
it
is
in
fact
the
very
thing
sought
to
be
determined.
The
contention
is
not
that
the
question
is
impertinent
to
the
subject
of
the
inquiry
but
that
it
has
no
relation
or
materiality
to
any
proposed
legislation.
We
have
already
indicated
that
it
is
not
necessary
for
the
legislative
body
to
show
that
every
question
propounded
to
a
witness
is
material
to
any
proposed
or
possible
legislation;
what
is
required
is
that
is
that
it
be
pertinent
to
the
matter
under
inquiry.
xxx
xxx
xxx
If
the
subject
of
investigation
before
the
committee
is
within
the
range
of
legitimate
legislative
inquiry
and
the
proposed
testimony
of
the
witness
called
relates
to
that
subject,
obedience,
to
its
process
may
be
enforced
by
the
committee
by
imprisonment.
2.
YES,
the
Senate
had
the
authority
to
commit
petitioner
for
contempt
for
a
term
beyond
its
period
of
legislative
session.
We
find
no
sound
reason
to
limit
the
power
of
the
legislative
body
to
punish
for
contempt
to
the
end
of
every
session
and
not
to
the
end
of
the
last
session
terminating
the
existence
of
that
body.
The
very
reason
for
the
exercise
of
the
power
to
punish
for
contempt
is
to
enable
the
legislative
body
to
perform
its
constitutional
function
without
impediment
or
obstruction.
Legislative
functions
may
be
and
in
practice
are
performed
during
recess
by
duly
constituted
committees
charged
with
the
duty
of
performing
investigations
or
conducting
hearing
relative
to
any
proposed
legislation.
To
deny
to
such
committees
the
power
of
inquiry
with
process
to
enforce
it
would
be
to
defeat
the
very
purpose
for
which
that
the
power
is
recognized
in
the
legislative
body
as
an
essential
and
appropriate
auxiliary
to
is
legislative
function.
It
is
but
logical
to
say
that
the
power
of
self-‐preservation
is
coexistent
with
the
life
to
be
preserved.
But
the
resolution
of
commitment
here
in
question
was
adopted
by
the
Senate,
which
is
a
continuing
body
and
which
does
not
cease
exist
upon
the
periodical
dissolution
of
the
Congress
.
.
.
There
is
no
limit
as
to
time
to
the
Senate’s
power
to
punish
for
contempt
in
cases
where
that
power
may
constitutionally
be
exerted
as
in
the
present
case.
3.
NO,
the
petitioner
may
NOT
rightfully
invoke
his
right
against
self-‐incrimination.
Since
according
to
the
witness
himself
the
transaction
was
legal,
and
that
he
gave
the
[P440,000.00]
to
a
representative
of
Burt
in
compliance
with
the
latter’s
verbal
instruction,
we
find
no
basis
upon
which
to
sustain
his
claim
that
to
reveal
the
name
of
that
person
might
incriminate
him.
There
is
no
conflict
of
authorities
on
the
applicable
rule,
to
wit:
Generally,
the
question
whether
testimony
is
privileged
is
for
the
determination
of
the
Court.
At
least,
it
is
not
enough
for
the
witness
to
say
that
the
answer
will
incriminate
him
as
he
is
not
the
sole
judge
of
his
liability.
The
danger
of
self-‐incrimination
must
appear
reasonable
and
real
to
the
court,
from
all
the
circumstances,
and
from
the
whole
case,
as
well
as
from
his
general
conception
of
the
relations
of
the
witness.
Upon
the
facts
thus
developed,
it
is
the
province
of
the
court
to
determine
whether
a
direct
answer
to
a
question
may
criminate
or
not.
.
.
The
fact
that
the
testimony
of
a
witness
may
tend
to
show
that
he
has
violated
the
law
is
not
sufficient
to
entitle
him
to
claim
the
protection
of
the
constitutional
provision
against
self-‐incrimination,
unless
he
is
at
the
same
time
liable
to
prosecution
and
punishment
for
such
violation.
The
witness
cannot
assert
his
privilege
by
reason
of
some
fanciful
excuse,
for
protection
against
an
imaginary
danger,
or
to
secure
immunity
to
a
third
person.
It
is
the
province
of
the
trial
judge
to
determine
from
all
the
facts
and
circumstances
of
the
case
whether
the
witness
is
justified
in
refusing
to
answer.
A
witness
is
not
relieved
from
answering
merely
on
his
own
declaration
that
an
answer
might
incriminate
him,
but
rather
it
is
for
the
trial
judge
to
decide
that
question.
Philippine
Bar
Association
(PBA)
vs.
COMELEC
FACTS:
11
petitions
were
filed
for
prohibition
against
the
enforcement
of
BP
883
which
calls
for
special
national
elections
on
February
7,
1986
(Snap
elections)
for
the
offices
of
President
and
Vice
President
of
the
Philippines.
BP
883
in
conflict
with
the
constitution
in
that
it
allows
the
President
to
continue
holding
office
after
the
calling
of
the
special
election.
Senator
Pelaez
submits
that
President
Marcos’
letter
of
conditional
“resignation”
did
not
create
the
actual
vacancy
required
in
Section
9,
Article
7
of
the
Constitution
which
could
be
the
basis
of
the
holding
of
a
special
election
for
President
and
Vice
President
earlier
than
the
regular
elections
for
such
positions
in
1987.
The
letter
states
that
the
President
is:
“irrevocably
vacat(ing)
the
position
of
President
effective
only
when
the
election
is
held
and
after
the
winner
is
proclaimed
and
qualified
as
President
by
taking
his
oath
office
ten
(10)
days
after
his
proclamation.”
The
unified
opposition,
rather
than
insist
on
strict
compliance
with
the
cited
constitutional
provision
that
the
incumbent
President
actually
resign,
vacate
his
office
and
turn
it
over
to
the
Speaker
of
the
Batasang
Pambansa
as
acting
President,
their
standard
bearers
have
not
filed
any
suit
or
petition
in
intervention
for
the
purpose
nor
repudiated
the
scheduled
election.
They
have
not
insisted
that
President
Marcos
vacate
his
office,
so
long
as
the
election
is
clean,
fair
and
honest.
ISSUE:
Is
BP
883
unconstitutional,
and
should
the
Supreme
Court
therefore
stop
and
prohibit
the
holding
of
the
elections
HELD:
The
petitions
in
these
cases
are
dismissed
and
the
prayer
for
the
issuance
of
an
injunction
restraining
respondents
from
holding
the
election
on
February
7,
1986,
in
as
much
as
there
are
less
than
the
required
10
votes
to
declare
BP
883
unconstitutional.
The
events
that
have
transpired
since
December
3,as
the
Court
did
not
issue
any
restraining
order,
have
turned
the
issue
into
a
political
question
(from
the
purely
justiciable
issue
of
the
questioned
constitutionality
of
the
act
due
to
the
lack
of
the
actual
vacancy
of
the
President’s
office)
which
can
be
truly
decided
only
by
the
people
in
their
sovereign
capacity
at
the
scheduled
election,
since
there
is
no
issue
more
political
than
the
election.
The
Court
cannot
stand
in
the
way
of
letting
the
people
decide
through
their
ballot,
either
to
give
the
incumbent
president
a
new
mandate
or
to
elect
a
new
president.
DE
CASTRO
VS.
JBC
ARTURO
M.
DE
CASTRO
vs.
JUDICIAL
AND
BAR
COUNCIL
(JBC)
and
PRESIDENT
GLORIA
MACAPAGAL
–
ARROYO
G.R.
No.
191002,
March
17,
2010
FACTS:
The
compulsory
retirement
of
Chief
Justice
Reynato
S.
Puno
by
May
17,
2010
occurs
just
days
after
the
coming
presidential
elections
on
May
10,
2010.
These
cases
trace
their
genesis
to
the
controversy
that
has
arisen
from
the
forthcoming
compulsory
retirement
of
Chief
Justice
Puno
on
May
17,
2010,
or
seven
days
after
the
presidential
election.
Under
Section
4(1),
in
relation
to
Section
9,
Article
VIII,
that
“vacancy
shall
be
filled
within
ninety
days
from
the
occurrence
thereof”
from
a
“list
of
at
least
three
nominees
prepared
by
the
Judicial
and
Bar
Council
for
every
vacancy.”
Also
considering
that
Section
15,
Article
VII
(Executive
Department)
of
the
Constitution
prohibits
the
President
or
Acting
President
from
making
appointments
within
two
months
immediately
before
the
next
presidential
elections
and
up
to
the
end
of
his
term,
except
temporary
appointments
to
executive
positions
when
continued
vacancies
therein
will
prejudice
public
service
or
endanger
public
safety.
The
JBC,
in
its
en
banc
meeting
of
January
18,
2010,
unanimously
agreed
to
start
the
process
of
filling
up
the
position
of
Chief
Justice.
Conformably
with
its
existing
practice,
the
JBC
“automatically
considered”
for
the
position
of
Chief
Justice
the
five
most
senior
of
the
Associate
Justices
of
the
Court,
namely:
Associate
Justice
Antonio
T.
Carpio;
Associate
Justice
Renato
C.
Corona;
Associate
Justice
Conchita
Carpio
Morales;
Associate
Justice
Presbitero
J.
Velasco,
Jr.;
and
Associate
Justice
Antonio
Eduardo
B.
Nachura.
However,
the
last
two
declined
their
nomination
through
letters
dated
January
18,
2010
and
January
25,
2010,
respectively.
The
OSG
contends
that
the
incumbent
President
may
appoint
the
next
Chief
Justice,
because
the
prohibition
under
Section
15,
Article
VII
of
the
Constitution
does
not
apply
to
appointments
in
the
Supreme
Court.
It
argues
that
any
vacancy
in
the
Supreme
Court
must
be
filled
within
90
days
from
its
occurrence,
pursuant
to
Section
4(1),
Article
VIII
of
the
Constitution;
that
had
the
framers
intended
the
prohibition
to
apply
to
Supreme
Court
appointments,
they
could
have
easily
expressly
stated
so
in
the
Constitution,
which
explains
why
the
prohibition
found
in
Article
VII
(Executive
Department)
was
not
written
in
Article
VIII
(Judicial
Department);
and
that
the
framers
also
incorporated
in
Article
VIII
ample
restrictions
or
limitations
on
the
President’s
power
to
appoint
members
of
the
Supreme
Court
to
ensure
its
independence
from
“political
vicissitudes”
and
its
“insulation
from
political
pressures,”
such
as
stringent
qualifications
for
the
positions,
the
establishment
of
the
JBC,
the
specified
period
within
which
the
President
shall
appoint
a
Supreme
Court
Justice.
A
part
of
the
question
to
be
reviewed
by
the
Court
is
whether
the
JBC
properly
initiated
the
process,
there
being
an
insistence
from
some
of
the
oppositors-‐intervenors
that
the
JBC
could
only
do
so
once
the
vacancy
has
occurred
(that
is,
after
May
17,
2010).
Another
part
is,
of
course,
whether
the
JBC
may
resume
its
process
until
the
short
list
is
prepared,
in
view
of
the
provision
of
Section
4(1),
Article
VIII,
which
unqualifiedly
requires
the
President
to
appoint
one
from
the
short
list
to
fill
the
vacancy
in
the
Supreme
Court
(be
it
the
Chief
Justice
or
an
Associate
Justice)
within
90
days
from
the
occurrence
of
the
vacancy.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
incumbent
President
can
appoint
the
successor
of
Chief
Justice
Puno
upon
his
retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition
under
Section
15,
Article
VII
does
not
apply
to
appointments
to
fill
a
vacancy
in
the
Supreme
Court
or
to
other
appointments
to
the
Judiciary.
The
first,
Section
15,
Article
VII
(Executive
Department),
provides:
Section
15.
Two
months
immediately
before
the
next
presidential
elections
and
up
to
the
end
of
his
term,
a
President
or
Acting
President
shall
not
make
appointments,
except
temporary
appointments
to
executive
positions
when
continued
vacancies
therein
will
prejudice
public
service
or
endanger
public
safety.
The
other,
Section
4
(1),
Article
VIII
(Judicial
Department),
states:
Section
4.
(1).
The
Supreme
Court
shall
be
composed
of
a
Chief
Justice
and
fourteen
Associate
Justices.
It
may
sit
en
banc
or
in
its
discretion,
in
division
of
three,
five,
or
seven
Members.
Any
vacancy
shall
be
filled
within
ninety
days
from
the
occurrence
thereof.
Had
the
framers
intended
to
extend
the
prohibition
contained
in
Section
15,
Article
VII
to
the
appointment
of
Members
of
the
Supreme
Court,
they
could
have
explicitly
done
so.
They
could
not
have
ignored
the
meticulous
ordering
of
the
provisions.
They
would
have
easily
and
surely
written
the
prohibition
made
explicit
in
Section
15,
Article
VII
as
being
equally
applicable
to
the
appointment
of
Members
of
the
Supreme
Court
in
Article
VIII
itself,
most
likely
in
Section
4
(1),
Article
VIII.
That
such
specification
was
not
done
only
reveals
that
the
prohibition
against
the
President
or
Acting
President
making
appointments
within
two
months
before
the
next
presidential
elections
and
up
to
the
end
of
the
President’s
or
Acting
President’s
term
does
not
refer
to
the
Members
of
the
Supreme
Court.
Had
the
framers
intended
to
extend
the
prohibition
contained
in
Section
15,
Article
VII
to
the
appointment
of
Members
of
the
Supreme
Court,
they
could
have
explicitly
done
so.
They
could
not
have
ignored
the
meticulous
ordering
of
the
provisions.
They
would
have
easily
and
surely
written
the
prohibition
made
explicit
in
Section
15,
Article
VII
as
being
equally
applicable
to
the
appointment
of
Members
of
the
Supreme
Court
in
Article
VIII
itself,
most
likely
in
Section
4
(1),
Article
VIII.
That
such
specification
was
not
done
only
reveals
that
the
prohibition
against
the
President
or
Acting
President
making
appointments
within
two
months
before
the
next
presidential
elections
and
up
to
the
end
of
the
President’s
or
Acting
President’s
term
does
not
refer
to
the
Members
of
the
Supreme
Court.
Section
14,
Section
15,
and
Section
16
are
obviously
of
the
same
character,
in
that
they
affect
the
power
of
the
President
to
appoint.
The
fact
that
Section
14
and
Section
16
refer
only
to
appointments
within
the
Executive
Department
renders
conclusive
that
Section
15
also
applies
only
to
the
Executive
Department.
This
conclusion
is
consistent
with
the
rule
that
every
part
of
the
statute
must
be
interpreted
with
reference
to
the
context,
i.e.
that
every
part
must
be
considered
together
with
the
other
parts,
and
kept
subservient
to
the
general
intent
of
the
whole
enactment.
It
is
absurd
to
assume
that
the
framers
deliberately
situated
Section
15
between
Section
14
and
Section
16,
if
they
intended
Section
15
to
cover
all
kinds
of
presidential
appointments.
If
that
was
their
intention
in
respect
of
appointments
to
the
Judiciary,
the
framers,
if
only
to
be
clear,
would
have
easily
and
surely
inserted
a
similar
prohibition
in
Article
VIII,
most
likely
within
Section
4
(1)
thereof.
Avelino
vs
Cuenco
(G.R.
No.
L-‐2821)
FACTS:
The
petitioners,
Senator
Jose
Avelino,
in
a
quo
warranto
proceeding,
asked
the
court
to
declare
him
the
rightful
Senate
President
and
oust
the
respondent,
Mariano
Cuenco.
In
a
session
of
the
Senate,
Tanada’s
request
to
deliver
a
speech
in
order
to
formulate
charges
against
then
Senate
President
Avelino
was
approved.
With
the
leadership
of
the
Senate
President
followed
by
his
supporters,
they
deliberately
tried
to
delay
and
prevent
Tanada
from
delivering
his
speech.
The
SP
with
his
supporters
employed
delaying
tactics,
the
tried
to
adjourn
the
session
then
walked
out.
Only
12
Senators
were
left
in
the
hall.
The
members
of
the
senate
left
continued
the
session
and
Senator
Cuenco
was
appointed
as
the
Acting
President
of
the
Senate
and
was
recognized
the
next
day
by
the
President
of
the
Philippines.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether
or
not
the
court
has
jurisdiction
of
the
case.
2.
Whether
or
not
Resolutions
67
&
68
was
validly
approved.
HELD:
1.
The
Court
has
no
jurisdiction
of
the
case
because
the
subject
matter
is
political
in
nature
and
in
doing
so,
the
court
will
be
against
the
doctrine
of
separation
of
powers.
To
the
first
question,
the
answer
is
in
the
negative,
in
view
of
the
separation
of
powers,
the
political
nature
of
the
controversy
(Alejandrino
vs.
Quezon,
46
Phil.
83;
Vera
vs.
Avelino,
77
Phil.
192;
Mabanag
vs.
Lopez
Vito,
78
Phil.
1)
and
the
constitutional
grant
to
the
Senate
of
the
power
to
elect
its
own
president,
which
power
should
not
be
interfered
with,
nor
taken
over,
by
the
judiciary.
We
refused
to
take
cognizance
of
the
Vera
case
even
if
the
rights
of
the
electors
of
the
suspended
senators
were
alleged
affected
without
any
immediate
remedy.
A
fortiori
we
should
abstain
in
this
case
because
the
selection
of
the
presiding
officer
affect
only
the
Senators
themselves
who
are
at
liberty
at
any
time
to
choose
their
officers,
change
or
reinstate
them.
Anyway,
if,
as
the
petition
must
imply
to
be
acceptable,
the
majority
of
the
Senators
want
petitioner
to
preside,
his
remedy
lies
in
the
Senate
Session
Hall
—
not
in
the
Supreme
Court.
2.
It
was
held
that
there
is
a
quorum
that
12
being
the
majority
of
23.
In
fine,
all
the
four
justice
agree
that
the
Court
being
confronted
with
the
practical
situation
that
of
the
twenty
three
senators
who
may
participate
in
the
Senate
deliberations
in
the
days
immediately
after
this
decision,
twelve
senators
will
support
Senator
Cuenco
and,
at
most,
eleven
will
side
with
Senator
Avelino,
it
would
be
most
injudicious
to
declare
the
latter
as
the
rightful
President
of
the
Senate,
that
office
being
essentially
one
that
depends
exclusively
upon
the
will
of
the
majority
of
the
senators,
the
rule
of
the
Senate
about
tenure
of
the
President
of
that
body
being
amenable
at
any
time
by
that
majority.
And
at
any
session
hereafter
held
with
thirteen
or
more
senators,
in
order
to
avoid
all
controversy
arising
from
the
divergence
of
opinion
here
about
quorum
and
for
the
benefit
of
all
concerned,the
said
twelve
senators
who
approved
the
resolutions
herein
involved
could
ratify
all
their
acts
and
thereby
place
them
beyond
the
shadow
of
a
doubt.
Teodosio
Lansang
vs
Garcia
(G.R.
No.
L-‐33964)
Abandonment
of
the
Doctrine
Held
in
the
Barcelon
Case
&
the
Montenegro
Case
FACTS:
Due
to
the
throwing
of
two
hand
grenades
in
a
Liberal
Party
caucus
in
1971
causing
the
death
of
8
people,
Marcos
issued
PP
889
which
suspended
the
privilege
of
the
writ
of
habeas
corpus.
Marcos
urged
that
there
is
a
need
to
curtail
the
growth
of
Maoist
groups.
Subsequently,
Lansang
et
al
were
invited
by
the
PC
headed
by
Garcia
for
interrogation
and
investigation.
Lansang
et
al
questioned
the
validity
of
the
suspension
of
the
writ
averring
that
the
suspension
does
not
meet
the
constitutional
requisites.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
suspension
is
constitutional.
HELD:
The
doctrine
established
in
Barcelon
and
Montenegro
was
subsequently
abandoned
in
this
case
where
the
SC
declared
that
it
had
the
power
to
inquire
into
the
factual
basis
of
the
suspension
of
the
privilege
of
the
writ
of
habeas
corpus
by
Marcos
in
Aug
1971
and
to
annul
the
same
if
no
legal
ground
could
be
established.
Accordingly,
hearings
were
conducted
to
receive
evidence
on
this
matter,
including
two
closed-‐door
sessions
in
which
relevant
classified
information
was
divulged
by
the
government
to
the
members
of
the
SC
and
3
selected
lawyers
of
the
petitioners.
In
the
end,
after
satisfying
itself
that
there
was
actually
a
massive
and
systematic
Communist-‐oriented
campaign
to
overthrow
the
government
by
force,
as
claimed
by
M
LAMP
VS.
SEC
OF
BUDGET
AND
MANAGEMENT
LAWYERS
AGAINST
MONOPOLY
AND
POVERTY
(LAMP),
represented
by
its
Chairman
and
counsel,
CEFERINO
PADUA,
Members,
ALBERTO
ABELEDA,
JR.,
ELEAZAR
ANGELES,
GREGELY
FULTON
ACOSTA,
VICTOR
AVECILLA,
GALILEO
BRION,
ANATALIA
BUENAVENTURA,
EFREN
CARAG,
PEDRO
CASTILLO,
NAPOLEON
CORONADO,
ROMEO
ECHAUZ,
ALFREDO
DE
GUZMAN,
ROGELIO
KARAGDAG,
JR.,
MARIA
LUZ
ARZAGA-‐MENDOZA,
LEO
LUIS
MENDOZA,
ANTONIO
P.
PAREDES,
AQUILINO
PIMENTEL
III,
MARIO
REYES,
EMMANUEL
SANTOS,
TERESITA
SANTOS,
RUDEGELIO
TACORDA,
SECRETARY
GEN.
ROLANDO
ARZAGA,
Board
of
Consultants,
JUSTICE
ABRAHAM
SARMIENTO,
SEN.
AQUILINO
PIMENTEL,
JR.,
and
BARTOLOME
FERNANDEZ,
JR.
vs.
THE
SECRETARY
OF
BUDGET
AND
MANAGEMENT,
THE
TREASURER
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
THE
COMMISSION
ON
AUDIT,
and
THE
PRESIDENT
OF
THE
SENATE
and
the
SPEAKER
OF
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
in
representation
of
the
Members
of
the
Congress
FACTS:
For
consideration
of
the
Court
is
an
original
action
for
certiorari
assailing
the
constitutionality
and
legality
of
the
implementation
of
the
Priority
Development
Assistance
Fund
(PDAF)
as
provided
for
in
Republic
Act
(R.A.)
9206
or
the
General
Appropriations
Act
for
2004
(GAA
of
2004).
Petitioner
Lawyers
Against
Monopoly
and
Poverty(LAMP),
a
group
of
lawyers
who
have
banded
together
with
a
mission
of
dismantling
all
forms
of
political,
economic
or
social
monopoly
in
the
country.
According
to
LAMP,
the
above
provision
is
silent
and,
therefore,
prohibits
an
automatic
or
direct
allocation
of
lump
sums
to
individual
senators
and
congressmen
for
the
funding
of
projects.
It
does
not
empower
individual
Members
of
Congress
to
propose,
select
and
identify
programs
and
projects
to
be
funded
out
of
PDAF.
For
LAMP,
this
situation
runs
afoul
against
the
principle
of
separation
of
powers
because
in
receiving
and,
thereafter,
spending
funds
for
their
chosen
projects,
the
Members
of
Congress
in
effect
intrude
into
an
executive
function.
Further,
the
authority
to
propose
and
select
projects
does
not
pertain
to
legislation.
“It
is,
in
fact,
a
non-‐legislative
function
devoid
of
constitutional
sanction,”8
and,
therefore,
impermissible
and
must
be
considered
nothing
less
than
malfeasance.
RESPONDENT’S
POSITION:
the
perceptions
of
LAMP
on
the
implementation
of
PDAF
must
not
be
based
on
mere
speculations
circulated
in
the
news
media
preaching
the
evils
of
pork
barrel.
ISSUES:
1)
whether
or
not
the
mandatory
requisites
for
the
exercise
of
judicial
review
are
met
in
this
case;
and
2)
whether
or
not
the
implementation
of
PDAF
by
the
Members
of
Congress
is
unconstitutional
and
illegal.
HELD:
I.
A
question
is
ripe
for
adjudication
when
the
act
being
challenged
has
had
a
direct
adverse
effect
on
the
individual
challenging
it.
In
this
case,
the
petitioner
contested
the
implementation
of
an
alleged
unconstitutional
statute,
as
citizens
and
taxpayers.
The
petition
complains
of
illegal
disbursement
of
public
funds
derived
from
taxation
and
this
is
sufficient
reason
to
say
that
there
indeed
exists
a
definite,
concrete,
real
or
substantial
controversy
before
the
Court.
LOCUS
STANDI:
The
gist
of
the
question
of
standing
is
whether
a
party
alleges
“such
a
personal
stake
in
the
outcome
of
the
controversy
as
to
assure
that
concrete
adverseness
which
sharpens
the
presentation
of
issues
upon
which
the
court
so
largely
depends
for
illumination
of
difficult
constitutional
questions.
Here,
the
sufficient
interest
preventing
the
illegal
expenditure
of
money
raised
by
taxation
required
in
taxpayers’
suits
is
established.
Thus,
in
the
claim
that
PDAF
funds
have
been
illegally
disbursed
and
wasted
through
the
enforcement
of
an
invalid
or
unconstitutional
law,
LAMP
should
be
allowed
to
sue.
Lastly,
the
Court
is
of
the
view
that
the
petition
poses
issues
impressed
with
paramount
public
interest.
The
ramification
of
issues
involving
the
unconstitutional
spending
of
PDAF
deserves
the
consideration
of
the
Court,
warranting
the
assumption
of
jurisdiction
over
the
petition.
II.
The
Court
rules
in
the
negative.
In
determining
whether
or
not
a
statute
is
unconstitutional,
the
Court
does
not
lose
sight
of
the
presumption
of
validity
accorded
to
statutory
acts
of
Congress.
To
justify
the
nullification
of
the
law
or
its
implementation,
there
must
be
a
clear
and
unequivocal,
not
a
doubtful,
breach
of
the
Constitution.
In
case
of
doubt
in
the
sufficiency
of
proof
establishing
unconstitutionality,
the
Court
must
sustain
legislation
because
“to
invalidate
[a
law]
based
on
x
x
x
baseless
supposition
is
an
affront
to
the
wisdom
not
only
of
the
legislature
that
passed
it
but
also
of
the
executive
which
approved
it.”
The
petition
is
miserably
wanting
in
this
regard.
No
convincing
proof
was
presented
showing
that,
indeed,
there
were
direct
releases
of
funds
to
the
Members
of
Congress,
who
actually
spend
them
according
to
their
sole
discretion.
Devoid
of
any
pertinent
evidentiary
support
that
illegal
misuse
of
PDAF
in
the
form
of
kickbacks
has
become
a
common
exercise
of
unscrupulous
Members
of
Congress,
the
Court
cannot
indulge
the
petitioner’s
request
for
rejection
of
a
law
which
is
outwardly
legal
and
capable
of
lawful
enforcement.
PORK BARREL:
The
Members
of
Congress
are
then
requested
by
the
President
to
recommend
projects
and
programs
which
may
be
funded
from
the
PDAF.
The
list
submitted
by
the
Members
of
Congress
is
endorsed
by
the
Speaker
of
the
House
of
Representatives
to
the
DBM,
which
reviews
and
determines
whether
such
list
of
projects
submitted
are
consistent
with
the
guidelines
and
the
priorities
set
by
the
Executive.”33
This
demonstrates
the
power
given
to
the
President
to
execute
appropriation
laws
and
therefore,
to
exercise
the
spending
per
se
of
the
budget.
As
applied
to
this
case,
the
petition
is
seriously
wanting
in
establishing
that
individual
Members
of
Congress
receive
and
thereafter
spend
funds
out
of
PDAF.
So
long
as
there
is
no
showing
of
a
direct
participation
of
legislators
in
the
actual
spending
of
the
budget,
the
constitutional
boundaries
between
the
Executive
and
the
Legislative
in
the
budgetary
process
remain
intact.
Greco
Belgica
vs
Executive
Secretary
Paquito
Ochoa
710
SCRA
1
–
Political
Law
–
Constitutional
Law
–
Local
Government
–
Invalid
Delegation
Legislative
Department
–
Invalid
Delegation
of
Legislative
Power
This
case
is
consolidated
with
G.R.
No.
208493
and
G.R.
No.
209251.
The
so-‐called
pork
barrel
system
has
been
around
in
the
Philippines
since
about
1922.
Pork
Barrel
is
commonly
known
as
the
lump-‐
sum,
discretionary
funds
of
the
members
of
the
Congress.
It
underwent
several
legal
designations
from
“Congressional
Pork
Barrel”
to
the
latest
“Priority
Development
Assistance
Fund”
or
PDAF.
The
allocation
for
the
pork
barrel
is
integrated
in
the
annual
General
Appropriations
Act
(GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a.
P70
million:
for
each
member
of
the
lower
house;
broken
down
to
–
P40
million
for
“hard
projects”
(infrastructure
projects
like
roads,
buildings,
schools,
etc.),
and
P30
million
for
“soft
projects”
(scholarship
grants,
medical
assistance,
livelihood
programs,
IT
development,
etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-‐President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The
PDAF
articles
in
the
GAA
do
provide
for
realignment
of
funds
whereby
certain
cabinet
members
may
request
for
the
realignment
of
funds
into
their
department
provided
that
the
request
for
realignment
is
approved
or
concurred
by
the
legislator
concerned.
The
president
does
have
his
own
source
of
fund
albeit
not
included
in
the
GAA.
The
so-‐called
presidential
pork
barrel
comes
from
two
sources:
(a)
the
Malampaya
Funds,
from
the
Malampaya
Gas
Project
–
this
has
been
around
since
1976,
and
(b)
the
Presidential
Social
Fund
which
is
derived
from
the
earnings
of
PAGCOR
–
this
has
been
around
since
about
1983.
Ever
since,
the
pork
barrel
system
has
been
besieged
by
allegations
of
corruption.
In
July
2013,
six
whistle
blowers,
headed
by
Benhur
Luy,
exposed
that
for
the
last
decade,
the
corruption
in
the
pork
barrel
system
had
been
facilitated
by
Janet
Lim
Napoles.
Napoles
had
been
helping
lawmakers
in
funneling
their
pork
barrel
funds
into
about
20
bogus
NGO’s
(non-‐government
organizations)
which
would
make
it
appear
that
government
funds
are
being
used
in
legit
existing
projects
but
are
in
fact
going
to
“ghost”
projects.
An
audit
was
then
conducted
by
the
Commission
on
Audit
and
the
results
thereof
concurred
with
the
exposes
of
Luy
et
al.
Motivated
by
the
foregoing,
Greco
Belgica
and
several
others,
filed
various
petitions
before
the
Supreme
Court
questioning
the
constitutionality
of
the
pork
barrel
system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
As
a
rule,
the
budgeting
power
lies
in
Congress.
It
regulates
the
release
of
funds
(power
of
the
purse).
The
executive,
on
the
other
hand,
implements
the
laws
–
this
includes
the
GAA
to
which
the
PDAF
is
a
part
of.
Only
the
executive
may
implement
the
law
but
under
the
pork
barrel
system,
what’s
happening
was
that,
after
the
GAA,
itself
a
law,
was
enacted,
the
legislators
themselves
dictate
as
to
which
projects
their
PDAF
funds
should
be
allocated
to
–
a
clear
act
of
implementing
the
law
they
enacted
–
a
violation
of
the
principle
of
separation
of
powers.
(Note
in
the
older
case
of
PHILCONSA
vs
Enriquez,
it
was
ruled
that
pork
barrel,
then
called
as
CDF
or
the
Countrywide
Development
Fund,
was
constitutional
insofar
as
the
legislators
only
recommend
where
their
pork
barrel
funds
go).
This
is
also
highlighted
by
the
fact
that
in
realigning
the
PDAF,
the
executive
will
still
have
to
get
the
concurrence
of
the
legislator
concerned.
As
a
rule,
the
Constitution
vests
legislative
power
in
Congress
alone.
(The
Constitution
does
grant
the
people
legislative
power
but
only
insofar
as
the
processes
of
referendum
and
initiative
are
concerned).
That
being,
legislative
power
cannot
be
delegated
by
Congress
for
it
cannot
delegate
further
that
which
was
delegated
to
it
by
the
Constitution.
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii)
authority
of
the
President
to,
by
law,
exercise
powers
necessary
and
proper
to
carry
out
a
declared
national
policy
in
times
of
war
or
other
national
emergency,
or
fix
within
specified
limits,
and
subject
to
such
limitations
and
restrictions
as
Congress
may
impose,
tariff
rates,
import
and
export
quotas,
tonnage
and
wharfage
dues,
and
other
duties
or
imposts
within
the
framework
of
the
national
development
program
of
the
Government.
In
this
case,
the
PDAF
articles
which
allow
the
individual
legislator
to
identify
the
projects
to
which
his
PDAF
money
should
go
to
is
a
violation
of
the
rule
on
non-‐delegability
of
legislative
power.
The
power
to
appropriate
funds
is
solely
lodged
in
Congress
(in
the
two
houses
comprising
it)
collectively
and
not
lodged
in
the
individual
members.
Further,
nowhere
in
the
exceptions
does
it
state
that
the
Congress
can
delegate
the
power
to
the
individual
member
of
Congress.
One
feature
in
the
principle
of
checks
and
balances
is
the
power
of
the
president
to
veto
items
in
the
GAA
which
he
may
deem
to
be
inappropriate.
But
this
power
is
already
being
undermined
because
of
the
fact
that
once
the
GAA
is
approved,
the
legislator
can
now
identify
the
project
to
which
he
will
appropriate
his
PDAF.
Under
such
system,
how
can
the
president
veto
the
appropriation
made
by
the
legislator
if
the
appropriation
is
made
after
the
approval
of
the
GAA
–
again,
“Congress
cannot
choose
a
mode
of
budgeting
which
effectively
renders
the
constitutionally-‐given
power
of
the
President
useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As
a
rule,
the
local
governments
have
the
power
to
manage
their
local
affairs.
Through
their
Local
Development
Councils
(LDCs),
the
LGUs
can
develop
their
own
programs
and
policies
concerning
their
localities.
But
with
the
PDAF,
particularly
on
the
part
of
the
members
of
the
house
of
representatives,
what’s
happening
is
that
a
congressman
can
either
bypass
or
duplicate
a
project
by
the
LDC
and
later
on
claim
it
as
his
own.
This
is
an
instance
where
the
national
government
(note,
a
congressman
is
a
national
officer)
meddles
with
the
affairs
of
the
local
government
–
and
this
is
contrary
to
the
State
policy
embodied
in
the
Constitution
on
local
autonomy.
It’s
good
if
that’s
all
that
is
happening
under
the
pork
barrel
system
but
worse,
the
PDAF
becomes
more
of
a
personal
fund
on
the
part
of
legislators.
The
main
issue
raised
by
Belgica
et
al
against
the
presidential
pork
barrel
is
that
it
is
unconstitutional
because
it
violates
Section
29
(1),
Article
VI
of
the
Constitution
which
provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica
et
al
emphasized
that
the
presidential
pork
comes
from
the
earnings
of
the
Malampaya
and
PAGCOR
and
not
from
any
appropriation
from
a
particular
legislation.
The
Supreme
Court
disagrees
as
it
ruled
that
PD
910,
which
created
the
Malampaya
Fund,
as
well
as
PD
1869
(as
amended
by
PD
1993),
which
amended
PAGCOR’s
charter,
provided
for
the
appropriation,
to
wit:
(i)
PD
910:
Section
8
thereof
provides
that
all
fees,
among
others,
collected
from
certain
energy-‐related
ventures
shall
form
part
of
a
special
fund
(the
Malampaya
Fund)
which
shall
be
used
to
further
finance
energy
resource
development
and
for
other
purposes
which
the
President
may
direct;
(ii)
PD
1869,
as
amended:
Section
12
thereof
provides
that
a
part
of
PAGCOR’s
earnings
shall
be
allocated
to
a
General
Fund
(the
Presidential
Social
Fund)
which
shall
be
used
in
government
infrastructure
projects.
These
are
sufficient
laws
which
met
the
requirement
of
Section
29,
Article
VI
of
the
Constitution.
The
appropriation
contemplated
therein
does
not
have
to
be
a
particular
appropriation
as
it
can
be
a
general
appropriation
as
in
the
case
of
PD
910
and
PD
1869.