These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices
Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.
No. 78791 September 30, 1987
KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM
AND NATIONALISM-OLALIA,petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA.
ESTRELLA ALDAS, CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG
and KIMBERLY-CLARK PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of
Filipro Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent
Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the
intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of
the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets'
quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times
obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of
justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along
the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers
and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved
their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the
court all day long with the use of loud speakers.
their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of
Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be
informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same
constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain
their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10,
1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the
opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito
Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson
Centeno, union leaders of respondent Union of Filipro Employees in the
Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs.
Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of
petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July
14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they
should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further
required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with.
On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared
before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of
Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791,
who was still recuperating from an operation.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned,
apologized to the Court for the above-described acts, together with an
assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court
that he had experienced to the picketers why their actions were wrong and
that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be
warranted under the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's
leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders
of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an
unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in the Southern
Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the
Kimberly Independent Labor Union. 2
Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any
delay in the resolution of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control
of the Court and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its
role as the guardian of the Constitution.
To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood
the reason for the citation and that they wig abide by their promise that said
incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a
written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on July
17, 1987.
We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego
the imposition of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described
earlier. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the
earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30, 1987,
should not, however, be considered in any other light than an
acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of
a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar
situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who
attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case
pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper
channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in
keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of
justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and
tending to embarrass the administration of justice." 3
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all
free governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may
be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained
for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society
everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law
should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be
decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such
facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." 4
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly
in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor.
Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the
fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the
protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." 5 The
aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the
dignity of this Court, but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the
adverse parties and the citizenry at large.
incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession
that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on
matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor
leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their
members.
WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are
DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure
or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending
cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all
courts.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 TSN, July 14, 1987 p. 16.
2 Ibid., p. 17
3 In re Torres, 55 Phil. 799.
4 In Re Stolen, 216 N.W. 127.
5 Cooper vs. People, 13 Colo 373, cited in in Re Kelly, 35
Phil. 944.
6 In Re Stolen, supra.

We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not
knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are
not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are
protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of
justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no
longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that
any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of
court. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily
and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C.
Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to
demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 1769 June 8, 1992
CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking
disciplinary action against respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the
Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts
of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge and
bribery", in connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83
and 88 then pending before the Municipal Court of Experanza, Agusan del
Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia 1 in which respondent
Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia
Mascarinas.
Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila
was the owner of d farm located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that
herein complainant Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm,
receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that the complaint in Civil
Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the squatters from the
aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of
Esperanza, Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was the
Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge of
the municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). 4 The defendants in the
mentioned civil cases were, in due course, declared in default.
In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the present case
show that complainant Lantoria wrote a letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23
April 1974, which reads as follows:
Atty. Ireneo Bunye
928 Rizal Avenue
Santa Cruz, Manila
Dear Atty. Bunye:
xxx xxx xxx
Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the
corresponding judgements (sic) on the 3 defaulted cases he
said he has no objection in fact he is happy and
recommended that you mail the said decisions in due time
thru me to be delivered to him.
xxx xxx xxx
I will communicate with you from time to time for any future
development.
My best regards to you and family and to
Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas and all.
On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the
said three (3) cases, in this wise:
Dear Major Lantoria,
At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the
call in your several letters received, which is about the
preparation of the three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge
Galicia. The delay is that I have been too much occupied
with my cases and other professional commitments here in
Manila and nearby provinces. Not only to Mrs. Mascarinas I
would say that I am so sorry but also to you. Mrs.
Mascarinas has been reminding me but I always find myself
at a loss to prepare these Decisions at an early date sa (sic)
possible. So also with my calendar as to the dates for the
next hearing of the remaining cases over there.
 Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions
against the (3) defaulted defendants. I am not sure if they
will suit to satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once.
However, it is my request to Judge Galicia, thru your kind
mediation, that if the preparation of these Decisions do not
suit his consideration, then I am ready and willing to accept
his suggestions or correction to charge or modify them for
the better. And to this effect, kindly relay at once what he is
going to say or thinks if he signs them readily and please
request for each copy for our hold.
xxx xxx xxx
Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your kind
assistance in attending to our cases there. Regards to you
and family and prayer for your more vigor and success.
It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to complainant
Lantoria, dated 04 March 1974, the contents of which read as follows:
Dear Major Lantoria,
This is an additional request, strictly personal and
confidential. Inside the envelope addressed to Judge Vicente
C. Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders, which he told me
to prepare and he is going to sign them. If you please,
deliver the envelope to him as if you have no knowledge and
information and that you have not opened it. Unless, of
course, if the information comes from him. But, you can
inquire from him if there is a need to wait from his words
about them, or copies to be furnished me, after he signs
them, it could be made thru you personally, to expedite
receiving those copies for our hold. According to him, this
envelope could be delivered to him at his residence at No.
345 M. Calo St., Butuan City, during week end. or, at
Bayugan if you happen to go there, if he is not in Butuan
City.
Thanking You for your kind attention and favor. Three years
after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this
Court the present administrative case against respondent
Bunyi, predicated mainly on the above-quoted three (3)
letters dated 04 March, 23 April and 01 June, 1974.
Complainant contends that respondent won the said three
(3) cases because to (respondent) was the one who
unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that
the preparation by respondent of said decisions warranted
disciplinary action against him.
By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion to dismiss 8 the
administrative complaint, admitted the existence of the letter of 01 June
1974, but explained the contents thereof as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is
self-explanatory and speaks for itself, that if ever the same
was written by the Respondent, it was due to the insistence
of the Complainant thru his several letters received, that the
decisions in question be drafted or prepared for Judge
Galicia, who considered such preparation as a big help to
him, because he was at that time holding two (2) salas —
one as being the regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan and
the other, as the acting Judge of Esperanza, both of Agusan
del Sur, with many pending cases and it was to the benefit of
the Complainant that the early disposition of the cases
involved would not suffer inconsiderable delay. But, the
intention to draft or prepare the decisions in question was
never spawned by the Respondent. Instead, it came from
the under-standing between the Judge and the complainant
who, from his several letters, had demonstrated so much
interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm he was
entrusted to manage. Furthermore, the Complainant's
conclusion that the said decisions were lutong macao is
purely non-sense as it is without any factual or legal basis.
He himself knew that Judge Galicia asked for help in the
drafting of said decisions as at any rate they were judgments
by default, the defendants lost their standing in court when
they were declared in default for failure to file their answers
and to appear at the place and time set for hearing thereof
(See first paragraph, letter of June 1, 1974)
c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were
in the form of drafts, as in fact, the letter mentioned subject
to suggestion or correction to change or modify for the better
by Judge Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid);
d) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even
apologized for the delay in sending the same to the
 Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance
in attending to the cases involved (Last paragraph, Ibid.)
In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 9 On 21 July
1980, the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court, with the
following averments, to wit: 1) that the case was set for hearing on April 12,
September 29, and December 18, 1978, but in all said scheduled hearings
only respondent Bunyi appeared; 2) that in the hearing of 16 January 1979,
both respondent and complainant appeared; 3) that at the same hearing, the
Solicitor General reported the following development —
Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated
January 16, 1979 sworn to before the investigating Solicitor,
praying that the complaint be considered withdrawn,
dropped or dismissed on the ground that complainant "could
hardly substantiate" his charges and that he is "no longer
interested to prosecute" the same. For his part, respondent
manifested that he has no objection to the withdrawal of the
complaint against him. At the same time, he presented
complainant Lantoria as a witness are elicited testimony to
the effect that complainant no longer has in his possession
the original of the letters attached to his basic complaint, and
hence, he was not prepared to prove his
charges. 10 (emphasis supplied)
In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the
letters of respondent Bunyi (dated 4, March and 1 June 1974), addressed to
complainant, showed that respondent had indeed prepared the draft of the
decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, which he submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia
thru the complainant; b) that those letters indicated that respondent had
previous communications with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the
decisions; c) that the testimony of complainant to the effect that he had lost
the original of said letters, and complainant's withdrawal of the complaint in
the case at bar are of no moment, as respondent Bunyi, and his motion to
dismiss filed with the Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared the draft of
the decisions in the said civil cases, and be affirmed the existence of the
letters.
Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of
highly unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as
an officer of the court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary and
to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial determination
of a litigation in which he is counsel. 11 The Solicitor General recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year. He filed with the Court the corresponding complaint against
respondent.
In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent
manifested that in the future he would be more careful in observing his duties
as a lawyer, and in upholding the provisions of the canons of professional
ethics.
On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case,
the hearing was postponed until further notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent
filed a manifestation 13 alleging that no hearing was as yet set in the case
since the last setting on 10 December 1980, and he requested that the next
hearing be not set until after six (6) months when be expected to return from
the United States of America where he would visit his children and at the
same time have a medical check-up.
On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for bearing in this case,
respondent Bunyi and the Solicitor General appeared, and respondent was
directed to submit his memorandum. Respondent Bunyi filed his
memorandum on 16 November 1981. In said memorandum, 14 respondent
submitted that although he prepared the draft of the decisions in the civil
cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or consideration to influence the
Judge in allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. 15 He also offered his
apology to the Court for all the improprieties which may have resulted from
his preparation of the draft decisions.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination
of the merits of the instant case should proceed notwithstanding
complainant's withdrawal of his complaint in the case, the respondent himself
having admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and that he even
asked for an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters may
have had on his duty as a lawyer.
With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which
the present administrative complaint is based, the remaining issue to be
resolved is the effect of the acts complained of on respondent's duty both as
a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that
respondent, by way of disciplinary action, deserves suspension from the
practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous
communication with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the draft
decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact prepared.
Although nothing in the records would show that respondent got the trial SO ORDERED.
court judge's consent to the said preparation for a favor or consideration, the
acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer Narvasa C.J., Paras, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
and an officer of the Court.
Footnotes
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics (which were enforced at the time respondent committed the acts 1 Rollo, p. 28.
admitted by him), which provides as follows: 2 Rollo, p. 97.
3 Ibid.
3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court 4 Ibid.
5 Rollo, p. 5.
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a 6 Id., p. 6.
lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of 7 Ibid., p. 7.
the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to 8 Rollo, p. 36.
misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer 9 Ibid., p. 47.
should not communicate or argue privately with the judge as 10 Id., p. 58.
to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and 11 Rollo, p. 63.
denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge 12 Ibid., pp. 85 and 86.
special personal consideration or favor. A self-respecting 13 Id., p. 89.
independence in the discharge of professional duty, without 14 Rollo, pp. 99 and 100.
denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the 15 Respondent alleged that at the time complainant filed his
judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial complaint in the case at bar, Judge Galicia was already
personal and official relations between bench and bar. dead, and was followed by the death of Mrs. Mascarinas.
(Rollo, p. 98).
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility 16 a lawyer's attempt to 16 Promulgated by the Supreme Court on 23 June 1988.
influence the court is rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, 17 In the case of Artiaga, Jr. vs. Villanueva (163 SCRA 638,
which read: July 29, 1988), Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva was found guilty
of three (3) unethical practices, namely: (1) causing his client
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his to perjure himself; (2) lack of candor and respect toward his
adversary and the courts; and (3) abuse of the right of
cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
recourse to the courts. He was suspended indefinitely from
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
the practice of law.
Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary
attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating
familiarity with judges.

Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in

attempting to influence the court where he had pending civil case. 17

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for a period of one (1) year from the date of notice hereof.
Let this decision be entered in the bar records of the respondent and the
Court Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this
suspension.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12871 July 25, 1959
TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.
Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.
City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed
by Timoteo V. Cruz against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City
Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with the preliminary
investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in connection with the
killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City.
To better understand the present case and its implications, the following facts
gathered from the pleadings and the memoranda filed by the parties, may be
stated.
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were
accused as involved and implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court
of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito
Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty of the
crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the
sentence although without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the
extreme penalty, the case would have to be reviewed automatically by this
Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and upon retrial,
he was again found guilty and his former conviction of sentence was affirmed
and reiterated by the same trial court.
It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a
reinvestigation of the case. The purpose of said reinvestigation does not
appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence agents of the Philippine
Constabulary and investigators of Malacañang conducted the investigation
for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what
would appear to be confession, pointing to persons, other than those
convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of Manuel
Monroy.
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal
Salva to conduct a reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the
affidavits and confessions obtained by those who had investigated the case
at the instance of Malacañang. Fiscal Salva conferred with the Solicitor
General as to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the
Secretary of Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by
the Philippine Constabulary and Malacañang investigators made available to
counsel for the appellants.
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a
motion for new trial with this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called
affidavits and confessions of some of those persons investigated, such as
the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo
Canlas, and written statements of several others. By resolution of this
Tribunal, action on said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was
studied and determined on the merits. In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same
affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the motion for
new trial was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a
reinvestigation designating for said purposes a committee of three composed
of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. Avendañio
and Ernesto A. Bernabe.
In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the
committee, petitioner Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to
appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to testify "upon oath before me
in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at the time and place by
this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September
19, 1957, petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the
transfer of the preliminary investigation from September 21, due to the fact
that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that same
day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for postponement, Fiscal Salva
set the preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas
appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee,
particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in view
of the fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was
pending appeal in this Court, and on the same day filed the present petition
for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for
certiorari and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00
issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary
investigation being conducted by respondent Salva.
The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary
investigation being conducted by respondent Salva and his committee was
that affidavits and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, and which were being investigated, implicated petitioner Cruz,
even picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel
Monroy.
The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the
principal case of People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is
pending appeal and consideration before us, no court, much less a
prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that
would be obstructing the administration of justice and interferring with the
consideration on appeal of the main case wherein appellants had been found
guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent authority to cite
him to appear and testify at said investigation.
Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz
at all, it was because of the latter's oral and personal request to allow him to
appear at the investigation with his witnesses for his own protection,
possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence therein presented against him.
Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo
Cruz had expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the
investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.
Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that
he be allowed to appear at the investigation, we are inclined to agree with
Fiscal Salva that such a request had been made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo
Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits
and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by Salva
and his committee, it was but natural that petitioner should have been
interested, even desirous of being present at that investigation so that he
could face and cross examine said witnesses and affiants when they testified
in connection with their affidavits or confessions, either repudiating,
modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication, addressed
to respondent Salva asking that the investigation, scheduled for September
21, 1957, be postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend,
Timoteo Cruz expressed no opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that
he was objecting to his being cited to appear at the investigation.
As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation
which he and his committee began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which
a fiscal intervened though nominally, for according to respondent, two
government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary of Justice to
handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and
decided and it is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the
functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is
handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General.
Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to
conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime
involved in the appeal.
However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a
justification for his reinvestigation because according to him, in the original
criminal case against Castelo, et al., one of the defendants named Salvador
Realista y de Guzman was not included for the reason that he was arrested
and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial
against the other accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had
rested its case and the defense had begun to present its evidence. Naturally,
Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent, at
the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in
August, 1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the
prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and plan of action,
whether to present the same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in
the original case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the
affidavits and confessions sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary, he
should first assess and determine the value of said evidence by conducting
an investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons criminally
responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already
tried and convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-
appellants, including Salvador Realista, then he might act accordingly and
even recommend the dismissal of the case against Realista.
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by
him and as suggested by authorities, the duty and role of prosecuting
attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the conviction of the guilty but
also to protect the innocent.
We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and
investigation of the prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them,
but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation by such
officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that
they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid
injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the
corresponding informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of
the Supreme Court of the United States, theprosecuting officer "is
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
 escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike had blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. (69
United States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the
case of Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil., 556)
With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and
testify before him at the scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law,
petitioner had a right to be present at that investigation since as was already
stated, he was more or less deeply involved and implicated in the killing of
Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and
testimonies respondent Salva was considering or was to consider at said
preliminary investigation. But he need not be present at said investigation
because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than a
duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent
Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be
present at the said investigation, if he latter changed his mind and renounced
his right, and even strenuously objected to being made to appear at said
investigation, he could not be compelled to do so.
Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by
the respondent. If, as contended by him, the purpose of said investigation
was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate the evidence involved in the
affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by
questioning them, then he, respondent, could well have conducted the
investigation in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare,
much less publicity.
However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the
investigation was conducted not in respondent's office but in the session hall
of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big
crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including members of the
press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere
and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with
the permission of, if not the encouragement by the respondent, news
photographers and newsmen had a filed day. Not only this, but in the course
of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes
taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar
Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent Salva, addressing the
newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I
am willing to let you do so and the question asked will be reproduced as my
own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de Guzman had finished
testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said,
"Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as ours." Why respondent
was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and
address the questions to the witnesses under investigation, in favor of the
members of the press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent,
wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his investigation as much
as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he accorded
such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and prudently
declined the offer and did not ask questions, this according to the transcript
now before us.
But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took
place during the investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive
recitals, narrations of and comments on the testimonies given by the
witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took place during
the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing
of Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the
lower court and which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal,
was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent
place and complaisance of respondent.
Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by
such publicity and sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the
door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous
error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory
explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of
prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue
publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even
when it being tried in court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is
allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending
consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even
abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called
upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an
appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than
the others favored the imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction.
After mature deliberation, we have finally agreed that a public censure would,
for the present, be sufficient.
In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in
holding the preliminary investigation involved in this case, insofar as
Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason the writ of preliminary
injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in
view of petitioner's objection to appear and testify at the said investigation,
respondent may not compel him to attend said investigation, for which
reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner is hereby set
aside.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in
part and denied in part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us,
respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and
censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he
had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we
consider and find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned
that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary
action and penalty. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and

Barrera, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA
BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO,
and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES,oppositors.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners'
request for permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former
President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the
Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really
no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the
freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the
accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be
resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the people,
as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live
media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the
courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his
objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its
allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience
with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-
called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed
at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other.
Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be
served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than
live TV and radio coverage.1âwphi1.nêt
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important
issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way
modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or
television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of
its members,1 the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the
Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of
eight (8) Justices,2 has resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the
trial.
What follows is the opinion of the majority.lawphil.net
Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former
President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the
Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the
proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for
documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing,
after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to
which the recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the
National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for
historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.4
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be
inconspicuously installed in the courtroom and the movement of TV crews
will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its entirety, except such portions
thereof as the Sandiganbayan may decide should not be held public
pursuant to Rule 119, §21 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. No
comment shall be included in the documentary except annotations which
may be necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The audio-
visual recordings shall be made under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case may be.
There are several reasons for such televised recording.1awphil.net First, the
hearings are of historic significance. They are an affirmation of our
commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he is under God
and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.)
Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who
have a fundamental right to know how their government is conducted. This
right can be enhanced by audio visual presentation. Third, audio-visual
presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for
documentary purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving the
essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite do
because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events. They will be
primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the
proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or
becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic notes
taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast,
concerns that those taking part in the proceedings will be playing to the
cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance of their
roles -- whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges -- will be
allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar
of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination of
the cases can be minimized. The possibility that judgment will be rendered
by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be
avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial --
which, it may be assumed, is the concern of those opposed to, as much as of
those in favor of, televised trials - will be addressed since the tapes will not
be released for public showing until after the decision of the cases by the
Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem
posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trial can be
served by audio-visual recordings without impairing the right of the accused
to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such
documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. V. Capulong,5 this Court set
aside a lower court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day
Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of
then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA
people power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy
has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure
and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about
him constitute matters of a public character."6
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if
a documentary record is made of the proceedings, any movie that may later
be produced can be checked for its accuracy against such documentary and
any attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of
celebrated cases or causes célèbres was made was made way back in 1971
by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay
friends found similarly moving. An educational television network
filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of
resisting arrest, and broadcast the document in full, in four
installments, several months after the case was concluded --
concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect
for the painstaking way in which the truth was searched for, for the
ways whereby law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through
presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with
which judge and jury carried out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom,
for the familiar good reasons. And yet the use of television at a trial
for documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of live news, and
with the safeguards of completeness and consent, is an educational
experiment that I would be prepared to welcome. Properly
safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the depiction of an
actual trial is an agency of enlightenment that could have few equals
in its impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our
educational system, is now a desperate need.7
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty
years ago. It is perceptive for its recognition of the serious risks posed to the
fair administration of justice by live TV and radio broadcasts, especially when
emotions are running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same
time acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of the
proceedings of celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition, after
passions have subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President
Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the
account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial
shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119,
§21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall
be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c)
the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only
and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes
depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast
of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision
in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of
contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition;
(e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of
the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to
rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-
visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited
in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office
for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. I am for full live coverage hence I maintain my original view;
nonetheless. I concur.
Kapunan, J. I maintain my original view prohibiting live T.V. and radio
coverage and concur with the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Quisumbing, J. Although earlier I respectfully Dissented as I favor live TV
coverage, I now concur in the result.
Pardo, J. I concur with the denial of the motion for reconsideration only. The
conditions are inadequate. I join J. Vitug's opinion.
Buena, J. I concur with the Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug.
Ynares-Santiago, J. I concur with the separate opinion of J. Jose Vitug.
De Leon, Jr., J. I concur with Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. I concur but only in the denial with finality of the MR.
Footnote
1 Nine (9) members of the Court, namely, JUSTICES VITUG, KAPUNAN, MENDOZA, PARDO, BUENA, GONZAGA-
REYES, YNARES-SANTIAGO, DE LEON, and SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, vote to deny reconsideration, while six (6),
namely, CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE, JR. and JUSTICES BELLOSILLO, MELO, PUNO, PANGANIBAN, and
QUISUMBING, vote to grant a reconsideration.
2 CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE, JR. and JUSTICES BELLOSILLO, MELO, PUNO, MENDOZA, PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING, and GONZAGA-REYES.
3 JUSTICES VITUG, KAPUNAN, PARDO, BUENA, YNARES-SANTIAGO, DE LEON, and SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ.
4 R.A. No. 8492 provides in pertinent parts:
SEC. 7. Duties and Function. - The [National] Museum shall have the following duties and functions:
7.1. Acquire documents, collect, preserve, maintain, administer and exhibit to the public, cultural materials, objects of
art, archaeological artifacts, ecofacts, relics and other materials embodying the cultural and natural heritage of the
Filipino national, as well as those of foreign origin. Materials relevant to the recent history of the country shall be
likewise acquired, collected, preserved, maintained, advertised and exhibited by the Museum. (Emphasis added)
DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 13-A, dated May, 9, 1985, of the Department of Education Culture and Sports provides:
Rule 7. Transfer of Records to Archives. -
7.5 Preservation of Archival Records.
7.5.1 Archival records shall be stored under one roof and authorize their accessibility to the public, subject to certain
security and safety measures to preserve the integrity of the records.
7.5.2 It shall be the responsibility of the Archives Division to protect archival documents in its custody and undertake
corrective measures to rehabilitate weakened or brittled documents in accordance with modern techniques.
5 160 SCRA 861 (1988). Cf. Lagunzad v. Soto Vda. De Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979), involving the novelized film
on the life of Mioses Padilla, a majoralty candidate of Magallon, Negros Occidental, who was murdered for political
reasons at the instance of then Governor Rafael Lacson.
6 Id. At 870.
7 Paul A. Freund, Contempt Power: Prevention, Not Retribution, TRIAL, January-February 1971 at 13.
Separate Opinion
VITUG, J.:
Due Process is timeless. It is a precious fundamental right that secures and protects, under a rule of law, the life, and
liberty of a person from the oppression of power. A cherished fixture in our bill of rights, its encompassing guarantee
will not be diminished by advances in science and technology. I fail to perceive it to be otherwise.
Precisely, in its 29th June 2001 decision, the Court did not consider it propitous to allow live television and radio
coverage of the trial in order to help ensure a just and fair trial. The Court felt it judicious to insulate not only the
Sandiganbayan but also the trial participants, the lawyers and witnesses, from being unduly influenced by possible
adverse effects that such a coverage could bring. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above ruling and
countered that, if one must be pitted against the other, the right to public information of grave national interest should
be held more paramount than the right of the accused to a "fair and public trial," the former being appurtenant to the
sovereign and latter being merely a privilege bestowed to an individual.
I am not ready to accept such a notion. I see it as being an implicit retreat, unwisely, from an age-old struggle of the
individual against the tyranny of the sovereign.1 The right of the public to information, in any event, is not here really
being sacrified. The right to know can very well be achieved via other media coverage; the windows of information
through which the public might observe and learn are not closed.
In addressing the present motion for reconsideration, colleagues on the Court opine that there should be an audio-
visual recording of the proceedings for documentary purposes because, first, the hearings are of historic
significance, second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to
know how their government works; third, the audio-visual presentation is essential for education and civil training of
the people; and fourth, such recording can be used by appellate courts in the event that the review of the proceedings,
ruling, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary.lawphil.net2
The proposition has novel features, regrettably, I still find it hard to believe that the presence of the cameras inside the
courtroom will not have an untoward impact on the court proceedings. No empirical data has been shown to suggest
otherwise. To the contrary, experience attests to the intimidating effect of cameras and electronic devices in
courtrooms on the litigants, witnesses and jurors.3 In addition, the natural reticence of witnesses at the stand can even
easily be exacerbated by placing them on camera in contravention of normal experience.4 The demeanor of the
witnesses can also have an abstruse effect on the ability of the judge to accurately assess the credibility of such
witnesses.5 The presence of cameras, for whatever reason, may not adequately address the dangers mentioned in the
Court's decision of 29 June 2001. There are just too many imponderables.
Most importantly, it does not seem right to single out and make a spectacle of the cases against Mr. Estrada. Dignity is
a precious part of personability innate in ever human being, and there can be no cogent excuse for impinging it even to
the slightest degree. It is not the problem of privacy that can cause concern more than the erosion of reality that
cameras tend to cast.
In the petition, albeit entitled an administrative matter, the only issue raised is whether the case of a former President
pending before the Sandiganbayan can be covered by live television and radio broadcast. The matter now being
sought to be addressed by my esteemed colleagues is not even an issue. If it has to be considered at all, the rule must
be of general application and promulgated after a thorough study and deliberation, certainly far more than what have
been said and done in this case. Hearings, where expert opinion is sought and given, should prove to be helpful and of
value.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, I concur but only in the denial with finality of the motion for reconsideration.
Footnote
1 See Frankfurter, J. in Bridges v. California, 314 US 252.
2 Resolution, pp. 3-4.
3 Picturing Justice: Images of Law and Lawyers in the Visual Media, Gerard uelmen, University of San Francisco law
review, Summer 1996.
4 "The Continuing debate Over Cameras in the Courtroom," Federal Lawyers, July 1995.
5 Supra.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H.
CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he
therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this
Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal
"peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who
was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of
the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that
he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this
Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to
argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may
know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be
repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive
the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-
law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future
and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may
retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned
petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published
statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he
did it to expose the tribunal's"unconstitutional and
obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals
without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen
deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000,
without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in
this petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men
who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
without reason their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title
by which he earns his living, the present members of the
Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought
to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of
those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or
"denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila
Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented
that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that
the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional
bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for
the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against
his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision.
Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He
served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the
latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18,
1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of
service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on
the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen
filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he
attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August
30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is,
on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff
interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24,
1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967,
filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be
dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-
appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby
dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed
record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and
place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of
paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965),
which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal,
and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety
& Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled
"Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the
applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9,
1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by
defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the
resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important
distinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-
16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its
resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the
latest case,Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30,
1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the
question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary
to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that
of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution
denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds
similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26,
1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation
of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June
24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was
interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without
prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the
main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the
Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio
presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the
resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the
Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take
the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly
thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave
to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from
the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by
filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted
to — a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore
reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior
that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold
action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate.
Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from
him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier
vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition.
To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in
connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is
now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did
not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer
was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for
contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved
to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17
resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public
hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to
state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request,
otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for
decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the
complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer
questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court
could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a
written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in
person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to
file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no
apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his
jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm
and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible,
Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged.
For with what judgment you judge, you shall
be judged, and with what measure you
measure, it shall be measured to you. But
why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's
eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in
thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy
brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy
eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own
eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam
from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see
clearly to cast out the speck from thy
brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to
you, even to do you also to them: for this is
the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the
statements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he
refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his
lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath
that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE
are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they
tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into
disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member
of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne
by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE
BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with
the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our
client, the members have shown callousness to our various
pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter,
...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility,
appeals for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding,
sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE,
— what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED,
with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling
of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it
is plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members
of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the
Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the
reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict
punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good
faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and
supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and
FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn
denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your
respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates
the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this.
the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own
President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is
to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the
Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war.
There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that
justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the
Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the
ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court,
not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled
by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the
finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has
performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that
the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against
our client and sensing that you have not performed your
duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and
wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right
to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and
the further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly
shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were
applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the
French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we
may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name'
or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy
name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of
any abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering
that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion
must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that
can be found in all courts and government offices. We have
added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb.
Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever
heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense,
that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to
give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one
word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or
ailment in the above statement. We only describe the.
impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in
the members of this Court and for which reason we offered
to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY.
Because what has been lost today may be regained
tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end
our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of
the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the
 Constitution and be condemned by the members of this
Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not
intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his
grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are
quite aware of the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of
rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away
with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial.
We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject
frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary
hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed
with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected
by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at
all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand
critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due
course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for
every petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the
burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme
Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it,
is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will
have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved."
Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs.
Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and
as to the same petition different reasons may read different
justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed,
even confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it
has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate
its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In
order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its
indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the
Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion.
During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,
224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three
terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189
petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do
its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however
brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would
be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already
indicated different reasons not infrequently move different
members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at
a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31,
1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar
Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners
counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article
VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same
question has been raised before; and we held that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition
for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions
of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers
have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered
that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and
so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one
thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended —
helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was
patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court,
wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions
for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate
review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if
this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the
supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is
not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied
in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A
review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while neither
controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate
the character of reasons which will be considered:
 (a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far
sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for
the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a
thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of
Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the
light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away
from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the
procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was,
therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty.
Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that for a motion for
reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must
not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did),
but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which
admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila
Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for
motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly
Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the
time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the
Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And
according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be
acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed
it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but
a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v.
Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla,
42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of
Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45
Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets
the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way
to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since
the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he
may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's
judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the
forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right.
To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked
for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a
martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the
liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the
members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most
circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express
his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a
meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with,
and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the
manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the
actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the
criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a
lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a
concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to
public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the
Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the
people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure
them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer
for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on
one's integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the
administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict
punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks
especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an
entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously
assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the
strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen
and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical
evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative
branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished
by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the
court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important
place accorded to him in the administration of justice, his
right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a
fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar,
as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by
the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional
work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of
lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the
doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see
that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d
286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40
Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope
in the expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity,
impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar.
They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a
correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the
courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on
this subject under liability to be called to account and to be
deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or
judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and
expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only
to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No
law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny
into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat
Opportunity to become conversant with the character and
efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the
privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of
Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges
is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might
consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as
the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as
to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72
N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide,
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism
is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct
that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties
which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession
places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows
solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics
enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do
not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they
are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is
not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher,
20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential
to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their
clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.
 The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more
learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience
and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as
incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to
the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be
obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and
the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering
respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not
be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a
court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per
Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-
22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as
to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements
made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the
course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring
into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant
parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor
immune to public criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court
of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared
that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of
appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that
a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments and
criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and
truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public
confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when
the likely impairment of the administration of justice the
direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the
rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting
out and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which
accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so
prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to
the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote:
"They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove
that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the
leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the
accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into
disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed
the two-year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a
judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The
circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a
statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep
that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place
no limit to the criticism members of the bar may make
regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts,
even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the
attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless
insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212,
17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte
Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case
mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide)
that a libelous publication by an attorney,
directed against a judicial officer, could be
so vile and of such a nature as to justify the
disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were
of graver character than those made by the respondent here.
But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of
those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing
law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of
truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the
courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due
administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and
 usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac.
220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney,
representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge
who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening
letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge
and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up
so that my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury
committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to
resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case
warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such
dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing
with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men.
Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever
there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judge,
it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to
the proper authorities, but the public interest and the
administration of the law demand that the courts should have
the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism,
insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which
tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to
destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be
permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an
attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of
judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit,
together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was
intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with
the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state
of being influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the
Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had
criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was
charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a
period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to
weaken the authority of the court against whose members it
was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its
influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and
interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not,
under the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of
any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a
citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in
cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt
from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when
an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that
he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of
speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as
well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of
civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six
months for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the
judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action,
the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from
practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements,
and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what
he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing
habit in the profession of criticising the motives and integrity
of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and
thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and
creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by
corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as
well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to
submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the
power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a
judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or
would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has
improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and
such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable
inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making
them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an
attorney in a case decided against him, or the right of the
Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or
the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the
motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official
 duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers
whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the
confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in
the administration of justice; and when such charges are
made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty
to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making
such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience,
barring possible temporary observations more or less
vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for
a decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the
bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an
unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo,
upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out
a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a
lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under
oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as
well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the
Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney
published in a newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the
court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily
and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is
one most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of
such members does not measure up to the requirements of
the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial
determination is of prime importance under our system and
ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede
for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well
as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity
or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free
speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act
honestly and honorably both with their client and with the
courts where justice is administered, if administered at all,
could ever properly serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law.
Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such
discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none
the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the
health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by
the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the
bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established
courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the
private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such
conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself
demands retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an
affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several
judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal
confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"
"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was
considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of
the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney
claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases
finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter
to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the
intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in
the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the
defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the
letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no
better right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like
robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a
fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no
undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the
decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court
emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and
faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a
 committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the
University Law School, aided by the researches of its
hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the
court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a
correct motive for the decision, which shall not require
fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made,
it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney
for six months, delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of
professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the
letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found,
for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of
this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice
personally because of acts done by him and his associates
in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made,
could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in
any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney
and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could
not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial
capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused
of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any
reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have
any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due
regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise
than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral
or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed
secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any
action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter to the person defamed
does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the
sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was
wholly different from his other acts charged in the
accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles
are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable;
but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed
by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of
public policy, to which reference has been made, he was
immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be
enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were
paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an
officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus
assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right
which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully
violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts
and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by
merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open
court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally for their official acts."Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.
(U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no
distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the
indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced
by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by
written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his
chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes
misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts
addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we
think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was
recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that
case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a
citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are
ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for
assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of
the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in
the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or
assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the
assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the
building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-
respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to
the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example
of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ...
No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under
such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge
personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a
professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly
decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case,
wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his
conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty
of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of
Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is
held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City
Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused
attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City
Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his
 decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The
result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that,
while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the
matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme
Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says
the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by
writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as
principals or accessories, it will not be long before the
general public may feel that they may redress their fancied
grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be
anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice
will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671,
was in this respect much the same as the case at bar. The
accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the
circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail,
at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in
insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause
wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this
it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having
"willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a
judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an
attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support
of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the
following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed.
214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149;Commonwealth v.
Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237,
244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179
Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have
been so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such
a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable
warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's
suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he
accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had
paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's
unjustifiable attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge
constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising
not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was
dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a
case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper
articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language.
The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed
disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the
public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the
loss of a case, prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral
turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was
ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of
judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or
publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial
actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the
permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend
to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity
and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate
disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and
ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of
unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-
cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been
disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although
resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end,
nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable
practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford
enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial
of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an
outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the
cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor
 and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never
will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is
that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements
made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and
an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is
thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused its power
and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press
Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel
Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item
carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement
expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency
or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In
the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during
these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to
change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced
as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the
impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were
the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced
that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session
of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith
and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused
to be published in the press, the respondent does not merely
criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case,
which was then and still is pending consideration by this
Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to
intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of
a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the
number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the
members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow
minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case
by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the
honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose
of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and
degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last
years committing deliberately so many blunders and
injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of
Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the
decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the
last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or
degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution,
the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to
obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights
when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of
this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result.
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty.
Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect
to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special
obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication
to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken
from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant
misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso
Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having
"repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous
"erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the
Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was
unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez
stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted)
employed in the motion for reconsideration, implications
there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one
pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever
the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into
question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on
its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of
this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much
as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent
statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The
plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept
that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it
has committed error and continuously repeated that error to
the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which
refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the
pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the
industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements
detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court.
They bring into question the capability of the members —
and some former members of this Court to render justice.
The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm
which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against
splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other
cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of
them involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending
litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of
contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or
malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after
the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the
thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for
which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had
written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has
lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this
jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when,
inPeople vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented
with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which
upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the
settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding,
where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for
publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were
conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said
examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an
adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent
in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even
after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit
or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is
'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends
to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in
them or that which tends to bring them in any way into
disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is
equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind
of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of
newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts
to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the
second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is
extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct
calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public
confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where
there is no action pending, as there is no decision which
might in any way be influenced by the newspaper
publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or
without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is
the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if
public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that
his statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after
the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be
liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency
of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held
liable for contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here
immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have
confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty.
Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as
an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals
inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal
profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and
unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or
non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole
objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession,
by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself
unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging
to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional
mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules
for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the
corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law
those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in
the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the
court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record,
and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration
that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is
not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any
respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court
having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this
state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right,
in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them
from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a
representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So
much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an
attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of
the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right,
but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers,
and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to
withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held
that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are
judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and
exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of
right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and
the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above
being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an
express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed
to make an assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of
Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary
sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely
potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no
statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he
went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said
move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated
entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his
contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client
as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces
the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and
dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its
members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent
injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its
members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat
to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the
publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort
;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the
Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered
no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and
reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually
tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites
incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary
sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and
oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the
scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of
legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the
spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more
important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy
public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of
justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature,
and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth.
It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross
violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal
Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the
exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is
unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism.
Like any other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not,
and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be
intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last
resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means
synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness,
real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any
criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be
informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority
in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of
the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into
one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion,
not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the
present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but
is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not
being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In
such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved
parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably
as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature
of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but.
only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the
majesty of their office.30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the
individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose
rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave
hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in
the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership
in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a
necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty
it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction
legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and
cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy
demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which
call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the
imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of
complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that
may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by
the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal
or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion
of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by
personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative
need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded
and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity
cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that
disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would
accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to
hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that
abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in
every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of
respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances.
His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting
repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how
long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree
that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone
because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also
because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that
if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law,
there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and
effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority.
The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to
Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that
suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes
effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the
practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further
orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the
Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Docketed as Civil Case 8909 on September 17, 1965 in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
2 See e.g. "Mounting Discontent against the Supreme
Court's Minute Resolution," 32 Lawyers J. p. 325; "Lack of
Merit Resolutions are Obnoxious," 31 Lawyers J. p. 329.
3 In the years 1966, 1967 and 1968, this Court rejected by
minute resolutions 803, 682 and 848 petitions, respectively,
and resolved by extended decisions or resolutions 584, 611
and 760 cases, respectively. For the period covering the first
six months of the year 1969, this Court rejected by minute
resolutions 445 petitions, and resolved by extended decision
or resolutions 279 cases.
4 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); In re Gomez, 43 Phil.
376; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 736 (Malcolm, J.,
dissenting); Austria vs. Masaquel, G.R. L-22536, Aug. 31,
1967; Cabansag vs. Fernandez, et al., G.R. L-8974, Oct. 18,
1957.
5 In re Gomez, supra.
6 In re Gomez, supra; In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil.
801 (1930) ; In re Abistado 57 Phil. 668 (1932); People vs.
Alarcon; In re Contempt Proceedings, Mangahas, 69 Phil.
265 (1939). SeePennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S.
331, 90 L. ed. 1295; In re Bozorth, 118 A. 2d 432; In re
Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d 432 (1959) ; In re Pryor, 26 Am. Rep.
474; Hill vs. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286;Caig v. Hecht, 68 L.
ed. 293 (Concurring opinion of Justice Taft).
7 Strebel v. Figueras, 96 Phil. 321 (1954).
8 State v. Bee Pub. Co., 83 N.W. 204, Sullivan, J. See
also State ex rel Atty. Gen. v. Circuit Ct., 72 N. W. 193.
9 In re Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d 432 (1959).
10 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918) ; In re Gomez, 43
Phil. 376; Cabansag v. Fernandez, L-18974, Oct. 18,
1957; Austria vs. Masaquel, L-22536, Aug. 31, 1967; Re
Troy (1920), 111 Atl. 723; State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Circuit
Ct. (1897), 65 Am. St. Rep. 90; Goons v. State, 134 N.E.
194; State vs. Sweetland, 54 N.W. 415; Hill vs. Lyman, 126
NYS 2d 286; Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657.
11 State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA
(NS) 585; Re Pryor, 26 Am. Rep. 747; Ex Parte Steinman,
40 Am. Rep. 637; Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657; Brannon
v. State, 29 So. 2d 918;Medgar Evers v. State, 131 So. 2d
653; Re Ades, 6 F 2d 467.
12 "A judge as a public official," said Justice Thornal in State
v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, "is neither sacrosanct nor
immune to public criticism of his conduct in office."
13 In re Bozorth, 118 Atl. 432: "The harsh and sometimes
unfounded criticism of the members of any of the three
branches of our Government may be unfortunate lot of public
officials ..., but it has always been deemed a basic principle
that such comment may be made by the public ... . Nor
should the judicial branch ... enjoy any more enviable
condition than the other two branches."
In Bridges v. California, 86 L. ed. 192, Mr. Justice Black,
speaking for the majority, said: "... an enforced silence,
however, limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity
of the bench, would probably engender resentment,
suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance
respect." Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the minority
opinion, said: "Judges as persons, or courts as institutions,
are entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other
persons or institutions. Just because the holders of judicial
office are identified with the interest of justice they may
forget their common human frailties and fallibilities. There
have sometimes been martinets upon the bench as there
have sometimes been wielders of authority who have used
the paraphernalia of power in support of what they called
their dignity. Therefore judges must be kept mindful of their
limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a
vigorous stream of criticism expressed with candor however
blunt "A man cannot be summarily laid by the heels because
his words may make public feeling more unfavorable in case
the judge should be asked to act at some later date, any
more than he can for exciting public feeling against a judge
for what he already has done." ... Courts and judges mast
take their share of the gains and pains of discussion which is
unfettered except by laws of libel, by self- restraint, and by
good taste. Winds of doctrine should freely blow for the
promotion of good and the correction of evil. Nor should
restrictions be permitted that cramp the feeling of freedom in
the use of tongue or pen regardless of the temper of the
truth of what may be uttered."
14 Sec. 3, Rule 138.
15 Sec. 20(b), Rule 138.
16 See e.g. Re Chopac, 66 F. Supp., where an attorney was
suspended for three years for writing a judge a letter in
which he said that the judge in signing an order took
"advantage of your office to rule with passion and
vehemence." Also People v. Green, 3 P. 65, where an
attorney was disbarred for stopping a judge upon the street
and addressed abusive, insulting language to him. See
alsoJohnson v. State, 44 So. 671; In re McCowan, 170 P.
1101; State v. Calhoon, 102, 2d 604; Re Huppe, 11 Pac. 2d
793; State v. Rhodes, 131 NW 2d 118; Re Rogers, 212 Pac.
1034; In re Griffin, 1 NYS 7; In re Wilkes, 3 NYS 753; Re
Manheim, 99 NYS 87; Re Greenfield, 262 NYS 2d 349; In re
Klein, 262 NYS 2d 416; In re Smith, 36 A 130.
17 In re Humphrey, 163 P. 60; In re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39; In
Snyder's Case, 76 ALR 666; Re Troy, 111 A. 723; State v.
Sprigs, 155 P. 2d 285.
18 Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; In the matter of the
Intestate Estate of Rosario Olba, Contempt proceedings
against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312, 315; People
vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 579; People vs. Venturanza, et al., 85
Phil. 211, 214; De Joya, et al. vs. CFI of Rizal, 99 Phil. 907,
914; Sison vs. Sandejas, L-9270, April 29, 1959; Paragas vs.
Cruz, L-24438, July 30, 1965; Cornejo vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772,
775.
19 In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; In re Lozano, 54 Phil. 801; In
re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; People vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil.
1965; Cornejo vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772, 775. State vs. Dist.
Court, 151 Pac. 2d 1002; In re Shannon, 27 Pac. 352; State
ex rel. Grice vs. Dist. Court, 97 Pac. 1032; Weston vs.
Commonwealth, 77 S.E. 2d 405; State vs. Kaiser, 13 P.
964; State vs. Bee Pub. Co. 83 N.W. 204;Patterson vs.
Colorado. 51 L. ed. 879; Re Hart, 116 N.W. 212.
20 69 Phil. 265.
21 42 O.G. 59.
22 Article VIII, Section 12, Constitution.
23 Re Simpson, 83 N.W. 541.
24 Re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39, 84.
25 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
26 See Norman Dorsen, Frontiers of Civil Liberties, pp. 60-
61; Griswold, "Of Time and Attitudes," 74Harvard Law
Review, 81, 94; Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court of the
United States, (1961) pp. 176-177; see also Freund, On Law
and Justice (1968) ch. 4.
27 In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577; De
Durant, 10 Ann. Cas. 1913, 1220.
28 State vs. Peck, 91 Atl. 274; 286; Fairfield County Bar vs.
Taylor, 22 Atl. 441.
29 Ex Parte Tyler, 40 Pac. 33, 34; Treadwell's case, 7 Pac.
724; Deles vs. Aragona, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 634,
644, and the cases therein cited.

30 Sarcos vs. Castillo, et al., L-29755, January 21, 1969.

31 Cf. Radiowealth, Inc. vs. Agregado, 47 O.G., No. 12

(Supp) pp. 87, 89, citing Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
Vol. 2, P. 870; Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil. 552, 553; Ex parte
Alabama State Bar Ass'n., 8 So. 768.

32 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

33 Melville vs. Wettengel, 57 Pa. 2d 699; People vs.

Winogard, 287 Pac. 864; People vs. Kelly, 285 Pac. 767;
People vs. Harris, 112 N.E. 978; People vs. Anderson, 112
N.E. 273; In re Gullickson, 181 Atl. 716; Haitmanek vs.
Turano, 158 A. 878; Grimsell vs. Wilcox, 98 A. 799; States
vs. Kern, 233 N.W. 629; In re Borchardt, 192 N.E. 383; State
vs. Trapley, 259 Pac. 783; State vs. Jennings, 159 S.E. 627;
In re Jacobson, 126 S.E. 2d 346; Mulvey vs. O'Niell, 44 Atl.
2d 880; State ex rel Oklahoma Bar Ass'n vs. Hatcher, 209
Pac. 2d 873; Cleveland Bar Ass'n vs. Wilkerson, 156 N.E. 2d
136 N.E. 2d 136; In re Eddy, 292 N.Y.S. 619.
 Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty.
Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the land dispute between Serapia Raymundo
Republic of the Philippines (Serapia in short) another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia
SUPREME COURT spouses since both were relatives and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia
Manila was willing to relinquish ownership if the Valencias could show documents
evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale written in the Ilocano
dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a different property.
EN BANC
Paulino and Serapia were not able to settle their differences. (Report of
Investigating Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 21-22).

On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting,

A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543
PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and
ATTY. ARSENIO FER. CABANTING,respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.
filed a complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with
April 26, 1991 damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170, entitled
"Serapia Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report,
p. 11).
Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the
services of Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a
notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private document written in Ilocano. For
this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the
person who would falsify the signature of the alleged vendor (Complaint, p.
2; Rollo, p. 7). A "Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed purporting
to be a sale of the questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V,
rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court
expressed the belief that the said document is not authentic. (Report, p. 14)

PER CURIAM:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio
Antiniw, Arsenio Fer. Cabanting and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named,
now an MCTC Judge) for grave malpractice and misconduct in the exercise
of their legal profession committed in the following manner:
1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391.
In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife
Romana allegedly bought a parcel of land, where they built their residential
house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the
original owner. However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer
certificate of title in their names.
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with
Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court
failed to provide a workable solution concerning his house. While the petition
was pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution
stating that "the decision in this case has already become final and
executory" (Exhibits 3 and 3-A). On March 14, 1973, a writ of execution was
issued.
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty.
Jovellanos and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio
Fer. Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of Administrative Case No.
1302).
On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as
Administrative Case No. 1302) against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that
said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as
Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of
property under litigation by a counsel.
On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.
On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a
disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1391) against
Atty. Dionisio Antiniw for his participation in the forgery of "Compraventa
Definitiva" and its subsequent introduction as evidence for his client; and
also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and Arsenio Cabanting for
purchasing a litigated property allegedly in violation of Article 1491 of the
New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for allegedly rigging Civil
Case No. V-2170 against her parents. On August 17, 1975, Constancia
Valencia filed additional charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos as
follows:
1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:
In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in
confabulation with one Lydia Bernal had a deed of sale, fabricated,
executed and ratified before him as Notary Public by one Santiago
Bernal in favor of Lydia Bernal when as a matter of fact said
Santiago Bernal had died already about eight years before in the
year 1965.
2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:
In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad
faith, in confabulation with Rosa de los Santos as vendee had, as
Notary Public, executed and ratified before him, two (2) deeds of
sale in favor of said Rosa de los Santos when as a matter of fact the
said deeds were not in fact executed by the supposed vendor Rufino
Rincoraya and so Rufino Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to
annul and declare void the said sales (p. 7, Report)
2. Administrative Case No. 1543.
A deed of donation propter nuptias involving the transfer of a piece of land by
the grandparents of Lydia Bernal (complainant,) in favor of her parents, was
lost during the last world war. For this reason, her grandmother (the living
donor) executed a deed of confirmation of the donation propter nuptias with
renunciation of her rights over the property. (Complaint, p. 1).
Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother still offered to sell the same
property in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen the deed of
donation (to prevent others from claim-ing the property).
On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty.
Antiniw allegedly prepared and notarized the deed of sale in the name of her
grandfather (deceased at the time of signing) with her grandmother's
approval.
Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property filed a
complaint against her (Lydia Bernal) and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for
falsification of a public document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The fiscal exonerated
the counsel for lack of evidence, while a case was filed in court against Lydia
Bernal.
On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed
as Administrative Case No.1543) against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad
advice.
Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December
9, 1974, the resolution of the Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the
two resolutions of the Second Division both dated December 3, 1975,
Administrative Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 were referred to the Office
of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated
March 3, 1976, all of these cases were ordered consolidated by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza per his handwritten directive of March 9, 1976.
On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.1âwphi1 When Atty. Jovellanos was
appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of Alcala-Bautista,
Pangasinan, We referred the investigation of these cases to Acting Presiding
Judge Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Villasis, Pangasinan,
for further investigation.
In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the
alleged threats against the person of complainant Constancia L. Valencia,
We directed the transfer of investigation to the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, under the sala of Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr.
After investigation, Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr., recommended the
dismissal of cases against Atty. Jovellanos and Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting;
dismissal of Administrative Case No. 1543 and the additional charges in
Administrative Case No. 1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos;
however, he recommended the suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the practice
of law for six months finding him guilty of malpractice in falsifying the
"Compraventa Definitiva."
The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in
violation of Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code.
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of
malpractice in falsifying notarial documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case
No. V-2170.
I
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public
of judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of
another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment
and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in which they make take
part by virtue of their profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship
involved. It is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his
client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and
disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute
malpractice (In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground
for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while
the litigation is pending. (Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513;
Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased
the lot after finality of judgment, there was still a
pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if
there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment
that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan Tingco vs.
Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the
appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe
to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated
when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected
therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the property by Atty.
Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and
the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for
suspension.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There
was no attorney-client relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos,
considering that the latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No. V-
2170. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons
adverted to.
II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of
P200.00 in consideration of his executing the document "Compraventa
Definitiva" which would show that Paulino bought the property. This charge,
Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence that affirmative
testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Bayasen vs. CA,
L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos vs. CA, et al., L40804, Jan. 31,
1978). When an individual's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not
enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains
the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of
him. (De los Reyes vs. Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334, Nov. 28, 1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his
testimony, even if not corroborated by another witness, deserves credence
and can be relied upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which was so
delicate and confidential that it would be difficult to believe the he fabricated
his evidence.
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed
falsification of a deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court
prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the
court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos vs.
Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry
Shopworkers Union vs. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is
not to his client but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115
SCRA 459) To that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate. His
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost
earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty
to resort to illegal means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney
to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such
means as are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan vs. Ramos, 93 SCRA
87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the
most important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court.
(In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a
lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
(Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a
punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that courts and
the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs. Sison, 125
SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law
profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos
should be dismissed for lack of evidence.
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal
testified in full on direct examination, but she never submitted herself for
cross-examination. Several subpoenas for cross-examination were
unheeded. She eventually requested the withdrawal of her complaint.
Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him.1âwphi1 He enjoys
the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the
contrary is proved. (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz,
Adm. Case No. 1616, February 9, 1989), Since Atty. Antiniw was not
accorded this procedural due process, it is but proper that the direct
testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.
In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant,
Administrative Case No. 1543 should be dismissed. Although the filing of an
affidavit of desistance by complainant for lack of interest does not ipso
factoresult in the termination of a case for suspension or disbarment of an
erring lawyer (Munar vs. Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We are constrained in the
case at bar, to dismiss the same because there was no evidence to
substantiate the charges.
The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391
is predicated on the information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based
on the personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia: hence, hearsay. "Any
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of
some other person not on the witness stand." (Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p. 486). Being hearsay, the evidence
presented is inadmissible.
The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty.
Jovellanos in Administrative Case No. 1391 was not proved at all.
Complainant failed to prove her additional charges.
III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these
administrative cases conspired in executing the falsified "Compraventa
Definitiva" and rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.
Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he
and the Valencias are neighbors and only two meters separate their houses.
It would not be believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer, would
hold a meeting with the heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house with the
intention of inducing them to sue the Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to
settle the differences between the parties in a meeting held in his house. He
appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170 as an involuntary witness to attest to the
holding of the conference.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a
sign of brotherhood among them. One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer is his
duty to the Bar. A lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and his brethren
in the law profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility. They may "do as
adversaries do in law: strive mightily but (they) eat and drink as friends." This
friendship does not connote conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw
DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off
from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six months from finality of this judgment; and 3.
Administrative Case No. 1391 against Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and
additional charges therein, and Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11724 November 23, 1959
WACK WACK GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PETRONILO ARCANGEL and ANTONIO D.
BERNARDO, respondents.
Juan T. Chuidian Law Office for petitioner.
Amado A. Yatco for respondent Petronilo Arcangel.
Deogracias T. Reyes, Benjamin C. Yatco and Ernesto Pangalangan for
respondent Antonino B. Bernardo.
BARRERA, J.:
These petitions were filed by the Wack Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc., to
review the decisions of the Court of Appeals in two cases involving the same
corporation. (CA-G. R. No. 15910-R and CA-G. R. No. 15902-R). As the
issues raised in said cases relate to the same principle of law, we shall take
them up jointly and resolve the questions assigned therein in a single
decision. G. R. No. L-11724, (CA-G. R. No. 15910).
Petronilo Arcangel, a former employee of the Wack Wack Golf and Country
Club, Inc., filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a money claim for
overtime services rendered to said employer, for unenjoyed vacation leave,
moral damages and attorney's fees. The employer having filed its answer to
the complaint, the case was accordingly set for trial. At the hearing of May 6,
1955, however, neither the defendant (employer) nor its counsel, Balcoff,
Poblador and Angel Cruz appeared notwithstanding the fact that they were
duly notified of the hearing since March 22, 1955; hence, the plaintiff was
allowed to continue presenting his evidence without the presence of
defendant.
On May 10, 1955, the lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff
employee, awarding him a total of P7,702.78.
On May 14, 1955, the law firm of Juan Chuidian, on behalf of the defendant
employer, filed a petition to set aside the judgment on the ground of
misunderstanding, mistake and excusable neglect, which petition was denied
by the lower court in its order of May 31.
The employer appealed from this order — not from the decision on the merits
— to the Court of Appeals claiming that the court a quo committed a grave
abuse of discretion in denying its petition for relief. The Court of Appeals,
finding no justification for the employer's failure to appear at the hearing,
upheld the order appealed from.
There is no disagreement as to the facts allegedly constituting the mistake,
accident, or excusable negligence upon which the employer's petition for
relief was based. As put down in petitioner-appellant's brief filed in the Court
of Appeals, and adopted by said court, they are:
The records of this case show that defendant-appellant (employer)
was represented by the law office of Balcoff and Poblador and Angel
Cruz from the inception of this case up to May 14, 1955, when law
Office Juan T. Chuidian filed its appearance upon being referred by
law office of Balcoff and Poblador on May 12, 1955 the copy of the
decision dated May 10, 1955 of the trial Court.
"Sometime before May 5, 1955 the defendant-appellant Wack Wack
Golf and Country Club Inc., had manifested its desire to replace their
counsel Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador in this case with Law
Office Juan Chuidian. On May 5, 1955 Atty. Jesus Sayoc of the
undersigned law firm conferred with Atty. Angel Cruz of Messrs.
Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador for the purpose of securing the court
file in this case and effect the substitution of attorney. Unfortunately,
Mr. Balcoff was not in the office at the moment and attorney Angel
Cruz declared he had no authority to turn over to Law office of Juan
T. Chuidian the court papers and file in this case; besides, there
were unpaid bill due Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador. Arriving
at the office, Mr. Jesus Sayoc advised Mr. Juan Chuidian of the
reluctance of Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador to turn over the
court file of the case to the former. In view of this development, Atty.
Chuidian called up Atty. Balcoff by telephone and it was agreed
between the two gentlemen that inasmuch as Attys. Paredes, Balcoff
and Poblador were still the attorneys of record in the case, Atty.
Balcoff would sent a representative of his law office to appear at the
hearing of the case of the following day, May 6, 1955 in order to ask
for postponement of the case. Consequently, nobody in Law Office
Juan Chuidian appeared in behalf of defendant-appellant on May 6,
1955 before the Trial Court. As a matter of fact, the records of the
case were turned over to Law Office Juan T. Chuidian only on May
 13, 1955 after Law Office Juan T. Chuidian had received on May 12,
1955 through Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador a copy of the
decision dated May 10, 1955 of the Trial Court. On the other hand,
Atty. Angel Cruz or any associate lawyer of Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff
and Poblador did not appear for defendant-appellant on May 6,
1955.
We are with the Court of Appeals in the observation that as of May 6, 1955,
the law firm of Balcoff and Poblador and Angel Cruz were still the employer's
counsel of record, the law office of Juan Chuidian having entered its
appearance in the case only on May 14, 1955. As such counsel of record,
said law firm must have known that, its impending relief as counsel for the
defendant notwithstanding, it is under obligation to protect the client's interest
(which includes appearance at the hearing) until its final release from the
professional relationship with such client. For its part, the court could
recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except such counsel
of record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected. Thus, any
agreement or arrangement such counsel of record and its client may reach
regarding the presentation of the client' case in the court is purely their
private concern. Proceedings in the court cannot be made to depend on
them. The lack of coordination or understanding between the two law firms in
the instant case cannot be considered as a legal excuse or falling within the
ambit of excusable negligence to justify the granting of relief from the order
declaring the client in default, or as in the case, from a decision entered after
presentation of evidence in his absence.
Where the defendants were given every reasonable opportunity to
try their case and no legal excuse was presented for a further
adjournment, and order denying defendant's motion to set aside their
default and vacate the judgment against them entered upon such
default, was proper. (Centerville Creamy Co. vs. Waxler, 30 N.T.S.
2d. 232, 262 App. Div. 1055.)
G.R. No. L-11724 (CA-G.R. No. 15902-R):.
On February 18, 1953, Antonino Bernardo, former official of appellant, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Manila a claim against the Wack Wack Golf
& Country Club, Inc. for overtime pay, unenjoyed vacation and sick leaves
from 1946 to 1951 and attorney's fees. As the employer denied the claim, the
case was set for trial.
At the hearing of May 12, 1955, after about 8 previous postponements,
nobody appeared for the employer although said defendant was represented
from the commencement of the proceeding by Atty. Angel Cruz and was duly
notified of the hearing since March 26, 1955. Consequently, the plaintiff-
employee was permitted to continue presenting his evidence before the
Deputy Clerk of Court who was delegated for this purpose.
On May 14, 1955, the lower court adjudged the plaintiff entitled to the claim,
and sentenced defendant-employer to pay the total sum of P26,422.78.
On the same day, May 14, 1955, the employer represented by the law office
of Juan Chuidian, filed a petition for relief from the order authorizing the
Deputy Clerk of Court to receive plaintiff's evidence and for the re-opening of
the case. The petition was later supplemented by another similarly praying
for the setting aside of the decision rendered therein, on the ground of
accident or excusable negligence. Upon plaintiff's opposition, these petitions
were denied by the court in its order of May 31, 1955. From this order of
denial, defendant employer appealed to the Court of Appeals. On October
30, 1956, the Court of Appeals affirmed the disputed order, for the reason
that under the circumstances, there was no justification for defendant's
counsel to anticipate that the justification for defendant's counsel to
anticipate that the Court would grant a motion for postponement of the
hearing of May 12, 1955.
The accident or excusable negligence referred to by the new counsel for
defendant employer is stated in the petition for relief filed in the lower court,
thus:
1. That defendant heretofore had been represented by attorney
Angel Cruz; that for certain reasons the defendant recently
contracted the services of law office of Juan T. Chuidian to handle
this case; in substitution of Atty. Angel Cruz, the appearance of the
undersigned law office has been filed with this Honorable Court on
May 12, 1955;
2. That it was only in the afternoon of May 11, 1955, that the records
of this case were sent to the undersigned Law Office, and that Atty.
Juan T. Chuidian was then out of town and, consequently, nobody
knew what action to take in this case;
3. That in the morning of May 12, 1955, Atty. Juan T. Chuidian
telephoned the undersigned law office and requested that one of the
assistant attorneys appear at the sala in connection with the
scheduled hearing of the above-entitled case, and to move for the
postponement thereof on the obvious reason that the undersigned
law firm was not prepared right then and there to proceed with the
trial of the case inasmuch as the facts of the case were not then
sufficiently known to any of the associate attorneys;
 4. That when Attorney Suntay of the undersigned law office arrived
at the sala of this Honorable Court, he was informed that the case
had been called earlier in the calendar and in view of the failure of
any person to appear in behalf of defendant, the Deputy Clerk of
Court was authorized to receive the evidence for the plaintiff;
5. The subsequent efforts of Attorney Suntay to suspend the
reception of plaintiff's evidence and postpone the hearing and proved
fruitless; ...
From the foregoing facts, it is evident that Atty. Suntay's appearance (late by
some 35 minutes) at the hearing of the case was solely for the purpose of
securing another postponement of the trial; that his delay was brought about
by the absence of the principal counsel in town, and by want of instructions
from the latter as to what action his assistants should take on the matter; that
the records of the case were only turned over to the new counsel on May 11,
and that there was no time to prepare for the trial. Under these
circumstances, the employer's charge that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying its petition for relief from the order authorizing the reception of
plaintiff's evidence in the absence of the defendant and the judgment
rendered in the case, is premised on the ground (1) that counsel's tardiness
or delay as well as his unpreparedness to go to trial are accidental or may be
considered as excusable negligence, and (2) that the trial court should have
allowed the motion for postponement.
Both points find adequate answer in the Court of Appeals ruling which we
quote with approval:
The hearing on May 12, 1955 had been fixed, with the conformity of
both parties, as early as March 18, 1955. Not only that, but the
verbal order issued in open court was supplemented by a written
order, copy of which was received by defendant's counsel on March
26, 1955. On the date of the trial defendant was still represented by
Atty. Angel Cruz as counsel of record. Up to then there had been no
substitution of attorneys, nor had Attorney Cruz withdrawn his
appearance in the case. Indeed the record does not show that he
ever did withdraw his appearance or filed a motion for substitution.
The responsibility for representing defendant at the trial on May 12,
1955 was therefore still his. On the other hand if it is true, as alleged
by appellant, that the services of Attorney Juan Chuidian had been
engaged sometime prior to May 11, 1955 then it was the latter's duty
to file his appearance opportunely and prepare for the trial on May
12, 1955. It is to be presumed that in accepting the case Attorney
Chuidian knew that the trial was to be held on that date; and he
certainly was not justified in accepting the case unless he was
prepared to go to trial as scheduled. He had no right to take for
granted the liberality of the court or generosity of the plaintiff by
appearing, through an assistant of his, after the case had been
actually called on the calendar and while the evidence of the plaintiff
was already being received, and then only to ask (verbally) for
another postponement.
All motions for postponement should be presented at such time as is
practicable to prevent the adverse party from incurring unnecessary
expenses by coming to trial, otherwise postponement shall be
denied. And a party moving for the postponement should be in court
on the day for trial if the motion was not acted upon favorably before
that day. He has no right to rely either on the liberality of the court, or
on the generosity of the adverse party." (Moran on Rules of Court,
1952 edition, pp. 651-653, citing Linus vs. Robira, 61 Phil., 907;
Macondray & Co. vs. Paredes, G. R. No. 38255, Sept. 5 1933;
Sunico vs. Villapando, 14 Phil., 352.)
In addition, the records of these two cases reveal that even prior to May 5,
1955, defendant-appellant had manifested its desire to replace its former
counsel Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador with the law office of Atty.
Juan Chuidian. If this were so, it was the bounden duty of both law firms to
have made the necessary arrangement for the protection of the interest of
their client. Their failure to do so cannot certainly be considered excusable
neglect to the extent of making the action of the trial court, as well as the
Court of Appeals in denying relief based thereon, an abuse of discretion
constituting reversible error.
Although no longer necessary in view of the conclusions already reached
and expressed, attention may be drawn to the lack of the required affidavits
of merit to support the petitions for relief. While there are sworn statements
on the alleged mistake, accident, and/or excusable negligence, there is in
G.R. No. L-11724, total absence of, and in G.R. No. L-11725, insufficient
affidavit showing the facts constituting the valid defense which the movant
may prove in case a new trial is granted. Even in the latter case, the only
reference made in the affidavit of the assistant lawyer in the law firm of Atty.
Chuidian, who as admitted in the pleadings submitted by them, did not know
the facts of the case, was the statement "that the defendant has genuine
and bona fide defenses to the claims interposed by plaintiff, more particularly
set out in its Amended Answer dated August 4, 1954." This amended answer
is not under oath. Consequently, the mere incorporation thereof by reference
made by one who had no knowledge of the said defenses does not comply
with the requirements of the rules and decisions on the matter. The affidavits
of merit must state facts, and not mere conclusions or opinions, otherwise
they are not valid.1
Anent the question raised by petitioner in both instances regarding the
legality of the lower court's order authorizing the Deputy Clerk of Court to
receive plaintiff's evidence, we again make our own the Court of Appeals
ruling, thus:

Defendant next contends that the trial court acted contrary to law and
gravely abused its discretion when it delegated the Deputy Clerk of
Court to receive plaintiff's evidence. It should be borne in mind that
the delegation was made in view of the absence of defendant and
his counsel and that the function thus delegated was merely
ministerial, namely, the taking down of the testimony of the
witnesses and the marking down of whatever documentary evidence
would be presented. There could be no occasion for the exercise of
judicial discretion such as might have been called for if the other
party had been present to object to questions that were propounded
or to the admission of exhibits. It cannot therefore be seriously
maintained that any prejudice was caused to defendant by the action
taken by the Court.

Wherefore, finding no error in the decisions of the Court of Appeals sought to

be nullified, the petitions filed in these two cases are hereby dismissed, with
costs. It is so ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,

Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Estrella vs. Zamora, 5 Phil., 415; Philippine Engineering Co. vs.

Argosino, 49 Phil., 983; Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil., 446.
 Remedios, Mauro Jr., Marylene, Idelfonso, Rosalind, Mary Jean -- all
surnamed Edrial -- and Susan Edrial-Valenzuela. The case was docketed as
Republic of the Philippines Civil Case No. 6315 and raffled to Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court
SUPREME COURT (RTC) of Dumaguete City.5 The Court of Appeals presented the facts of this
Manila case as follows:

THIRD DIVISION "Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, a lawyer of the LAPIL (IBP) Negros Oriental, who
was also an [e]lection [r]egistrar of the COMELEC, filed the complaint in
G.R. No. 133625 September 6, 2000 1975;

REMEDIOS F. EDRIAL, MAURO EDRIAL JR., MARYLENE EDRIAL, Atty. Lituanas was able to present evidence on the following dates:
ILDEFONSO EDRIAL, ROSALIND EDRIAL, MARY JEAN EDRIAL, and
SUSAN EDRIAL-VALENZUELA, petitioners, July 10, 1981
vs.
PEDRO QUILAT-QUILAT, GABRIELA QUILAT-QUILAT, ISIDRA QUILAT- First plaintiffs' witness Atilano Ramirez, 73 years old, was presented;
QUILAT, and ESTANISLAO QUILAT-QUILAT, respondents.
July 16, 1981
DECISION
Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;
PANGANIBAN, J.:
August 24, 1982
Parties who prayed for and were granted several postponements and caused
repeated delays cannot ask for the reopening of the trial for the purpose of Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;
presenting additional evidence. After squandering several opportunities given
them to ventilate their claims, they can no longer complain of alleged November 20, 1984
violation of their right to due process.
Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;
The Case
February 28, 1984
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the October 17,
1997 Decision1 and the March 19, 1998 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA)3 in CA-GR SP No. 42660. The CA affirmed the Order of the trial court, Direct Examination of 2ndPlaintiffs' witness Ignacio Tomias. Cross-
which had denied their Motion to Reopen the Case and to allow them to examination was waived.
complete the presentation of their evidence. The assailed Decision disposed
as follows:4 August 21, 1985

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED." Plaintiff Pedro Quilat-Quilat was presented on direct examination.

The Resolution denied reconsideration of the challenged Decision. "On December 16, 1986, the Citizen Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) entered
its appearance as new [private respondents'] counsel after Atty. Gerardo
The Facts Lituanas has filed his withdrawal. The subsequent events are as follows:

Respondents Pedro, Gabriela, Isidra and Estanislao - all surnamed Quilat- February 23, 1987
Quilat -- filed an action for recovery of a parcel of land against Petitioners
The case was set for hearing on April 21, 1987. No hearing was held as the certification from the Bureau of Forest
Development [was] being awaited.
April 21, 1987
March 16, 1989
The hearing was reset due to the projected amendment of the complainant to
implead Primitiva Torrecampo. The said certification [was] still being awaited.

June 19, 1987 May 25, 1989

The third amended complaint was admitted. The testimony of [Private Respondent] Pedro Quilat-Quilat [was] suspended
after a question was [propounded] that would require him to use reading
September 9, 1987 eyeglasses which he did not have at the moment.

Hearing was postponed at the instance of the defendants [herein petitioners]. December 14, 1989

October 22, 1987 Hearing [was] reset due to the illness of [private respondents'] counsel.

The hearing was suspended for the reason that the Court would require the September 20, 1990
[private respondents] to submit a certification from the Bureau of Forest
Development that the land involved in this case [was] not a part of the public Atty. Eleccion, [petitioners'] counsel did not appear despite due notice. At this
forest. time, the [private respondents] rested their case.

December 17, 1987 October 15, 1990

The hearing was postponed at the request of [private respondents'] counsel Atty. Eleccion [private respondents'] counsel did not appear. Hearing [was]
for the reason that she [would] be attending [a] conference in Cebu City. reset to October 16, 1990.

March 18, 1988 October 16, 1990

The hearing was aborted due to the fact that the Bureau of Forest Atty. Eleccion did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to December 10, 11 and
Development report ha[d] not yet been finished. 12.

July 5, 1988 December 10, 1990

The hearing [was] reset upon agreement of both counsel. Atty. Eleccion asked for postponement. Hearing [was] reset to December 11,
1990.
September 15, 1988
December 11, 1990
The hearing [was] reset upon the Court's instance.
Atty. Eleccion did not appear. The case [was] submitted for decision as of
December 8, 1988 th[at] day.

August 21, 1992

The transcript of stenographic notes which was taken down by stenographer
Alexander Yberley, was missing. He was ordered to produce the transcript.
October 30, 1992
Witness Atilano Ramirez was recalled for cross-examination since
stenographer Yberley manifested that the record was burned. Despite due
notice, nobody appeared for the [petitioners]. So as of this day, the cross-
examination of Atilano Ramirez was considered waived and the case was
finally submitted for decision.
December 11, 1992
Court granted the prayer of Atty. Sedillo and the case [was] set for hearing
on March 22, 29 and April 5 1993.
March 22, 1993
Atty. Sedillo did not present evidence but instead moved for a resetting of the
hearing to April 12, 1993. He [was] advised by the Court to be prepared on
the next scheduled hearing.
June 4, 1993
Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to July 2, 1993.
July 2, 1993
Flaviano Umbac was presented as first [petitioners'] witness. Hearing [was]
scheduled [for] August 27, 1993.
August 27, 1993
[Petitioners] moved for a resetting to October 7, 1993.
October 7, 1993
Atty. Bongaciso was presented as second witness for the [petitioners]. His
testimony [was] terminated and hearing [was] reset to December 13, 1993.
December 13, 1993
Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to February 14, 1994.
February 14, 1994
Hearing [was] reset at the instance of Atty. Sedillo who want[ed] to recall his
witness Atty. Bonganciso. Hearing [was] reset to March 23, 1994.
March 24, 1994
Hearing [was] postponed to May 6, 1994 to find avenue for settlement.
May 6, 1994
Due to the conflict of schedule by Atty. Sedillo and due to the absence of
recalled 2nd [petitioners'] witness Bongaciso, hearing [was] reset to June 17,
1994.
June 17, 1994
Atty. Sedillo asked for postponement. He [would] attend a Kiwanis Training
Conference. Hearing [was] reset to July 4, 1994.
July 4, 1994
Atty. Sedillo was present but Atty. Rosalinda Ybanez [was] available at 10:00
a.m. so the case [was] reset to August 15, 1994.
August 15, 1994
Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to October 3, 1994.
October 3, 1994
The hearing [was] reset to November 17, 1994 due to non-availability of
[petitioners'] witness Atty. Roque Bonganciso who [was] on recall.
November 17, 1994
There [was] talk about [a] proposed settlement, hearing [was] held in
abeyance.
January 6, 1995
Since no settlement [was] realized a [private respondents'] motion to set [the]
case for hearing was filed and the case was reset to [February] 27, 1995.
February 27, 1995
Earlier, [petitioners'] counsel, Atty. Sedillo filed a motion for postponement as
he [would be] appearing in a case in Manila. Atty. Ybanez manifested that on
February 26, 1995 Atty. Sedillo was in Dumaguete and further that this case
ha[d] been delayed by the failure of the [petitioners] to complete the
presentation of their evidence. The Court then ordered the case submitted for
decision for the THIRD TIME.
March 16, 1995
The Court issued an order reconsidering the February 27, 1995 order upon
motion of Atty. Sedillo and set the case for the [petitioners] for June 16, 1995
with a STERN WARNING TO THE [PETITIONERS].
June 16, 1995
The hearing set for [this day] was cancelled as the Judge [was] on leave and
reset to September 8, 1995.
September 8, 1995
The [petitioners'] counsel did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to November
16, 1995.
November 16, 1995
The [petitioners'] counsel did not appear. Neither did his client. The hearing
[was] reset to February 13, 1996.
February 9, 1996
The [petitioners'] counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.
February 12, 1996
The Court issued an order granting the withdrawal of the [petitioners']
counsel. The [petitioners were] directed to immediately engage the services
of a new counsel. This notice was received personally by the wife of
[Petitioner] Mauro Edrial, Jr.
February 13, 1996
The Court issued an order setting the case [for] April 26, 1996. This order
was received by the wife of the [Petitioner] Mauro Edrial, Jr.
April 26, 1996
There was no appearance from the [petitioners]. Hence, the case was
submitted for decision for the FOURTH TIME.
July 8, 1996
Atty. Sedillo filed a motion to reopen the case and in effect reentered his
appearance.
August 20, 1996
Private respondents thru counsel filed opposition to the motion of the
[petitioners].
September 6, 1996
The Hon. Judge issued an order denying the motion to reopen hereby
affirming the April 26, 1996 order submitting the case for decision.
September 11, 1996
[Petitioners] filed a motion for reconsideration.
October 2, 1996
Court denied the motion for reconsideration.
October 23, 1996
Private respondents received a copy of the Petition for Certiorari."6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA dismissed petitioners' appeal because, in issuing the questioned
Orders, the trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. In giving petitioners more than ample time to complete
their presentation of evidence and in granting their Motions for
Postponement, the judge was accommodating them more than they actually
deserved.
Hence, this Petition.7
Issues
Petitioners submit that the CA erred in affirming the twin Orders of the
Dumaguete City RTC, Branch 39. They contend that a reversal thereof would
have allowed them to complete their presentation of evidence. Hence, by
affirming those Orders, the CA allegedly violated their right to due process.8
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is without merit.
Main Issue
Due Process and Reopening of Trial
Counsel for petitioners alleges that the addresses of his clients on file in his
law firm were incorrect; hence, the notices and other forms of communication
he had sent to them were not received. He allegedly discovered this fact only
after he had filed his withdrawal as their counsel. He also argues that the
denial of the Motion to Reopen Trial was "plainly capricious and oppressive"
because private respondents were equally guilty of delay and procrastination.
Finally, he maintains that allowing petitioners to present their remaining
evidence would be "in the interest of substantial due process and humane
justice."
Respondents disagree, reasoning that the trial court thrice reconsidered its
Order to submit the case for decision; that is, petitioners were given several
opportunities to present their evidence, but they squandered them.
Petitioners, they further point out, were intentionally seeking to delay the
resolution of the case because they were in physical possession of the land
in dispute.
Counsel's excuses are unsatisfactory and unacceptable. The CA ruled that
petitioners were given "more than enough time" to complete their
presentation of evidence. Respondents rested their case as early as
September 1992. Petitioners' lawyer, at his own request, was allowed to start
presenting evidence only on April 12, 1993. From that day until April 26, 1996
or for a period of three years, counsel presented only two witnesses. The trial
judge was in fact liberal in granting petitioners' Motions for Postponement.
But enough was enough; when they attempted to delay the trial some more,
the trial judge finally and correctly refused to go along.
True, respondents also asked for continuances, but petitioners were
ultimately to blame for the inexcusable delay. The case was submitted for
decision three times -- on December 11, 1990, October 30, 1992, and
February 27, 1995 - but petitioners and/or their counsel did not appear in
court each time. After having failed to take advantage of opportunities to
ventilate their claims below, parties may no longer be accorded the same
chances, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court, as in this case.9
The Court frowns on lawyers' practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of
time to file pleadings and thereafter simply letting the period lapse without
submitting any pleading or even any explanation or manifestation of their
failure.10 The same principle applies more forcefully to motions for
continuance. Postponement is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion. Actions thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts in the
absence of a clear or manifest abuse of discretion, resulting in a denial of
substantial justice.11 We concur with the CA that there is no such denial in
this case.1âwphi1
It is highly suspicious how the counsel for petitioners continued to represent
his clients effectively for several years despite allegedly having lost their
correct addresses. It was definitely his duty to know the correct ones. Indeed,
it was too late for him to do so after he had withdrawn as their counsel.
According to him, after April 16, 1996, he sent an office employee to verify
the whereabouts of Mauro Edrial Jr. The inquiry yielded the information that
Mauro actually resided in San Jose, Negros Oriental, and that Susan Edrial
Valenzuela resided in Gomez St., Dumaguete City.12 He should have
undertaken the search before withdrawing as counsel. Further, notice might
not have been received by petitioners themselves, but that did not excuse
counsel's failure to appear during trials.
Counsel for petitioners further avers that he had difficulty in presenting Atty.
Roque Bonganciso because of the latter's prior commitments which
conflicted with the scheduled trial dates. The last witness was Mauro Edrial
Jr., but counsel had the wrong address on file. He should just have adjusted
the order of presentation of witnesses and called Edrial Jr. later. Such move
could have prevented the postponement. Besides, finding an available date
in his calendar would not have taken Atty. Bonganciso three years.
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, shall not let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their
failure to do so (Rule 12.03).13 Moreover, they should avoid any action that
would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes (Rule 12.04).
For the benefit of the bench and bar, worth repeating is the CA's reminder to
petitioners' counsel of his duty to his client and to the court:
"Being an officer of the court a lawyer is part of the machinery in the
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance
its ends-the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication
of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not
only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or
improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged
as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice."14
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
8Petition, p. 19; rollo, p. 22. Petitioners' Memorandum was filed by
Sedillo Icao Hernando and Associates, represented by Atty. Eduardo
T. Sedillo who failed/neglected to sign it.
9Inciong Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 578, 585, June 26,
1996.
10Achacoso v. Court of Appeals, 51 SCRA 424, 424-425, June 28,
1973; Casals v. Cusi Jr., 52 SCRA 58, 63-64, July 12, 1973.
11Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA
518, 525, December 2, 1998; Reyes v.Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA
543, 550, February 6, 1997.
12 Petition, p. 18; rollo, p. 21.
13 People v. Compendio Jr., 258 SCRA 254, 270, July 5, 1996.
14CA Decision, p. 11; citing Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p.
123; rollo, p. 40.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 30-40.

2 Rollo, p. 45.

3Former Special Ninth Division; penned by Justice Buenaventura J.

Guerrero, chairman; with the concurrence of Justices Conrado M.
Vasquez Jr. and Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, members.

4 CA Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 40.

5 Presided by Judge Teopisto L. Calumpang.

6 Rollo, pp. 79-84.

7 The case was deemed submitted for decision upon the Court's
receipt of the Memorandum for the Respondents on February 22,
2000. Said Memorandum was signed by Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte
Felipe of the Public Attorney's Office.
 Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Republic of the Philippines Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas
SUPREME COURT
Manila Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

EN BANC Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International
Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the House of
Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and
proclaimed as officers:
The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July
4,1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the
widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers
who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive
electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys
Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of
government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to
influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws
which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Courten banc, exercising its
power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-
taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.

NAME
Atty. Violeta Drilon
Atty. Bella Tiro
Atty. Salvador Lao
Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo
Atty. Teodoro Quicoy
POSITION
President
Executive Vice-President
Chairman, House of Delegates
Secretary, House of Delegates
Treasurer, House of Delegates
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting
and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the
"IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals,
was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above
board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent
tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported
electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted
by the three candidates for president of the IBP.

Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

Atty. Justiniano Cortes
Atty. Ciriaco Atienza
Atty. Mario Jalandoni
Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon
Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon
Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon
Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila
Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila
Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive
columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The
Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an
article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and
the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were
unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly
employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C.
Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul,
money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a
disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-
flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations, and
she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters
of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves
of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her.
Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some
members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as
well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and
Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government
positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition,
mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor, especially
conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort
to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in
plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously,
womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x
x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the
election, some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial,
appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the
judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting
himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of
the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the
convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's
reports with some embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated
June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP
Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House of
Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock
p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned
reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate
approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the
fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its
organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-
political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in
the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The
fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would
be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to
serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that
in connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors and of
the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports
carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was
extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well
as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-
buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus,
Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give
counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one
hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an
informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to
determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP
By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's
national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R.
Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Griño-
Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel
Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to
subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections.
The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and
the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo)
allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their
supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and
the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that
an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB
planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of
delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge
that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention.
Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to
ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or
worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil
Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of
information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they said,
on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to
have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom
Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing
and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have
direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court, after
deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political"
character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly
non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic
feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized
accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-
judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible
for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated
Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or
employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of
any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of
candidacy for any elective public office or accepts
appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited
acts relative to IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections.
— The following acts and practices relative to election are
prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any
elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member,
directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or
through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign
material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign
material other than a statement of the biodata of a candidate
on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or
causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons
other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the
elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding
an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of
candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to
withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1)
payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member;
(2) giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any
article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or
(3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made,
offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above
rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or
commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices
defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices relative
to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal
from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of
sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws
of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating
committee, the following violations were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for
president, executive vice-president, the officers of candidate the House of
Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began
travelling around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April
1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July
13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato
in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga,
and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern
Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47)
where they announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP
chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their written
endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and requested
the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to formalize
their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started
campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the
chapter elections which determined the membership of the House of
Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989,
pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies
of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form
I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada,
Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S.
Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor
L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito
M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg,
Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V.
Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose
S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez,
Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon,
Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P.
Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the
commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85).
Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes
in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that.
some of those who had committed their votes to him were "manipulated,
intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695;
Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit
C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department
of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from the
Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional
Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest
(Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant
Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty.
Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the
passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that
she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n.,
July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the
Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking
from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He
went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at
the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official
business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be
taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he
asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane to
Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess
their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP
chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their support
(t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by
Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR
Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional
development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit
the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity
brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the
DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be
allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with
the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong,
Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga,
Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente
Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed
their own slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for
Executive Vice-President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern
Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater
Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr.
(Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco
(Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A.
Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for
Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of
Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong
Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern
Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern
Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern
Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano
Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C.
Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez,
Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S.
Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the
convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip
tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles
was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment
from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan,
h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in
Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles
said that he did not use them, because if he did, he would be committed to
Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp.
77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and
another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine
Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr.
(Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-
Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-
3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won:
Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n.
July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to
delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at
the Holiday Inn, which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be
occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites
were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association,
and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his
delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C.
Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio
Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio
Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado,
Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro
Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo,
Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela,
Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza,
Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores,
Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo
Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza,
Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy,
Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon,
Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo
booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used
as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo,
the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of
P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine
Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40
rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza
banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed
with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty.
Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it
was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP
delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He
gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with
her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food,
and beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of
P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation
with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of
P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the
Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet'
showed that the following persons contributed for that down payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000
(b) Antonio Carpio 20,000
(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000
(d) Jay Castro 10,000
(e) Danny Deen 20,000
(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000
(g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000
(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300
(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)
Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing
money every time the IBP embarks on a project. This time, they contributed
so that their partners or associates could attend the legal aid seminar and the
IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her
delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose
name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a room
where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however, that she
paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon
(t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty.
Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria
C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong,
Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao
Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto
Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio
Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot,
Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma,
Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad
Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza,
Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior
partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that
some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n.
July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention.
Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon
(meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being
sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate,
two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans.
They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a
sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members
of his own firm who attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He
made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n.
July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by
soliciting the votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former
teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy
Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989,
pp. 22, 29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract
with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room.
He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April
20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales
department manager, credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively
of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those
who committed themselves to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B.
Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin,
Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano
Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P.
Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno
Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo
Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate
while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II,
Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he
took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He
stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some
moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member
of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the significance of Sigma
Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon
being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the
Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her
immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong,
Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress
of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other
groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto
toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of
113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from his
room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs.
Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy
Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms served as
the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed
before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where the
supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the
Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP
BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of
candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or
support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a candidate
who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in
the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989,
pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March,
April, May during any election year. This year, the collections increased by
P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to
Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of
legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to
be distributed his bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen
as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their
tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000.
They were printed by his own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than
those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-
Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials
on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign
materials distributed at the convention site this year than in previous years.
The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal
Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's
ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed during the
convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm
campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or
against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him
to withdraw his candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run
as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989,
pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio
and president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third
week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor &
Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty.
Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin
and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited
her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her.
Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents'
meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region
(t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who
had earlier committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was
offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When
Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that there
was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP
candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to
be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was
Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City,
Court Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my
wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP chapters
informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June
29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly
campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the
Western Visayas, expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections
because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified
that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an
assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the
Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty.
Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been
reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew
that the three candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo,
at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He
knew about this because a week before the elections, representatives of
Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil
Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the
Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City.
These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets and accommodations
at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the
offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a
businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty.
Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two
companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own
tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks
of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was
the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar
Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces
(Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n.
June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not
include the expenses for his campaign which began several months before
the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some
delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's
camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty.
Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by
Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal
candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14
of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political"
Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates
(Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the
Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the
delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that
elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets,
slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with,
or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written
commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the
delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the
expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and
some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among
the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of
tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo
admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed
girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign
materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of
assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the
use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the
Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel
accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in
exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them
to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored
consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings
and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated
the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which
imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold
the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal
processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of
Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers
themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful
practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for
their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the
association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle
of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did
not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials
and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses,
including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it
before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation
conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less
than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves
to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the
irregularities committed during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987
Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council
composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the
Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the
position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers.
The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office
might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the
participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct
which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this
Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not
entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the
organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned
unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an
association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court
hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby
annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of
Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-
Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-
President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of
the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47,
Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic
succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the
expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's
resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby
restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President
shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of
governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among
the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for
election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the
rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been
completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-
President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable,
on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-
President for their respective regions. There shall also be a
Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP
shall be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of
the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and
Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-
Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of
Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar
of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors
consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as
delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to
be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from
that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated
among the different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at
least one (1) month before the national convention the
delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their
region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be
rotated among the chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following
provision as part of the first paragraph:
 No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general
membership shall be held prior to any election in an election
year.

11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should
be as they are hereby deleted.

All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the

Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are
inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.

12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9)
IBP regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's
resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of
Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among
themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these
special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held
on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution
entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified
in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon
that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for
any position.

13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by

the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the
dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of
such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin,

Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., took no part.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 167 March 9, 1999
ATTY. PRUDENCIO S. PENTICOSTES, complainant,
vs.
PROSECUTOR DIOSDADO S. IBAÑEZ, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
Sometime in 1989, Encarnacion Pascual, the sister-in-law of Atty. Prudencio
S. Penticostes (herein complainant) was sued for non-remittance of SSS
payments. The complaint was docketed as I.S. 89-353 and assigned to
Prosecutor Diosdado S. Ibañez (herein respondent) for preliminary
investigation. In the course of the investigation, Encarnacion Pascual gave
P1,804.00 to respondent as payment of her Social Security System (SSS)
contributions in arrears. Respondent, however, did not remit the amount to
the system. The fact of non-payment was certified to by the SSS on October
2, 1989.
On November 16, 1990 or over a year later, complainant filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac a complaint for professional misconduct
against Ibañez due to the latter's failure to remit the SSS contributions of his
sister-in-law. The complaint alleged that respondent's misappropriation of
Encarnacion Pascual's SSS contributions amounted to a violation of his oath
as a lawyer. Seven days later, or on November 23, 1990, respondent paid
P1,804.00 to the SSS on behalf of Encarnacion Pascual.
In the meantime, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Tarlac Chapter, the court observing that it had no competence to
receive evidence on the matter. Upon receipt of the case, the Tarlac Chapter
forwarded the same to the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline.
In his defense, respondent claimed that his act of accommodating
Encarnacion Pascual's request to make payments to the SSS did not amount
to professional misconduct but was rather an act of Christian charity.
Furthermore, he claimed that the action was moot and academic, the amount
of P1,804.00 having already been paid by him to the SSS. Lastly, he
disclaimed liability on the ground that the acts complained of were not done
by him in his capacity as a practicing lawyer but on account of his office as a
prosecutor.
On September 3, 1998, the Commission recommended that the respondent
be reprimanded, with a warning that the commission of the same or similar
offense would be dealt with more severely in the future. On November 5,
1998, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
adopted and approved its Commission's recommendation.
This Court adopts the recommendation of the IBP and finds respondent guilty
of professional misconduct. While there is no doubt that payment of the
contested amount had been effected to the SSS on November 23, 1990, it is
clear, however, that the same was made only after a complaint had been
filed against respondent. Furthermore, the duties of a provincial prosecutor
do not include receiving money from persons with official transactions with
his office.
This court has repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high sense of morality,
honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
It is glaringly clear that respondent's non-remittance for over one year of the
funds coming from Encarnacion Pascual constitutes conduct in gross
violation of the above canon. The belated payment of the same to the SSS
does not excuse his misconduct. While Pascual may not strictly be
considered a client of respondent, the rules relating to a lawyer's handling of
funds of a client is applicable. In Daroy v. Legaspi, 1 this court held that "(t)he
relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature...
[thus] lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received
by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct." The failure of respondent to immediately remit the amount to
the SSS gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional
ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment. 2
Respondent's claim that he may not be held liable because he committed
such acts, not in his capacity as a private lawyer, but as a prosecutor is
unavailing. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

These canons shall apply to lawyers in government services

in the discharge of their official tasks.

As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the Code, "a lawyer does not
shed his professional obligations upon assuming public office. In fact, his
public office should make him more sensitive to his professional obligations
because a lawyer's disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the
public's eye. 3 Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a
lawyer who holds a responsible public office. 4

ACCORDINGLY, this Court REPRIMANDS respondent with a STERN

WARNING that the commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely in the future.

LET copies of this decision be spread in his records and copies be furnished
the Department of Justice and the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes

1 65 SCRA 304 (1975).

2 RAGPALO, Legal Ethics, 194 (4th ed., 1989).

3 Comments of the IBP Committee, p. 30.

4 Macoco v. Diaz, 70 Phil. 97.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 4346 April 3, 2002
ERLINDA ABRAGAN, MILA GINA JAVIER, REYNALDO MERCADO,
PATERNO TORRES, BENIGNA ANTIBO, ELEISER SALVADOR, EDNA
SAPON, JULIANA CUENCA, ESPERANZA BUENAFE, VICENTE
BARNAGA, MARTHA SAPON, JOSEFINA OPEÑA, PUREZA WABE,
RONULFO LOPEZ, DOMINADOR HERNANDEZ, FELIPA EMBATE,
ROQUE CATIIL, JERRY SAPON, CONCEPCION MATANOG, and PABLO
SALOMON, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. MAXIMO G. RODRIGUEZ, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers violate their oath of office when they represent conflicting interests.
They taint not only their own professional practice, but the entire legal
profession itself.1âwphi1.nêt
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Petition1 praying for the disbarment of Atty. Maximo G.
Rodriguez because of alleged illegal and unethical acts. The Petition
relevantly reads as follows:
"2. That sometime in 1986, the petitioners hired the services of the
respondent and the latter, represented the former in the case entitled
PABLO SALOMON et al vs. RICARDO DACALUZ et al., before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3
docketed as Civil Case No. 11204, for Forcible Entry with Petition for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages, [and] a Certified True
and Correct Copy of the COMPLAINT by Clerk of Court III Gerardo
B. Ucat of the said Court, is herewith attached to the original of this
PETITION, while photocopies of the same are also attached to the
duplicate copies of this same Petition and marked as Annex 'A'
hereof;
"3. That after the Case No. 11204 was finally won, and a Writ of
Execution was issued by the Honorable Municipal Trial Court in
Cities of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3, the same respondent
lawyer represented the petitioners herein;
"4. That when respondent counsel disturbed the association
(Cagayan de Oro Landless Residents Association, Inc.), to which all
the complainants belong, by surreptitiously selling some rights to
other persons without the consent of the petitioners herein, they
decided to sever their client-lawyer relationship;
"5. That in fact, the National Bureau of Investigation of Cagayan de
Oro City, is presently undertaking an investigation on the illegal
activities of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez pertaining to his express
involvement in the illegal and unauthorized apportionment,
assignment and sale of parcels of land subject to the Case No.
11204, where he represented the poor landless claimants of
Cagayan de Oro City, which include your petitioners in this case;
"6. That petitioners herein later filed an indirect contempt charge
under Civil Case No. 11204 against Sheriff Fernando Loncion et al.,
on August 2, 1991 engaging the services of Atty. LORETO O.
SALVA, SR., an alleged former student of law of Atty. Maximo
Rodriguez, [and a] certified true and correct copy of the complaint
thereat consisting of four (4) pages is herewith attached and
photocopies of which are also attached to the duplicates hereof, and
correspondingly marked as their Annex 'B';
"7. That respondent lawyer, Atty. Maximo Rodriguez, (in the Indirect
Contempt Case under the same Civil Case No. 11204,)
REPRESENTED and actively took up the defense of FERNANDO
LONCION et al. much to the dismay, damage and prejudice of the
herein petitioners, [and] a copy of Atty. Rodriguez's Answer, which is
also certified true and correct by Clerk of Court III Gerardo Ucat of
Branch 3 of MTCC – Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of three (3)
pages, is attached to the original of this Petition, while photocopies of
the same are attached to the other copies hereof and accordingly
marked as Annex 'C';
"8. That the records will bear the petitioners out that their counsel,
Atty. SALVA SR. later on withdrew the case of Indirect Contempt
upon the suggestion of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez; and instead, filed
the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution;
"9. That on January 12, 1993, the herein respondent, without
consulting the herein Petitioners who are all poor and ignorant of
court procedures and the law, filed in behalf of the plaintiffs (which
include the herein Petitioners) in Civil Case No. 11204, a Motion to
Withdraw Plaintiffs' Exhibits, [and] a certified true and correct copy of
said Motion by Mr. Gerardo Ucat of MTCC Branch 3, Cagayan de
Oro City is herewith attached to the original of this Petition, while
photocopies of the same are also attached to the rest of the copies
of this same Petition, and are correspondingly marked as their Annex
'D'.
"10. That the illegal and unethical actions of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez
are most obnoxious, condemnable, and highly immoral, to say the
least, more so if we consider his social standing and ascendancy in
the community of Cagayan de Oro City;
"11. That the records of Civil Case No. 11204 which are voluminous
will bear the petitioners' allegations against the herein respondent,
who, after representing them initially, then transferring allegiance and
services to the adverse parties (Lonchion, Palacio and NHA
Manager), came back to represent the herein petitioners without any
regard [for] the rules of law and the Canons of Professional Ethics,
which is highly contemptible and a clear violation of his oath as a
lawyer and an officer of the courts of law;
"12. That these acts are only those that records will bear, because
outside of the court records, respondent, without regard [for]
delicadeza, fair play and the rule of law, has assigned, apportioned
and sold parcels of land[,] subject matter in Civil Case No. 11204
which legally have been pronounced and decided to be in the
possession of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11204, who are partly
the petitioners herein. Thus, they cannot yet enjoy the fruits of the
tedious and protracted legal battle because of respondent's illegal
acts, which have instilled fear among the plaintiffs and the petitioners
herein;
"13. That respondent lawyer even represented ERLINDA ABRAGAN,
one of the herein petitioners, in a later proceedings in Civil Case No.
11204 wherein the apportionment of parcels of land was
erroneously, unprocedurally and illegally submitted to a
commissioner, and that ERLINDA ABRAGAN, after winning in the
said Civil Case was later on dispossessed of her rights by
respondent counsel's maneuver, after the decision (in Civil Case No.
11208) became final executory;
"14. That to make matters worse, respondent Atty. Rodriguez
eventually fenced an area consisting of about 10, 200 square meters
within Lot No. 1982[,] the subject matter in Civil Case No. 11204
without the consent of the herein petitioners. He even openly and
publicly proclaimed his possession and ownership thereof, which fact
is again and also under NBI investigation;
"15. That all the foregoing acts of respondent lawyer plus his
continuing and ongoing illegal and unethical maneuvers have
deprived the herein petitioners of their vested rights to possess and
eventually own the land they have for decades possessed, and
declared as such by final judgment in Civil Case No. 11204."
In his Comment,2 respondent flatly denied the accusations of petitioners. He
explained that the withdrawal of the exhibits, having been approved by the
trial court, was not "illegal, obnoxious, undesirable and highly immoral." He
added that he took over the 8,000 square meters of land only after it had
been given to him as attorney's fees. In his words:
"14. Respondent ADMITS that he fenced an area of about 8,000 sq.
[m]. after the association had awarded the same as attorney's fees in
Civil Case Number 11204, the dismissal of the appeal by the NHA,
the successful handling of three (3) cases in the SUPREME COURT,
the pending case of QUIETING OF TITLE filed by the NHA, and for
the pending reconveyance case, Civil Case No. 93-573, supra.
These area of 8,000 sq. [m]., was awarded as attorney's fees, which
[were] supposed to be ten percent of the 22 hectares, Lot No. 1982,
the subject matter of Civil Case No. 11204, but the association and
its members were able to take actual possession by judgment of the
courts only o[f] the twelve (12) hectares. [This] area consisting of
8,000 sq. [m]., and consisting of two (2) lots [was] fenced by the
respondent to prevent squatters from entering the area. The rights of
possession and ownership o[f] this area by the respondent depends
upon the outcome of Civil Case No. 93-573, supra, for reconveyance
of title by the association and its members versus the NHA, et. al. If it
is true that this is under investigation by the NBI, then why, not wait
and submit the investigation of the NHA, instead of filing this
unwarranted, false and fabricated charge based on preposterous
and ridiculous charges without any proof whatsoever, except the vile
[language] of an irresponsible lawyer."3
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Reply4 in which they reiterated their allegations
against respondent and added that the latter likewise violated Rule 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and/or
decision.5
 Report of the Investigating Commissioner
In her Report and Recommendation dated January 23, 2001, Investigating
IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for violation of Rule
15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Her report
reads in part as follows:
"From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent represented
conflicting interest considering that the complainants were the same
plaintiffs in both cases and were duly specified in the pleadings
particularly in the caption of the cases. Under the said predicament
even if complainants were excluded as members of the Association
represented by the respondent; the latter should have first secured
complainants' written consent before representing defendants in the
Indirect Contempt case particularly Macario Palacio, president of the
Association, or inhibited himself.
"It is very unfortunate that in his desire to render service to his client,
respondent overlooked the fact that he already violated Rule 15.03 of
[C]anon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
'Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.'
"We have no alternative but to abide by the rules."6
IBP Board of Governors' Resolution
Upholding the above-quoted Report, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended via its May 26, 2001
Resolution that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
months for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
This Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors, but hold that the penalty should be six-month suspension as
recommended by the investigating commissioner.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
At the outset, we agree with Commissioner Navarro's conclusion that apart
from their allegations in their various pleadings, petitioners did not proffer any
proof tending to show that respondent had sold to other persons several
rights over the land in question; and that he had induced the former counsel
for petitioners, Atty. Salva Jr., to withdraw the indirect contempt case that
they had filed. Neither did the IBP find anything wrong as regards the 8,000
square meters awarded to respondent as payment for his legal services.
Petitioners' bare assertions, without any proof to back them up, would not
justify the imposition of a penalty on respondent.
Having said that, we find, however, that respondent falls short of the integrity
and good moral character required from all lawyers. They are expected to
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times. The trust and
confidence clients repose in them require a high standard and appreciation of
the latter's duty to the former, the legal profession, the courts and the public.
Indeed, the bar must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as
of honesty and fair dealings. To this end, lawyers should refrain from doing
anything that might tend to lessen the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of their profession.7
In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after full disclosure of the facts."
The Court explained in Buted v. Hernando:8
"[A] lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose.
"The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not
to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also the
subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in
matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to
which confidence has been reposed."9 (Italics in the original)
In the case at bar, petitioners were the same complainants in the indirect
contempt case and in the Complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No.
11204.10 Respondent should have evaluated the situation first before
agreeing to be counsel for the defendants in the indirect contempt
proceedings. Attorneys owe undivided allegiance to their clients, and should
at all times weigh their actions, especially in their dealings with the latter and
the public at large. They must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all
times.
The Court will not tolerate any departure from the "straight and narrow" path
demanded by the ethics of the legal profession.1âwphi1.nêt
In Hilado v. David,11 which we quote below, the Court advised lawyers to be
like Caesar's wife – to be pure and to appear to be so.
"This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest
practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well as to protect the
honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice.
It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has
been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the
rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to
proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it
behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice."
Because of his divided allegiance, respondent has eroded, rather than
enhanced, the public perception of the legal profession. His divided loyalty
constitutes malpractice for which he may be suspended, following Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of Attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. – Any member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. x x x."
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. We find however that
suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law, as recommended by
Commissioner Navarro, is sufficient to discipline respondent.
A survey of cases involving conflicting interests on the part of counsel
reveals that the Court has imposed on erring attorneys 12 either a reprimand,
or a suspension from the practice of law from five (5) months 13 to as high as
two (2) years.14
WHEREFORE, Maximo G. Rodriguez is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03
of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.1âwphi1.nêt
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney
and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall
circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J.,abroad on official business.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 1-6.
2
Ibid., pp. 46-57.
3 Id., pp. 53-54.
4 Id., p. 81.
5 Resolution dated December 4, 1995; id., p. 100.
6 Report and Recommendation filed on June 7, 2001, pp. 7-8.
7 Marcelo v. Javier Sr., 214 SCRA 1, 12-13, September 18,
1992; Fernandez v. Grecia, 223 SCRA 425, 434, June 17, 1993.
8 203 SCRA 1, October 17, 1991.
9 Ibid., p. 5, per curiam.
10 Rollo, p. 9.
11 84 Phil. 571, 578-579, September 21, 1949, per Tuason, J.
12 See Nombrado v. Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13, November 25,
1968; San Jose v. Cruz, 57 Phil. 792, February 4, 1933.
13 Buted v. Hernando, supra.
14 See Vda. De Alisbo v. Jalandoon Sr., 199 SCRA 321, July 31,
1991; Bautista v. Barrios, 9 SCRA 695, December 21, 1963; Natan
v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640, July 23, 1952; Cantorne v. Ducosisn, 57 Phil.
24, August 9, 1932.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8243 July 24, 2009
ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case stems from an administrative complaint1 filed by Rolando Pacana,
Jr. against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with flagrant
violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.2Complainant alleges that respondent committed acts
constituting conflict of interest, dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to
render an accounting of all the money and properties received by her from
complainant.
On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel
Communications Corporation (MCC). MCC is an affiliate company of Multitel
International Holdings Corporation (Multitel). Sometime in July 2002, MCC
changed its name to Precedent Communications Corporation (Precedent). 3
According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand
letters from its members and investors because of the failure of its
investment schemes. He alleges that he earned the ire of Multitel investors
after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent
and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million
Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank.
Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened
to be a member of the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where
complainant and his wife were also active members. From then on,
complainant and respondent constantly communicated, with the former
disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedent’s
relation with Multitel. Respondent gave legal advice to complainant and even
helped him prepare standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, complainant
avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established between him and
respondent although no formal document was executed by them at that time.
A Retainer Agreement4 dated January 15, 2003 was proposed by
respondent. Complainant, however, did not sign the said agreement because
respondent verbally asked for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
as acceptance fee and a 15% contingency fee upon collection of the
overpayment made by Multitel to Benefon,5 a telecommunications company
based in Finland. Complainant found the proposed fees to be prohibitive and
not within his means.6 Hence, the retainer agreement remained unsigned.7
After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter
from respondent8 asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds
invested by respondent’s clients in Multitel. When complainant confronted
respondent about the demand letter, the latter explained that she had to send
it so that her clients – defrauded investors of Multitel – would know that she
was doing something for them and assured complainant that there was
nothing to worry about.9
Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding
the persistent demands made by Multitel investors against complainant. On
these occasions, respondent impressed upon complainant that she can
closely work with officials of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportations (BID),10 and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)11 to resolve complainant’s problems.
Respondent also convinced complainant that in order to be absolved from
any liability with respect to the investment scam, he must be able to show to
the DOJ that he was willing to divest any and all of his interests in Precedent
including the funds assigned to him by Multitel.12
Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping to
be used only for his case whenever necessary. Complainant agreed and
gave her an initial amount of P900,000.00 which was received by respondent
herself.13 Sometime thereafter, complainant again gave
respondent P1,000,000.00.14 Said amounts were all part of Precedent’s
collections and sales proceeds which complainant held as assignee of the
company’s properties.15
When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several
messages from respondent sent through electronic mail (e-mail) and short
messaging system (SMS, or text messages) warning him not to return to the
Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president of Multitel, was arrested and
that complainant may later on be implicated in Multitel’s failed investment
system. Respondent even said that ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold
departure order had been issued against him. Complainant, thereafter,
received several e-mail messages from respondent updating him of the
status of the case against Multitel and promised that she will settle the matter
discreetly with government officials she can closely work with in order to
clear complainant’s name.16 In two separate e-mail messages,17 respondent
again asked money from complainant, P200,000 of which was handed by
complainant’s wife while respondent was confined in Saint Luke’s Hospital
after giving birth,18 and anotherP700,000 allegedly to be given to the NBI.19
Through respondent’s persistent promises to settle all complainant’s legal
problems, respondent was able to convince complainant who was still in the
US to execute a deed of assignment in favor of respondent allowing the latter
to retrieve 178 boxes containing cellular phones and accessories stored in
complainant’s house and inside a warehouse.20 He also signed a blank deed
of sale authorizing respondent to sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper. 21
Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle his
legal problems, complainant was advised by his family to hire another lawyer.
When respondent knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as
follows:
Dear Butchie,
Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as
your friend and lawyer. The charges are all non-bailable but all the same as
the SEC report I told you before. The findings are the same, i.e. your
company was the front for the fraud of Multitel and that funds were provided
you.
I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a quitclaim. Rolly is willing to
return the Crosswind, laptap (sic) and [P]alm [P]ilot. Manny Cancio really
helped. Anthony na lang. Then, I will need the accounting of all the funds you
received from the sale of the phones, every employees and directors[’]
quitclaim (including yours), the funds transmitted to the clients through me,
the funds you utilized, and whatelse (sic) is still unremitted, every centavo
must be accounted for as DOJ and NBI can have the account opened.
I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and the trust
given [to] you. So we can inform them [that] it was not touched by you.
I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco
Pimentel. I know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no
problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. In this
cases (sic), you cannot be highprofile (sic) because it is the clients who will
be sacrificed at the expense of the fame of the lawyer. I have to work quietly
and discreetly. No funfare. Just like what I did for your guys in the SEC. I
have to work with people I am comfortable with. Efren Santos will sign as
your lawyer although I will do all the work. He can help with all his
connections. Val’s friend in the NBI is the one is (sic) charge of organized
crime who is the entity (sic) who has your warrant. My law partner was the
state prosecutor for financial fraud. Basically we have it covered in all
aspects and all departments. I am just trying to liquidate the phones I have
allotted for you s ana (sic) for your trooper kasi whether we like it or not, we
have to give this agencies (sic) to make our work easier according to Val.
The funds with Mickey are already accounted in the quit claims (sic) as
attorneys (sic) fees. I hope he will be able to send it so we have funds to
work with.
As for your kids, legally they can stay here but recently, it is the children who
(sic) the irate clients and government officials harass and kidnap to make the
individuals they want to come out from hiding (sic). I do not want that to
happen. Things will be really easier on my side.
Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you
hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your case. Please trust
me. I have never let you down, have I? I told you this will happen but we are
ready and prepared. The clients who received the phones will stand by you
and make you the hero in this scandal. I will stand by you always. This is my
expertise. TRUST me! That is all. You have an angel on your side. Always
pray though to the best legal mind up there. You will be ok!
Candy22
On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondent’s advice, complainant returned to the
country. On the eve of his departure from the United States, respondent
called up complainant and conveniently informed him that he has been
cleared by the NBI and the BID.23
About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with complainant and
his wife and told them that she has already accumulated P12,500,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to complainant in
appreciation for his help. Respondent allegedly told complainant that without
his help, she would not have earned such amount. Overwhelmed and
relieved, complainant accepted respondent’s offer but respondent, later on,
changed her mind and told complainant that she would instead invest
the P2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a business venture. Complainant declined
and explained to respondent that he and his family needed the money
instead to cover their daily expenses as he was no longer employed.
Respondent allegedly agreed, but she failed to fulfill her promise.24
Respondent even publicly announced in their religious organization that she
was able to help settle the ten (10) warrants of arrest and hold departure
order issued against complainant and narrated how she was able to defend
complainant in the said cases.25
By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was evading
him. Respondent would either refuse to return complainant’s call or would
abruptly terminate their telephone conversation, citing several reasons. This
went on for several months.26 In one instance, when complainant asked
respondent for an update on the collection of Benefon’s obligation to
Precedent which respondent had previously taken charge of, respondent
arrogantly answered that she was very busy and that she would read
Benefon’s letter only when she found time to do so.
On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondent’s arrogance
and evasiveness, complainant wrote respondent a letter formally asking for a
full accounting of all the money, documents and properties given to the
latter.27 Respondent rendered an accounting through a letter dated
December 20, 2004.28 When complainant found respondent’s explanation to
be inadequate, he wrote a latter expressing his confusion about the
accounting.29 Complainant repeated his request for an audited financial
report of all the properties turned over to her; otherwise, he will be
constrained to file the appropriate case against respondent.30 Respondent
replied,31explaining that all the properties and cash turned over to her by
complainant had been returned to her clients who had money claims against
Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she was able to secure quitclaim
documents clearing complainant from any liability. 32 Still unsatisfied,
complainant decided to file an affidavit-complaint33against respondent before
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent.
In her Answer-Affidavit,34 respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer for
Precedent. She maintained that no formal engagement was executed
between her and complainant. She claimed that she merely helped
complainant by providing him with legal advice and assistance because she
personally knew him, since they both belonged to the same religious
organization.35lavvph!1
Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel
and that she merely mediated in the settlement of the claims her clients had
against the complainant. She also averred that the results of the settlement
between both parties were fully documented and accounted
for.36 Respondent believes that her act in helping complainant resolve his
legal problem did not violate any ethical standard and was, in fact, in accord
with Rule 2.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 37
To bolster her claim that the complaint was without basis, respondent noted
that a complaint for estafa was also filed against her by complainant before
the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City citing the same grounds. The
complaint was, however, dismissed by Assistant City Prosecutor Josephus
Joannes H. Asis for insufficiency of evidence.38 Respondent argued that on
this basis alone, the administrative case must also be dismissed.
In her Position Paper,39 respondent also questioned the admissibility of the
electronic evidence submitted by complainant to the IBP’s Commission on
Bar Discipline. Respondent maintained that the e-mail and the text messages
allegedly sent by respondent to complainant were of doubtful authenticity and
should be excluded as evidence for failure to conform to the Rules on
Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).
After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a
Report and Recommendation40finding that a lawyer-client relationship was
established between respondent and complainant despite the absence of a
written contract. The Investigating Commissioner also declared that
respondent violated her duty to be candid, fair and loyal to her client when
she allowed herself to represent conflicting interests and failed to render a
full accounting of all the cash and properties entrusted to her. Based on
these grounds, the Investigating Commissioner recommended her
disbarment.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,41 but the IBP Board of Governors
issued a Recommendation42 denying the motion and adopting the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner.
The case now comes before this Court for final action.
We affirm the findings of the IBP.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:
Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste43 and,
more importantly, upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case,
including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be considered
sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given to him to take
advantage of his client; for if the confidence is abused, the profession will
suffer by the loss thereof.44 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the
client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double
─ dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice.45 It is for
these reasons that we have described the attorney-client relationship as one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree.46
Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively
communicating with complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with
demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a
lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the
inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance
she rendered to complainant was only in the form of "friendly
accommodations,"47precisely because at the time she was giving assistance
to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties
who had been referred to her by the SEC.48
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by
arguing that no written contract for the engagement of her services was ever
forged between her and complainant.49 This argument all the more reveals
respondent’s patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and of basic
ethical standards expected from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct
when it said:
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was
a professional relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is
not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may
be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice
and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent
to his profession.50 (Emphasis supplied.)1awphi1
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent
should have done was either to advise complainant to engage the services of
another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or
to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as
counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that
would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of
interest.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,51 we explained the concept of conflict of interest,
thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be
called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.52
Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainant’s hapless situation,
initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and
properties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressed upon complainant
that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the
properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But
simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her
clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to
reclaim the money they invested with Multitel. Respondent herself admitted
to complainant that without the latter’s help, she would not have been able to
earn as much and that, as a token of her appreciation, she was willing to
share some of her earnings with complainant.53Clearly, respondent’s act is
shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,54 but also toyed with decency and good taste.
Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever
complained of respondent’s unethical behavior.55 This remark indubitably
displays respondent’s gross ignorance of disciplinary procedure in the Bar.
As a member of the Bar, she is expected to know that proceedings for
disciplinary actions against any lawyer may be initiated and prosecuted by
the IBP Board of Governors, motu proprio or upon referral by this Court or by
the Board of Officers of an IBP Chapter56 even if no private individual files
any administrative complaint.
Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
recommendations of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the
IBP Board of Governors, on the admissibility of the electronic evidence
submitted by complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the same in toto.
Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors to disbar her on the grounds of deceit, malpractice and other
gross misconduct, aside from violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, has been
rendered moot and academic by voluntary termination of her IBP
membership, allegedly after she had been placed under the Department of
Justice’s Witness Protection Program.57 Convenient as it may be for
respondent to sever her membership in the integrated bar, this Court cannot
allow her to do so without resolving first this administrative case against her. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
JR. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is
necessary in order to determine the degree of her culpability and liability to
complainant. The case may not be dismissed or rendered moot and TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION*
academic by respondent’s act of voluntarily terminating her membership in CASTRO
Associate Justice
the Bar regardless of the reason for doing so. This is because membership in Associate Justice
the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.58 The conduct of a lawyer
may make him or her civilly, if not criminally, liable to his client or to third DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
parties, and such liability may be conveniently avoided if this Court were to Associate Justice Associate Justice
allow voluntary termination of membership. Hence, to terminate one’s
membership in the Bar voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer first prove
that the voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to further prejudice
the public or to evade liability. No such proof exists in the present case.
Footnotes
WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby
DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for engaging in * On official leave.
unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyer’s Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility. 1 Rollo, pp. 1-45.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent’s record as a 2
member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar Id. at 8.
of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
3 Id. at 1 and 622.
to all courts in the country.

4 Id. at 13; Annex "B."

SO ORDERED.

5 Id. at 376; 554.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
6 Id.

CONSUELO YNARES- 7 Id. at 13.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice 8 Id. at 10-12; Annex "A."

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA 9 Id. at 2.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
10 Id. at 554.
CONCHITA CARPIO
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
MORALES 11 Id. at 377.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
12 Id. at 554.
13 Id. at 3 and 14; Annex "C." 34 Id. at 49-213.

14 Id. at 3 and 19; Annex "F." 35 Id. at 50.

15 Id. 36 Id. at 51.

16 Id. at 3-4 and 20-24; Annexes "G," "H," and "I." 37Rule 2.02 of Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
reads in full:
17 Id. at 20-24; Annexes "H" and "I."
Rule 2.02 – In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a
18 Id. at 6 and 555. case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person
concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter’s
19 rights.
Id. at 6 and 24; Annex "I."
38 Id. at 235-237.
20 Id. at 4, 15 and 554; Annex "D."
39 Id. at 215-238.
21 Id. at 5, 16-17 and 554; Annex "E."
40 Id. at 550-566.
22 Id. at 20; Annex "G."
41 Id. at 567-576.
23 Id. at 6.
42 Id. at 618.
24 Id.
43Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, 579 (1949) cited in Quiambao v.
25 Id. at 360; Exhibit "33."
Bamba, A.C. No. 6708, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 1, 9-10.
26 Id. at 7. 44 US v. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500 (1912).
27 Id. at 27; Annex "K." 45 Hilado v. David, supra note 43.
28 Id. at 28-30; Annex "L." 46 Maturan v. Gonzales, 350 Phil. 882, 887 (1998).
29 Id. at 31-32; Annex "M." 47 Rollo, p. 50.
30 Id. at 32. 48 Id. at 51.
31 Id. at 33-39; Annex "N." 49 Id. at 49.
32 Id. 50 Id. at 629.
33 Id. at 1-45. 51 453 Phil. 108 (2003).
52 Id. at 111-112.
53 Id. at 6, 38-39
54
Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides in full:
Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a
fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice
law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or
associate that, upon the latter’s death, money shall be paid
over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the
persons specified in the agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal
business of a deceased lawyer; or
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court of
Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly
charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court;
Provided, further, That charges filed against Justices and
Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their
appointment in the Judiciary, shall immediately be forwarded
to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication.
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the
Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapters
who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of
Governors for assignment to an investigator.
57 Rollo, pp. 577-584.
58St. Loius University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty
and Staff v. Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz A.C. No. 6010, August 28,
2006.

c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer

employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in
whole or in part, on a profit-sharing arrangement.

55 Rollo, pp. 66-67; respondent’s Answer-Affidavit.

56Section 1 of Rule 139-B on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

provides in full:

SECTION 1. How instituted. – Proceedings for disbarment,

suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.
The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits or
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said
facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu prorprio or upon

referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of
Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against any erring attorneys
including those in the government service; Provided,
however, That all charges against Justices of the Court of

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 2040 March 4, 1998
IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates
back to the '50s during their school days in De La Salle and the Philippine
Law School. Their closeness extended to their families and respondent
became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in
Moran Street, Baguio City.1 For lack of funds, he requested respondent to
purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent would
keep the property in trust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back.
Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank
(in the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase
and renovate the property. Title was then issued in respondent's name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose
Nakpil died on July 8, 1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel and
accountant of his widow, complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976,
respondent's law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the
proceeding for the settlement of Jose's estate. Complainant was appointed
as administratrix of the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate
proceedings. It appears that respondent excluded the Moran property from
the inventory of Jose's estate. On February 13, 1978, respondent transferred
his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by
filing with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for
reconveyance with damages against respondent and his corporation. In
defense, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and
denied that a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this
administrative case to disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent
violated professional ethics when he:
I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property
(Pulong Maulap) which belonged to the estate he was
settling as its lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the "inventory of real
estate properties" he prepared for a client-estate and, at the
same time, charged the loan secured to purchase the said
excluded property as a liability of the estate, all for the
purpose of transferring the title to the said property to his
family corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the
estate that retained him as its counsel and auditor.2
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondent's offer
to serve as lawyer and auditor to settle her husband's estate. Respondent's
law firm then filed a petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased
Nakpil but did not include the Moran property in the estate's inventory.
Instead, respondent transferred the property to his corporation, Caval Realty
Corporation, and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused
respondent of maliciously appropriating the property in trust knowing that it
did not belong to him. She claimed that respondent has expressly
acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil in his
correspondences3 with the Baguio City Treasurer and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondent's auditing firm
(C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the inventory
of her husband's estate, yet included in the claims against the estate the
amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which respondent represented as
her husband's loans applied "probably for the purchase of a house and lot in
Moran Street, Baguio City."
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondent's law firm (Carlos
J. Valdes and Associates) filed the petition for the settlement of her
husband's estate in court, while respondent's auditing firm (C.J. Valdes &
Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of both the estate and two of its creditors.
She claimed that respondent represented conflicting interests when his
accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and
ENORN, Inc. against her husband's estate which was represented by
respondent's law firm. Complainant averred that there is no distinction
between respondent's law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior and
controlling partner of both firms which are housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In his
ANSWER, 4 respondent initially asserted that the resolution of the first and
second charges against him depended on the result of the pending action in
the CFI for reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership of the Moran
property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the
reconveyance case that he did not hold the Moran property in trust for the
Nakpils as he is its absolute owner. Respondent explained that the Nakpils
never bought back the Moran property from him, hence, the property
remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the inventory of Nakpil's
estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims
against the estate which included his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00
for the purchase and renovation of the Moran property. In charging his loans
against the estate, he stressed that the list drawn up by his accounting firm
merely stated that the loans in respondent's name were applied "probably for
the purchase of the house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City." Respondent
insisted that this was not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property
as the phrase "probably for the purchase" did not imply a consummated
transaction but a projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter
(Exhibit "H") of his accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the
real estate taxes for the Moran property on behalf of the Nakpils. He
contended that the letter could be a mere error or oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did
not own the Moran property for: (1) complainant's February 1979 Statement
of Assets and Liabilities did not include the said property, and; (2)
complainant, as administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of the Estate where
the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and
accounting firms in the settlement of her husband's estate.5 However, he
pointed out that he has resigned from his law and accounting firms as early
as 1974. He alleged that it was Atty. Percival Cendaña (from the law firm
Carlos Valdes & Associates) who filed the intestate proceedings in court in
1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest
when his law firm represented the estate in the intestate proceedings while
his accounting firm (C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) served as accountant of the
estate and prepared the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc.
against the estate. He proffered the following reasons for his thesis: First, the
two claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc.
is a family corporation of the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the
President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the late Nakpil who, upon the
latter's death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These two claimants
had been clients of his law and accounting firms even during the lifetime of
Jose Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of conflicting interests
was with the knowledge and consent of complainant as administratrix. Third,
there was no conflict of interests between the estate and the claimants
for they had forged a modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would be
satisfied only after full payment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant,
as administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN,
Inc. Complainant has started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil and
ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the banks' claims. Complainant did not assert
that their claims caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the work of Carlos
J. Valdes & Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for
the firm prepared a true and accurate amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent
resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974.6 He
rejoined his accounting firm several years later. He submitted as proof the
SEC's certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an Amended Articles
of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaña, from the firm
Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court.
On the other hand, the claimants were represented by their own counsel
Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent alleged that in the remote
possibility that he committed a breach of professional ethics, he committed
such "misconduct" not as a lawyer but as an accountant who acted as
common auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be held
accountable in another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY.7 She maintained
that the pendency of the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the
investigation of her disbarment complaint against respondent for the issue in
the latter is not the ownership of the Moran property but the ethics and
morality of respondent's conduct as a CPA-lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondent's Annexes to his Reply (such as the
Statement of Assets & Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the
Estate) which showed that complainant did not claim ownership of the Moran
property were all prepared by C.J. Valdes & Co. as accountant of the estate
of Jose Nakpil and filed with the intestate court by C.J. Valdes & Associates
as counsel for the estate. She averred that these Annexes were not proofs
that respondent owned the Moran property but were part of respondent's
scheme to remove the property from the estate and transfer it to his family
corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the documents because of
the professional counsel of respondent and his firm that her signature
thereon was required. Complainant charged respondent with greed for
coveting the Moran property on the basis of defects in the documents he
himself prepared..
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents
(the list of claims against the estate and the letter regarding Nakpil's payment
of realty tax on the Moran property) which were prepared by his law and
accounting firms and invoke other documents prepared by the same firms
which are favorable to him. She averred that respondent must accept
responsibility not just for some, but for all the representations and
communications of his firms.
Complainant refuted respondent's claim that he resigned from his firms from
March 9, 1976 to "several years later." She alleged that none of the
documents submitted as evidence referred to his resignation from his law
firm.The documents merely substantiated his resignation from his accounting
firm.
In his REJOINDER,8 respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him
liable for representing the interests of both the estate and the claimants
without showing that his action prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is
not per se anomalous for respondent's accounting firm to act
as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He reiterated that he is not
subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as
accountant for both the estate and its claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the
creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by
his accounting or law firm but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law
firm did not oppose these claims as they were legitimate and not because
they were prepared by his accounting firm. He emphasized that there was no
allegation that the claims were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of
respondent's law firm to object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,9 we deferred further action on the
disbarment case until after resolution of the action for reconveyance between
the parties involving the issue of ownership by the then CFI of Baguio.
Complainant moved for reconsideration on the ground that the issue of
ownership pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her complaint which
involved an entirely different issue, i.e., the unethical acts of respondent as a
CPA-lawyer. We granted her motion and referred the administrative case to
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and
recommendation. 10
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial
court ruled that respondent held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils
but found that complainant waived her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate
court held that respondent was the absolute owner of the Moran property.
The Decision was elevated to this Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainant's appeal to this
Court, the OSG submitted its Report 11on the disbarment complaint. The
OSG relied heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals then pending
review by this Court. The OSG found that respondent was not put on notice
of complainant's claim over the property. It opined that there was no trust
agreement created over the property and that respondent was the absolute
owner thereof. Thus, it upheld respondent's right to transfer title to his family
corporation. It also found no conflict of interests as the claimants were
related to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it
involves the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting
profession and law practice in connection with the property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business
transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. 12 The
measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his
dealings with his client is a much higher standard than is required in business
dealings where the parties trade at "arms length." 13 Business transactions
between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the
policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure
that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on
public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to
take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no
presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an
attorney's favor. 14
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its
Report. These findings were based mainly on the decision of the Court
of Appeals in the action for reconveyance which was reversed by this Court
in 1993. 15
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court
in the aforementioned reconveyance case. 16 It is well-established that
respondent offered to the complainant the services of his law and accounting
firms by reason of their close relationship dating as far back as the '50s. She
reposed her complete trust in respondent who was the lawyer, accountant
and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil
agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in
trust for the latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed
absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell the property to
complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the
reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later transferred it
to his corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and
respected the trust nature of the Moran property. Respondent's bad faith in
transferring the property to his family corporation is well discussed in this
Court's Decision,17 thus:
. . . Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust
during the lifetime of the late Jose Nakpil. On the contrary,
he expressly recognized it. . . . (H)e repudiated the trust
when (he) excluded Pulong Maulap from the list of properties
of the late Jose Nakpil submitted to the intestate court in
1973. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by
the parties . . . can be bolstered by Exh. "I-2," an annex to
the claim filed against the estate proceedings of the late
Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel Nakpil, which was
prepared by Carlos J. Valdes & Co., the accounting firm of
herein respondent. Exhibit "I-2," which is a list of the
application of the proceeds of various FUB loans contracted
as of 31 December 1973 by the late Jose Nakpil, . . .
contains the two (2) loans contracted in the name of
respondent. If ownership of Pulong Maulap was already
transferred or ceded to Valdes, these loans should not have
been included in the list.
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to
under the arrangement outlined in Exh. "J" was that
respondent Valdes would . . . "take over the total loan of
P140,000.00 and pay all of the interests due on the notes"
while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would continue to live
in the disputed property for five (5) years without
remuneration save for regular maintenance expenses. This
does not mean, however, that if at the end of the five-year
period petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his
advances, . . . Valdes could already automatically assume
ownership ofPulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of
respondents Carlos J. Valdes and Caval Realty Corporation
was to proceed against the estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil
and/or the property itself." (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainant's
documentary evidence (Exhibits "H", "J" and "L"), which she also adduced in
this administrative case, should estop respondent from claiming that he
bought the Moran property for himself, and not merely in trust for Jose
Nakpil. 18
It ought to follow that respondent's act of excluding the Moran property from
the estate which his law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the
cause of his client. If respondent truly believed that the said property
belonged to him, he should have at least informed complainant of his
adverse claim. If they could not agree on its ownership, respondent should
have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead of
transferring the property to his own corporation and concealing it from
complainant and the judge in the estate proceedings. Respondent's misuse
of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly
unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged
the two loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after
said loans were obtained by respondent for the purchase and renovation of
the property which he claimed for himself. Respondent seeks to exculpate
himself from this charge by disclaiming knowledge or privity in the
preparation of the list of the estate's liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion
of the loans must have been a mere error or oversight of his accounting firm.
It is clear that the information as to how these two loans should be treated
could have only come from respondent himself as the said loans were in his
name. Hence, the supposed error of the accounting firm in charging
respondent's loans against the estate could not have been committed without
respondent's participation. Respondent wanted to "have his cake and eat it
too" and subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain.
Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his client's cause and enjoins
him to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that
an attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to
represent both sides of an issue. 19 The proscription against representation of
conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests arise with
respect to the same general matter 20 and is applicable however slight such
adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorney's intentions and
motives were honest and he acted in good faith. 21 However, representation
of conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent to the
representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough
for the clients must give their informed consent to such representation. The
lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of the conflict and the
possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his clients. 22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and
that of its creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firm
prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time,
computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict
between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the
two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance,
respondent's law firm questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against
the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in
the intestate proceedings. He points out that it was one Atty. Percival
Cendaña, from his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the
intestate case in court. However, the fact that he did not personally file the
case and appear in court is beside the point. As established in the records of
this case and in the reconveyance case, 23 respondent acted as counsel and
accountant of complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondent's
defense that he resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974
(or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is unworthy of merit.
Respondent's claim of resignation from his law firm is not supported by any
documentary proof. The documents on record 24 only show respondent's
resignation from his accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these
documents reveal that respondent returned to his accounting firm on July 1,
1976 and as of 1978, the intestate proceedings for the settlement of Jose's
estate had not yet been terminated. It does not escape us that when
respondent transferred the Moran property to his corporation on February 13,
1978, the intestate proceedings was still pending in court. Thus, the
succession of events shows that respondent could not have been totally
ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes
& Associates was the legal counsel of the estate 25 and his accounting firm,
C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was the auditor of both the estate and the two
claimants against it. 26 The fact, however, that complainant, as administratrix,
did not object to the set-up cannot be taken against her as there is nothing in
the records to show that respondent or his law firm explained the legal
situation and its consequences to complainant. Thus, her silence regarding
the arrangement does not amount to an acquiescence based on an informed
consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not
negate the conflict of interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate,
his interest is per se adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed out by
complainant, if she had a claim against her husband's estate, her claim is still
adverse and must be filed in the intestate proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law
firm in a position where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the
estate proceedings, the duty of respondent's law firm was to contest the
claims of these two creditors but which claims were prepared by
respondent's accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not
prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine
whether there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not
certainty of conflict. It was respondent's duty to inhibit either of his firms from
said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of
interest, he could not be charged before this Court as his alleged
"misconduct" pertains to his accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing
both professions. He is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms
which carry his name. In the case at bar, complainant is not charging
respondent with breach of ethics for being the common accountant of the
estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm to
represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law
firm to represent the estate in the proceedings where these claims were
presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics and undesirable as it
placed respondent's and his law firm's loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even
granting that respondent's misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it
would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. 27 Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite
to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of
law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and (Rollo, at p. 76) and the SEC certification that the letter of
improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine resignation was duly presented to said body (Rollo, at p. 77).
his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in
the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to 7 Rollo, pp. 137-155.
always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly 8 Rollo, pp. 182-197.
fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.28 In the case
at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his 9 Ibid., p. 200.
clients. 29
10 See Resolution, dated July 18, 1984; Rollo, at p. 305.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J.
VALDES guilty of misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a 11 Rollo, pp. 306-342.
period of one (1) year effective from receipt of this Decision, with a warning
that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future. 12 7 C.J.S. 966.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated 13 Gould v. State, 69 ALR 709.
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
14 5 Am. Jur. 338.
SO ORDERED.
15 Nakpil v. IAC, 225 SCRA 456.
Regalado, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.
16 Ibid.
Melo, J., took no part.
17 Nakpil v. IAC, supra.
Footnotes
18 Ibid., at p. 465.
1 The Moran property consists of a four-bedroom bungalow
on a 2,490 square meter lot. 19 7A C.J.S. 206-209, citing U.S. — Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corporation vs. Daniel Intern Corporation, C.A.
2 Letter-complaint, dated June 16, 1979; Rollo, pp. 1-9. Ga., 563.

3 Exhibits "H", "J" and "L", adduced also in the 20 Md. — Rippon vs. Mercantile Safe Deposit & T. Co. of
reconveyance case. Baltimore, 131 A. 2d 695, 699, 213 Md. 215.

4 Rollo, pp. 44-63.
5 Attached to his Answer is the retainership agreement,
dated February 20, 1976, between complainant and his
firms; Rollo, pp. 73-75.
6 He attached to his Answer his letter of resignation
addressed to the managing partner of his accounting firm
21 U.S. — Cinema 5 Ltd. vs. Cinerama, Inc., C.A.N.Y., 528
F. 2d 1384.
22 7A C.J.S. 215-216; Pa. — Jedwabny vs. Philadelphia
Transport Co., 135 A.2d 252, 390 Pa. 231; 78 S. Ct. 557,
355 U.S. 966, 2 L. Ed. 2d 541.
23 Nakpil vs. IAC, supra, at p. 458.
24 Amendment to Amended Articles of Partnership of
respondent's accounting firm which contains the following
information: (a) on July 17, 1973, a week after Jose Nakpil
died, the SEC approved the recall of respondent's
withdrawal from his accounting firm in 1972; see Rollo, at pp.
80-81; (b) on August 31, 1974, respondent resigned again
from his accounting firm; see Respondent's letter of
resignation from his accounting firm, dated August 15,
1974; Rollo, at p. 76; (c) On July 1, 1976, barely three
months after the filing of the intestate case in court,
respondent rejoined the accounting firm; Rollo, at p. 89. All
the foregoing documents refer to respondent's resignation
from his accounting firm. Moreover, it appears from the
records that as of 1978, the intestate case was still pending
in court.

25 Rollo, at p. 60.

26 Ibid., at p. 59.

27 Nadayag vs. Grageda, 237 SCRA 202 [1994].

28 Igual vs. Javier, 254 SCRA 416 [1996].

29 Canon 15, Code of Professional Responsibility.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BIDIN, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine
National Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst.
Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of complainant bank with
violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thus:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service.
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with
complainant bank in which respondent during his employment with aforesaid
bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he
participated in arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M
and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the
gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of
Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man
Division Compound. When a civil action arose out of this transaction between
Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the employ of
complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative
case filed by complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel
Elefan, for grave misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as
counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil Service
Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of
complainant’s Asset Management Group, he intervened in the handling of
the loan account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with
complainant bank by writing demand letters to the couple. When a civil action
ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a result of
this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer,
Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as
counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending
appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the
litigation of the case before the trial court. With respect to the case of the
Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that he never appeared as counsel for
them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo &
Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually handled
only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into a
general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named
therein. They are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm
maintained by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one office as
well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own
cases independently and individually receives the revenues therefrom which
are not shared among them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and
recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that
respondent was previously fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in
connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador
Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel
for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo
and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully
substantiated. Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of
the Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the
light of the attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in
one of the hearings of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the
same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not enter his
appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and
argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the application for
a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly admitted being the
partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that respondent was
working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true,
it is in itself a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule
15.02) since the client’s secrets and confidential records and information are
exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of
respondent to devise ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers
of complainant bank since he was in the best position to see the legal
weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor for the said clients to
seek his professional service. In sum, the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by
respondent of his ethics in consideration of the money he expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice
of law for 3 years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on
October 4, 1994, submitted to this Court its Report and recommendation in
this case, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated October 25,
1994 of the recommendation contained in the said Report with the IBP Board
of Governors. On December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another "Motion
to Set Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration.
In resolving this case, the Court took into consideration the aforesaid
pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion
appropriate to emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding the
representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case of Pasay Law and
Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal
Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who participated in the investigation
of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on acted as counsel
for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court, citing Nombrado
vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no
reason to disagree with him, that even if respondent did not
use against his client any information or evidence acquired
by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become
privy to information regarding the ownership of the parcel of
land which was later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it
was the dispute over the land that triggered the mauling
incident which gave rise to the criminal action for physical
injuries. This Court's remarks in Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil.
571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great
number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of
entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-known
facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of
dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the
nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of
the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent
utilized against his former client information given to him in a
professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous
relationship should have precluded him from appearing as
counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case. In the
case ofHilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further said:
Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare
relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not
alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent
conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. . . . It is
founded on principles of public policy, of good taste. As has
been said in another case, the question is not necessarily
one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's
wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double
dealing. Only thus can litigants. be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and
effect to respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of
complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the
opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction
which he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation
of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse influence and
conflicting interests, to wit:

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except

by express conflicting consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon,
a lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on
one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY.

TELESFORO S. CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS,
effective immediately.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts in Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo,

Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 77439 August 24, 1989
DONALD DEE petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMELITO MUTUC, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta & Tanjuatco for petitioner.
Amelito R. Mutuc for and in his own behalf
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner assails the resolution of respondent court, dated February
12,1987, reinstating its decision promulgated on May 9, 1986 in AC-G.R. CV
No. 04242 wherein it affirmed the decision of the that court holding that the
services rendered by private respondent was on a professional, and not on
a gratis et amore basis and ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the
sum of P50,000.00 as the balance of the latter's legal fee therefor.
The records show that sometime in January, 1981, petitioner and his father
went to the residence of private respondent, accompanied by the latter's
cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness
of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar's Palace, a well-known
gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. Petitioner's father was
apprehensive over the safety of his son, Dewey, having heard of a link
between the mafia and Caesar's Palace and the possibility that his son may
be harmed at the instance of the latter. 1
Private respondent assured petitioner and his father that he would inquire
into the matter, after which his services were reportedly contracted for
P100,000. 00. From his residence, private respondent called up Caesar's
Palace and, thereafter, several long distance telephone calls and two trips to
Las Vegas by him elicited the information that Dewey Dee's outstanding
account was around $1,000,000.00. Further investigations, however,
revealed that said account had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with
Dewey Dee merely signing for the chits. Private respondent communicated
said information to petitioner's a father and also assured him that Caesar's
Palace was not in any way linked to the mafia. 2
In June, 1981, private respondent personally talked with the president of
Caesar's Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada. He advised the president that for the
sake and in the interest of the casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy
answer for the indebtedness. The president told him that if he could convince
Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey Dee would be exculpated
from liability for the account. Upon private respondent's return to Manila, he
conferred with Ramon Sy and the latter was convinced to acknowledge the
indebtedness. In August, 1981, private respondent brought to Caesar's
Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt and asking for a discount.
Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was cleared and the casino never
bothered him. 3
Having thus settled the account of petitioner's brother, private respondent
sent several demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. Petitioner, however, ignored said letters. On
October 4, 1982, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch CXXXVI, for the collection of
attorney's fees and refund of transport fare and other expenses. 4
Private respondent claimed that petitioner formally engaged his services for a
fee of P100,000.00 and that the services he rendered were professional
services which a lawyer renders to a client. Petitioner, however, denied the
existence of any professional relationship of attorney and client between him
and private respondent. He admits that he and his father visited private
respondent for advice on the matter of Dewey Dee's gambling account.
However, he insists that such visit was merely an informal one and that
private respondent had not been specifically contracted to handle the
problem. On the contrary, respondent Mutuc had allegedly volunteered his
services "as a friend of defendant's family" to see what he could do about the
situation. As for the P50,000.00 inceptively given to private respondent,
petitioner claims that it was not in the nature of attomey's fees but merely
"pocket money" solicited by the former for his trips to Las Vegas and the said
amount of P50,000.00 was already sufficient remuneration for his strictly
voluntary services.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering herein petitioner to
pay private respondent the sum of P50,000.00 with interest thereon at the
legal rate from the filing of the complaint on October 4, 1982 and to pay the
costs. All other claims therein of private respondent and the counterclaim of
petitioner were dismissed. 5 On appeal, said judgment was affirmed by the
then Intermediate Appellate Court on May 9, 1986. 6
Petitioner, in due time, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
Appellate Court overlooked two important and decisive factors, to wit: (1) At
the time private respondent was ostensibly rendering services to petitioner
and his father, he was actually working "in the interest" and "to the
advantage" of Caesar's Palace of which he was an agent and a consultant,
hence the interests of the casino and private respondent were united in their
objective to collect from the debtor; and (2) Private respondent is not justified
in claiming that he rendered legal services to petitioner and his father in view
of the conflicting interests involved.
In its resolution of July 31, 1986, respondent court reconsidered its decision
and held that the sum of P50,000.00 already paid by petitioner to private
respondent was commensurate to the services he rendered, considering that
at the time he was acting as counsel for petitioner he was also acting as the
collecting agent and consultant of, and receiving compensation from,
Caesar's Palace. 7 However, upon a motion for reconsideration thereafter
filed by private respondent, the present respondent Court of Appeals issued
another resolution, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating the aforesaid
decision of May 9, 1986. 8
Petitioner is now before us seeking a writ of certiorari to overturn the latter
resolution.
It is necessary, however, to first clear the air of the questions arising from the
change of stand of the First Civil Cases Division of the former Intermediate
Appellate Court when, acting on the representations in petitioner's undated
motion for reconsideration supposedly filed on May 28,1986, it promulgated
its July 31, 1986 resolution reconsidering the decision it had rendered in AC-
G.R. CV No. 04242. Said resolution was, as earlier noted, set aside by the
Twelfth Division of the reorganized Court of Appeals which, at the same time,
reinstated the aforesaid decision.
Because of its clarificatory relevance to some issues belatedly raised by
petitioner, which issues should have been disregarded 9 but were
nevertheless auspiciously discussed therein, at the risk of seeming prolixity
we quote hereunder the salient portions of the assailed resolution which
demonstrate that it was not conceived in error.
The reason for then IAC's action is that it deemed the
P50,000.00 plaintiff-appellee had previously received from
defendant-appellant as adequate compensation for the
services rendered by am for defendant-appellant,
considering that at the time plaintiff-appellee was acting as
counsel for defendant-appellant, he was also acting as the
collecting agent and consultant of, and receiving
compensation from Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas, Nevada,
the entity with whom defendant-appellant was having a
problem and for which he had engaged the services of
plaintiff-appellee. The crux of the matter, therefore, is
whether or not the evidence on record justifies this finding of
the IAC.
Plaintiff-appellee maintains that his professional services to
defendant-appellant were rendered between the months of
July and September of 1981, while his employment as
collection agent and consultant of Caesar's Palace covered
the period from December 1981 to October 1982. This
positive testimony of plaintiff-appellee, however, was
disregarded by the IAC for the following reasons:
1. In August l983, plaintiff-appellee testified that he was a
representative of Caesar's Palace in the Philippines 'about
two or three years ago.' From this the IAC concluded that the
period covers the time plaintiff-appellee rendered
professional services to defendant-appellant.
We do not think that IAC's conclusion is necessarily correct.
When plaintiff-appellee gave the period 'about two or three
years ago,' he was merely stating an approximation.
Considering that plaintiff-appellee was testifying in August
1983, and his employment with Caesar's Palace began in
December 1981, the stated difference of two years is
relatively correct. . . .
2. The plaintiff appellee had testified that he was working for
the sake,' 'in the interest,' and 'to the advantage' of Caesar's
Palace. x x x "We detect nothing from the above which
would support IAC's conclusion that plaintiff-appellee was
then in the employ of Caesar's Palace. What is gathered is
that plaintiff-appellee was simply fulfilling a condition which
plaintiff-appellee had proposed to, and was accepted by,
Caesar's Palace, for the release of Dewey Dee from his
obligation to Caesar's Palace.
3. Caesar's Palace would not have listened to, and acted
upon, the advice of plaintiff-appellee if he were no longer its
consultant and alter ego.
Why not? We are witnesses to many successful negotiations
between contending parties whose representing lawyers
 were not and were never in the employ of the opposite party.
The art of negotiation is precisely one of the essential tools
of a good practitioner, and mastery of the art takes into
account the circumstance that one may be negotiating,
among others, with a person who may not only be a
complete stranger but antagonistic as well. The fact that
plaintiff-appellee was able to secure a favorable concession
from Caesar's Palace for defendant-appellant does not
justify the conclusion that it could have been secured only
because of plaintiff-appellee's professional relationship with
Caesar's Palace. It could have been attributable more to
plaintiff-appellee's stature as a former ambassador of the
Philippines to the United States, his personality, and his
negotiating technique.
Assuming, however, that plaintiff-appellee was employed by
Caesar's Palace during the time that he was rendering
professional services for defendant-appellant, this would not
automatically mean the denial of additional attorney's fees to
plaintiff appellee. The main reason why the IAC denied
plaintiff-appellee additional compensation was because the
latter was allegedly receiving compensation from Caesar's
Palace, and, therefore, the amount of P50,000.00 plaintiff-
appellee had previously received from defendant-appellant is
'reasonable and commensurate. This conclusion, however,
can only be justified if the fact and amount of remuneration
had been established. These were not proven at all. No
proof was presented as to the nature of plaintiff-appellee's
remuneration, and the mode or manner in which it was paid..
. . 10
Both the lower court and the appellate court concur in their findings that there
was a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and private respondent
Mutuc. We find no reason to interfere with this factual finding. There may be
instances when there is doubt as to whether an attorney-client relationship
has been created. The issue may be raised in the trial court, but once the
trial court and the Court of Appeals have found that there was such a
relationship the Supreme Court cannot disturb such finding of fact, 11 absent
cogent reasons therefor.
The puerile claim is advanced that there was no attorney-client relationship
between petitioner and private respondent for lack of a written contract to
that effect. The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that
there was a professional relationship which merits attorney's fees for
professional services rendered. Documentary formalism is not an essential
element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or
implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to
his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the
attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a request from
the latter. 12
There is no question that professional services were actually rendered by
private respondent to petitioner and his family. Through his efforts, the
account of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, with Caesar's Palace was
assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and his family were further freed from
the apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even killed by the so-
called mafia. For such services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably entitled to
receive a reasonable compensation and this right cannot be concluded by
petitioner's pretension that at the time private respondent rendered such
services to petitioner and his family, the former was also the Philippine
consultant of Caesar's Palace.
On the first aspect, the evidence of record shows that the services of
respondent Mutuc were engaged by the petitioner for the purposes
hereinbefore discussed. The previous partial payments totalling P50,000.00
made by petitioner to respondent Mutuc and the tenor of the demand letters
sent by said private respondent to petitioner, the receipt thereof being
acknowledged by petitioner, ineluctably prove three facts, viz: that petitioner
hired the services of private respondent Mutuc; that there was a prior
agreement as to the amount of attorney's fees to be given to the latter; and
there was still a balance due and payable on said fees. The duplicate original
copy of the initial receipt issued and signed in this connection by private
respondent reads:
RECEIVED from Mr. Donald Dee, for professional services
rendered, the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) as partial payment, leaving a balance of
SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00), payable on
demand.
Makati, Metro Manila, July 25,1981. 13
Thereafter, several demand letters for payment of his fees, dated August 6,
1981, December 2, 1981, January 29, 1982, March 7, 1982, and September
7, 1982 were sent by private respondent to petitioner, 14 all to no avail.
On the second objection, aside from the facts stated in the aforequoted
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, it is also not completely accurate
to judge private respondent's position by petitioner's assumption that the
interests of Caesar's Palace were adverse to those of Dewey Dee. True, the
casino was a creditor but that fact was not contested or opposed by Dewey SO ORDERED.
Dee, since the latter, as verifications revealed, was not the debtor. Hence,
private respondent's representations in behalf of petitioner were not in Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
resistance to the casino's claim but were actually geared toward proving that
fact by establishing the liability of the true debtor, Ramon Sy, from whom
payment was ultimately and correctly exacted. 15
Footnotes
Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests obtained, private
respondent's role therein was not ethically or legally indefensible. Generally,
an attorney is prohibited from representing parties with contending positions. 1 Petition, 4 Rollo, 9.
However, at a certain stage of the controversy before it reaches the court, a
lawyer may represent conflicting interests with the consent of the parties. 16 A 2 Rollo, 9-10, 21-22.
common representation may work to the advantage of said parties since a
mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and impartially cognizant of the 3 Rollo, 10.
parties' disparate positions, may well be better situated to work out an
acceptable settlement of their differences, being free of partisan inclinations 4 Civil Case No. 1736 (47992): Original Record, 1-4.
and acting with the cooperation and confidence of said parties.
5 Judge Ricardo J. Francisco, presiding: Original Record,
Here, even indulging petitioner in his theory that private respondent was 127-132.
during the period in question an agent of Caesar's Palace, petitioner was not
unaware thereof, hence he actually consented to and cannot now decry the
6 Penned by Presiding Justice Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr.,
dual representation that he postulates. This knowledge he admits, thus:
Justices Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa and Leonor Ines
Luciano concurring; First Civil Cases Division.
It is a fair question to ask why, of all the lawyers in the land,
it was the private respondent who was singled out by the
7 Penned, likewise, by Presiding Justice Gaviola, Jr., with
petitioner's father for consultation in regard to an apparent
the concurrence of Justices Quetulio-Losa and Luciano of
problem, then pending in Caesar's Palace. The testimony of
the same Division.
Arthur Alejandrino, cousin to private respondent, and the
admission of the private respondent himself supply the
answer. Alejandrino testified that private respondent was the 8 Justice Luis A. Javellana, ponente, with whom concurred
representative of Caesar's Palace in the Philippines (p. 23, Justices Pedro A. Ramirez and Cecilio L. Pe Twelfth
t.s.n., Nov. 29, 1983).lâwphî1.ñèt Private respondent Division.
testified that he was such representative tasked by the
casino to collect the gambling losses incurred by Filipinos in 9 Sec. 18, Rule 46 and Sec. 7, Rule 51, Rules of Court; De
Las Vegas. (p. 5, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1983). 17 la Santa vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 140 SCRA 44 (1985);
Dihiansan et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.. 153 SCRA 712
A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable (1987).
compensation for services rendered at the special instance and request of
his client and as long as he is honestly and in good faith trying to serve and 10 Rollo, 52-55.
represent the interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his just fees. 18
11 Vda. de Reyes vs. Court of Appeals et al., 116 SCRA 607
WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated (1982).
February 12,1987, reinstating its original decision of May 9, 1986 is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against l petitioner.
12 See C.J.S., 848-849, and Hirach Bros. & Co. vs. R.E.
Kennington Co., 88 A.L.R 1, as cited in Hilado vs. Gutierrez
David, et al., 84 Phil. 569 (1949).

13 Exhibit S, Folder of Exhibits. While objected to as self-

serving (Original Record, 102), the authenticity and due
execution of this document was not definitively denied by
petitioner in his testimony (TSN, Nov. 21, 1983, 20-21).

14 Exhibits B, D, E, F, and G, Ibid.

15 Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, then in

force, provides; "Within the meaning of this canon a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client,
it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose."

16 Canon 6, Id.

17 Memorandum of Petitioner, 5; Rollo, 88.

18 De Guzman vs. Visayan Rapid Transit Co., Inc. et al., 68

Phil. 643 (1939).