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AGUSTIN VS EDU personal liberty or property in order to promote the
Generally Accepted Principles of International Law –
Police Power
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He
is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229
which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning
devices particularly to equip them with a pair of
“reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin
is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh,
cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars
are already equipped with blinking lights which is
already enough to provide warning to other motorists.
And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set
of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and
would only make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not
an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car
owners whose cars are already equipped with 1)
‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor
vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside
motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front
and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted
two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said
1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under
adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters,
any motorist from this country or from any part of the
world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early
warning device installed on the roads, highways or
expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that
somewhere along the travelled portion of that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which
is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or
endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a
motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other
built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not
immediately get adequate advance warning because
he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it
an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is
it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the
mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than
decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the
exercise of the police power. That is conceded by
petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is
the submission of the former, however, that while
embraced in such a category, it has offended against
the due process and equal protection safeguards of the
Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned
only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the
police power which was originally identified by Chief
Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an
1847 decision, as “nothing more or less than the
powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty” was stressed in the aforementioned
case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first
leading decision after the Constitution came into force,
Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
general welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of
the state. Shortly after independence in 1948,
Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as ‘the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth in
negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-
Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ In
that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted
by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of
legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest
and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to
quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential,
insistent, and at least illimitable powers,’ extending as
Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the great public
needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In
the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were
narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in
the present with the well-being of the nation. What is
critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police
power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and
far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that
men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably
the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to
insure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare.”
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by
Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular
police power measure challenged was clearly intended
to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence
indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or
executive act of that character. None has been called
to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent.
The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the
validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived
with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found
nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which
was: “To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstruction on roads and streets designated as
national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the first law
sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner
failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the
imperative demands of public safety.
Issue: Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No.
229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued
is unconstitutional
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of
the petition. The statutes in question are deemed not
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unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise
of police power as such was established to promote
public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of
instruction is based on the constitutional provision of
adopting to the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. The
letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and
basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention
on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on
traffic safety by the United Nations - that such letter
was issued in consideration of a growing number of
road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on
the streets and highways.
KURODA VS JALANDONI
83 Phil. 171 – Political Law – Generally Accepted
Principles of International Law
Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese
officer stationed in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation. He was then charged before the Military
Commission, headed by Major General Rafael
Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that were done against
non combatant civilians and prisoners during the war.
His trial was in pursuant to Executive Order No. 68
which established the National War Crimes Office and
prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of
accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the
legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not
provided for in the Constitution. He further underscores
the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the
Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations
Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose
against him any criminal charges because it has no
laws to base on, national or international.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in
Philippine courts?
HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the
Philippine courts can take cognizance of the case at
bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional
provision that states “the Philippines renounces war as
an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the nation.” The Hague Convention
and other similar conventions whose principles are
generally accepted are hence considered as part of the
law of the land.
Issue: Whether or not the established Military
Commission is legal and constitutional.
Held: The court ruled that the Military Commission
was legal and constitutional base on the citation of
Article II, Section 3 of the Philippine Constitution
declaring that “the Philippine adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the nation”.
The court ruled that in accordance with the generally
accepted principles of international law of the present
day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva
Convention, and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United
Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who
had been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a
war of aggression and of the commission of crimes
and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in
violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity
and civilization, were held accountable therefore.
Although the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them, our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope
and is not confined to the recognition of rules and
principles of international law as contained in treaties
to which our government may have been or shall be a
signatory. Consequently, in the promulgation and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President
of the Philippines had acted in conformity with the
generally accepted principles and policies of
international law which are part of our Constitution.
REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN
The PCGG cannot vote sequestered shares to elect
the ETPI Board of Directors or to amend the Articles of
Incorporation for the purpose of increasing the
authorized capital stock unless there is a prima facie
evidence showing that said shares are ill-gotten and
there is an imminent danger of dissipation.
Two sets of board and officers of Eastern
Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) were
elected, one by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) and the other by the registered
ETPI stockholders. Victor Africa, a stockholder of ETPI
filed a petition for Certiorari before the Sandiganbayan
alleging that the PCGG had been “illegally exercising
the rights of stockholders of ETPI,” in the election of the
members of the board of directors. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that only the registered owners,
their duly authorized representatives or their proxies
may vote their corresponding shares. The PCGG filed
a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
before the Court which was granted. The Court
referred the PCGG’s petition to hold the special
stockholders’ meeting to the Sandiganbayan for
reception of evidence and resolution. The
Sandiganbayan granted the PCGG “authority to cause
the holding of a special stockholders’ meeting of ETPI
and held that there was an urgent necessity to increase
ETPI’s authorized capital stock; there existed a prima
facie factual foundation for the issuance of the writ of
sequestration covering the Class “A” shares of stock;
and the PCGG was entitled to vote the sequestered
shares of stock. The PCGG-controlled ETPI board of
directors held a meeting and the increase in ETPI’s
authorized capital stock from P250 Million to P2.6
Billion was “unanimously approved”. Africa filed a
motion to nullify the stockholders meeting, contending
that only the Court, and not the Sandiganbayan, has
the power to authorize the PCGG to call a stockholders
meeting and vote the sequestered shares. The
Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration
of prompting Africa to file before the Court a second
petition, challenging the Sandiganbayan Resolutions
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authorizing the holding of a stockholders meeting and
the one denying the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in ordering the holding of a
stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI board of
directors without first setting in place, through
the amendment of the articles of incorporation and the
by-laws of ETPI 2. Whether the PCGG can vote the
sequestered ETPI Class “A” shares in the stockholders
meeting for the election of the board of directors.
HELD:
First Issue : On the PCGG’s imputation of grave abuse
of discretion upon the Sandiganbayan for ordering the
holding of a stockholders meeting to elect the
ETPI board of directors without first setting in place,
through the amendment of the articles of incorporation
and the by-laws of ETPI, the safeguards prescribed in
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Roxas. The Court laid down those
safeguards because of the obvious need to reconcile
the rights of the stockholder whose shares have been
sequestered and the duty of the conservator to
preserve what could be ill-gotten wealth. There is
nothing in the Cojuangco case that would suggest that
the above measures should be incorporated in the
articles and by-laws before stockholders meeting for
the election of the board of directors is held. The
PCGG nonetheless insists that those measures should
be written in the articles and by-laws before such
meeting, “otherwise, the {Marcos] cronies will elect
themselves or their representatives, control the
corporation, and for an appreciable period of time,
have every opportunity to disburse funds, destroy or
alter corporate records, and dissipate assets.” That
could be a possibility, but the peculiar circumstances of
the case require that the election of the board of
directors first be held before the articles of
incorporation are amended. Section 16 of the
Corporation Code requires the majority vote of
the board of directors to amend the articles of
incorporation. At the time Africa filed his motion for the
holding of the annual stockholders meeting, there were
two sets of ETPI directors, one controlled by the PCGG
and the other by the registered stockholders. Which of
them is the legitimate board of directors? Which of
them may rightfully vote to amend the articles of
incorporation and integrate the safeguards laid down in
Cojuangco? It is essential, therefore, to cure
the aberration of two boards of directors sitting in a
single corporation before the articles of incorporation
are amended to set in place the Cojuangco
safeguards. The danger of the so-called Marcos
cronies taking control of the corporation and dissipating
its assets is, of course, a legitimate concern of the
PCGG, charged as it is with the duties of a conservator.
Nevertheless, such danger may be averted by the
“substantially contemporaneous” amendment of the
articles after the election of the board.
Second Issue: The principle laid down in Baseco vs.
PCGG was further enhanced in the subsequent cases
of Cojuangco v. Calpo and Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Cojuangco, Jr., where the Court
developed a “two-tiered” test in determining whether
the PCGG may vote sequestered shares. The issue of
whether PCGG may vote the sequestered shares in
SMC necessitates a determination of at least two
factual matters: a.) whether there is prima facie
evidence showing that the said shares are ill-gotten
and thus belong to the state; and b.) whether there is
an immediate danger of dissipation thus necessitating
their continued sequestration and voting by the PCGG
while the main issue pends with the Sandiganbayan.
The two-tiered test, however, does not apply in cases
involving funds of “public character.” In such cases, the
government is granted the authority to vote said
shares, namely: (1) Where government shares are
taken over by private persons or entities who/which
registered them in their own names, and (2) Where
the capitalization or shares that were acquired with
public funds somehow landed in private hands. In
short, when sequestered shares registered in the
names of private individuals or entities are alleged to
have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-
tiered test is applied. However, when the sequestered
shares in the name of private individuals or entities are
shown, prima facie, to have been (1) originally
government shares, or (2) purchased with public funds
or those affected with public interest, then the two-
tiered test does not apply. The rule in the jurisdiction is,
therefore, clear. The PCGG cannot perform acts of
strict ownership of sequestered property. It is a mere
conservator. It may not vote the shares in a corporation
and elect members of the board of directors. The only
conceivable exception is in a case of a takeover of a
business belonging to the government or
whose capitalization comes from public funds, but
which landed in private hands as in BASECO. In short,
the Sandiganbayan held that the public character
exception does not apply, in which case it should have
proceeded to apply the two-tiered test. This it failed to
do. The questions thus remain if there is prima facie
evidence showing that the subject shares are ill- gotten
and if there is imminent danger of dissipation. The
Court is not, however, a trier of facts, hence, it is not in
a position to rule on the correctness of the PCGG’s
contention. Consequently, the issue must be
remanded to the Sandiganbayan for resolution.
TANADA VS ANGARA
Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the
Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the
concurrence of herein respondents acting in their
capacities as Senators via signing the said
agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially
its major trading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and
industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities
for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated
with exporting and more investment in the country.
These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the
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agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators,
a “free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO
agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair
Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative
power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution
was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading
intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its
concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state
policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity ,
with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered automatically
part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda –
international agreements must be performed in good
faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but
creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in
fact and reality be considered as absolute because it
is a regulation of commercial relations among nations.
Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations
(UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under
the “concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What
Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to
determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or
viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and
review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a
legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of
membership should this be the political desire of a
member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation
of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only
viable structure for multilateral trading and the
veritable forum for the development of international
trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not
economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be
allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their
free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RAMON GONZALES VS RUFINO HECHANOVA
9 SCRA 230 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Treaty vs Executive Agreements – Statutes Can
Repeal Executive Agreements
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he
entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam
and Burma for the importation of rice without complying
with the requisite of securing a certification from the
National Economic Council showing that there is a
shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive
Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the
importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the
detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then
president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association assailed the executive agreements.
Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because
Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and
corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2
executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function
of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter,
except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not
defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the
status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through
an executive agreement providing for the performance
of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of
conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which
is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable
to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but,
also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not
treaties. No such justification can be given as regards
executive agreements not authorized by previous
legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional
set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an
international agreement may be invalidated by our
courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the
Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the
rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
or executive order or regulation is in question”. In other
words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental
law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congress.
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE
ASSOCIATION VS DUQUE
Facts: Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR)
of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR
is not valid as it contains provisions that are not
constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to
implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory
Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on
Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk
Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11
of the Int’l Code of Marketing and Breastmilk
Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World
Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA
also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be
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ensured that nutrition and health claims are not And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .
permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH
issued the assailed RIRR. These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH
and respondents are prohibited from implementing
Issue: said provisions.
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent int’l agreements entered
into by the Phil are part of the law of the land and may
be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N
the RIRR is in accord with int’l agreements

MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in
violation of the Constitution by promulgating the RIRR.

Held:

Sub-issue: Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, int’l

law can become domestic law by transformation (thru
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or
incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e
treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not
treaties as they have not been concurred by 2/3 of all
members of the Senate as required under Sec, 21, Art
8. However, the ICBMS had been transformed into
domestic law through a local legislation such as the
Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim
reproduction of ICBMS.

No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH

failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA
resolutions are customary int’l law that may be deemed
part of the law of the land. For an int’l rule to be
considered as customary law, it must be established
that such rule is being followed by states because they
consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules
(opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although signed
by most of the member states, were enforced or
practiced by at least a majority of member states.
Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of
the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA
Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive
breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24
Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk
substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law
nor are they followed in our country as well. The
Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their
babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be
classified as SOFT LAW – non-binding norms,
principles and practices that influence state behavior.
Soft law is not part of int’l law.

Main issue: Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in

consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec. 4(f) -
>advertising, promotions of formula are prohibited,

Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk

substitutes intended for infants and young children uo
to 24 months