Case Digest in Labor Law
(Patterned in the Course Outline of Atty. Charisma I. Nolasco)
APPRENCTICE, LEARNER, DISABLED WORKERS; REQUIREMENTS OF
AN INVALID AGREEMENT
Century Canning Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 152894, August 17, 2007
Facts: On 15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation hired Palad as
“fish cleaner” at petitioner’s tuna and sardines factory. Palad signed
on 17 July 1997 an apprenticeship agreement with petitioner. On 25
July 1997, petitioner submitted its apprenticeship program for
approval to the TESDA, which it approved on September 26, 1997.
According to petitioner, a performance evaluation was conducted
where petitioner gave Palad a rating of N.I. or “needs improvement”
since she scored only 27.75% based on a 100% performance
indicator. Furthermore, according to the performance evaluation,
Palad incurred numerous tardiness and absences. As a consequence,
petitioner issued a termination notice to Palad. The latter then filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and non-
payment of pro-rated 13th month pay for the year 1997.
L.A.: The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but
ordered petitioner to pay Palad her last salary and her pro-rated
13th month pay.
NLRC: On appeal, the NLRC affirmed with modification the Labor
Arbiter’s decision with additional pay of complainant’s backwages
for two (2) months.
Upon denial of Palad’s motion for reconsideration, Palad filed a
special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
CA: The CA set aside the NLRC decision finding the dismissal illegal.
The CA held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed
was not valid and binding because it was executed more than two
months before the TESDA approved petitioner’s apprenticeship
program.
The CA also held that petitioner illegally dismissed Palad. It ruled
that petitioner failed to show that Palad was properly apprised of
the required standard of performance.
Issues: Whether the apprenticeship agreement is valid.
Ruling: No. Republic Act No. 7796 (RA 7796), which created the
TESDA, has transferred the authority over apprenticeship programs
from the Bureau of Local Employment of the DOLE to the TESDA. RA
7796 emphasizes TESDA’s approval of the apprenticeship program
as a prerequisite for the hiring of apprentices.
In this case, the apprenticeship agreement was entered into
between the parties before petitioner filed its apprenticeship
program with the TESDA for approval. Petitioner and Palad executed
the apprenticeship agreement on 17 July 1997 wherein it was stated
that the training would start on 17 July 1997 and would end
approximately in December 1997. On 25 July 1997, petitioner
submitted for approval its apprenticeship program, which the TESDA
subsequently approved on 26 September 1997. Clearly, the
apprenticeship agreement was enforced even before the TESDA
approved petitioner’s apprenticeship program. Thus, the
apprenticeship agreement is void because it lacked prior approval
from the TESDA.
The TESDA’s approval of the employer’s apprenticeship program is
required before the employer is allowed to hire apprentices. Prior
Nina Sarah P. Pineda, JD 3-1
approval from the TESDA is necessary to ensure that only employers
in the highly technical industries may employ apprentices and only in
apprenticeable occupations. Thus, under RA 7796, employers can
only hire apprentices for apprenticeable occupations which must be
officially endorsed by a tripartite body and approved for
apprenticeship by the TESDA. This is to ensure the protection of
apprentices and to obviate possible abuses by prospective
employers who may want to take advantage of the lower wage rates
for apprentices and circumvent the right of the employees to be
secure in their employment.
The requisite TESDA approval of the apprenticeship program prior to
the hiring of apprentices was further emphasized by the DOLE with
the issuance of Department Order No. 68-04 on 18 August 2004.
Department Order No. 68-04, which provides the guidelines in the
implementation of the Apprenticeship and Employment Program of
the government, specifically states that no enterprise shall be
allowed to hire apprentices unless its apprenticeship program is
registered and approved by TESDA.
Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the
apprenticeship agreement was enforced before the TESDA’s
approval of petitioner’s apprenticeship program, Palad is deemed a
regular employee performing the job of a "fish cleaner." Clearly, the
job of a "fish cleaner" is necessary in petitioner’s business as a tuna
and sardines factory. Under Article 280 of the Labor Code, an
employment is deemed regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
Atlanta Industries, Inc. vs. Sebolino, G.R. No. 187320, January 26,
2011
Facts: Complainants Aprilito R. Sebolino, et al., filed several
complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization, underpayment,
nonpayment of wages and other money claims, against Atlanta and
its President and Chief Operating Officer Robert Chan. Atlanta is a
domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel pipes.
The complainants alleged that they had attained regular status as
they were allowed to work with Atlanta for more than six (6) months
from the start of a purported apprenticeship agreement between
them and the company. They claimed that they were illegally
dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement expired.
In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers were not
entitled to regularization and to their money claims because they
were engaged as apprentices under a government-approved
apprenticeship program. The company offered to hire them as
regular employees in the event vacancies for regular positions occur
in the section of the plant where they had trained. They also claimed
that their names did not appear in the list of employees (Master List)
prior to their engagement as apprentices.
L.A.: Labor Arbiter Medroso dismissed the complaint with respect to
dela Cruz, Magalang, Zaño and Chiong, but found the termination of
service of the remaining nine to be illegal.
NLRC: rendered a decision modifying the ruling of the LA
withdrawing the illegal dismissal finding with respect to Sebolino
and 3 others.
CA: The CA granted the relief sought by Sebolino et al ruling that
they were already employees of the company before they entered
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(Patterned in the Course Outline of Atty. Charisma I. Nolasco)
into the first and second apprenticeship Agreements. That the first
and second apprenticeship agreements were defective as they were
executed in violation of the law and the rules. The agreements did
not indicate the trade or occupation in which the apprentice would
be trained; neither was the apprenticeship program approved by the
TESDA.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in holding that respondents were
employed by Atlanta before they were engaged as apprentices and
that a second apprenticeship agreement is invalid.
Ruling: No, the CA committed no reversible error.
The fact that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already
rendering service to the company when they were made to undergo
apprenticeship renders the apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as
far as the four are concerned. This reality is highlighted by the CA
finding that the respondents occupied positions such as machine
operator, scaleman and extruder operator - tasks that are usually
necessary and desirable in Atlanta’s usual business or trade as
manufacturer of plastic building materials. These tasks and their
nature characterized the four as regular employees under Article
280 of the Labor Code. Thus, when they were dismissed without just
or authorized cause, without notice, and without the opportunity to
be heard, their dismissal was illegal under the law.
Even if we recognize the company’s need to train its employees
through apprenticeship, we can only consider the first
apprenticeship agreement for the purpose. With the expiration of
the first agreement and the retention of the employees, Atlanta had,
to all intents and purposes, recognized the completion of their
training and their acquisition of a regular employee status. To foist
upon them the second apprenticeship agreement for a second skill
which was not even mentioned in the agreement itself, is a violation
of the Labor Code’s implementing rules and is an act manifestly
unfair to the employees, to say the least. This we cannot allow.
TOPIC: CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT; TEST OF
MANAGERIAL/SUPERVISORY STATUS
Clientologic Philippines, Inc. vs. Castro, G.R. No. 186070, April 11,
2011
Facts: Respondent was employed by petitioner ClientLogic
Philippines, Inc. (now known and shall hereafter be referred to as
SITEL) as a call center agent for its Bell South Account. After six (6)
months, he was promoted to the “Mentor” position, and thereafter
to the “Coach” position. A “Coach” is a team supervisor who is in
charge of dealing with customer complaints which cannot be
resolved by call center agents. In June 2006, he was transferred to
the Dot Green Account.
During respondent’s stint at the Dot Green Account, respondent
noticed that some of the call center agents under him would often
make excuses to leave their work stations. Their most common
excuse was that they would visit the company’s medical clinic. To
verify that they were not using the clinic as an alibi to cut their work
hours, respondent sent an e-mail to the clinic’s personnel requesting
for the details of the agents’ alleged medical consultation. His
request was denied on the ground that medical records of
employees are highly confidential and can only be disclosed in cases
involving health issues, and not to be used to build any disciplinary
case against them.
Case Digest in Labor Law
Nina Sarah P. Pineda, JD 3-1
On Oct. 2006, respondent received a notice requiring him to explain
why he should not be penalized for: (1) violating Green Dot
Company’s Policy and Procedure for Direct Deposit Bank Info
Request when he accessed a customer’s online account and then
gave the latter’s routing and reference numbers for direct deposit;
and (2) gravely abusing his discretion when he requested for the
medical records of his team members.
Respondent did not deny the infractions imputed against him. He,
however, justified his actuations by explaining that the customer
begged him to access the account because she did not have a
computer or an internet access and that he merely requested for a
patient tracker, not medical records.
On 2007, respondent received a notice of termination. These events
prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter against herein petitioners SITEL and its officers.
LA: ruled in favour of respondent by declaring him illegally dismissed
and ordering petitioners to pay his full backwages and his separation
pay. The LA further awarded respondent’s money claims upon
finding that he was not occupying a managerial position.
NLRC: reversed and set aside the decision of the LA by dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit on the ground that respondent’s
employment was terminated for a just cause. NLRC failed to discuss
the money claims.
CA: affirmed the NLRC’s finding that there was no illegal dismissal.
Anent the money claims, however, the CA concurred with the LA’s
ruling.
Issue: Whether respondent is a supervisor
Ruling: No. Article 82 of the Labor Code states that the provisions of
the Labor Code on working conditions and rest periods shall not
apply to managerial employees. Generally, managerial employees
are not entitled to overtime pay for services rendered in excess of
eight hours a day.
Article 212 (m) of the Labor Code defines a managerial employee as
"one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-
off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively
recommend such managerial actions. Employees are considered
occupying managerial positions if they meet all of the following
conditions, namely:
1. Their primary duty consists of management of the
establishment in which they are employed or of a
department or subdivision thereof;
2. They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or
more employees therein;
3. They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of
lower rank; or their suggestions and recommendations as
to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any
other change of status of other employees are given
particular weight.
They are considered as officers or members of a managerial staff if
they perform the following duties and responsibilities:
1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work
directly related to management of policies of their
employer;
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(Patterned in the Course Outline of Atty. Charisma I. Nolasco)
2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and
independent judgment;
3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial
employee whose primary duty consists of management of
the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision
thereof; or (ii) execute under general supervision work
along specialized or technical lines requiring special
training, experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute, under
general supervision, special assignment and tasks xxx.
(Respondent’s) duties do not fall under any of the categories
enumerated above. His work is not directly related to management
policies. Even the circumstances shown by the instant case reveal
that (respondent) does not regularly exercise discretion and
independent judgment. (Petitioners) submitted a list of the
responsibilities of "HR Manager/Supervisor" and "Division
Manager/Department Manager/Supervisors" but these do not
pertain to (respondent) who does not have any of the said positions.
He was just a team Supervisor and not (an) HR or Department
Supervisor.
The test of "supervisory" or "managerial status" depends on
whether a person possesses authority to act in the interest of his
employer and whether such authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
The position held by respondent and its concomitant duties failed to
hurdle this test.
As a coach or team supervisor, respondent’s main duty was to deal
with customer complaints which could not be handled or solved by
call center agents. If the members of his team could not meet the
needs of a customer, they passed the customer’s call to respondent.
This job description does not indicate that respondent can exercise
the powers and prerogatives equivalent to managerial actions which
require the customary use of independent judgment. There is no
showing that he was actually conferred or was actually exercising
the following duties attributable to a "member of the managerial
staff," viz.:
1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work
directly related to management of policies of their
employer;
2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and
independent judgment;
3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial
employee whose primary duty consists of management of
the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision
thereof; or (ii) execute under general supervision work
along specialized or technical lines requiring special
training, experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute, under
general supervision, special assignment and tasks; and
4) Who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours
worked in a workweek to activities which are not directly
and closely related to the performance of the work
described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) above.
According to petitioners, respondent also performed the following
duties, as shown in the company’s Statement of Policy on Discipline:
a. Know and understand in full the Policy on Discipline
including their underlying reasons.
b. Implement strictly and consistently the Policy on
Discipline.
c. Ensure that the said Policy on Discipline is communicated
to and understood by all employees.
d. Monitor compliance by employees with the said Policy.
e. Advise HR Manager on the state of discipline in their
respective departments; problems, if any, and recommend
solution(s) and corrective action(s).
Case Digest in Labor Law
Nina Sarah P. Pineda, JD 3-1
As correctly observed by the CA and the LA, these duties clearly
pertained to "Division Managers/Department Managers/
Supervisors," which respondent was not, as he was merely a team
supervisor. Petitioners themselves described respondent as "the
superior of a call center agent; he heads and guides a specific
number of agents, who form a team."
Cruz vs. BPI, G.R. No. 173357, February 13, 2013
Petitioner was hired by Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) in
1989. Upon the merger of FEBTC with respondent Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) in April 2000, petitioner automatically
became an employee of respondent. Petitioner held the position of
Assistant Branch Manager of the BPI Ayala Avenue Branch in Makati
City, and she was in charge of the Trading Section. On April 19, 2002,
BPI Vice-President Edwin S. Ragos issued a memorandum directing
petitioner to explain within 24 hours the unauthorized pre-
terminations/withdrawals of US dollar deposits at the BPI Ayala
Avenue Branch. In petitioner's reply, she asserted that she followed
the bank procedure/policy on pre-termination of accounts, opening
of transitory accounts and reactivation of dormant accounts.
Moreover, petitioner stated that at the time the alleged fraudulent
transactions took place, she was not yet an Assistant Manager, but
only a Cash II Officer of the branch, still operating under the FEBTC
set-up. After 13 years of continuous service, respondent terminated
petitioner on grounds of gross negligence and breach of trust.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent
and its officers with the Arbitral Office of the NLRC.
LA: ruled that the dismissal was illegal
NLRC: reversed the LA’s decision ruling the dismissal was for a valid
cause
CA: affirmed the NLRC decision.
Issue: Whether Cruz is a manager
Ruling: Yes. The test of "supervisory" or "managerial status"
depends on whether a person possesses authority to act in the
interest of his employer and whether such authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment.
In respondent's Position Paper before the NLRC and its
Memorandum, respondent stated that the responsibility of
petitioner, among others, were as follows: (1) to maintain the
integrity of the signature card files of certificates of deposits and/or
detect spurious signature cards in the same files; (2) to ensure that
releases of original CDS are done only against valid considerations
and made only to the legitimate depositors or their duly authorized
representatives; (3) to approve payments or withdrawals of deposits
by clients to ensure that such withdrawals are valid transactions of
the bank; and (4) to supervise the performance of certain rank-and-
file employees of the branch.
Petitioner holds a managerial status since she is tasked to act in the
interest of her employer as she exercises independent judgment
when she approves pre-termination of USD CDs or the withdrawal of
deposits. In fact, petitioner admitted the exercise of independent
judgment when she explained that as regards the pre-termination of
the USD CDs of Uymatiao and Caluag, the transactions were
approved on the basis of her independent judgment that the
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(Patterned in the Course Outline of Atty. Charisma I. Nolasco)
signatures in all the documents presented to her by the traders
matched, as shown in her reply dated April 23, 2002 to respondent's
memorandum asking her to explain the unauthorized
preterminations/withdrawals of U.S. dollar deposits in the BPI Ayala
Avenue Branch
TOPIC: FIELD PERSONNEL; ACTUAL HOURS OF WORK CANNOT BE
DETERMINED WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY
Mercidar Fishing Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 112574, October 8, 1998
Facts: This case originated from a complaint filed by Agao against
petitioner for illegal dismissal, violation of P.D. No. 851, and non-
payment of five days SIL. Private respondent had been employed as
a “bodegero” or ship’s quartermaster. He complained that he had
been constructively dismissed by petitioner when the latter refused
him assignments aboard its boats. Private respondent alleged that
he had been sick and thus allowed to go on leave without pay for
one month but that when he reported to work at the end of such
period with a health clearance, he was told to come back another
time as he could not be reinstated immediately. Thereafter,
petitioner refused to give him work.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that it was private respondent
who actually abandoned his work. It claimed that the latter failed to
report for work after his leave had expired and was, in fact, absent
without leave for three months .
L.A.: rendered a decision ordering respondents to
reinstate complainant with backwages, pay him his 13th month pay
and incentive leave pay.
NLRC: Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which dismissed the appeal
for lack of merit. The NLRC dismissed petitioner’s claim that it
cannot be held liable for SIL pay by fishermen in its employ as the
latter supposedly are “field personnel” and thus not entitled to such
pay under the Labor Code.
Issue: Whether Agao is a field employee
Ruling: No, Agao is NOT a field employee, hence, he is entitled to
SIL pay
Art. 82 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 82. Coverage. — The provisions of this Title [Working Conditions
and Rest Periods] shall apply to employees in all establishments and
undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to government
employees, field personnel, members of the family of the employer
who are dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in
the personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results
as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
“Field personnel” shall refer to non-agricultural employees who
regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of
business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of
work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
Petitioner argues essentially that since the work of private
respondent is performed away from its principal place of business, it
has no way of verifying his actual hours of work on the vessel. It
contends that private respondent and other fishermen in its employ
should be classified as “field personnel” who have no statutory right
to SIL pay.
Case Digest in Labor Law
Nina Sarah P. Pineda, JD 3-1
In the case of Union of Pilipro Employees (UFE) v. Vicar, this Court
explained the meaning of the phrase “whose actual hours of work in
the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty” in Art. 82
of the Labor Code, as follows:
Moreover, the requirement that “actual hours of work in the field
cannot be determined with reasonable certainty” must be read in
conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules which
provides:
Rule IV Holidays with Pay
Sec. 1. Coverage — This rule shall apply to all employees except:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and
performance is unsupervised by the employer . . .
Petitioner in said case is contending that such rule added another
element not found in the law. Contrary to the contention of the
petitioner, the Court finds that the aforementioned rule did not
add another element to the Labor Code definition of field
personnel. The clause “whose time and performance is
unsupervised by the employer” did not amplify but merely
interpreted and expounded the clause “whose actual hours of
work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable
certainty.” The former clause is still within the scope and purview of
Article 82 which defines field personnel. Hence, in deciding whether
or not an employee’s actual working hours in the field can be
determined with reasonable certainty, query must be made as to
whether or not such employee’s time and performance is
constantly supervised by the employer.
In the case at bar, during the entire course of their fishing voyage,
fishermen employed by petitioner have no choice but to remain on
board its vessel. Although they perform non-agricultural work away
from petitioner’s business offices, the fact remains that
throughout the duration of their work they are under the effective
control and supervision of petitioner through the vessel’s patron or
master as the NLRC correctly held.
ILARIO DASCO v. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES
INC/CENTURION SOLANO, GR No. 211141, Jun 29, 2016
Facts: Dasco filed a complaint for regulatization, underpayment of
wages, non-payment of service incentive leave (SIL) pay against
Philtranco. The petitioners were employed by the respondents as
bus drivers and/or conductors with travel routes of Manila (Pasay) to
Bicol, Visayas and Mindanao, and vice versa. the petitioners filed a
case against the respondents alleging that they cannot be
considered as field personnel because their working hours are
controlled by the respondents from dispatching to end point and
their travel time is monitored and measured by the distance because
they are in the business of servicing passengers where time is of the
essence.
In response, the respondents asserted that the petitioners are
seasonal employees since their contracts are for a fixed period and
their employment was dependent on the exigency of the
extraordinary public demand for more buses during peak months of
the year; and (3) the petitioners are not entitled to overtime pay and
SIL pay because they are field personnel whose time outside the
company premises cannot be determined with reasonable certainty
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(Patterned in the Course Outline of Atty. Charisma I. Nolasco)
since they ply provincial routes and are left alone in the field
unsupervised.
LA: rendered a decision in favour of Philtranco but declared the
petitioners as regular employees. The LA also found that the
petitioners are not entitled to holiday pay and SIL pay because they
are considered as field personnel.
NLRC: modified the LA’s decision holding that the petitioners are not
field personnel considering that they ply specific routes with fixed
time schedules determined by the respondents; thus, they are
entitled to minimum wage, SIL pay, and overtime benefits.
CA: reversed and set aside the NLRC rulings and reinstated the LA's
decision. The CA considered the petitioners as field workers.
According to the CA, there was no way for the respondents to
supervise the petitioners on their job. The petitioners are practically
on their own in plying the routes in the field, as in fact, they can
deviate from the fixed routes, take short cuts, make detours, and
take breaks, among others. The petitioners work time and
performance are not constantly supervised by the respondents, thus
making them field personnel.
Issue: Whetherthe petitioners as bus drivers and/or conductors are
field personnel
Ruling: No, they are not field personnel but a regular employee.The
determination of whether bus drivers and/or conductors are
considered as field personnel was already threshed out in the case
of Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Bautista,[30] where the Court
explained that:
As a general rule, [field personnel] are those whose performance of
their job/service is not supervised by the employer or his
representative, the workplace being away from the principal office
and whose hours and days of work cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific amount for
rendering specific service or performing specific work. If required to
be at specific places at specific times, employees including drivers
cannot be said to be field personnel despite the fact that they are
performing work away from the principal office of the employee, x x
x payment of service incentive leave pay and non-payment of 13th
x x x At this point, it is necessary to stress that the definition of a
"field personnel" is not merely concerned with the location where
the employee regularly performs his duties but also with the fact
that the employee's performance is unsupervised by the employer.
As discussed above, field personnel are those who regularly perform
their duties away from the principal place of business of the
employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty. Thus, in order to conclude
whether an employee is a field employee, it is also necessary to
ascertain if actual hours of work in the field can be determined with
reasonable certainty by the employer. In so doing, an inquiry must
be made as to whether or not the employee's time and performance
are constantly supervised by the employer.
the NLRC properly concluded that the petitioners are not field
personnel but regular employees who perform tasks usually
necessary and desirable to the respondents' business. Evidently, the
petitioners are not field personnel as defined above and the NLRC's
finding in this regard is supported by the established facts of this
Case Digest in Labor Law
Nina Sarah P. Pineda, JD 3-1
case: (1) the petitioners, as bus drivers and/or conductors, are
directed to transport their passengers at a specified time and place;
(2) they are not given the discretion to select and contract with
prospective passengers; (3) their actual work hours could be
determined with reasonable certainty, as well as their average trips
per month; and (4) the respondents supervised their time and
performance of duties.
In order to monitor their drivers and/or conductors, as well as the
passengers and the bus itself, the bus companies put checkers, who
are assigned at tactical places along the travel routes that are plied
by their buses. The drivers and/or conductors are required to be at
the specific bus terminals at a specified time. In addition, there are
always dispatchers in each and every bus terminal, who supervise
and ensure prompt departure at specified times and arrival at the
estimated proper time. Obviously, these drivers and/or conductors
cannot be considered as field personnel because they are under the
control and constant supervision of the bus companies while in the
performance of their work.
The Court agrees with the above-quoted findings of the NLRC.
Clearly, the petitioners, as bus drivers and/or conductors, are left
alone in the field with the duty to comply with the conditions of the
respondents' franchise, as well as to take proper care and custody of
the bus they are using. Since the respondents are engaged in the
public utility business, the petitioners, as bus drivers and/or
conductors, should be considered as regular employees of the
respondents because they perform tasks which are directly and
necessarily connected with the respondents' business. Thus, they
are consequently entitled to the benefits accorded to regular
employees of the respondents, including overtime pay and SIL pay.
TOPIC: DOMESTIC SERVANTS/PERSONS IN THE PERSONAL SERVICE
OF ANOTHER
Remington Industrial vs. Castañeda, G.R. No. 169295-96, November
20, 2006
Facts: Erlinda instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime services, non-
month pay against Remington before the NLRC.
She alleged that she started working in August 1983 as company
cook for Remington, that she worked for six (6) days a week, starting
as early as 6:00 a.m. because she had to do the marketing and would
end at around 5:30 p.m., or even later, after most of the employees,
if not all, had left the company premises; that she continuously
worked with Remington until she was unceremoniously prevented
from reporting for work when Remington transferred to a new site
in Edsa, Caloocan City. She averred that she reported for work at the
new site in Caloocan City on January 15, 1998, only to be informed
that Remington no longer needed her services.
Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It posited that
Erlinda was a domestic helper, not a regular employee; Erlinda
worked as a cook and this job had nothing to do with Remington’s
business.
L.A.: In a Decision, the LA dismissed the complaint and ruled that the
respondent was a domestic helper. finding that her work as a cook
was not usually necessary and desirable in the ordinary course of
trade and business of the petitioner corporation, and that the latter
did not exercise control over her functions.
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(Patterned in the Course Outline of Atty. Charisma I. Nolasco)
NLRC: Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA’s ruling as there was
no allegation by Remington that Erlinda had ever worked in the
residence of Mr. Tan. What is clear is that Erlinda continuously did
her job as a cook in the office of Remington serving the needed food
for lunch and merienda of the employees. Thus, her work as cook
inured not for the benefit of the family members of Mr. Tan but
solely for the individual employees of respondent. It is even
bolstered by the certification issued by the corporation of the
company certifying that Erlinda is their bonafide employee. While
the petition was pending with the CA, the NLRC rendered another
decision increasing the award of retirement pay due the
complainant.
CA: CA dismissed the consolidated petitions of Remington for lack of
merit finding no GAD on the part of NLRC. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Erlinda is a domestic helper.
Ruling: No. Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code,
as amended, the terms "househelper" or "domestic servant" are
defined as follows:
"The term ‘househelper’ as used herein is synonymous to the term
‘domestic servant’ and shall refer to any person, whether male or
female, who renders services in and about the employer’s home and
which services are usually necessary or desirable for the
maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to
the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family."
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or
domestic servant who is employed in the employer’s home to
minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the
employer’s family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic
servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and similar
househelps.
The criteria are the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family
of the employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true
that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or
laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar
in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former
instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter
case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged
in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit,
service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises
of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are
employees of the company or employer in the business concerned
entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic
servant is assigned to certain aspects of the business of the
employer that such househelper or domestic servant may be
considered as such an employee. The Court finds no merit in making
any such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or
domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of
the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business,
as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and
employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or
domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular
employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper
or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book
3 of the Labor Code, as amended.
In the case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in its position paper
that respondent worked at the company premises and her duty was
to cook and prepare its employees’ lunch and merienda. Clearly, the
situs, as well as the nature of respondent’s work as a cook, who
caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and his family but also to
Case Digest in Labor Law
Nina Sarah P. Pineda, JD 3-1
that of the petitioner’s employees, makes her fall squarely within
the definition of a regular employee under the doctrine enunciated
in the Apex Mining case. That she works within company premises,
and that she does not cater exclusively to the personal comfort of
Mr. Tan and his family, is reflective of the existence of the
petitioner’s right of control over her functions, which is the primary
indicator of the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
Moreover, it is wrong to say that if the work is not directly related to
the employer's business, then the person performing such work
could not be considered an employee of the latter. The
determination of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship is defined by law according to the facts of each case,
regardless of the nature of the activities involved. Indeed, it would
be the height of injustice if we were to hold that despite the fact
that respondent was made to cook lunch and merienda for the
petitioner’s employees, which work ultimately redounded to the
benefit of the petitioner corporation, she was merely a domestic
worker of the family of Mr. Tan.
We note the findings of the NLRC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
that no less than the company’s corporate secretary has certified
that respondent is a bonafide company employee; she had a fixed
schedule and routine of work and was paid a monthly salary of
P4,000.00; she served with the company for 15 years starting in
1983, buying and cooking food served to company employees at
lunch and merienda, and that this service was a regular feature of
employment with the company.
TOPIC: WORKERS PAID BY RESULTS; CATEGORIES
Lambo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 111042, October 26, 1999
Facts: Lambo and Belocura were employed as tailors by J.C. Tailor
Shop and/or Johnny Co in 1985. As in the case of the other 100
employees of private respondents, petitioners were paid on a piece-
work basis, according to the style of suits they made.
In 1989, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for
illegal dismissal and sought recovery of overtime pay, holiday pay,
premium pay on holiday and rest day, SIL pay, separation pay, 13th
month pay, and attorney’s fees.
LA: found private respondents guilty of illegal dismissal
NLRC: reversed the decision of the LA. It found that petitioners had
not been dismissed from employment but merely threatened with a
closure of the business if they insisted on their demand for a
“straight payment of their minimum wage,” after petitioners, in
1989, walked out of a meeting with private respondents and other
employees. According to the NLRC, during that meeting, the
employees voted to maintain the company policy of paying them
according to the volume of work finished. Only petitioners allegedly
insisted that they be paid the minimum wage and other
benefits. The NLRC held petitioners guilty of abandonment of work.
Petitioners deny that they abandoned their work.
Issue: Are Lambo and Belocura supervised employees?
Ruling: Yes.
There are two categories of employees paid by results — (1) those
whose time and performance are supervised by the employer, and,
(2) those whose time and performance are unsupervised.
There is no dispute that petitioners were employees of private
respondents although they were paid not on the basis of time spent
on the job but according to the quantity and the quality of work
Page 6 of 14

(Patterned in the Course Outline of Atty. Charisma I. Nolasco)
produced by them. There are two categories of employees paid by
results:
1. Those whose time and performance are supervised by the
employer. (Here, there is an element of control and
supervision over the manner as to how the work is to be
performed. A piece-rate worker belongs to this category
especially if he performs his work in the company
premises.); and
2. Those whose time and performance are unsupervised.
(Here, the employer’s control is over the result of the
work. Workers on pakyao and takay basis belong to this
group.)
Both classes of workers are paid per unit accomplished. Piece-rate
payment is generally practiced in garment factories where work is
done in the company premises, while payment on pakyao and takay
basis is commonly observed in the agricultural industry, such as in
sugar plantations where the work is performed in bulk or in volumes
difficult to quantify. Petitioners belong to the first category, i.e.,
supervised employees.
TOPIC: HOURS OF WORK; COMPENSABLE WORKING HOURS;
PRINCIPLES IN DETERMINING HOURS WORKED; ENGAGED TO WAIT
RULE/IDLE TIME
Luzon Sevedoring Co. vs. Luzon Marine Department Union, G.R.
No. L-6265, April 29, 1957
Facts: Luzon Marine Department Union filed a petition with the
Court of Industrial Relations containing several demands against
Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., among which were the petition for full
recognition of the right of COLLECTIVE bargaining, close shop and
check off. During the pendency of the petition with the CIR, the
union declared a strike which was ruled to be illegal. Hence, the
union filed a Constancia pertaining to the unresolved demands. One
of the unresolved demands is, "That the work performed in excess of
eight (8) hours be paid an overtime pay of 50 per cent the regular
rate of pay, and that work performed on Sundays and legal holidays
be paid double the regular rate of pay."
Trial Court: The demand was denied, employees are only entitled to
receive overtime pay for work rendered in excess of 8 hours on
ordinary days including Sundays and legal holidays.Respondent
Company has proved to the satisfaction of the Court that it has paid
its employees for such overtime work; Company, by the nature of its
business s considered a public service operator by the Public Service
Commission and, therefore, exempt from paying additional
remuneration or compensation for work performed on Sundays and
legal holidays, pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 444.
LMDU filed motion for reconsideration praying that the decision be
modified so as to declare and rule that the members of the Union
who had rendered services from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. were
entitled to 4 hours' overtime pay. Stevedoring on the other hand
also sought for the reconsideration of the decision only in so far as it
interpreted that the period during which a seaman is aboard a
tugboat shall be considered as "working time" for the purpose of the
Eight -Hour-Labor Law, insinuating that although the seamen
concerned stayed in petitioner’s tugboats, or merely within its
compound, for 12 hours, yet their work was not continuous but
interrupted or broken. It has been the consistent stand of petitioner
that while it is true that the workers herein were required to report
for work at 6:00 a.m. and were made to stay up to 6:00 p.m., their
work was not continuous and they could have left the premises of
their working place were it not for the inherent physical impossibility
peculiar to the nature of their duty which prevented them from
Case Digest in Labor Law
Nina Sarah P. Pineda, JD 3-1
leaving the tugboats. It is the Company’s defense that a literal
interpretation of what constitutes non-working hours would result in
absurdity if made to apply to seamen aboard vessels in bays and
rivers.
Court en Banc: the 4 hours of overtime work included i n the
regular daily schedule of work from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. should be
paid independently of the so-called "coffee-money"; Company's
motion for reconsideration was denied.
Court Industrial Relations: he 20 minutes' rest given the claimants
after mealtime should not be deducted from the 4 hours of overtime
worked performed by said claimants
Issue: Is the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to
dryland laborers equally applicable to seamen? Or should a different
criterion be applied by virtue of the fact that the seamen’s
employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition
of work from that of a dryland laborer?
Ruling: Yes. The SC finds no reason to set for seamen a criterion
different from that applied to laborers on land.
We are called upon to make an interpretation of the law on "non-
working hours" that may comprehend within its embrace not only
the non-working hours of laborers employed in land jobs, but also of
that particular group of seamen, i.e., those employed in vessels
plying in rivers and bays, since admittedly there is no need for such
ruling with respect to officers and crew of interisland vessels which
have aboard 2 shifts of said men and strictly follow the 8-hour
working period.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 444, known as the Eight-Hour
Labor Law, provides: “The legal working day for any person
employed by another shall be of not more than eight hours daily.
When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer
is not working AND CAN LEAVE HIS WORKING PLACE and can rest
completely, shall not be counted.”
The requisites contained in this section are further implemented by
contemporary regulations issued by administrative authorities
(Sections 4 and 5 of Chapter III, Article 1, Code of Rules and
Regulations to Implement the Minimum Wage Law).
For the purposes of this case, We do not need to set for seamen a
criterion different from that applied to laborers on land, for under
the provisions of the above quoted section, the only thing to be
done is to determine the meaning and scope of the term "working
place" used therein.
As We understand this term, a laborer need not leave the premises
of the factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not
be counted, it being enough that he "cease to work", may rest
completely and leave or may leave at his will the spot where he
actually stays while working, to go somewhere else, whether within
or outside the premises of said factory, shop or boat. If these
requisites are complied with, the period of such rest shall not be
counted.
In the case at bar, We do not need to look into the nature of the
work of claimant mariners to ascertain the truth of petitioner’s
allegation that this kind of seamen have had enough "free time", a
task of which We are relieved, for although after an ocular
inspection of the working premises of the seamen affected in this
case the trial Judge declared in his decision that the Company gave
the complaining laborers 3 free meals a day with a recess of 20
minutes after each meal, this decision was specifically amended by
the Court en banc in its Resolution of June 6, 1955, wherein it held
Page 7 of 14

(Patterned in the Course Outline of Atty. Charisma I. Nolasco)
that the claimants herein rendered services to the Company from
6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. including Sundays and holidays, which implies
either that said laborers were not given any recess at all, or that they
were not allowed to leave the spot of their working place, or that
they could not rest completely. And such resolution being on a
question essentially of fact, this Court is now precluded to review
the same.
National Development Co. vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-15422, November 30,
1962
Facts: At the National Development Co., a government-owned and
controlled corporation, there were four shifts of work. One shift was
from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., while the three other shifts were from 6 a.m.
to 2 p.m.; then from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. and, finally, from 10 p.m. to 6
a.m. In each shift, there was a one-hour mealtime period, to wit:
From (1) 11 a.m. to 12 noon for those working between 6 a.m. and 2
p.m. and from (2) 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. for those working between 2 p.m.
and 10 p.m. Although there was a one-hour mealtime, NDC
nevertheless credited the workers with eight hours of work for each
shift and paid them for the same number of hours.
However, since 1953, whenever workers in one shift were required
to continue working until the next shift, petitioner instead of
crediting them with eight hours of overtime work, has been paying
them for six hours only. NDC argued that the two hours
corresponding to the mealtime periods should not be included in
computing compensation. On the other hand, National Textile
Workers Union whose members are employed at the NDC,
maintained the opposite view and asked the Court of Industrial
Relations to order the payment of additional overtime pay
corresponding to the mealtime periods.
Issue: Are mealtime breaks considered working time?
Ruling: Yes. The legal working day for any person employed by
another shall be of not more than eight hours daily. When the work
is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working
and can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not be
counted. (Sec. 1, Com. Act No. 444, as amended.)
It will be noted that, under the law, the idle time that an employee
may spend for resting and during which he may leave the spot or
place of work though not the premises of his employer, is not
counted as working time only where the work is broken or is not
continuous. The determination as to whether work is continuous or
not is mainly one of fact which We shall not review as long as the
same is supported by evidence. (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 103, as
amended, Philippine Newspaper Guild v. Evening News, Inc., 86 Phil.
303).
That is why We brushed aside petitioner's contention in one case
that workers who worked under a 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. schedule had
enough "free time" and therefore should not be credited with four
hours of overtime and held that the finding of the CIR "that
claimants herein rendered services to the Company from 6:00 a.m.
to 6:00 p.m. including Sundays and holidays, .
. . implies either that they were not allowed to leave the spot of
their working place, or that they could not rest completely" (Luzon
Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union, et
al., G.R. No. L-9265, April 29, 1957).
Indeed, it has been said that no general rule can be laid down is to
what constitutes compensable work, rather the question is one of
fact depending upon particular circumstances, to be determined by
the controverted in cases. (31 Am. Jurisdiction Sec. 626 pp. 878.)
Case Digest in Labor Law
Nina Sarah P. Pineda, JD 3-1
In this case, the CIR's finding that work in the petitioner company
was continuous and did not permit employees and laborers to rest
completely is not without basis in evidence and following our earlier
rulings, shall not disturb the same. Thus, the CIR found:
While it may be correct to say that it is well-high impossible for an
employee to work while he is eating, yet under Section 1 of Com. Act
No. 444 such a time for eating can be segregated or deducted from
his work, if the same is continuous and the employee can leave his
working place rest completely. The time cards show that the work
was continuous and without interruption. There is also the evidence
adduced by the petitioner that the pertinent employees can freely
leave their working place nor rest completely. There is furthermore
the aspect that during the period covered the computation the work
was on a 24-hour basis and previously stated divided into shifts.
From these facts, the CIR correctly concluded that work in petitioner
company was continuous and therefore the mealtime breaks should
be counted as working time for purposes of overtime compensation.
TOPIC: ON CALL
Sime Darby Philippines, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 119205, April 15,
1998
Facts: Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc., petitioner, is engaged in the
manufacture of automotive tires, tubes and other rubber products.
Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association (ALU-TUCP), private
respondent, is an association of monthly salaried employees of
petitioner at its Marikina factory. Prior to the present controversy,
all company factory workers in Marikina including members of
private respondent union worked from 7:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. with
a 30-minute paid “on call” lunch break.
Petitioner issued a memorandum to all factory-based employees
advising all its monthly salaried employees in its Marikina Tire Plant,
except those in the Warehouse and Quality Assurance Department
working on shifts, a change in work schedule effective 14 September
1992 thus —
TO: ALL FACTORY-BASED EMPLOYEES
RE: NEW WORK SCHEDULE
Effective Monday, September 14, 1992, the new work schedule of
the factory office will be as follows:
7:45 A.M. — 4:45 P.M. (Monday to Friday)
7:45 A.M. — 11:45 A.M. (Saturday).
Coffee break time will be ten minutes only anytime between:
9:30 A.M. — 10:30 A.M. and
2:30 P.M. — 3:30 P.M.
Lunch break will be between:
12:00 NN — 1:00 P.M. (Monday to Friday).
Since private respondent felt affected adversely by the change in the
work schedule and discontinuance of the 30-minute paid “on call”
lunch break, it filed on behalf of its members a complaint with the
Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice, discrimination and evasion
of liability pursuant to the resolution of this Court in Sime Darby
International Tire Co., Inc. v. NLRC. 2However, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the change in the work
schedule and the elimination of the 30-minute paid lunch break of
the factory workers constituted a valid exercise of management
prerogative and that the new work schedule, break time and one-
hour lunch break did not have the effect of diminishing the benefits
granted to factory workers as the working time did not exceed eight
(8) hours.
Page 8 of 14

(Patterned in the Course Outline of Atty. Charisma I. Nolasco)
Private respondent appealed to respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) which sustained the Labor Arbiter
and dismissed the appeal. 4 However, upon motion for
reconsideration by private respondent, the NLRC, this time with two
(2) new commissioners replacing those who earlier retired, reversed
its earlier decision as well as the decision of the Labor Arbiter. 5 The
NLRC considered the decision of this Court in the Sime Darby case
of 1990 as the law of the case wherein petitioner was ordered to
pay “the money value of these covered employees deprived of
lunch and/or working time breaks.” The public respondent declared
that the new work schedule deprived the employees of the benefits
of a time-honored company practice of providing its employees a
30-minute paid lunch break resulting in an unjust diminution of
company privileges prohibited by Art. 100 of the Labor Code, as
amended.
Hence, this petition alleging that public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed in a lieu of comment a
manifestation and motion recommending that the petitioner be
granted, alleging that the memorandum which contained the
new work schedule was not discriminatory of the union members
nor did it constitute unfair labor practice on the part of petitioner.
Issue: Is the change in the work schedule and discontinuance of the
30-minute paid "on call"
lunch break proper?
Ruling: Yes. The right to fix the work schedules of the employees
rests principally on their employer. In the instant case petitioner, as
the employer, cites as reason for the adjustment the efficient
conduct of its business operations and its improved production. It
rationalizes that while the old work schedule included a 30-minute
paid lunch break, the employees could be called upon to do jobs
during that period as they were "on call." Even if denominated as
lunch break, this period could very well be considered as working
time because the factory employees were required to work if
necessary and were paid accordingly for working. With the new
work schedule, the employees are now given a one-hour lunch break
without any interruption from their employer. For a full one-hour
undisturbed lunch break, the employees can freely and effectively
use this hour not only for eating but also for their rest and comfort
which are conducive to more efficiency and better performance in
their work. Since the employees are no longer required to work
during this one-hour lunch break, there is no more need for them to
be compensated for this period. We agree with the Labor Arbiter
that the new work schedule fully complies with the daily work
period of eight (8) hours without violating the Labor Code. Besides,
the new schedule applies to all employees in the factory similarly
situated whether they are union members or not.
TOPIC: ASSEMBLY TIME
Arica vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 78210, February 28, 1989
Facts: This case stemmed from a complaint filed against private
respondent Stanfilco for assembly time, moral damages and
attorney’s fees, with the Regional Arbitration- Davao City. The Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of private respondent
STANFILCO, holding that:
“We cannot but agree with respondent that the pronouncement in
that earlier case, i.e. the thirty-minute assembly time long practiced
cannot be considered waiting time or work time and, therefore, not
compensable, has become the law of the case which can no longer
be disturbed without doing violence to the time-honored principle of
resjudicata.”
Case Digest in Labor Law
Nina Sarah P. Pineda, JD 3-1
NLRC uphold the Labor Arbiters’ decision and declared that:
“Surely, the customary functions referred to in the above-quoted
provision of the agreement includes the long-standing practice and
institutionalized non-compensable assembly time. This, in effect,
estopped complainants from pursuing this case.
MR was denied hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners contend that the preliminary activities as workers of
respondents STANFILCO in the assembly area is compensable as
working time (from 5:30am to 6:00 am) since these preliminary
activities are necessarily and primarily for private respondent’s
benefit. These preliminary activities of the workers are as follows-.
a) First there is the roll call. Followed by getting their
individual work assignments from the foreman.
b) Then, they are individually required to accomplish the
Laborer’s Daily Accomplishment Report during which they
are often made to explain about their reported
accomplishment the following day.
c) Then they go to the stockroom to get the working
materials, tools and equipment.
d) Lastly, they travel to the field bringing with them their
tools, equipment and materials.
All these activities take 30 minutes to accomplish.
Respondent avers that the instant complaint is not new because it is
the very same claim they brought against respondent by the same
group of rank and file employees in the case of Arica vs. National
Labor Relations Commission which was filed before in a different
case. The said case involved a claim for “waiting time”, as the
complainants purportedly were required to assemble.
In the previous case, the 30-minute assembly time long practiced
and institutionalized by mutual consent of the parties under their
CBA cannot be considered as ‘waiting time’ within the purview of
Section 5, Rule 1, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor.
Issue: Whether assembly time is compensable
Ruling: No. The thirty (30)-minute assembly time long practiced and
institutionalized by mutual consent of the parties under Article IV,
Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be
considered as waiting time within the purview of Section 5, Rule I,
Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.
... Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply- rooted,
routinary practice of the employees, and the proceedings attendant
thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive the workers
the time to attend to other personal pursuits. They are not new
employees as to require the company to deliver long briefings
regarding their respective work assignments. Their houses are
situated right on the area where the farm are located, such that
after the roll call, which does not necessarily require the personal
presence, they can go back to their houses to attend to some
chores. In short, they are not subject to the absolute control of the
company during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in the
assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary
measures. The CBA does not contain any provision to this effect; the
record is also bare of any proof on this point. This, therefore,
demonstrates the indubitable fact that the thirty (30)-minute
assembly time was not primarily intended for the interests of the
employer, but ultimately for the employees to indicate their
availability or non-availability for work during every working day.
Page 9 of 14

(Patterned in the Course Outline of Atty. Charisma I. Nolasco)
The NLRC can not be faulted for ruling that petitioners’ claim is
already barred by res judicata.
TOPIC: COMMUTING TIME, TRAVEL TIME AT LECTURES, SEMINARS,
ETC; SEMESTRAL BREAK
University of Pangasinan Faculty Union vs. University of
Pangasinan, G.R. No. L-63122,
February 20, 1984
Facts: Petitioner is a labor union composed of faculty members of
the respondent University of Pangasinan, an educational institution
duly organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the Philippines.
The petitioner filed a complaint against the private respondent with
the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC- Dagupan City seeking: (a) the
payment of Emergency Cost of Living Allowances (ECOLA) for
November 7 to December 5, 1981, a semestral break; (b) salary
increases from the 60% of the incremental proceeds of increased
tuition fees; and (c) payment of salaries for suspended extra loads.
The petitioner’s members are full-time professors, instructors, and
teachers of respondent University. The teachers in the college level
teach for a normal duration of 10 months a school year, divided into
2 semesters of 5 months each, excluding the 2 months summer
vacation. These teachers are paid their salaries on a regular monthly
basis.
During the semestral break (Nov. 7- Dec. 5, 1981), they were not
paid their ECOLA. The private respondent claims that the teachers
are not entitled thereto because the semestral break is not an
integral part of the school year and there being no actual services
rendered by the teachers during said period, the principle of “No
work, no pay” applies.
Issues: Are the faculty members entitled to ECOLA during semestral
breaks?
Ruling: Yes. It is beyond dispute that the petitioner’s members are
full-time employees receiving their monthly salaries irrespective of
the number of working days or teaching hours in a month. However,
they find themselves in a most peculiar situation whereby they are
forced to go on leave during semestral breaks. These semestral
breaks are in the nature of work interruptions beyond the
employees’ control. The duration of the semestral break varies from
year to year dependent on a variety of circumstances affecting at
times only the private respondent but at other times all educational
institutions in the country. As such, these breaks cannot be
considered as absences within the meaning of the law for which
deductions may be made from monthly allowances. The "No work,
no pay" principle does not apply in the instant case. The petitioner’s
members received their regular salaries during this period. It is clear
from the aforequoted provision of law that it contemplates a "no
work" situation where the employees voluntarily absent themselves.
Petitioners, in the case at bar, certainly do not, ad voluntatem,
absent themselves during semestral breaks. Rather, they are
constrained to take mandatory leave from work. For this they
cannot be faulted nor can they be begrudged that which is due them
under the law. To a certain extent, the private respondent can
specify dates when no classes would be held. Surely, it was not the
intention of the framers of the law to allow employers to withhold
employee benefits by the simple expedient of unilaterally imposing
"no work" days and consequently avoiding compliance with the
mandate of the law for those days.
It is evident that the intention of the law is to grant ECOLA upon the
payment of basic wages. Hence, we have the principle of "No pay,
no ECOLA" the converse of which finds application in the case at bar.
Case Digest in Labor Law
Nina Sarah P. Pineda, JD 3-1
Petitioners cannot be considered to be on leave without pay so as
not to be entitled to ECOLA, for, as earlier stated, the petitioners
were paid their wages in full for the months of November and
December of 1981, notwithstanding the intervening semestral
break. This, in itself, is a tacit recognition of the rather unusual state
of affairs in which teachers find themselves. Although said to be on
forced leave, professors and teachers are, nevertheless, burdened
with the task of working during a period of time supposedly
available for rest and private matters. There are papers to correct,
students to evaluate, deadlines to meet, and periods within which to
submit grading reports. Although they may be considered by the
respondent to be on leave, the semestral break could not be used
effectively for the teacher’s own purposes for the nature of a
teacher’s job imposes upon him further duties which must be done
during the said period of time. Learning is a never ending process.
Teachers and professors must keep abreast of developments all the
time. Teachers cannot also wait for the opening of the next semester
to begin their work. Arduous preparation is necessary for the
delicate task of educating our children. Teaching involves not only an
application of skill and an imparting of knowledge, but a
responsibility which entails self dedication and sacrifice. The task of
teaching ends not with the perceptible efforts of the petitioner’s
members but goes beyond the classroom: a continuum where only
the visible labor is relieved by academic intermissions. It would be
most unfair for the private respondent to consider these teachers as
employees on leave without pay to suit its purposes and, yet, in the
meantime, continue availing of their services as they prepare for the
next semester or complete all of the last semester’s requirements.
Furthermore, we may also by analogy apply the principle enunciated
in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code to wit:
Sec. 4. Principles in Determining Hours Worked. — The following
general principles shall govern in determining whether the time
spent by an employee is considered hours worked for purposes of
this Rule:
xxx
"(d) The time during which an employee is inactive by reason of
interruptions in his work beyond his control shall be considered time
either if the imminence of the resumption of work requires the
employee’s presence at the place of work or if the interval is too
brief to be utilized effectively and gainfully in the employee’s own
interest."
The petitioner’s members in the case at bar, are exactly in such a
situation. The semestral break scheduled is an interruption beyond
petitioner’s control and it cannot be used "effectively nor gainfully in
the employee’s interest’. Thus, the semestral break may also be
considered as "hours worked." For this, the teachers are paid regular
salaries and, for this, they should be entitled to ECOLA. Not only do
the teachers continue to work during this short recess but much
less do they cease to live for which the cost of living allowance is
intended. The legal principles of "No work, no pay; No pay, no
ECOLA" must necessarily give way to the purpose of the law to
augment the income of employees to enable them to cope with the
harsh living conditions brought about by inflation; and to protect
employees and their wages against the ravages brought by these
conditions. Significantly, it is the commitment of the State to protect
labor and to provide means by which the difficulties faced by the
working force may best be alleviated. To submit to the respondents’
interpretation of the no work, no pay policy is to defeat this noble
purpose. The Constitution and the law mandate otherwise.
TOPIC: MEAL BREAK, COFFEE BREAK; REST PERIOD; OVERTIME;
SEAFARERS
Legahi vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 122240, November 18, 1999
Page 10 of 14

(Patterned in the Course Outline of Atty. Charisma I. Nolasco)
Facts: Petitioner entered in a contract of employment which
stipulated that his term of employment as Chief Cook was for ten
months beginning October 9, 1992 with a basic monthly salary of
US$450.00 with 44 hours weekly as minimum number of hours
worked with a fixed overtime pay (OT) of $185.00 and three (3) days
leave with pay every month.
For several months in 1992 and January 1993, petitioner was asked
by the Shipmaster to prepare victualling cost statement for months
of October, November, and December 1992. Petitioner, after
learning that such preparation involves mathematical skills, as it
would require estimation of food cost, value of stocks, intimated
that he did not know how to do such work as it was not part of the
duties of a chief cook. He was told that it was not a difficult job and
that he only needed to copy the previous forms. After much
reluctance, petitioner nonetheless prepared the statements in
deference to the Shipmaster.
When petitioner finally deferred from performing said tasks, a
committee was formed headed by the Shipmaster himself with the
Chief Officer, Chief Engineer and Bosun as members and informed
petitioner, in meeting held for that purpose, that he was dismissed.
The next day, petitioner was repatriated to the Philippines through
the assistance of the Philippine Consulate.
Upon arrival or on February 16, 1993, petitioner filed with the POEA
a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondents. He
sought the payment of his salary corresponding to the unexpired
portion of his contract, unpaid overtime pay, leave pay, salary
differential and damages.
POEA promulgated a decision finding that there was just cause for
petitioner’s dismissal.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the
Commission affirmed in toto the POEA decision.
Issue: Whether seafarers are entitled to overtime pay.
Ruling: Yes, provided they actually rendered overtime work. We
already resolved the question of overtime pay of worker aboard a
vessel in the case of National Shipyards and Steel Corporation v. CIR
(3 SCRA 890). We ruled: We cannot agree with the Court below that
respondent Malondras should be paid overtime compensation for
every hour in excess of the regular working hours that he was on
board his vessel or barge each day, irrespective of whether or not he
actually put in work during those hours. Seamen are required to stay
on board their vessels by the very nature of their duties, and it is for
this reason that, in addition to their regular compensation, they are
given free living quarters and subsistence allowances when required
to be on board. It could not have been the purpose of our law to
require their employers to pay them overtime even when they are
not actually working; otherwise, every sailor on board a vessel would
be entitled to overtime for sixteen hours each a day, even if he spent
all those hours resting or sleeping in his bunk, after his regular tour
of duty. The correct criterion in determining whether or not sailors
are entitled to overtime pay is not, therefore, whether they were on
board and cannot leave ship beyond the regular eight working hours
a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of said
number of hours.
TOPIC: EVIDENCE/REQUIRED PROOF
Pigcaulan vs. Security & Credit, G.R. No. 173648, January 16, 2012
Facts: Canoy and Pigcaulan were both employed by SCII as security
guards and were assigned to SCII’s different clients. Subsequently,
however, Canoy and Pigcaulan filed with the Labor Arbiter separate
complaints7 for underpayment of salaries and non-payment of
Case Digest in Labor Law
Nina Sarah P. Pineda, JD 3-1
overtime, holiday, rest day, service incentive leave and 13th month
pays. These complaints were later on consolidated as they involved
the same causes of action. Canoy and Pigcaulan, in support of their
claim, submitted their respective daily time records reflecting the
number of hours served and their wages for the same. They
likewise presented itemized lists of their claims for the
corresponding periods served.
RESPONDENT MAINTAINS: that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid
their just salaries and other benefits under the law; that the
salaries they received were above the statutory minimum wage and
the rates provided by the Philippine Association of Detective and
Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO) for security guards; that
their holiday pay were already included in the computation of their
monthly salaries; that they were paid additional premium of 30% in
addition to their basic salary whenever they were required to work
on Sundays and 200% of their salary for work done on holidays; and,
that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid the corresponding 13th month
pay for the years 1998 and 1999. In support thereof, copies of
payroll listings8 and lists of employees who received their 13th
month pay, for the said periods.
LABOR ARBITER: (in favor of petitioner herein) held that the payroll
listings presented by the respondents did not prove that Canoy and
Pigcaulan were duly paid as same were not signed by the latter or by
any SCII officer. The 13th month payroll was, however,
acknowledged as sufficient proof of payment, for it bears Canoy’s
and Pigcaulan’s signatures.
NLRC affirmed; CA however reversed in favor of respondent. Hence,
the present Petition for Review on Certiorari [filed by
petitioner PIGCAULAN alone]
Issue: Whether the CA erred when it dismissed the complaint
allegedly due to absence of legal and factual [bases] despite
attendance of substantial evidence in the records.
Ruling: Yes.
There was no substantial evidence to support the grant of overtime
pay.
The handwritten itemized computations are self-serving, unreliable
and unsubstantial evidence to sustain the grant of salary
differentials, particularly overtime pay. Unsigned and
unauthenticated as they are, there is no way of verifying the truth of
the handwritten entries stated therein. Written only in pieces of
paper and solely prepared by Canoy and Pigcaulan, these
representative daily time records, as termed by the Labor Arbiter,
can hardly be considered as competent evidence to be used as basis
to prove that the two were underpaid of their salaries. We find
nothing in the records which could substantially support Pigcaulan’s
contention that he had rendered service beyond eight hours to
entitle him to overtime pay and during Sundays to entitle him to
restday pay. Hence, in the absence of any concrete proof that
additional service beyond the normal working hours and days had
indeed been rendered, we cannot affirm the grant of overtime pay
to Pigcaulan.
Pigcaulan is entitled to holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and
proportionate 13th month pay for year 2000
Under the Labor Code, Pigcaulan is entitled to his regular rate on
holidays even if he does not work. Likewise, express provision of the
law entitles him to service incentive leave benefit for he rendered
service for more than a year already. Furthermore, under
Presidential Decree No. 851, he should be paid his 13th month pay.
Page 11 of 14

(Patterned in the Course Outline of Atty. Charisma I. Nolasco)
As employer, SCII has the burden of proving that it has paid these
benefits to its employees.
SCII presented payroll listings and transmittal letters to the bank to
show that Canoy and Pigcaulan received their salaries as well as
benefits which it claimed are already integrated in the employees’
monthly salaries. However, the documents presented do not prove
SCII’s allegation. SCII failed to show any other concrete proof by
means of records, pertinent files or similar documents reflecting that
the specific claims have been paid. With respect to 13th month pay,
SCII presented proof that this benefit was paid but only for the years
1998 and 1999. To repeat, the burden of proving payment of these
monetary claims rests on SCII, being the employer. It is a rule that
one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. "Even when
the plaintiff alleges non-payment, still the general rule is that the
burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the
plaintiff to prove non-payment." Since SCII failed to provide
convincing proof that it has already settled the claims, Pigcaulan
should be paid his holiday pay, service incentive leave benefits and
proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2000.
Robina Farms Cebu vs Villa, G.R. No. 175869, April 18, 2016
Facts: Respondent Elizabeth Villa brought against the petitioner her
complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, nonpayment of
overtime pay, and nonpayment of service incentive leave pay in the
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII of the NLRC in Cebu City.
In her verified position paper, Villa averred that she had been
employed by petitioner Robina Farms as sales clerk since August
1981; that in the later part of 2001, the petitioner had enticed her to
avail herself of the company's special retirement program; that on
March 2, 2002, she had received a memorandum from Lily
Ngochuarequiring her to explain her failure to issue invoices for
unhatched eggs in the months of January to February 2002; that she
had explained that the invoices were not delivered on time because
the delivery receipts were delayed and overlooked; that despite her
explanation, she had been suspended for 10 days from March 8,
2012 until March 19, 2002; that upon reporting back to work, she
had been advised to cease working because her application for
retirement had already been approved; that she had been
subsequently informed that her application had been disapproved,
and had then been advised to tender her resignation with a request
for financial assistance; that she had manifested her intention to
return to work but the petitioner had confiscated her gate pass; and
that she had since then been prevented from entering the company
premises and had been replaced by another employee.
Robina admitted that Villa had been its sales clerk at Robina Farms.
It stated that on December 12, 2001, she had applied for retirement
under the special privilege program offered to its employees in
Bulacanand Antipolo who had served for at least 10 years; that in
February 2002, her attention had been called by Anita Gabatanof
the accounting department to explain her failure to issue invoices
for the unhatchedeggs for the month of February; that she had
explained that she had been busy.
The petitioner added that after the administrative hearing Villa was
found to have violated the company rule on the timely issuance of
the invoices that had resulted in delay in the payment of buyers
considering that the payment.
Case Digest in Labor Law
Nina Sarah P. Pineda, JD 3-1
Robina added that after the administrative hearing Villa was found
to have violated the company rule on the timely issuance of the
invoices that had resulted in delay in the payment of buyers
considering that the payment had depended upon the receipt of the
invoices; that she had been suspended from her employment as a
consequence; that after serving the suspension, she had returned to
work and had followed up her application for retirement withLucina
de Guzman, who had then informed her that the management did
not approve the benefits equivalent to 86% of her salary rate applied
for, but only 1/2 month for every year of service; and that
disappointed with the outcome, she had then brought her complaint
against the petitioners.
Labor Arbiter Ruling: Labor Arbiter Violeta Ortiz-Bantug rendered
her decision 4 finding that Villa had not been dismissed from
employment. The Labor Arbiter declared that Villa was entitled to
service incentive leave pay for the period of the last three years
counted from the filing of her complaint because the petitioner did
not refute her claim thereon.
Judgment of the NLRC: The NLRC rendered its judgment dismissing
the appeal by the petitioner but granting that of Villa.The decision of
the Labor Arbiter is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and a new one
ENTERED declaring complainant to have been illegally dismissed.
Decision of CA: The CA promulgated its assailed decision dismissing
the petition for certiorari, decrjeeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that
petitioner Lily Ngochua should not be held liable with
petitioner corporation.
Issue: Whether or not Villa had been illegally dismissed?
Ruling: We note that the CA and the NLRC agreed on their finding
that the petitioner did not admit Villa back to work after the
completion of her 10-day suspension.
Neither did Villa's application for early retirement manifest her
intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. Although
she applied for early retirement, she did so upon the belief that she
would receive a higher benefit based on the petitioner's offer. As
such, her consent to be retired could not be fairly deemed to have
been knowingly and freely given.
The difficulty in the case of Villa arises from determining whether
the retirement was voluntary or involuntary. The line between the
two is thin but it is one that the Court has drawn. On one hand,
voluntary retirement cuts the employment ties leaving no residual
employer liability; on the other, involuntary retirement amounts to a
discharge, rendering the employer liable for termination without
cause.
Under the circumstances, the CA did not err in declaring the
petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal for violating Article 282 29 of
the Labor Code and the twin notice rule.
OVERTIME PAY AND SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
Page 12 of 14

(Patterned in the Course Outline of Atty. Charisma I. Nolasco)
The petitioner posits that the CA erroneously affirmed the giving of
overtime pay and service incentive leave pay to Villa; that she did
not adduce proof of her having rendered actual overtime work; that
she had not been authorized to render overtime work; and that her
availment of vacation and sick leaves that had been paid precluded
her claiming the service incentive leave pay.
We partly agree with the petitioner's position.
Firstly, entitlement to overtime pay must first be established by
proof that the overtime work was actually performed before the
employee may properly claim the benefit. The burden of proving
entitlement to overtime pay rests on the employee because the
benefit is not incurred in the normal course of business.
Failure to provesuch actual performance transgresses the principles
of fair play and equity.
And, secondly, the NLRC's reliance on the daily time records (DTRs)
showing that Villa had stayed in the company's premises beyond
eight hours was misplaced. The DTRs did not substantially prove the
actual performance of overtime work. The petitioner correctly
points out that any employee could render overtime work only
when there was a prior authorization therefor by the management.
Without the prior authorization, therefore, Villa could not validly
claim having performed work beyond the normal hours of work.
We uphold the grant of service incentive leave pay.
Although the grant of vacation or sick leave with pay of at least five
days could be credited as compliance with the duty to pay service
incentive leave, the employer is still obliged to prove that it fully
paid the accrued service incentive leave pay to the employee.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari
for lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September
27, 2006 by the Court of Appeals, with the MODIFICATION that the
award of overtime pay in favor of respondent Elizabeth Villa is
DELETED; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
TOPIC: UNDERTIME; NIGHT WORK; RATIONALE
Association of Int’l Shipping Lines, Inc. Vs. United Harbors’ Pilot
Association
Facts: On March 1, 1985, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) issued
PPA Administrative Order (AO) No. 03-85 [herein referred to PPA AO
03-85] substantially adopting the provisions of Customs
Administrative Order (CAO) No. 15-654 on the payment of additional
charges for pilotage service5 rendered “between 1800H to 1600H,”
or on “Sundays or Holidays,” practically referring to “nighttime and
overtime pay.”
On February 3, 1986, responding to the clamor of harbor pilots for
the increase and rationalization of pilotage service charges, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order (EO) No. 1088
providing for uniform and modified rates for pilotage services
rendered in all Philippine ports. It fixed the rate of pilotage fees on
the basis of the “vessel’s tonnage” and provided that the “rate for
docking and undocking anchorage, conduction and shifting and
other related special services is equal to 100%.” EO No. 1088 also
contained a repealing clause stating that all orders, letters of
instruction, rules, regulations, and issuances inconsistent with it are
repealed or amended accordingly.
Case Digest in Labor Law
Nina Sarah P. Pineda, JD 3-1
Subsequently, pursuant to EO No. 1088, the PPA issued several
resolutions [Res. No. 1486, 1541, and 1554 ] disallowing overtime
premium or charge and recalling its recommendation for a
reasonable night premium pay or night differential pay.
On the strength of PPA Resolution No. 1486, petitioners Association
of International Shipping Lines (AISL) and its members refused to
pay respondent United Harbor Pilots’ Association of the Philippines,
Inc. (UHPAP)’s claims for nighttime and overtime pay.10 In
response, UHPAP threatened to discontinue pilotage services should
their claims be continually ignored.
Petitioners then filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC.
The issues raised there were: (1) whether EO No. 1088 authorized
the payment of nighttime and overtime pay xxx
RTC granted the petition and declared that respondent UHPAP is not
authorized to collect any overtime or night shift differential for
pilotage services rendered; respondent UHPAP filed directly before
this Court a petition for review on certiorari, decision was reversed
in favor of respondents. Decision became final and executory.
Respondent UHPAP filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution with the RTC.14Petitioners opposed15 the motion alleging
that,
x x x [W]hen the Supreme Court ruled and declared that Executive
Order 1088 does not deprive the PPA of its power and authority to
promulgate rules and rates for payment of fees including
additional charges, it had effectively ruled on the validity of PPA
resolutions 1486, 1541, and 1554.
Opposition denied. Hence, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 with CA, partly granted rendering PPA Resolution Nos. 1486,
1541, and 1554 are valid and effective thereby disallowing the
collection of overtime pay BUT did not discuss the logical
consequence of the resolution of the issue on PPA Resolution.
Therefore, filed a motion for partial reconsideration, DENIED. Hence,
the present recourse.
Issues: (1) whether EO No. 1088 repealed the provisions of CAO No.
15-65 and PPA AO No. 03-85, as amended, on payment of additional
pay for holidays work and premium pay for nighttime service; (2)
WON PPA Resolutions remain valid.
HELD: In both issues NO
As this Court pronounced in G.R. No. 133763, there is nothing in EO
No. 1088 that reveals any intention on the part of Former President
Marcos to amend or supersede the provisions of PPA AO No. 03-85
on nighttime and overtime pay. While Section 3 of EO No. 1088
provides a general repealing clause, the same is made dependent
upon its actual inconsistency with other previous orders, rules,
regulations or other issuance.
There is no inconsistency between EO No. 1088 and the provisions
of PPA AO No. 03-85. These two orders dwell on entirely different
subject matters.
EO No. 1088 provides for uniform and modified rates for pilotage
services rendered to foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine
ports, public or private. On the other hand, the subject matter of
the provisions of PPA AO No. 03-85 is the payment of the
additional charges of nighttime and overtime pay. Plainly, EO No.
1088 involves the basic compensation for pilotage service while
PPA AO No. 03-85 provides for the additional charges where
pilotage service is rendered under certain circumstances.
Page 13 of 14
 Case Digest in Labor Law
(Patterned in the Course Outline of Atty. Charisma I. Nolasco)
Nina Sarah P. Pineda, JD 3-1

Members of respondent UHPAP are entitled to nighttime and the minimum set by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity
overtime pay. Undoubtedly, pursuant to PPA AO No. 03-85, Board. Finally, petitioners alleged that they were not paid their rest
members of respondent UHPAP are legally entitled to nighttime days, sick and vacation leaves, night shift differentials, subsistence
and overtime pay. allowance, and fixed overtime pay.

Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaint; NLRC affirmed; CA affirmed.

It bears pointing out that additional compensation for nighttime
work is founded on public policy.32 Working at night is violative of
the law of nature for it is the period for rest and sleep. An
employee who works at night has less stamina and vigor. Thus, he
can easily contract disease. The lack of sunlight tends to produce
anemia and tuberculosis and predispose him to other ills. Night
work brings increased liability to eyestrain and accident. Serious
moral dangers also are likely to result from the necessity of
traveling the street alone at night, and from the interference with
normal home life.33 Hygienic, medical, moral, cultural and socio-
biological reasons are in accord that night work has many
inconveniences and when there is no alternative but to perform it,
it is but just that the laborer should earn greater salary than
ordinary work so as to compensate the laborer to some extent for
the said inconveniences.34
**Respondent’s motion for execution is procedurally infirm. In such
civil actions for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, the judgment does not entail an executory process, as the
primary objective of petitioner is to determine any question of
construction or validity and for a declaration of concomitant rights
and duties.39 The proper remedy would have been for members of
respondent UHPAP to claim for overnight and nighttime pay before
petitioners AISLI and its members.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: whether petitioners were entitled to their monetary claims
Ruling: No. Apropos the monetary claims, there is insufficient
evidence to prove petitioners’ entitlement thereto. As crew
members, petitioners were required to stay on board the vessel by
the very nature of their duties, and it is for this reason that, in
addition to their regular compensation, they are given free living
quarters and subsistence allowances when required to be on board.
It could not have been the purpose of our law to require their
employers to give them overtime pay or night shift differential, even
when they are not actually working. Thus, the correct criterion in
determining whether they are entitled to overtime pay or night
shift differential is not whether they were on board and cannot
leave ship beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but
whether they actually rendered service in excess of said number of
hours.15 In this case, petitioners failed to submit sufficient proof
that overtime and night shift work were actually performed to
entitle them to the corresponding pay.

Petition DENIED.

TOPIC: UNDERTIME; NIGHT WORK; SEAFARERS

Dacut vs. CA, G.R. No. 169434, March 28, 2008

Facts: Petitioners Lazaro V. Dacut, Cesario G. Cajote, Romerlo F.

Tungala, Lowel Z. Zubista, and Orlando P. Taboy were crew members
of the LCT “BASILISA”, an inter-island cargo vessel owned by private
respondent Sta. Clara International Transport and Equipment
Corporation.
Dacut discovered a hole in the vessel’s engine room. The company
had the hole patched up with a piece of iron and cement. Despite
the repair, Dacut and Tungala resigned in July 1999 due to the
vessel’s alleged unseaworthiness.

On the other hand, Cajote went on leave from April 12-28, 1999 to
undergo eye treatment. Since then, he has incurred several
unauthorized absences. Fearing that he will be charged as Absent
Without Leave (AWOL), Cajote resigned in June 1999.

Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint for constructive dismissal

amounting to illegal dismissal (except for Zubista and Taboy);
underpayment of wages, special and regular holidays; xxx

Dacut and Tungala contentions: that they resigned after Reynalyn G.

Orlina, the secretary of the Personnel Manager, told them that they
will be paid their separation pay if they voluntarily resigned. They
also resigned because the vessel has become unseaworthy after the
company refused to have it repaired properly.8 Meanwhile, Cajote
alleged that he resigned because the company hired a replacement
while he was still on leave. When he returned, the Operations
Manager told him that he will be paid his separation pay if he
voluntarily resigned; otherwise, he would be charged for being
AWOL. On the other hand, Zubista claimed that his wage was below
Page 14 of 14