XXIII.
EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF Justice Chase discussed the basis of the ex post
ATTAINDER
A. EX POST FACTO LAWS
1. CARMELL VS TEXAS
SUMMARY
In Carmell v. Texas, the defendant was convicted on 15
counts of sexual offenses against his stepdaughter
between 1991 and 1995 when she was between 12 and 16
years old. The Texas sexual offense statute specifies that
a victim's testimony about a sexual offense cannot support
a conviction unless it is corroborated by other evidence or
the victim informed another person of the offense within
six months of its occurrence. But the victim's testimony
alone can support a verdict if the victim was under a
certain age at the time of the offense. In 1993, legislation
increased this age limit from 14 to 18.
On four counts, the defendant's conviction depended on
which version of the law applied because (1) the incidents
occurred before the law changed on September 1, 1993
and (2) the only evidence produced was the testimony of
the victim who was 14 or 15 years old at the time of the
incidents.
The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether applying the
amended statute to these counts violated the ex post
facto clause of the U.S. Constitution (Art. 1, §§ 9, 10).
The clause generally prohibits a law passed after an act
occurs from retroactively changing the legal
consequences of that act. In a five to four decision, the
Court ruled that applying the amended Texas statute
retroactively violated the ex post facto clause because the
statute is a sufficiency of the evidence rule that reduced
the amount of evidence required to convict the person
(No. 98-7540 (May 1, 2000)).
The dissent argued that the statute was a witness
competency rule that could apply retroactively based on
the Court's precedents and did not conflict with the
fundamental purposes of the ex post facto clause of
preventing unfairness and vindictive legislation.
MAJORITY OPINION
The majority stated that the Texas statute is a sufficiency
of the evidence rule that set a minimum level of evidence
to support a conviction and cannot be applied
retroactively under the ex post facto clause. The majority
relied on Justice Chase's discussion in the Supreme
Court's ruling in Calder v. Bull (3 Dall. 386 (1798)).
facto clause in English common law and described four
categories of laws that violated the clause. Justice Chase
stated that the clause prohibits application of a law passed
after an act was committed to:
1. make the act criminal and punish it,
2. aggravate the crime or make it greater than it was when
the act was committed,
3. change the punishment and inflict greater punishment
than the law required when the act was committed, or
4. alter the legal rules of evidence to receive less or
different testimony to convict the offender than the law
required at the time of the offense.
The majority stated that a number of the Court's cases
endorsed these categories and the Texas statute fit into the
fourth category. The majority reasoned as follows.
1. The statute as amended requires only the victim's
testimony to convict when the victim is under age 18 and
no longer requires corroborating evidence. This is
requiring less testimony to convict.
2. This case is similar to the case of Sir John Fenwick,
which Justice Chase and the treatise he relied on both cite.
England charged Fenwick with treason in the late 17th
century. The law at the time required the testimony of two
witnesses to convict him. Parliament passed a bill of
attainder to make this rule inapplicable to his case and
allowed his conviction on the testimony of one witness.
3. Justice Chase's fourth category fits with the ex post
facto clause's purpose of fundamental justice. Applying a
rule retroactively to reduce the amount of evidence
required to convict is as unfair as eliminating an element
of the offence, increasing punishment, or lowering the
burden of proof. In all of these categories, the government
refuses to play by its own rules after the fact by altering
them in a way that assists only the state.
4. The arguments for abandoning the fourth category are
not persuasive. The Court has not previously done so and
the category serves the purposes of the ex post
facto clause.
5. Applying the statutory change retroactively conflicts
with the purposes of the ex post facto clause: prohibiting
unfairness and injustice and protecting the presumption of
innocence.
DISSENTING OPINION
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The dissent argued that the Texas statute was not a
sufficiency of the evidence rule but an evidentiary
provision setting the circumstances when the jury can
credit a victim's testimony. The dissent stated that the
amended statute gave a victim under age 18 the same
competency to testify as witnesses in general in court
proceedings and a witness competency rule could apply
to offenses committed before its enactment.
The dissent reasoned as follows:
1. Under the Texas statute, the jury cannot give weight to
the victim's testimony unless it is corroborated by other
evidence if the victim does not meet the statute's age
requirement. This is a common but increasingly
outmoded rule of evidence. The effect of the legislation is
to declare that the testimony is not independently
trustworthy.
2. The statute's history shows that its focus has always
been on the competency and credibility of the victim as a
witness. The statute, allows conviction of this crime in a
number of ways (including the testimony of a third party
or circumstantial evidence) as long as the state proves the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The
statutory change did not lower that standard of proof but
expanded the range of methods the state could use to meet
it. It did not change the quantity of proof required or the
presumption of innocence.
3. The statute sounds like a sufficiency of the evidence
rule but the rule is the same as a rule of witness
competency.
4. Prohibiting the retroactive application of the amended
statute does not serve the two fundamental purposes of
the ex post facto clause: (1) fair notice so that people can
rely on the laws and (2) separation of powers preventing
the passage of vindictive legislation.
5. Justice Chase's description of the four categories was
not essential to the ruling in that case. The Court ignored
the fourth category in citing Justice Chase's categories in
other cases and the Court has never relied on that category
to invalidate the application of a statute. The Court twice
struck down the retroactive application of criminal trial
rules but both decisions were overruled by later cases.
Even if the fourth category is still valid, this Court's
precedents show that it cannot be stretched to include this
case.
6. This case in not like Sir John Fenwick's case and the
two-witness rule. The Texas statute does not restrict the
state to only one form of proof and does not apply to
everyone who testifies. The statute only makes the
testimony of a victim who is above a certain age less
competent than other testimony. The fact that the new
statute makes some convictions easier to obtain does not
prevent its retroactive application.
7. The Court's precedents require the Court to find that the
retroactive application of the Texas statute does not
violate the ex post facto clause. The Court enlarges the ex
post facto clause in a way that fails to advance the clause's
fundamental purposes.
2. KATIGBAK VS SOLICITOR GENERAL
The penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379
cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its
passage without running afoul of the Constitutional
provision condemning ex post facto laws or bills of
attainder.
Facts:
The proceedings at bar originated from two actions filed
with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The first,
instituted by the Spouses Alejandro Katigbak and
Mercedes Katigbak praying that R.A. No. 1379 be
declared unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes
forfeiture of properties acquired before its approval. The
second action commenced by petition filed by the
Republic of the Philippines against Alejandro Katigbak,
his wife, Mercedes, and his son, Benedicto, seeking the
forfeiture in favor of the State of the properties of
Alejandro Katigbak allegedly gotten by him illegally, in
accordance with R.A. No. 1379.
The CFI dismissed the complaint and the counterclaim
filed by Sps Katigbak and as regards the petition filed by
the Republic, it ordered "that from the properties of
Katigbak enumerated in its decision as acquired in 1953,
1954 and 1955, shall be enforced as a lien in favor of the
Government. Motion for reconsideration was denied.
Appeal was taken from this verdict of the Court of
Appeals by the Katigbaks which appeal was certified to
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether R.A. No. 1379 operates as an ex-post
facto law.
Ruling:
YES. Whatever persuasiveness might have been carried
by the ruling on the issue of the learned Trial Judge in
1961, the fact is that the nature of R.A. No. 1379 as penal
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was in 1962 clearly and categorically pronounced by this
Court in Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.
The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act
No. 1379 being in the nature of a penalty; and it being
axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which inter alia
"makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law
and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an
act," or, "assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right
for something which when done was lawful," it follows
that penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379
cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage
without running afoul of the Constitutional provision
condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder. But
this is precisely what has been done in the case of the
Katigbaks. The Trial Court declared certain of their
acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to be illegal under
R.A. No. 1379 although made prior to the enactment of
the law, and imposed a lien thereon "in favor of the
Government in the sum of P100,000.00." Such a
disposition is, quite obviously, constitutionally
impermissible
3. SALVADOR VS MAPA, JR
The rule on ex post facto law does not apply when the
laws involved are not penal laws.
Facts:
Former President Fidel Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and
Memorandum Order No. 16, wherein the functions of the
Committee were subsequently expanded. Several loan
accounts were referred to the Committee for
investigation, including the loan transactions between
Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine
Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP). The Committee determined that
they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as the
stockholders and officers of PEMI were known cronies of
then President Ferdinand Marcos; that the loan was under-
collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time
the loan was granted. Atty. Orlando Salvador, Consultant
of the Committee, and representing the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint for
violations of R.A. No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, against the respondents. It is
contended that the administrative orders issued by the
President are ex post facto laws and therefore should be
striken down.
Issue:
Whether Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex-post facto laws.
Ruling:
NO. An ex post facto law has been defined as one
(a) which makes an action done before the passing of the
law and which was innocent when done criminal, and
punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or
makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed;
or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives
less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense in order to convict
the defendant. This Court added two (2) more to the list,
namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and
remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f)
that which deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex
post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of
penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their
nature, and provide for their punishment. The subject
administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not
come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative
Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its
composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty
for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order
No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for
determining behest loans. Not being penal laws,
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order
No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws.
There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule
that the subject administrative and memorandum orders
are ex post facto
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4. GONZALES VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
The new law, Republic Act No. 8294, 1 approved barely
two months ago (June 6, 1997) which has lowered the
penalty for illegal possession of firearms finds application
in instant case to favor the accused so as to immediately
release him from jail where he has already served nine (9)
years, nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days, which
is well beyond the maximum penalty now imposed for his
offense. Whereas prior to the passage of this law, the
crime of simple illegal possession of firearms was
penalized with reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua, 2 after its enactment, the penalty
has been reduced to prision correccional in its maximum
period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00). 3
Being favorable to the accused, this newly-enacted law
constitutes an exception to the fundamental doctrine that
laws should be applied prospectively. Further applying
the Indetermine Sentence Law, petitioner should be
penalized with four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day as minimum, to six (6) years as maximum. Petitioner,
therefore, holds the "distinction" of being the first
beneficiary of this reduced penalty to favor him with its
retroactive application.
The following recital of facts constitutes the backdrop for
the application of the new law.
Two separate informations were field against petitioner
Reynaldo Gonzales y Rivera involving the crimes of
attempted homicide and violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1866.
On May 20, 1984, Jaime, Dionisio, and Zenaida all
surnamed Verde were in front of their house when, at
about six o'clock in the evening, petitioner Reynaldo
Gonzales and a certain Bening Paguia arrived in the
premises. Without any provocation, petitioner started to
hurl invectives at Zenaida and pushed her. Surprised at the
unprovoked attack, Jaime tried to restrain the petitioner
but instead of allowing himself to be subdued, the latter
turned on the former. Pulling out his gun, he fired the
same at Jaime but missed his mark. The incident was
thereafter reported to the police authorities which
conducted a paraffin test that showed that petitioner's
right hand was positive for gunpowder residue.
On the other hand, the version of the defense was as
follows:
Petitioner testified that on the said date and time, he was
with his barrio mates when suddenly, a commotion
attracted their attention. They saw a group of persons
chasing an unidentified person who was running towards
their direction with a gun in hand while the mob was
shouting "Harangin." During the chase, the unidentified
person accidentally fell and dropped the gun he was
holding which petitioner then grabbed.
The fleeing person hastily boarded a passing bus. It was
at this point that the Verdes, who turned out to be the
persons giving chase, demanded the gun from the
petitioner who, however, refused to surrender the same,
as a result of which, a scuffle ensued during which the gun
accidentally went off without hitting anybody.
After trial, the court a quo acquitted the petitioner of the
offense of attempted homicide but found him guilty of the
offense of illegal possession of firearm
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner
asserted that the trial court erred in not giving credence to
the defense's narration of the incident and his guilt has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. This argument did
not persuade the appellate court
RULING
We affirm the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.
The main thesis of petitioner's defense is that he
inadvertently picked up the gun accidentally dropped by
an unidentified person who was being chased by the
Verdes. Thus, he cannot be convicted for illegal
possession of firearm.
Completely contradicting petitioner's version, we quote
with approval the trial court's finding: 6
The testimony that the gun came from the unarmed
(should be unidentified) person who fell in front of him
while being chased is again hard to believe. The natural
reaction of a person being chased in a hostile place is to
remove hindrances along his way. If he had a gun, as the
accused would want the court to believe, he could have
used it against all persons who would block his way since
there were shouts "harangin, harangin." On the other
hand, the actuation of the accused is contrary to common
observation and experience. No person in his right mind
would approach a person holding a gun being chased and
there were shouts "harangin, harangin."
4
In addition, petitioner's narration is not in conformity with
human experience and reactions. We likewise note the
incredible assertion of the petitioner that the unidentified
person, after tripping and dropping the gun, was able to
board a "slow moving" but without even attempting to
retrieve his weapon. Such a hollow tale hardly commends
itself to our mind.
Also, petitioner bewails the fact that no preliminary
investigation was conducted. While the right to
preliminary investigation is one that is statutorily granted
and not mandated by the Constitution, still it is a
component part of due process in criminal justice 7 that
may not be treated lightly, let alone ignored. It has been
consistently held, however, that its absence does not
impair the validity of the criminal information or render it
defective. In any case, dismissal of the case is not the
remedy. 8 It is incumbent on the trial court to hold in
abeyance the proceedings upon such information and to
remand the case to the fiscal to conduct a preliminary
investigation if the accused actually makes out a case
justifying the same. 9
Conversely, it is a well-settled rule that the right to a
preliminary investigation may be waived by the failure to
invoke it prior to or at least at the time of the accused's
plea. 10 Thus, when the petitioner entered a plea to the
charge, 11 he is deemed to have waived the right to
preliminary investigation. 12
Having set aside the procedural aspect of this petition, we
now proceed to determine whether the petitioner is indeed
guilty of the offense of illegal possession of firearm.
In cases involving illegal possession of firearm, there are
certain well-established principles, namely: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not
have the corresponding license or permit to
possess. 13 The first requisite is beyond dispute as the
subject firearm was recovered, identified and offered in
evidence during trial. 14 With respect to the second
requisite, the same was undisputably proven by the
prosecution. The unvarying rule is that ownership is not
an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession
which includes, not only actual physical possession, but
also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing
to one's control and management. 15
In the instant petition, there is no doubt that the petitioner
is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed an
unlicensed firearm. The testimony of the petitioner that he
came into possession of the firearm only after a scuffle, is
a lame defense which cannot overcome the solid evidence
presented by the prosecution proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. On this score, we note that a
prosecution witness testified that petitioner pulled the gun
from his waist and fired a shot aimed at Jaime Verde's
foot. 16
Thus, we have no reservations in affirming petitioner's
conviction since we find no compelling reason to depart
from the actual findings of both the trial court and the
respondent appellate court which are, as a rule, accorded
great respect and finality. 17
As regards the penalty imposed by the trial court and
affirmed by the appellate court (17 years, 4 months, 1 day
to 18 years, 8 months of reclusion temporal), we reduce
the same in view of the passage of R.A. No. 8294 wherein
the penalty for simple illegal possession of firearms has
been lowered. Since it is an elementary rule in criminal
jurisprudence that penal laws shall be given retroactive
effect when favorable to the accused, 18 we are now
mandated to apply the new law in determining the proper
penalty to be imposed on the petitioner.
While prior to the passage of R.A. No. 8294, the crime of
simple illegal possession of firearm was penalized
with reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua, after its enactment, the penalty was
reduced to prision correccional in its maximum period
and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00).
Accordingly, applying the Intermediate Sentence Law,
the principal penalty for the offense of simple illegal
possession of firearm is four (4) years and two (2) months
as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum 19 and a fine of
P15,000.00. Consistent with the doctrine that an appeal in
a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, the
appellate court may, applying the new law, additionally
impose a fine, which if unpaid, will subject the convict to
subsidiary imprisonment, pursuant to Art. 39 of the
Revised Penal Code. 20
5
5. VALEROSO VS PEOPLE
By way of exception, penal laws that favor a guilty person,
who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive
effect.
Facts:
Valeroso was charged and convicted for illegal
possession of firearms under the first paragraph of P.D.
No. 1866. During the pendency of the case, PD 1866 was
amended by RA 8294 which lowered the penalty of illegal
possession of firearms from reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua to merely prision
correctional in its maximum period.
Issue:
Whether Valeroso can benefit from the enactment
of RA 8294 which lowered the penalty for illegal
possession of firearms.
Ruling:
YES. The Prosecution was able to establish that
Valeroso was indeed guilty of illegal possession of
firearms. However, Valeroso was charged under the first
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended,
providing that the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the
time Valeroso committed the offense. However, R.A. No.
8294 amended P.D. No. 1866, during the pendency of the
case with the RTC, which now provides that the penalty
of prision correctional in its maximum period and a fine
of not less than P15,000 shall be imposed.
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive
application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post
facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the
law is advantageous to the accused. According to Mr.
Chief Justice Araullo, this is not as a right of the offender,
but founded on the very principles on which the right of
the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are
based, and regards it not as an exception based on political
considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict
justice
6. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT VS CARPIO MORALES
If the day when the violation was committed be not
known, then it shall begin to run from the discovery of
said violation and the institution of judicial proceedings
for investigation and punishment.
Facts:
Former President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative
Order No. 13 creating a Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans and subsequently issued
Memorandum Order No. 61 prescribing certain criteria to
be used by the Committee as a guide in investigating and
studying loans granted by government financing
institutions that amount to behest loan. One of the loan
accounts referred to the Ad Hoc Committee for
investigation was that of Resorts Hotel Corporation
(RHC). The Committee found that RHC account qualifies
as behest in character. The Committee, represented by the
PCGG, filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman, against the directors and officers of RHC
and that of DPB for violation of RA 3109, or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Ombudsman
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. PCGG
moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied on
the ground of prescription.
Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of
prescription.
Ruling:
NO. Based on jurisprudence, the following guidelines in
the determination of the reckoning point for the period of
prescription of violations of RA 3019, viz: 1). As a
general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of
the commission of the offense; 2). If the date of the
commission of the violation is not known, it shall be
counted form the date of discovery thereof; 3). In
determining whether it is the general rule or the exception
that should apply in a particular case, the availability or
suppression of the information relative to the crime
should first be determined. If the necessary information,
data, or records based on which the crime could be
discovered is readily available to the public, the general
rule applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the
date of the commission of the crime. Otherwise, should
martial law prevent the filing thereof or should
6
information about the violation be suppressed, possibly
through connivance, then the exception applies and the
period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date of
discovery thereof.
In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest
loans which the SC has recognized as a violation that, by
their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by
the simple expedient of suppressing their documentation,
the second mode applies. The SC counts the running of
the prescriptive period from the date of discovery thereof
on January 4, 1993, when the Committee reported to the
President its findings and conclusions anent RHC’s loans.
This being the case, the filing by the PCGG of its
Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
on January 6,2003, a little over ten (10) years from the
date of discovery of the crimes, is clearly belated.
Undoubtedly, the ten-year period within which to institute
the action has already lapsed, making it proper for the
Ombudsman to dismiss petitioner’s complaint on the
ground of prescription
7. PEOPLE VS JABINAL
Facts:
The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the
Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty
of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based
upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s
ruling in People vs. Mapa.
As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused
admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession
of the revolver and the ammunition described in the
complaint was without the requisite license a permit. He
however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT
appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently
appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the
authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his
official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme
Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang and People
vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.
Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the
accused, the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise,
citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero
were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs.
mapa.
Issue:
Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme
Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or should his
conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of
Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
Ruling:
The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant
was acquitted.
Reason:
The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was
part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time
appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question
and he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the
doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one
is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had
relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
2ND VERSION
FACTS:
Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession
of Firearm and Ammunition.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was
in possession of the revolver and the ammunition
described in the complaint, without the requisite license
or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or
permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the
Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander,
and the said appointments expressly carried with them the
authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view
of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm
subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to
acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision
in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs.
Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal
and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).
7
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis
of the court’s rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or
should his conviction stand in view of the complete
reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in
Mapa.
RULING:
Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code states that “Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system … .” The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim
“legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet” — the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law.
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm
pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal
liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in
spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor,
appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not
be punished for an act which at the time it was done was
held not to be punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.
8. CO VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging
firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the
Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983
in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on
January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the
tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED
ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company
against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime
charged.
He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the
check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to
the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on
September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or
"bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not
considered a punishable offense, an official
pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of
Justice.
ISSUE: whether the decision issued by the Court be
applied retroactively to the prejudice of the accused.
HELD: No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code
"judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law
of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil
Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed
in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the
law looks forward not backward. The rationale against
retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of
contract and hence, is unconstitutional
The weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the
proposition that the Court's decision of September 21,
1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a
check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an
obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 —
should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice
of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on
the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a
check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
2ND VERSION
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against
petitioner with the Regional Trial Court. The case
eventuated in petitioner’s conviction of the crime charged
on the basis that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by
B.P. Blg. 22. Pending litigation, Ministry of Justice
Circular No. 4 (which excludes guarantee check from
application of B.P. Blg. 22) was subsequently reversed by
Ministry Circular No. 12 which ruled that a check issued
merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration
upon the theory that it was reversible error for the
Regional Trial Court but the Court of Appeals affirmed
his conviction.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August 8,
1984 declaring the guarantee check will no longer be
considered as a valid defense be retroactively applied.
HELD:
NO. Decision of the Court of Appeals and RTC were set
aside. Criminal prosecution against accused-petitioner
was dismissed.
RATIO:
It would seem that the weight of authority is decidedly in
favor of the proposition that the Court’s decision of
September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160
(1987) that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by
B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to
the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated,
who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of
Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of
B.P. Blg. 22.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which,
pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be
resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered,
the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine
of mala prohibita should override the principle of
prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above
set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.
B. BILLS OF ATTAINDER
9. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (BOCEA) VS TEVES
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment on individuals or members of a particular
group without a judicial trial.
Facts:
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into
law RA 9335. The law intends to encourage Bureau of
Internal Revenue and Bureau of Customs officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions. It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
Contending that the enactment and
implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with
constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental
rights of its members, Bureau of Customs Employees
Association (BOCEA) filed a petition before the SC and
averred that the BOC started to disseminate Collection
District Performance Contracts for the lower ranking
officials and rank-and-file employees to sign. Such
Performance Contracts provide that officials and
employees whose revenue collection fall short of the
target shall be removed for the service. BOCEA opined
that the revenue target was impossible to meet due to
economic factors. BOCEA claimed that some BOC
employees were forced to sign the Performance Contract,
but majority of them did not sign. BOCEA officers were
summoned and required to sign the Performance
Contracts but they also refused.
The petition was filed directly with the SC.
BOCEA asserted the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335
and its IRR, and their adverse effects on the constitutional
rights of BOC officials and employees. BOCEA argued,
among others, that its members and other BOC employees
are in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to
meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear
violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure,
and at their and their respective families’ prejudice. They
seek to declare the said law unconstitutional for being a
bill of attainder.
Issue:
Whether R.A. 9335 is a bill of attainder; hence,
unconstitutional because it inflicts punishment through
legislative fiat upon a particular group or class of officials
and employees without trial.
Ruling:
NO. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which
inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a
particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill
of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a
group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment,
penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. R.A. No.
9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder.
It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial
trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the
termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and
provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic
processes are still followed and the constitutional rights
of the concerned employee are amply protected
9