CANON 15 named therein.
They are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by
A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BIDIN, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National Bank
charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset
Management Group of complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thus:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while
in said service.
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in which
respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging
the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for
P200,000. He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in
favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division
Compound. When a civil action arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and
complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had
since left the employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed by
complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and
dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil
Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainant’s Asset
Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses Ponciano
and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the couple. When a
civil action ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a result of this loan
account, the latter were represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of
which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel for Mrs.
Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged
that he did not participate in the litigation of the case before the trial court. With respect to the
case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that he never appeared as counsel for them.
He contended that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is designated as
counsel of record, the case is actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred
that he did not enter into a general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers
lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting
staff. Each one of them handles their own cases independently and individually receives the
revenues therefrom which are not shared among them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was previously
fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled
"Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where respondent
appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer
Maynigo and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully substantiated.
Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the Almeda spouses is not a
partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of the attestation of complainant's counsel,
Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent
attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not enter his appearance,
he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore,
during the hearing of the application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent
impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that respondent
was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in itself a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the client’s secrets and
confidential records and information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all
times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to devise ways
and means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best
position to see the legal weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor for the said
clients to seek his professional service. In sum, the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent
of his ethics in consideration of the money he expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3 years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, 1994,
submitted to this Court its Report and recommendation in this case, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation contained in the said Report
with the IBP Board of Governors. On December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another "Motion
to Set Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration. In resolving this
case, the Court took into consideration the aforesaid pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to emphasize the
paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case
of Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal
Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft
case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-
graft case, this Court, citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree
with him, that even if respondent did not use against his client any
information or evidence acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that
 he did become privy to information regarding the ownership of the parcel of
land which was later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute
over the land that triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the
criminal action for physical injuries. This Court's remarks in Hilado vs. David,
84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of
litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and
irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the complexity of what is said in
the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other
matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his
former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere
fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing
as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case. In the case of Hilado
vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further said:
Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of
attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests.
This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner
from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on
principles of public policy, of good taste. As has been said in another case,
the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to
whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not only to
keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double dealing. Only thus can litigants. be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice.
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to
respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now
seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a
transaction which he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of
Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to
wit:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express
conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest
when, in behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO
from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in
Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 6708 August 25, 2005
(CBD Case No. 01-874)
FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NESTOR A. BAMBA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
We are aware of the hapless fact that there are not enough lawyers to serve an exploding
population. This unfortunate state of affairs, however, will not seize this Court from exercising its
disciplinary power over lawyers culpable of serious indiscretions. The incidence of public force
must be deployed to bear upon the community to eventually forge a legal profession that
provides quality, ethical, accessible, and cost-effective legal service to our people and whose
members are willing and able to answer the call to public service.
In this administrative case for disbarment, complainant Felicitas S. Quiambao charges
respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
representing conflicting interests when the latter filed a case against her while he was at that
time representing her in another case, and for committing other acts of disloyalty and double-
dealing.
From June 2000 to January 2001, the complainant was the president and managing director of
Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. (AIB), a family-owned corporation engaged in providing security
and investigation services. She avers that she procured the legal services of the respondent not
only for the corporate affairs of AIB but also for her personal case. Particularly, the respondent
acted as her counsel of record in an ejectment case against Spouses Santiago and Florita
Torroba filed by her on 29 December 2000 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Parañaque City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 11928. She paid attorney’s fees for
respondent’s legal services in that case.1 About six months after she resigned as AIB president,
or on 14 June 2001, the respondent filed on behalf of AIB a complaint for replevin and damages
against her before the MeTC of Quezon City for the purpose of recovering from her the car of
AIB assigned to her as a service vehicle. This he did without withdrawing as counsel of record in
the ejectment case, which was then still pending.2
Apart from the foregoing litigation matter, the complainant, in her Position Paper, charges the
respondent with acts of disloyalty and double-dealing. She avers that the respondent proposed
to her that she organize her own security agency and that he would assist her in its organization,
causing her to resign as president of AIB. The respondent indeed assisted her in December
2000 in the formation of another security agency, Quiambao Risk Management Specialists, Inc.,
(QRMSI), which was later registered under complainant’s name, with the respondent as a "silent
partner" represented by his associate Atty. Gerardo P. Hernandez. The respondent was paid
attorney’s fees for his legal services in organizing and incorporating QRMSI. He also planned to
"steal" or "pirate" some of the more important clients of AIB. While serving as legal counsel for
AIB and a "silent partner" of QRMSI, he convinced complainant’s brother Leodegario Quiambao
to organize another security agency, San Esteban Security Services, Inc. (SESSI) where he (the
respondent) served as its incorporator, director, and president. The respondent and Leodegario
then illegally diverted the funds of AIB to fund the incorporation of SESSI, and likewise planned
to eventually close down the operations of AIB and transfer the business to SESSI.3
For his part, the respondent admits that he represented the complainant in the aforementioned
ejectment case and later represented AIB in the replevin case against her. He, however, denies
that he was the "personal lawyer" of the complainant, and avers that he was made to believe
that it was part of his function as counsel for AIB to handle even the "personal cases" of its
officers. Even assuming that the complainant confided to him privileged information about her
legal interests, the ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated cases involving different
issues and parties and, therefore, the privileged information which might have been gathered
from one case would have no use in the other. At any rate, it was the complainant herself who
insisted that he stay as her counsel despite the perceived differences among her, her brother,
and AIB over the motor vehicle subject of the replevin case. The complainant even asked him to
assist her in her monetary claims against AIB.4
The respondent also denies the charge raised by the complainant in her position paper that he
agreed to be a "silent partner" of QRMSI through his nominee, Atty. Gerardo P. Hernandez, who
was his former law partner. He declined complainant’s offer to assume that role and suggested
Atty. Hernandez in his place; thus, 375 shares of stock were registered in Atty. Hernandez’s
name as consideration of his (Atty. Hernandez’s) legal services as corporate secretary and legal
counsel of QRMSI. The respondent also denies that he convinced complainant’s brother
Leodegario to organize another security agency and that the funds of AIB were unlawfully
diverted to SESSI. It was to complement the business of AIB, which was then in danger of
collapse, that SESSI was established. Leodegario’s wife and her son have the effective control
over SESSI. Respondent’s subscribed shareholdings in SESSI comprise only 800 shares out of
12,500 subscribed shares. He serves AIB and SESSI in different capacities: as legal counsel of
the former and as president of the latter.5
In his Report and Recommendation6 dated 31 August 2004, the investigating commissioner of
the IBP found the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests based on the following
undisputed facts: first, the respondent was still complainant’s counsel of record in the ejectment
case when he filed, as legal counsel of AIB, the replevin case against her; and second, the
respondent was still the legal counsel of AIB when he advised the complainant on the
incorporation of another security agency, QRMSI, and recommended his former law partner,
Atty. Gerardo Hernandez, to be its corporate secretary and legal counsel and also when he
conferred with Leodegario to organize another security agency, SESSI, where the respondent
became an incorporator, stockholder, and president. Thus, the investigating commissioner
recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the investigating commissioner’s report and
recommendation, but reduced the penalty from one year to a stern reprimand.7
The issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests in contravention of the basic tenets of the legal profession.
Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts." This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste.8
In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the
client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is,
therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.9 It behooves lawyers not only to
keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which
is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.10
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose.11
Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine whether a lawyer’s
conduct lies within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an
issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other
client.12 Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in
arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.13 Still
another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a
former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.14
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no
moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer
has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit,
are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.15
In this case, it is undisputed that at the time the respondent filed the replevin case on behalf of
AIB he was still the counsel of record of the complainant in the pending ejectment case. We do
not sustain respondent’s theory that since the ejectment case and the replevin case are
unrelated cases fraught with different issues, parties, and subject matters, the prohibition is
inapplicable. His representation of opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously
constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of double-dealing. While the
respondent may assert that the complainant expressly consented to his continued
representation in the ejectment case, the respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the
facts to both his clients and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant and AIB
as required under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Neither can we accept respondent’s plea that he was duty-bound to handle all the cases referred
to him by AIB, including the personal cases of its officers which had no connection to its
corporate affairs. That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest
intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative.16 Moreover,
lawyers are not obliged to act either as an adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become their client. They have the right to decline such employment, subject, however, to
Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.17 Although there are instances where
lawyers cannot decline representation,18 they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest
between a present client and a prospective one.19
Additionally, in his position paper, the respondent alleges that when the complainant invited the
respondent to join QRMSI, he "vehemently refused to join them due to his perception of
conflicting interest as he was then (and still is at present) the Legal Counsel" of AIB, which is
also a security agency.20 To bolster his allegation, he invoked the affidavits of complainant’s
witnesses which contained statements of his apprehension of conflict of interest should he join
QRMSI.21
Surprisingly, despite his apprehension or awareness of a possible conflict of interest should he
join QRMSI, the respondent later allowed himself to become an incorporator, stockholder, and
president of SESSI, which is also a security agency. He justified his act by claiming that that
while both AIB and SESSI are engaged in security agency business, he is serving in different
capacities. As the in-house legal counsel of AIB, he "serves its legal interest the parameter of
which evolves around legal matters" such as protecting the legal rights and interest of the
corporation; conducting an investigation or a hearing on violations of company rules and Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court reads in part as follows:
regulations of their office employees and security guards; sending demand letters in collection
cases; and representing the corporation in any litigation for or against it. And as president of
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. –
SESSI, he serves the operational aspects of the business such as "how does it operate[], how
much do they price their services, what kind or how do they train[] their security guards, how
they solicit clients." Thus, conflict of interest is far-fetched. Moreover, the respondent argues that (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon
the complainant, not being a stockholder of AIB and SESSI, has no right to question his alleged the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the
conflict of interest in serving the two security agencies.22 Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
reasons on which it is based.
While the complainant lacks personality to question the alleged conflict of interests on the part of
the respondent in serving both security agencies, we cannot just turn a blind eye to respondent’s We may consider the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as a memorandum decision
act. It must be noted that the proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds adopting by reference the report of the investigating commissioner. However, we look with
application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter however disfavor the change in the recommended penalty without any explanation therefor. Again, we
slight the adverse interest may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the lawyer’s private remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance of the requirement to announce in plain
activity or in the performance of a function in a non-professional capacity.23 In the process of terms its legal reasoning, since the requirement that its decision in disciplinary proceedings must
determining whether there is a conflict of interest, an important criterion is probability, not state the facts and the reasons on which its decision is based is akin to what is required of the
certainty, of conflict. decisions of courts of record.27 The reasons for handing down a penalty occupy no lesser
station than any other portion of the ratio.
Since the respondent has financial or pecuniary interest in SESSI, which is engaged in a
business competing with his client’s, and, more importantly, he occupies the highest position in In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests a
SESSI, one cannot help entertaining a doubt on his loyalty to his client AIB. This kind of situation penalty ranging from one to three years’ suspension was imposed.28 In this case, we find that a
passes the second test of conflict of interest, which is whether the acceptance of a new suspension from the practice of law for one year is warranted.
relationship would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba is hereby held GUILTY of violation of Rule
duty. The close relationship of the majority stockholders of both companies does not negate the
15.03 of Canon 15 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
conflict of interest. Neither does his protestation that his shareholding in SESSI is "a mere
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR effective from receipt of
pebble among the sands."
this Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
In view of all of the foregoing, we find the respondent guilty of serious misconduct for
representing conflicting interests.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.
Furthermore, it must be noted that Republic Act No. 5487, otherwise known as the Private
Security Agency Law, prohibits a person from organizing or having an interest in more than one
SO ORDERED.
security agency. From respondent’s position paper, it can be culled that Leodegario Quiambao is
the president and managing director of AIB, holding 60% of the outstanding shares; while his
four other siblings who are permanent residents in the United States own the remaining 40%.24
This prohibition notwithstanding, the respondent organized SESSI, with Leodegario’s wife and
son as majority stockholders holding about 70% of the outstanding shares and with him (the
respondent), as well as the rest of the stockholders, holding minimal shares.25 In doing so, the
respondent virtually allowed Leodegario and the latter’s wife to violate or circumvent the law by
having an interest in more than one security agency. It must be noted that in the affidavit26 of
Leodegario’s wife, she mentioned of their conjugal property. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the property relation of Leodegario and his wife can be presumed to be that of conjugal
partnership of gains; hence, the majority shares in AIB and SESSI are the conjugal property of
Leodegario and his wife, thereby placing themselves in possession of an interest in more than
one security agency in contravention of R.A. No. 5487. Thus, in organizing SESSI, the
respondent violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates lawyers to promote respect for the law and refrain from counseling or abetting
activities aimed at defiance of the law.

As to the recommendation that the penalty be reduced from a suspension of one year to a stern
warning, we find the same to be without basis. We are disturbed by the reduction made by the
IBP Board of Governors of the penalty recommended by the investigating commissioner without
clearly and distinctly stating the facts and reasons on which that reduction is based.
A.C. No. 9537 June 10, 2013 When the said obligation became due, despite Dr. Lee's repeated demands, Mejorado failed and
(Formerly CBD Case No. 09-2489) refused to comply with his obligation. Since Atty. Simando was still her lawyer then, Dr. Lee
instructed him to initiate legal action against Mejorado. Atty. Simando said he would get in touch
with Mejorado and ask him to pay his obligation without having to resort to legal action.
DR. TERESITA LEE, Complainant,
However, even after several months, Mejorado still failed to pay Dr. Lee, so she again asked
vs.
Atty. Simando why no payment has been made yet. Dr. Lee then reminded Atty. Simando that
ATTY. AMADOR L. SIMANDO, Respondent.
he was supposed to be the co-maker of the obligation of Mejorado, to which he replied: "Di
kasuhan din ninyo ako!"5
DECISION
Despite complainant's repeated requests, respondent ignored her and failed to bring legal
PERALTA, J.: actions against Mejorado. Thus, in January 2008, complainant was forced to terminate her
contract with Atty. Simando.
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated July 21, 2009 filed by Dr. Teresita Lee (Dr. Lee)
against respondent Atty. Amador L. Simando (Atty. Simando) before the Integrated Bar of the Subsequently, complainant's new lawyer, Atty. Gilbert Morandarte, sent a demand letter dated
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2489, now June 13, 2008 to Atty. Simando in his capacity as the co-maker of some of the loans of
A.C. No. 9537, for violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics of Lawyers. Mejorado.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Atty. Simando was the retained counsel of complainant Dr. Lee from November 2004 until
January 8, 2008, with a monthly retainer fee of Three Thousand Pesos (Php3,000.00). 2
Sometime during the above-mentioned period, Atty. Simando went to see Dr. Lee and asked if
the latter could help a certain Felicito M. Mejorado (Mejorado) for his needed funds. He claimed
that Mejorado was then awaiting the release of his claim for informer's reward from the Bureau
of Customs. Because Dr. Lee did not know Mejorado personally and she claimed to be not in the
business of lending money, the former initially refused to lend money. But Atty. Simando
allegedly persisted and assured her that Mejorado will pay his obligation and will issue postdated
checks and sign promissory notes. He allegedly even offered to be the co-maker of Mejorado
and assured her that Mejorado's obligation will be paid when due. Atty. Simando was quoted
saying: "Ipapahamak ba kita, kliyente kita"; "Sigurado ito, kung gusto mo, gagarantiyahan ko pa
ito, at pipirma din ako"; "Isang buwan lang, at hindi hihigit sa dalawang buwan ito, bayad ka na." 3
Due to Atty. Simando's persistence, his daily calls and frequent visits to convince Dr. Lee, the
latter gave in to her lawyer's demands, and finally agreed to give Mejorado sizeable amounts of
money. Respondent acted as co-maker with Mejorado in various cash loans, to wit:4
Date: Amount
November 11, 2006 Php 400,000.00
November 24, 2006 200,000.00
November 27, 2006 400,000.00
December 7, 2006 200,000.00
December 13, 2006 200,000.00
Total: Php1,400,000.00
In his Letter dated June 30, 2008, respondent denied his liability as a co-maker and claimed that
novation had occurred because complainant had allegedly given additional loans to Mejorado
without his knowledge.6
Dr. Lee then accused Atty. Simando of violating the trust and confidence which she gave upon
him as her lawyer, and even took advantage of their professional relationship in order to get a
loan for his client. Worse, when the said obligation became due, respondent was unwilling to
help her to favor Mejorado. Thus, the instant petition for disbarment against Atty. Simando.
On August 12, 2009, the IBP-CBD ordered respondent to submit his Answer on the complaint
against him.7
In his Answer8 dated September 17, 2009, Atty. Simando claimed that complainant, who is
engaged in lending money at a high interest rate, was the one who initiated the financial
transaction between her and Mejorado. He narrated that complainant asked him if it is true that
Mejorado is his client as she found out that Mejorado has a pending claim for informer's reward
with the Bureau of Customs. When he affirmed that Mejorado is his client, complainant signified
that she is willing to give money for Mejorado's financial needs while awaiting for the release of
the informer's reward. Eventually, parties agreed that Mejorado will pay double the amount and
that payment shall be made upon receipt by Mejorado of the payment of his claim for informer's
reward.9
Meanwhile, Atty. Simando stressed that Dr. Lee gave Mejorado a total of Php700,000.00 as an
investment but he signed as co-maker in all the receipts showing double the amount or
Php1,400,000.00.10
Respondent claimed that complainant is a money-lender exacting high interest rates from
borrowers.11 He narrated several instances and civil cases where complainant was engaged in
money-lending where he divulged that even after defendants had already paid their loan,
complainant still persists in collecting from them.12 Respondent asserted that he knew of these
transactions, because he was among the four lawyers who handled complainant's case. 13
Respondent averred that from the time that Mejorado and Dr. Lee had become close to each
other, the latter had given Mejorado additional investments and one (1) Silverado Pick-up at the
price of ₱500,000.00 and fifty (50) sacks of old clothings. He claimed that the additional
investments made by Dr. Lee to Mejorado were given without his knowledge.
Atty. Simando further alleged that with Dr. Lee's investment of around ₱2 Million which included
the Silverado Pick-up and the fifty (50) sacks of old clothings, the latter required Mejorado to
issue five (5) checks with a total value of ₱7,033,500.00, an amount more than the actual value
which Mejorado received.14
Atty. Simando added that while Dr. Lee and Mejorado agreed that the issued checks shall be
presented to the bank only upon payment of his informer's reward, Dr. Lee presented the checks
to the bank despite being aware that Mejorado's account had no funds for said checks. Atty.
Simando further denied that he refused to take legal action against Mejorado. He claimed that
complainant never instructed him to file legal action, since the latter knew that Mejorado is
obligated to pay only upon receipt of his informer's reward.
Finally, Atty. Simando insisted that he did not violate their lawyerclient relationship, since Dr. Lee
voluntarily made the financial investment with Mejorado and that he merely introduced
complainant to Mejorado. He further claimed that there is no conflict of interest because he is
Mejorado's lawyer relative to the latter's claim for informer's reward, and not Mejorado's lawyer
against Dr. Lee. He reiterated that there is no conflicting interest as there was no case between
Mejorado and Dr. Lee that he is handling for both of them.15
In her Reply dated October 30, 2009, Dr. Lee denied that what she entered into was a mere
investment. She insisted that she lent the money to Mejorado and respondent, in his capacity as
co-maker and the transaction was actually a loan.16 To prove her claim, Dr. Lee submitted the
written loan agreements/receipts which categorically stated that the money received was a loan
with due dates, signed by Mejorado and respondent as co-maker.17 She further claimed that she
did not know Mejorado and it was respondent who brought him to her and requested her to
assist Mejorado by lending him money as, in fact, respondent even vouched for Mejorado and
agreed to sign as co-maker.
Complainant further emphasized that what she was collecting is the payment only of the loan
amounting to One Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php1,400,000.00) which respondent
had signed as co-maker. Thus, respondent's claim that his obligation was already extinguished
by novation holds no water, since what was being collected is merely his obligation pertaining to
the loan amounting to Php1,400,000.00 only, and nothing more.
Finally, complainant lamented that respondent, in his comments, even divulged confidential
informations he had acquired while he was still her lawyer and even used it against her in the
present case, thus, committing another unethical conduct. She, therefore, maintained that
respondent is guilty of violating the lawyer-client confidentiality rule.
Both parties failed to appear during the mandatory conference on January 15, 2010. Both parties
requested for resetting of the mandatory conference, however, both failed to agree on a certain
date. Hence, the IBP, so as not to delay the disposition of the complaint, terminated the
mandatory conference and instead required the parties to submit their respective position
papers.18
On March 18, 2010, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Simando guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.
On December 29, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD to suspend Atty. Simando from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months.
Respondent moved for reconsideration.
On March 10, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors granted respondent's motion for
reconsideration for lack of sufficient evidence to warrant the penalty of suspension. The
Resolution dated December 29, 2010 was reversed and the case against respondent was
dismissed.
RULING
We reverse the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors.
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a lawyer is guilty of representing
conflicting interest:
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client
and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for
one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a
violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another
test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client
any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 19
In the instant case, we find substantial evidence to support respondent's violation of the above
parameters, as established by the following circumstances on record:
First, it is undisputed that there was a lawyer-client relationship between complainant and Atty.
Simando as evidenced by the retainer fees received by respondent and the latter's
representation in certain legal matters pertaining to complainant's business;
Second, Atty. Simando admitted that Mejorado is another client of him albeit in a case claiming
rewards against the Bureau of Customs;
Third, Atty. Simando admitted that he was the one who introduced complainant and Mejorado to
each other for the purpose of entering into a financial transaction while having knowledge that
complainant's interests could possibly run in conflict with Mejorado's interests which ironically
such client's interests, he is duty-bound to protect;
Fourth, despite the knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients, respondent
consented in the parties' agreement and even signed as co-maker to the loan agreement;
Fifth, respondent's knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was
demonstrated further by his own actions, when he:
(a) failed to act on Mejorado's failure to pay his obligation to complainant despite the
latter's instruction to do so;
(b) denied liability despite signing as co-maker in the receipts/promissory notes arising
from the loan agreement between his two clients;
 (c) rebutted complainant's allegations against Mejorado and him, and even divulged
informations he acquired while he was still complainant's lawyer.
Clearly, it is improper for respondent to appear as counsel for one party (complainant as
creditor) against the adverse party (Mejorado as debtor) who is also his client, since a lawyer is
prohibited from representing conflicting interests. He may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflict with that of his
present or former client.
Accordingly, we reiterate that lawyers are enjoined to look at any representation situation from
"the point of view that there are possible conflicts," and further, "to think in terms of impaired
loyalty" that is to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair loyalty to a client. 26
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and
recommendation of the IBP in Resolution No. XIX-20 10-733 suspending respondent Atty.
Amador L. Simando for six ( 6) months from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

Respondent's assertion that there is no conflict of interest because complainant and respondent Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
are his clients in unrelated cases fails to convince. His representation of opposing clients in both Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least, invites Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's record as member of
suspicion of double-dealing.20 Moreover, with the subject loan agreement entered into by the the Bar.
complainant and Mejorado, who are both his clients, readily shows an apparent conflict of
interest, moreso when he signed as co-maker.
Atty. Simando is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that
we can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
Likewise, respondent's argument that the money received was an investment and not a loan is
difficult to accept, considering that he signed as co-maker. Respondent is a lawyer and it is
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
objectionable that he would sign as co-maker if he knew all along that the intention of the parties
was to engage in a mere investment. Also, as a lawyer, signing as a co-maker, it can be
presupposed that he is aware of the nature of suretyship and the consequences of signing as SO ORDERED.
co-maker. Therefore, he cannot escape liability without exposing himself from administrative
liability, if not civil liability. Moreover, we noted that while complainant was able to show proof of
receipts of various amounts of money loaned and received by Mejorado, and signed by the
respondent as co-maker, the latter, however, other than his bare denials, failed to show proof
that the money given was an investment and not a loan.

It must be stressed that the proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds
application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter however
slight the adverse interest may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the lawyer’s private
activity or in the performance of a function in a non-professional capacity. In the process of
determining whether there is a conflict of interest, an important criterion is probability, not
certainty, of conflict.21

We likewise note that respondent offered several excuses in order to avoid payment of his
liability.1âwphi1 First, in his Answer to complainant's demand letter, he claimed there was
novation which extinguished his liability; Secondly, he claimed that the amount received by
Mejorado for which he signed as co-maker was merely an investment and not a loan. Finally, he
alleged that it was agreed that the investment with profits will be paid only after Mejorado
receives the payment for his claim for reward which complainant violated when she presented
the checks for payment prematurely. These actuations of Atty. Simando do not speak well of his
reputation as a lawyer.22

Finally, we likewise find respondent guilty of violating Rule 21.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.23 In his last-ditch effort to impeach the credibility of complainant, he divulged
informations24 which he acquired in confidence during the existence of their lawyer-client
relationship.

We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez25 that the termination of the relation of attorney and client
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of
the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client’s confidence once reposed cannot be
divested by the expiration of the professional employment. Consequently, a lawyer should not,
even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect
his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or
use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.
A.C. No. 5858 December 11, 2003
ROGELIO R. SANTOS, SR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO C. BELTRAN, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment1 filed by Rogelio R. Santos, Sr. against Atty.
Rodolfo C. Beltran on the grounds of gross misconduct and malpractice.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Spouses Filomeno Santiago Santos, Sr. and Benita Roxas Rodriguez had ten children, namely,
Romeo, Filomeno, Jr., Arturo, Erlinda, Ma. Alicia, Arcely, Renato, Alberto and Benito and
complainant Rogelio Santos, Sr. After the death of Filomeno, Benita donated their two
residential lots situated at 11 Javier Baritan, Malabon, Metro Manila, consisting of 489 and 333.4
square meters, respectively, and covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) Nos. R-18060
and R-18061, including the ancestral house situated thereon, in favor of the nine children,
except complainant. Respondent lawyer notarized the Deed of Donation.2
Benita Rodriguez died. Complainant and his brother, Alberto, were appointed administrators3 in
the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the spouses’ estate, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
516-AF, entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Spouses Filomeno Santiago Santos, Sr.
and Benita Roxas Rodriguez, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch
26 thereof.
On November 9, 1999, complainant filed a verified complaint against respondent before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), alleging that when
respondent notarized the subject Deed of Donation, his siblings did not personally appear before
him.4 Complainant submitted the affidavit executed by Benito and Renato attesting to the fact
that they signed the Deed of Donation not in the law office of the respondent but in their houses
at Villa Benita Subdivision. The Deed also showed that his siblings secured their Community Tax
Certificates twenty-two days after the execution of the Deed of Donation, or on September 9,
1994. Complainant contended that respondent notarized the Deed of Donation in disregard of
Article 9045 of the Civil Code. Moreover, he argued that his siblings were American citizens who
were thus disqualified from owning real properties in the Philippines.
Complainant further alleged that respondent appeared as private prosecutor in Criminal Case
No. 73560 for falsification of public document, which he filed against Renato and Benito, without
being engaged by him or authorized by the court; that respondent represented conflicting
interest when he entered his appearance as defense counsel in an ejectment case in which his
former client, Erlinda R. Santos-Crawford, was the plaintiff; and that respondent, through
insidious machination acquired the titles of two residential lots at Villa Benita Subdivision owned
by Spouses Filomeno and Benita Santos.
Respondent denied the allegations. He confirmed the due execution of the Deed of Donation
and submitted in support thereof the affidavit executed by Mely Lachica, the secretary of his law
office. In her Affidavit, Lachica categorically stated that she caused all parties to sign the Deed.
She, nevertheless admitted that she forgot to change the date of the execution of the Deed from
August 18, 1994 to September 9, 1994 when all the parties had secured their CTCs.6
Respondent argued that complainant’s siblings may still acquire properties in the Philippines
through hereditary succession even though they were already American citizens. The
certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation were not conclusive proof of
the arrival and departure of his siblings considering that there were many ports of entry in the
country. Respondent also declared that complainant humiliated his mother when, in his
presence and that of his siblings, complainant uttered the unsavory Tagalog words, "Putang ina
mo matanda ka, walanghiya ka, walang pinagkatandaan dapat mamatay ka na."7
Respondent denied having represented complainant in Criminal Case No. 73560 on December
15, 1999 when he appeared as private prosecutor. He explained that complainant filed a
complaint for falsification of public document against him and his nine siblings, docketed as I.S.
No. 04-99-3187, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City, relying on the
affidavit executed by Benito and Renato that they signed the Deed of Donation in their houses at
Villa Benita and not at respondent’s office. The prosecutor dismissed the complaint. A second
action for falsification of public document was filed by complainant against Renato and Benito,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 73560. Respondent appeared at one of the hearings of the said
case to defend himself from the accusation of Benito and Renato. Respondent emphasized that
he did not ask for any compensation from complainant for that isolated appearance.
Respondent denied having acquired any property under litigation. On February 16, 1999, he
bought8 two parcels of land inside Villa Benita Subdivision, covered by TCT Nos. T-50223 and
50225, from a corporation owned by the Santoses, Fabern’s Inc., and not from Spouses
Filomeno and Benita Santos, as claimed by complainant. He was surprised when sometime in
August 2002, complainant caused the annotation on the said titles of an adverse claim that the
properties belonged to the estate of Spouses Filomeno and Benita Santos. Complainant relied
on the Contract of Development dated May 10, 1995 which Fabern’s Inc. executed in favor of
Villa Benita Management and Development Corporation where respondent was one of the
directors.
Respondent admitted having represented Erlinda R. Santos-Crawford in Civil Case No. 12105
for ejectment, entitled "Erlinda R. Santos-Crawford v. Renato R. Santos and Rogelio R. Santos,
Sr.,"9 involving a land covered by TCT No. T-10168 at No. 1 F. S. Avenue, Villa Benita
Subdivision, Cabanatuan City and the improvements thereon. He also acted as defense counsel
of Evalyn Valino, Norberto Valino and Danilo Agsaway in Civil Case No. 1482310 for ejectment
filed by Rogelio Santos on behalf of Erlinda R. Santos involving the same property. He
emphasized that the decision in Civil Case No. 12105 had long been executed, thus the
attorney-client relationship between him and Erlinda Santos-Crawford was also terminated.
On July 19, 2002, the IBP-CBD found respondent guilty of violating his notarial commission and
recommended that his commission be suspended for a period of one year.11
The Board of Governors, in Resolution No. CBD Case No. 99-670, modified the
recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/ Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and
considering respondent’s violation of his notarial obligation, Respondent’s Commission as
Notary Public is hereby SUSPENDED, with DISQUALIFICATION from being appointed as
Notary Public for two (2) years from notice of final decision.12
On October 11, 2002, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforestated
Resolution, which was denied by the Board on December 14, 2002 on the ground that it has lost
jurisdiction thereof upon its endorsement to this Court.13
In essence, complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent for allegedly notarizing a Deed
of Donation without the affiants personally appearing before him. Indeed, the power to disbar
must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
as a member of the bar.14 Corollary thereto, gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong
conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment."15
The rule is that a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their
favor the presumption of regularity.16 In the instant case, complainant failed to controvert the
said presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Instead, the quantum of evidence shows
that complainant’s siblings appeared before the respondent as notary public and in fact, signed
the deed. The claim of Renato and Benito Santos in their affidavit that they did not sign the
document in the law office of the respondent but in their houses at Villa Benita is admissible only
against them.17 Likewise, we find the allegation of the complainant that it was physically
impossible for his siblings to sign the document untenable. The certifications issued by the BID
that the complainant’s siblings were absent at the time of the execution of the Deed of Donation
is not absolute. There are many ports of entry which complainant’s siblings may have used in
coming into the country.1âwphi1 The possibility that complainant’s siblings executed and signed
the Deed is not remote. The discrepancy in the date stamped in the Deed and the date when
complainant’s siblings obtained their CTCs had been substantially explained in the affidavit
executed by the secretary of the law office, Mely Lachica.
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those
in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will
be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.19
In the case at bar, Civil Case No. 12105 for ejectment was filed by Arcely Y. Santos in behalf of
Erlinda Santos-Crawford against complainant and Renato Santos. Respondent, however
appeared as counsel for Evalyn Valino, Norberto Valino and Danilo Agsaway in Civil Case No.
14823 for ejectment filed by complainant as attorney-in-fact of Erlinda Santos-Crawford. Civil
Case No. 14823, although litigated by complainant, was actually brought in behalf of and to
protect the interest of Erlinda Santos-Crawford. Respondent’s act of representing the parties
against whom his other client, Erlinda Santos-Crawford, filed suit constituted conflict of
interest.20
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Beltran is found GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective
immediately. Respondent is further STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as
The allegation that respondent represented complainant in Criminal Case No. 73569 without
well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and
being retained or authorized by the court is also untenable. Respondent adequately explained
guidance.
his isolated appearance at one of the hearings. The transcript of stenographic notes shows that
respondent himself was in doubt as to the nature of his appearance in the case. In entering his
appearance as private prosecutor, he did not intend to represent complainant but only to defend SO ORDERED.
himself from the accusation of Benito and Renato that he notarized the Deed of Donation in their
absence. This was patent in the transcript of stenographic notes wherein he admitted that he
himself was in doubt as to his position. We are not persuaded by complainant who tried to
insinuate that it was unethical for the respondent to represent him.1âwphi1

Anent the charge that respondent acquired properties under litigation in violation of Article
149118 of the Civil Code, records show that respondent acquired the property from Fabern’s
Inc., and not from Spouses Filemon and Benita Santos. Complainant’s allegation that
respondent as director of Villa Benita Management and Development Corporation fraudulently
caused the transfer of titles of properties, specifically parcels of lands owned by the family
corporation, Fabern’s Inc., by executing a management and development contract, lacks basis.
Respondent may not be held accountable based on mere allegation that through insidious
machinations he deprived Spouses Filomeno and Benita Santos, now their estate, of the
properties. Surmises, suspicion and conjectures are not bases of culpability.

Lastly, complainant indicted respondent for representing conflicting interest in violation of Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule
A.C. No. 9395 November 12, 2014
DARIA O. DAGING, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This administrative complaint for disbarment arose from an Affidavit Complaint1 filed by Daria O.
Daging (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Benguet Chapter,2
against Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis (respondent).
Antecedents
Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased from
Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac) a building spaGe located at No. 22 Otek St., Baguio City where she
operated the bar.
Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal3 from Davis & Sabling Law Office signed
by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty. Sabling). This eventually
resulted in the signing by the complainant, the respondent and Atty. Sabling of a Retainer
Agreement4 dated March 7, 2005.
Because complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the lease.
Together with Novie Balageo (Balageo) and respondent, Pinlac went to complainant's music bar,
inventoried all the equipment therein, and informed her that Balageo would take over the
operation of the bar. Complainant averred that subsequently respondent acted as business
partner of Balageo in operating the bar under her business name, which they later renamed
Amarillo Music Bar.
Complainant likewise alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that time, Davis & Sabling
Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer Agreement remained subsisting and in force.
However, respondent appeared as counsel for Balageo in that ejectment case and filed, on
behalf of the latter, an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.5
In his Comment,6 respondent denied participation in the takeover or acting as a business
partner of Balageo in the operation of the bar. He asserted that Balageo is the sole proprietress
of the establishment. He insisted that it was Atty. Sabling, his partner, who initiated the proposal
and was in fact the one who was able to convince complainant to accept the law office as her
retainer. Respondent maintained that he never obtained any knowledge or information regarding
the business of complainant who used to consult only Atty. Sabling. Respondent admitted
though having represented Balageo in the ejectment case, but denied that he took advantage of
the Retainer Agreement between complainant and Davis and Sabling Law Office. Thus:
3.a Prior to the engagement of the Complainant of the DAVIS and SABLING LAW OFFICE
as her retainer, Novie Balageo was already one of the Clients of Respondent in several
cases;
3.b Sometime in the last week of the month of May 2005, while Respondent was in his office
doing some legal works, Novie Balageo called up Respondent informing the latter that his
assistance is needed for purposes of conducting an inventory of all items at the former
Nashville Country Music Lounge;
3.c Respondent [asked] Novie Balageo [the purpose of] the inventory [to which] the latter x
xx responded x xx that she entered into a lease contract with the present administrator of the
building, Benjie Pinlac;
3.d Respondent, to his disbelief requested Novie Balageo to go [to] the LAW OFFICE for
further clarification of the matter. Thereafter, Respondent was later informed that the
business of Complainant was taken over and operated by Mr. Benjie Pinlac for seven days.
Furthermore, Mr. Benjie Pinlac offered the said place to Novie Balageo which the latter
readily accepted;
3.e [Left] with no recourse, Respondent requested one of his staff to assist Novie Balageo in
conducting an inventory. Furthermore, Respondent never acted as partner of Novie Balageo
in operating the former Nashville Country Music Lounge;
3.f When Complainant filed the civil case for Ejectment against Novie Balageo and Benjie
Pinlac, Respondent represented the former thereof without taking advantage of the
retainership contract between the DA VIS and SABLING LAW OFFICE [and] Complainant
as Respondent has no knowledge or information of any matters related by complainant to
Atty. Sabling regarding the former' s business;
3.g While the Complaint was pending, respondent was xx x informed by Novie Balageo and
Benjie Pinlac of the truth of all matters x x x which x x x Respondent [was unaware of];
3.h However, for the interest of justice and fair play, x x x Respondent [deemed it prudent] to
xx x withdraw as Counsel for Novie Balageo. Hence, Respondent filed his Motion to
Withdraw As Counsel. x x x
3.i The civil case was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the [Complaint's]
subject matter. x x x7
On October 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and
Recommendation8 finding respondent guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of
information obtained from his client to the disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage of
another person. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice oflaw for a
period of one year.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.9 Upon motion of the respondent, it
reduced the penalty imposed to six months suspension considering that there is no proof that
respondent actually handled any previous legal matters involving complainant.10
Our Ruling
It is undisputed that complainant entered into a Retainer Agreement dated March 7, 2005 with
respondent's law firm. This agreement was signed by the respondent and attached to the rollo of
this case. And during the subsistence of said Retainer Agreement, respondent represented and
defended Balageo, who was impleaded as one of the defendants in the ejectment case
complainant filed before the MTCC of Baguio City. In fact, respondent filed on behalf of said A.C. No. 6836 January 23, 2006
Balageo an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated July 11, 2005. It was only on August 26, 2005 when respondent withdrew his
LETICIA GONZALES, Complainant,
appearance for Balageo.
vs.
ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, Respondent.
Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1âwphi1 It provides:
RESOLUTION

Rule 15.03 -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

Before this Court is a complaint filed by Leticia Gonzales (Gonzales) praying that Atty. Marcelino
"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
Cabucana, (respondent) be disbarred for representing conflicting interests.
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client."11 The prohibition against
representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in
good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.12 In Quiambao v. Atty. On January 8, 2004, Gonzales filed a petition before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Bamba,13 this Court emphasized that lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's alleging that: she was the complainant in a case for sum of money and damages filed before the
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1-567 where
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount she was represented by the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA
importance in the administration of justice.14 LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as an
associate/partner; on February 26, 2001, a decision was rendered in the civil case ordering the
losing party to pay Gonzales the amount of P17,310.00 with interest and P6,000.00 as attorney’s
Respondent argues that while complainant is a client of Davis & Sabling Law office, her case is
fees; Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of execution issued in
actually handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling. He was not privy to any transaction between
connection with the judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a complaint against the said
Atty. Sabling and complainant and has no knowledge of any information or legal matter
sheriff with this Court; in September 2003, Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of
complainant entrusted or confided to his law partner. He thus inveigles that he could not have
Gonzales; they harassed Gonzales and asked her to execute an affidavit of desistance
taken advantage of an information obtained by his law firm by virtue of the Retainer Agreement.
regarding her complaint before this Court; Gonzales thereafter filed against the Gatchecos
We are not impressed. In Hilado v. David,15 reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr.,16 this
criminal cases for trespass, grave threats, grave oral defamation, simple coercion and unjust
Court held that a lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has engaged
vexation; notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 1-567, where respondent’s law firm
the services of his law firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and suspicion and
was still representing Gonzales, herein respondent represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed
undermines the integrity of justice. Thus, respondent's argument that he never took advantage of
by Gonzales against the said spouses; respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law
any information acquired by his law finn in the course of its professional dealings with the
since respondent’s acceptance of the cases of the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client
complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably aware of the fact that
relationship between complainant and respondent’s law firm and renders respondent liable
complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should have immediately informed both the
under the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) particularly Rules 10.01,1 13.01,2 15.02,3
complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other members of his law firm, cannot represent
15.03,4 21.015 and 21.02.6
any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they would be representing conflicting interests and
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. Indeed, respondent could have simply advised
both complainant and Balageo to instead engage the services of another lawyer. On January 9, 2004, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline ordered Atty. Marcelino Cabucana,
Jr. to submit his Answer to the complaint.7
The penalty for representing conflicting interests may either be reprimand or suspension from
the practice of law ranging from six months to two years.17 We thus adopt the recommendation In his Answer, respondent averred: He never appeared and represented complainant in Civil
of the IBP Board of Governors. Case No. 1-567 since it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared and represented
Gonzales in said case. He admitted that he is representing Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife in the
cases filed against them but claimed that his appearance is pro bono and that the spouses
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the January 15, 2012 Resolution of the
pleaded with him as no other counsel was willing to take their case. He entered his appearance
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is found
in good faith and opted to represent the spouses rather than leave them defenseless. When the
GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
Gatchecos asked for his assistance, the spouses said that the cases filed against them by
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon
Gonzales were merely instigated by a high ranking official who wanted to get even with them for
receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a commission of the same or similar offense in the
their refusal to testify in favor of the said official in another case. At first, respondent declined to
future will result in the imposition of a stiffer penalty.Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into
serve as counsel of the spouses as he too did not want to incur the ire of the high-ranking
the records of Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis and furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the
official, but after realizing that he would be abdicating a sworn duty to delay no man for money or
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the
malice, respondent entered his appearance as defense counsel of the spouses free of any
Philippines, for their information and guidance.Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is DIRECTED to
charge. Not long after, the present complaint was crafted against respondent which shows that
inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Resolution.
respondent is now the subject of a ‘demolition job.’ The civil case filed by Gonzales where
respondent’s brother served as counsel is different and distinct from the criminal cases filed by
SO ORDERED. complainant against the Gatcheco spouses, thus, he did not violate any canon on legal ethics. 8
Gonzales filed a Reply contending that the civil case handled by respondent’s brother is closely
connected with the cases of the Gatchecos which the respondent is handling; that the claim of
respondent that he is handling the cases of the spouses pro bono is not true since he has his
own agenda in offering his services to the spouses; and that the allegation that she is filing the
cases against the spouses because she is being used by a powerful person is not true since she
filed the said cases out of her own free will.9
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP sent to the parties a Notice of Mandatory
Conference dated March 1, 2004.10 On the scheduled conference, only a representative of
complainant appeared.11 Commissioner Demaree Raval of the IBP-CBD then directed both
parties to file their respective verified position papers.12
Complainant filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions and added that respondent
prepared and notarized counter-affidavits of the Gatcheco spouses; that the high-ranking official
referred to by respondent is Judge Ruben Plata and the accusations of respondent against the
said judge is an attack against a brother in the profession which is a violation of the CPR; and
that respondent continues to use the name of De Guzman in their law firm despite the fact that
said partner has already been appointed as Assistant Prosecutor of Santiago City, again in
violation of the CPR.13
Respondent filed his Position Paper restating his allegations in his Answer. 14
On August 23, 2004, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes issued an Order notifying both parties
to appear before his office on October 28, 2004 for a clarificatory question regarding said case. 15
On the said date, only respondent appeared16 presenting a sworn affidavit executed by
Gonzales withdrawing her complaint against respondent. It reads:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
TUNGKOL SA PAG-UURONG NG DEMANDA
Ako, si LETICIA GONZALES, nasa tamang edad, Pilipino, may asawa, at nakatira sa
Barangay Dubinan East, Santiago City, makaraang manumpa ayon sa batas ay
nagsasabing:
Ako ang nagdedemanda o petitioner sa CBD Case No. 04-1186 na may pamagat na
"Leticia Gonzales versus Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr." na kasalukuyang
nahaharap sa Commission on Bar Discipline ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Ang pagkakahain ng naturang demanda ay nag-ugat sa di-pagkakaintindihan na
namamagitan sa akin at nina Mr. and Mrs. Romeo and Anita Gatcheco.
Dahil sa aking galit sa naturang mag-asawa, idinawit ko si Atty. Marcelino C.
Cabucana, Jr. sa sigalot na namamagitan sa akin at sa mag-asawang Gatcheco,
gayong nalalaman ko na si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana ay walang nalalaman sa
naturang di pagkakaintindihan.
Makaraang pag-isipang mabuti ang paghain ko ng demanda kontra kay Atty.
Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr., nakumbinsi ako na ang pagdedemanda ko kay Atty.
Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay isang malaking pagkakamali dahil siya ay walang
kinalalaman (sic) sa di pagkakaintindihan naming(sic) ng mag-asawang Gatcheco.
Si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay di ko rin naging abogado sa Civil Case No. 1-
567 (MTCC Br. I Santiago City) na inihain ko kontra kay Eduardo Mangano.
Nais kong ituwid ang lahat kung kaya’t aking iniuurong ang naturang kasong inihain ko
kontra kay Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. at dahil dito ay hindi na ako interesado
pang ituloy and naturang kaso, at aking hinihiling sa kinauukulan na dismisin na ang
naturang kaso.
Ginawa ko ang sinumpaang salaysay na ito upang patotohanan sa lahat ng nakasaad
dito.17
Commissioner Reyes issued an Order dated October 28, 2004 requiring Gonzales to appear
before him on November 25, 2004, to affirm her statements and to be subject to clarificatory
questioning.18 However, none of the parties appeared.19 On February 17, 2005, only respondent
was present. Commissioner Reyes then considered the case as submitted for resolution. 20
On February 24, 2005, Commissioner Reyes submitted his Report and Recommendation,
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
The Undersigned Commissioner believes that the respondent made a mistake in the acceptance
of the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, however, the Commission (sic) believes that
there was no malice and bad faith in the said acceptance and this can be shown by the move of
the complainant to unilaterally withdraw the case which she filed against Atty. Marcelino C.
Cabucana, Jr. However, Atty. Cabucana is reminded to be more careful in the acceptance of
cases as conflict of interests might arise.
It is respectfully recommended that Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. (be) sternly warned and
reprimanded and…advised to be more circumspect and careful in accepting cases which might
result in conflict of interests.21
On June 25, 2005, a Resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2005-153
CBD CASE NO. 03-1186
Leticia Gonzales vs.
Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent
made (a) mistake in the acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, Atty.
Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is hereby WARNED and REPRIMANDED and advised to be more
circumspect and careful in accepting cases which might result in conflict of interests. 22
Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of Commissioner Reyes,
respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco spouses in the administrative case filed by
Gonzales against them. As respondent himself narrated in his Position Paper, he likewise acted The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention will also not
as their counsel in the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against them.23 exculpate him as such claim does not render the prohibition inoperative. 33

With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. 24 Such prohibition is founded
on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree.25 Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the
client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only
then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.26
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.27
In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no other lawyer is
willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there may be instances where
lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest
between a present client and a prospective one.34 Granting also that there really was no other
lawyer who could handle the spouses’ case other than him, still he should have observed the
requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with the prospective client to ascertain as
soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client then seek the
written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. 35 These respondent failed to
do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.
We note the affidavit of desistance filed by Gonzales. However, we are not bound by such
desistance as the present case involves public interest. 36 Indeed, the Court’s exercise of its
power to take cognizance of administrative cases against lawyers is not for the purpose of
enforcing civil remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the public against an
attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his profession.37
In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests a
penalty ranging from one to three years’ suspension was imposed. 38

As we expounded in the recent case of Quiambao vs. Bamba,28

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no
moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer
has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit,
are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. 29
The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the civil case
handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by
Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit. The representation of
opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very
least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow.30
Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales in the civil case
and not him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not agree. As respondent
admitted, it was their law firm which represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the
case, the rule against representing conflicting interests applies.
We shall consider however as mitigating circumstances the fact that he is representing the
Gatcheco spouses pro bono and that it was his firm and not respondent personally, which
handled the civil case of Gonzales. As recounted by complainant herself, Atty. Edmar Cabucana
signed the civil case of complainant by stating first the name of the law firm CABUCANA,
CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, under which, his name and
signature appear; while herein respondent signed the pleadings for the Gatcheco spouses only
with his name,39 without any mention of the law firm. We also note the observation of the IBP
Commissioner Reyes that there was no malice and bad faith in respondent’s acceptance of the
Gatchecos’ cases as shown by the move of complainant to withdraw the case.
Thus, for violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and taking
into consideration the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, we impose the penalty of fine of
P2,000.00.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVI-2005-153 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
APPROVED with MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is FINED the
amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the
same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David:31

…[W]e… can not sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who had sought
and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the
plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without
condemning the respondent’s conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that
upon the admitted facts it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of
which he is a distinguished member, "into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the
integrity of justice."32
A.C. No. 6174 November 16, 2011
LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO T. GALING, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us for consideration is Resolution No. XVIII-2007-1961 of the Board of Governors,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint2 for disbarment filed by Lydia
Castro-Justo against Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing.
Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Galing in connection with dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Arlene W.
Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid his professional fees, the respondent drafted and sent a letter to
Ms. Koa demanding payment of the checks.3 Respondent advised complainant to wait for the
lapse of the period indicated in the demand letter before filing her complaint.
On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. 4
On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation5 filed by respondent for and
on behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases, and the latter’s daughter Karen Torralba
(Ms. Torralba). Further, on 8 August 2003, respondent appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa before
the prosecutor of Manila.
Complainant submits that by representing conflicting interests, respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In his Comment,6 respondent denied the allegations against him. He admitted that he drafted a
demand letter for complainant but argued that it was made only in deference to their long
standing friendship and not by reason of a professional engagement as professed by
complainant. He denied receiving any professional fee for the services he rendered. It was
allegedly their understanding that complainant would have to retain the services of another
lawyer. He alleged that complainant, based on that agreement, engaged the services of Atty.
Manuel A. Año.
To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by complainant against Ms.
Koa for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was based not on the demand letter he drafted but
on the demand letter prepared by Atty. Manuel A. Año.
Respondent contended that he is a close friend of the opposing parties in the criminal cases. He
further contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa are likewise long time friends, as in fact,
they are "comares" for more than 30 years since complainant is the godmother of Ms. Torralba.7
Respondent claimed that it is in this light that he accommodated Ms. Koa and her daughter’s
request that they be represented by him in the cases filed against them by complainant and
complainant’s daughter. He maintained that the filing of the Motion for Consolidation which is a
non-adversarial pleading does not evidence the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between
him and Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba. Likewise, his appearance in the joint proceedings should
only be construed as an effort on his part to assume the role of a moderator or arbiter of the
parties.
He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help the parties achieve an
out of court settlement and possible reconciliation. He reported that his efforts proved fruitful
insofar as he had caused Ms. Koa to pay complainant the amount of ₱50,000.00 in settlement of
one of the two checks subject of I.S. No. 03G-19484-86.
Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make good the other checks
caused a lot of consternation on the part of complainant. This allegedly led her to vent her ire on
respondent and file the instant administrative case for conflict of interest.
In a resolution dated 19 October 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved
with modification the findings of its Investigating Commissioner. They found respondent guilty of
violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by representing
conflicting interests and for his daring audacity and for the pronounced malignancy of his act. It
was recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. 8
We agree with the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, 9 as adopted
by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
It was established that in April 2003, respondent was approached by complainant regarding the
dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Koa.
It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was filed by respondent
in I.S. No. 03G-19484-86 entitled "Lydia Justo vs. Arlene Koa" and I.S. No. 03G-19582-84
entitled "Lani C. Justo vs. Karen Torralba". Respondent stated that the movants in these cases
are mother and daughter while complainants are likewise mother and daughter and that these
cases arose out from the same transaction. Thus, movants and complainants will be adducing
the same sets of evidence and witnesses.
Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant
because there was no professional fee paid for the services he rendered. Moreover, he argued
that he drafted the demand letter only as a personal favor to complainant who is a close friend.
We are not persuaded. A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the close friendship
between complainant and respondent. The relationship was established the moment
complainant sought legal advice from respondent regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting
the demand letter respondent further affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter
was not utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that respondent was not eventually engaged
by complainant to represent her in the criminal cases is of no moment. As observed by the
Investigating Commissioner, by referring to complainant Justo as "my client" in the demand letter
sent to the defaulting debtor10, respondent admitted the existence of the lawyer-client
relationship. Such admission effectively estopped him from claiming otherwise.
Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate respondent from liability.
Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying with the prohibition
against pursuing cases with conflicting interests. The prohibition attaches from the moment the
attorney-client relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the professional
relationship.11 We held in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta12 that it is not necessary that any retainer be
paid, promised or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward
handle the case for which his service had been sought.13
Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts." Respondent was therefore bound to refrain from representing parties
with conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing so, without showing any proof that he had
obtained the written consent of the conflicting parties, respondent should be sanctioned.

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy
and good taste.14 In the course of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns of the facts
connected with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of
the relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. 15

It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 16

The case of Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat17 is instructive on this concept, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties.1awp++i1 The test is ‘whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client.’18 This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.19 Also, there
is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an
act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection.20 Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.21

The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Año who was eventually
engaged by complainant will not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The take- over of a client’s cause of action by another
lawyer does not give the former lawyer the right to represent the opposing party. It is not only
malpractice but also constitutes a violation of the confidence resulting from the attorney-client
relationship.

Considering that this is respondent’s first infraction, the disbarment sought in the complaint is
deemed to be too severe. As recommended by the Board of Governors of the IBP, the
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is warranted.

Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from the practice of law for
one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a
more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office
of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this Decision to respondent’s record as
member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 CANON 16
A.C. No. 4566 December 10, 2004
UNITY FISHING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANILO G. MACALINO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this petition by way of a complaint for disbarment filed by Unity Fishing
Development Corporation against Atty. Danilo Macalino for having violated Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
In its resolution of June 26, 1996, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint
within ten (10) days from notice.1
On July 26, 1996, respondent filed a motion for extension of thirty (30) days within which to file
comment,2 which motion was granted by the Court in its resolution of August 21, 1996.3
On August 26, 1996, respondent filed another motion for extension, this time for an additional
period of fifteen (15) days.4 The motion was similarly granted by the Court in its resolution of
October 7, 1996.5
Still, on September 19, 1996, respondent filed a third and "last extension of time to file
comment".6 Again, this was granted by the Court via its resolution of November 27, 1996.7
Unfortunately, no comment was ever filed by respondent.
Hence, and taking note of complainant’s "Motion to Conduct Further Proceedings", filed on
March 23, 1998,8 the Court, in its resolution of April 27, 1998,9 referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
Acting on the referral, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline designated Atty. Cesar R. Dulay as
investigating commissioner.
It appears, however, that even while the case was already under formal investigation,
respondent displayed the same attitude of lack of concern. As reported by Atty. Dulay:
The Commission issued a notice setting the case for hearing on October 8, 1998, at
which hearing complainant represented by its legal counsel and respondent appeared.
Again, respondent asked for fifteen days from October 8, 1998 to file his Answer.
Complainant also asked the same period within which to file his reply.
On November 5, 1998, respondent filed an urgent motion for extension of time to file
answer.
On November 9, 1998, respondent again filed an urgent motion for last extension of
time or a period of fifteen (15) days from November 15, 1998 to file answer, which was
granted by the Commission.
Since the respondent has not filed his answer as required by the Honorable Supreme
Court and the Commission, the case was again set for hearing on November 9, 1999.
On said date, only the counsel for complainant appeared. Respondent was absent.
However, records show the notice sent to him was returned unserved with the
annotation "Moved." Records also show that respondent has not filed his answer and
again he was given a last chance to file his answer within ten (10) days from receipt of
the Order dated November 9, 1999 and the hearing of the case was reset to
December 9, 1999.
On December 9, 1999, only counsel for complainant appeared and moved that
respondent’s right to file answer be deemed waived and that complainant be allowed
to file Memorandum after which, the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 14, 1999, respondent again filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of
fifteen (15) days from December 4, 1999 within which to file his answer.
On January 7, 2000, the complainant filed a Memorandum, a copy of which was
furnished to respondent and which was not controverted by respondent.
All told, respondent filed six (6) motions for extension of time to file Answer and up to
this time, which is almost seven (7) years from the time the Honorable Supreme Court
required respondent to file his answer to the complaint, respondent has not filed any
answer,10
on account of which the investigating commissioner considered the case as "now ready for
resolution".11
Thereafter, the investigating commissioner submitted his Report. Dated January 20, 2003,12 the
Report recites the factual background of the case and the commissioner’s discussion and
findings thereon, thus:
"Frabal Fishing and Ice Plant Corporation (hereinafter, Frabal) was the owner of a
parcel of land located along Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard, Sta. Mesa, Manila which
was leased to Wheels Distributors, Inc. (hereinafter, Wheels), an authorized dealer of
cars and motor vehicles of various make;
A dispute arose between Frabal and Wheels regarding the terms and conditions of the
lease contract. The dispute eventually led to a lawsuit. Frabal hired the services of
respondent Atty. Danilo G. Macalino as counsel for the purpose of representing its
interest in the said lawsuit;
Frabal merged and was absorbed by Petitioner corporation on February 12, 1991, with
the former conveying, assigning and transferring all its business assets and liabilities
to the latter, including all judicial and extra-judicial claims. Hence, Petitioner was
substituted in lieu of Frabal in the former’s lawsuit with Wheels;
As Petitioner’s legal counsel, Respondent advised Petitioner to severe all contractual
relationship with Wheels as a step towards eventually evicting the latter from the
property they were occupying;
Hence, upon advice of Respondent, the contract of lease between Frabal and Wheels
was terminated. Respondent likewise advised Petitioner to return the guarantee
deposit equivalent to two (2) months rental or the amount of P50,000.00 to Wheels;
On March 2, 1988, Petitioner prepared Metrobank Check No. MB350288 dated March
8, 1988 for the amount of P50,000.00. The check was crossed and made payable to
the Wheels Distributors, Inc. (Annex "A").
Respondent volunteered to bring the check to the office of Wheels himself and to
make them accept it. Hence, on March 3, 1988, Respondent sent his representative to
Petitioner’s office to get the said check;
Respondent’s representative duly received the said check from Petitioner, as proof of
which he signed Check Voucher No. 3-012 (Annex "B");
Thereafter, Respondent represented to Petitioner that he was able to deliver the check
to Wheels Distributors, Inc.;
The suit between Petitioner and Wheels continued for several years. In the meantime,
Petitioner changed counsels, replacing Respondent with someone else;
Finally, sometime in May 1994, the suit ended in amicable settlement. In the process
of negotiating the terms and conditions of the settlement, Wheels informed Petitioner
that it never received therefund (sic) guarantee deposit in the amount of P50,000.00;
Petitioner was shocked to learn this piece of information from Wheels Distributors as
all along Respondent had represented to Petitioner that Wheels has already received
the guarantee deposit of P50,000.00;
Petitioner searched its files for the subject check. After locating the check, Petitioner
noted that at the back of the check was a rubber stamp marking indicating that it was
deposited with the United Savings Bank Head Office on May 13, 1988 to Account No.
CA-483-3. United Savings Bank has since been acquired by the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) and is now known as UCPB Savings Bank;
Petitioner checked with Wheels Distributors from whom it later learned that the latter
never maintained an account with the United Savings Bank, now the UCPB Savings
Bank;
Petitioner wrote to Respondent on May 19, 1994 to explain why the check in issue
never reached Wheels Distributors and how it was endorsed and encashed despite
the fact that it was a crossed check (Copy of said letter is Annex "C");
Despite receipt of said letter, however, Respondent never responded nor attempted to
explain his side to what strongly appears to be a gross misappropriation of the money
for his own personal use;
Hence, Petitioner was constrained to institute an action for damages against
Respondent Danilo G. Macalino as well as UCPB Savings Bank with the Regional
Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 72 where the same is now docketed as Civil Case No.
2382-MN;
That Respondent misappropriated the amount of P50,000.00 for his own personal use
cannot be denied. An employee of UCPB in the person of Eduardo Estremadura
testified in the aforestated case for damages that Respondent Atty. Danilo G.
Macalino was the one maintaining Account No. CA-483-37 at UCPB, to which the
crossed check payable to Wheels was deposited (TSN, p. 8, Aug. 24, 1995, copy of
the TSN is Annex "D");
The Metrobank Check No. MB350288 dated March 8, 1988 for the amount of
P50,000.00 was deposited to Respondent’s account is further shown in United
Savings Bank Current Account Deposit Slip accomplished by Respondent when he
deposited said check with United Savings Bank on May 13, 1988 (Copy of said
deposit slip is Annex "E").
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS:
Respondent Atty. Danilo G. Macalino was given all the opportunity to answer and
present his defenses to the complaint. Regrettably, the records show that despite the
orders of the Supreme Court and this Commission respondent has not taken any step
to verify and inquire as to the status of the complaint against him. Almost three years
since the submission of the complainant’s memorandum, respondent has not reacted
nor made any move to protect himself and answer the complaint. Due process
consists in being given the opportunity to be heard and we believe that in this case
respondent has been given all the opportunity to be heard.
On the basis of the above, the investigating commissioner concluded his Report with the
following -
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for two (2) years and be ordered to account to complainant the
amount of P50,000.00. Respondent should be warned that a similar offense will merit
a more severe penalty.13
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2003-341,14
adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner with a
modification as to the penalty, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with
modification as to the penalty to conform to the evidence, and considering
respondent’s failure to account for the funds received by him in trust from complainant
in gross violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as
for respondent’s lax, remiss and untroubled attitude in this case, Atty. Danilo G.
Macalino is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and
Ordered to account to complainant the amount of P50,000.00 with a Warning that a
similar offense will merit a more severe penalty.
This resolution is now before us for confirmation.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of
fidelity and good faith. It is designed "to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of
that kind from being done for the protection of the client".15 So it is that the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES
OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on
all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules
of Court.
The Canon of Professional Ethics is even more explicit when it states:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he
abuses or takes advantages of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the
possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should
not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him. (par. 11)
Here, we are in full accord with the findings, conclusion and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent misappropriated the money entrusted to him and which he failed to
account for to his client despite demand therefor.
Respondent’s failure to rebut complainant’s evidence clearly reveals his failure to live up to his
duties as a lawyer in consonance with the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His repeated failure without any valid reason to comply with the orders of the
Court requiring him to comment on the complaint lends credence to the allegations thereof and
manifests his tacit admission of the same. As aptly found by Commissioner Dulay, the following
uncontroverted facts as supported by the annexes of the complaint had been established:
"1. that Metrobank Check No. MB350288 in the amount of P50,000.00 payable to
Wheels Distributors (Annex ‘A’ of Petition) was prepared by Frabal Fishing & Ice Plant
Corporation (Annex ‘B’ Petition) and released to respondent’s representative;
2. that the said Metrobank Check No. [MB350288] was deposited to Account No.
0110004833 under Account Name Danilo G. Macalino at the United Savings Bank
(Annex "E" of Petition);
3. that on 19 May 1994 complainant wrote a letter to respondent (Annex ‘C’ of
Petition) advising the latter that the Metrobank Check intended for Wheel Distributors,
Inc. was not received by them (Wheels Distributors) yet it was endorsed and
encashed. Respondent was therefore requested to explain how the particular check
was encashed. Respondent received the letter on May 23, 1994 (Annex ‘C-3’ of
Petition) and the records do not show that respondent replied to the latter requiring
him to explain; and
4. that complainant filed a civil case against UCPB Savings Bank, and Danilo
Macalino before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila docketed as Civil
Case No. 2382-MN (Annex ‘D’ of Petition) and at the hearing of said case on August
24, 1995, witness Eduardo Estremadura, a bookeeper of UCPB Bank positively
testified that Danilo G. Macalino was the maintainer of Account No. CA-483-3 of the
UCPB Savings Bank, Legaspi Branch (page 8 & 9 Annex ‘D’, TSN of hearing of Civil
Case No. 2382-MN) and that Check No. 350288 was deposited to the Account of
Danilo G. Macalino under CA-483-3 on May 13, 1988 (page 9 of Annex ‘D’, TSN of
hearing); and was credited to the account of Danilo G. Macalino (page 12 of Annex
‘D’, TSN of hearing of Civil Case No. 2382-MN)"16 ,
from which established facts, the investigating commissioner made the following conclusions:
"1. that Metrobank Check No. 350288 in the amount of P50,000.00 which was
intended for Wheels Distributors, Inc. was deposited and the amount credited to
Account No. 483-3 of respondent Danilo G. Macalino with the UCPB Savings Bank.
2. that respondent when required by the complainant to explain and account for the
amount of P50,000.00 caused by Metrobank Check No. 350288 which was not
intended for him failed to reply and give any accounting of such funds to
complainant".17
Respondent’s wanton failure to make an accounting and to return to his client the amount
entrusted to him upon demand give rise to the presumption that he misappropriated it, in
violation of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His act of holding on to complainant’s
money without its acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety.18 A
lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money and is bound to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his client.19
It is clear, therefore, that respondent, by depositing the check in his own account and
subsequently deceiving his client into believing that he delivered the same to Wheels is
undoubtedly guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused
dishonor, not merely to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be
denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a
member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.20 Like judges, lawyers must not only be
clean; they must also appear clean. This way, the people’s faith in the justice system remains
undisturbed.21
What is more, respondent’s repeated failures to comply with the orders of the Court requiring
him to comment on the complaint indicate a high degree of irresponsibility on his part.
We have no hesitance, then, in confirming the resolution passed by the IBP Board of Governors
suspending respondent from the practice of law for one (1) year. We could have taken a more
drastic action against respondent, but considering that he has no prior administrative record, it is
our sentiment that the recommended penalty serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the
public and the legal profession. After all, in Espiritu vs. Cabredo,22 we imposed the same
penalty on an attorney who similarly failed to account the money received from his client and to A.C. No. 10681 February 3, 2015
restitute it without any reason.
SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION and BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION, Complainants,
WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo G. Macalino is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 16 of the vs.
Code of Professional Responsibility, for his failure to immediately return and deliver the funds of ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA, Respondent.
his former client upon demand, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year effective immediately, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
DECISION
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is likewise ordered to return the sum of
P50,000 to complainant within ten (10) hereof.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Let copies of the Resolution be entered into respondent’s record as an attorney and be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and all the courts in the country for their information This is an administrative case that stemmed from a Verified Complaint1 filed by complainants
and guidance. Spouses Henry A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S. Concepcion (Blesilda; collectively
complainants) against respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa (respondent), charging him with
gross misconduct for violating, among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
SO ORDERED.
Responsibility (CPR).

The Facts

In their Verified Complaint, complainants alleged that from 19972 until August 2008,3
respondent served as their retained lawyer and counsel. In this capacity, respondent handled
many of their cases and was consulted on various legal matters, among others, the prospect of
opening a pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said business, however, failed to
materialize.4

Aware of the fact that complainantshad money intact from their failed business venture,
respondent, on March 23, 2006, called Henry to borrow the amount of ₱2,500,000.00, which he
promised to return, with interest, five (5) days thereafter. Henry consulted his wife, Blesilda, who,
believing that respondent would be soon returning the money, agreed to lend the aforesaid sum
to respondent. She thereby issued three (3) EastWest Bank checks5 in respondent’s name:6

Upon receiving the checks, respondent signed a piece of paper containing: (a) photocopies of
the checks; and (b) an acknowledgment that he received the originals of the checksand that he
agreed to return the ₱2,500,000.00, plus monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5)
days.7 In the afternoon of March 23, 2006, the foregoing checks were personally encashed by
respondent.8

On March 28, 2006, or the day respondent promised to return the money, he failed to pay
complainants. Thus, in April 2006, complainants began demanding payment but respondent

Check No. Date Amount Payee

03-23-
0000561925ZZ ₱750,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa
06

03-23-
0000561926 ₱850,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa
06

03-23-
0000561927 ₱900,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa
06

Total: ₱2,500,000.00
merely made repeated promises to pay soon. On July 7, 2008,Blesilda sent a demand letter9 to
respondent, which the latter did not heed.10 On August 4, 2008, complainants, through their
new counsel, Atty. Kathryn Jessica dela Serna, sent another demand letter11 to respondent.12
In his Reply,13 the latter denied borrowing any money from the complainants. Instead,
respondent claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault (Nault), one of his other clients, was the
real debtor. Complainants brought the matter to the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa in
Barangay Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. The parties, however, failed to reach a settlement.14
On January 11, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter received complainants’ letter-
complaint15 charging respondent with violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR. The rule prohibits
lawyers from borrowing money from clients unless the latter’s interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice.16
In his Comment,17 respondent denied borrowing ₱2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting
that Nault was the real debtor.18 He also claimed that complainants had been attempting to
collect from Nault and that he was engaged for that specific purpose.19
In their letter-reply,20 complainants maintained that they extended the loan to respondent alone,
as evidenced by the checks issued in the latter’s name. They categorically denied knowing Nault
and pointed out that it defies common sense for them to extend an unsecured loan in the
amount of ₱2,500,000.00 to a person they do not even know. Complainants also submitted a
copy of the Answer to Third Party Complaint21 which Nault filed as third-party defendant in a
related collection case instituted by the complainants against respondent.22 In said pleading,
Nault explicitly denied knowing complainants and alleged thatit was respondent who incurred the
subject loan from them.23
On November 23, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter endorsed the letter-complaint to the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),24 which was later docketed as CBD Case No. 11-
2883.25 In the course of the proceedings, respondent failed to appear during the scheduled
mandatory conferences.26 Hence, the same were terminated and the parties were directed to
submit their respective position papers.27 Respondent, however, did not submit any.
The IBP Report and Recommendation
On April 19, 2013, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Jose I. de La Rama, Jr. (Investigating
Commissioner), issued his Report28 finding respondent guilty of violating: (a) Rule 16.04 of the
CPR which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his clients unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice; (b) Canon 7
which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the IBP; and (c) Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust
all monies and properties of his client that may come into his possession.29
The Investigating Commissioner observed that the checks were issued in respondent’s name
and that he personally received and encashed them. Annex "E"30 of the Verified Complaint
shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of the three (3) EastWest Bank checks and agreed
to return the ₱2,500,000.00, plus a pro-rated monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5)
days.31
On the other hand, respondent’s claim that Nault was the real debtor was found to be
implausible. The Investigating Commissioner remarked that if it is true that respondent was not
the one who obtained the loan, he would have responded to complainants’ demand letter;
however, he did not.32 He also observed that the acknowledgment33 Nault allegedly signed
appeared to have been prepared by respondent himself.34 Finally, the Investigating
Commissioner cited Nault’s Answer tothe Third Party Complaint which categorically states that
he does not even know the complainants and that it was respondent alone who obtained the
loan from them.35
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent’s actions degraded the
integrity of the legal profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the
CPR. Respondent’s failure to appear during the mandatory conferences further showed his
disrespect to the IBP-CBD.36 Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be disbarred and that he be ordered to return the ₱2,500,000.00 to complainants,
with stipulated interest.37
Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and by the
applicable laws and rule, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report in Resolution No. XX-2013-617 dated May 11, 2013,38 but reduced the
penalty against the respondent to indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordered the
return of the ₱2,500,000.00 to the complainants with legal interest, instead of stipulated interest.
Respondent sought a reconsideration39 of Resolution No. XX-2013-617 which was, however,
denied in Resolution No. XXI-2014-29440 dated May 3, 2014.
The Issue Before the Court
The central issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
for violating the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings except as to its recommended penalty and its directive
to return the amount of ₱2,500,000.00, with legal interest, to complainants.
I.
Respondent’s receipt of the ₱2,500,000.00 loan from complainants is amply supported by
substantial evidence. As the records bear out, Blesilda, on March 23, 2006, issued three (3)
EastWest Bank Checks, in amounts totalling to ₱2,500,000.00, with respondent as the payee.41
Also, Annex "E"42 of the Verified Complaint shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of the
checks and agreed to pay the complainants the loan plus the pro-rated interest of five percent
(5%) per month within five (5) days.43 The dorsal sides of the checks likewise show that
respondent personally encashed the checks on the day they were issued.44 With respondent’s
direct transactional involvement and the actual benefit he derived therefrom, absent too any
credible indication tothe contrary, the Court is thus convinced that respondent was indeedthe
one who borrowed the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 from complainants, which amount he had failed
to return, despite their insistent pleas.
Respondent’s theory that Nault is the real debtor hardly inspires belief. While respondent
submitted a document purporting to be Nault’s acknowledgment of his debt to the complainants,
Nault, in his Answer to Third Party Complaint, categorically denied knowing the complainants
and incurring the same obligation.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainants, it would be illogical for them to extend a
₱2,500,000.00 loan without any collateral or security to a person they do not even know. On the
other hand, complainants were able to submit documents showing respondent’s receipt of the
checks and their encashment, as well as his agreement to return the ₱2,500,000.00 plus
interest. This is bolstered by the fact that the loan transaction was entered into during the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship between him and complainants,45 allowing the former to
wield a greater influence over the latter in view of the trust and confidence inherently imbued in
such relationship.
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his
client unless the client’s interests are fully protected:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come
into his possession.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he is handling for the client."
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is
one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and
confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is
intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.46 The rule
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation.47 In Frias v. Atty. Lozada48 (Frias) the Court
categorically declared that a lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what herein respondent
did, is unethical, to wit:
Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case and by independent advice.
A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical.1âwphi1 It
comes within those acts considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon presumes that
the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on
her obligation.49 (Emphasis supplied)
That being said, the Court turns tothe proper penalty to be imposed and the propriety of the
IBP’s return directive.
II.
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.50
In Frias, the Court suspended the lawyer from the practice of law for two (2) years after
borrowing ₱900,000.00 from her client, refusing to pay the same despite court order, and
representing conflicting interests.51 Considering the greater amount involved in this case and
respondent's continuous refusal to pay his deQt, the Court deems it apt to suspend him from the
practice of law for three (3) years, instead of the IBP's recommendation to suspend him
indefinitely.
The Court also deems it appropriate to modify the IBP's Resolution insofar as it orders
respondent to return to complainants the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 and the legal interest
thereon. It is settled that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether
the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.52 In such
cases, the Court's only concern is the determination of respondent's administrative liability; it
should not involve his civil liability for money received from his client in a transaction separate,
distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. In this case, respondent
received the ₱2,500,000.00 as a loan from complainants and not in consideration of his
professional services. Hence, the IBP's recommended return of the aforementioned sum lies
beyond the ambit of this administrative case, and thus cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and
Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon finality of this
Decision, with a stem warning that a commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. This Decision is immediately executory upon receipt.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.

As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and
whose interests, by the lack of any security on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their
trust and confidence in respondent, complainants relied solely on the former’s word that he will
return the money plus interest within five (5) days. However, respondent abused the same and
reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients the runaround up to this day. Accordingly,
there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.

In the same vein, the Court finds that respondent also violated Canon 7 of the CPR which reads:
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same,
respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing,
failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.Thus, he should be equally held
administratively liable on this score.
A.C. No. 5829 October 28, 2003
DANIEL LEMOINE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR., respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On December 17, 1999, complainant Daniel Lemoine, a French national, filed a verified
complaint1 against respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., for estafa and misconduct before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 99-679, was referred by
the Commission on Bar Discipline to an Investigator for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
In early 1998, complainant filed a car insurance claim with the Metropolitan Insurance Company
(Metropolitan Insurance), the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As complainant encountered
problems in pursuing his claim which was initially rejected,2 his friend, a certain Jesus "Jess"
Garcia (Garcia), arranged for the engagement of respondent’s services.
By letter3 of October 21, 1998 addressed to Elde Management, Inc., "ATTN: Mr. Daniel
Lemoine," under whose care complainant could be reached, respondent advised complainant,
whom he had not before met, that for his legal services he was charging "25% of the actual
amount being recovered. . . payable upon successful recovery;" an advance payment of
P50,000.00 "to be charged [to complainant] to be deducted from whatever amount [would] be
successfully collected;" P1,000.00 "as appearance and conference fee for each and every court
hearings, conferences outside our law office and meetings before the Office of the Insurance
Commission which will be also charged to our 25% recovery fee;" and legal expenses "such as
but not limited to filing fee, messengerial and postage expenses . . . and other miscellaneous but
related expenses," to be charged to complainant’s account which would be reimbursed upon
presentation of statement of account.
The letter-proposal of respondent regarding attorney’s fees does not bear complainant’s
conformity, he not having agreed therewith.
It appears that Metropolitan Insurance finally offered to settle complainant’s claim, for by letter4
of December 9, 1998 addressed to it, respondent confirmed his acceptance of its offer to settle
the claim of complainant "in an ex-gratia basis of 75% of his policy coverage which is therefore
FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P525,000.00) PESOS."
A day or a few days before December 23, 1998 when complainant left for France,5 he, on the
advice of respondent, signed an already prepared undated Special Power of Attorney6
authorizing respondent and/or Garcia to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the
satisfaction of complainant’s claim as well as to "negotiate, sign, compromise[,] encash and
receive payment" from it. The Special Power of Attorney was later dated December 23, 1998 on
which same date Metropolitan Insurance issued a Chinabank Check No. 841172 payable to
complainant in the amount of P525,000.00 as full settlement of the claim.7 The check was
received by respondent.
In the meantime, complainant returned to the Philippines in early January 1999 but left again on
the 24th of the same month.8 On inquiry about the status of his claim, Garcia echoed to
complainant what respondent had written him (Garcia) in respondent’s letter9 of March 26, 1999
that the claim was still pending with Metropolitan Insurance and that it was still subject of
negotiations in which Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle it for P350,000.00 representing fifty
percent thereof. In the same letter to Garcia, respondent suggested the acceptance of the offer
of settlement to avoid a protracted litigation.
On December 6, 1999, on complainant’s personal visit to the office of Metropolitan Insurance, he
was informed that his claim had long been settled via a December 23, 1998 check given to
respondent the year before.10 Complainant lost no time in going to the law office of respondent
who was not around, however, but whom he was able to talk by telephone during which he
demanded that he turn over the proceeds of his claim.11
Respondent thereupon faxed to complainant a December 7, 1999 letter12 wherein he
acknowledged having in his possession the proceeds of the encashed check which he retained,
however, as attorney’s lien pending complainant’s payment of his attorney’s fee, equivalent to
fifty percent (50%) of entire amount collected. In the same letter, respondent protested what he
branded as the "uncivilized and unprofessional behavior" complainant "reportedly demonstrated"
at respondent’s office. Respondent winded up his letter as follows, quoted verbatim:
We would like to make it clear that we cannot give you the aforesaid amount until and unless our
attorney’s fees will be forthwith agreed and settled. In the same manner, should you be barbaric
and uncivilized with your approached, we will not hesitate to make a proper representation with
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for the authenticity of your visa, Department of Labor
and Employment for your working status, Bureau of Internal Revenue for your taxation
compliance and the National Bureau of Investigation [with] which we have a good network...
While it [is your] prerogative to file a legal action against us, it is also our prerogative to file a
case against you. We will rather suggest if you could request your lawyer to just confer with us
for the peaceful settlement of this matter. (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
As despite written demands,13 respondent refused to turn over the proceeds of the insurance
claim and to acknowledge the unreasonableness of the attorney’s fees he was demanding,
complainant instituted the administrative action at bar on December 17, 1999.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that "[i]t appears that there was ‘irregularity’ with
the check," it having been issued payable to him, but "and/or AMADEO BALON" was therein
intercalated after his (complainant’s) name.14 1awphi1.nét
Maintaining that respondent was entitled to only P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees,15 complainant
decried respondent’s continued possession of the proceeds of his claim16 and his
misrepresentations that the recovery thereof was fraught with difficulties.17
In his Counter-Affidavit18 of February 18, 2000, respondent asserted that his continued retention
of the proceeds of complainant’s claim is in lawful exercise of his lien for unpaid attorney’s fees.
He expressed readiness, however, to account for and turn them over once he got paid fifty
percent (50%) thereof, he citing the so called contingent fee billing method of "no cure, no pay"
adopted by practicing lawyers in the insurance industry as the basis of the amount of his
attorney’s fees,19 which to him was justified in the absence of an attorney-client contract
between him and complainant, the latter having rejected respondent’s letter-proposal of October
21, 1998.20
Respondent also highlighted the value of the time and efforts he extended in pursuing
complainant’s claim and the expenses he incurred in connection therewith. He went on to assert
that his inability to contact complainant whose whereabouts he did not know prompted him to
encash the check and keep the proceeds thereof in conformity with the Special Power of
Attorney executed in his favor.21
During the hearings conducted by the IBP Investigator, complainant echoed his allegations in his
Complaint-Affidavit and stressed that he turned down as unreasonable respondent’s proposal in
his October 21, 1998 letter that he be paid 25% of the actual amount collected for his legal
services.22 And he presented documentary evidence, including the March 26, 1999 letter of
respondent informing his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia of the supposedly still unrecovered claim and
suggesting acceptance of the purported offer of Metropolitan Insurance to settle complainant’s
claim at P350,000.00.
Explaining how his above-mentioned March 26, 1999 letter to Garcia came about, respondent
declared that it was made upon Garcia’s request, intended for a certain Joel Ramiscal
(Ramiscal) who was said to be Garcia’s business partner.23
Respondent later submitted a June 13, 2001 Supplement24 to his Counter-Affidavit reiterating
his explanation that it was on Garcia’s express request that he wrote the March 26, 1999 letter,
which was directed to the fax number of Ramiscal.1ªvvphi1.nét
Additionally, respondent declared that in the first week of May 1999, on the representation of
Garcia that he had talked to complainant about respondent’s retention of fifty percent (50%) of
the insurance proceeds for professional fees less expenses,25 he gave Garcia, on a staggered
basis, the total amount of P233,000.00 which, so respondent averred, is the amount of
insurance claim complainant is entitled to receive less attorney’s fees and expenses.26 Thus,
respondent claimed that he gave Garcia the amount of P30,000.00 on May 31, 1999 at Dulcinea
Restaurant in Greenbelt, Makati; the amounts of P50,000.00, P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 on
different occasions at his (respondent’s) former address through his executive secretary Sally I.
Leonardo; the amount of P20,000.00 at the office of his (respondent’s) former employer
Commonwealth Insurance Company through his subordinate Glen V. Roxas; and several other
payments at Dulcinea, and at Manila Intercontinental Hotel’s coffee shop sometime in October
1999.27 Respondent submitted the separate sworn statements of Leonardo and Roxas.28
Explaining why no written memorandum of the turn over of various payments to Garcia was
made, respondent alleged that there was no need therefor since he very well knew Garcia who
is a co-Rotarian and co-attorney-in-fact and whom he really dealt with regarding complainant’s
claim.29
Respondent furthermore declared that he rejected complainant’s offer to pay him P50,000.00 for
his services, insisting that since there had been no clear-cut agreement on his professional fees
and it was through him that Metropolitan Insurance favorably reconsidered its initial rejection of
complainant’s claim, he is entitled to a contingent fee of 50% of the net proceeds thereof.30
Finally, respondent declared that he, in connection with his follow-up of the insurance claim,
incurred representation expenses of P35,000.00, entertainment and other representation
expenses on various occasions of P10,000.00, and transportation and gasoline expenses and
parking fees of P5,000.00;31 and that his retention of complainant’s money was justified in light
of his apprehension that complainant, being an alien without a valid working permit in the
Philippines, might leave the country anytime without settling his professional fees.32
The Investigating Commissioner, by Report and Recommendation33 of October 26, 2001, found
respondent guilty of misconduct and recommended that he be disbarred and directed to
immediately turn over to complainant the sum of P475,000.00 representing the amount of the
P525,000.00 insurance claim less respondent’s professional fees of P50,000.00, as proposed by
complainant.
The Board of Govenors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, acting on the Investigator’s
Report, issued Resolution No. XV-2002-40134 on August 3,2002, reading:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and
considering respondent’s dishonesty which amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical
behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent but the noble profession to which he
belongs, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with the
directive to turn over the amount of Five Hundred Twenty Five Thousand (P525,000.00) Pesos
to the complainant without prejudice to respondent’s right to claim attorney’s fees which he may
collect in the proper forum. (Underscoring supplied)
The records of the case are before this Court for final action.
Respondent, by a Motion for Reconsideration35 filed with this Court, assails the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation as not supported by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. He prays for the reopening of the case and its remand to the Investigator so
that Garcia can personally appear for his (respondent’s) confrontation.
There is no need for a reopening of the case. The facts material to its resolution are either
admitted or documented.
This Court is in full accord with the findings of the IBP Investigator that respondent violated the
following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.
RULE 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.
RULE 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
RULE 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
RULE 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to
his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence in him.
RULE 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
RULE 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in
the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
Specifically with respect to above-quoted provision of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Filipino lawyer’s principal source of ethical rules, which Canon 16 bears on
the principal complaint of complainant, a lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his client that he may come to possess. This commandment entails certain specific acts to be
done by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all money or property received for or from
the client36 as well as delivery of the funds or property to the client when due or upon
demand.37 Respondent breached this Canon when after he received the proceeds of
complainant’s insurance claim, he did not report it to complainant, who had a given address in
Makati, or to his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia who was his contact with respect to complainant.
In fact, long after respondent received the December 23, 1998 check for P525,000.00 he, by his
letter of March 26, 1999 to Garcia, had even the temerity to state that the claim was still pending
and recommend "acceptance of the 50% offer . . . which is P350,000.00 pesos." His explanation
that he prepared and sent this letter on Garcia’s express request is nauseating. A lawyer, like
respondent, would not and should not commit prevarication, documented at that, on the mere
request of a friend.
a time when, as respondent alleged, he and Garcia were not in good terms.43 Not only that. As
stated earlier, respondent’s Counter-Affidavit of February 18, 2000 and his December 7, 1999
letter to complainant unequivocally contained his express admission that the total amount of
P525,000.00 was in his custody. Such illogical, futile attempt to exculpate himself only
aggravates his misconduct. Respondent’s claim discredited, the affidavits of Leonardo and
Roxas who, acting allegedly for him, purportedly gave Garcia some amounts forming part of the
P233,000.00 are thus highly suspect and merit no consideration.
The proven ancillary charges against respondent reinforce the gravity of his professional
misconduct.
The intercalation of respondent’s name to the Chinabank check that was issued payable solely
in favor of complainant as twice certified by Metropolitan Insurance44 is clearly a brazen act of
falsification of a commercial document which respondent resorted to in order to encash the
check.

Respondent’s threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to expose complainant to possible sanctions
By respondent’s failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the benefit of
from certain government agencies with which he bragged to have a "good network" reflects lack
his client, he committed professional misconduct.38 Such misconduct is reprehensible at a
of character, self-respect, and justness.
greater degree, for it was obviously done on purpose through the employment of deceit to the
prejudice of complainant who was kept in the dark about the release of the check, until he
himself discovered the same, and has to date been deprived of the use of the proceeds thereof. It bears noting that for close to five long years respondent has been in possession of
complainant’s funds in the amount of over half a million pesos. The deceptions and lies that he
peddled to conceal, until its discovery by complainant after about a year, his receipt of the funds
A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty
and his tenacious custody thereof in a grossly oppressive manner point to his lack of good moral
of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to the client’s cause but also degrades himself and besmirches
character. Worse, by respondent’s turnaround in his Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he
the fair name of an honorable profession.39
already delivered to complainant’s friend Garcia the amount of P233,000.00 which, so
respondent claims, is all that complainant is entitled to, he in effect has declared that he has
That respondent had a lien on complainant’s funds for his attorney’s fees did not relieve him of nothing more to turn over to complainant. Such incredible position is tantamount to a refusal to
his duty to account for it.40 The lawyer’s continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes remit complainant’s funds, and gives rise to the conclusion that he has misappropriated them.45
that the client agrees with the amount of attorney’s fees to be charged. In case of disagreement
or when the client contests that amount for being unconscionable, however, the lawyer must not
In fine, by respondent’s questioned acts, he has shown that he is no longer fit to remain a
arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees.41 He can file, if he still
member of the noble profession that is the law.
deems it desirable, the necessary action or proper motion with the proper court to fix the amount
of such fees.42
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is found GUILTY of malpractice, deceit
and gross misconduct in the practice of his profession as a lawyer and he is hereby
In respondent’s case, he never had the slightest attempt to bring the matter of his compensation
DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
for judicial determination so that his and complainant’s sharp disagreement thereon could have
Attorneys and to inform all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of this Decision.
been put to an end. Instead, respondent stubbornly and in bad faith held on to complainant’s
funds with the obvious aim of forcing complainant to agree to the amount of attorney’s fees
sought. This is an appalling abuse by respondent of the exercise of an attorney’s retaining lien Respondent is ordered to turn over to complainant, Daniel Lemoine, the amount of P525,000.00
which by no means is an absolute right and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of within thirty (30) days from notice, without prejudice to whatever judicial action he may take to
money and property to his client when due or upon demand. recover his attorney’s fees and purported expenses incurred in securing the release thereof from
Metropolitan Insurance.
Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing a 25% attorney’s fees. After he received
the check and after complainant had discovered its release to him, he was already asking for SO ORDERED.
50%, objection to which complainant communicated to him. Why respondent had to doubly
increase his fees after the lapse of about one year when all the while he has been in custody of
the proceeds of the check defies comprehension. At any rate, it smacks of opportunism, to say
the least.

As for respondent’s claim in his June 2001 Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he had on
several occasions from May 1999 to October 1999 already delivered a total of P233,000.00 out
of the insurance proceeds to Garcia in trust for complainant, this does not persuade, for it is
bereft of any written memorandum thereof. It is difficult to believe that a lawyer like respondent
could have entrusted such total amount of money to Garcia without documenting it, especially at
ADM. CASE NO. No. 5195 April 16, 2009
NELIA PASUMBAL DE CHAVEZ-BLANCO, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
ATTY. EUGENIA J. MUÑOZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAIME B. LUMASAG, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Nelia P. de Chavez-
Blanco against respondent Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr., for deceit, dishonesty and gross
misconduct.
In a Report and Recommendation dated 11 December 2001,1 the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Milagros San Juan found respondent guilty of the charges and
recommended the penalty of disbarment. Subsequently, the IBP Board of Governors reduced
the penalty to a five (5)-year suspension in its Resolution XV-2002-229 dated 29 June 2001. In a
Resolution dated 9 December 2002, the Court, however, remanded the case to the IBP in view
of its findings that no formal hearing/investigation was conducted.
Upon remand to the IBP, the case was re-assigned to IBP Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa and
hearings were accordingly held thereafter.
Through her attorney-in-fact, Atty. Eugenia J. Muñoz, complainant alleged in her Complaint2 that
she was a resident of the United States of America together with her husband, Mario Blanco.
She also stated that she owned two (2) adjacent parcels of land in Quezon City, each with an
area of 400 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 22162 and
22163 registered in her name. In a document dated 20 November 1989, she authorized
respondent, who were her husband’s first cousin, to sell said lots.3
In a letter dated 20 March 1990, respondent reported that he had sold only one lot for the price
of ₱320,000.00 and therefrom he deducted ₱38,130.00 for taxes and commissions. And,
allegedly, per complainant’s instructions, he remitted the remaining balance of ₱281,900.00 to a
certain Belen Johnnes.4
In 1995, complainant was informed by respondent that the other lot remained unsold due to the
presence of squatters on the property.
In December 1998, Mario Blanco discovered that in truth, the two (2) lots had been sold on 11
March 1990 to the spouses Celso and Consolacion Martinez for the price of ₱1,120,000.00, and
that new titles had been issued to the transferees. Mario Blanco confronted respondent with
these facts in a letter, but the latter disregarded the same. Thus, in May 1999, complainant,
through Atty. Muñoz sent a demand letter to respondent directing him to remit and turn over to
her the entire proceeds of the sale of the properties.
Soon thereafter, respondent admitted the sale of the properties and his receipt of its proceeds,
but he never tendered or offered to tender the same to complainant. Despite repeated and
continued demands, respondent has since not remitted the amount equivalent to ₱838,100.00
(₱278,000.00 for the first parcel of land and ₱560,000.00 for the second). 5
Complainant also averred that the Special Power of Attorney dated 16 January 1989, which
respondent had used to sell the lots is a forgery and a falsified document, as the signature
therein were not the real signatures of complainant and her spouse. In addition, they could not
have acknowledged the document before a notary, as they were not in the Philippines at the
time.6
For his part, respondent vehemently denied all the accusations of deceit, dishonesty and gross
misconduct.7
Respondent countered that Mario Blanco was the true owner of the properties, which had to be
titled in complainant’s name, as Mario Blanco was a U.S. citizen. Mario Blanco had requested
him to look for a buyer of the properties and, in the course of selling them, respondent claimed
that he had only transacted with the former and never with complainant. Respondent averred
that he had been authorized in November 1989 to sell the property, through a Special Power of
Attorney, for a price of not less than ₱250,000.00 net for the owner.8
Respondent also alleged that the deed of absolute sale if the two (2) lots had been executed on
19 March 1990 but, only one lot was initially paid in the amount of ₱281,980.00, which he
immediately remitted to Mario Blanco. The payment for the other lot was withheld, pending the
relocation of the squatters who had been occupying the premises. And when respondent had
finally collected the proceeds of the second lot more than three (3) years after, he asked Mario
Blanco if the former could use the amount for a real estate venture whose profit, if successful, he
would share with the latter. Mario Blanco allegedly did not think twice and consented to the
proposal. The venture, however, did not push through.9
Respondent strongly maintained that the two (2) lots had been sold for only ₱563,960.00. 10
Finally, respondent denied the charge of falsification. He claimed that complainant and her
spouse, Mario Blanco, had in fact signed the Special Power of Attorney, but it was only notarized
later.11
In his Report and Recommendation dated 4 December 2006, Atty. Dennis A.B. Funa arrived at
the following findings:
It appears from the records that the two lots were sold by Respondent for ₱560,000.00, not
₱1,120,000.00 as alleged by Complainant. The basis is the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March
11, 1990 which shows that the two lots composing 800 sq. meters being sold for ₱560,000.00.
There appears to be no documentary basis for the claimed amount of ₱1,120,000.00 of
Complainant. However, Respondent in his Comment stated that the two lots were sold by him
for ₱563,960.00. In any case, we shall uphold and apply the amount stated in the Deed of
Absolute Sale.
In Respondent’s letter dated March 20, 1990, he acknowledged that he already received
₱320,000.00 as the "total value of one lot". Moreover, the computation shows that the
₱320,000.00 was only for 400 sq.m. as the computation stated: "400 sq.m. x
800p/sqm=₱320,000.00." Therefore, if the first lot was sold for ₱320,000.00, then the second lot
must have been sold for ₱240,000 x x x
x x x there was clear deception on the part of Respondent when he wrote the letter dated March
20, 1990 "informing" the Blanco spouses that he had sold only one of the two parcels of land for
₱320,000.00. This is belied by the fact that on March 11, 1990, or 9 days before he wrote the
letter, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by him selling the two lots for ₱560,000.00. This
Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized on March 19, 1990. During the hearing, Respondent
admitted that the Deed of Sale covered two lots. Clearly, Respondent was not forthcoming
towards the Blanco spouses.1awphi1
xxx
x x x Instead of representing that two lots had been sold for ₱560,000.00. Respondent only
represented that he sold only one lot for ₱320,000.00 and pocketing the balance of
₱240,000.00.
xxx
During the course of hearing, Respondent claims that the Deed of Sale referred to above is a
fake, and that there is a Deed of Sale showing a selling price of ₱320,000.00 which is the real
Deed of Sale. However, no such Deed of Sale has been presented by Respondent and no such
Deed of Sale appears in the records. Later in the hearing, Respondent retracted his statement
claiming he was merely confused.
As for the alleged falsification of a Special Power of Attorney dated January 16, 1989, wherein
the signatures of the Blanco spouses appear in the SPA when they were not in the Philippines
on January 16, 1989 but were allegedly in the United States, their absence in the country has
not been satisfactorily established since mere xerox copies of their passports, although noted by
a notary public, cannot duly establish their absence in the country on that date. Other acceptable
documents such as a certification from the Bureau of Immigration would have been appropriate
but which, however, had not been presented. In any case, Respondent denies the charge of
falsification.12 (Citations omitted) [Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, the IBP Commissioner recommended that, in view of the fact that respondent was
already 72 years old, he be meted out the penalty of suspension of one (1)-year suspension, not
disbarment as had been prayed for and not 5 year-suspension as had been earlier resolved by
the IBP Board of Governors. Moreover, the IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent
be ordered to deliver to Complainant the amount of ₱240,000.00 plus the legal interest rate of
6% per annum computed from March 1990.
On 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-222 adopting
and approving the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner.13
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but a reduction of the
recommended penalty is called for, following the dictum that the appropriate penalty for an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 14
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders
him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility commands all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof provides:
Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
There is no need to stretch one’s imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that
respondent committed dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him by the complainant
and her spouse.
Records show that two lots had been sold by respondent as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute
Sale of 11 March 1990. Respondent, however, taking advantage of the absence of complainant
and her spouse from the Philippines and their complete trust in him, deceitfully informed them in
a letter dated 20 March 1990 that he had sold only one. It can be reasonably deduced from the
exchanges between the parties that the proceeds of the first lot had been transmitted to
complainant and her spouse. Respondent’s contention, though, that he had been authorized to
retain the proceeds of the second is specious, as complainant and her spouse could not have
given the same, having been left in the dark as regards its sale. And despite repeated demands,
to date, there is no showing that the outstanding amount has been paid. Thus, respondent’s
deceitful conduct warrants disciplinary sanction and a directive for the remittance of the
remaining proceeds is in order.
As to the charge of falsification, the Court agrees with the IBP that the same appears to be
unsubstantiated. Settled is the rule that, in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that
the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. In fact, if the
complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no
obligation to prove his exception or defense.15 Mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof.16
Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.— A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to so do.
Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. The Court finds, however, that suspension from
the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is
meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. While the Court will not hesitate to
remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls
for it, the Court will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end. In this case, the Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension of two (2)
years for respondent to be too severe, considering his advanced age. The Court believes that a
suspension of six (6) months is sufficient. Suspension, by the way, is not primarily intended as
punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession. 171avvphi1
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. Further, respondent
is ordered to deliver to complainant the amount of ₱240,000.00 plus legal interest rate of 6% per
annum computed from March 1990.
Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondent’s record as an attorney in this Court, and
notice thereof be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.