PERSONS ARTS.
36-40 action”; thus, this element is missing in this
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
vs.Janiola
G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009
Facts:
This case is a petition for the reversal of
the decision on the suspension of the criminal
proceeding filed by the petitioner in the MTC
for the ground that there is a presence of
prejudicial question with respect to the civil case
belatedly filed by the respondent. The petitioner
appealed to RTC but denied Dreamwork,
through its President, and Vice-President, filed
a Complaint Affidavit against Janiola for
violation of BP 22 at the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. Correspondingly,
the former alsofiled a criminal information for
violation of BP 22 against private respondent
with the MTC, entitledPeople of the Philippines
v. Cleofe S. Janiola.On September 20, 2006,
Janiola, instituted a civil complaint against
petitioner for the rescission of analleged
construction agreement between the parties, as
well as for damages. Thereafter respondentfiled
a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the
Criminal Case for the ground that private
respondentclaimthat the civil case posed a
prejudicial question against the criminal
case.Petitioner opposed theRespondent’s Motion
to Suspend criminal proceeding based on
juridical question for the followinggrounds;
(1) there is no prejudicial question in thiscase as
the rescission of the contract upon which the
bouncingchecks were issued is a separate and
distinct issue from the issue of whether private
respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of
the elements of a prejudicial question isthat “the
previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to
the issueraised in the subsequent criminal
case, the criminal casehaving preceded the civil
case.
The MTC granted the Respondents Motion to
Suspend Proceedings.Petitioner appealed the
Orders to the RTC but denied the
petition.Hence, this petition raised.
ISSUE
Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in
its discretion to suspend proceedings in Criminal
Case on the basis of “Prejudicial Question
“, with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed.
Held
This petition must be granted, pursuant to SEC.
7.Elements of prejudicial question. The elements
of aprejudicial question are:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b)
the resolution of such issuedetermines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is
understood in law asthat which must precede
thecriminal action and which requires a
decisionbefore a final judgment can be rendered
in the criminalaction.The civil action must be
instituted prior to the institution ofthe criminal
action.In this case, the Information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint
in Civil Case filedby the State with the RTC.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists.The
Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal
Action. Even if the trial court in the civil case
declares thatthe construction agreement between
the parties is void forlack of consideration, this
would not affect theprosecution of private
respondent in the criminal case.The fact of the
matter is that private respondent issued checks
which were subsequently dishonored
forinsufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject
of prosecution under BP 22.Therefore, it isclear
that the second element required for the
existence of a prejudicial question, isabsent.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists
QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO
GR No. L-48157 March 16, 1988
FACTS:
Ejectment Case. Private Respondent claims to
own the land and Petitioner through force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth entered their
property. Petitioner raised in his affirmative
defense and as a ground for dismissing the case
that an administrative case is pending before the
Office of Land Authority between the same
parties and involving the same piece of land.
In the administrative case Petitioner dispute the
right of the Private Respondent over the property
for default in payments for the purchase of the
lot. Petitioner argue that the administrative case
was determinative of private respondents right
toe eject petitioner from the from the lot in
question; hence a prejudicial question which
bars a judicial action until after its termination.
The Municipal Court denied the Motion to
Dismiss contained in the Petitioner’s affirmative
defenses. Petitioner appealed to the Court of
First Instance. Private Respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss arguing there is no
Prejudicial Question.
The Land Authority filed and Urgent Motion for
Leave to Intervene in the CFI praying that the
Petition for Certiorari be granted and the
ejectment case be dismissed and the Office of
the Land Authority be allowed to decide the
matter exclusively.
The Petition was denied by the CFI finding the
issue involved in the ejectment case to be one of
prior possession and Motion to Intervene was
denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner and Intervenor raised the case to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE BETWEEN THE PRIVATE PARTIES
INVOLVING THE LOT SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE EJECTMENT CASE CONSTITUTES
A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHICH
WOULD OPERATE AS A BAR TO SAID
EJECTMENT CASE.
DECISION: PETITION IS GRANTED. CIVIL
CASE No. 2526 of the then MUNICIPAL
COURT OF MALABON RIZAL IS HEREBY
ORDERED DISMISSED. No Costs.
Technically, No prejudicial question.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be
that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in said case and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. (Zapata v.
Montessa 4 SCRA 510 (1962); Pp v. Aragon,
500 G. No. 10, 4863) The Doctrine of
Prejudicial Question comes into play generally
in a situation where civil and criminal actions
are pending and the issues involved in both
cases are similar or so closely related that an
issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil
case before the criminal action can proceed.
Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a
civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause
the suspension of the latter pending final
determination of the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question
as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court are:
the Civil Action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal
action
the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
However because of intimate correlation of the
two proceedings and the possibility of the Land
Authority in deciding in favor of Petitioner
which will terminate or suspend Private
Respondents Right to Eject Petitioner, the SC
gave the lower court and advise. This advise
became the which became the basis for
deciding the case.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more
prudent course for the trial court to have taken is
to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance
until after a determination of the administrative
case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not
jurisprudence dictate such move. To allow the
parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the
possibility of petitioner’s right of possession
being upheld in the pending administrative case
is to needlessly require not only the parties but
the court as well to expend time, effort and
money in what may turn out to be a sheer
exercise of futility. Thus, 1 AM Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in
the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the
action in abeyance to abide the outcome of
another pending in another court, especially
where the parties and the issues are the same, for
there is power inherent in every court to control
the disposition of cases on its dockets with
economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights
parties to the second action cannot be properly
determined until the questions raised in the first
action are settled the second action should be
stayed. (at page 622)
While the rule is properly applicable for
instances involving two [2] court actions, the
existence in the instant case of the same
consideration of identity of parties and issues,
economy of time and effort for the court, the
counsels and the parties as well as the need to
resolve the parties right of possession before the
ejectment case may be properly determined,
justifies the rule’s analogous application to the
case at bar.
Fortich-Celdran, et al vs. Caldran, et al, 19
SCRA 502, provides another analogous
situation. In sustaining the assailed order of the
then CFI of Misamis Oriental ordering the
suspension of the criminal case for falsification
of public document against several persons,
among them the subscribing officer Santiago
Catane until the civil case involving the issue of
the genuineness of the alleged forged document
shall have been decided, this Court cited as a
reason therefor its own action on administrative
charges against said Santiago Catane, as follows:
It should be mentioned here also that an
administrative case filed in this Court against
Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held
by Us in Abeyance, thus:
“As it appears that the genuineness of the
document allegedly forged by respondent
attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77
(Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane,
etc, et al.) is necessarily involved in Civil Case
No. R-3397 of the Cebu CFI, action on the
herein complaint is withheld until that litigation
has finally been decided. Complainant Celdran
shall inform the Court about such decision.”(SC
minute resolution April 27, 1962 in Adm Case
No. 77, Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago
Catane, etc. et. al)
If a pending civil case may be considered to be
in the nature of a prejudicial question to an
administrative case. We see no reason why the
reverse may bot be so considered in the proper
case, such as in the petition at bar.
The SC even noted the Wisdom of Its advice.
Finally, events occurring during the pendency of
the petition attest to the wisdom of the
conclusion herein reached. For in the
Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner, it
was stated that he intervenor Land Authority
which later became the Department of Agrarian
REform had promulgated a decision in the
administrative case affirming the cancellation of
Agreement to Sell issued in favor of the private
respondent. Wit this development, the folly of
allowing the ejectment case to proceed is too
evident to need further elaboration.
YAP V. PARAS
G.R. No. 101236 January 30, 1992
FACTS:
According to Yap, Paras sold in 1971 to her his
share in the intestate estate for P300.00. The sale
was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen
years later, (in 1990), Paras sold the same
property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00.
This was evidenced by a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale. When Yap learned of the second
sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against
Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City.
On the
same date, she filed a complaint for the
nullification of the said sale with the Regional
Trial
Court of General Santos City. After
investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor
instituted a criminal
complaint for estafa against Paras with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-
Malapatan,
South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D.
Barcelona, Sr., who dismissed the criminal case
on the ground that the issue in the civil case is
prejudicial to the criminal case for estafa.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Judge correct in motu proprio
dismissing the criminal case?
HELD:
1. NO. First, he should not have dismissed the
criminal case but only suspended it. Second, it
was wrong for him to dismiss the criminal case
outright, since it requires a motion first from the
proper party. The rule provides:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
question. — A petition for suspension of the
criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the
office of the fiscal or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal
action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Third, there is actually no prejudicial question
here.
Anent the issue of prejudicial question, the rule
provides that: Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended
provides:
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The
two (2) essential elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which
arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must
be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with
it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It was held that "for a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the criminal action
pending the determination of the civil action, it
must appear not only that the civil case involves
the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution is based, but also that the resolution
of the
issues raised in said civil action would be
necessarily determinative of the guilt or
innocence of
the accused".
Indeed, the civil case at bar does not involve the
same facts upon which the criminal action is
based. There was no motion for suspension in
the case at bar; and no less importantly, the
respondent judge had not been informed of the
defense Paras was raising in the civil action.
Judge Barcelona could not have ascertained then
if the issue raised in the civil action would
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal case
FORTICH VS. CELDRAN
A suit for annulment of an extrajudicial partition
of properties and for accounting was filed on
February 3, 1954 in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu (Civil Case No. 3397-R).
Appearing therein as plaintiffs were: Jose,
Francisco, Pedro, Jr., Ignacio, all surnamed
Abuton-Celdran (children of the deceased Pedro
Celdran by the first nuptial) and, as the
administratrix of Francisco Celdran (another
brother), Modesta Rodriguez. Defendants were:
Pablo Celdran (child of the deceased by the first
marriage who refused to join as plaintiff), Josefa
Vda. de Celdran (spouse of the deceased by the
second marriage), Manuel, Antonio, Pedro III,
Jesus, Vicente and Miguel, all surnamed Fortich
Celdran (children of the deceased by the second
nuptial.
After the defendants answered on May 28, 1954,
a motion to withdraw as co-plaintiff was filed on
May 24, 1957. It was signed "Ignacio Celdran.
This motion has been marked as Exhibit B-
Josefa.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, with leave of court, the plaintiffs
(excluding Ignacio) filed an amended complaint
impleading Ignacio Celdran as defendant.
Ignacio Celdran filed an answer with
counterclaim and cross-claim.
After trial but before judgment, Ignacio Celdran
had the document Exh. B-Josefa (the motion to
withdraw) examined by the Police Department
of Cebu City. The police were of the view that
the same (signature therein) was falsified.
Alleging newly discovered evidence, Ignacio
Celdran asked for new trial, which the court
denied.
All the parties, except Ignacio Celdran,
thereafter entered on May 6, 1959 into an
amicable settlement, recognizing as valid the
aforementioned extrajudicial partition.
Regarding Ignacio Celdran, the court rendered
judgment on July 19, 1961, declaring the same
extrajudicial partition as valid for having been
ratified by him (Ignacio). Specifically, the court
found among other things that Ignacio signed the
motion to withdraw (Exh. B-Josefa) after he
received P10,000 of the agreed P20,000 and two
residential lots to be given to him in return for
his aforesaid ratification of the partition.
Said decision was later amended to require
Pedro III, Antonio, Jesus, Miguel and Vicente,
all surnamed Fortich-Celdran, to pay Ignacio the
balance of P20,000 aforestated and to deliver to
him the promised two parcels of land.
Ignacio Celdran appealed therefrom to the Court
of Appeals. And said appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 30499-R, shown in the record
before Us as still pending.
Now on March 22, 1963, at the instance of
Ignacio Celdran, an information for falsification
of a public document — that is, Exh. B-Josefa or
the abovementioned motion to withdraw in the
civil case — was filed by the City Fiscal of
Ozamis in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental. Accused therein were: Pedro III,
Antonio, Manuel, Vicente, Miguel, and Jesus, all
surnamed Celdran (defendants in the civil case);
Santiago Catane, as subscribing officer;
Abelardo Cecilio, as the person who filed the
motion.
As private complainant, however, Ignacio
Celdran on December 12, 1962, moved before
trial to suspend the proceedings in the criminal
case on the ground of prejudicial question. The
reason given in support thereof was that the
alleged falsification of the same document is at
issue in the civil case pending in the Court of
Appeals.
Declaring that there was no pre-judicial
question, the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental denied on January 28, 1963 the
motion to suspend the prosecution. It ruled that
the alleged forgery was not an issue in the civil
case.
Assailing the above ruling, Ignacio Celdran filed
in the Court of Appeals on February 21, 1963, a
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
(CA-G.R. No. 31909-R) to enjoin the CFI of
Misamis Occidental and the City Fiscal of
Ozamis from proceeding with the prosecution of
the criminal case.
On February 18, 1964 the Court of Appeals
decided said petition for certiorari, ordering the
suspension of the criminal case due to pre-
judicial question.
Pedro III, Jesus, Manuel, Miguel and Vicente,
all surnamed Fortich-Celdran; Santiago Catane
and Abelardo Cecilio — accused in the criminal
suit and respondents in the petition
for certiorari — appealed to Us from the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated February
18, 1964.
Appellants would contend that there is no pre-
judicial question involved. The record shows
that, as aforestated, the Court of First Instance
ruled that Ignacio Celdran ratified the partition
agreement; among the reasons cited by the trial
court for said ruling is that Ignacio Celdran
received P10,000 and signed the motion to
withdraw as plaintiff in the suit. Disputing this,
Celdran assigned as error in his appeal the
finding that he signed the aforementioned
motion (Exh. B-Josefa) and maintains that the
same is a forgery. Since ratification is principal
issue in the civil action pending appeal in the
Court of Appeals, and the falsification or
genuineness of the motion to withdraw —
presented and marked as evidence in said civil
case — is among the questions involved in said
issue, it follows that the civil action poses a pre-
judicial question to the criminal prosecution for
alleged falsification of the same document, the
motion to withdraw (Exh. B-Josefa).
Presented as evidence of ratification in the civil
action is the motion to withdraw; its authenticity
is assailed in the same civil action. The
resolution of this point in the civil case will in a
sense be determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal suit pending in
another tribunal. As such, it is a prejudicial
question which should first be decided before
the prosecution can proceed in the criminal case.
A pre-judicial question is one that arises in a
case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent to the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal;
that is, it is determinative of the case before the
court and jurisdiction to pass upon the same is
lodged in another tribunal.1
It should be mentioned here also that an
administrative case filed in this Court against
Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held
by Us in abeyance, thus:
As it appears that the genuineness of the
document allegedly forged by respondent
attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77
(Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane,
etc., et al.) is necessarily involved in Civil Case
No. R-3397 of the Cebu Court of First Instance,
action on the herein complaint is withheld until
that litigation has finally been decided.
Complainant Celdran shall inform the Court
about such decision. (Supreme Court minute
resolution of April 27, 1962 in Adm. Case No.
77, Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago
Catane, etc., et al.) .
Regarding the procedural question on Ignacio
Celdran's right as private offended party to file
through counsel a motion to suspend the
criminal case, the same exists where, as herein,
the Fiscal, who had direction and control of the
prosecution, did not object to the filing of said
motion. And its filing in this case complied with
Sec. 5 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
SEC. 5. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
question. — A petition for the suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a
pre-judicial question in a civil case, may only be
presented by any party before or during the trial
of the criminal action.
Denial of the motion to suspend the prosecution
was therefore attended with grave abuse of
discretion; and the issue having been squarely
and definitely presented before the trial court, a
motion for reconsideration, which would but
raise the same points, was not necessary. Neither
was appeal the remedy available, since the order
denying suspension is interlocutory and thus not
yet appealable.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals
under review — ordering suspension of
Criminal CASE No. 5719,People vs. Pedro
Fortich-Celdran, et al., pending before the Court
of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, until
after Civil Case, CA-G.R. No. 30499-R, Pedro
A. Celdran, et al. vs. Pedro Fortich-Celdran III,
et al., shall have been decided — is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellant. So
ordered.
UMALI V IAC GR No. 63198 June 21, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioners are the officers of the Orosea
Development Corporation (OROSEA).On
September 4, 1979, petitioners purchased from
the spouses Honorio and Solina Edano, Lot No.
49 of the Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, Bo.
Casay, Mulanay, Province ofQuezon, covered
by TCT No. RT-(T-36471), in the name of
spouses Edano, for the sumof P1,036,500.00
payable in four installments. The first
check for P225,000.00 was honored upon
its presentment. By arrangement of the
petitioners with the Edano spouses, a deed of
absolute sale was executed by the vendors. In
the first deferment petitioners issued a check that
matured on June 30, 1980 to replace the check
that matured on March 31, 1980. On the second
deferment petitioners issued another check dated
July 31, 1980 to replace the check dated June 30,
1980.This second renewal check was presented
with the bank but it was dishonored due to lack
of funds. So were the checks postdated
September 30, 1980 and March 31, 1981.
They were also dishonored upon their
presentment for lack of funds. On May
21, 1981the Edano spouses filed a complaint
for estafa against petitioners, docketed as
Criminal Case No.1423-I, as a consequence
of the dishonor of the checks. On
October 14, 1981,OROSEA filed a Complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against
the Edano spouses, docketed as Civil Case No.
8769, for the annulment/rescission of the
Contract of Sale executed on September 4,
1979 by and between OROSEA and the Edano
spouses covering Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral
Survey of Mulanay, and for which the
petitioners issued the checks.
ISSUE:
Whether CV No. 8769 involves a prejudicial
question in relation to CR No. 1423-Iso as to
require a suspension of proceedings in the latter
case, until the civil case is disposed of
RULING:
At the time the acts complained of in CR No.
1423-I were committed, the deed of sale sought
to be later annulled in CV No. 8769 was binding
upon the parties thereto, including the
petitioners. The two (2) essential elements for a
prejudicial question to exist are: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue in the civil
action determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. Given the
nature of a prejudicial question, and
considering the issues raised in CV No. 8769
and CR No.1423-I, we agree with the ruling of
the respondent Court of Appeals that the
resolution of the issues in CV No. 8769 is
not determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the petitioners-accused in CR No. 1423-
I, hence, no prejudicial question is
involved between the said two (2) cases. What
private respondents complained of in CR No.
1423-I is that the checks issued by petitioners in
their favor were dishonored for lack of funds
upon due presentment to the drawee
bank. Undeniably, at the time of said
dishonor, petitioners' obligation to pay private
respondents pursuant to the deed of sale,
continued to subsist. And because petitioners'
checks were dishonored for lack of funds,
petitioners are answerable under the law for the
consequences of their said acts. And even if CV
No. 8769 were to be finally adjudged to the
effect that the said deed of sale should be
annulled, such declaration would be of
no material importance in the determination
of the guilt or innocence of petitioners-accused
in CR No. 1423-I. The petition for review on
certiorari is denied and the decision of the Court
of Appeals is affirmed.
WILSON PO CHAM v. ATTY.
EDILBERTO PIZARRO
A.C. No. 5499, 16 August 2005
The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor to thus render him
unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned
with disbarment or suspension.
Upon Atty. Edilberto Pizarro’s representations
to complainant Wilson Po Cham (Po Cham) that
a certain parcel of land being offered for sale to
him was alienable and disposable, Po Cham
gave Atty. Pizarro two checks representing the
purchase price of the said property. Po Cham
subsequently took possession of the property
and installed a barbed wire fence at its front
portion. Soon after, however, a forest guard
approached him and informed him that the
property could not be fenced for the reason that
it was part of the Bataan National Park. Upon
investigation, Po Cham discovered that the
property is not an alienable or disposable land
susceptible of private ownership.
Po Cham demanded the return of the purchase
price but Atty. Pizarro did not heed to the
demand. Po Cham thereafter charged Atty.
Pizarro of violation of his oath as a member of
the Bar.
The Supreme Court (SC) referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation or
decision. The IBP, in its Report and
Recommendation, found Atty. Pizarro to have
violated his oath as a member of the Bar. It
recommended his suspension from the practice
of law for 3 months, subject to the approval of
the members of the Board of Governors. The
case was forwarded to the SC for final action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Pizarro violated his solemn
oath as a lawyer
HELD:
The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor to thus render him
unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned
with disbarment or suspension.
Atty. Pizarro has utterly failed to substantiate his
documented claim of having irrevocable rights
and interests over the property which he could
have conveyed to Po Cham. Atty. Pizarro must
thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing Po
Cham to purchase non-existent ―irrevocable
rights, interest and participation‖ over an
inalienable property.
ARTICLES 38-39
KRIVENKO V. REGISTER OF DEEDS
G.R. No. L-630. November 15, 1947
Facts:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a
residential lot from Magdalena Estate Inc. in
December 1941. The registration was
interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought
to accomplish the said registration but was
denied by the Register of Deeds of Manila on
the grounds that he is a foreigner and he cannot
acquire a land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko
brought the case to the CFI of Manila. The CFI
ruled that he cannot own a land, being an alien.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an alien under our
Constitution may acquire residential land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights
to acquire residential lot that was already of
private ownership prior to the approval of this
Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?
RULING:
1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the
Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber,
and mineral lands of the public domain, water,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution.
This means to say that, under the provisions of
the Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to
acquire the ownership of urban or residential
lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all
acquisitions made in contravention of the
prohibitions since the fundamental law became
effective are null and void per se and ab initio.
2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the
Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121
which granted aliens the right to acquire private
only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed
that the pharase "no land" used in this section
refers to all private lands, whether strictly
agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being
practically no private land which had not been
acquired by any of the means provided in said
two sections. Therefore, the prohibition
contained in these two provisions was, in effect,
that no private land could be transferred to aliens
except "upon express authorization by the
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine
Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease,
encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other
words, aliens were granted the right to acquire
private land merely by way of reciprocity.
YAP VS. GRAGEDA
FACTS:
Maximino Rico executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of the petitioner Donato Reyes Yap
who was then a Chinese national. After the lapse
of nearly fifteen years from and after the
execution of the deed of absolute sale, Donato
Reyes Yap was admitted as a Filipino citizen
and allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. On December 1,
1967, the petitioner ceded the major portion of a
lot which he acquired by purchase under the
deed of sale in favor of his engineer son, Felix
Yap, who was also a Filipino citizen because of
the Filipino citizenship of his mother and the
naturalization of his father Donato Reyes Yap.
Subsequently, Lourdes Rico, aunt and co-heir
of respondent Jose A. Rico, son of maximino
Rico, sold the remaining portion of that lot to the
petitioner who had his rights. Donato Reyes
Yap, has been in possession of the lots in
question since 1939, openly, publicly,
continuously, and adversely in the concept of
owner until the present time.
ISSUE: WON the sale of residential lot in
question to a Chinese national is null and void in
spite of the fact that the vendee had been a
naturalized born Filipino citizen.
RULING:
The litigated property is now in the hands of a
naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a
disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a
naturalized citizen, was constitutionally
qualified to own the subject property. There
would be no more public policy to be served in
allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land
as it is already in the hands of a qualified person.
Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in
Vasquez vs. Giap and Leng Seng Giap & Sons;
... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only
agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by
this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve
the nation's lands for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but achieved by making lawful the
acquisition of real estate by aliens who became
Filipino citizens by naturalization.
GODINEZ VS FONG PAK LUEN
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The Plaintiffs filed this case to recover a parcel
of land sold by their father, now deceased, to
Fong Pak Luen, an alien, on the ground that the
sale was null and void ab initio since it violates
applicable provisions of the Constitution and the
Civil Code. The plaintiffs filed a complaint in
the CFI of Sulu alleging that they are the heirs of
Jose Godinez who was married to Martina
Alvarez Godinez sometime in 1910. During the
marriage of their parents they acquired a parcel
of land lot No.94 of Jolo
townsite with an area of 3,665 square meters as
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title in the
name of Jose Godinez. Their mother died
sometime in 1938 leaving the plaintiffs as their
sole surviving heirs. 0n November 23, 1941,
without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, the said
Jose Godinez, sold the aforesaid parcel of land
to the defendant Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese
citizen. A TCT was then issued by the Register
of Deeds to the said defendant, which is null and
void ab initio since the transaction constituted a
non-existent contract.
Thereafter, defendant Fong Pak Luen executed
a power of attorney in favor of his co-defendant
Kwan Pun Ming, also an alien, who conveyed
and sold the above described parcel of land to
co-defendant Trinidad S. Navata , who is aware
of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak Luen
is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming,
who under the law are prohibited and
disqualified to acquire real property in this
jurisdiction.
Since one-half of the said property is conjugal
property inherited by the plaintiffs from their
mother,
Jose Godinez could not have legally conveyed
the entire property. Notwithstanding repeated
demands onsaid defendant to surrender to
plaintiffs the said property she refused, hence,
plaintiffs filed a complaint that they be adjudged
as the owners of the parcel of land in question
and the TCT issued in the name of defendant
Fong Pak Luen as well as the TCT issued in the
name of defendant Navata be declared null
andvoid ab initio.
Defendant Navata filed her answer alleging that
the complaint does not state a cause of action
since it appears from the allegation that the
property is registered in the name of Jose
Godinez so that as his sole property he may
dispose of the same. The cause of action has
been barred by the statute of limitations as the
alleged document of sale executed by Jose
Godinez on November 27, 1941,conveyed the
property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a result
of which a title was issued to said defendant.
 The Lower court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that their cause of action has prescribed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of a person who sold a
parcel of land to an alien in violation of a
constitutional prohibition may recover the
property if it had, in the meantime, been
conveyed to a Filipino citizen qualified to own
and possess it. - NO
RULING:
There can be no dispute that the sale in 1941 by
Jose Godinez of his residential lot acquired from
the Bureau of Lands as part of the Jolo townsite
to Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese citizen residing in
Hongkong, was violative of Section 5, Art. 13 of
1935 Constitution which provided: Save in cases
of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
land will be transferred or assigned except to
individuals,corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines.
We see no necessity from the facts of this case
to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale
executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen
whether void ab initio, illegal per se or merely
pro-exhibited. It is enough to stress that insofar
as the vendee is concerned, prescription is
unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his
heirs rely on an argument based on
imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941
is now in the hands of a Filipino citi#en against
whom the constitutional prescription was never
intended to apply. The lower court erred in
treating the case as one involving simply the
application of the statute of limitations. From the
fact that prescription may not be used to defend
a contract which the Constitution prohibits, it
does not necessarily follow that the appellants
may be allowed to recover the property sold to
an alien. As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen,
the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same
property to Trinidad S. Navata, a Filipino citizen
qualified to acquire real property.
In Herrera v. Luy Kim Guan the court declared
that where land is sold to a Chinese citizen, who
later sold it to a Filipino, the sale to the latter
cannot be impugned. In Sarrosa vda. de
Barsoboa v. Cuenco we had occasion to pass
upon a factual situation substantially similar to
the one in the instant case. We ruled: But the the
factual set-up has changed. The litigated
property is now in the hands of a naturalized
Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified
vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen,
was constitutionally qualified to own the subject
property. There would be no more public policy
to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to
recover the land as it is already in the hands of a
qualified person.
Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in
Vasquez vs. Giap & Sons: if the ban on aliens
from acquiring not only agricultural but also
urban lands, as construed by this Court in the
Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands
for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or
purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by
aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization.
While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private
respondent's vendor, had no rights of ownership
to transmit, it is likewise in escapable that
petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26
years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or
inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred
from asserting her claim to the litigated
property. Laches has been defined as the failure
or neglect, for an unreasonable and une6plained
length of time, to do that which by exercising
due diligence could or should have been done
earlier: it is negligence or ommission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be
the rightful owner of the property. Respondent
Navata, the titled owner of the property is
declared the rightful owner.
ARTICLE 40
GELUZ V. CA
[2 S 801 (1961)]
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant
(Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948-- thru
her aunt. In 1950, she became pregnant by her
present husband before they were legally
married. During to conceal her pregnancy from
her parent, she had herself aborted by def. After
the marriage w/ the plaintiff., she again became
pregnant. As she was employed in the
COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by
def. in Oct 1953. Less than 2 years later, she
again became pregnant. On 2/21/55, she again
repaired to the defendant’s clinic. Nita was again
aborted of a 2-month old foetus, in consideration
of the sum of P50.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes
pltff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages The CA and the trial court predicated
the award of damages upon the provisions of the
initial par. of Art. 2206 of the NCC.
Issue: WON the husband can recover damages
from the death of a fetus - NO
RULING:
This award, we believe, to be error for the said
art., in fixing an award for the death of a person,
does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that
is not endowed w/ personality.
RATIO:
Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for
damages on its behalf. A husband of a woman
who voluntarily procured her abortion could not
recover damages from the physician who caused
the same.
(1) Since an action for pecuniary damages on
account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the injured, no such right of action
could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs
of an unborn child. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child,
the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place
from one that lacked juridical personality (or
juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity
to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional
personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro
nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Cod,
because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently
born alive: "provided it be born later with the
condition specified in the following article." In
the present case, there is no dispute that the child
was dead when separated from its mother's
womb.
(2) This is not to say that the parents are not
entitled to collect any damages at all. But such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon
them, as distinguished from the injury or
violation of the rights of the deceased, his right
to life and physical integrity. Because the
parents cannot expect either help, support or
services from an unborn child, they would
normally be limited to moral damages for the
illegal arrest of the normal development of the
spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account
of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and
the disappointment of their parental expectations
(Art. 2217, CC), as well as to exemplary
damages, if the circumstances should warrant
them (Art. 2230, CC). But in this case, there is
no basis for an award of moral damages,
evidently because the husband's indifference to
the previous abortions clearly indicates that he
was unconcerned with the frustration of his
parental hopes and affection.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is
considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb.
However, if the foetus had an intrauterine life of
less than seven months, it is not deemed born if
it dies within twenty-four hours after its
complete delivery from the maternal womb.
Tolentino: Separation from Mother.-- This is
produced by the cutting of the umbilical cord,
whether the removal takes place naturally or by
surgical operation.
Alive at Birth.-- The duration of extra-uterine
life is immaterial; for acquisition of juridical
personality, it is enough that the child lives even
for an instant.
Test of Life.-- The general opinion is that
independent life required for juridical
personality can be shown only by complete
respiration. The cry of the child, although it is
not a necessary sign of life, is evidence that it
has acquired complete respiration. Another
indication of complete respiration is the floating
of the lungs when placed in water; this means
that air has penetrated into the lungs by
breathing.
Viability Not Required.-- Viability means that
the child is capable of living, and this is
determined by the extent of the development of
its organs.
Premature Birth.-- In this case, if the child does
not live 24 hours completely separated from the
mother's womb, it does not acquire juridical
personality. This is an absolute requirement for
feotuses w/c have an intrauterine life of less than
7 mos. (Balane quoting Manresa and JBL.)
"The aborted creature does not reach the
category of a natural person and consequently is
not born in the contemplation of law." (Geluz v.
CA, supra.)
This is so, even if the child is killed before the
period lapses and it can be proved that it could
have survived that period if it had not been
prevented by the wilful act of another. On the
other hand, juridical personality is acquired even
if the survival for 24 hours is caused only by
medical or scientific means w/o w/c the child
would have died before the lapse of that period.
LIMJOCO VS. ESTATE OF FRAGRANTE
G.R. No. L-770
April 27, 1948
FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service
Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said
intestate estate through its Special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate
an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of
two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality
of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from the
said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that
Fragante’s intestate estate is financially capable
of maintaining the proposed service.
Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of
the legal representative of the estate of Fragante
for the latter as party applicant and afterwards
granting the certificate applied for is a
contravention of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an
artificial judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an
artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had
lived, in view of the evidence of record, would
have obtained from the commission the
certificate for which he was applying. The
situation has not changed except for his death,
and the economic ability of his estate to
appropriately and adequately operate and
maintain the service of an ice plant was the same
that it received from the decedent himself.
It has been the constant doctrine that the estate
or the mass of property, rights and assets left by
the decedent, directly becomes vested and
charged with his rights and obligations which
survive after his demise. The reason for this
legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased
person is considered a "person", as deemed to
include artificial or juridical persons, is the
avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting
from the impossibility of exercising such legal
rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the
decedent as survived after his death unless the
fiction is indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be considered an
artificial or juridical person for the purposes of
the settlement and distribution of his estate
which, include the exercise during the judicial
administration of those rights and the fulfillment
of those obligations of his estate which survived
after his death.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are
not extinguished by death go to make up a part
and parcel of the assets of his estate for the
benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if
any, and the heirs of the decedent. It includes
those rights and fulfillment of obligation of
Fragante which survived after his death like his
pending application at the commission.
Another Ruling:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an
artificial judicial personality because under the
Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be
considered as artificial juridical person for the
purpose of the settlement and distribution of his
properties”. It should be noted that the exercise
of juridical administration includes those rights
and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which
survived after his death. One of those surviving
rights involved the pending application for
public convenience before the Public Service
Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the
purposes of the prosecution of said case No.
4572 of the Public Service Commission to its
final conclusion, both the personality and
citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be
deemed extended, within the meaning and intent
of the Public Service Act, as amended, in
harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged
and decreed”.