G.R. No.

L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent HELD: There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to
AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL. is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the
obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to
Issue: has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to
to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the no other force except the dictates of their conscience.
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be
prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest,
Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
also raised versus the power of the executive of the women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability
Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge must necessarily have the same means to return them from for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during
in his capacity as Mayor. Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from
may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition
Facts: by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions
impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to
Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 liberty may not thus be easily evaded. pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that
women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should
and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the
specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said Political Law: Martinez vs Morfe (Privilefe from Arrest) prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after
women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Martinez vs Morfe On January 2, 2012 legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that
Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc. Political Law – Privilege from Arrest precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the
Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power.
respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women Sr., as delegates of the present Constitutional Convention The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain
were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
in the city of Davao instead. above constitutional provision, if considered in connection with manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the
Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer essence. Petitioners cannot claim their claim to immunity.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions; or employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, “arrest
or search any member thereof, except in case such member has ***According to Art. VI, Sec. 15 of the Constitution: “The
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in
optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the higher than prision mayor.” For under the Constitutional all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be
bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
(2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of immunities of a senator or a representative. Both petitioners the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and
sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought are facing criminal prosecutions, the information filed against for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned
before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin for falsification of a public in any other place.”
show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the document and two informations against petitioner Fernando
right to be present. Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code. The EXEMPTION: They can be arrested in cases of Treason, Felony
Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent Judges in the and Breach of Peace. Treason exists when the accused levies
Held: above proceedings, would dispute such a contention on the war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them
ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any aid and comfort. A felony is act or omission punishable by law.
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the
the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is a well-settled
due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly would be unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative. and any breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution.
and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the Petitioners cannot claim their claim to immunity.
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from
defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim arrest.
that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, G.R. No. L-7447 January 2, 1913
had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICASIO CAPULE, defendant-appellant.
Luciano de la Rosa, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction
rendered in this case by the Honorable Vicente Jocson, judge.
On September 2, 1903, Nicasio Capule, for the purpose of
appropriating to himself a tract of coconut land, situated in the
town of San Pablo, Laguna, without the knowledge or consent
of the owners thereof, the married couple Aniceto Maghirang
and Isabel Pili, by agreement and cooperation with the notary
public, Inocente Martinez, who later died, prepared and drew
up a document setting forth the sale in his favor of the said
land, pretending that it was made and executed by the said
owners of the tract, stating in the document that they had
made the declaration that they had sold said land for the sum of
550 pesos paid at the time of the sale to the vendors, and
Jacinto Peñaflor and Jorge Tolentino appear in said document
as witnesses of the execution thereof; and Eulogio Ortega and
Doroteo Guia as the signers of the deed of sale, because the
alleged vendors did not know how to do so. Recorded at the
bottom of the document was their ratification of its contents in
the presence of said notary, before whom the said married
couple appeared. The defendant Capule exhibited said
document later, although he had been assured that it was false,
in a trial before the justice of the peace of that town in the
attempt to sustain his alleged right to the said piece of land.
For this reason a complaint was filed on February 3, 1910, by
the provincial fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
charging Nicasio Capule with the crimes of falsification of a
public document and estafa. After due trial the judge rendered
judgment therein on March 21, 1911, sentencing Nicasio Capule
to the penalty of eight years of presidio mayor, to payment of a
fine of 2,000 pesetas, the accessories, and the costs; from which
judgment the defendant appealed.
The document whose falsification is here in question, Exhibit A,
the original whereof appears at pages 17 and 148 of the file
exhibits and has been attached to the complaint, seems to have
been executed on September 2, 1903, by Aniceto Maghirang y
Espiritu and Isabel Pili y Emnaceno, of legal age, residents of San
Pablo, who declare therein that they have agreed with the
accused Capule on the real and absolute sale of a piece of land
planted with 42 fruit-bearing coconut trees and approximately
300 not bearing fruit, for the sum of P550, which the purchaser
has paid them to their entire satisfaction, which land is located
in the place called Quinayoan, barrio of Dolores of the said
town, with its boundaries and situation stated; and further
setting forth that the land is the property of Isabel Pili, who
acquired it by inheritance from her deceased niece, Claudia
Reyes, according to a certified copy of some affidavit
proceedings; that the land described had not been sold, ceded
or encumbered in favor of any person other than Nicasio
Capule, to whom then and thenceforth they delivered the
possession and usufruct of said land as its legitimate owner,
with right to alienate it, they being responsible to Capule, his
heirs and successors in interest for the ownership, and agreeing
to defend him against any just claims that might be presented;
and Nicasio Capule y Capitulo, informed of the contents of the
document by the vendor married couple, accepted it on his
part; and as the vendors do not know how to sign Eulogio
Ortega and Doroteo Guia do so at their request, as does also
the purchaser, who signs the document in duplicate and to the
same effect in the town hall of San Pablo, and there
furthermore appear therein the signatures of Jacinto Peñaflor
and Jorge Tolentino as witnesses. On the same date appears the
certificate of the notary public, whose commission extended to
January 1, 1905, wherein it is recorded that personally
appeared before him the married couple Maghirang and Pili,
whom he knew as the executors of the foregoing document and
they ratified it as executed of their own free will, the husband,
as well as the purchaser, exhibiting his cedula, but not the
woman because she was exempt from payment thereof.
It likewise appears from the evidence adduced in this case that
said married couple Maghirang and Pili were the owners of said
land, which they possessed and had the usufruct of and for
which they paid to the Government the corresponding land tax;
that on January 31, 1904, said married couple sold a portion of
said land with 150 coconut trees to Esteban Reyes and his wife
Elisea Maghirang for 250 pesos, according to Exhibit B, and
since then Reyes has possessed and had the usufruct of the
portion of land he had bought, and made declaration before the
land-tax board in May, 1906, as of land belonging to him,
according to Exhibit E, which sale was ratified by the vendors in
favor of Reyes before the notary Segundo Abrera on May 2,
1908, Exhibit C.
On May 2, 1908, the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and
Isabel Pili likewise sold the remaining portion of the said land
with its coconut trees to Melecio Briñas for the sum of 650
pesos, before the notary public Segundo Abrera, according to
Exhibit J, and since then Briñas has possessed and had the
usufruct of the land purchased, although in the tax list the tract
continues in the name of the vendor, who had made
declaration in May, 1906, Exhibit K, and had been paying the tax
from 1903, Exhibit P, although Reyes, the owner of one part
which he had bought in 1904, appears to have paid the tax up
to 1910, Exhibit F.
Although Esteban Reyes was in lawful possession of a portion of
the land he had purchased, on February 2, 1909, Nicasio Capule
filed a complaint before the justice of the peace of San Pablo
accusing him of the theft of coconuts from the land he
possessed and of which Reyes was the owner; but the court
dismissed the case for lack of evidence of the right alleged by
the plaintiff, with the costs against him, Exhibit D, page 17 of
the record.
On April 16, 1909, Nicasio Capule, claiming to be the owner of
the coconut land situated in Dolores, the subject matter of an
alleged sale, accused the married couple Maghirang and Pili and
Eusebio Soriano of theft, and in spite of the fact that he
exhibited the document marked "Exhibit A", setting forth the
said sale made in his favor by that married couple, the justice of
the peace acquitted the accused of the crime of theft, Exhibit 1,
page 67; and on June 4, 1909, according to Exhibit I, page 107 of
said record, Aniceto Maghirang and Guadalupe Javier were also
acquitted of the crime of coercion with which they were
accused.
On October 21, 1909, Nicasio Capule and his wife were accused
by Nemesio Briñas of the crime of theft in the justice of the
peace court of San Pablo and upon trial were sentenced to two
months of arresto mayor and payment of P14.25 with the costs,
from which judgment they appealed to the Court of First
Instance, page 54 of the record, although at the request of the
fiscal the case was dismissed, because the action exercised by
the complainant had to be settled in a civil suit.
Although Capule presented, in some of the said hearings before
the justice of the peace court of San Pablo, the deed of sale,
Exhibit A, for the purpose of proving that he was the owner of
the land in question, yet in the judgments rendered therein said
instrument was held to be false and no probative value
whatever was attached to it.
Aniceto Maghirang denies that he sold the said land to Nicasio
Capule or that he executed in his favor any document of sale,
stating that he had conferred a power of attorney upon him so
that he might represent himself and his wife, who later died, in
a suit they had with Maximino Reyes, because of the absolute
confidence they had in the defendant, just as it was the latter
himself who drew up the document that was later signed in his
stead by Eulogio Ortega, because he could not read or write;
but he denied that he or his wife had ever been in the house of
the notary Inocente Martinez to execute or ratify any document
or that he and his wife Isabel Pili, when she was alive, had told
the defendant Capule that they wished to sell the said land and
that he had offered to buy it.
Nicasio Capule avers that the said document, Exhibit A, was
drawn up in his own house in the presence of the married
couple, Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili, for whom he had to
translate the contents of the document into Tagalog, and they
then signified their agreement; and as they could not sign,
Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia did so in their stead, and at
that time Jacinto Peñaflor and Jorge Tolentino, also signed it as
witnesses; and that on the afternoon of that day the married
couple Maghirang and Pili appeared in the house of the notary
Martinez and ratified before him the said document in the
presence of the witness testifying; all of which Aniceto
Maghirang denies, asserting that he did not execute said
document, or ratify it before the notary Martinez, for he had
never been in the latter's house nor had he ever seen the
document, Exhibit `A. His wife, Isabel Pili, did not testify, for she
had died in the meantime.
Let us examine the statements of the persons who appear to
have signed the document, impugned as false, in place of the
married couple executing it, and one of the witnesses to the
execution of the said document, for it does not appear that the
other, Jorge Tolentino, testified.
Upon making his statement and after having been informed of
the contents of the document, Exhibit A, Doroteo Guia denied
that he had been present in the drawing up and execution
thereof, or that he had ever known that the married couple
Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili had sold any land to the
defendant, Nicasio Capule, although he remembered that on a
certain occasion said married couple had asked him to sign for
them in the defendant Capules's house a document of power of
attorney made out in Capule's favor, so that the latter might
represent them in a suit they were prosecuting against
Maximino Reyes, and believing that it was in fact a question of a
power of attorney, as they had assured him, went to the
defendant's house and without informing himself of the
contents of the document that Capule spread out on a table,
signed it, but he denies that Eulogio Ortega, Jacinto Peñaflor,
and Jorge Tolentino with whom he was acquainted, were
present in that house.
Eulogio Ortega likewise denied that he signed any document of
sale of land or that he had ever been informed that the married
couple Maghirang and Pili had sold any land to the defendant
Nicasio Capule, although he remembers that one day about
seven years ago Nicasio Capule and Isabel Pili came to his house
and the latter told him that as she did not know how to write
she begged him to do the favor of signing in her stead a power
of attorney, whereupon the defendant told him that as he did
not know Spanish the contents of said document would be
translated to him so that he might understand them, stating at
the same time that a power of attorney was conferred upon
him, Capule, by Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili in the suit
against Maximino Reyes, the attorney thus authorized
responding for its result, without the necessity for the
intervention of the married couple granting the power; and that
after being informed of the of the contents of the document
presented to him he signed it, and he asserts that said
document is Exhibit A; that on that occasion Doroteo Guia,
Jacinto Peñaflor, and Jorge Tolentino were not present; and
that one Sunday, when he was passing a tienda with Jorge
Tolentino and Domingo Capuno, the defendant Capule, who
was there, called to him and after offering them wine told him
that they should understand each other for that document
which he, Capule, had said was a power of attorney was really a
deed of sale executed in his favor by Aniceto Maghirang and in
case of winning the suit Capule would give him P200.
Jacinto Peñaflor, who figures in said document as a witness,
having the same before him, stated that the signature which
appears therein with his name and surname looks like his, but
he could not assert definitely whether such signature was his or
not, for he does not remember having signed such a document
in the presence of the married couple Maghirang and Pili and
the individuals Eulogio Ortega, Doroteo Guia, and Jorge
Tolentino, setting forth the sale of a tract of lands to Nicasio
Capule, and that he did not recognize the signatures of Doroteo
Guia and Eulogio Ortega.
From the result of taking these statements and the conduct of
the accused together, it is logically inferred that after preparing
the document, Exhibit A, he tried by all the means he thought
expedient to assert his ownership of the land which, under an
alleged title of acquisition, had come to be his property and to
that end he tried to dispose of the products of the young trees
that there were on the tract, even daring to trample upon the
legitimate rights of its original owners and of the new ones who
had later acquired it, up to the point of accusing them as
perpetrators of crimes directed against his pretended and false
right of ownership, which he claimed to have acquired through
the said false instrument.
Believing that with the document, Exhibit A, he could get the
courts to override the true owners of the land, which he
pretended its original owners had sold, in the various
complaints he presented before the justice of the peace of San
Pablo against the offended alleged owners and one of the new
owners who acquired part of the land in question, as well as
when he was accused of theft by the owner of the remaining
part of the tract, the defendant dared to assert that he was the
owner thereof and of the coconut trees growing thereon, even
to the point of exhibiting said false instrument, but in spite of
his allegations and his documentary evidence the persons
accused by him were acquitted, while Capule himself was
convicted of theft of coconuts on a complaint of one of the
owners of said land. The notary, Inocente Martinez, was not
examined, for he had died in the meantime.
It therefore appears to be plainly proven that the crime of
falsification of a document has been committed, and while it
may not be public still it is of an official or notarial character,
provided for and penalized in articles 300 and 301, because the
defendant executed upon said notarial document of an official
character acts constituting falsification, by counterfeiting
therein the intervention of the married couple Aniceto
Maghirang and Isabel Pili, to whom he ascribed statements
different from what they had made to him and by perverting
the truth in the narration of facts, getting two persons to sign in
the name of said married couple through deceit, after giving
them to understand that the document contained a commission
or power of attorney, when in fact it was a deed of sale of a
piece of land, the legitimate owners whereof had never
intended or consented to its alienation.
None of the persons who appear to have signed said document
and seem to have been present at its execution were informed
of its true contents, because they all confided with the greatest
good faith in the false and deceitful statements of the
defendant, believing what he said to the effect that said
instrument was a commission voluntarily conferred upon him
by the couple executing it, who never intended to execute any
document of sale of their property to the defendant, who went
to the extreme of getting a notary to certify to its ratification
before him, made apparently by the alleged vendors in the
contents of the said false document.
The fact that the married couple Maghirang and Pili did not
know how to read and write certainly reveals great ignorance
and lack of culture in them, but when they got to be
landowners and acquired property of some value, they cannot
be absolutely denied the ability to distinguish a deed of sale
from a power of attorney, because they have demonstrated
well enough that they understood their purpose to be that the
defendant should represent them in a suit pending in a court
and that they had never intended or executed any fact for the
alienation of a tract of land belonging to them in favor of the
defendant, and it is therefore unquestionable that he took
advantage of the opportunity when he was to have executed a
document or instrument of power of attorney, which the
married couple desired, to draw up maliciously and deceitfully a
deed of sale in his favor, deceiving the alleged vendors and the
two persons who signed for them and making them believe that
the document executed was a power of attorney or
commission, when it fact it was a deed of sale and is the Exhibit
A, wherein, if he did not forge the signatures of the two
witnesses Peñaflor and Tolentino, he must have obtained them
in an equally deceitful way.
If it were true that the vendors had really alienated their
coconut land to the defendant, their continuing to pay the land
tax is unexplained. In January, 1904, a part of said land with its
coconut trees was sold to Esteban Reyes and in May, 1908, the
rest of the tract was sold to Melecio Briñas. Persons so simple,
even ignorant and of little culture, as the offended parties,
would not have dared to sell successively to two of their
neighbors in two portions the said land, if it had been in fact
already sold to the defendant Capule; while the latter, by
profession a clerk and acting as such for the notary Martinez,
who made sworn statements before the assessment board and
paid the land tax for the year 1906, never complied with these
obligations of landowner in connection with the land which,
according to Exhibit A, he had acquired on September 2, 1903,
yet on the other hand it does not appear why he did not enter
in possession of the tract if he had really bought it in September
of that year, which indicates that although he dared to draw up
a false document with the connivance of the notary, his
boldness did not prevail to the extent of depriving in a frank and
open manner its legitimate owners of the possession of the land
by appealing to the courts to assert his right, provided he was
sure that it was legitimate.
Although under article 535 of the Penal Code those who
commit fraud by causing another to subscribe a document by
the use of deceit, as the defendant has done, incur, according to
paragraph 7 thereof, the penalties set forth in the preceding
article; still when as in the present case the crime of falsification
was committed for the purpose of getting a piece of real
property, which is the profit its perpetrator sought to obtain, he
is regarded as duly punished as guilty of falsification of a
notarial document, in which crime fraud or estafa is held to be
included, with the penalties indicated in said article 301 of the
Code.
The defendant pleaded not guilty and alleged that the married
couple Maghirang and Pili had positively sold him the land to
which Exhibit A refers for the sum of P500 which he forthwith
delivered to them, Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia and two
other eyewitnesses to the execution of the document having
signed the instrument which he drew up in his house in the
presence of all of them, and that it was he who drew up the
certificate of ratification authorized by the notary and
interpreted the contents of the document with its ratification
before the notary to the vendors, who really did not know or
understand Spanish, on the afternoon of the same date on
which said instrument was drawn up; further stating that
immediately afterwards he took possession, in the same month
of September, 1903, of the land he had bought and from that
time on picked the fruit the coconut trees produced, although
he was disturbed in his possession by the vendors themselves
and the neighbors Esteban Reyes and Melecio Briñas; that it
was true that he had not in 1906 made any declaration of
ownership of said land, as is ordered for the purposes of
assessment, but he paid the land tax for that time by delivering
the money to Isabel Pili, although he did not know whether the
receipts had been made out in her name. The defendant, who is
a person of more education and knowledge than the offended
parties, even alleged other defenses which were in like manner
as those stated completely unsupported.
He tried to prove that in January, 1906, he sold said land under
pacto de retro for two years to Andres Borja, who possessed it
during those two years, although the alleged purchaser Borja
said that only a private document was made out for the sale nor
did he require of the defendant any previous document of
ownership to evidence the defendant's right to the land sold,
which private document was not exhibited in the case and no
proof was adduced to show Borja's possession of the land sold
to him; and what is stranger still is that in the declaration of
ownership of the land, Exhibit K, page 116, presented by the
offended party Aniceto Maghirang in May of the same year,
1906, the alleged Andres Borja appears to have signed as a
witness, attesting that the land was Aniceto Maghirang's and
thus Andres Borja signs at page 87 of his statement, in spite of
the alleged previous purchase, nor does it appear that the
defendant redeemed the tract.
An attempt was also made to prove that in November, 1908,
the defendant Capule sold the same land absolutely to
Marcelino Capiriña with another tract, which is set forth in the
document, Exhibit B, ratified before a notary, for the sum of
P2,500, and the purchaser forthwith took possession of the
lands sold. If this absolute sale is true it is incomprehensible
why the purchaser Capiriña did not ever attempt to enter into
possession of the land in question sold to him in November,
1908, on which date the original owners, Maghirang and Pili,
had already got rid of said land, having sold a part thereof to
Esteban Reyes on January 31, 1904, and the remainder on May
2, 1908, to Melecio Briñas. These new owners took possession
from that time on of the respective portions of the land they
had acquired, nor does it all appear in the case that the
purchaser Capiriña asked the alleged vendor to make delivery of
the land sold to him, or that he ever appealed in any way to the
courts. Moreover, in presenting his complaints years later
against the married couple Maghirang and Pili and others, the
defendant Capule did so in the capacity of owner of that very
land, so it is not true that he had previously sold it to the said
Capiriña.
These two alleged sales to Borja and Capiriña were ways and
means chosen by the defendant to see if he could effectually
deprive the married couple Maghirang and Pili of their right to
the land in question, since at that time he did not yet dare to
exhibit the false instrument he had maliciously and fraudulently
drawn up and he did not secure from said document the results
he expected and intended to become the owner of the land by
means of a false instrument.
Likewise the alleged transaction that he says Eulogio Ortega
proposed to him to allow rescission of the alleged sale in the
document, Exhibit A, through return of the price by the
vendors, a transaction proposed, according to the accused and
his witness Silvestre Capiriña, one day in the month of July,
1909, is in every way unlikely to have been made in the name of
Aniceto Maghirang, because the land had already been sold
some years before to Esteban Reyes and Melecio Briñas, and
therefore the offended party could not get Ortega to talk with
the defendant to propose said transaction for the return of a
piece of land that had never been sold to him but to the said
Reyes and Briñas in 1904 and 1908, and in 1909 he no longer
had any interest or right in the land in question, aside from the
fact that he has not proved that the offended party Maghirang
ever intrusted such a commission to Eulogio Ortega or
authorized him to make the proposition. Eulogio Ortega denied
having interviewed the defendant Capule on behalf of Aniceto
Maghirang. Such allegations are nothing more than ingenious
quibbles and tricks invented by the defendant's counsel to save
him from the punishment he deserves as the proven
perpetrator of the crime of falsification.
Starting from the hypothesis that the defendant really obtained
in a fraudulent and deceitful manner the consent of the married
couple Maghirang and Pili to the execution of said false
instrument, his counsel argues that still he was not guilty of the
crime of falsification of a public document, in accordance with
the finding of this court in the decision of the case against
Geronimo Milla (4 Phil. Rep., 391), wherein the following
principle was laid down:
The fact that one's consent to a contract may be obtained by
mistake, violence, intimidation, or fraud does not make the
contract a false contract, and therefore a person who has
obtained such contract by those means, whatever be the crime
he may be guilty of, is not guilty of the crime of falsification
either of a public or of a private document.
This was the question of a contract wherein the offended
parties gave their consent to the execution of the document
that was later impugned as false, although this consent was
obtained through intimidation which the defendants in that
case, Juan Cardona and Geronimo Milla, had used upon them,
and for this reason the court, in view of the fact that the
contracting parties consented to the terms of the instrument,
could not find that there was falsification in the statement of
the facts, according to article 300 of the Penal Code, merely
because the consent had been secured through intimidation.
As has been seen, there was no contract in the present case, SYLLABUS Code, which corresponds with the above-mentioned number 2
nor any consent to the contract pretended to have been 1. PUBLIC SANDAL. — Article 441 of the Penal Code construed. of article 586 of the Penal Code of Spain, and provides that a
stipulated in the instrument, Exhibit A, wherein the defendant Held, That it is an essential element of the crime defined and penalty of from one of ten days’ arrest and a fine of from 15 to
entered statements ascribed to the alleged vendors, who penalized therein that the acts complained of resulted in a 125 pesetas shall be imposed upon —
proposed and intended to execute an instrument of commission grave public scandal.
or power of attorney in favor of the defendant, but not a deed “2. Those who, by exhibiting prints or engravings, or by means
of sale, as in bad faith and with evident perverseness the DECISION of other acts, shall offend against good morals and custom
defendant did, perverting the truth in the statement of facts CARSON, J. : without committing a crime."
and ascribing to the offended parties statements different from
those they made to him in the counterfeited document, since
The trial court found be accused guilty of the crime of public Since this is a lesser offense that the one charged in the
the statements set forth therein were not characteristic and
scandal in violation of the provisions of article 441 of Penal complaint, and is included therein, we find him guilt of a
constitutive of an instrument of power of attorney in his favor
Code. violation of the provisions of the said article and, reversing the
in order that he might represent them in a suit against sentence of the trial court, we impose upon the accused, Jose
Maximino Reyes. It appears, however, that the acts complained of were Catajay, the penalty of the ten days’ imprisonment (arresto),
Finally, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
committed at night, in a private house, and at a time when no and the payment of a fine of 125 pesetas, and the costs of the
in the case of Weems vs. U.S. (217 U.S., 349) is vainly invoked,
one was present except the accused, the mistress of the house, trial in both instances. After the expiration of ten days from the
for Nicasio Capule is not a public officer and, moreover, as he is
and one servant, and we are of opinion that these date of final judgment let the cause be remanded to the lower
accused of the crime of falsification of a notarial document of
circumstances do not constitute that degree of publicity which court for proper procedure. So ordered.
official character equivalent to a public document the principle
is an essential element of the crime defined and penalized in
laid down in said decision is totally inapplicable in his favor. The
article 441 of the Penal Code. (Decision of the supreme court of Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
defendant Capule does not come within the purview of article
Spain, April 13, 1885.)
300 of the Penal Code, but of 301, which fixes the penalty, not Separate Opinions
of cadena temporal but of presidio mayor; further keeping in
The correct construction of this article well stated by Viada in
mind that the act of falsification of a public document in itself
his commentary on article 457 of the Penal Code of Spain, TORRES, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
constitutes a crime, morally and legally punishable, even though
which exactly corresponds with the article in question.
to date the penal law with respect to falsification of a public Granting that the facts of the case have been proved and not
document committed by public officers, in lieu of said article
"Constituyen el delito acqui previsto todos aquellos actos being possible to convict the accused of the crime of attempted
300 of the code, has not yet been promulgated; but article 301,
contrarios al pudor y a las buenas costumbres que, por su rape, or at least of that of "abusos deshonestos," as defined in
applicable to the present case, has not been repealed and
publicidad, han podido ser objeto de escandalo publico para las article 439 of the Penal Code, owing to the improper
subsists in all its force. personas que accidentalmente los han presenciado. Aunque no qualification set forth in the complaint, in the judgment of the
The concurrence of neither extenuating nor aggravating lo diga el articulo, es evidente que es condicion precisa para que undersigned, and taking into consideration the fact that the act
circumstances can be found in the commission of the crime, and
exista este delito que la ofensa al pudor y a las buenas offended against good morals and customs, public and private,
therefore the penalty fixed in said article 301 of the code must
costumbre sea publica: si la ofensa no tuviese este caracter, es and not only the companion of the injured party in the house
be imposed in its medium degree. claro que ya no habria de producir el grave escandalo ni la but also her neighbors were informed and had notice of the act,
For these reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment
transcendencia que requiere el articulo, y por lo tanto, ya no because the attempt was publicity made, therefore, I am of
appealed from are found to be refuted, we hold that it should
quedaria sujeta a la sancion del mismo, sino a la mas benigna opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed,
be affirmed; provided, however, that Nicasio Capule be del No. 2 del articulo 586, que castiga como reos de una simple with the costs against the accused.
sentenced to the penalty of eight years and one day of presidio
falta contra el orden publicio, con la pena de arresto de uno a
mayor, to the accessories fixed in article 57 of the code, to the
diez dias y multa de 5 a 50 pesetas, a los que con cualquier clase
payment of a fine of 5,000 pesetas, without subsidiary de actos ofendieren la moral y las buenas costumbre sin JOSE R. VELOSO v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE
imprisonment in case of insolvency, according to article 51; and
cometer delito. Cuando el hecho, pues, ofensivo al pudor se
to the costs in the case. So ordered. cometa publicamente, debera apreciarse como delito, puesto Facts
que esta misma publicidad es la que produce el grave escandalo
que en el se castiga: en otro caso, la disposicion citada del  Petitioner (District Auditor/SHED Resident Auditor), along
[G.R. No. 2785. August 23, 1906. ] articulo 586 es la que debera aplicarse." (Viada comentarios al with other officers and employees of the Ministry of Public
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE CATAJAY, Codigo Penal de 1870, cuarta edicion, tomo 3, pag. 130.) Highways Central Office, Regional Office No. VII and
Defendant-Appellant. Siquijor Highway Engineering District (SHED), and some
There can be no doubt that the accused committed the offense contractors were charged with 46 counts of Estafa thru
defined and penalized in No. 2 of the article 571 of the Penal
 Falsification of Public Documents, as defined and penalized
under A318 (Other Deceits) and A171(4) in relation to A48
of the RPC
 Accused were being held liable for defrauding the 
Government in the amount of P982,207.60 through the
illegal and unauthorized issuance of fake Letters of Advice
of Allotments (LAAs) and Cash Disbursement Ceilings
(CDCs) and tampering and falsifications of General
Vouchers (GVs) and supporting documents.
 Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty as co-principal of
the crime charged. His liability emanated from his irregular
and improper processing, pre-audit and approval of all the 
GVs based on irregular/fake supporting papers and he
knew that these were illegally funded and improperly
charged to the prior year’s obligations. He also engaged in
“Splitting” so that he would be the one to pass the GVs in
audit when such should have been forwarded to the COA
Regional Auditor for action/review
 Petitioner does not dispute the existence of anomalies in
the SHED nor the existence of a conspiracy between the 
suppliers and certain government officials and employees.
Ratio/Issues
Whether petitioner’s participation in the criminal conspiracy
has been established beyond reaonable doubt. YES  He cannot rely on the excuse that his subordinates have
 Under a COA circular, petitioner is authorized to
countersign checks and warrants in amounts not exceeding
P50,000 in each case. All GVs exceeding said amount
should be processed, pre-audited and approved by the
Regional Auditor of COA.
 In this case, accused district officials split GVs involved in
the fake LAA in the amount of P200,000 into 3 separate
transactions involving the amounts of P48, 480, P48, 480
and P48,189.60, Otherwise, the Regional COA Auditor, who
might be averse to joining the conspiracy, may find that
the latter GVs were the result of inexistent programs of
work, illegal funding, irregular/non-existent bidding,
fictitious deliveries and inspection and other anomalies.
 Sandiganbayan considered such “Splitting” as an integral
and/or essential element/link in the conspiracy to defraud
the government inasmuch as such practices were
consciously and deliberately resorted to in order to hide
the massive and stupefying misappropriations being
undertaken by the accused.
 Petitioner: Claims innocence and good faith in attaching
his signature to the documents. His act was merely
ministerial. He could not question the veracity of the
prepared LAAs and CDCs since such documents gave him
the go-signal to pass them in audit.
Sandiganbayan rejected such arguments. Accused cannot
rely on the regularity of the documents or on the
presumption that their subordinates and/or superiors have
acted regularly, since, by the very nature of their duties,
they should have known/realized by mere scrutiny of the
documents or by the exercise of ordinary diligence that
there were irregularities/anomalies reflected on their very
faces.
Petitioners acts and omissions in auditing the documents
which related not only to one but to several transactions
clearly established his participation in the conspiracy to
defraud the government beyond reaonsable doubt. There
need not be direct evidence of the existence and details of
the conspiracy, as conspiracy and a conspirator’s
participation may be established through circumstantial
evidence.
Petitioner was tasked with ensuring the regularity of all
transactions that are subject to his review. In these cases,
he had before him GVs that were patently irregular which
he should not have passed in audit, however, he merely
turned a blind eye and signed the documents, completing
the process that led to the consummation of the crime.
already initialed to documents for his signature because his
function as their superior is to check on their work and to
ensure that they do it correctly.
 The number of transactions in which petitioner is involved
and the magnitude of the amount involved also negate the
proposition that he was merely careless/negligent in the
performance of his functions.
Decision of Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN “KOKOY”
ROMUALDEZ and SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 166510
April 29, 2009
en banc
FACTS:
Private respondent Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez was charged
The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the
with violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and
prescriptive period is tolled only when the Office of the
Corrupt Practices Act, committed “on or about and during the
period from 1976 to February 1986”. However, the subject
criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan only on 5
November 2001, following a preliminary investigation that
commenced only on 4 June 2001. The Information alleged that
from 1976 to February 1986, Romualdez, then the Provincial
Governor of the Province of Leyte, using his influence with his
brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself
appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to foreign countries,
particularly the People's Republic of China (Peking), Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and United States of America
(Washington D.C.), knowing fully well that such appointment
and/or assignment is in violation of the existing laws as the
Office of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is incompatible
with his position as Governor of the Province of Leyte, thereby
enabling himself to collect dual compensation from both the
Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of
Leyte to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the
amount of P5,806,709.50.
ISSUE: whether or not the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished by prescription
HELD:
The time span that elapsed from the alleged commission of the
offense up to the filing of the subject cases is clearly beyond the
fifteen (15) year prescriptive period provided under Section 11
of Rep. Act No. 3019.
The initial filing of the complaint in 1989 or the preliminary
investigation by the PCGG that preceded it could not have
interrupted the fifteen (15)-year prescription period under Rep.
Act No. 3019. As held in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the
investigatory power of the PCGG extended only to alleged ill-
gotten wealth cases, absent previous authority from the
President for the PCGG to investigate such graft and corruption
cases involving the Marcos cronies. Accordingly, the preliminary
investigation conducted by the PCGG leading to the filing of the
first information is void ab initio, and thus could not be
considered as having tolled the fifteen (15)-year prescriptive
period, notwithstanding the general rule that the
commencement of preliminary investigation tolls the
prescriptive period. After all, a void ab initio proceeding such as
the first preliminary investigation by the PCGG could not be
accorded any legal effect by this Court.
Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its
investigation. As such preliminary investigation was
commenced more than fifteen (15) years after the imputed acts
were committed, the offense had already prescribed as of such
time.
Further, the flaw was so fatal that the information could not
have been cured or resurrected by mere amendment, as a new
preliminary investigation had to be undertaken, and evidence
had again to be adduced before a new information could be
filed. The rule may well be that the amendment of a criminal
complaint retroacts to the time of the filing of the original
complaint. Yet such rule will not apply when the original
information is void ab initio, thus incurable by amendment.
G.R. No. 117033 February 15, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL AVECILLA y MOBIDO, accused-appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Qualified
Illegal Possession of Firearm, committed as follows:
That on or about December 24, 1991, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, not being allowed or authorized
by law to keep, possess and carry a firearm, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and knowingly have in his possession,
control and custody a firearm, to with:
One (1) .38 Caliber Revolver Colt (Paltik)
marked made in USA
without first obtaining the necessary license and/or permit to
carry and possess the same and in connection and by reason of
such possession, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, fire and shoot one Macario
Afable, Jr. y Canqui, thus inflicting upon the latter mortal
gunshots and injuries which caused the death of the latter as a
consequence.1
It appears from the records that at about 11:00 o'clock in the
evening of December 24, 1991, accused-appellant arrived at the
basketball court located on Dapo Street, Pandacan, Manila, and,
for no apparent reason, suddenly fired a gun in the air. He then
went to a nearby alley and, minutes later, proceeded to the
closed store about four (4) meters away from the basketball
court. There, he initiated an argument with the group of Boy
Manalaysay, Jimmy Tolentino and Macario Afable, Jr. Afable
tried to pacify accused-appellant, whereupon, the latter placed
his left arm around Afable's neck and shot him pointblank on
the abdomen. Afable ran toward the alley and accused-
appellant ran after him. Another shot rang out, so one of the
bystanders, Carlos Taganas, went to the alley and there, he saw
accused-appellant and Afable grappling for possession of the
gun. The Chief Barangay Tanod arrived and was able to wrest
the gun away from accused-appellant, who immediately fled
from the scene of the incident. Afable was rushed to the
Philippine General Hospital, where he eventually
expired.1âwphi1.nêt
On June 21, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38,
rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of the crime of
Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to
indemnify and pay damages to the victim's heirs.2 Hence, this
appeal filed by accused-appellant.
The records and the evidence show that the elements of the
offense of qualified illegal possession of firearms, defined in the
second paragraph of Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866,
are present in this case. Specifically, there are:
1. there must be a firearm;
2. the gun was possessed by the accused;
3. the accused had no license from the government; and
4. homicide or murder was committed by the accused with the
use of said firearm.3
The prosecution sufficiently established by evidence that
accused-appellant had in his custody and possession the
following firearms and ammunitions:
1. One (1) .38 cal. Rev., Colt "paltik" without serial number,
nickel plated with brown handle, two and one half inches barrel
and marked "BC";
2. Three (3) .38 Caliber cartridge cases marked BC-1, BC-2, BC-3;
3. Two (2) .38 cal. Ammo. (used for test);
4. One (1) .38 cal. Slug (deformed) marked "F" from Medico
legal.4
Likewise, per Certification of the Firearms and Explosives Office
dated September 1, 1992,5 it was proved that accused-appellant
was not a licensed or registered firearm holder of any kind and
caliber.
Finally, there was an eyewitness account positively asserting
that accused-appellant had the subject firearm in his possession
and used it in shooting the victim.6 The medical examination on
the victim disclosed that the gunshot wounds he sustained were
caused by the same unlicensed firearm in accused-appellant's
possession, and that the same were the direct cause of the
death of the victim. The ballistics report established that the
deformed .38 caliber slugs found in the victim's body were fired
from the subject firearm.7 The victim's cause of death was
determined as "cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and
hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound, left antero-lateral
thorax."8
However, the law on illegal possession of firearms has been
amended by Republic Act No. 8294, which took effect on July 6,
1994. The pertinent provision of the said law provides:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition
or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. – The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand
pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32
and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition:
Provided, that no other crime was committed.
xxx xxx xxx
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to,
or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection,
sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be
absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or
insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat. (Underscoring
provided)
It is clear from the foregoing that where murder or homicide
results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no
longer qualified illegal possession, but murder or homicide, as
the case may be. In such a case, the use of the unlicensed
firearm is not considered as a separate crime but shall be
appreciated as a mere aggravating circumstance. In view of the
amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294 to
Presidential Decree NO. 1866, separate prosecutions for
homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead,
illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an
aggravating circumstance in the homicide case.9
Thus, in People v. Nepomuceno, Jr.,10 we stated:
But, pursuant to the amendment, the use of an unlicensed
firearm in the commission of murder or homicide is treated as
an aggravating circumstance. There, the illegal possession or
use of the unlicensed firearm is no longer separately punished.
This Court emphatically said so in People v. Bergante (286 SCRA
629 [1998]), thus:
The violation of P.D. No. 1866 should have been punished
separately conformably with our ruling in People v. Quijada.
Nevertheless, fortunately for appellant Rex Bergante, P.D. No.
1866 was recently amended by Republic Act. No. 8294,
otherwise known as "An Act Amending the Provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as Amended." The third
paragraph of Section 1 of said Act provides that "if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance." In short, only one offense should be
punished, viz., either homicide or murder, and the use of the
unlicensed firearm should only be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. Being favorable to Rex Bergante, this provision
may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code, he not being a habitual criminal.
The crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form, is
committed only where the unlicensed firearm is not used to
commit any of the crimes of murder, homicide, rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat. Otherwise, the
use of unlicensed firearm would be treated either: (1) as an
essential ingredient in the crimes of rebellion, insurrection,
sedition or attempted coup d'etat; or (2) as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide.
With respect to the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal
possession of firearms under P. D. No. 1866, it was held in the
case of People vs. Molina (292 SCRA 742) and reiterated in the
recent case of People vs. Ronaldo Valdez (G.R. NO. 127663,
March 11, 1999, 304 SCRA 611), that in cases where murder or
homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal
possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in view of the
amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294. Thereunder,
the use of unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is simply
considered as an aggravating circumstance in the murder or
homicide and no longer as a separate offense. Furthermore, the
penalty for illegal possession of firearms shall be imposed
provided that no other crime is committed (Section 1 of R.A.
No. 8294). In other words, where murder or homicide was
committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no
longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating
circumstance (People v. Molina, supra, at p. 782).
It bears stressing, however, that the dismissal of the present
case for illegal possession of firearm should not be
misinterpreted to mean that there can be longer be any
prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms. In
general, all pending cases involving illegal possession of
firearms should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other
crimes expressly provided in R.A. No. 8294 are involved (murder
or homicide, under Section 1, and rebellion, insurrection,
sedition or attempted coup d' etat, under Section 3) (People v.
Valdez, supra).11
Inasmuch as the amendatory law is favorable to accused-
appellant in this case, the same may be retroactively applied.
This new law applies even to violations that occurred prior to its
effectivity as it may be given retroactive effect under Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code.12
R.A. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997. The crime involved in the
case at bench was committed on May 5, 1991. As a general rule,
penal laws will generally have prospective application except
where the new law will be advantageous to the accused. In this
case R.A. 8294 will spare accused-appellant from a separate
conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearm.
Accordingly, said law should be given retroactive application.13
Neither can accused-appellant be charged with simple illegal
possession. As stated above, the same may only done where no
other crime is committed.14
With more reason, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of
homicide or murder with "the use of the unlicensed firearm as
aggravating," inasmuch as said felonies are not charged in the
information but merely mentioned as the result of the use of
the unlicensed firearm. Accused-appellant was not arraigned for
homicide or murder. Hence, he cannot be convicted of any of
these crimes without violating his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, not to mention
his right to due process.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is
REVERSED. Criminal Case No. 92-105691, for Qualified Illegal
Possession of Firearm, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs CARPIO Case Digest
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO CARPIO
G.R. No. 170840 November 29, 2006
FACTS: Two informations charged the appellant with two
counts of statutory rape committed against AAA, his
grandniece. The sexual assault on AAA began sometime in 1991,
when the child was nine (9) years old. Around after lunch on the
day she was raped, the appellant summoned AAA from her
home to remove his earwax. He brought her to a nipa hut,
about only six (6) meters away from his house. After removing
the earwax of appellant, he brought her to the room of his
house. The appellant locked the door, lay the victim on the bed
and undressed her. Thereafter, he succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of AAA.
BBB, mother of AAA, testified that her kumadre told her that People vs avila
she saw appellant kissing AAA. When she confronted her
daughter, the latter told her everything. The following day, BBB [check full text]
took AAA to the Doña Gregoria Memorial Hospital. The medical
examination conducted on AAA revealed that AAA's genetalia
bore reddish discoloration, with "old hymenal lacerations at 9
and 3:00 o'clock positions." Dr. Elflida Bautista (Dr. Bautista),
who examined AAA, testified that she examined AAA when the
child was just eleven (11) years old and found old lacerations of
the hymen which could have been obtained two (2) months to
two (2) years prior to the examination. Dr. Bautista opined that
the two lacerations she found on the hymen of AAA are not
normal to an 11-year old child whose hymen should still be
intact.
ISSUE: Was statutory rape sufficiently proved?
HELD: Yes. The medical certificate and testimony of Dr. Bautista
corroborate AAA's allegations of rape. Dr. Bautista found two
old hymenal lacerations at 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions in
her examination of AAA. The rupture of AAA's hymen, she
explained, was caused by the insertion of a hard object, possibly
an erect human penis.
What is material is that all the elements of statutory rape have
been properly alleged and adequately proved in this case. In
statutory rape, only two elements need to be established: (1)
that the accused had carnal knowledge of the offended party;
and (2) that the offended party was below twelve (12) years of
age at the time of the sexual assault. Force or intimidation, not
being an essential element of the crime, need not be proven.
People vs Adorno
There is robbery with force upon things only when the doors or
windows are broken in order to enter a building to steal or
when doors or wardrobes are broken inside a building. (People
v. Adorno, 40 OG 567)
With respect to robbery through the use of force upon things,
some qualifications are called for, since it will be robbery only if
the force is as described in Art. 299. Not every physical force
exerted by the offender is covered by Art. 299, hence breaking
storewindows to steal something but without entry, is only
theft. (People vs. Adorno, CA, 40 O.G. 567)
US vs De Vera ● They found the gold in a house on Calle Regidor, And the appealed judgment being in accordance with law, it
divided into three pieces was found wrapped in a handkerchief must be, as is hereby, affirmed with costs against the appellant.
Case Summary: and placed inside the water tank of a water-closet. So ordered.
Three Igorots were trying to sell a bar of gold. An Ilocano invited ● The accused requested one Mamerta de la Rosa to let
them to his house, saying there was a woman (THE ACCUSED) her have P150 which she in turn handed to the policeman.
who would by the gold. Woman asked the owner of the gold to ● The bar of gold delivered to the accused weighed
hand the bar over so she could have it examined at the 559.7 grammes and was worth P587.68 at the rate of P1.05 per
silversmith. The owner agreed, and also handed her P200 in gramme; whereas, the three bars found by the police weighed
bank notes to be changed into silver coins. The woman said she only 416 grammes, and were therefore, 143.7 grammes short.
would be back soon, but after twelve hours, she still wasn’t Of the P200 bank notes delivered to the accused, she returned
back. The Igorots reported to the police and the police located only P150. GUILTY OF THEFT, said the CFI
the woman, the gold, and the money. CFI Manila found her ● Counsel for defendants say not guilty of theft, but of
guilty of theft. In this appeal, the counsel for defendants said estafa
they were guilty of estafa, not theft. SC said this isn’t estafa, this
is theft because all elements of theft are present: First, the Issue:
taking of personal property, second, that the property belongs
to another; third, that the taking away be done with intent of W/N the accused are guilty of estafa or theft? – THEFT
gain; fourth, that the taking away be done without consent of
the owner; and fifth, that the taking away be accomplished Holding:
without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon
things. Judgment appealed from is affirmed. ● Elements of theft
○ First, the taking of personal
Rule of Law: property
Art 135 ○ second, that the property belongs
to another;
Detailed Facts: ○ third, that the taking away be
done with intent of gain;
● Appeal from CFI Manila decision finding De Vera and a ○ fourth, that the taking away be
John Doe guilty of theft of a gold bar weighing 559.7 grams and done without consent of the owner;
worth P587.68, and P200 in bank notes of different ○ and fifth, that the taking away be
denominations, to the damage and prejudice of Pepe (Igorot), accomplished without violence or intimidation against
owner of the bar and money aforementioned, in the total sum persons or force upon things
of P787.68, Philippine currency, equivalent to 3,938.4 pesetas. ● ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THEFT ARE PRESENT
● Feb 20, 1920 - Three Igorots (Jose II, Balatan, Pepe) ● The theory of the defense is untenable, according to
were trying to dispose of a bar of gold. An Ilocano approached which, when the things is received and then appropriated or
them and invited them to his house where there was a woman converted to one's own use without the consent of the owner,
who would buy the metal the crime committed is not that of theft.
● The woman (herein accused) requested them to hand ● LARCENY - crime similar to theft
over the gold so she could take it to a silversmith and have it Where the parties are engaged in a cash sale the whole
examined, stating that she would return within a short time to transaction is incomplete until the payment is completed; and
report the result the possession of the goods remains in the seller and that of the
● Pepe then handed it to her, along with P200 in bank money in the buyer, until they are simultaneously exchanged. If,
notes so that she could change it to silver coins (bec it was more in such case, the buyer gets control of the goods and makes off
acceptable in the Mountain Province) with them without paying for them, he is guilty of larceny.
● The Igorots waited for 3hrs but she didn’t return
● Policeman Jose Gonzales was assigned to the case and Ruling:
he easily found the woman