1. SPOUSES MARIA LUISA P. MORATA AND JULIUS MORATA, petitioners, vs.

SPOUSES
VICTOR GO and FLORA C. GO and HON. VALERIANO P. TOMOL, JR., Judge, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch XI, respondents.

ESCOLIN., J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the Court is called upon to determine the classes of actions which fall
within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1508, 1 otherwise known as
Katarungang Pambarangay Law. This law requires the compulsory process of
arbitration at the Barangay level as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in
court, Petitioners contend that said legislation is so broad and all-embracing as
to apply to actions cognizable not only by the city and municipal courts, now known
as the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts, but also by the courts
of first instance, now the regional trial courts. Upon the other hand, respondents
would limit its coverage only to those cases falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts.

The antecedent facts are not disputed. On August 5, 1982, respondents Victor Go and
Flora D. Go filed in the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided by
respondent Judge Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr., a complaint against petitioners Julius
Morata and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting
to P49,400.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-22154.

On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-litigants are all
residents of Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds
therefor, the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs
of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence
of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or
settlement had been reached by the parties. The motion was opposed by private
respondents.
On September 2, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to
dismiss.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in an order
dated October 3, 1982, as follows:
Considering the specific reference to City or Municipal Courts in the provisions of
Sections 11 and 12 of P.D. No. 1508, as the Courts to which the dispute settled or
arbitrated by the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat, shall be elevated for
nullification of the award or for execution of the same, and considering that from
the provision of Section 14 of the same law, the pre- condition to the filing of a
complaint as provided for in Section 6 thereof, is specifically referred to, it is
the considered opinion of this Court that the provision of Section 6 of the law
applies only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts mentioned in Sections 11
and 12 of the law.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants,
of the order of September 2. 1982, denying their motion to dismiss, is hereby
denied. [Annex 'G', p. 36, Rollo].
From this order, petitioners came to Us thru this petition. In a resolution dated
December 2, 1982, We required respondents to file an answer, and likewise granted a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent judge from requiring petitioners
to file their answer and enter into trial in Civil Case No. R-22154.

We find the petition impressed with merit. Section 6 of P.D. 1508 reads as follows:

SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint.— No complaint,

petition, action for proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the
Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any
other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of
the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has
been repudiated.

However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:

[1] Where the accused is under detention;
[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for
habeas corpus proceedings;
[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and
[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations

Section 2 of the law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus:
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.—The Lupon of each barangay
shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same
city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
[1] Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute
relates to the performance of his official functions;
[3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine
exceeding P200.00;
[4] Offenses where there is no private offended party;
[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the
interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and
the Minister of Local Government.

Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon
has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who
actually reside in the same city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no
distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be
compromised at the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed
upon the Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority over
criminal cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law
employed the universal and comprehensive term "all", to which usage We should
neither add nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory
construction that "where the law does not distinguish, We should not distinguish. 2
By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention
of the barangay leader and other respected members of the barangay, the animosity
generated by protracted court litigations between members of the same political
unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided. It must be
borne in mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise
designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to
decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice
dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases
exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective.
Worse, it would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would stop a party, say
in an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from bloating
up his claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior
court and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed,
should the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and
not in the regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much more serious?
Indeed, the lawmakers could not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating
legislation.

The objectives of the law are set forth in its preamble thus:
WHEREAS, the perpetuation and official recognition of the time-honored tradition of
amicably settling disputes among family and barangay level without judicial
resources would promote the speedy administration of justice and implement the
constitutional mandate to preserve and develop Filipino culture and to strengthen
the family as a basic social institution;

WHEREAS, the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts of justice contributes

heavily and unjustifiably to the congestion of court dockets, thus causing a
deterioration in the quality of justice;

WHEREAS, in order to help relieve the courts of such docket congestion and thereby
enhance the quality of justice dispensed by the courts, it is deemed desirable to
formally organize and institutionalize a system of amicably settling disputes at
the barangay level.

There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon "the authority
to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality
for amicable settlement of all disputes, ... ," its obvious intendment was to grant
to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive an authority as possible as would bring
about the optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives would
only be half-met and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only in
cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.
Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases
cognizable by the inferior courts, then it would not have provided in Section 3
thereof the following rule on Venue, to wit:
Section 3. Venue. ... However, all disputes which involve real property or any
interest therein shall be brought in the Barangay where the real property or and
part thereof is situated.
for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically, jurisdiction over
cases involving real property or any interest therein, except forcible entry and
detainer cases, has always been vested in the courts of first instance [now
regional trial court].
But it is pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections 11, 3 12, 4 and 14, 5
of the law speak of the city and/or municipal courts as the forum for the
nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the
Lupon. We hold that this circumstance cannot be construed as a limitation of the
scope of authority of the Lupon. As heretofore stated, the authority of the Lupon
is clearly established in Section 2 of the law; whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14,
relied upon by respondent judge, deal with the nullification or execution of the
settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level. These sections
conferred upon the city and municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and
resolve petitions or actions for nullification or enforcement of
settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount
involved or the nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the context
of said sections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in
other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts.

Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22 issued by
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, 6 the full text of which is quoted as follows:

TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE
AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURTS, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL
COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT
SUBJECT: Implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local
Government and Community Development that all the barangays within your respective
jurisdictions have organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No.
1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the
barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from
receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the
authority of said Lupons.

Circular No. 12 dated October 20, 1978, issued by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro is to that extent modified.

This Circular takes effect immediately.

It is significant that the above-quoted circular embodying the directive "to desist
from receiving complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling
within the authority of said Lupons," has been addressed not only to judges of city
and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the courts of first instance,
circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian
relations, now known as regional trial courts under B.P. No. 129. The said circular
was noted by president Ferdinand E. Marcos in a Letter of Implementation, dated
November 12, 1979, the first paragraph of which reads as follows: "with the view to
easing up the log-jam of cases and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of
all government offices involved in the investigation, trial and adjudication of
cases, it is hereby ordered that immediate implementation be made by all government
officials and offices concerned of the system of amicably settling disputes at the
barangay level as provided for in the Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Presidential
Decree No. 1508]."

Therefore, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, We now declare that the
conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-
condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling
under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but
for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, and the order of respondent judge denying
petitioners' motion to dismiss is hereby set aside. Respondent judge is restrained
from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-22154, except to dismiss
the case. No costs.

2.
ROSARIA LUPITAN PANG-ET,
Petitioner,

- versus -

CATHERINE MANACNES-DAO-AS, Heir of LEONCIO MANACNES and FLORENTINA MANACNES,

Respondent.G.R. No. 167261

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,*
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 2, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 78019, dated 9 February 2005, which reversed and set aside the Judgment[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36, Bontoc, Mountain Province, and
reinstated the Resolution[3] of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Besao-
Sagada, Mountain Province dismissing herein petitioners action for Enforcement of
Arbitration Award and Damages.

The instant petition draws its origin from an Action[4] for recovery of possession
of real property situated in Sitio Abatan, Barrio Dagdag, Sagada filed by herein
petitioner before the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province on 9 November 1994,
against the spouses Leoncio and Florentina Manacnes, the predecessors-in-interest
of herein respondent.

On 23 February 1995, during the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through their
respective counsels, agreed to refer the matter to the Barangay Lupon (Lupon)
of Dagdag,Sagada for arbitration in accordance with the provisions of
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.[5] Consequently, the proceedings before the MCTC
were suspended, and the case was remanded to the Lupon for resolution.[6]

Thereafter, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due
to the refusal of the Manacnes spouses to enter into an Agreement for Arbitration
and their insistence that the case should go to court. On 8 March 1995, the
Certification, as well as the records of the case, were forwarded to the MCTC.

An Order was issued by the MCTC on 7 April 1995, once more remanding the matter for
conciliation by the Lupon and ordering the Lupon to render an Arbitration Award
thereon. According to the MCTC, based on the records of the case, an Agreement for
Arbitration was executed by the parties concerned; however, the Lupon failed to
issue an Arbitration Award as provided under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, so
that, the case must be returned to the Lupon until an Arbitration Award is
rendered.
In compliance with the MCTC Order, the Lupon rendered an Arbitration Award on 10
May 1995 ordering herein petitioner to retrieve the land upon payment to the
spouses Manacnes of the amount of P8,000.00 for the improvements on the
land. Aggrieved, Leoncios widow,[7] Florentina Manacnes, repudiated the Arbitration
Award but her repudiation was rejected by the Lupon. Thereafter, the MCTC was
furnished with copies of the Arbitration Award.

On 1 June 1995, herein petitioner filed with the Lupon a Motion for Execution of
the Arbitration Award. On the other hand, Florentina Manacnes filed a Motion with
the MCTC for the resumption of the proceedings in the original case for recovery of
possession and praying that the MCTC consider her repudiation of the Arbitration
Award issued by the Lupon.

Subsequently, the MCTC heard the Motion of Florentina Manacnes notwithstanding the
latters failure to appear before the court despite notice. The MCTC
denied Florentina Manacnes Motion to repudiate the Arbitration Award elucidating
that since the movant failed to take any action within the 10-day reglementary
period provided for under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, the arbitration award
has become final and executory. Furthermore, upon motion of herein petitioner Pang-
et, the MCTC issued an Order remanding the records of the case to the Lupon for the
execution of the Arbitration Award. On 31 August 1995, the then
incumbent Punong Barangay of Dagdag issued a Notice of Execution of the Award.

Said Notice of Execution was never implemented. Thus, on 16 October 2001, herein
petitioner Pang-et filed with the MCTC an action for enforcement of the Arbitration
Award which was sought to be dismissed by the heir of the Manacnes spouses.[8] The
heir of the Manacnes spouses argues that the Agreement for Arbitration and the
Arbitration Award are void, the Agreement for Arbitration not having been
personally signed by the spouses Manacnes, and the Arbitration Award having been
written in English a language not understood by the parties.

In its Resolution dated 20 August 2002, the MCTC dismissed the Petition for
Enforcement of Arbitration Award in this wise:

x x x Are defendants estopped from questioning the proceedings before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa concerned?

The defendants having put in issue the validity of the proceedings before
the lupon concerned and the products thereof, they are not estopped. It is a
hornbook rule that a null and void act could always be questioned at any time as
the action or defense based upon it is imprescriptible.

The second issue: Is the agreement to Arbitrate null and void? Let us peruse the
pertinent law dealing on this matter which is Section 413 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (RA 7160), to wit:

Section 413 (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing
that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon chairman or
the pangkat. x x x

The foregoing should be taken together with Section 415 of the same code which
provides:

Section 415. Appearance of parties in person. In

all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without
the assistance of counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who
may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.

It is very clear from the foregoing that personal appearance of the parties in
conciliation proceedings before a Lupon Tagapamayapa is mandatory. Likewise, the
execution of the agreement to arbitrate must be done personally by the parties
themselves so that they themselves are mandated to sign the agreement.
Unfortunately, in this case, it was not respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who signed
the agreement to arbitrate as plaintiff herself admitted but another person. Thus,
it is very clear that the mandatory provisos of Section 413 and 415 of RA 7160 are
violated. Granting arguendo that it was Catherine who signed the agreement per
instruction of her parents, will it cure the violation? The answer must still be in
the negative. As provided for by the cited provisos of RA 7160, if ever a party is
entitled to an assistance, it shall be done only when the party concerned is a
minor or incompetent. Here, there is no showing that the spouses [Manacnis] were
incompetent. Perhaps very old but not incompetent. Likewise, what the law provides
is assistance, not signing of agreements or settlements.

Just suppose the spouses [Manacnis] executed a special power of attorney in favor
of their daughter Catherine to attend the proceedings and to sign the agreement to
arbitrate? The more that it is proscribed by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
specifically Section 415 of RA 7160 which mandates the personal appearance of the
parties before the lupon and likewise prohibits the appearance of representatives.

In view of the foregoing, it could now be safely concluded that the questioned
agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious for being violative of the mandatory
provisions of RA 7160 particularly sections 413 and 415 thereof as it was not the
respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who signed it.

The third issue: Is the Arbitration Award now sought to be enforced effective? Much
to be desired, the natural flow of events must follow as a consequence. Considering
that the agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious as earlier declared, it follows
that the arbitration award which emanated from it is also inefficacious. Further,
the Arbitration Award by itself, granting arguendo that the agreement to arbitrate
is valid, will readily show that it does not also conform with the mandate of
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law particularly Section 411 thereto which provides:

Sec. 411. Form of Settlement All amicable settlements shall be in writing in a

language or dialect known to the parties x x x. When the parties to the dispute do
not use the same language or dialect, the settlement shall be written in the
language known to them.

Likewise, the implementing rules thereof, particularly Section 13 provides:

Sec. 13 Form of Settlement and Award. All settlements, whether by mediation,

conciliation or arbitration, shall be in writing, in a language or dialect known to
the parties. x x x

It is of no dispute that the parties concerned belong to and are natives of the
scenic and serene community of Sagada, Mt. Province who speak
the Kankanaey language. Thus, the Arbitration Award should have been written in
the Kankanaey language. However, as shown by the Arbitration Award, it is written
in English language which the parties do not speak and therefore a further
violation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

IN THE LIGHT of all the foregoing considerations, the above-entitled case is hereby
dismissed.[9]

Petitioner Pang-ets Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, she filed an
Appeal before the RTC which reversed and set aside the Resolution of the MCTC and
remanded the case to the MCTC for further proceedings. According to the RTC:
As it appears on its face, the Agreement for Arbitration in point found on page 51
of the expediente, dated Feb. 6, 1995, and attested by the Pangkat Chairman of the
Office of theBarangay Lupon of Dagdag, Sagada was signed by the
respondents/defendants spouses Manacnis. The representative of the Appellee in the
instant case assails such Agreement claiming that the signatures of her aforesaid
predecessors-in-interest therein were not personally affixed by the latter or are
falsified-which in effect is an attack on the validity of the document on the
ground that the consent of the defendants spouses Manacnis is vitiated by
fraud. Indulging the Appellee Heirs of Manacnis its contention that such indeed is
the truth of the matter, the fact still remains as borne out by the circumstances,
that neither did said original defendants nor did any of such heirs effectively
repudiate the Agreement in question in accordance with the procedure outlined by
the law, within five (5) days from Feb. 6, 1995, on the ground as above-stated
(Secs. 413 (a), 418, RA 7160; Secs. 7, 13, KP Law; Sec. 12, Rule IV, KP Rules). As
mandated, such failure is deemed a waiver on the part of the defendants
spouses Manacnis to challenge the Agreement for Arbitration on the ground that
their consent thereto is obtained and vitiated by fraud (Sec. 12, Par. 3, KP
Rules). Corollarily, the Appellee Heirs being privy to the now deceased original
defendants should have not been permitted by the court a quo under the equitable
principle of estoppel, to raise the matter in issue for the first time in the
present case (Lopez vs. Ochoa, 103 Phil. 94).

The Arbitration Award relative to Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) dated May 10, 1995,
written in English, attested by the Punong Barangay of Dagdag and found on page 4
of the record is likewise assailed by the Appellee as void on the ground that the
English language is not known by the defendants spouses Manacnis who
are Igorots. Said Appellee contends that the document should have been written
in Kankana-ey, the dialect known to the party (Sec. 413 (b), RA 7160; Sec. 7, Par.
2, KP law, Sec. 11, KP Rules). On this score, the court a quo presumptuously
concluded on the basis of the self-serving mere say-so of the representative of
the Appellee that her predecessors did not speak or understand English. As a matter
of judicial notice, American Episcopalian Missionaries had been
in Sagada, Mountain Province as early as 1902 and continuously stayed in the place
by turns, co-mingling with the indigenous people thereat, instructing and educating
them, and converting most to the Christian faith, among other things, until the
former left about twenty years ago. By constant association with the white folks,
the natives too old to go to school somehow learned the Kings English by ear and
can effectively speak and communicate in that language. Any which way, even
granting arguendo that the defendants spouses Manacnis were the exceptions and
indeed totally ignorant of English, no petition to nullify the Arbitration award in
issue on such ground as advanced was filed by the party or any of
the Appellee Heirs with the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, within ten (10) days from May 10,
1995, the date of the document. Thus, upon the expiration thereof, the Arbitration
Award acquired the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 416, RA
7160; Sec. 11, KP Law; Sec. 13, KP Rules); conclusive upon the original defendants
in Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) and the AppelleeHeirs herein privy to said
defendants.

In the light thereof, the collateral attack of the Appellee on the Agreement for
Arbitration and Arbitration Award re Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) should not have in
the first place been given due course by the court a quo. In which case, it would
not have in the logical flow of things declared both documents inefficacious;
without which pronouncements, said court would not have dismissed the case at bar.

Wherefore, Judgment is hereby rendered Reversing and Setting Aside the Resolution
appealed from, and ordering the record of the case subject thereof remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings.[10]
Aggrieved by the reversal of the RTC, herein respondent filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC Judgment. On 9 February 2005, the
appellate court rendered the herein assailed Decision, to wit:

After thoroughly reviewing through the record, We find nothing that would show that
the spouses Manacnes were ever amenable to any compromise with respondent Pang-
et. Thus, We are at a loss as to the basis of the Arbitration Award sought to be
enforced by respondent Pang-ets subsequent action before the MCTC.

There is no dispute that the proceeding in Civil Case No. 83 was suspended and the
same remanded to the Lupon on account of the Agreement to Arbitrate which was
allegedly not signed by the parties but agreed upon by their respective counsels
during the pre-trial conference. In the meeting before the Lupon, it would seem
that the agreement to arbitrate was not signed by the spouses Manacnes. More
importantly, when the pangkat chairman asked the spouses Manacnes to sign or affix
their thumbmarks in the agreement, they refused and insisted that the case should
instead go to court. Thus, the Lupon had no other recourse but to issue a
certificate to file action. Unfortunately, the case was again remanded to the Lupon
to render an arbitration award.This time, the Lupon heard the voice tape of the
late Beket Padonay affirming respondent Pang-ets right to the disputed
property. While Pang-et offered to pay P8,000.00 for the improvements made by the
spouses Manacnes, the latter refused to accept the same and insisted on their right
to the subject property. Despite this, the Lupon on May 10, 1995 issued an
Arbitration award which favored respondent Pang-et.

From the time the case was first referred to the Lupon to the time the same was
again remanded to it, the Spouses Manacnes remained firm in not entering into any
compromise with respondent Pang-et. This was made clear in both the minutes of the
Arbitration Hearing on 26 February 1995 and on 9 April 1995. With the foregoing, We
find it evident that the spouses Manacnes never intended to submit the case for
arbitration.

Moreover, the award itself is riddled with flaws. First of all there is no showing
that the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was duly constituted in accordance with Rule V
of the KatarunganPambarangay Rules. And after constituting of the Pangkat, Rule VI,
thereof the Punong Barangay and the Pangkat must proceed to hear the case. However,
according to the minutes of the hearing before the lupon on 9 April 1995,
the pangkat Chairman and another pangkat member were absent for the hearing.

Finally, Section 13 of the same Rule requires that the Punong Barangay or
the Pangkat Chairman should attest that parties freely and voluntarily agreed to
the settlement arrived at. But how can this be possible when the minutes of the two
hearings show that the spouses Manacnes neither freely nor voluntarily agreed to
anything.

While RA 7160 and the Katarungan Pambarangay rules provide for a period to
repudiate the Arbitration Award, the same is neither applicable nor necessary since
the Agreement to Arbitrate or the Arbitration Award were never freely nor
voluntarily entered into by one of the parties to the dispute. In short, there is
no agreement validly concluded that needs to be repudiated.

With all the foregoing, estoppel may not be applied against petitioners for an
action or defense against a null and void act does not prescribe. With this, We
cannot but agree with the MCTC that the very agreement to arbitrate is null and
void. Similarly, the arbitration award which was but the off shoot of the agreement
is also void.

WHEREFORE, the RTC judgment of 2 June 2003 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the MCTC
Resolution DISMISSING the Civil Case No. 118 for enforcement of Arbitration Award
is REINSTATED.[11]

Vehemently disagreeing with the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner Pang-
et filed the instant petition. Petitioner maintains that the appellate court
overlooked material facts that resulted in reversible errors in the assailed
Decision. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that
the original parties, as represented by their respective counsels in Civil Case No.
83, mutually agreed to submit the case for arbitration by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa
of Barangay Dagdag. Petitioner insists that the parties must be bound by the
initial agreement by their counsels during pre-trial to an amicable settlement as
any representation made by the lawyers are deemed made with the conformity of their
clients. Furthermore, petitioner maintains that if indeed the spouses Manacnes did
not want to enter into an amicable settlement, then they should have raised their
opposition at the first instance, which was at the pre-trial on Civil Case No. 83
when the MCTC ordered that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for
arbitration.

We do not agree with the petitioner.

First and foremost, in order to resolve the case before us, it is pivotal to stress
that, during the initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, the
spouses Manacnesdeclined to sign the Agreement for Arbitration and were adamant
that the proceedings before the MCTC in Civil Case No. 83 must continue. As
reflected in the Minutes[12] of the Arbitration Hearing held on 26 February 1995,
the legality of the signature of Catherine Manacnes, daughter of
the Manacnes spouses, who signed the Agreement for Arbitration on behalf of her
parents, was assailed on the ground that it should be the
spouses Manacnes themselves who should have signed such agreement. To resolve the
issue, the Pangkat Chairman then asked the spouses Manacnes that if they wanted the
arbitration proceedings to continue, they must signify their intention in the
Agreement for Arbitration form. However, as stated earlier, the Manacnes spouses
did not want to sign such agreement and instead insisted that the case go to court.

Consequently, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February

1995 due to the refusal of the Manacnes spouses. Indicated in said Certification
are the following: 1) that there was personal confrontation between the parties
before the Punong Barangay but conciliation failed and 2) that
the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was constituted but the personal confrontation before
the Pangkat failed likewise because respondents do not want to submit this case for
arbitration and insist that said case will go to court.[13] Nevertheless, upon
receipt of said certification and the records of the case, the MCTC ordered that
the case be remanded to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and for the latter to render an
arbitration award, explaining that:

Going over the documents submitted to the court by the office of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa of Dagdag, Sagada, Mountain Province, the court observed that an
Agreement for Arbitration was executed by the parties anent the above-entitled
case. However, said Lupon did not make any arbitration award as mandated by
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law but instead made a finding that the case may now be
brought to the court. This is violative of the KP Law, which cannot be sanctioned
by the court.[14]

At this juncture, it must be stressed that the object of

the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the amicable settlement of disputes through
conciliation proceedings voluntarily and freely entered into by the parties.
[15] Through this mechanism, the parties are encouraged to settle their disputes
without enduring the rigors of court litigation.Nonetheless, the disputing parties
are not compelled to settle their controversy during the barangay proceedings
before the Lupon or the Pangkat, as they are free to instead find recourse in the
courts[16] in the event that no true compromise is reached.

The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under

the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement of the parties
to submit the dispute for adjudication either by the Lupon or the Pangkat, whose
award or decision shall be binding upon them with the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court.[17] Absent this voluntary submission by the parties to submit
their dispute to arbitration under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, there cannot be
a binding settlement arrived at effectively resolving the case. Hence, we fail to
see why the MCTC further remanded the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and
insisted that the arbitration proceedings continue, despite the clear showing that
the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the controversy for arbitration.

It would seem from the Order of the MCTC, which again remanded the case for
arbitration to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, that it is compulsory on the part of the
parties to submit the case for arbitration until an arbitration award is rendered
by the Lupon. This, to our minds, is contrary to the very nature of the proceedings
under the KatarungangPambarangay Law which espouses the principle of voluntary
acquiescence of the disputing parties to amicable settlement.

What is compulsory under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is that there be a

confrontation between the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and that
a certification be issued that no conciliation or settlement has been reached, as
attested to by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, before a case falling within the
authority of the Lupon may be instituted in court or any other government office
for adjudication. [18] In other words, the only necessary pre-condition before any
case falling within the authority of the Lupon or the Pangkat may be filed before a
court is that there has been personal confrontation between the parties but despite
earnest efforts to conciliate, there was a failure to amicably settle the
dispute. It should be emphasized that while the spouses Manacnes appeared before
the Lupon during the initial hearing for the conciliation proceedings, they refused
to sign the Agreement for Arbitration form, which would have signified their
consent to submit the case for arbitration. Therefore, upon certification by
the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa that the confrontation before the Pangkat failed because
the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the case for arbitration and insisted that
the case should go to court, the MCTC should have continued with the proceedings in
the case for recovery of possession which it suspended in order to give way for the
possible amicable resolution of the case through arbitration before the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa.

Petitioners assertion that the parties must be bound by their respective counsels
agreement to submit the case for arbitration and thereafter enter into an amicable
settlement is imprecise. What was agreed to by the parties respective counsels was
the remand of the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for conciliation proceedings
and not the actual amicable settlement of the case. As stated earlier, the parties
may only be compelled to appear before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for the necessary
confrontation, but not to enter into any amicable settlement, or in the case at
bar, to sign the Agreement for Arbitration. Thus, when the Manacnes spouses
personally appeared during the initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa,
they had already complied with the agreement during the pre-trial to submit the
case for conciliation proceedings. Their presence during said hearing is already
their acquiescence to the order of the MCTC remanding the case to the Lupon for
conciliation proceedings, as there has been an actual confrontation between the
parties despite the fact that no amicable settlement was reached due to the
spouses Manacnes refusal to sign the Agreement for Arbitration.

Furthermore, the MCTC should not have persisted in ordering the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa to render an arbitration award upon the refusal of the
spouses Manacnes to submit the case for arbitration since such arbitration award
will not bind the spouses. As reflected in Section 413 of the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in order that a party may be bound by an
arbitration award, said party must have agreed in writing that they shall abide by
the arbitration award of the Lupon or the Pangkat. Like in any other contract,
parties who have not signed an agreement to arbitrate will not be bound by said
agreement since it is axiomatic that a contract cannot be binding upon and cannot
be enforced against one who is not a party to it.[19] In view of the fact that upon
verification by the Pangkat Chairman, in order to settle the issue of whether or
not they intend to submit the matter for arbitration, the spouses Manacnes refused
to affix their signature or thumb mark on the Agreement for Arbitration Form,
the Manacnes spouses cannot be bound by the Agreement for Arbitration and the
ensuing arbitration award since they never became privy to any agreement submitting
the case for arbitration by the Pangkat.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019 is hereby AFFIRMED.The Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province, is hereby ORDERED to
proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 83 for Recovery of Possession of Real
Property, and the immediate resolution of the same with deliberate dispatch. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

3. Dante Pascual vs. Marilou Pascual

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On challenge via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the February 10, 2003 Order
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela, Branch 23 at Roxas dismissing, on
motion of herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual, the complaint filed against her by
her brother-herein petitioner Dante M. Pascual, represented by his attorney-in-fact
Reymel R. Sagario (Sagario), for non-compliance with the conciliation provision-pre
condition to filing of complaint in court under R.A. 7160 (the Local Government
Code).

Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States of America, appointed Sagario

as his attorney-in-fact by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated April 10, 2002:
1. To file a case for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
271656 issued in the name of Marilou M. Pascual as well as the Deed of Sale of
Registered Land (Dec. No. 639; Page No. 52; Book No. XXI; Series of 1994) and/or
Reconveyance at the appropriate court;

2. To collect the monthly rentals from the tenant;

3. To enter into amicable settlement with Marilou M. Pascual or any other mode of
payment/and/or dispute resolution;

4. To execute and sign any and all papers, contracts/documents which may be
necessary relative to the above acts.

x x x[1]

Pursuant to the SPA, Sagario filed on October 14, 2002 before the Isabela RTC at
Roxas a complaint entitled Dante M. Pascual, plaintiff v. Marilou M. Pascual and
Register of Deeds, Defendants, docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 23-713-02, for
Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271657 of Isabela and Deed of
Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages.[2]

To the Complaint the defendant-herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual filed a Motion

to Dismiss[3] on two grounds one of which was non-compliance with the requirement
under Section 412 of the Local Government Code,[4] she contending that there is no
showing that the dispute was referred to the barangay court before the case was
filed in court.

By the assailed Order of February 10, 2003,[5] Branch 23 of the Isabela RTC at
Roxas granted respondents Motion to Dismiss in this wise:

. . . RA 7160 repealing P.D. 1508 otherwise known as the Revised Katarungang

Pambarangay provides under Section 409 All disputes involving real property or any
interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or the
larger portion thereof is situated. Hence, the reliance of the plaintiff on Section
408 of R.A. 7160 is incorrect. When real property or any interest therein is
involved, the dispute shall be filed before the barangay where the property is
located, regardless of the residence of the parties. Besides, it is incorrect to
say that the parties are not residents of the same place, Vira, Roxas, Isabela. The
Attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff in the person of Reymel R. Sagario is a resident
of Vira, Roxas, Isabela, and he substitute(sic) Dante Pascual by virtue of said
Special Power of Attorney. Hence, said Attorney-in-fact should have brought the
dispute before barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela, where the property is located. In the
case of Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 127 SCRA 470, Ordinarily, non-
compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to
dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity.[6] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[7] of the above-said order was denied by

Order of March 24, 2003:[8]

x x x

Consequently, the Court is [of] the opinion that the said Attorney-in-fact shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest, reading from the tenor of the provisions
of the Special Power of Attorney. Being a real party in interest, the Attorney-in-
fact is therefore obliged to bring this case first before the Barangay Court. Sec.
3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that Where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest.

x x x

Being the real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact may therefore bring the
necessary complaint before the Lupon Tagapayapa and appear in person as if he is
the owner of the land.[9](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Hence, the present petition questioning the palpable legal errors of the RTC.

Petitioner argues that since he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario, is the real
party in interest, and since he actually resides abroad, the lupon would have no
jurisdiction to pass upon the dispute involving real property, he citing Agbayani
v. Belen.[10]

Respondent submits, on the other hand, that Section 408, paragraph (f), of the
Local Government Code, is qualified by paragraph (c) of Section 409 of the same
Code the latter of which provides that [a]ll disputes involving real property or
any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property is
located, hence, the use of the word shall makes it mandatory for the bringing of
the dispute before the lupon.
That attorney-in-fact Sagario is a resident of the same barangay as that of hers,
respondent argues in any event, brings the matter under the jurisdiction of
the lupon, for Sagario, following Section 3 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides:

Sec. 3. Representative as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted

or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the
beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be
the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust,
a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these
Rules. An agent acting in his own name for the benefit of an undisclosed principal
may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves
things belonging to the principal,

being a substitute, becomes the real party-in-interest.

Respondents submissions do not lie.

The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code read:

SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. The lupon of
each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually
residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes
except:

(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality

thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding
Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or
municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities
or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon; and
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the
interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon
under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the
case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 409. Venue. (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay
.

(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the
respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought
in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.

(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at
the institution where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the
barangay where such workplace or institution is located.

Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong
barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may
confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to
may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated representative
whose ruling thereon shall be binding. (Emphasis supplied)

In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso,[11] this Court held that where the parties
are not actual residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays,
there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the lupon as provided
for in Section 6 vis a vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang
Pambarangay Law).

[B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no
jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same
city or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside
adjoin each other. (Underscoring supplied)

In the 2000 case of Vercide v. Hernandez,[12] this Court, noting that

the Tavora ruling, reiterated in other cases including the 1996 case
of Agbayani[13] cited by petitioner, was decided under the provisions of P.D. No.
1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay) Law which were, except for some modifications,
echoed in Sections 408-409 of the Local Government Code which took effect on
January 1, 1992, held that the Tavora ruling remained.

To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to

the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would
abrogate the meaning of a real party in interest as defined in Section 2 of Rule
3[14] of the 1997 Rules of Court vis a vis Section 3 of the same Rule which was
earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood by respondent.

In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not
an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides,
the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it
for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
The RTC thus erred in dismissing petitioners complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed February 10, 2003 Order, as well
as the March 24, 2003 Order denying reconsideration of the first, of Branch 23 of
the Regional Trial Court of Isabela at Roxas is SET ASIDE. Said court is
accordingly directed to reinstate Civil Case No. 23-713-02 to its docket and take
appropriate action thereon with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

4. ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, A.C. No. 6296

Complainant,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman

- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES and
GARCIA, JJ.
ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-
JACOBA, Promulgated:
Respondent. November 22, 2005
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

R E S O L U T I O N

GARCIA, J.:

In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty.
Olivia Velasco-Jacoba, a member of the same IBP provincial chapter, with willful
violation of (a) Section 415 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b)
Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had

with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into.
In a bid to have the stand-off between them settled, complainant addressed a
letter, styled Sumbong,[1] to Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay captain of Brgy. San
Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the barangay conciliation/confrontation
proceedings conducted on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special
Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter, accompanied by
his son, Lorenzito. Complainants objection to respondents appearance elicited the
response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as
complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to complainants retort that her being a
lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as an
attorney-in-fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.

Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation,

tending to prove that respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings
before the Punong Barangay, acted as Inos Lorenzos counsel instead of as his
attorney-in-fact. This is what complainant said in her complaint: [2]

5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the subject
matter of the complaint. A heated argument took place because Lorencito Inos said
that [complainants brother] Melencio Magno, Jr. made alterations in the lagoon .
Afterwards Atty. Olivia Jacoba . . . returned to the barangay hall to have the
incident recorded in the barangay blotter.... attached as Annex A

6. That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo Inos appeared before the hearing
also with the assistance of [respondent]. When the minutes of the proceeding (sic)
was read, [respondent] averred that the minutes is partial in favor of the
complainant because only her statements were recorded for which reason, marginal
insertions were made to include what [respondent] wanted to be put on record. She
also signed as saksi in the minutes .

7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong) sent to the Punong

Barangay dated December 22, 2002, she signed representing herself as Family Legal
Counsel of Inos Family, a copy of the letter is attached as Annex C . . . . (Words
in bracket added.)

In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP

Director for Bar Discipline, directed the respondent to submit, within fifteen (15)
days from notice, her answer to the complaint, otherwise she will be considered as
in default.[3]

The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, who admitted respondents answer notwithstanding her earlier
order of July 15, 2003, declaring respondent in default for failure to file an
answer in due time.[4]

In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was

filed with the Office of the Punong Barangay, instead of before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of
the collegial Lupon or a conciliation panel known as pangkat. Prescinding from this
premise, respondent submits that the prohibition against a lawyer appearing to
assist a client in katarungan pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she
argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.

In her report dated October 6, 2003,[5] Commissioner Maala stated that the
charge of complainant has been established by clear preponderance of evidence and,
on that basis, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of her
profession for a period of six (6) months. On the other hand, the Board of
Governors, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, while agreeing with the inculpatory
finding of the investigating commissioner, recommended in its Resolution No. XVI-
2003-235,[6] a lighter penalty, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering respondent's
actuations was in violation of Section 415 which expressly prohibits the presence
and representation by lawyers in the Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Jacoba is hereby ADMONISHED.

This resolution is now before us for confirmation.

Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay,

provides:

Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang

pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance
of the counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be
assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of

the parties in katarungan pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by
counsel or representative. The rationale behind the personal appearance
requirement is to enable the lupon to secure first hand and direct information
about the facts and issues,[8] the exception being in cases where minors or
incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can
easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes between themselves without
what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could
sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues.[9] Worse still, the participation of
lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend
to prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.

The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation

proceedings was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the
aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since complainant addressed
her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter proceeded
to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that
complainant wrote her Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the
benefits of barangay justice. That she addressed her Sumbong to the barangay
captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
[10]

Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to

all katarungan barangay proceedings. Section 412(a)[11] the LGC of 1991 clearly
provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall
go through the conciliation process either before the lupon chairman or
the lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this case, the punong barangay, as
chairman of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation proceedings to
resolve the disputes between the two parties.

Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
in its determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in
Section 415 of the LGC. However, its recommended penalty of mere admonition must
have to be modified. Doubtless, respondents conduct tended to undermine the
laudable purpose of the katarungan pambarangay system. What compounded matters was
when respondent repeatedly ignored complainants protestation against her continued
appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.
 WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby FINED in the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for willful violation of Section 415 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 with WARNING that commission of similar acts of impropriety
on her part in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Municipality/City Trial Court of Cebu City, and ATTY. RICARDO REYES, Respondents.
Antonio T. Uy for Petitioner.Numeriano G. Estenzo for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; ACTIONS FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD; ACTION
NOT BARRED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period
for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, and this period is
counted from demand to vacate the premises. (Desbarat v. Vda. de Laureano, 18 SCRA
116, Calubayan v. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146, Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Canonoy, 35 SCRA 197) In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28,
1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed in court on September 16, 1982.
Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at least
eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of
the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, the time
needed for the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat
should take no more than 60 days. Giving private respondent nine (9) months-ample
time indeed- within which to bring his case before the proper court should
conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted, as private
respondent would want Us to believe, that his case would be barred by the Statute
of Limitations if he had to course his action to the Barangay Lupon.2. REMEDIAL
LAW; SECTION 4 (A) OF P.D. No. 1508; CONSTRUED. — Under Section 4(a) of PD 1508,
referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties
thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as
contrasted with a social group or institution." Obviously, the law applies only to
cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical
person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate,
estate, etc.3. ID.; JURIDICAL PERSON; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; REFERRAL TO BARANGAY
LUPON, NOT REQUIRED. — In Civil Case No. R-239l5, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere
nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo.
while it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the
administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose
benefit the action is presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party
in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration.
Since the said estate is a juridical person (Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante, 80
Phil. 776) plaintiff administrator may file the complaint directly in court,
without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.

D E C I S I O N

ESCOLIN, J.:

Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the Municipal
Trial Court of Cebu City from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of
the plaintiff to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation.The
intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of a building bearing the
deceased’s name, located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City. Said building has been leased
and occupied by petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo at a monthly rental of P500.00
payable in advance within the first five days of the month.On August 28, 1982,
private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate and a resident
of Cebu City, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay the overdue
rentals corresponding to the period from March to September 1982, and thereafter to
vacate the premises. As petitioner failed to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted on
September 16, 1982 an ejectment case against the former in the Municipal Trial
Court of Cebu City. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-23915 and
assigned to the sala of respondent judge.On November 12, 1982, petitioner moved to
dismiss the case, advancing, among others, the want of jurisdiction of the trial
court. Pointing out that the parties are residents of the same city, as alleged in
the complaint, petitioner contended that the court could not exercise jurisdiction
over the case for failure of respondent Atty. Reyes to refer the dispute to the
Barangay Court, as required by PD No. 1508, otherwise known as Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibraryRespondent judge denied the motion to
dismiss. He justified the order in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph"The Clerk of
Court when this case was filed accepted for filing same. That from the acceptance
from (sic) filing, with the plaintiff having paid the docket fee to show that the
case was docketed in the civil division of this court could be considered as
meeting the requirement or precondition for were it not so, the Clerk of Court
would not have accepted the filing of the case especially that there is a standing
circular from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court without even mentioning the
Letter of Instruction of the President of the Philippines that civil cases and
criminal cases with certain exceptions must not be filed without passing the
barangay court." (Order dated December 14, 1982, Annex "c", P. 13, Rollo).Unable to
secure a reconsideration of said order, petitioner came to this Court through this
petition for certiorari. In both his comment and memorandum, private respondent
admitted not having availed himself of the barangay conciliation process, but
justified such omission by citing paragraph 4, section 6 of PD 1508 which allows
the direct filing of an action in court where the same may otherwise be barred by
the Statute of Limitations, as applying to the case at bar.The excuse advanced by
private respondent is unsatisfactory. Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the
period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, 1 and this
period is counted from demand to vacate the premises. 2 In the case at bar, the
letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment was
filed in court on September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month
had elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive
period provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined
in Section 4 of PD 1508, 3 the time needed for the conciliation proceeding before
the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Giving
private respondent nine (9) months — ample time indeed — within which to bring his
case before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be
truthfully asserted, as private respondent would want Us to believe, that his case
would be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the
Barangay Lupon.With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at
the Barangay level a condition precedent for filing of actions in those instances
where said law applies. For this reason, Circular No. 22 addressed to "ALL JUDGES
OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS COURT, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND
THEIR CLERKS OF COURT" was issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on November
9, 1979. Said Circular reads:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red"Effective upon your receipt
of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and Community Development
that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have organized their
Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay system of settlement
of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from receiving complaints,
petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said
Lupons."cralaw virtua1aw libraryWhile respondent acknowledged said Circular in his
order of December 14, 1982, he nevertheless chose to overlook the failure of the
complaint in Civil Case No. R-23915 to allege compliance with the requirement of PD
1508. Neither did he cite any circumstance as would place the suit outside the
operation of said law. Instead, he insisted on relying upon the pro tanto
presumption of regularity in the performance by the clerk of court of his official
duty, which to Our mind has been sufficiently overcome by the disclosure by the
Clerk of Court that there was no certification to file action from the Lupon or
Pangkat secretary attached to the complaint. 4 Be that as it may, the instant
petition should be dismissed. Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a
dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are
"individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a
social group or institution." 5 Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving
natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a
corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.In
Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is
suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true that
Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to
sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented
or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No.
R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is a
juridical person 6 plaintiff administrator may file the complaint directly in
court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. Respondent judge is ordered to try
and decide Civil Case No. R-23915 without unnecessary delay. No costs.SO ORDERED.

6. NAPOLEON GEGARE, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (ELEVENTH DIVISION) AND
ARMIE ELMA, respondents.
Camilo Cariño Dionio, Jr. for petitioner.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The familiar story in the Old Testament is of how King Solomon settled the dispute
between two women over a child by deciding that the child be cut into two for them
to share. The real mother full of love implored that the King not kill the child
and give the child to the other woman. The latter asked the King not to give it to
either of them and to go on, cut the child into two.
This case involves a small piece of land. The decision was to cut it into two
between the parties. But the parallel ends there. The petitioner wants the whole
lot. Private respondent is happy with his half. This is the impasse that must be
resolved.
The center of controversy is Lot 5989, Ts-217 with an area of about 270 square
meters situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City. This lot was titled in the name
of Paulino Elma under Original Certificate of Title No. (P-29947) (P-11503) P-1987
issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of General Santos City and
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-635. A reversion case was filed by the Republic of
the Philippines against Paulino Elma in the Court of First Instance of South
Cotabato docketed as Civil Case No. 950, wherein in due course a decision was
rendered on January 29, 1973 declaring the title of Paulino Elma null and void and
the same was ordered cancelled. The lot was reverted to the mass of public domain
subject to disposition and giving preferential right to its actual occupant,
Napoleon Gegare.
This decision was affirmed by this Court when We dismissed the petition for review
on certiorari filed by the heirs of Elma on March 13, 1974 in G.R. No. L-38069.
Thereafter, the writ of execution was issued and the title of Elma to the property
was cancelled.
Both petitioner and private respondent filed an application for this lot in the
Board of Liquidators (Board for short) in 1975. On June 15, 1976, Resolution No.
606, Series of 1976 was passed by the Board disposing of the lot in favor of
petitioner by way of a negotiated sale in conformity with the decision in Civil
Case No. 950. Private respondent protested against the application of petitioner
and on August 8, 1978, the Board adopted Resolution No. 611, Series of 1978 denying
private respondent's protest for the same reason. A request for reconsideration of
private respondent was referred by the Board to Mr. Artemio Garlit, liquidator-
designee, General Santos Branch, for verification and investigation. After
hearings, Mr. Garlit submitted a report to the Manila office recommending division
of the lot to the parties. Nevertheless, on March 13, 1981, the Board denied the
protest because the case had already been decided by the court.
However, a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent was favorably
considered by the Board in Resolution No. 233, Series of 1981 dated July 8, 1981.
Thus, the Board directed the chief of LASEDECO to investigate the occupancy and
area of the lot. In this investigation, it was found that only private respondent
was the actual occupant so the LASEDECO chief recommended the division of the
property between petitioner and private respondent.
On August 14, 1981, the Board passed Resolution No. 272, Series of 1981 approving
said recommendation by dividing the lot equally between the parties at 135.5 square
meters each to be disposed to them by negotiated sale.
Both parties appealed to the Office of the President but in a decision dated March
25, 1984, both appeals were dismissed. A motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was denied on May 29,1984.
Private respondent paid for the value of 1/2 of the lot and applied for the
issuance of a patent. In Resolution No. 185, Series of 1985 adopted on October 7,
1985, the Board gave due course to the application of private respondent and for
the issuance of a patent to 1/2 portion of the lot. Petitioner was also advised to
file his application and pay for his portion. Thus, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No.
4261 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-5139 were issued to private
respondent.
On November 27, 1985, petitioner filed an action for "Annulment and Cancellation of
Partition of Lot 5989, Ts-217, situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City and
Annulment of Resolutions No. 272 and 185 and/or to Declare them Null and Void"
against private respondent and the Board. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No.
3270 in the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City.
On February 11, 1985, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2)
petitioner has no capacity to sue; (3) petitioner is not a real party-in-interest;
and (4) the action is barred by prior judgment. Private respondent added another
ground (5) lack of conciliation efforts pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 1508. The motion was granted in an order dated March 18, 1986.
On April 3, 1986, petitioner moved for a reconsideration thereof to which an
opposition was filed by private respondent. The motion for reconsideration was
granted in an order of April 21, 1986 and private respondent was required to file
his responsive pleading. Private respondent filed his answer. On July 10, 1986,
private respondent asked for a preliminary hearing of the grounds for the motion to
dismiss in his affirmative defenses. This was denied on July 24, 1986.
Hence, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the
Court of Appeals questioning the said orders of the trial court dated April 21,
1986 and July 24, 1986. In due course, a decision was rendered by the appellate
court on March 16, 1988 granting the petition, declaring the questioned orders null
and void, and directing the trial court to dismiss the civil case for lack of
jurisdiction, without pronouncement as to costs. An urgent motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated May 31,
1988. 1
Thus, the herein petition wherein petitioner raises the following issues---
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DECIDING CA-G.R. SP NO. 12183 WITHOUTFIRST SERVING
SUMMONS AND A COPY OF THE PETITION TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE SAID CASE (NOW
PETITIONER IN THE INSTANT CASE), THUS, DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION OF ARMIE ELMA IN
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12183 IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) ORDERS SUBJECT MATTER OF
THE PETITION ARE INTERLOCUTORY IN NATURE.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
CIVIL CASE NO. 3270.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED
CIVIL CASE NO. 3270 FOR FAILURE OF THE PLAINTIFF TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF
P.D. NO. 1508 BEFORE FILING HIS COMPLAINT IN COURT. 2
The petition is devoid of any merit.
Under the first assigned error, petitioner alleges that he was not served summons
and a copy of the petition so that he was deprived of due process and the
respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person.
Private respondent disputes this claim by showing that it was at the address of
petitioner appearing in the petition at Liwayway Disco Restaurant and Disco Pub,
Ilang-Ilang Street, General Santos City, where petitioner was served a copy of
private respondent's "Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution. 3 Petitioner's
counsel was also served a copy of the resolution dated June 28, 1987, 4 "Motion for
Restraining Order" dated July 28, 1987 and Manifestation dated December 1,
1987. 5 Indeed, petitioner's counsel filed a motion dated April 4, 1988 seeking a
reconsideration of the decision of respondent court 6 which was denied on May 31,
1988. Obviously, petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
respondent court and was never deprived of due process. 7
Under the second and third assigned errors, petitioner contends that the appellate
court erred in giving due course to the petition that assailed the two orders of
the court a quo which are interlocutory in character and in holding that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3270.
It is precisely to correct the lower court when in the course of proceedings it
acts without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or if the trial court judge
otherwise acted with grave abuse of discretion that the extraordinary writ of
certiorari or prohibition is afforded to parties as a relief. Such writ is
available even in respect to interlocutory orders. 8
The appellate court correctly ruled that courts of justice will not interfere with
purely administrative matters rendered by administrative bodies or officials acting
within the scope of their power and authority. The discretionary power vested in
the proper executive official in the absence of arbitrariness or grave abuse so as
to go beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or
control of the courts and is treated with finality. 9
When Board Resolution No. 272 was passed in 1981, petitioner appealed to the Office
of the President. After his appeal was denied on March 26, 1984, he did not file a
petition for review in this court. Thus, the said decision became final and it was
duly implemented. We agree that when petitioner filed Civil Case No. 3270, the
trial court should have refrained from interfering with said administrative
disposition of the chief executive absent any showing of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
Moreover, petitioner had no capacity to file the questioned suit in the lower
court. The real party-in-interest who can seek the nullification of the land grant
is the government or the state. 10
Under the fourth and last assigned error, petitioner argues that it was erroneous
for the appellate court to hold that the case should be dismissed by the lower
court for failure to comply with a provision of Presidential Decree No. 1508 before
filing the complaint. He alleges that this rule is not applicable in said case for
one of the parties therein is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof which is excepted from this requirement under Section 2 of said law.
True it is that the Board is a government instrumentality but the petitioner and
private respondent who are also contending parties in the case are residents of the
same barangay so Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 should apply to them as
it provides---
Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint,
petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or
any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation
of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or
the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the
settlement has been repudiated.
The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to settle their
differences amicably. If the other only contending party is the government or its
instrumentality or subdivision the case falls within the exception but when it is
only one of the contending parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken
among the other parties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

7. EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner, vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals
Resolutions[2] dated 2 July 1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Bacoor, Cavite (RTC), denying petitioner Edwin N. Tribianas (Edwin) motion to
dismiss the petition for habeas corpus filed against him by respondent Lourdes
Tribiana (Lourdes).
Antecedent Facts
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996 but
formalized their union only on 28 October 1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a
petition for habeas corpus before the RTC claiming that Edwin left their conjugal
home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana (Khriza). Edwin has since deprived
Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four (4)
months of age. Later, it turned out that Khriza was being held by Edwins mother,
Rosalina Tribiana (Rosalina). Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes petition on the ground
that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made
before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.
On 20 May 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss claiming
that there were prior efforts at a compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to
her opposition a copy of the Certification to File Action from their Barangay dated
1 May 1998.
On 18 May 1998, the RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous
order requiring Edwin and his mother, Rosalina to bring Khriza before the RTC. Upon
denial of his motion for reconsideration, Edwin filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The appellate court denied Edwins petition on 2 July 1998. The appellate
court also denied Edwins motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
The RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss on the ground that the Certification to
File Action attached by Lourdes to her opposition clearly indicates that the
parties attempted to reach a compromise but failed.
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and added that under Section 412
(b) (2) of the Local Government Code, conciliation proceedings before the barangay
are not required in petitions for habeas corpus.
The Issue
Edwin seeks a reversal and raises the following issue for resolution:
WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITION PRECEDENT UNDER
ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Edwin argues that Lourdes failure to indicate in her petition for habeas
corpus that the parties exerted prior efforts to reach a compromise and that such
efforts failed is a ground for the petitions dismissal under Section 1(j), Rule 16
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[4] Edwin maintains that under Article 151 of
the Family Code, an earnest effort to reach a compromise is an indispensable
condition precedent. Article 151 provides:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear
from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts
were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under
the Civil Code.
Edwins arguments do not persuade us.
It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege
that she resorted to compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in
her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay
Certification to File Action dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not dispute the
authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its contents. This effectively
established that the parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their
efforts. However, Edwin would have the petition dismissed despite the existence of
the Barangay Certification, which he does not even dispute.
Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of
the Family Code. A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if
there is a failure to comply with a condition precedent. Given that the alleged
defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a condition precedent, the
proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under
Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[5] It would have been a
different matter if Edwin had asserted that no efforts to arrive at a compromise
have been made at all.
In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a
jurisdictional defect.[6] Such defect does not place the controversy beyond the
courts power to resolve. If a party fails to raise such defect in a motion to
dismiss, such defect is deemed waived.[7] Such defect is curable by amendment as a
matter of right without leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive
pleading.[8] A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading.[9] More importantly,
an amendment alleging compliance with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional
matter. Neither does it alter the cause of action of a petition for habeas corpus.
We have held that in cases where the defect consists of the failure to state
compliance with a condition precedent, the trial court should order the amendment
of the complaint.[10] Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings
to avoid multiplicity of suits and to present the real controversies between the
parties.[11]
Moreover, in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a
child of tender age, the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of
who has legal custody of the child. Technicalities should not stand in the way of
giving such child of tender age full protection.[12] This rule has sound statutory
basis in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, No child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise. In this case, the child (Khriza) was only one year and four
months when taken away from the mother.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Edwins contentions by citing as an additional ground
the exception in Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) on barangay
conciliation, which states:
(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. the parties may go directly to
court in the following instances:
xxx
2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling
for habeas corpus proceedings;
xxx.
Under Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may resort to a habeas
corpus proceeding in two instances. The first is when any person is deprived of
liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention. The second
instance is when custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to such
custody. The most common case falling under the second instance involves children
who are taken away from a parent by another parent or by a relative. The case filed
by Lourdes falls under this category.
The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the LGC does not apply
to habeas corpus proceedings where a person is deprived of personal liberty. In
such a case, Section 412 expressly authorizes the parties to go directly to court
without need of any conciliation proceedings. There is deprivation of personal
liberty warranting a petition for habeas corpuswhere the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.[13] Thus, the Court of Appeals
did not err when it dismissed Edwins contentions on the additional ground that
Section 412 exempts petitions for habeas corpus from the barangay conciliation
requirement.
The petition for certiorari filed by Edwin questioning the RTCs denial of his
motion to dismiss merely states a blanket allegation of grave abuse of discretion.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and is not a proper subject
of a petition for certiorari.[14] Even in the face of an error of judgment on the
part of a judge denying the motion to dismiss, certiorari will not lie. Certiorari
is not a remedy to correct errors of procedure.[15] The proper remedy against an
order denying a motion to dismiss is to file an answer and interpose as affirmative
defenses the objections raised in the motion to dismiss. It is only in the presence
of extraordinary circumstances evincing a patent disregard of justice and fair play
where resort to a petition for certiorari is proper.[16]
The litigation of substantive issues must not rest on a prolonged contest on
technicalities. This is precisely what has happened in this case. The circumstances
are devoid of any hint of the slightest abuse of discretion by the RTC or the Court
of Appeals. A party must not be allowed to delay litigation by the sheer expediency
of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on scant allegations of
grave abuse. More importantly, any matter involving the custody of a child of
tender age deserves immediate resolution to protect the childs welfare.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 2 July 1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 48049. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite is ordered
to act with dispatch in resolving the petition for habeas corpus pending before it.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.

8. ESTELA L. BERBA, G.R. No. 160032

- versus - JOSEPHINE PABLO and THE Promulgated:
HEIRS OF CARLOS PALANCA,
Respondents. November 11, 2005
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed before the Court on a petition for review on certiorari is the

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73531, affirming the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 170639.

Estela L. Berba, a resident of 978 Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila, was the owner
of a parcel of land located at No. 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, Manila covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63726. A house was constructed on the
lot, which she leased to Josephine Pablo* and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca sometime
in 1976. The lease was covered by a lease contract. Upon its expiration, the
lessees continued leasing the house on a month-to-month basis.

By 1999, the monthly rental on the property was P3,450.00. The lessees failed to
pay the rentals due, and by May 1999, their arrears amounted to P81,818.00. Berba
then filed a complaint for eviction and collection of unpaid rentals only against
Pablo in the Office of the Punong Barangay. On June 5, 1999, Berba and Pablo
executed an Agreement approved by the pangkat, as follows:

Ako si Josephine Pablo, naninirahan sa 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila, na
nasasakop ng Barangay 873, Zone 96, ay nangangako kay GG Robert Berba na nagmamay-
ari ng aking tinitirahan ay maghuhulog ng halagang Tatlong Libong Piso P3,000.00
kada ika-sampu ng buwan bilang hulog sa aking pagkakautang kay GG Berba na umaabot
sa halagang P81,818.00 na ang nasabing halagang ito ay aking huhulugan hanggang
aking mabayaran ng buo ang aking pagkakautang. Ako rin, si Josephine Pablo, ay
nangangako na ang hindi ko pagsunod o pagbayad ng buwanang hulog, ako ay kusang
aalis sa aking tinitirahan. Bukod pa sa hulog sa aking pagkakautang, ako rin ay
magbabayad ng halagang P3,450.00 bilang aking upa sa aking tinitirahan.[3]

By May 2000, Pablo and the lessees still had a balance of P71,716.00. As of May 1,
2001, the total arrearages of the lessees amounted to P135,115.63.[4] On May 2,
2001, Berba, through counsel, wrote the lessees, demanding payment of the said
amount and to vacate the house within 30 days from notice, otherwise she will sue
them.[5] The lessees ignored the demand. On June 21, 2001, Berba filed a
complaint[6] against Josephine Pablo and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila for unlawful detainer. She prayed that,
after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed for that judgment be rendered in favor of
plaintiff ordering defendant (sic)

a) to vacate the premises situated at 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, City of
Manila;
b) to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand One Hundred Fifteen
and 63/100 Pesos (P135,115.63) representing monthly rentals in arrears to the
present;
c) to pay plaintiff the amount of Four Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Two and 63/100
Pesos (P4,562.63) per month representing monthly rent on the premises for the year
2001 until finality of the judgment;
d) to pay plaintiff the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) by way of
attorneys fees;
e) to reimburse plaintiff all expenses for litigation estimated in the amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos;
f) to pay costs of suit.

Other reliefs just and equitable are, likewise, prayed for under the premises.[7]

Berba, however, failed to append to her complaint a certification from the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa that no conciliation or settlement had been reached.

In their answer to the complaint, the defendants admitted to have stopped paying
rentals because of financial distress. They also alleged that they were not certain
if the plaintiff was the owner of the property. By way of special and affirmative
defenses, they averred that the plaintiff had no cause of action against them as
she failed to secure a Certificate to File Action from the Lupon.[8]

During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested to the court that, despite
earnest efforts, no amicable settlement was reached. They defined the main issue as
whether or not the plaintiff had a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer
against the defendants.[9]

In her position paper, Berba appended an Agreement dated June 5, 1999 between her
and Pablo, which appeared to have been approved by Punong Barangay Cayetano L.
Gonzales of Barangay 873, as well as other members of the Lupon,[10] duly approved
by the Pangkat. She also appended a Statement of Account indicating that the
defendants back rentals amounted to P135,115.63.[11]

In their position paper, the defendants insisted that the dispute did not go
through the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa prior to the filing of the complaint; hence,
Berbas complaint was premature. They also averred that the increase in the rental
rates imposed by the plaintiff was unjustified and illegal.

In her reply, the plaintiff alleged that there was no more need for her to secure a
Certificate to File Action because she was a resident of No. 978 Maligaya Street,
Malate, Manila, while the defendants were residing in Barangay 873, Zone 6 in Sta.
Ana, Manila.

On March 14, 2002, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of Berba. The fallo of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and ordering the

defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises at
2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila and restore possession thereof to the
plaintiff. Ordering the defendant to pay the amount of P135,115.63 representing
monthly rentals since 1999 until December 2000. Ordering the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P4,562.63 per month beginning January 2001 and for the
succeeding months until finally vacated. Ordering the defendant to pay the reduced
amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The defendants appealed the decision to the RTC. On motion of the plaintiff,
the RTC issued an order for the execution of the decision pending appeal.[13] The
defendants filed a motion for the recall of the Order,[14] but before the court
could resolve the motion, the Sheriff turned over the physical possession of the
property to Berba on May 20, 2002.[15]

In their Appeal Memorandum, Pablo and the heirs of Palanca insisted that Berbas
action in the MTC was premature because of the absence of Certificate to File
Action issued by the Lupon. They also claimed that Berba unlawfully increased the
rentals for the house.[16] Berba, on the other hand, averred that there was no need
of a prior referral to the Lupon before filing her complaint. The petitioner cited
Section 408(f) of the Local Government Code, pointing out that she resided in
a Barangay in Malate, 8 kilometers away from Barangay 873 in Sta. Ana, where Pablo
and the Palanca heirs resided.[17]

On August 20, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting the appeal and setting aside
the appealed decision. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court a quo is ordered set aside. The complaint is
also ordered DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Writ of Execution issued by the
Court a quo pending appeal is also set aside.

SO ORDERED.[18]

The RTC ruled that under Section 408 of the Local Government Code, parties who
reside in the same city or municipality although in different barangays are
mandated to go through conciliation proceedings in the Lupon.[19] The court cited
the rulings of this Court in Morata v. Go,[20] and Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy.[21]

Berba filed a motion for the reconsideration[22] of the decision, which

the RTC denied in its Order[23] dated October 2, 2002. She then elevated the case
to the CA via petition for review, where she averred:
a) The raising of other affirmative defenses apart from the non-referral to
the Barangay Court by the respondents constitute a waiver of such requirement; and

b) There was substantial compliance on the part of the petitioner with respect to
referring her complaint before the Barangay Court.[24]

Citing the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals,[25] Berba claimed that
Section 408 of the Local Government Code should be construed liberally together
with Section 412. She further averred that she had complied substantially with the
requisites of the law, and recalls that conciliation proceedings before
the Lupon resulted in the execution of an Agreement on June 5, 1999. Upon failure
to comply with the agreement, all chances of amicable settlement were effectively
foreclosed. Hence, Pablo and the Heirs of Palanca were estopped from claiming that
she failed to comply with the Local Government Codes requirement of prior referral
of their dispute to the Lupon.

After due proceedings, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and
affirming the RTC decision. Berba moved for a reconsideration of the decision,
which proved futile.

In the instant petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner alleges that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF DIU VS. COURT OF APPEALS (251 SCRA
478) AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF
PD 1508 (NOW R.A. 7160) WITH RESPECT TO PRIOR REFERRAL TO THE BARANGAY COURT,
THEREBY DECIDING THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
COURT.[26]
The petitioner avers that she is a sickly widow, in the twilight of her years, and
whose only source of income are the rentals generated from the property, which she
also uses to pay her medical expenses. She avers that the continued denial of her
right to the fruits of the subject property is highly unjust and contrary to the
spirit behind the enactment of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508.[27]

The petitioner also points out that, for her to pay obeisance to the decision of
the CA, she would have to go through the tedious, not to mention horrendous,
process of going back to square one; that is, referring the dispute to
the barangay which, in all likelihood, would be rendered useless considering that
respondents had already been validly and effectively ejected from the leased
premises. She would then have to go through the rungs of the judicial ladder a
second time to vindicate her trampled rights. She further claims that the CAs
affirmation of the RTC decision is equivalent to sanctioning a legal anomaly. She
points out that the very purpose of barangay conciliation is to abbreviate disputes
between members of the same or adjacent barangays to the end that their disputes
will not reach the doors of the courts. Clearly, it does not contemplate a
protracted process as suggested by the RTC ruling and affirmed by the CA.[28]

In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioner was
estopped from relying on the June 5, 1999 Agreement between her and respondent
Josephine Pablo before the Lupon because the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca
were not parties thereto. The respondents maintained that the petitioner must bear
the blame for her failure to comply with the Local Government Code. At first, she
insisted that there was no need for prior referral of the dispute to
the Lupon, claiming that she resided in a barangay other than where the respondents
resided. Thereafter, she made a volte face and invoked the June 5, 1999 Agreement
between her and respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the respondents aver, the MTC
had no jurisdiction over the petitioners action for unlawful detainer because it
was filed only on June 21, 2001, or more than one year from June 5, 1999 when the
petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed the agreement. As such, the
action should be one for recovery of possession of property (accion publiciana).

On June 2, 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required
the parties to file their respective memoranda.[29] The parties complied.

The Court rules that the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the decision of
the RTC reversing the decision of the MTC and ordering the dismissal of the
complaint for unlawful detainer without prejudice.

The records show that petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed an
Agreement on June 5, 1999, which was approved by the Lupon. Respondent Josephine
Pablo did not repudiate the agreement; hence, such agreement of the parties
settling the case had the force and effect of a final judgment. As the Court
declared in Vidal v. Escueta,[30] the settlement of the parties may be enforced by
the Lupon, through the punong barangay, within six months; and if the settlement is
not enforced after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced by an action in the
proper city or municipal court, as provided in Section 417 of the Local Government
Code:

We also agree that the Secretary of the Lupon is mandated to transmit the
settlement to the appropriate city or municipal court within the time frame under
Section 418 of the LGC and to furnish the parties and the Lupon Chairman with
copies thereof. The amicable settlement which is not repudiated within the period
therefor may be enforced by execution by the Lupon through the Punong
Barangay within a time line of six months, and if the settlement is not so enforced
by the Lupon after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced only by an action
in the proper city or municipal court as provided for in Section 417 of the LGC of
1991, as amended, which reads:

SEC. 417. Execution. The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced
by execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the
settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action
in the proper city or municipal court. (Italics supplied).

Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides a mechanism for the enforcement
of a settlement of the parties before the Lupon. It provides for a two-tiered mode
of enforcement of an amicable settlement executed by the parties before
the Lupon, namely, (a) by execution of the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial
and summary in nature on mere motion of the party/parties entitled thereto; and (b)
by an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial. Under the first remedy, the
proceedings are covered by the LGC and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing
Rules and Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called upon during the hearing to
determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement and to
give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his
obligation under the settlement. Under the second remedy, the proceedings are
governed by the Rules of Court, as amended. The cause of action is the amicable
settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has the force and effect of a final
judgment.

Section 417 of the LGC grants a period of six months to enforce the amicable
settlement by the Lupon through the Punong Barangay before such party may resort to
filing an action with the MTC to enforce the settlement. The raison detre of the
law is to afford the parties during the six-month time line, a simple, speedy and
less expensive enforcement of their settlement before the Lupon.[31]

In the present case, respondent Josephine Pablo failed to comply with her
obligation of repaying the back rentals of P81,818.00 and the current rentals for
the house. Hence, the petitioner had the right to enforce the Agreement against her
and move for her eviction from the premises. However, instead of filing a motion
before the Lupon for the enforcement of the agreement, or (after six months), an
action in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) for the enforcement of the settlement,
the petitioner filed an action against respondent Josephine Pablo for unlawful
detainer and the collection of unpaid rentals, inclusive of those already due
before the June 5, 1999 Agreement was executed. The action of the petitioner
against respondent Pablo was barred by the Agreement of June 5, 1999.

The Court notes that the petitioner even submitted with the MTC a copy of her June
5, 1999 Agreement with respondent Josephine Pablo. Instead of dismissing the
complaint as against such respondent, the MTC rendered judgment against her and
ordered her eviction from the leased premises.
The Court thus rules that the petitioners complaint against respondent Heirs of
Carlos Palanca was premature. It bears stressing that they were not impleaded by
the petitioner as parties-respondents before the Lupon. The petitioner filed her
complaint solely against respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the said respondent
heirs were not privy to the said agreement, and, as such, were not bound by it.
Section 412 of the Local Government Code, sets forth the precondition to filing of
complaints in court, to wit:

SEC. 412 Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. No

complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between
the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary
or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or
unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties may go directly to court in
the following instances:

(1) Where the accused is under detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling
for habeas corpus proceedings;

(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente
lite; and

(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.

(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. The customs and
traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes
between members of the cultural communities.

Under Sec. 408 of the same Code, parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality are bound to submit their disputes to the Lupon for
conciliation/amicable settlement, unless otherwise provided therein:

SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. The lupon of
each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing
in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality

thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding
Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or
municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities
or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the
interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of
the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu
proprio refer the case to the luponconcerned for amicable settlement.

If the complainant/plaintiff fails to comply with the requirements of the Local

Government Code, such complaint filed with the court may be dismissed for failure
to exhaust all administrative remedies.[32]
The petitioners reliance on the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of
Appeals[33] is misplaced. In that case, there was a confrontation by the parties
before the BarangayChairman and no agreement was reached. Although no pangkat was
formed, the Court held in that instance that there was substantial compliance with
the law. In any event, the issue in that case was whether the failure to
specifically allege that there was no compliance with the barangay conciliation
procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. Moreover, no such confrontation
before the Lupon occurred with respect to the unlawful detainer suit against
Josephine Pablo before the MTC.[34]

In this case, the petitioner and the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca resided in
the City of Manila, albeit in different barangays. The dispute between the
petitioner and the respondent heirs was thus a matter within the authority of
the Lupon. Hence, the petitioners complaint for unlawful detainer and the
collection of back rentals should have been first filed before the Lupon for
mandatory conciliation, to afford the parties an opportunity to settle the case
amicably. However, the petitioner filed her complaint against the respondent Heirs
of Carlos Palanca directly with the MTC. Clearly then, her complaint was premature.
The execution of the June 5, 1999 Agreement between petitioner and respondent
Josephine Pablo does not amount to substantial compliance to the requirements of
the Local Government Code on mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings.

Indeed, considering that the MTC had already rendered a decision on the merits of
the case, it is not without reluctance that the Court reaches this conclusion which
would require the petitioner to start again from the beginning. The facts of the
present case, however, do not leave us any choice. To grant the petition under
these circumstances would amount to refusal to give effect to the Local Government
Code and to wiping it off the statute books insofar as ejectment and other cases
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure are concerned. This Court has no
authority to do that.[35]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.