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 contents

Number 4 Features
Feb/Mar 2009
6 Command of the Air:
Publisher: Christopher Cummins A Brief History of US Strategic Airpower
Editor: Ty Bomba
in World War II
Assistant Editor: Joseph Miranda
In World War II the RAF and USAAF fought the Axis air forces
Copy Editors: Jason Burnett, Lewis Goldberg,
and Dav Vandenbroucke. for control of the skies. That eventual Allied victory had its
Design • Graphics • Layout: Callie Cummins origins in the inter-war era.
Map Graphics: Meridian Mapping
by Brian Todd Carey
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 The Strategy & Tactics of World War II

contents

Departments
37 Issue in Doubt: 29 Observation Post
The Battle of Wake Island, Strategic Backwaters:
8-23 December1941 The Thai-French War of 1941
As the Japanese overrun the Pacific in 1942, the Warren Robinson
Americans make a desperate stand on Wake Island.
by M.R. Pierce On the Battleline:
The Moselle, November 1944:
A Little Known but Epic River Crossing
Raymond Bell

Historical Perspective:
The Impact of Confused Allied
Intelligence on the Munich Crisis
Erik Henderson

52 Independent Operational Group Polesie:

Final Battle of the Polish Campaign, 1939 Rules
The Polish army takes on the Wehrmacht as World R1 USAAF
War II breaks out. by The Decision Games Team
by Maciej Jonasz
World at War 5

WaW4 Issue.indd 5 12/16/08 10:55:37 AM

 Command of the Air:
A Brief History of
US Strategic Airpower in WWII
By Brian Todd Carey

One
of the persistent debates among airpower advocates has been that of the impact of
aerial bombardment on enemy morale. Can a strategic bombing campaign break
the enemy’s will to fight and force him to capitulate—or does bombing strengthen
the enemy’s determination? Is airpower an effective means to force an enemy into
making political concessions—or is it better used to attack tactical targets, or perhaps the enemy’s economic
infrastructure? Those questions have determined much about air warfare since the airplane was first used on a
large-scale in the World War I.
The interwar period (1919-1939) saw that debate heighten as strategic airpower matured both technologically
and doctrinally. The World War II witnessed the wide-scale use of airpower globally, with the major combatants
building armadas of airplanes in order to attack the enemy on the battlefield and in his cities and industry.
Airpower emerged in the second third of the 20th century as a convenient instrument of military power, at least
for the Western powers. An air war strategy seemingly allowed an industrial power to substitute machinery for
manpower, thereby reducing war’s human and political costs. Airpower’s actual applications, however, have had
mixed results in both general wars and limited conflicts, and have generated numerous coercive strategies, among
them punishment, denial, risk and decapitation.

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The objective of aerial punishment strategy is to
inflict enough pain on enemy civilians to overwhelm
their political ambitions and cause either their gov-
ernment to concede to negotiations, or motivate the
enemy populace to rebel against its own government
in order to end the war. Under that strategy, airpower
brings the cost of war directly to the civilian popula-
tion, killing noncombatants through saturation bomb-
ing of urban areas. That strategy can also destroy the
economy by targeting electric power, oil refineries,
water systems and transportation, lowering the ene-
my’s ability to distribute and refrigerate food, purify
water and heat homes. Those privations are intended
to increase poverty, hunger and disease in the enemy
population. The aerial punishment strategy dominated
much of the World War II British air campaign against
Germany, as well as the latter part of the US campaign
against Japan. Elements of the strategy were also used
by the US in Korea and Vietnam.
WaW4 Issue.indd 7
The second strategy is that of denial. Using airpower
for denial entails attacking enemy military forces direct-
ly, weakening them to the point where friendly ground
forces can seize disputed territory while suffering only
minimal losses. The initial focus of a denial campaign
is on the attainment of air superiority, then on attrition
of battlefield forces, disruption of enemy movement and
communication, destruction of arms manufacturing, and
interdiction of supplies being sent to the front. Because
of its direct military application, variations of the denial
strategy have been widely used by air commanders in
the 20th century, most successfully by the Germans in
their blitzkrieg campaigns in World War II and by the
US in Korea and Vietnam.
The third kind of bombing campaign is the strategy
of the manipulation of risk of punishment for political
purposes. The risk strategy uses the enemy’s anticipa-
tion of destruction for political leverage. The heart of
the strategy is to slowly raise the risk of civilian dam-
age, compelling the opponent to seek negotiations to
avoid suffering even more damage from even more in-
tense future bombardment. Like the strategy of punish-
ment, the risk strategy focuses on population and eco-
nomic targets, but unlike the punishment strategy, which
advocates inflicting the greatest amount of damage in
the shortest amount of time, the risk model calls for a
gradual escalation of bombing, stopping periodically in
order to pursue diplomacy.
That strategy was born in the first two decades of the
nuclear age, when the threat of annihilation by manned
bombers delivering atomic bombs created a political
environment in which airpower assumed a pivotal role.
After the Soviet Union joined the “Nuclear Club” in
1949, however, the threat of annihilation as America’s
‘big stick’ of political leverage lost much of its power.
The advent of mutual assured destruction (MAD) cre-
ated a political climate in which the superpowers were
hesitant to fight one another directly for fear, as the
name implies, of mutual annihilation. Instead, during the
Cold War the superpowers fought each other indirectly
through involvement in Third World conflicts. There the
strategy of risk would most notably be applied by the
US through conventional airpower in Southeast Asia.
The final strategy is that of decapitation. That strate-
gy advocates directly attacking the enemy nation’s lead-
ership and communication facilities, thereby destroying
the enemy’s decision-making mechanisms. According
to decapitation theory, a nation’s leadership is like a
body’s brain: destroy it and the body dies; isolate it and
the body is paralyzed; confuse it and the body is uncon-
trollable. The main attraction of targeting political lead-
ership with aerial bombardment is it offers the possibil-
ity of successful coercion with minimal commitment of
resources and risk of life. This strategy was consciously
used in World War II when the Allies targeted German
government buildings in Berlin, and again in Korea and
Vietnam when Communist radio stations were targeted.
World at War 7
12/16/08 10:55:54 AM

More recently, palaces and command bunkers have been
added to target lists, as illustrated by the US Air Force’s
attacking Libyan leader Mugmmar Qaddafi in 1986, and
Saddam Hussein in Gulf War I in 1991 and Gulf War II in
2003.
Origin
The earliest significant use of what can truly be called
“strategic” airpower was the German air offensive of 1917,
in which Gotha bombers and Zeppelin airships struck
population centers in Great Britain, notably London. All
together 51 Zeppelin and 52 Gotha raids dropped 280 tons
of bombs, killing 1,413 people and wounding some 3,500.
Though that effort was meager in comparison to later cam-
paigns, it illustrated the potential of airpower against en-
emy morale. The initial response of the civilian populace
was shock and panic, but the British quickly rebounded,
establishing an effective air defense system and forming
the Royal Air Force (RAF) as the world’s first independent
8 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 8
air service.
The British also responded by launching their own
strategic bombing campaign against German indus-
try in the last year of World War I. While the RAF
bombers were insufficient to stop German war pro-
duction, they proved effective in creating widespread
panic among German civilians, as well as forcing Ber-
lin to pull back much-needed fighters from the front.
Regardless of the physical damage, the lesson from
both the German and British bombing campaigns was
clear: the enemy homeland was wide open as a target
for airpower.
Limited success with strategic bombers during
World War I fired the imaginations of inter-war theo-
rists concerning the effectiveness of the punishment
strategy. The assumption was population and indus-
trial centers would prove vulnerable to larger fleets of
heavy bombers. The Italian air theorist Giulio Douhet
advocated, in his influential 1921 work Command of
the Air, attacking the enemy nation’s urban areas and
factories with explosives, incendiaries and poison gas.
No distinction was to be made between combatants
and noncombatants. He believed strategic bombing
would simultaneously demoralize the enemy’s civil-
ian populace while destroying his material capacity to
wage war.
One hypothesis widely accepted in those years
was: “the bombers will always get through.” Since
interwar bombers were generally faster than single-
engine fighters, it was believed they could penetrate
enemy air space, attack their targets and return safely
to base. That was before radar and other electronic de-
tection methods came into use; so there were grounds
for the belief in the supremacy of the bomber over
the fighter. (Though there were also dissenters, such
as Claire Chennault, a US airman who would later go
on to lead the “Flying Tigers” of World War II fame).
Chennault advanced the idea that ground control sta-
tions could visually detect intruders and then use radio
communications to vector fighters to intercept them.
During the inter-war era, both the RAF and US
Army Air Corps embraced strategic airpower. The
idea was to take the war directly to the enemy. The
RAF initially held tightly to the punishment strategy
of area bombing against civilians, while the US Army
Air Corps began to develop a strategy emphasizing
precision strikes against industry. The instructors at
the US Army Corps Tactical School (ACTS) focused
on “key node” selective targeting for strategic bomb-
ing, with the goal of destroying the backbone of an
enemy nation’s war economy: critical factories, power
sources, transportation and vital raw materials, while
avoiding direct attack on civilians. The American ap-
proach assumed technology would provide a means
to accurately bomb individual targets. Both of those
strategies would be tried against the Axis powers in
World War II.
12/16/08 10:55:55 AM
 Airwar Over Europe
Great Britain and the US were committed to differ-
ent variants of the punishment strategy, and both de-
veloped (or were in the process of developing when the
war broke out) four-engine heavy “strategic” bombers.
They included the Avro 683 Lancaster, the Boeing B-
17 Flying Fortress, and the Consolidated B-24 Libera-
tor. These bombers all had large payloads, and were
thought capable of penetrating enemy air space with-
out fighter escort because of their speed, operational
ceiling and onboard machineguns. But the realities of
the airwar against Germany soon forced the RAF to
modify its strategic doctrine.
Luftwaffe day fighters could reach British high al-
titude bombers, and did so with horrifying success,
shooting down many of them. The new wave of fight-
ers, such as the Me-109, could easily outfly the bomb-
ers, and ground control could efficiently vector them
to attack the intruders. So RAF Bomber Command at
first abandoned daylight area bombing in favor of se-
lective targeting, launching daylight raids against Ger-
man war industry. The idea was to hit a few targets that
might paralyze the Reich’s war economy. But contin-
ued high bomber attrition rates and poor bomb accu-
racy forced Bomber Command to further reappraise
its doctrine. Consequently, the RAF returned to area
bombing, this time striking at night.
The US Army Air Force (USAAF, by then the
American air service had become a de facto separate
air arm) entered the European Theater of Operations
(ETO) in 1942 committed to daylight precision bomb-
ing. American air commanders believed the USAAF’s
use of the Norden bombsight, at the time the world’s
most sophisticated, would give them the needed edge.
The Norden took account of such factors as speed,
course, wind direction and distance to target. Under
favorable conditions, trained aircrews were able to
place their payloads within a few hundred feet of a
target from an elevation of over 15,000 feet, prompt-
ing one USAAF spokesman to boast they could “drop
a bomb into a pickle barrel at 25,000 feet.”
For the Norden bombsight to work well, however,
US pilots had to deliver their payloads during day-
light hours, in good weather and in level flight. Un-
fortunately, operational conditions in the ETO, and
a skilled German air force, played havoc with those
requirements.
The US Eighth Air Force, responsible for strate-
gic bombing in the ETO, deployed to Britain in the
summer of 1942. For the following year, the Eighth’s
leadership struggled to build a force capable of inflict-
ing serious damage on the German economy. Early
American raids against occupied Europe experienced
heavy losses to Luftwaffe interceptors. In response, Al-
lied air commanders placed German aircraft industry
at the top of their target list. The idea was that destroy-
ing the factories would paralyze the Luftwaffe once it
WaW4 Issue.indd 9
Airpower Prophet:
Giulio Douhet
In 1921 a former Italian infantry
officer published one of the most in-
fluential treatises in modern military
history. Giulio Douhet’s (1869-1930)
Il Dominio dell’ Aria (Command of
the Air) articulated for the first time
the merits of the aerial “punish-
ment” strategy. Douhet believed in
the almost limitless capabilities of
airpower. He especially emphasized
its ability to attack with impunity
enemy military and civilian popula-
tions, transportation networks and
industrial centers. The objective was
to break enemy morale and degrade his ability to make war.
Douhet had an erratic military career. In 1909 he secured com-
mand of Italy’s first air unit, the same formation that was to be the
first to conduct aerial bombardment during the Italo-Turkish War of
1911-12 in Libya. Douhet was then made chief-of-staff of an infantry
division. In 1915 he was court-martialed and imprisoned for criticiz-
ing the Italian high command. He was reinstated after the disaster at
Caporetto (in November 1917, when the Central Powers shattered
the Italian front), and was promoted to general and head of the Cen-
tral Aeronautical Bureau in 1918. After the war he retired from the
army to devote all his time to writing, publishing his famous treatise
in 1921.
Douhet was recalled to government service to serve as Musso-
lini’s commissioner of aviation in 1922, but he shortly thereafter
retired again. He died in 1930, before he could see the impact his
writings would have on warfare in World War II and beyond.
Because he wrote in Italian, Douhet’s groundbreaking ideas on
airpower were slow to make their way to the rest of the world. Even
so, his ideas influenced inter-war air architects such as US Gen. Wil-
liam “Billy” Mitchell and Sir Hugh Trenchard in Great Britain. His
concepts of strategic bombing were later used, in various forms, by
both the British and the US in World War II.
Douhet advocated an independent air force, something realized
in Great Britain in 1918 with the creation of the Royal Air Force, and
in the US in 1947. His writings—which presented airpower as the
ultimate offensive weapon against which there was no defense—an-
ticipated the Cold War-era development of nuclear-armed inter-con-
tinental ballistic missiles, the ultimate purveyor of the Douhetian
punishment strategy.
USAAF bombardiers.
World at War 9
12/16/08 10:55:56 AM
 could no longer count on a steady supply of fighters.
Operation Pointblank, as the joint Allied Combined
Bomber Offensive was eventually code named, was criti-
cal to the opening of the “second front” in the ETO. Any
attack against Hitler’s Atlantic Wall (the defenses along
the English Channel and Atlantic coasts) would require
Allied air superiority and a weakened Luftwaffe. The
Luftwaffe had to be destroyed or rendered ineffective,
since it could otherwise be used to counterattack exposed
Allied beachhead positions, as well as convoys support-
ing the invasion.
Pointblank directives therefore ordered the Allied air
forces to destroy the German aviation industry and se-
cure air superiority over the continent in time for D-Day.
10 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 10
By attacking “key node” industries associated with German
airpower, the Luftwaffe would be denied the replacement
aircraft, parts and petroleum required to mount a successful
defense of occupied Europe.
Destroying the German aviation industry was easier said
than done. Throughout the summer and fall of 1943, Eighth
Air Force bomber crews were experiencing a monthly air-
frame attrition rate of 30 percent (destroyed, or damaged and
written off). Those were clearly unsustainable losses for any
air force. The message was clear: bombers couldn’t survive
beyond the range of fighter escort. After “Black Week” in
October 1943, when USAAF deep penetration raids were
hammered by the Luftwaffe, the Americans called off the
campaign and pondered their dilemma.
12/16/08 10:55:57 AM
 Strategic airpower: USAAF B-24s on a bomb run.
The Eighth Air Force’s frustrations had many
architects. Allied intelligence had underestimated
the resiliency and capacity of German industry. The
Germans were able to quickly repair damage and
expand production. Moreover, the Luftwaffe proved
a determined foe. It had prepared for the air assault
with sophisticated ground defenses, including radar,
fighters and flak. In late 1943, then, the Germans
were able to congratulate themselves on seemingly
having defeated the US aerial offensive—though a
few dissenters, such as fighter chief Adolph Galland,
warned the Luftwaffe Americans would return in
greater strength.
Big Week
And return the USAAF did. With the addition of
long-range fighter escorts, such as the Republic P-47
Thunderbolt and the North American P-51 Mustang,
US bombers could fight their way through to targets
anywhere in Germany. The American daylight preci-
sion bombing campaign then began to pay off, cul-
minating in the combined bomber offensive’s “Big
Week” of February 1944. As the Allies secured air
superiority over western Europe, the full weight of
the bomber offensive was felt. In 1944, Allied bomb-
ers dropped 1,189,000 tons on the Third Reich, up
from 227,000 tons in 1943. Still, even with that four-
fold increase in tonnage dropped, German produc-
tion actually continued to increase in 1944.
In reality, though, there was more to the situation.
While production lines were turning out more tanks
and airplanes for the Wehrmacht, much of that equip-
ment couldn’t get to the front owing to petroleum
shortages and disruption of transportation, both in
large part the results of the bombing campaign. Fur-
ther, some of the production statistics included not
only newly manufactured weapons, but also equip-
ment that had been damaged and returned to the fac-
tories for rebuilding.
WaW4 Issue.indd 11
Despite doctrinal differences, American and Brit-
ish pursuit of the punishment strategy against Nazi
Germany actually paralleled each other in many im-
portant ways. American precision bombing was rarely
as precise as pre-war advocates claimed, with only one
bomb in five falling within 1,000 feet (about three city
blocks) of the target. In fact, the American strategic
air campaign could actually be characterized as utiliz-
ing area bombing techniques due to the inaccuracy of
precision bombing.
Meanwhile, after years of night strikes, RAF
Bomber Command perfected radar bombing, great-
ly increasing payload accuracy, often to a point that
could be characterized as precise. The RAF’s success
with incendiary bombing was emulated by the USAAF
against the Japanese with great success. While the con-
cept of selectively targeting “key nodes” was shared by
both air forces, neither the British nor the Americans
fully understood nor exploited that concept. It wasn’t
until 1944 the Allies began targeting Germany’s petro-
leum industry, and even then RAF Bomber Command
continued to classify oil refineries as only a second-
ary target system. American attacks on Germany’s
oil industry had begun in 1943 with USAAF raids on
Ploesti, but it wasn’t until May 1944 a full-scale effort
was made to cripple that key industry.
Another target the Allies generally ignored was
electric power. The Reich’s power grid had little re-
serve capacity, and attacks on a few key production
and distribution centers could have brought the entire
economy to a halt. Coal was also another critical target
the Allies did not fully recognize.
To their credit, Allied air commanders finally did
recognize the importance of overall air superiority.
The US deployment of long-range fighter escorts, and
independent fighter “sweep” missions, cleared the
Luftwaffe from the skies. If nothing else, the Luftwaffe
had to come up and fight in order to protect Germa-
continues on page 16
World at War 11
12/16/08 10:55:59 AM
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 World at War 13

WaW4 Issue.indd 13 12/16/08 10:56:19 AM


Operational airpower: Heinkel-111 medium bomber.
Variations on Denial Strategy
Like the punishment strategy, military historians trace
the origins of the denial strategy to the skies over western
Europe in World War I. Pilots then were quick to realize the
possibilities of the single-engine airplane as an attack plat-
form. Reconnaissance aircraft quickly evolved into armed
“fighters,” with Allied and German pilots wrestling for con-
trol of the skies over the trenches. When local air superiority
was gained, pilots then struck enemy troop concentrations as
well as men and materiel moving to the front.
From the opening days of World War I, observation air-
craft flew over the front and participated in ad hoc attacks
on enemy trenches. The impact was tremendous—not so
much because ground attack missions could cause great
numbers of casualties but, rather, for their psychological ef-
fect. Ground troops who had to operate under the constant
threat of aerial attack were less able to move in the open.
Consequently, both the Allies and Central Powers modified
observation and fighter aircraft for ground attack.
It was the British Royal Flying Corps (RFC) that first
recognized two forms of ground attack: “trench strafing,”
corresponding to the modern concept of close air support of
friendly ground forces, and “ground strafing,” equivalent to
modern battlefield air interdiction.
People’s Fighter: Heinkel 161 jet interceptor, employed by the
Luftwaffe at the end of World War II.
14 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 14
By mid-1917, specialized ground attack aircraft appeared
on both sides, armed with machineguns and small bombs.
During the Battle of Cambrai, in the fall and winter of 1917,
both Allied and German ground attack was commonplace.
By the start of the final German offensives in March 1918,
Allied and German air doctrine called for the large-scale em-
ployment of close air support aircraft. Target lists included
enemy troop positions, supplies, transportation centers and
arms factories (the latter target developing into a central fea-
ture of early strategic bombing doctrine).
With the outbreak of World War II in Europe, the air
forces of the belligerents emphasized either strategic bomb-
ing or combined-arms cooperation as the foundation of their
aerial operations. Great Britain and the US, believing in the
idea of the heavy bomber always getting through, empha-
sized strategic bombing. Germany emphasized airpower as
an instrument of operational warfare: the Luftwaffe would
fight as an independent air force across a theater of opera-
tions in order to neutralize critical enemy command-control
centers, attack troop concentrations, conduct aerial recon-
naissance and provide close support to far-ranging panzer
forces. Soviet strategists believed airpower must first and
foremost serve the needs of the ground campaign, with the
air forces divided up to support ground commanders. In all
cases, though, denying the enemy use of his airspace was
crucial to the success of an air campaign; thus command of
the air was necessary for airpower to fulfill its various mis-
sions.
Air superiority over the battlefield proved an important
element in the success of another variation of the denial
strategy: destruction of the enemy army on the battlefield.
Nazi Germany’s successful blitzkrieg campaigns against Po-
land in 1939, France in 1940, and Russia in 1941 all showed
the effectiveness of airpower when used in that manner.
Blitzkrieg campaigns began with the Luftwaffe launch-
ing massive air attacks against enemy airfields in order to
destroy the enemy’s air force on the ground. A screen of Me-
109 single-engine fighters would engage and destroy any
enemy aircraft that dared challenge the Luftwaffe in the sky.
Most German bombers were fast medium aircraft, such
as the Heinkel -111 and Junkers-88, which proved effective
at striking into enemy rear areas. Of course, the Germans
also developed one of the most famous ground attack air-
craft of all time, the Junkers-87 Stuka dive bomber, which
destroyed enemy motorized and mechanized vehicles in
great numbers, paving a path for the German army into en-
emy territory.
The German air force was ill-suited for strategic bomb-
ing, however, and the Luftwaffe had one of its notable defeats
during the Battle of Britain, from August through September
1940. In that campaign, German medium bombers lacked
the ‘punch’ to fight their way through British air defenses;
the Me-109 fighters lacked the range to escort the bombers
to targets deep in enemy territory, and the Me-110 twin-en-
gine “destroyer” fighters proved unable to challenge British
single-engine interceptors.
12/16/08 10:56:20 AM
 What made the Luftwaffe work—when it did work—
wasn’t simply their aircraft. Rather, it was the entire system,
which included air-minded leaders, good training, effective
doctrine, superior command control, intelligence gathering,
and a mobile ground-based logistical system.
The success of the blitzkrieg bred imitation. On the east-
ern front the Red Air Force bounced back from devastation
in the opening weeks of Operation Barbarossa to fight and
win a hard fought battle against the Luftwaffe for air supe-
riority. The Soviets learned how to combine their air for-
mations into unified forces for conducting large operations.
The Red Army’s destruction of Axis forces at Stalingrad was
in no small part due to the restructuring and rebuilding of
the Red Air Force. By inflicting crippling losses on the Ger-
man aerial re-supply effort, the Soviet Air Force contributed
greatly to the final reduction of the Stalingrad pocket. And
the Soviet victory at Kursk was in no small part due to dedi-
cated ground attack aircraft, protected by combat air patrols,
finding and destroying large numbers of German tanks.
In North Africa, British success in Operation Crusader
and at El Alamein was in large degree due to Allied opera-
tional and tactical airpower. That made it difficult for Af-
rika Korps commander Rommel to maneuver his forces in
the open. And British aircraft based on the island of Malta
proved effective in interdicting Axis reinforcement to North
Africa.
Those lessons were further applied in the battles for Sic-
ily and Italy. Operation Strangle, undertaken to stop critical
road and rail supplies from reaching the German army on the
Italian peninsula in 1944, proved somewhat disappointing as
a strategic interdiction campaign. It was successful, though,
as a battlefield air interdiction operation, fixing the Germans
in place and making it difficult for them to maneuver. Once
again, the establishment of local air superiority allowed the
Allies to fight and defeat the Germans by combined air-land
operations.
Perhaps the most significant example of the power of air
superiority can be seen in the Allied air operations imme-
diately prior to and following D-Day, Operation Overlord.
Operation Pointblank had made achieving air superiority
for D-Day a top priority by calling for all-out attacks on the
German aircraft industry. Air supremacy over the beaches of
Normandy then contributed to the success of Overlord. The
Luftwaffe, unable to respond, couldn’t support the German
army’s attempted counteroffensives in Normandy.
Allied airpower assisted the breakout of ground forces
in Normandy with massive air attacks that pulverized en-
tire German divisions. During the following pursuit across
France, the Allied air forces continued to interdict enemy
units and logistics, as well as providing close support to
fast-moving mechanized forces, making it impossible for
Somewhere over Europe: gun camera view of a fighter being
the Germans to establish a cohesive defense short of the
Rhineland. It would not be until the Battle of the Ardennes
shot down; the pilot is bailing out on the upper right.
in December 1944 that the Luftwaffe would again be able to
challenge the Allies for control of the skies, and by that time
it was too little, too late.
World at War 15

WaW4 Issue.indd 15 12/16/08 10:56:22 AM

 Airpower against the Rising Sun: B-29s on an air raid.
ny’s industries and cities; so it was forced into a los-
ing battle of attrition. While aircraft could be replaced,
pilots had to be trained, and the fuel and cadre to train
them simply weren’t there. The result was Luftwaffe
pilots proved less and less capable of challenging the
Allies in the skies, thereby opening up more of Ger-
many to bombing. That meant, in turn, an increasing
inability to make good further lost veterans. It was a
downward spiral from which the Luftwaffe—and the
Third Reich—never recovered.
Assault on Japan
The US had entered the war against Hitler firmly
committed to precision bombing against the German
economy. Even so, the final months of the European
airwar witnessed American bombers participating in
incendiary attacks against German civilians. In Febru-
ary 1945, British and American bombers struck Dres-
den for three days, gutting the center of the city and
killing an estimated 25,000-135,000 civilians. Dres-
den had some military value, since it was a central rail
transfer junction for switching Wehrmacht forces be-
16 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 16
tween western and eastern fronts, but the firebombing
of the city still stands out as one of the greatest horrors
of modern times.
The US had considered some form of aerial of-
fensive against Japan ever since the War Plan Orange
contingency plans of the inter-war years. The idea was
US naval and land forces would capture islands, build
them up as airbases, and then use them to launch a
strategic air offensive to force Japanese capitulation.
In the actual event, the comprehensive strategic
bombing offensive against the Japanese mainland be-
gan with Operation Matterhorn. Finalized in Novem-
ber 1943, the plan advocated a punishment strategy
using the new Boeing B-29 Super Fortresses to attack
Japanese industry on the main islands. Those B-29s
would at first be based on forward airfields in China,
with support from the other bases in India, and finally
from Guam, Saipan and Tinian in the Central Pacific,
once those locales were captured from the Japanese.
As more of the B-29s entered the theater of operations,
high-altitude daylight attacks would intensify in order
12/16/08 10:56:22 AM
 to devastate the Japanese economy and force the col-
lapse of the enemy war effort.
The architect of the strategic bombing campaign
against Japan was Gen. Haywood Hansell. He advo-
cated the by then well-established doctrine of high-al-
titude daylight precision bombing to the XXI Bomber
Command of the newly created Twentieth Air Force
in the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO). The cam-
paign at first used the type of large bomber formations
that had characterized the strategic air offensive in the
ETO, but the approach failed to work against Japan.
Japanese industry was too dispersed (often in private
homes), and much of it was in Manchuria or otherwise
out of range of the B-29s.
With no good results forthcoming, Hansell was
replaced by Gen. Curtis LeMay. Understanding the
vulnerability of Japanese cities to incendiary raids,
LeMay in March 1945 ordered his bombers to indi-
vidually firebomb Japanese urban areas from low alti-
tude and at night. His order instantly changed the char-
acter of the campaign, as hundreds of B-29s dropped
WaW4 Issue.indd 17
their incendiaries on Japanese cities, creating massive
firestorms that swept through both industrial and resi-
dential areas. For the next five months US bombers
dropped incendiaries on Japanese cities with dramatic
result: cities burned, mass casualties were suffered by
their civilians, and the Japanese economy was para-
lyzed.
The post-war US Strategic Bombing Survey esti-
mated that in Tokyo alone the incendiary campaign
destroyed or badly damaged more than 25,000 small
factories and home workshops. Without those sub-
contractors, the Japanese economy was unable to meet
the demands of a sustained war effort. The strategic
bombing of urban Japan was so successful that by July
1945 the level of industrial production in Japan’s 33
largest urban areas was only a third of its 1944 peak.
By the end of the war, Super Fortresses had de-
stroyed or severely damaged over 600 of Japan’s ma-
jor manufacturing plants: aircraft, oil, steel, munitions,
chemicals and machinery were all affected. In all, over
60 cities were bombed. By early August, before the
World at War 17
12/16/08 10:56:25 AM
 Victory through airpower: B-17s.
atomic bombs were dropped, more than 105 square
miles of urban Japan had been destroyed by area incen-
diary bombing out of a total of 257 square miles. Al-
most a quarter-million Japanese had been killed, over
300,000 injured, and 8.5 million civilians displaced. In
fact, more than 10 million Japanese, a seventh of the
total population and a fourth of all city dwellers, fled
to the countryside for refuge.
Victory through Airpower
The Allied airwar against Germany and Japan illus-
trated the power of the punishment strategy, but with
mixed results. Pre-war supporters of strategic daylight
precision bombing believed the civilian populace was
the weak link in a nation’s defense. Bringing the hor-
rors of war directly to the citizens of a belligerent na-
tion would compel the government to sue for peace.
But the Allied combined bomber offensive’s around-
the-clock strategic bombing of Nazi Germany didn’t
bring the Third Reich to its knees, even though civilian
morale often fluctuated in response to the bombing. The
initial response was a sense of outrage, followed by a
determination to support the war effort all the more.
The prolonged bombing campaigns caused some dete-
rioration of civilian morale and also led to some disre-
spect for the Luftwaffe’s leadership, who couldn’t stop
the intruders. After the RAF fire-bombing of Hamburg
in July 1943, a wave of pessimism overcame many
in the Reich, reaching as high as Propaganda Minister
Goebbels, but German home front morale never col-
18 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 18
lapsed. In any event, expecting a civilian populace to
take up arms and rebel against its own government
during wartime over an enemy bombing campaign ap-
pears, in retrospect, to be a far-fetched idea.
The belief strategic bombing could eliminate an
enemy nation’s ability to wage war by destroying its
industrial base also failed to live up to expectations.
Germany had sufficient industrial overcapacity to ab-
sorb the first years of Allied strategic bombing. Dis-
persal of industry, ongoing repair and expansion com-
pensated for additional bombing; however, attacks on
transportation made it difficult to employ the increased
production. Further, the destruction of the Reich’s pe-
troleum industry rendered much of the surplus produc-
tion useless.
If the strategic air campaign in Europe failed to
meet the expectations of Allied air commanders, the
airwar over Japan seemed to validate the efficacy of
the punishment strategy. Five months of successful in-
cendiary and high explosive strikes against Japanese
industrial and military targets in 1945 demonstrated
the USAAF’s doctrine. The atomic bombs employed
against Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the ultimate op-
erations in that strategy.
Even with the success of the strategic bombing
campaign against Japan, a purely Douhetian victory
was not attained. The Twentieth Army Air Force’s B-
29s benefited from the attrition of Japanese airpower
in the mid-war years in the battles over the Pacific. The
12/16/08 10:56:33 AM
 Japanese army and naval air arms, having lost most of
their veteran pilots in defense of the outer perimeter of
the Southeast Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, were unable
to overcome the Twentieth Air Force’s ever-intensify-
ing air campaign. As with the Germans, the Japanese
were also afflicted by a shortage of petroleum, leading
to a collapse of pilot training and the massacre of their
inexperienced pilots in aerial battles.
The US strategic bombing campaign can’t be
viewed in isolation. Years of Allied commerce raid-
ing and a tightening naval blockade also contributed
to shortages of key industrial materials and food in
Japan, further reducing its military capabilities. The
Japanese economy, in any event, lacked the economic
wherewithal to fight a protracted war and, indeed, pre-
war projections figured the economy could sustain six
months of fighting at best.
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WaW4 Issue.indd 19
Still, strategic bombing in the PTO seemed to ful-
fill many of Douhet’s predictions. American strategic
airpower had delivered on its pre-war promise that war
waged from the skies could compel a determined en-
emy to capitulate. Though airpower didn’t win the war
by itself, strategic bombing destroyed much of impe-
rial Japan’s military potential and eroded civilian mo-
rale.
The punishment aerial strategy brought total war
to whole populations in a way never before imagined.
Though the USAAF’s strategic bombing campaign
against Germany and Japan had mixed results, its suc-
cesses demonstrated an all-out bombing offensive had
become a critical element in general war. If nothing
else, it also led to the formation of the US Air Force as
an independent service in 1947.
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World at War 19
12/16/08 10:56:36 AM
 Blair Mayne of the
Special Air Service
By Kelly Bell

The
scene was not of the North Africa of legend. There was no baleful desert sun scorching
down on the obscure but significant military outpost outside Tamut on the Mediter-
ranean coast between Tripoli and El Agheila. In fact, there was no sun at all. The time
was just before midnight, 14 December 1941, and it was bitterly cold.
Tamut was a vital installation of the German Luftwaffe in North Africa. The Luftwaffe, of course, was there
to support the Afrika Korps, commanded by Gen. Erwin Rommel. And that otherwise obscure base became the
scene of one of the greatest special operations raid of the North African campaign.
20 #4

WaW4 Issue.indd 20 12/16/08 10:56:37 AM

 The German warplanes based around Tamut pro-
vided a crucial aerial umbrella over the divisions of
Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in the Western Desert,
the expanse of sand and escarpments that stretched
from the Nile Delta in Egypt into Libya. An Axis drive
into Egypt would threaten the Allied hold on the Mid-
dle East and its rich oilfields.
Operations had concluded for the day at Tamut it-
self, and the German and Italian pilots in the officers’
club were drinking beer and Chianti. The conversation
centered around two faraway events—the Red Army
counteroffensive in front of Moscow, and the stunning
Japanese offensive in the Pacific that had begun with
the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor.
The pilots were torn from their banter as the door
splintered under the impact of a booted foot. An enor-
mous grim-faced soldier in British uniform stepped in-
side, braced a submachinegun against his right hip and
opened fire on the astounded Germans and Italians. He
left none unscathed as he swept the room with fire.
Lt. Robert Blair “Paddy” Mayne was just getting
started. Mayne and the five commandoes with him
pounded out of the base and into the freezing desert
at 9:40 p.m. Hiding out at a safe distance, they lis-
tened as confused Axis troops shot at each other in the
darkness. At 11:00 p.m., with the airfield’s garrison
under the misconception the attack was over and there
would be no more trouble that night, Mayne and his
saboteurs infiltrated back to the airfield and began set-
ting explosive charges on the aircraft parked around its
perimeter. They also rigged explosives to ammunition
and fuel supplies and telephone poles. Then the British
commandos again fled into the Sahara, and this time
they didn’t pause to look back until slightly after mid-
night, when they turned to watch their explosives blow
Tamut into a junkyard of blazing warplanes, gasoline
and cooking-off ammunition.
The Special Air Service (SAS) raid on Tamut was
the first in a string of missions during which Mayne
would take the war to the Afrika Korps. Over the next
18 months both Rommel and his superiors would be
stunned at the extent of the devastation the young
Irishman would inflict on their forces.
Enter Mayne
Of English ancestry, the Mayne family had been
living in Ireland for several generations when Paddy
was born in Newtownards on 11 January 1915. By the
time of the 1938 Munich Crisis, he’d already enlisted
in the Queen’s University Officer Training Corps. In
February 1939 he was posted to the 5th Light Anti-Ar-
tillery Territorial Regiment, where his heavy drinking
and chronic insubordination moved his commanding
officers to brand him “unruly and generally unreli-
able.”
When war broke out in September 1939, he was
sobered in more ways than one when his superiors left
WaW4 Issue.indd 21
him behind when the
unit was transferred to
Egypt. Though he was
inclined to be willful
and resentful of author-
ity, Mayne was also,
by both temperament
and physique, a natu-
ral fighter, and he was
fervently committed to
the Allied cause. Being
excluded from his unit
made an impression,
and when he managed
to transfer to the 11th
Scottish Commandoes
in the spring of 1940 he
became a silent, obedi-
ent and hard-working
warrior-in-training. Special Air Service: Blair Mayne.
He spent the next year learning how to use explo-
sives, engage in unarmed combat, climb cliffs, swim
in full kit, read maps, fire weapons expertly, and un-
complainingly endure brutal physical training. He was
sent to the Mediterranean in the summer of 1941, a
time when almost all of continental Europe was either
under Hitler’s heel or allied with him.
His outfit’s first action was the abortive Litani Riv-
er raid in Syria, in which 120 Commonwealth troops
were lost. The survivors were transferred to Cyprus to
be rested, reinforced and prepared for an operation to
kidnap Rommel. The 11th Scottish Commandoes also
received a new commanding officer, Col. David Stir-
ling.
Stirling had in mind the formation of a commando
unit he intended to call the “Special Air Service.” He’d
noted how large-scale raids against targets far behind
enemy lines lost, through their very size, the element
of surprise. He instead planned to utilize small, highly
trained and well-armed groups of special forces troops
to approach targets by land, or dropping by parachute,
to sabotage aircraft, railways, fuel and ammunition
dumps, communication facilities and other behind-
the-lines targets vital to the enemy, then fading away
into the night.
Stirling took his proposals directly to the Deputy
Chief of Staff for British Middle East Forces, Maj.
Gen. Neil Ritchie, in July 1941. His timing was right.
Prime Minister Winston Churchill was pressing the
commander in North Africa, Field Marshal Sir Claude
John Auchinleck, to start commando actions against
the Germans and Italians in the hope of diverting Axis
resources away from the Russian front.
Ritchie was therefore immediately intrigued with
Stirling’s proposition. It would provide a method of
striking at the enemy without risking much in the way
of men, weapons and supplies. Three days after meet-
World at War 21
12/16/08 10:56:38 AM
 ing with Ritchie, Stirling was summoned to Auchin-
leck’s headquarters, and the field marshal gave him the
go-ahead to assemble his unit.
After recruiting the best men he could find on Cy-
prus, Stirling moved the unit to North Africa, where
the recently arrived Rommel was already threatening
the British petroleum lifeline from the Middle East.
Stirling arranged for his men to work closely with the
Long-Range Desert Group (LRDG). Another round of
training followed, including desert survival technique.
By the autumn of 1941 the SAS was ready for action.
Planning was meticulous, with much use made of aer-
ial reconnaissance photographs.
Second Show
The SAS would tolerate nothing less than suc-
cess. Stirling and Mayne also believed the Axis com-
mand wouldn’t be expecting another attack on Tamut
for some time after the December raid. Sure enough,
the Germans and Italians simply bulldozed away the
wreckage and restocked the installation with newly ar-
rived planes, trucks, sundry vehicles, food, ammuni-
tion, fuel and spare parts. Late on the night of 27 De-
cember, then, Mayne and his men returned and again
blew the airbase into junk.
Meanwhile, the British had launched Operation
Crusader, a ground offensive that drove the Axis from
Benghazi, depriving them of that vital port and forc-
ing them to ship supplies and reinforcements from the
harbor of Bouerat, 350 miles to the west. Bouerat thus
became the next target for the SAS, but the first attack
against it in January 1942 “hit air” when the harbor
was found to be almost empty.
On 24 February 1942, against the backdrop of the
Afrika Korps’s counteroffensive that retook the Gazala
Line, Mayne was decorated with the Distinguished
Service Order and promoted to captain for his earli-
Key to the Western Desert: the port of Tobruk;
smoke is from an air raid.
22 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 22
er exploits. Impatient to get back into action, Mayne
hastily drew up plans for a raid on a busy Luftwaffe
airfield called Berka Satellite. He took with him just
three enlisted men. At 3:00 a.m. on the morning of 15
March, they blew to bits 15 aircraft, a stack of 12 tor-
pedoes and the base’s fuel dump. Though they easily
escaped, they missed the rendezvous with their trans-
port and had to spend most of the next day walking
across 30 miles of burning desert to the next LRDG
pick-up site.
The Wire
In the spring of 1942 the Mediterranean island
of Malta assumed critical importance for both sides.
Royal Air Force squadrons based on the island had
spent the past year cutting deeply into the flow of men
and materiel bound for Rommel. Albert Kesselring, in
overall command of all German forces in the Mediter-
ranean, sent massive formations of Luftwaffe bomb-
ers and fighters against Malta. The crushing assault
had its intended effect, neutralizing the island fortress
and allowing steady shipments bound for Libya from
Italy. With his reinforced divisions, Rommel launched
a new offensive on 26 May. The Germans then took
the British bastion of Tobruk, rounding up 33,000
POWs (including five generals) and large amounts of
weapons, fuel, ammunition, medicine and other sup-
plies. By the end of June the battered British Eighth
Army had fallen back all the way to El Alamein, just
60 miles west of Alexandria. The stage was set for the
culminating battle of the war in the Western Desert,
and Mayne and his SAS would be heavily involved.
After the pounding his warplanes had delivered
against Malta, Kesselring assumed the island was no
longer a factor, and transferred that air fleet to support
Rommel’s drive into Egypt. The RAF took full advan-
tage of the respite to reinforce Malta with pilots and
planes. Soon British aircraft were again raking Axis
sea lanes, and Luftwaffe units were forced to withdraw
from the front to fly cover over the convoys, depriving
Rommel of sorely needed air support. That dilution of
Axis air strength meant Stirling’s and Mayne’s attacks
on German installations were more significant than
ever, as they could further tip the balance in favor of
the British at El Alamein.
Rounding up as many spare vehicles as they could,
SAS troops assembled a fleet of vehicles bristling with
weapons for use in long-range, high-speed missions
far behind enemy lines. The Jeeps were armed with
two forward-facing Vickers machineguns and a swiv-
eling .50-caliber Browning machinegun in the rear. By
late July 1942 the unit was fully motorized with its
own task force of mobile gun platforms.
On the night of 4 July, Mayne led a raid on Luft-
waffe airfields scattered throughout the area surround-
ing the towns of Fuka and Bagush. Roughly 100 miles
from the front, the personnel of those bases felt safe
and had taken few precautions against raiders. Arriv-
12/16/08 10:56:39 AM
 SAS & LRDG
In mid-1941 a young Scots Guards subaltern
named David Stirling began to develop a new concept
of using small forces to conduct raids against Axis
forces in North Africa. Having participated in several
unsuccessful large-scale seaborne commando attacks
along the Cyrenaican coast, he noted that big, ocean-
going assaults gave up the essential element of sur-
prise. So he began “to evaluate the factors that would
justify the creating of a special service unit to carry on
the commando role, and amass a case to present to the
commander-in-chief in favor of such a unit.”
Stirling wanted to use small units trained to launch
stealthy, night attacks on strategic targets far behind
enemy lines. Bands of commandos would parachute
in and attack fuel and ammunition caches, supply con-
voys and, especially, airfields. They would then slip
away under cover of darkness. Such a force would
risk little while destroying the enemy’s most valuable
resources. All Stirling had to do was to get his plan
accepted by the high command.
Bypassing the multi-layered hierarchy of the Brit-
ish Army, Stirling simply barged unannounced and
unexpected into the office of Deputy Chief of Staff,
Middle East Forces, Maj. Gen. Neil Ritchie one af-
ternoon in July 1941. He dumped his written outline,
graphs and charts, onto his desk. Ignoring the as-
tounded general’s attempts to interrupt, Stirling briefed him
Special Air Service: David Stirling (standing).
on his proposal. By a lucky quirk of timing, it was one of the
few times Stirling could have gotten away with such imper-
Still, there were similarities. Both units were made up
tinence. Hitler had just launched his invasion of the Soviet
of unconventionally minded soldiers with a disdain for or-
Union, and Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin was crying out for
thodoxy. They operated with panache and could live off the
a “second front” in the west to take some of the heat off the
bleak desert for weeks at a time while carrying out their as-
reeling Red Army. Stung by Stalin’s question, “When are
signments. The LRDG’s knowledge of the North African the-
you going to start fighting?” British Prime Minister Winston
ater of operations became legendary. Its men could navigate
Churchill was pressuring his commanders in North Africa to
the region’s tracks, villages, oases, and hiding places—and
strike at the Germans
could exploit them to reach enemy installations. The person-
Ritchie suspected Stirling’s proposition was just what nel of those units were drawn from the entire British Com-
Churchill had in mind. He therefore sent Stirling on to the monwealth, including New Zealanders and Rhodesians, as
office of theater Commander-in-Chief Field-Marshal Sir well as Free French paratroopers. By November 1942 the
Claude Auchinleck, who quickly approved the new force and SAS had been expanded to a regiment. In 1943 a second
authorized Stirling to recruit six officers and 60 NCOs and regiment was formed, commanded by Stirling’s brother.
enlisted men. Promoted to captain, Stirling would answer
The LRDG used specialized desert vehicles to get troops
to no one but Auchinleck, ensuring the new outfit would
and their supplies to specific locations on time and in op-
be able to train and operate without interference. Stirling’s
erating order. Even so, things didn’t always go smoothly.
command was designated Special Air Service (SAS). It was
The LRDG commander, Maj. Gen. David Lloyd Owen, de-
to be the real part of a larger British deception operation, by
scribed the difficulties that arose:
which they’d created a fictional unit, 1st Special Air Service
Brigade, as a notional airborne unit.
Stirling immediately got to work training and equipping There were bound to be problems in avoiding a
his men, and within three months they were creating havoc clash of aims of the two units. It was never easy
deep inside enemy lines. The SAS would occasionally col- to achieve a sensible balance between the require-
laborate with the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), another ments of reconnaissance for intelligence purposes
special operations unit Wavell had formed in the summer of and the need to stir up trouble in the rear areas. The
1940. Commanded by Maj. Ralph Bagnold, the LRDG con- enemy’s reaction to Stirling’s operations was bound
centrated on long-range reconnaissance, while the SAS were to make the work of the LRDG less simple than it
raiders. otherwise would have been.

World at War 23

WaW4 Issue.indd 23 12/16/08 10:56:39 AM

 ing at Bagush after dark on the seventh, Mayne and
three of his men set explosives on 40 airplanes, then
pulled back into the desert to watch the fireworks. To
their bitter disappointment, only 22 of the bombs deto-
nated. “Damn! We did 40 aircraft! Some of the bloody
primers must have been damp!” growled Mayne.
Determined to finish the job, he and Stirling drove
their jeeps back into the base’s interior in a wild charge,
machineguns blazing 1,200 rounds per minute, while
the airfield’s personnel, stunned at this new assault af-
ter having assumed the saboteurs were long departed,
ran for cover. By the time the two jeeps bounced away
into the night, a dozen more German planes were
wreathed in oily flames.
In the Shadows
Despite the pyrotechnics, Mayne’s exploits were
overlooked by war correspondents, largely because he
never trumpeted his accomplishments. Yet the impact
of his depredations was out of proportion to the num-
ber of personnel involved. On the night of 7 July 1942,
Mayne and three other men destroyed 34 of Hitler’s
warplanes, contributing to the upcoming, pivotal vic-
tory at El Alamein. Yet no one seemed to take note,
and Mayne preferred it that way.
Early in July he and Stirling cooked up a plot for
a motorized assault on the sprawling Luftwaffe base
24 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 24
outside El Daba, 50 miles west of El Alamein. The
Germans had finally acted in response to the night-
time raiders, and had markedly beefed up airfield se-
curity. Increased security meant silently infiltrating the
bases would be dicey; so Mayne and Stirling decided
on a more direct approach. The two therefore planned
to execute an attack by simply crashing through the
base’s outer defenses in order to machinegun the facil-
ity from within. They first used that tactic to destroy 14
planes in the German airfield outside El Daba on the
night of 9 July. On 11 July they did it again at Fuka,
destroying another 22 machines.
The morale of Axis rear area personnel began to
suffer owing to the depredations of a small band of
nocturnal warriors who seemed able to penetrate and
pulverize at will any base they wished. Ironically, the
SAS, despite being one of the most effective military
units fighting for the Allies, remained largely unknown
to everyone except the Germans and Italians.
Immediately after the second Fuka raid, Royal
Air Force reconnaissance detected a build-up of Luft-
waffe aircraft at Sidi Haneish. The recon revealed it
was packed with Junkers-52 tri-motor cargo airplanes.
Those machines were essential for the delivery of
provisions, reinforcements, ammunition and weapons
to the front. Mayne and Stirling therefore concocted
12/16/08 10:56:40 AM
 an assault in which they would send 18 of their jeeps
against the airfield under a full moon. Precisely be-
cause the bright moonlight would make it difficult to
approach the installation unnoticed, they reckoned it
was a time the enemy would least be expecting an at-
tack. The jeeps would bear down on the base at high
speed in two columns, with the vehicles just five yards
apart. That close spacing demanded meticulous re-
hearsing to ensure against collisions and friendly fire.
Following two weeks of training, the 18-vehicle force
set out on the evening of 27 July 1942.
Four hours later, as the unit was approaching the
airfield, Mayne signaled his men to form into twin as-
sault columns. At that moment, the base was suddenly
flooded with light to guide in a Heinkel-111 twin-en-
gine bomber returning from a patrol. The commandos
were pleased to have the additional illumination as
they charged through the field’s perimeter and their
gunners opened fire.
The installation turned out to be an even better tar-
get than anticipated. Besides the JU-52s the runways
were lined with Messerschmitts, Heinkels, and JU-87
Stuka dive-bombers. The Germans were yet again tak-
en by surprise and had few defenses prepared as rows
of armed and fueled planes began exploding.
After a few minutes, Mayne, his hair singed, was
out of ammunition and preparing to signal his men to
depart, but he spotted a solitary JU-52 parked off to
one side. Grabbing a plastic explosive, he ran up to the
plane, armed the bomb and slapped it onto the wing
root. Then he vaulted back into his jeep and led his ju-
bilant men off into the desert. Behind them more than
40 of Rommel’s aircraft were burning into puddles of
aluminum. Mayne lost one man and one jeep in the
attack.
Across the Desert
The raid on Sidi Haneish finally brought the SAS
recognition within the Allied high command. With the
desert war nearing its climactic battle, Axis air power
was seriously weakened. Newly appointed Eighth
Army commander, Field Marshal Bernard Law Mont-
gomery, decided Mayne and his gang would be useful
in a large-scale operation.
Montgomery was anxious for his forces to achieve
a decisive victory in North Africa. Simply holding the
Afrika Korps at bay wasn’t enough—it was time to go
over to the offensive. El Alamein would be the turning
point in North Africa, and the field marshal decided
Mayne’s part in it would be to neutralize the enemy’s
supply port at Benghazi. That was too large a target
for the SAS to tackle; so Montgomery sent Mayne
more than 100 new men. That increased the unit to
220 men, but there was no time for Stirling and Mayne
to adequately train the reinforcements in their uncon-
ventional style of fighting. Further, a force that size
was difficult to conceal, compromising the element
of surprise. Last, the strict timetable Montgomery im-
WaW4 Issue.indd 25
The other foe: vehicle crew escapes from the heat.
posed on the operation cancelled out the usual tactical
asset of flexibility. Mayne readied his men as well as
he could despite those obstacles.
After briefing and drilling the men during the little
time they had, Mayne and Stirling loaded them into
trucks and jeeps and started the 800-mile trek through
enemy territory to Kufra Oasis. After a brief layover
there, the convoy motored another 600 miles to the
mountainous Djebel region, only 20 miles from the
harbor. The British command in Cairo had meanwhile
received intelligence reports the Germans had spotted
the convoy during its long journey, and were likely
to have guessed its objective. Stirling and Mayne re-
ceived no orders to abort, however, and on the night of
13 September they set out for Benghazi.
The enemy was indeed ready and waiting, and
the convoy was bushwhacked when it stopped at an
unmanned roadblock just outside the port. Taking
withering fire from both sides of the road, the expedi-
tion retreated all the way back to Kufra, which was
still 800 miles inside enemy territory. Anxious to get
medical attention for his wounded, Mayne set out for
home at first light, only to immediately come under
air attack. The vengeful Luftwaffe steadily attacked the
convoy as it made its way east. At one point a particu-
larly determined pilot attacked Mayne’s vehicle, and
a wounded man fell from the jeep. Forced to keep go-
ing until the Germans broke off and departed, Mayne
parked under cover and backtracked on foot until he
found the injured soldier, then carried him back to the
jeep. He hadn’t even known whether the man was still
alive, but he had no intention of abandoning any one,
dead or alive.
The abortive Benghazi raid cost the SAS 50 men
and 50 machines, justifying Mayne’s reservations
World at War 25
12/16/08 10:56:42 AM
 Desert Fox: Rommel confers with Afrika Korps officers.
AfrikaKorps & Eighth Army
At the start of World War II, Libya was an Italian colony
while Egypt was a British “protectorate.” The Western Des-
ert is the region that stretches from Egypt west of Alexandria
into Libya. It became the scene of one of the more critical
and glamorized campaigns of World War II. That campaign
began in September 1940, when Italian Tenth Army ad-
vanced into Egypt, only to be counterattacked by the British
Western Desert Force. While the Italians had the advantage
of numbers, the British had the edge in mobility. When the
dust settled, the British had overrun eastern Libya.
At that time, Hitler sent Gen. Erwin Rommel to Afri-
ca. Rommel initially commanded a small German mecha-
nized force known as the Afrika Korps. In March 1941 he
began his first offensive, running rings around the British
and forcing them to fall back to Egypt. Rommel was then
stopped at the port-fortress of Tobruk, whose “Desert Rat”
garrison held out against all the “Desert Fox” could throw at
them. The British then launched two counteroffensives. The
first, Operation Battle Axe, was shot up in the summer; the
second, Operation Crusader,
pushed Axis forces back to Al
Agheila.
Rommel’s command was
administratively upgraded to
Panzergruppe Afrika, which
included all German and Ital-
ian forces in the theater. The
Afrika Korps became part of
that panzer group, along with
two Italian corps. The British
Western Desert Force was also
upgraded to become Eighth
Army in September 1941.
Eighth Army commander: Gen. Montgomery.
26 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 26
While 1941 closed with things looking bleak for the
Axis, 1942 opened with another stunning counteroffensive
by Rommel. Panzer Armee Afrika, now re-designated a pan-
zer army, swept through Libya, this time taking Tobruk with
scarcely a shot fired in its final defense. Eighth Army was
shattered. There followed a race across Egypt as both sides
attempted to reach Alexandria before the other. The British
made their stand at El Alamein in July 1942. Panzer Armee
Afrika launched a last desperate attack there, and was stopped
by an equally desperate resistance. The El Alamein position
was unassailable, in part because its south flank was covered
by the Qattara Depression (an impassible salt marsh), and in
part because Axis supply lines were overextended across the
desert.
In October 1942, Gen. Montgomery, in command of
Eighth Army, launched an offensive from the Alamein posi-
tion. Rommel held at first, but by November the game was
up as the British broke through. Compounding the Axis di-
saster, American forces landed far to the west in Morocco
and Algeria. Panzer Armee Afrika, yet again redesignated
as the German-Italian Panzer Army, fell back pursued by
Montgomery.
Rommel made his own stand in Tunisia. While Hitler
rushed reinforcement to Africa, the combined Anglo-Ameri-
can forces were simply too much to deal with. Despite a last
brilliant victory at Kasserine Pass, Rommel was finished in
North Africa. On 13 May 1943, the last of the panzer army
surrendered, though Rommel, recalled by Hitler, would fight
on in Europe.
12/16/08 10:56:43 AM
 Finally in Germany
Despite achieving their greatest successes as a commando unit in
North Africa, the SAS/SRS also saw combat in Europe later in the war.
In one instance, Mayne and his men drove into a hornets’ nest outside
the German city of Oldenburg on 9 April 1945. They were spearhead-
ing the Canadian 4th Armored Division past the town en route to Kiel,
when a German squad firing from an abandoned house beside the road
ambushed them.
Seizing a machinegun, Mayne ran alone into the house through
a side door and mowed down every man inside. He then ran back
outside, rallied his men and leaped into a jeep while bellowing for an-
other officer to man its .50-caliber. Another 100 yards down the road
the enemy was raking the column’s advance element with automatic
fire from the forest lining the thoroughfare. Driving slowly and delib-
erately, he ignored withering fire from the tree line while his gunner
sprayed the German gun pits, silencing most of them. Though still tak-
ing fire, he returned to the ambush site and lifted a number of wounded
Canadian and British troops from the roadway, loaded them onto his
jeep and drove them to an aid station.
The column had been fought to a standstill until Mayne’s dramatic
appearance. It then resumed its advance at such a pace it was soon a
full 20 miles ahead of 4th Division’s main body. Shaken and demoral-
ized by the devastating actions of that one lone soldier, the surviving
Germans along the roadway withdrew. With resistance aborted, the
rest of the division advanced easily.
Mayne’s fearless heroism destroyed the enemy’s defense and
saved the lives of an untold number of Allied soldiers. Without him
there is no way of knowing how long the column would have been
held at bay, or how many wounded men would never have survived to
reach medical attention. He never afterward mentioned the incident.

about using the SAS in large-scale set piece actions.
That wasn’t the style of warfare for which the outfit
had trained and, as Montgomery belatedly came to un-
derstood that, he allowed Mayne and Stirling to return
to the small-scale commando actions they favored.
As the apocalyptic desert battle of El Alamein
loomed in October 1942, the SAS set up a new staging
point in the Sand Sea, 200 miles behind German lines
and 150 miles from the prized target of the coastal
highway and railway Rommel was using as his supply
line. The new base was in such a desolate location the
Luftwaffe seldom overflew the area, and SAS head-
quarters went unnoticed by the enemy even while its
commandos raided Axis supply lines.
To Tunis
The SAS next relocated its base of operations to
Wadi Bir Zalten, 100 miles south of Rommel’s head-
quarters at El Agheila. Mayne and his 90 men and 30
jeeps spent the nights prowling the 400 miles of high-
way linking Rommel with his supply port of Tripoli.
With Axis convoys being forced to brave the motor-
ized raiders at night and RAF air attack during day-
light, the Afrika Korps was slowly being strangled for
supplies while attrition took its toll at the front. Mont-
gomery, appreciating how the SAS, through its unique
talents and tactics, was contributing to final victory
in the desert war, told correspondents the Special Air
Service “could have a decisive effect, yes, a really de-
cisive effect, on my forthcoming offensive.”
With his supplies being choked off, Rommel had
to detail armored patrols (which were sorely needed at
the front) to try to chase down the raiders. They had no
success, however, and on 8 October Hitler personally
ordered: “These British saboteurs and their accomplic-
es are to be hunted down and exterminated without
mercy.”
It was an impossible order to obey, for no one in the
Afrika Korps was capable of catching up with Mayne
and his warriors. Increasingly unable to receive rein-
forcement, weapons, ammunition, food, medical sup-
plies, spare parts, water or even mail, the Germans and
Italians were doomed when Montgomery’s well-sup-
plied Eighth Army struck back at El Alamein. Rommel
could only flee west with his remaining force. Mont-
gomery had achieved his aim of a great victory, and
just at the right time. As the Germans were sent reeling
from El Alamein, the US First Army came ashore far
to the west in Algeria and Morocco, trapping (newly
promoted) Panzer Armee Afrika between overwhelm-
ing Allied forces.
As the North African war wound down, the Al-
lied high command began to discuss disbanding the
SAS because its style of hit-and-run fighting seemed
unsuited for use against an enemy in constant retreat.
World at War 27

WaW4 Issue.indd 27 12/16/08 10:56:43 AM


Canadian soldiers at rest after the D-Day landings at Juno Beach.
Stirling, in fact, was captured before the final German
surrender in North Africa; so it fell on Mayne to en-
sure the survival of his beloved unit. Promoted to lieu-
tenant colonel, he politicked tirelessly in Cairo to pre-
serve the SAS. Capt. Derrick Harrison later described
how: “Paddy fought desperately to keep us alive. He
managed to do it by changing our role. We became
Special Raiding Squadron.”
New Shores
Tasked with training the new Special Raiding
Squadron (SRS) for non-desert warfare, Mayne threw
himself into preparations for the invasion of Sicily. He
even taught his men to fight from horseback.
The SRS fought eagerly and effectively until the
end of the war in Europe, yet the unit would never
recapture the importance, gallantry and élan it had in
North Africa. Helping push the Wehrmacht out of Sici-
ly and Italy, Mayne and his men epitomized the Allies’
aggressive response to the menace of the Axis powers.
Working closely with the French resistance, they then
prepared the way for D-Day.
During the Normandy campaign, he rode one of his
jeeps through the streets of newly liberated Le Mans
while firing a .50-caliber machinegun into the air. Ar-
rested by US military policemen and brought before
the Third Army’s commander, Gen. George Patton, he
embarrassed that fire-eating commander into releasing
him by saying simply: “I hope I didn’t frighten your
men.”
28 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 28
Working closely with the Canadian 4th Armored Di-
vision, the SRS ended the war by assisting in capturing
the German port of Kiel. Mayne and his troops spear-
headed the Allied advance into that city, neutralizing
perimeter defenses so tank columns could advance
unhindered.
The degree of Mayne’s commitment to the Allied
cause was further illustrated by a painful back injury
he suffered in France. Unwilling to submit to a lengthy
hospital stay that would take him out of action, he kept
his cracked vertebra a secret. Despite enduring agony
during repeated parachute drops in 1944, he said not a
word about it until after the war. His valor was recog-
nized with four Distinguished Service Order decora-
tions.
Though the Third Reich could not kill Paddy
Mayne, the peace he had done so much to bring about
finished him. Discharged in 1945, he spent 10 aimless
years drifting from job to job while drinking too much.
Early on the morning of 15 December 1955, an intoxi-
cated Mayne was killed in a car crash in his hometown
of Newtownards. He was 40.
He never married and had no children. His in-
credible military record is his legacy. With no room
in his makeup for ego, he never sought the spotlight,
and he had no problem with being overlooked among
the mammoth shadows cast by the Allied war heroes
whose jobs he’d made so much easier. Yet the men he
commanded—as well as those few Axis soldiers who
fought against him and lived—remembered him well.
at
Sources
Bradford, Roy & Martin Dillon. Rogue Warrior of the SAS: The Blair
Mayne Legend. Mainstream Publishing, 1987.
Cowles, Virginia. The Phantom Major: The Story of David Stirling and
the SAS Regiment. William Collins Publishing, 1958.
Editors of Time-Life Books series The Third Reich, AfrikaKorps, 1990.
Harrison, Derrick. These Men Are Dangerous: The Special Air Service at
War. Cassel Publishing, 1957.
Ladd, James D. Special Air Service Operations, Robert Hale Publishing,
1986.
Lewin, Ronald. Rommel as Military Commander, Bantam Books, 1968.
12/16/08 10:56:44 AM
 Strategic Backwaters
The Thai-French War of 1941
In January 1941 a long-standing
territorial border dispute lead to a brief
but intense war between Thailand and
the Vichy French government of Indo-
china (which then included Laos and
Cambodia) involving naval, land and
air forces on both sides. The Thais
gained the advantage in the land fight-
ing, but lost the naval battle of Koh
Chang in the Gulf of Siam, where the
French Far Eastern Squadron virtually
wiped out their navy.
Japan, which had been negotiating
with the French in Indochina for ac-
cess to bases there, and had secretly
encouraged the Thais, used the conflict
as an excuse for further asserting influ-
ence in the region. Tokyo brokered the
peace settlement that gave substantial
parts of Laos and Cambodia to the
Thais. Vichy ordered the French gov-
ernor-general to accept the settlement
over his objections.
When the larger Pacific war began
in December 1941, Thailand became
an explicit ally of Japan and was re-
warded with further territorial gains at
the expense of British Burma and Ma-
laya. Had Japan won the war, Thailand
would have been the geographically
dominant state in Southeast Asia, but
all those gains were reversed in 1945
when the borders reverted to prewar
lines. The only surviving trace of this
forgotten war is an impressive statuary
victory monument erected in 1942 in
the middle of a downtown Bangkok
traffic circle, which stands to this day.
For centuries the Southeast Asian
peninsula had been the scene of con-
stant power struggles among the nu-
merous small kingdoms making up
what are now Burma, Laos, Thailand,
Cambodia, Viet Nam and Malaysia.
The rich natural resources and the stra-
tegic location of the area also attracted
European powers. By the end of the
19th century most of those previously
independent states had been colonized
by Britain, moving east from India
and north from Singapore, and by
France, moving west after gaining a
WaW4 Issue.indd 29
foothold on the coast of Cochin China.
Thailand, which had been the largest
and most powerful of the local states,
thereafter came under constant pres-
sure from both France and England
and was forced to surrender, bit by bit,
considerable territory. Its diplomats,
however, managed to somewhat play
the two European rivals against one
another, and therefore kept their coun-
try an independent state.
In the late 1930s Thailand began
to transform from centuries as an ab-
solute monarchy into an oligarchy in
which power was shared by the crown
with the leading nobles, wealthy busi-
ness families and the military. It was
hardly a democracy by contemporary
standards, but it was somewhat par-
ticipatory, and a new sense of nation-
alism was emerging with the military
furnishing much of the leadership in
that regard. By 1940 that nationalism
found its focus in a campaign for the
restoration of the lost provinces—the
areas Thailand had been forced to give
up to the regimes established by the
British and French in the surround-
ing colonies. The leader in that push
for expansion was the Chief Minister
Gen. (later Field Marshal) Pibul Song-
kram.
When France was defeated in
Europe in 1940, her global position
changed as well. For most of the Sec-
ond World War, French forces in Indo-
China were cut off from the mother-
land and received little or no supplies
or reinforcements. Vietnam began to
destabilize, and a guerilla movement,
the Viet Minh, became active in the
mountainous regions.
The French were vulnerable, and
the Thais saw what appeared to be an
opportunity to regain provinces lost
earlier to French Cambodia and Laos.
After Japan’s surprising early success
against Great Britain in Burma and
Malaysia, Britain’s role in the region
also diminished, and the Thais began
to look for territorial gains in the south
and west as well. In sum, the Thai lead-
ership saw a new geopolitical order
emerging, with previously dominant
France and Britain all but out of the
picture and replaced by Japan. Clearly,
that assessment was a gamble, but it
appeared a good one in 1941. Such
was the background and context in
which the Thai-French war occurred.
The opposing naval forces were
roughly equal. The French had a light
cruiser, the Lamotte-Pickett (8,000
tons, eight 6-inch guns with a range
of 28,000 yards, a 4,000 mile cruis-
ing radius, a top speed of 30 knots,
commissioned in 1924); two modern
sloops, the Dumont D’Urville and Ad-
miral Charner (both 2,000 tons, with
three 5-inch guns, a cruising radius
of 9,000 miles, and a top speed of 15
knots, commissioned in 1931), two
patrol boats, Tahure (700 tons, with
two 5-inch guns, a 3,000 mile cruising
radius, a top speed 20 knots, commis-
sioned in 1919), and the Marne (600
tons, with four 4-inch guns, a 4,000
mile cruising radius, a top speed 20
knots, commissioned in 1916); and 10
river and harbor patrol boats.
The Thai fleet included the Ayuthia
and Dhonburi, classed as coastal de-
fense ships (2,500 tons, with four 8-
inch and four 3-inch guns, a top speed
of 15 knots, commissioned in 1938),
Mitsubishi Ki-30 bombers attacking
targets in Cambodia in support of the
Thai Army’s advance, January 1941.
(Royal Thai Air Force Museum )
World at War 29
12/16/08 10:56:45 AM
 two older coastal defense ships (1,000
tons, with two 6-inch and four 3-inch
guns, a top speed of 12 knots, com-
missioned in 1925), one destroyer
(ex-British World War I), 10 torpedo
boats, four submarines, and several
other small craft.
The French army in Indo-China
was a force of 40 infantry battalions,
two artillery regiments, and one engi-
neer battalion. Composed altogether
of about 50,000 men, that force was
80 percent locally recruited units (the
Tirailleurs Tonkinese, the Annamese
Tiralleurs, the 11th Colonial Infantry
and others), with French officers, and
was intended mainly to enforce colo-
nial law and order; however, the 5th
Regiment of the Foreign Legion was
stationed there as well. The 5th had at-
tached to it an armored unit of some 20
obsolete Renault FT-17 tanks.
Most of the French force was based
in Cochin-China, where there was con-
tinuing insurgency and the necessity to
defend against the possibility of Japa-
nese incursion from the north. (There
was one brief fire-fight with Japanese
forces attempting to cross the northern
border.) Only 12 battalions were based
in Cambodia, and fewer still were in
Laos. For air support the French had
100 aircraft of all types, including 40
old Potez fighter-bombers, 10 modern
Morane 406 fighters, eight Loire 130
naval scout amphibians, and various
other types.
The Thai Army was organized into
four “regions,” each with several “di-
visions.” The largest was the Burapha
Army with five divisions, with the Is-
san Army next with four divisions. All
in all, the army had some 60,000 men;
A Hawk III Fighter Pilot during the
Indochina conflict.
(Royal Thai Air Force Museum)
30 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 30
so the divisions were really brigade-
sized, and much of the force was actu-
ally best described as militia.
The high command had direct
control over an armored regiment that
had 60 Carden-Lloyd tankettes and
30 Vickers medium tanks. There were
also two motorized cavalry battalions,
an artillery battalion with howitzers
and field guns, plus supporting signal
and engineer units. Those units were
the core of Thai striking force. Thai
air power included over 140 aircraft,
with some 35 Mitsubishi bombers, 25
Curtis Hawk monoplane fighters, 50
Chance-Vought biplanes and various
other obsolete types.
On balance, on the land the Thais
appeared stronger than the French in
numbers and equipment. More, the
French had to man a strategic back
door in the north, and the Thais could
attack at places of their own choos-
ing along a long frontier. On the other
hand, though, none of the Thais—of-
ficers or soldiers—had any battle ex-
perience, whereas most of the French
middle and senior-level officers were
veterans of World War I. And the
French also had that regiment of the
Foreign Legion.
There were cross-border incidents
from October 1940 on, along with sev-
eral minor clashes in the air. In Janu-
ary 1941 the Thais struck in force and,
encountering almost no opposition,
overran the northern Laotian province
of Sayaubori and the southern one of
Champasak, both on the western bank
of the Mekong River. Several Thai
columns also pushed into Cambodia,
with the main thrust moving via road
toward the city of Battambang.
After initially falling back, the
French counterattacked at Yang Dam
Koum on 16 January 1941. Spear-
headed by the Legion, they stopped
the advancing Thai forces. The Thais
retained greater numbers, however,
and their tanks eventually forced the
French to give ground, allowing the
advance to resume within a few days.
Judging by the relatively light casual-
ties on both sides, the battle involved
no more than brigade-sized units—a
few thousand men at most. At the same
time, though, it was indeed a stand-up
fight involving infantry, artillery and
armor.
The more decisive naval battle of
Koh Chang took place off the coast
near the site of the Cambodian land ac-
tion. French Gov. Gen. Adm. Jean De-
coux had created a Groupe Occasionel
(task force) in December under Capit.
de Vaisseau Regis Berenger, consist-
ing of the cruiser and the four sloops.
They had drilled together as a unit, and
they appear to have been fully ready
for action when the Thais struck. The
slower sloops left Cam Rahn Bay on
13 January, the cruiser one day later, to
rendezvous after refueling on the 15th
just off the Gulf of Thailand. Orders
were clear: “Seek out and destroy Thai
naval forces,” and Berenger did just
that.
The Thai fleet had moved south
from Bangkok in support of the land
invasion of Battambang Province. Act-
ing on intelligence gained by his Loire
scout planes, Berenger caught the two
larger Thai coastal defense ships, three
torpedo boats, and several supply ves-
sels at anchor off the island of Koh
Chang. Attacking at dawn, he fought
a classic battle in miniature, dividing
his force into three groups to ensure
none of the Thai ships escaped around
the numerous islands in the vicinity. In
30 minutes all the Thai vessels were
sunk or damaged so seriously they
went down later, while the French suf-
fered no damage and returned to their
base. The French were understandably
elated: they had just won what turned
out to be the only indisputable victory
by their navy in all of World War II.
Both sides also made use of their
air forces. The Thais bombed French
airfields and cities in Laos and Cambo-
dia, once even raiding Saigon, and the
French bombed Bangkok. Mostly they
were nuisance raids, and there was lit-
tle use of air power in the ground-sup-
port role. Both sides claimed victories
in fighter versus fighter dogfights, and
both had their aces. The timely recon-
naissance by the French Navy’s Loire
130s before Koh Chang was the great-
est contribution air power made to the
war.
12/16/08 10:56:45 AM
 Casualties on both sides numbered
only in the hundreds, since there were
only two major battles and the bomb-
ing involved few aircraft; so civilian
casualties were few and damage was
slight. The war lasted scarcely two
months. The treaty written by the
Japanese gave the Thais the territory
they wanted in Laos and Cambodia,
and Tokyo later announced they were
also awarding Thailand the four north-
ern sultanates of Malaysia and the two
eastern-most of the Burmese Shan
States. The Thai military command
was jubilant.
By 1944, though, it seemed clear
to most Thais they’d picked the wrong
side. (Bangkok had begun to be more
meaningfully bombed by US B-29s
from bases in India.) The military
strongman, Marshal Pibul Songkram,
was forced from power and replaced
by a civilian government. Thailand
paid reparations to the British and
French after the war, chiefly in the
form of large shipments of rice and
other commodities needed in Sin-
gapore and Indonesia. Thailand was
soon accepted back into the good
graces of the Western powers, largely
because a communist threat developed
across the region after Mao triumphed
in 1949. In the years that followed,
Thailand was staunchly anti-commu-
nist and pro-Western. No Thai leader
since 1944 has ever again raised the
issue of the lost provinces, nor do they
seem likely to do so in the foreseeable
future.
~Warren Robinson
WaW4 Issue.indd 31
On the Battleline
The Moselle, November 1944:
A Little Known but Epic River Crossing
In the pitch darkness shortly before
dawn on 9 November 1944, Compa-
nies A and B, 1st Battalion, 358th Infan-
try Regiment, 90th Infantry Division,
accompanied by an engineer platoon
from the 315th Combat Engineer Bat-
talion, literally walked into the Ger-
man trenches surrounding Fort Koe-
nigsmacher without a shot being fired.
The fort complex, constructed when
the eastern French province of Lor-
raine belonged to Germany in 1915,
was a primary objective of the 90th
Division when it crossed the Moselle
River to encircle and capture the forti-
fied German-held city of Metz.
Originally part of the series of forts
set up to protect the city, Fort Koenigs-
macher, with its battery of four 100mm
howitzers in armored turrets, had later
been incorporated into the defense
scheme of the Maginot Line. In 1944
it remained a key obstacle to the 90th’s
crossing of the Mosselle and advanc-
ing to a junction with other American
units attacking from the south of Metz
in order to encircle the city.
The two companies attacking the
fort were components of the nine in-
fantry battalions of the 90th Division,
and they’d crossed the Mosselle in
what their army commander, Gen.
George S. Patton, called “an epic river
crossing done under terrific difficul-
ties.”
By darkness on 9 November, the
three battalions of the 359th Infantry
Regiment on the left, three battalions
of the 358th Infantry Regiment on the
right, and two battalions of the 357th
Infantry Regiment in between were
firmly established on the east bank of
the river. Without firing a shot, they’d
crossed the swift-moving and flooded
river, which at its highest stage had
overflowed its banks to swell to almost
a mile-and-a-half wide at the crossing
sites. The US infantrymen then caught
the Germans flatfooted.
The surprise achieved was the re-
sult of an elaborate deception scheme
by the armored cavalry and artillery
units of Maj. Gen. Walton H. Walker’s
XX Corps. The 3rd and 43rd Squadrons
of the 3rd Cavalry Group had been
screening the Third Army and XX
Corps left flank since early Septem-
ber. Their patrols had occasionally en-
gaged German forces, but for the most
part there was little activity along the
banks of the Moselle River north of
the city of Thionville.
In preparing for the crossing, which
was expected to be contested, the unit
commanders and staff officers of the
90th always made their reconnaissance
patrols in 3rd Cavalry vehicles. At the
same time, the regular patrol activity
of the 90th was conducted in the same
way, and in the same areas, as previ-
ously.
In the same way, 90th Division and
XX Corps artillery took advantage of
the fire planning already accomplished
by the artillery that had been firing in
support of 3rd Cavalry. Those addition-
al artillery battalions, having left their
observation posts (OP) and communi-
cation systems in place and still con-
ducting normal operations, moved into
new firing positions to register their
pieces on 7 November. Dummy rubber
artillery pieces, furnished by the 23rd
Special Troop (Third Army’s “simula-
tion unit”), replaced the moved firing
units. At the same time, the howitzer’s
supporting 3rd Cavalry also continued
their normal rate of fire, thereby mask-
ing the registration fire of the newly
positioned artillery pieces. In that way,
the Germans weren’t alerted to the fact
a large amount of new artillery had
moved into position to support a major
river crossing.
Even with a cover plan in place to
deceive the enemy, there were never-
theless still other, uncontrollable com-
plications. There was also the abomi-
nable weather and the river flooding
with which to contend. At the time of
the assault it had been raining almost
continuously for three days. Adding to
World at War 31
12/16/08 10:56:46 AM
 that misery, the soldiers had to wade
through thick mud and frigid water
simply to reach the point where they
could launch their boats and rafts to
cross the river. The trek from the as-
sembly areas to the line of departure
was long and arduous. By the time the
men had reached the launch sites, they
were already wet and tired, yet they
still had the rapid river current to deal
with ahead of them. During the cross-
ing many of the assault boats were
swept away by the turbulent water,
even while the level of the river con-
tinued to rise at an alarming rate.
Having been lulled by the illusion
of inactivity in the 3rd Cavalry sector,
the German forces on the east bank
didn’t expect an attack in such poor
weather across a flooded river valley.
Before the Germans realized what was
happening, then, the assault battalions
were well established across the river
and poised to continue their advance
to encircle all of Metz. While the Ger-
mans were late in reacting, once they
did so, however, it was with force and
vigor.
In an attempt to make up for their
relative lack of infantry, the Germans
had laid thousands of mines in exten-
sive fields, while also placing particu-
larly heavy concentrations of them at
the most probable crossing sites along
the river. They had also zeroed-in
A jeep crossing the Moselle River.
32 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 32
those likely sites with their artillery
and mortars—as the US engineers
assigned to try to bridge the Moselle
soon found out.
Ironically, the mines laid along the
riverbank at first proved to be little of a
threat because of the flood. The assault
craft simply floated over the mines,
which had ended up well underwa-
ter. Only when the flood began to re-
cede did the mines become a threat to
American soldiers. It was left for the
follow-on supply and evacuation ech-
elons to discover, and suffer from, the
lurking danger once the water reced-
ed.
Though the Germans had been
tardy in their initial reaction, their re-
sistance soon proved defiant. A fierce
battle erupted for possession of the in-
terior of Fort Koenigsmacher, the guns
of which dominated the surrounding
terrain and river. Though the soldiers
of Companies A and B had gained the
top of the fortified complex with ease,
the defenders still deep within the
structure soon sighted the exposed at-
tackers and brought them under heavy
fire.
The trenches around the fort’s
perimeter had been meant to be used
by its defenders, but they’d also been
zeroed-in by German mortars and ar-
tillery. From within armored obser-
vation posts that jutted above the un-
derground barracks, bunkers and gun
positions, German soldiers directed
fire that rained down on Americans
crouched in the dugouts. The enemy
in those OP were also able to direct
enfilading machinegun fire into the
trenches while simultaneously adjust-
ing the mortar and canon fire.
The attackers’ first order of busi-
ness therefore became the elimination
of those OP. It was accomplished by
engineers using 17 lb. satchel charges
of “Composition C” high explosive.
When the OP were neutralized, the fo-
cus was then shifted to destroying the
various concrete pillboxes.
Under cover of fire, a team of two
engineers would rush the door of a
pillbox, place two satchel charges
against it, ignite them, and then run
back a safe distance. After the explo-
sion, two other men would rush back
to the pillbox, crawl into the entryway
that led back from the destroyed door
and, igniting two more charges, toss
them down the stairwell that led to the
fort’s lower levels. Collapsing those
passages kept the enemy from emerg-
ing to infiltrate into the American posi-
tions.
The pillboxes weren’t the only
parts of the fort attacked with satchel
charges. They were also thrown down
the ventilator ports that protruded
above ground. In one such attack the
ensuing explosion was so great it blew
a German soldiers up through the port
to the surface. The Americans also
poured gasoline into other ports and
then dropped a thermite grenade down
the shaft after it, again causing exten-
sive damage to the underground facili-
ties.
Soon the attackers ran out of
satchel charges, and the gasoline tech-
nique had to be used more and more.
To alleviate that shortage the first day,
artillery liaison aircraft were used to
rush-airdrop another 500 lbs. of Com-
position C to the assault force. An-
other drop was made the next day as
Company C moved forward to join the
ongoing attack on the complex.
The afternoon of 10 November
saw the German garrison attempt to
sally against their attackers. Some 50
of them emerged from tunnels in the
12/16/08 10:56:46 AM
 fort’s southeastern sector, only to be
beaten back by US small arms and
machinegun fire. The Germans left be-
hind 28 dead when they withdrew into
the underground bunkers.
On the third day the Germans
called it quits. Subjected to more gas-
oline attacks, they had suffered ever-
increasing casualties. Those still alive
in the surrendered garrison numbered
120 men. Altogether the Germans lost
some 180 dead. American casualties
were 21 killed, 85 wounded, and five
missing.
While elements of the 358th Regi-
ment had been fighting to capture the
fort, the 90th Division’s other two in-
fantry regiments hadn’t been idle. The
357th Regiment made a river crossing
of its own in partial, and then full, day-
light. Though smoke was employed
to cover the move, German artillery
put heavy fire across the entire zone.
Further casualties were suffered when
several assault craft were overturned
or swept down stream by the swift
current. Complicating matters even
more was the fact resupply efforts and
the evacuation of the wounded back
across the river worked to congest an
already hazardous situation.
The 359th Regiment, having got-
ten across its three battalions during
darkness, quickly consolidated its
position—and none too soon, as the
Germans swiftly counterattacked. The
25th Panzer Grenadier Division, aided
by sympathizers in the small village
of Kerling, first moved against the 3rd
Battalion on 10 November, forcing a
withdrawal of the center of the regi-
ment’s front, thereby giving up the vil-
lage to the enemy. The US regimental
commander ordered a counterattack,
but the battalion was unable to recap-
ture the place.
The Germans still weren’t fin-
ished, however; on 11 November they
attacked again with infantry and tanks,
and that time they almost destroyed the
359th’s bridgehead over the river. Loss
of that bridgehead would’ve threat-
ened the defeat of the entire American
attempt to surround Metz.
German artillery had interrupted
the building of a bridge capable of car-
rying tanks over the river. As it was,
WaW4 Issue.indd 33
then, no American armor was able to
cross the Moselle until the early morn-
ing of 11 November. At that time two
tank destroyers managed to get across
a pontoon bridge that had already had
its floats punctured in many places. A
following third vehicle capsized and
fell into the river when German artil-
lery struck the middle of the bridge
and broke it into two pieces.
The two tank destroyers that had
crossed had done so under orders to
support the 357th Regiment, but they
were almost immediately ‘hijacked’
by the regimental commander of the
359th. A German assault gun, leading
some other vehicles, was just about to
overrun the scratch force of 2nd Battal-
ion defenders at the regimental head-
quarters. That assault was stopped
cold when the commandeered US
tank destroyers took them under fire.
Those newly arrived reinforcements
also worked to encourage the nearby
foot soldiers to increase their vol-
ume of fire, and with that the attack-
ing Germans began to rout. As those
Germans retreated, they were taken
under fire by almost 20 battalions of
artillery, containing pieces that ranged
up to 240mm size. At the same time,
the rest of 2nd Battalion launched into a
general attack that forced the Germans
fully back into Kerling.
Smoke Screen for the Third Army crossing of the Moselle River,November 1944.
In the course of their effort to wipe
out the 359th Regiment’s bridgehead,
and thereby defeat the entire US at-
tempt to encircle Metz, the Germans
had pushed Company G out of the way
as they attacked from Kirling. Attached
to that company was a heavy machine-
gun platoon from 2nd Battalion’s heavy
weapons company, Company H. That
platoon, down to only two machine-
guns, was led by Tech. Sgt. Forrest E.
Everhart. He placed the machineguns
about 200 yards apart, and when the
Germans assaulted the company they
opened fire, but to little effect.
Everhart, seeing what was happen-
ing, gathered up all the hand grenades
he could find nearby, stepped out in
front of the position and started throw-
ing them at the Germans. His efforts
stopped the enemy attack, whereupon
the Germans switched their emphasis
to attack the other machinegun posi-
tion. Everhart then ran to that gun and
repeated his previous feat, effectively
stopping Company G from being wiped
out. Miraculously, he was unscathed in
spite of his lengthy and full exposure
to the enemy. After the repulse of the
Germans, some 50 dead enemy were
counted in front of the two machine-
gun positions. Everhart won the Medal
of Honor for that action, one of four
awarded to 90th Infantry Division per-
sonnel in World War II.
World at War 33
12/16/08 10:56:47 AM
 Lt. Gen. Patton visited the 90th In-
fantry Division on 12 November, and
was taken to the site of the bridgehead
fight. Stretched out for a long distance
on the ground were the bodies of more
than 200 Germans. They’d been lined
up shoulder to shoulder by American
graves registration personnel in prepa-
ration for their mass burial. That sight
led Patton to comment: “I have never
seen so many dead Germans in one
place in my life.”
His remark was a fitting summary
of what he termed in his book, War as
I Knew It, “an epic river crossing.”
~Raymond E. Bell, Jr.

Chamberlain holds the Munich Agreement on his return from Germany in

September 1938.
Historical Perspective
The Impact of Confused Allied Intelligence
on the Munich Crisis

Much has been written about
Prime Minister Chamberlain’s failure
to protect Czechoslovakia during the
Munich Crisis of 1938, but few have
actually examined the ‘intelligence
picture’ that shaped his perceptions
and decisions. Yet in the high stakes
game of international diplomacy, it’s
precisely perception that often plays
the key role.
For the Munich conference, the
British and French intelligence ser-
vices provided their nations’ leaders
with estimates that depicted the size
and capability of Germany’s mili-
tary forces in the event of a war over
Czechoslovakia. Likewise, Germany’s
intelligence services provided Hitler
with estimates about Czech and Allied
capabilities, and also included political
intelligence that depicted the strong
domestic opposition to war in France,
Britain and, more importantly, in the
British dominions. That additional
information, combined with the short-
comings of the Allied intelligence es-
timates, combined to give Hitler what
might be called ‘intelligence superior-
ity’ during the crisis.
34 #4
Chamberlain’s tactics and policies
were driven primarily by two factors:
1) the British Commonwealth’s politi-
cal and economic situation; and 2) in-
telligence estimates that significantly
exaggerated Germany’s military and
economic strength. He entered the ne-
gotiations with little domestic support
for military action, while the domin-
ions’ governments (Australia, Canada,
and New Zealand) flatly told him they
wouldn’t enter a war for Czechoslo-
vakia. He also knew the French gov-
ernment was divided on the issue, but
probably would follow Britain’s lead.
Both Britain’s and France’s economies
were depressed, however, making de-
fense spending unpopular, and there
was a concern war would bankrupt
the treasury, particularly since there
would be little-to-no support from the
dominions. Beyond all that, his mili-
tary intelligence estimates were even
bleaker.
For example, in November 1937,
Britain’s Military Intelligence Direc-
torate (MID) estimated that, by the
first month of 1938, Germany would
be able to field 39 divisions and would
have another 15 reserve divisions
available within four days. In Septem-
ber 1938, at the height of the Sudeten
Crisis, the War Office report set those
numbers at 74 total divisions. Those
formations consisted of 43 infantry,
three armored, 22 Landwehr (home
guard), and six other divisions of cav-
alry, mountain, and light troops.
French intelligence believed the
Germans had over 1 million men un-
der arms, organized into 100 divisions
of which six were armored. In reality,
Germany had 75 divisions, of which
only 46 were active (four armored,
34 infantry, two cavalry, three moun-
tain, one light and one Landwehr). A
further eight reserve infantry divisions
were available, but the bulk of all the
units were in the early stages of forma-
tion. For example, the 7th Airborne Di-
vision consisted of only two battalions
in 1938 and didn’t reach regimental
strength until mid-1939. The Waffen
SS consisted of only a handful of bat-
talions.
MID estimated Germany could

WaW4 Issue.indd 34 12/16/08 10:56:47 AM

 put one-third of that overall force into
action immediately. At best the com-
bined Allies could field 50 divisions,
with only two being British. The War
Office therefore concluded: “Germa-
ny could launch at will a sudden and
overwhelming onslaught on Czecho-
slovakia without fear of effective in-
terference from the West during this
operation.”
What made matters worse was
British intelligence couldn’t deter-
mine where the German divisions
were stationed or how prepared they
were. Czech intelligence had a more
accurate picture of Germany’s armed
forces, but there’s no evidence French
and British intelligence even consid-
ered information from Prague as they
prepared their assessments.
On the other hand, the Admiralty
was confident up to late 1938 Ger-
many was adhering to the Anglo-Ger-
man Naval Agreement, believing they
were expanding their navy at a much
slower rate than was the case. They
didn’t realize the Bismarck, Tirpitz,
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau exceeded
the agreement’s tonnage limitations
until after they were built. From 1936
until late 1938, the Admiralty and Na-
val Intelligence Division (NID) both
believed in what they referred to as
the “Baltic Hypothesis.” It was under-
stood, that in the event of war, Germa-
ny’s navy would work to achieve su-
premacy in the Baltic to ensure trade
and communications would remain
open and to block the potential link up
of western and eastern Allied forces.
They believed Germany would fight
only in the east and not seek to engage
the British fleet, having learned the fu-
tility of that strategy in World War I.
That outlook began to change as
the Munich Crisis reached critical
mass in September. From that time
on the Baltic hypothesis dissipated
and the Admiralty began to plan se-
riously for another large-scale war.
The intelligence estimate they gave
Chamberlain stated the Royal Navy
could contain the Kriegsmarine and
the Allied naval blockade would col-
lapse Germany’s economy in about 18
months. The Royal Navy assessment
also matched that of Britain’s Industri-
WaW4 Issue.indd 35
al Intelligence Center, which reported
Germany would not be self-sufficient
in food, fuel, iron or non-ferrous met-
als by 1939, and that it probably had
sufficient stockpiles to sustain 15 to 18
months of peacetime operations.
That 18-month estimate likely fig-
ured prominently in Chamberlain’s
thinking when he read the Royal Air
Force Air Intelligence Division’s as-
sessment of the Luftwaffe. The AID
and Air Ministry embraced the worst-
case scenario for the Luftwaffe. They
believed Germany had over 2,000
bombers that could sustain an all-
out air assault on Britain from war’s
start. They believed the Luftwaffe
would concentrate on breaking the
population’s will by inflicting massive
casualties, as suggested by the Ital-
ian air warfare theorist Douhet. They
concluded that, over the course of the
new war’s first 24 hours, Germany
could deliver 945 tons of bombs, in-
flicting approximately 50,000 casual-
ties. Worse, AID believed Germany
could sustain that effort for “several
weeks.”
Chamberlain was told Britain
would suffer up to 350,000 civilian
deaths along with untold injured dur-
ing the war’s early months. In truth,
the Luftwaffe could deliver only 531
tons in that first strike, but then had
little capacity to sustain that effort be-
yond two weeks. More importantly, as
actual war experience later proved, ca-
sualties would have been only a frac-
tion of the initial estimate.
The Air Staff believed air power
alone would be the determining fac-
tor in winning wars, and expected
the Luftwaffe shared that belief. That
idea was in fact so ingrained among
air force officers at the time, they of-
ten overlooked contrary intelligence
and neglected to study actual German
bomber capabilities. Had that been
done, they would have realized the
Luftwaffe was ill-equipped for the sce-
nario they feared.
More, the AID lacked technical
intelligence about German aircraft,
and what little data they had suggested
Britain was losing the aircraft manu-
facturing race. AID believed the Luft-
waffe had 360 squadrons by late 1938,
for a total of 3,240 first-line planes.
AID also determined Germany could
manufacture 550 aircraft a month in
1938 and would reach monthly pro-
duction levels of 725-750 by early
1939.
That assessment was close to ac-
curate, even though it was based on
a one-work-shift system. With that in
mind, AID assumed if German fac-
tories operated 24 hours a day they
could double their production. AID
sources and analysts therefore be-
lieved Britain was all but incapable
of achieving air parity with Germany
unless Britain shifted the bulk of its
defense spending to the RAF. The Air
Ministry’s assessment was reinforced
by German misinformation efforts,
fed via high-level British officials.
For example, Britain’s ambassador
to Germany, Sir Neville Henderson,
echoed Herman Goering’s claim the
Luftwaffe outnumbered the combined
air forces of Britain, France, Belgium
and Czechoslovakia. In reality, due
to poor servicing, the Germans could
field only about half the numbers AID
cited.
In March 1938 the Foreign Office
released a strategic assessment titled
“The Military Implications of German
Aggression Against Czechoslovakia.”
That report, the only one of its kind
relating directly to the Munich Crisis,
stressed Britain wasn’t prepared to
fight a war. It incorporated AID’s air
assault scenario as the most probable
German response to war. The report
was further reinforced by the Chiefs
of Staff, whose beliefs mirrored those
of the Foreign Office. The Chiefs ad-
vocated heightened defense spending
while simultaneously pushing for a
diplomatic resolution to the crisis.
Additionally, Whitehall believed
Britain was facing not one, but poten-
tially three foes. They feared a three-
front war having to be fought against
Germany, Italy and Japan, a view
shared by the Cabinet. The British
government knew it couldn’t success-
fully conduct such a war, particularly
without dominion support. Therefore
the Defense Ministry, Admiralty and
Cabinet felt removing at least one of
those threats via diplomacy was the
World at War 35
12/16/08 10:56:48 AM
 best course.
It was, however, the perceived Luftwaffe threat that was
greatest in Chamberlain’s thinking. After his second meet-
ing with Hitler, he reported to the Cabinet that, after flying
over London, he wondered “what degree of protection we
could offer to the thousands of homes spread out below.” He
insisted: “We are in no position to justify waging a war today
in order to prevent a war hereafter.”
Most telling was his summary comment on the lack of
British air defense: “We cannot expose ourselves now to a
German attack. We simply commit suicide if we do. At no
time could we stand up against German air bombing.”
Chamberlain was convinced Britain and France couldn’t
stop a hostile takeover of Czechoslovakia. If he threatened
the use of Allied force to prevent it, and Hitler called his
bluff, another world war would start. He also admitted: “If
we now possessed a superior force to Germany, we should
probably be considering these proposals in a very different
spirit.”
Those statements demonstrate the impact British intel-
ligence reporting had on Chamberlain’s perceptions of the
German threat. Given, though, that so much of Britain’s in-
telligence reporting was conflicting, it’s also clear he was
finally forced to make his own judgment.
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36 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 36
The Foreign Office believed there were moderate mem-
bers within Hitler’s Cabinet who would sway him from war.
That hope was further reinforced by the reports from Sir
Henderson, who felt Hitler would accept a peaceful solu-
tion and go to war only if antagonized by a British hard line.
At the same time, however, Permanent Under-Secretary of
State Sir Robert Vansittart stressed Hitler was set on war and
could be deterred only by British resolve. Unfortunately, the
various intelligence services could offer no assessment on
Hitler’s reaction to a firm British stance.
Given the conflicting intelligence estimates he received,
and Britain’s poor strategic situation, Chamberlain went with
Henderson’s assessment and placed his faith in personal di-
plomacy. Further, most British officials, including Chamber-
lain, ultimately thought Czechoslovakia’s fate wasn’t a vital
British interest that justified going to war.
~Erik Henderson
Attention readers: We’re always looking
for authors for FYI for Strategy & Tactics
and Observation Post for World at War.
If you’d like to try your hand at writing
short (under 2,000 words), pithy articles
for this column, on virtually any aspect of
WWII military history, contact Ty Bom-
ba, FYI editor, at: WhiteRook@att.net.
Next Issue
Next issue’s wargame will be Joseph Miranda’s
“The Finnish Front, 1941-42,” along with ar-
ticles on “Omaha Beach,” “The Ribbentrops,”
“Zero Ace Saburo Sakai,” “Bugs Bunny in
the USMC,” “First Canadian Army,” “Jimmy
Doolittle’s 100-Octane War,” “Myth & Reality
About the Bridge Over the River Kwai,” “Ger-
man-Japanese Air Transport Plans,” and “Italy’s
274th Heavy Bomber Squadron.”
12/16/08 10:56:49 AM
 Issue in Doubt:
The Battle of Wake Island,
8-23 December 1941
By M.R. Pierce

Aerial view of Wake Island taken while it was under Japanese occupation.
Background
“Remember Wake Island!” was a phrase that ral-
lied the American nation during the dark days follow-
ing the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. For 15 days
the outnumbered defenders of that tiny speck of coral
and sand held the imagination of a demoralized nation.
The battle has since been almost forgotten, however,
and in most histories of the Second World War it’s
given little mention. At best, it usually merits only a
few lines and a mention of a stubborn defense. Never-
theless, it actually remains one of the most fascinating
episodes of the early war period.
Wake Island is an isolated, horseshoe-shaped strip
of coral located in the Central Pacific. Really composed
of three small islets—Wake, Wilkes and Peale—it is
1,000 miles from Pearl Harbor and 500 miles north of
the Marshall Islands. (Throughout this article, “Wake
Island” will be used to refer to the collectivity of all
three islets, and “Wake” will be used only to denote
that single islet.)
Strategically located, Wake Island sat astride the
lines of communication of both the US and the Japa-
nese Empire. Possession of the island would provide
the owning side with an important airbase location.
Despite that long-perceived importance, however,
Wake Island remained a US military backwater un-
til 1935. That year Pan American Airways (PanAir)
requested permission to construct a stopover for its
planned trans-Pacific service. The US Navy command
readily agreed, with the proviso Navy officials would
approve all construction. The intent was to insure the
new PanAir facilities would meet Navy requirements
in case of war.
World at War 37

WaW4 Issue.indd 37 12/16/08 10:56:51 AM


The Martin 130 Philippine Clipper (NC 14715) taxing across the
lagoon at Wake Island. Photo by William Bert Voortmeyer, one of
the workers Pan Air hired to build the Wake Island base in 1936.
The Pan American hotel at Wake Island, 1936. The photo was taken
after the hotel was constructed, just before being painted. Photo by
William Bert Voortmeyer.
38 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 38
PanAir indeed built a lavish facility on Peale, com-
plete with a hotel and seaplane ramp. The air service
began in the fall of 1935. Later, after much budgetary
wrangling in Congress, new military construction also
began on Wake Island in 1940. Contracts were let and,
in November, the first of what would become 1,041 ci-
vilian workers arrived. They set up a sprawling camp
near the PanAir facility. The contractor’s mission was
to develop the infrastructure needed to turn the island
into a fully functioning naval air station from which to
observe Japanese movements.
In March 1941 the US Marine Corps’ 1st Defense
Battalion (1DB) was dispatched to Palmyra and John-
ston Islands. The 1DB was heavy with the artillery
and anti-aircraft weapons that formed the backbone of
defense for all forward positions. Five months later,
in August, 485 officers and men from 1DB were also
deployed to Wake Island, bringing with them all of the
battalion’s heavy weapons.
When those Marines arrived, the civilian workers
had been there almost 10 months. In that time they’d
established an elaborate base camp and had also begun
work on the airfield for Wake. Their contract, however,
didn’t permit them to assist in 1DB’s defensive prepa-
rations. The Marines were therefore left with the daunt-
ing task of having to emplace their heavy weapons by
hand.
On 15 October, Maj. James P.S. Devereux, the ex-
ecutive officer of 1DB, arrived to assume command of
the Wake Island detachment. Surveying the situation,
he realized there was still much work to be done. He
therefore set his men to working 12-hour days, seven
days a week, in order to bring the defenses up to stan-
dard as quickly as possible. Even so, long hours and
hard work couldn’t instantly overcome the equipment
and personnel shortages of the 1DB detachment.
For instance, though 1DB was authorized three 3-
inch anti-aircraft batteries of four guns each, the Wake
detachment had only enough personnel to actually man
two such batteries. Further, only Battery D had both
a range and height finder. That battery was therefore
tasked with providing that information to the other bat-
tery. The most critical omission, though, was the lack of
radar. Without that vital early warning technology, the
defenders had to rely on visual observation of enemy
forces approaching the island.
To engage those forces, Devereux positioned his
weapons to be mutually supporting. The 5-inch batter-
ies were set up at the extreme ends of the island. Battery
A was at Peacock Point on Wake, Battery B was at Toki
Point on Peale, and Battery L was at Kuku Point on Wil-
kes. At least two batteries could therefore be brought to
bear against any approaching land force. He then posi-
tioned the 3-inch anti-aircraft batteries to protect to the
coastal guns and other vital positions. Finally, he scat-
tered numerous .50 caliber heavy and .30 caliber light
machineguns around the island at key locations.
12/16/08 10:56:53 AM
 Devereux relied on wire communications to stay in
contact with his units. While relatively secure in other
ways, wires are subject to being cut. Indeed, it was
those wire communications that would fail at a critical
time in the coming battle and thereby affect the deci-
sions made by Devereux and the overall island CO,
Commander Winfield S. Cunningham. Interestingly,
the latter was able to maintain wireless communica-
tions with Pearl Harbor until the day Wake Island fell.
Between what had been brought in by the civilians
and Marines, Wake Island was more than adequately
provisioned with a six-month supply of rations. Medi-
cal needs were met by a contingent of Navy corps-
men, along with a hospital the civilians had built. Fuel
tanks were also put in place, including two 25,000-gal-
lon containers for aviation fuel for the Marine fighter
squadron that was en route to Wake Island by 4 De-
cember.
The pilots of VMF 211, under the command of Maj.
Paul A. Putnam, flew their F4F-3 Grumman Wildcats
off USS Enterprise on that day. Only one portion of
the Wake airstrip was then complete, and it wasn’t
wide enough to allow sections of aircraft to take off
simultaneously. Revetments to protect the planes also
hadn’t yet been completed, and there was little room to
disperse the fighters, making them doubly vulnerable.
Cunningham nonetheless set Putnam and his pilots to
patrolling above the island at dawn and dusk. The Marines have landed! USMC recruiting poster.
On 6 December, Devereux declared a practice alert.
Pleased with the results of that drill, he gave the next vilians was to continue their work, as fast as possible,
day off to his tired Marines. It was their first real break on the air station. (Many of the civilians did volunteer
since their arrival. They had no idea it would be their to more directly assist the defense, and they acquitted
last day of leisure. themselves admirably during the battle. Others simply
December 7-9 hid until the fighting was over.)
The morning of 8 December (7 December at Pearl On Peale the PanAir personnel made their own
Harbor), began like all mornings on Wake Island. The preparations. The clipper itself was recalled shortly
Marines were finishing breakfast and preparing for the after it had taken off for Guam. The captain of that
day’s work assignments following their day of rest. At plane, a naval reserve officer, then volunteered to fly
about the same moment, Devereux and Cunningham it on a long-range reconnaissance patrol. Cunningham
received word Pearl Harbor had been attacked, along agreed and the mission was set for 1:00 p.m.
with a warning an attack on Wake Island was likely At 11:50 a.m. a force of 27 Japanese land-based
imminent. The Marines rushed to their battle sta- bombers descended out of a nearby rain squall to begin
tions. Within 45 minutes all ground positions reported the attack on Wake Island (having sortied from Truk).
“manned and ready.” Hampered by heavy low clouds and the lack of radar,
At the airfield, VMF 211’s morning patrol was the American lookouts didn’t spot the enemy planes
already up. On the ground, Putnam decided to leave until they were only a few hundred yards off shore. As
the other planes dispersed as much as possible along the alert went out, the Japanese were beginning their
the runway, rather than risk damaging them by mov- final bomb runs. Their targets were the PanAir facility
ing them farther from the airfield. He would later re- and the airfield.
mark that was one of his worst decisions. At the time, The PanAir facility was leveled while sustaining
though, he believed dispersal would have to suffice 37 civilian casualties. Miraculously, the clipper plane
until the revetments could be completed. parked in the lagoon was left airworthy. It departed
After receiving news of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Wake Island for Midway at 1:30 p.m. loaded with Pa-
Dan Teeters, supervisor of the civilians, asked Cun- nAir’s Caucasian employees. The company’s Guami-
ningham how he and his men could best help the de- an personnel were left on the island under the charge
fense. Both agreed the best course of action for the ci- of Teeters.

World at War 39

WaW4 Issue.indd 39 12/16/08 10:56:55 AM

 The main focus of the Japanese attack, however,
had been the airfield. There Cunningham found total
devastation. Both fuel tanks were burning and debris
was scattered across the entire facility. He found Put-
nam and a few other men doing what they could for
the wounded on the spot. Seven of the Grummans had
been destroyed and the eighth was severely damaged.
Worse, one of the four planes that had been out on pa-
trol at the time of the air raid was damaged on landing.
That left just three operational aircraft.
Putnam named Lt. John F. Kinney to replace the
unit maintenance officer who’d been killed during the
raid. Through hard work and ingenuity, Kinney and his
team managed to get four planes ready for the morning
patrol. They were off, conducting that mission, when
the Japanese returned with 26 aircraft at 11:45 a.m.
The patrolling US aircraft jumped those Japanese
bombers south of the island. They claimed one shot
down, but that couldn’t be confirmed. As the bombers
approached Wake Island, the Marine pilots broke off
in order to avoid anti-aircraft fire.
The Japanese target that day was Camp 2, the con-
tractor facility, as well as the defenses of Peacock
Point. During the raid they also destroyed the hospital
at Camp 2, killing many of the wounded inside. Casu-
alties and damage were minimal at Peacock Point.
During the raid, Marine Gunner Clarence B. McK-
instry noticed one of the Japanese planes broke forma-
tion and began circling over the anti-aircraft battery
at Peacock Point. He believed that plane was photo-
graphing the battery, and he therefore suggested to
Devereux those guns be relocated. The major agreed,
and a mixed team of Marines and civilians spent the
remainder of the day and night moving the eight-ton
guns 1,500 yards to the northwest. Dummy guns were
put in the old location, and the battery again reported
“manned and ready” by 5:00 a.m.
December 10-12
On 10 December the Japanese attacked with 18
bombers. McKinstry’s hunch was confirmed when
those planes attacked Battery E’s old position before
turning their attention on Battery L on Wilkes. That
bombing was accurate and effective, setting off a cache
of dynamite that shook the whole island and damaged
the fire control equipment for Battery L’s 5-inch guns.
Casualties, though, were light.
In the air, VMF 211 destroyed two bombers for
no losses of their own. The anti-aircraft gunners also
claimed several more bombers were smoking as they
disappeared over the horizon. Devereux ordered Bat-
tery E to relocate again.
Unknown to the defenders, a Japanese naval task
force had departed Truk on 8 December and would be
close to Wake Island on the evening of the 10th. That
force, commanded by Rear Adm. Kajioka Sadamichi
Inoue, consisted of three light cruisers, six destroyers,
40 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 40
four transports and two submarines. Some 450 Spe-
cial Naval Landing Force soldiers (SNLF: roughly the
equivalent of the US Marines) had been allocated for
the operation. One hundred and fifty would land on
Wilkes, while 300 went ashore on Wake. The Japanese
planners believed that force would be more than ad-
equate to defeat the defense.
At 3:00 a.m. on the 11 December, lookouts began
reporting ships on the horizon to the southwest. The
garrison went to general quarters. In the hope of de-
ceiving the Japanese, all the batteries were ordered to
hold fire and remain covered.
The Japanese ships unswervingly approached the
blacked out island. By 5:00 a.m. the cruiser Yubari,
flagship of the task force, had led the bombardment
group to a place 8,000 yards south of Peacock Point.
The Japanese then turned west and began bombarding
the island, raking the entire length of Wake and Wilkes
with their fire. Getting no response from the defenders,
the ships ceased fire and began moving in closer to
shore.
At the airstrip, Putnam ordered his four aircraft
to take off, but only three would start. At 5:15 he led
those planes aloft to a holding area north of the island.
Twenty minutes later the fourth F4F managed to take
off, even as the Japanese warships continued to close
in.
On their own initiative the men of Battery A (5-
inch) uncovered their guns and began tracking the ap-
proaching ships. The anxious gunners continuously
called Devereux’s command post, requesting permis-
sion to open fire. Devereux denied all their requests.
At 6:15, Devereux sent word to Cunningham notifying
him the Japanese ships were at 4,600 yards. Cunning-
ham ordered: “Cut loose at them!”
Seconds later the Marines opened fire. Initially
only Batteries A and L (5-inch) could bring their guns
to bear on the Japanese. Battery A, at Peacock Point,
began by engaging the lead ship, Yubari. The first sal-
vos went over, and Yubari replied by firing everything
she had at Battery A. The battery commander, 1st Lt.
Clarence A. Barniger, then adjusted fire and rapidly
scored two hits on the cruiser. Two destroyers rushed
to aid their stricken flagship, laying a smoke screen
to cover its withdrawal. The gunners at Peacock point
shifted their fire again, this time to the transports, also
forcing them to turn away.
Then Battery L opened fire. In lieu of a range find-
er, the commander there, 2nd Lt. John A. McCalister,
stood atop his outpost in order to estimate the range to
the lead enemy ship, the destroyer Hayate. The battery
quickly landed two salvos on the Hayate, then a third
broke her completely in two. She sank in two minutes,
taking with her all the crew. The Marine gunners loud-
ly but briefly celebrated before returning to the work
at hand.
12/16/08 10:56:55 AM
 They shifted to engage the approaching transports,
scoring several hits and forcing those vessels to turn
away. They next engaged a light cruiser, hitting her in
the stern as she departed. By that time Battery L had
fired 120 rounds in one hour.
three light cruisers had been damaged. Their exact
As the enemy task force withdrew, it came within
personnel losses aren’t known, but at least 185 sailors
range of Battery B. There the duel went more favor-
lost their lives when the Hayate went down, and an
ably for the Japanese. One Marine gun was destroyed,
unknown number of SNLF troops were also lost when
but not until another Japanese destroyer had been set
they tried to board their landing craft.
ablaze. Other destroyers laid another smoke screen,
and the Japanese continued to move out of range. The defenders didn’t have long to enjoy their suc-
cesses. At 10:00 a.m. Japanese bombers returned.
At 7:00 a.m. Adm. Kajioka’s crippled task force
Again, though, VMF 211 and the Marine gunners were
was attacked by VMF 211. Each of those four planes
ready. The US fighters broke up the attack, downing
was armed with two 100-lb. bombs. They dove on the
three bombers in the process. The bombing by the
ships, further damaging two light cruisers and a trans-
other Japanese planes was scattered and ineffective.
port. The pilots then returned to Wake to rearm and
refuel. They eventually shuttled between Wake and the Later in the day the Marine aviators also claimed
retreating Japanese ships a total of 10 times, sinking to have sunk a Japanese submarine. That boat has nev-
another destroyer and damaging several other vessels. er officially been credited to VMF 211, however, the
Japanese did report “losing contact” with a submarine
By noon, then, Kajioka had lost two destroyers
in the Wake Island area. They eventually listed it as
sunk, one transport set afire, while two destroyers and
“lost.” continues on page 44
World at War 41

WaW4 Issue.indd 41 12/16/08 10:56:56 AM

 The Bigger Picture
After the Japanese repulse on 11 December, the USN and the IJN
entered what amounted to a strategic race for Wake Island. It was a
race the Japanese would ultimately win, and it also revealed the im-
portance each navy placed on the island.
As the Japanese task force limped away from Wake Island on the
11th, the US CINCPAC (Commander IN Chief, PACific) staff was
planning the reinforcement of the island. Adm. Husband E. Kimmel
anticipated the defenders had, with their success, bought enough time
to execute a full-scale relief effort, followed by a general counter-
strike against the Japanese in the Central Pacific.
Early in his tenure as CINCPAC, Kimmel had noted the strategic
importance of Wake Island to both the overall US and Japanese posi-
tions across that area. His hope was to use the island as bait to lure
the Japanese into an ambush. His plan, though, was based on the US
fleet being intact and having good intelligence on the location of the
Japanese fleet. In the days after 7 December, neither of those condi-
tions pertained. Kimmel, though, remained determined to strike back
at the Japanese as soon as he could, wherever he could.
Kimmel divided his aircraft carriers into three task forces. Task
Force 8 was formed around Enterprise and was commanded by Adm.
William Halsey. Vice Adm. Wilson Brown led Task Force 11, formed
around Lexington. Task Force 14, commanded by Adm. Frank Fletch-
er and formed around Saratoga, was given the mission of delivering
reinforcements to Wake Island and evacuating its civilians. In addition
to the carriers, each task force had two or three cruisers and several
destroyers. That meager force roster highlighted the crippled state of
the US Pacific Fleet.
Kimmel’s plan called for Task Force 11 to raid Jaluit in order to
tie down Japanese forces in that area, while Task Force 8 remained
behind to protect the approaches to Oahu. Task Force 14 would move
within range of Wake Island and fly off VMF 221, which was already
embarked on Saratoga. A converted seaplane tender, the Tangier,
would at the same time make a dash directly to the island to deliver
ground reinforcements and carry away the civilians.
After 11 December the Japanese could have decided to simply
blockade and eventually starve out the garrison. That wasn’t an ac-
ceptable strategy, though, for two reasons. First, they still coveted
Wake Island for its strategic location and, second, they felt compelled
to seize the island quickly and directly in order to regain face. Adm.
Yamamoto’s chief of staff, Adm. Matome Ugaki, summarized the sig-
nificance of Wake Island shortly after the initial repulse, by saying it
represented the “greatest challenge the Imperial Japanese Navy yet
faces.”
Adm. Kajioka, in his planning for a second effort, demanded car-
rier support. The naval staff was at first reluctant, as those vessels
already had many further, already planned operations before them.
Yamamoto, however, personally overrode the reluctance of some on
his staff to improvise, ordering Carrier Division 2 to move to a sta-
tion in range of Wake and remain there until the island was captured.
When that Japanese force steamed from the base on Truk on 21 De-
cember, the race for Wake Island was on.
Kimmel’s staff estimated it would take Task Force 14 six and a
half days to transit to Wake Island. That planning was based on the
top speed of the slowest ship in the task force, the tanker Neches, with
a top speed of 12.75 knots. The estimate failed to take into account
anti-submarine maneuvering as well as the time involved in the un-
avoidable refueling of the destroyers.
On the evening of 16 December, Saratoga and her immediate es-
corts sortied from Pearl Harbor. The task force completed its full as-
sembly the next day, and then all ships turned toward Wake Island at a
speed of 12 knots. The relief of the island was planned for 10:30 a.m.
42 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 42
on 23 December (Pearl Harbor time). As events would show,
that was an achievable, even if optimistic, estimate.
The defenders on Wake had indeed bought Adm. Kim-
mel some time to strike at the enemy and thereby salvage
his reputation, but events in Washington were also moving
fast. Navy Secretary Frank Knox completed his inspection
of Pearl Harbor on 12 December and, before leaving, he also
approved the plan to reinforce Wake Island. Upon his return
to Washington, however, he also recommended to President
Roosevelt that Kimmel be relieved. It then took a week for
Kimmel’s replacement, Adm. Chester A. Nimitz, to arrive in
Hawaii. In the interim, Adm. William S. Pye, commander of
the battleship USS California, served as CINCPAC.
Pye, assuming command on 17 December, found himself
in a bad situation. He’d been given only temporary author-
ity over a crippled fleet, the remnants of which were even
then beginning a risky offensive operation. Since he’d only
recently witnessed the worst defeat in the US Navy’s history,
and with his own ship sitting on the bottom of the harbor, he
was understandably reluctant to find himself in the position
of having to hand to Nimitz a further list of ship losses and
casualties if the Wake operation misfired. His determination
to see Wake Island relieved was less than absolute from the
start.
December 17 was a pivotal day in the race for Wake.
In addition to Kimmel’s relief, CINCPAC headquarters also
received intercepts telling that Adm. Nagumo had been or-
dered to detach Carrier Division 2 to support a new attack
on Wake Island. That sent a wave of doubt through Pye, who
ordered the staff to reassess the situation in light of the new
information. Their recommendation was to continue the op-
eration but to also divert Task Force 11 to support Task Force
14. Pye agreed to go ahead, and issued orders for Brown
to move to link up with Fletcher. To facilitate that link up
as quickly as possible, though, Pye also ordered Fletcher to
reduce speed and not to go within 200 miles of Wake.
Pye then dispatched a Catalina patrol plane to Wake Is-
land to inform Cunningham of developments, tell him to
prepare to receive reinforcements and ready the civilians
for evacuation. The Catalina arrived on 20 December, Wake
Island time, and the news it brought boosted the morale of
the defenders. Unfortunately, the Japanese intercepted the
weather reports the crew of the Catalina broadcast hourly
on their approach to Wake. From that, the enemy analysts
correctly deduced Wake Island was going to be reinforced in
some manner. Accordingly, Carrier Division 2 was ordered
to increase its speed in order to be able to attack earlier than
planned.
It was only a few hours after the patrol plane left Wake
Island that the aircraft from Carrier Division 2 made their
first strike. Pye was suddenly concerned it was he who was
sending ships into an ambush, even though there were no in-
dications the Japanese knew Task Force 14 was approaching
the area. It might therefore still be possible to make a fast run
to Wake Island, and even possibly to catch the Japanese in-
vasion force as it was debarking. Pye chose the bold option;
he lifted the 200-mile restriction and authorized Tangier to
begin its high-speed run-in to the island.
On the morning of 22 December, Task Force 14 was 515
miles from Wake Island. Adm. Fletcher, believing his com-
mand was likely to find itself in combat the next day, de-
cided it was a good time to refuel the destroyers. Refueling
12/16/08 10:56:56 AM
 at sea, at best a time consuming
and even perilous task, was made
more difficult by the rough seas
that then prevailed across the
area. At one point, in order to try
to find the best mixture of current
and wind, Fletcher turned north-
east, away from Wake Island. Af-
ter 10-hours of intense effort, he
called off the operation, deciding
to try finishing refueling the next
day.
One possibility he considered
was to simply cut loose the Nech-
es and make a high-speed run
toward Wake with the other ves-
sels. That would’ve been a bold,
or perhaps even rash, course of
action. He considered the facts
as he knew them: he was likely
to be in combat the next day; his
destroyers—still only partially
refueled—would burn fuel at a
much faster rate while in com-
bat; he was commanding what
amounted to a third of the Pacific
Fleet’s offensive combat power,
while the location and number of
Japanese carriers in the area re-
mained unknown. He decided to
be prudent rather than bold, keep-
ing all his ships together.
will continue to be, a liability.”
The Japanese invasion force arrived off Wake Island
around midnight on the night of 22/23 December. While That was another blow to Pye’s determination. Then, at 6:52
Fletcher was still unsuccessfully attempting to refuel his de- a.m., he received what turned out to be the final message from Cun-
stroyers, Adm. Kajioka’s SNLF landing force began climb- ningham: “Enemy on island. Several ships plus transports moving
ing into their barges. At 2:30 a.m. the final battle for Wake in. Two DD [destroyers] aground.”
Island began. Pye reassessed the situation, and it no longer looked promising.
On receiving word of the Japanese landing, Pye con- His three carriers were out of mutual support range; there were at
vened another meeting of his headquarters staff to discuss least two Japanese carriers together in the area, and he had no up to
the future of the relief mission now that enemy ground forc- date knowledge of the locations of the others. He also had to con-
es were ashore. The staff was at first divided between those sider he was only temporarily in command; in a few days he would
who wanted to immediately withdraw Task Force 14 and oth- hand over the fleet to Adm. Nimitz. Based on those factors, Pye
ers who urged Fletcher should be ordered to increase speed, made the decision to recall Task Force 14.
rush forward, and attack the Japanese. Pye agreed with the He informed Washington that Wake Island had fallen with the
aggressive staffers and issued orders for Fletcher to move following dispatch: “The use of offensive action to relieve Wake
in. He said he believed that “offensive spirit” shown by the had been my intention and desire. But when the enemy had once
USN at that time would be worth any losses suffered. landed on the island, the general strategic situation took precedence,
On the morning of 23 December, Wake time, Task and the conservation of our naval forces became the first consider-
Force 14 was 425 miles from the island. It would have tak- ation. I ordered the retirement with extreme regret.”
en Fletcher about 12 hours to get within good operational The message was immediately taken to President Roosevelt,
range. There was a chance that would have been fast enough who in turn gave an address to the public in which he honored those
to catch the invasion force and inflict damage—possibly who’d made a heroic stand on Wake Island. Behind the scenes,
heavy damage—on the enemy. About 6:00 a.m., however, though, he rebuked the naval command for their mishandling of the
Cunningham radioed to CINCPAC: “Enemy on the Island. whole affair.
Issue in doubt.” Less than six months after the fall of Wake Island the US Navy
That last phrase seems to have been what drained the and the American nation gained a stunning victory in the Battle of
offensive spirit out of Pye. He countermanded his earlier Midway. Ironically—or not, depending on your interpretation of na-
order to Fletcher, this time telling him to merely attempt val strategy—Nimitz would use Midway island as bait to lure into
evacuating US forces from the island. No sooner had that ambush the Japanese fleet, much as Kimmel and Pye had hoped to
toned down order gone out than more word had come in, this do at Wake.
time from naval headquarters in Washington, stating those
highest-level commanders now believed: “Wake is now, and

World at War 43

WaW4 Issue.indd 43 12/16/08 10:56:57 AM

 The response from the command at Pearl Harbor
to Cunningham’s report of the day’s activities was
a simple: “Splendid work.” On the other hand, the
American press had a field day with the news. As part
of the coded “padding” added to a message he sent
to Pearl Harbor, Cunningham had inserted the phrase:
“Send more Japs.” Actually, the last thing any of the
defenders on Wake Island wanted was more Japanese
but, reported out of context, it made great copy for the
folks back home. Editorials and op-ed cartoons ran in
newspapers across the country singing the praises of
the defenders. It was a much needed boost to the oth-
erwise depressed home front morale.
For their part, the Japanese didn’t publicly acknowl-
edge their repulse for three days. Even then, their of-
ficial press agency only stated the Imperial Japanese
Navy had shelled the island, ending with: “Our side
suffered damage too.”
December 12 began with an air raid conducted by
two Japanese flying boats at 5:00 a.m. One of the three
operational Grummans intercepted and shot down one
of them. Afterward the defenders set about their activi-
ties sure an afternoon raid would be coming. The Japa-
nese, though, didn’t return that day. The next day went
even better, with no air raids at all. The men on Wake
Island took advantage of the lull to clean up and get a
good meal. Unfortunately, one of the F4Fs crashed on
take off, bringing the number of operational aircraft
down to two.
December 14-22
Devereux called the days from 14 to 20 December,
“When time stood still.” Those days went by in a blur
of Japanese air raids and further defense preparations.
The Japanese paid particular attention to the 5-inch
batteries. They had learned their lesson. At the same
time, Devereux occasionally displaced the 3-inch bat-
teries to keep the Japanese from fixing their positions.
Lt. Kinney and his mechanics also managed to keep
VMF 211 in the fight, with a strength that varied from
one to three aircraft. With no spare parts on hand, how-
ever, the entire defense was slowly being worn down
by simple attrition.
The 20th brought both heavy rains and a ray of hope.
A Catalina patrol plane arrived from Pearl Harbor with
new orders for Cunningham. He was to ready all re-
maining civilian personnel for evacuation. Further, re-
inforcements were en route, including elements of the
4th Defense Battalion and VMF 221. Most important,
a radar set was part of the load plan. The relief force
would arrive off Wake Island on 24 December (Wake
time).
After having received written reports from Cun-
ningham and Devereux, the Catalina departed at 7:00
a.m. the next day. Two hours later the island was at-
tacked by 29 single-engine dive bombers escorted by
Zero fighters. All the good news of the previous day
44 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 44
was negated by the appearance of those fighter air-
craft.
Single-engine fighters meant at least one Japa-
nese carrier was in the area. In fact, there were two
such vessels nearby, the Hiryu and the Soryu, form-
ing Carrier Division 2. They had been detached from
the returning Pearl Harbor attack force. The defenders’
situation thereby went from hopeful to desperate in a
matter of hours. The situation, in fact, was worse than
any on Wake could imagine.
In addition to detaching Carrier Division 2 to sup-
port the next invasion, the IJN command had also
beefed up the assault force. Cruiser Division 6 (four
ships) was also added, as was Cruiser Division 8 (two
ships), along with six more destroyers. Another 1,500
SNLF soldiers had been embarked, 1,000 for the new
assault and 500 for a reserve. The new orders that came
with the reinforcements gave further indication of the
Japanese high command’s determination to secure
Wake Island: if things began to go bad, the warships
were to beached and their crews join in the ground as-
sault.
The Japanese followed up their raid of 21 Decem-
ber with a 33-plane attack the next day. Wake Island’s
two remaining operational F4Fs again intercepted the
incoming bombers. On their first pass the Marines
downed two bombers before the Zero escorts were on
them. One of the Grummans was soon badly shot up,
and its wounded pilot crash landed. The other was last
seen chasing one Japanese plane while another closed
on his tail. There were no more fighters to defend
Wake Island. Putnam and his mechanics reported for
duty as riflemen.
December 23
The newly reinforced Japanese task force arrived
off Wake Island a few minutes after midnight on the
evening of 22/23 December. At about 1:00 a.m. a
report of a Japanese landing at Toki Point arrived at
Devereux’s command post, but it turned out to be a
false alarm. It wasn’t until 2:00 a.m. the SNLF actu-
ally began boarding their landing craft. Two destroy-
ers being used as transports headed for Wake, while
another force, in barges, made for Wilkes.
At 2:35 a.m. Marines on Wilkes reported hearing
motor noises along the beach. Devereux gave them
permission to illuminate the shoreline. In the glare of
their large spotlights, the Marines could see Japanese
dismounting from two barges. They could also see,
farther away, two destroyer-transports had deliberately
run aground on Wake.
Battery A (5-inch), on Peacock Point, couldn’t bring
its guns to bear on the destroyer-transports; so 2nd Lt.
Robert J. Hanna gathered a crew and moved with them
to man a nearby 3-inch gun that had been positioned
for beach defense. From 500 yards they engaged the
nearest transport over open sights. Their first shot
12/16/08 10:56:57 AM
 struck the bridge, and 14 more rounds quickly pierced
other parts of the ship, which was soon burning bright-
ly. Hanna then shifted fire to the second vessel. Some
100 soldiers had already slipped ashore from that ship,
however, and were already working their way toward
the airfield.
Devereux reacted by committing his reserve—eight
Marines and four .30 caliber machineguns—to the
west end of the landing strip. The runway gave them
an excellent field of fire on the advancing Japanese.
Devereux also ordered another reserve to be immedi-
ately formed from those manning the 3-inch battery on
Peale.
Lt. Arthur A. Poindexter, commander of the initial
reserve, noticed machinegun fire along the beach on
the south side of Wake and went to investigate. There
he found gunners engaging two barges attempting to
come ashore just south of Camp 1. His fire kept the A Marine artist’s concept of the fighting at Wake Island.
barges from landing. Not satisfied with that result,
though, Poindexter gathered a few men and some hand its southern corner. Moving inland, they came under
grenades and headed onto the beach. fire from Battery F. They continued to press their at-
tack, and eventually forced those Marines to abandon
As the machinegunners held their fire, Poindexter
their position. The retreating gunners were then able,
and his ad hoc grenadiers waded into the surf, lobbing
however, to take up new positions just east of their
explosives at the barges as they moved along. One
abandoned guns. From their they blocked all further
landed directly inside a barge, causing numerous ca-
Japanese efforts in their direction.
sualties among those Japanese. Despite Poindexter’s
counterattack, however, the other barge managed to Checked to the east, the Japanese on Wilkes tried
get ashore and debark some 75 to 100 soldiers, who to go west. They then came under fire from two cam-
quickly fanned out into the scrub brush around Camp ouflaged .50 caliber machineguns (numbers nine and
1. 10). Again their advance was halted.
It was around that time Devereux began losing A report came in from the crew of gun nine, telling
contact with his units. First to go quiet was Wilkes, Platt of the extent of the Japanese advance. At 4:00
but then the other islets also stopped reporting. The a.m., on finally losing all contact with gun nine, Platt
Japanese were finding and cutting the wires. From that determined to regain that contact. He moved along
time it was up to the initiative and determination of the beach until he came to gun 10. Without hesita-
the small detachments scattered around the islets, and tion, he gathered the eight men to him that he found
the individual Marines within them, to defend Wake in and near gun 10’s position and, taking along the
Island. heavy machineguns, they all set off to attack an enemy
force that outnumbered them by about 10 to one. They
On Wake, Poindexter continued to hold a position
moved quietly through the brush until they got within
near Camp 1, while Lt. Hanna, reinforced by some
50 yards of the Japanese perimeter. Platt then moved
aviators from VMF 211, kept up fire from a 3-inch gun.
apart the two machineguns, thereby defining the flanks
They were all increasingly limited to merely defend-
of his attack, and gave orders for the other men to pre-
ing their own immediate positions, and couldn’t see
pare to move in. On Platt’s order the two machineguns
the larger picture. Meanwhile, a nine-man detachment
opened fire while he led the other four men in an as-
sent by Devereux to reinforce Hanna became pinned
sault into the Japanese perimeter.
down and then retreated back to the command post.
On the west end of the air strip, Lt. David D. Kliewer Not expecting an attack from the west, the Japa-
manned a position from which it was his assignment nese had set up their machineguns oriented to the east.
to set off the charges that would crater the airfield. Bat- Platt’s assault panicked the enemy, and his ad hoc
tery A (5-inch) was cut off at Peacock Point, and the fire team soon retook the 3-inch battery position. At
commander there detached part of his range-finding that moment luck further intervened on the side of the
team to deploy nearby to protect that position as rifle- Americans.
men. On the opposite edge of the Japanese perimeter,
The situation was also confused on Wilkes, but totally uninformed of Platt’s movements, McCalister
there Capt. Wesley M. Platt, overall commander of and McKinstry launched an attack of their own at al-
that islet, was beginning to regain control of the situ- most the same time. The two groups linked up with
ation. About 100 Japanese had landed on Wilkes, near continues on page 47

World at War 45

WaW4 Issue.indd 45 12/16/08 10:56:58 AM


In the skies: F4Fs in formation
Grumman F4F Wildcat Statistics
Engine: Pratt-Whitney R-1830-86—1,200 dom was—due to a range of other factors—carrier based aircraft
horsepower
Wingspan: 38’
Length: 28’9”
Weight: 7,002 lbs.
Maximum Speed: 318 miles per hour
Ceiling: 37,500 feet
Range: 845 miles
Crew: 1
Armament: 4x.50 caliber machineguns
Mitsubishi A6M Zero
Engine: Nakajima Sakae—925 horsepower
Wingspan: 39’4”
Length: 29’9”
Weight: 5,313 lbs.
Maximum Speed: 316 miles per hour
Ceiling: 33,790 feet
Range: 1,165 miles
Crew: 1
Armament: 2x7.69 mm machineguns
On the deck: Zero fighter on aircraft carrier
46 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 46
Fighter Aircraft at Wake Island
US Grumman F4F “Wildcat” and Japanese A6M “Zero”
fighters fought each other for the first time over Wake Island.
The results were inconclusive. By the time Carrier Division 2
arrived, the battered US defenders had been in continuous daily
combat for almost two weeks and VMF 211 had just two opera-
tional Wildcats. The pilots had acquitted themselves well against
the Japanese bombers, but they were no longer any real match
for the newly arriving carrier planes and their pilots. By the
afternoon of 22 December, the Marine squadron was no longer
combat effective.
The F4F Wildcat had been introduced in 1940 and quickly
gained a reputation among American pilots as a rugged and
dependable aircraft. Among its many virtues were self-sealing
fuel tanks, armor plating around the pilot, and an exceptionally
stable gun platform. The F4F-3 was armed with four .50 caliber
machineguns, which were upgraded to six on the F4F-4 model.
The 1,200 horsepower radial engine gave it a top speed of
318 miles per hour. That figure was already recognized at the
time as being less than optimum; however, the conventional wis-
would always prove generally inferior to planes operating from
land. The A6M Zero defied that conventional wisdom.
The Zero had made its combat debut in China at the end
of the 1930s, and its remarkable performance was reported to
Washington at that time. Sadly, those reports were ignored.
Light and maneuverable, the Zero dominated the skies over the
Pacific in the months following Pearl Harbor. Those same early
virtues, however, later proved to be weaknesses. That is, in order
to gain the edge in performance, sacrifices had been made: they
had no self-sealing fuel tanks or armor plating. Usually only a
few rounds from the machineguns of Allied planes were enough
to bring down a Zero (provided only that the Allied pilot could
first get into firing position).
The Wildcat performed yeoman service during the early
days of the war, and wasn’t pulled from frontline carrier duty
until 1943. Its successor, the F6F Hellcat, would rack up more
victories than any other US plane in the Pacific. Japan, short on
resources and manufacturing capability, was forced to continue
to use the Zero, in numerous but increasingly less successful
variants, until the end of the war.
12/16/08 10:56:59 AM
 World at War 47

WaW4 Issue.indd 47 12/16/08 10:57:00 AM

 each other, then continued to fire into the Japanese
who were still all around them. In the end, the total of
Japanese losses was between 75 and 100, in exchange
for five Marines.
Platt immediately ordered struck the two Japanese
flags they’d found hoisted inside the perimeter. He
then reorganized the surviving Marines in preparation
for an expected Japanese counterattack. For the mo-
ment, Wilkes was secure.
As Platt was scoring his success on Wilkes, the sit-
uation grew only grimmer for the Americans on Wake.
Devereux remained out of contact with his units and,
with dawn breaking, he could see the many Japanese
flags that had been raised across the island to mark the
extent of the SNLF advance. He could also see nu-
merous Japanese warships were ringing the island. He
reacted by ordering his executive officer, Maj. George
H. Potter, to take the reserve squad and form a defense
line south of his command post. He also sent word to
Capt. Bryghte D. Goldbold, commander of Battery D
on Peale, to bring his men to the command post. With
that he had committed the last of the men available to
him.
With dawn the Japanese were also able to take ad-
vantage of the increasing visibility to more thoroughly
infiltrate through the underbrush around the Marine
positions. They set up an impromptu reassembly area
east of the airstrip in preparation for launching another
push to clear that islet. Also with daylight came re-
newed aerial and naval gunfire support. With that, the
Japanese resumed their advance.
Their warships continually bombarded identified
Marine positions while still maneuvering so as to
maintain a respectable distance from the coastal gun
batteries. As part of that effort, three destroyers passed
near Battery B, at Toki Point, while on their way to
Wilkes. 1st Lt. Woodrow W. Kessler opened fire on the
lead ship and scored hits with four volleys. In a replay
of 11 December, the destroyers made smoke and hast-
ily withdrew out to sea. For its efforts, though, Battery
B then received the attention of several Japanese dive
bombers.
The airmen of Carrier Division 8 had been await-
ing daylight in order to make their contribution to the
overall attack. With sun up, they began attacking every
area that even looked like it might be a Marine posi-
tion. Battery F, holding the last fully operational anti-
aircraft guns, opened fire, but with little effect.
At that time Devereux assessed the situation as fol-
lows: the entire islet of Wilkes had apparently fallen to
the Japanese; he had no communication with his units;
he had no further reserves; the enemy was beginning
to advance directly on his command post; and Japa-
nese aircraft were striking at will all across the island.
He was able to get through to Cunningham, and passed
him that report. In turn, Cunningham asked Devereux
if he thought he would be justified in surrendering for
48 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 48
“humanitarian reasons.”
Devereux evaded answering, deferring that deci-
sion to the commander. When Cunningham then told
him no outside help could be expected to arrive any
time soon, though, Devereux’s spirit broke. At 7:00
a.m. Cunningham told Devereux to surrender the is-
land.
Devereux immediately passed the word to those
few men with whom he still had communication. He
ordered them to destroy their equipment as best they
could. Some were thorough in completing that task.
One battery commander fired 20 rounds of .45 caliber
into his fire control equipment. The gunners of Battery
E stuffed blankets into the gun tubes of their pieces
and then fired rounds through them. Just to make sure,
they then rolled grenades down the barrels.
Devereux rigged a white flag and set out on the next
portion of his distasteful task, moving north along the
road toward Camp 2 and the hospital. A lone Japanese
soldier soon sprang out in front of them and stopped
their movement. After searching the Americans for
hidden weapons, he allowed them to continue on their
way. At the hospital, Devereux found the wounded,
bound hand and foot, had already been brought out-
side by the Japanese. Cunningham soon arrived from
his own command post wearing his Navy dress blues.
Devereux left Cunningham to work out the formal-
ities of the surrender while he turned back toward the
airfield. He found Hanna and his men from VMF 211
still defending their 3-inch guns, and he ordered them
to surrender. They had held that position for six hours,
and all but one of them had been killed or wounded.
Next, Devereux came upon Lt. Kliewer and his
three men. They were frantically trying to get a gen-
erator working so they could set off the explosives to
crater the airfield. As Devereux approached, he told
them to stop what they were doing. One of the Marines
with him advised Kliewer: “Don’t surrender, Lieuten-
ant! Marines never surrender! It’s a hoax!”
Kliewer, though, followed protocol and obeyed
Devereux. At 11:15 a.m. the slowly growing surrender
party met Poindexter and his men on the road west of
the airstrip. Earlier, at around 9:00 a.m., Poindexter
had realized the situation in Camp 1 was under con-
trol, and he then sought to expand the Marine coun-
terattack. He reorganized the men with him into three
10-man squads. During a series of short but sharp fire-
fights, he reached the road junction west of the airstrip.
It was there he met Devereux.
By that time it was becoming obvious to Devereux
the overall situation across the island wasn’t as bad as
he and Cunningham had concluded in their earlier talk.
That realization, which was disheartening enough,
was only amplified when the surrender party reached
Wilkes.
There, by about 8:00 a.m., the Marines had com-
12/16/08 10:57:00 AM
 pleted their counterattack and Platt ordered the men of
Battery L to return to their guns on Kuku Point. When
those pieces were found to have somehow been ren-
dered inoperative, Plant again reformed his men into
an infantry unit. Getting word of more Japanese land-
ing boats nearing Wilkes at the channel between that
islet and Wake, he moved off with his force to repel
the new attack. En route, Platt’s force was spotted and
attacked by dive bombers, and one of the Marines was
killed. He was the last casualty in the fighting for Wake
Island.
The approaching Japanese landing craft were actu-
ally carrying Devereux and the others of the surrender
party. Devereux was first to spot what he described as
“a few grubby, dirty men who came out of the brush
with their rifles ready.”
After Devereux identified himself and his mission,
Platt and his men also surrendered. By 2:00 p.m., then,
all resistance on Wake Island had ceased. In roughly
11 hours the Japanese had avenged their defeat and
loss of face of 11 December.
The captured defenders remained on the island un-
til 12 January 1942, when they were shipped to vari-
ous prisoner of war camps. One hundred of the civil-
ians were kept on the island to complete the work on
the naval air station. They were summarily executed
in 1943, on the orders of the Japanese garrison com-
mander, who panicked when he received a false report
a US invasion force was approaching. (That was an
offensive for which he was hanged as a war criminal
shortly after V-J Day.)
Exact Japanese losses for the entire 15-day cam-
paign are not known. They are conservatively esti-
mated, though, to have been as follows: approximately
1,000 killed; four vessels sunk and eight others dam-
aged; 21 aircraft shot down. For the defenders, losses
were: 58 Marines and an undetermined number of ci-
vilians killed, a dozen aircraft shot down or otherwise
destroyed; six 5-inch coastal guns and a dozen 3-inch
anti-aircraft guns destroyed.
at
Sources
Cressman, Robert J. The Battle for Wake Island: A Magnificent Fight. An-
napolis: Naval Institute Pres, 1995.
Cunningham, W. Scott, with Lydel Sims. Wake Island Command. Boston:
Little Brown, 1961.
Devereux, James P.S. The Story of Wake Island. New York: J.B. Lippincott,
1947.
Dull, Paul A. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945).
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978.
Heinl, Robert D., Jr. The Defense of Wake. Washington, DC: US Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1946.
Layton, Edwin T., Rear Adm., USN (ret.), Capt. Roger Pineau, USNR
(ret.), and John Costello.
And I Was There: Pearl Harbor to Midway – Breaking the
Secrets. New York: William Morrow, 1985.
Lundstrom, John B. The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl
Harbor to Midway. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984.
Moskin, Robert L. The United States Marine Corps Story. New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill Book Co., 1982.
WaW4 Issue.indd 49
Communiqués From Wake Island
The Battle of Wake Island conjures images of grim-faced Ma-
rines defiant in the face of overwhelming odds. Two of the com-
muniqués sent from Wake Island during the fighting reinforced
that image, at least in the popular media of those times. The truth
was more mundane.
Along with the Marine and naval personnel on Wake Island,
there was a seven-man detachment of US Army Signal Corps sol-
diers who were responsible for communications going out of and
coming onto the base. After the first Japanese raid on 8 December,
they were ordered to move their truck-mounted equipment into a
concrete bunker. To their credit, due to their efforts Cunningham
was able to maintain radio contact with Pearl Harbor throughout
the battle.
As the fighting progressed, Cunningham ordered the radio
operators to add “padding” to the messages they sent in order to
confuse the Japanese in case they intercepted them. Such padding
would usually be nothing more than a few nonsensical phrases
randomly added throughout the regular text of a message. In that
regard Cunningham has always maintained his famous “Send
more Japs” phrase was never anything other than padding. That
claim is supported by Corp. Franklin D. Gross, a .50 caliber ma-
chinegun section leader. He said the Army radio operator who ac-
tually sent the message had related to him the phrase was merely
padding he’d added to the text.
All testimony has confirmed that, at the time, the defenders
weren’t pleased by the publicity the message immediately gener-
ated. The last thing any of them wanted to see was more Japanese.
The legend of the defiant message has, however, become so much
a part of Wake Island lore it will likely never die.
One of the last messages Cunningham did send, and fully
compose himself, has also become part of the lore of defiance
that surrounds the battle. At about 6:00 a.m. on the final day he
radioed CINCPAC: “Enemy on island. Issue in doubt.”
Again, it was phrasing custom-made for the popular press.
Cunningham, though, later stated he hadn’t intended it as bra-
vado. He said it was a line he’d recalled from a novel, Revolt of
the Angels, which had been one of his favorites during his youth.
Whatever the reason behind those two messages—padding or
deliberate turn of phrase—they undeniably served an unintended,
and greater, purpose. They boosted the low morale of the Ameri-
can people in the darkest days of the war, and since then have
become ensconced in the mythos of US military history.
Maj. Devereux.
World at War 49
12/16/08 10:57:01 AM
 Command your task force in the Pacific!
War in the Pacific
On Sunday, 7 December 1941, the US naval base at Pearl Harbor,
Hawaii, was attacked by Japanese aircraft. For the next four years, Allied
task forces engaged elements of the Imperial Japanese fleet throughout
the ocean. Marines and army units began their program of island-hopping,
wresting from the Japanese the empire that they had expanded in every
direction.
War in the Pacific is a multi-level simulation of the Pacific theater of
operations during World War II. The game enables players to recreate the
entire course of the war, form the opening Japanese attack on 7 December,
1941 to the climatic Allied assaults in the closing days of 1945. Represent-
ing some 30% of the globe, the strategic maps let players move and engage in combat on all
levels: air, ground and naval. War in the Pacific is the most detailed board game of the Pacific
Theater ever created. There are a number of rules and concepts that will, at first, be unfamiliar to a
majority of players. But playing through smaller map sections and scenarios enables the player to
become familiar with the mechanincs of the game.
Components: 7 full size strategic maps in full color, new tactical maps with nearly 340 individual islands for
new ground units to fight over, 32 die-cut counter sheets, nearly 9,000 counters showing all types of units from
the Pacific Theater, rule books and assorted displays and player aid charts. Ships as 12 units.
$420.00
Strategic Map

War in the Pacific Extension Kit

This Extension kit extends WITP into late 1945 and 1946 making it possible to explore the possibilities of the war continuing without
atomic intervention. The kit includes a new counter sheet for planes, ships, and other units scheduled to appear after August 1945. It also
includes an additional set of the aircraft counter sheets for a total of five counter sheets, plus two more tactical island maps. The rules
and charts booklet covers the additional rules needed to continue the war. $40
50 #4

WaW4 Issue.indd 50 12/16/08 10:57:07 AM

 USN Deluxe
Refight the greatest naval-air-land war of history. USN Deluxe is an update
of the classic SPI game on the War in the Pacific, 1941-45. While maintaining
the original game’s basic systems, the new design includes rules for a compre-
hensive simulation that includes the entire war, extending the game from Hawaii
to the Asian Mainland. Scenarios include the first year of the Japanese offen-
sive, as well as 1941-43, 1943-45 and 1941-45. There are also mini-games for
Midway, the Solomons, Burma, China, the Philippines, Manchuria and others.
Included is a War Plan Orange scenario for a “what-if” naval war with the US
and Japan squaring off in the 1930s.
Naval forces are at the squadron level, except aircraft carriers, which are
each represented by individual counters. Air units are in groupings based on
squadrons. Land units are regiments, brigades, divisions, corps and armies.
The game system uses an interactive sequence of play in which both sides
can launch strikes, exploit errors and win great victories. New rules include
kamikazes, armored divisions, task force markers, Soviet intervention,
MAGIC, special operations forces, the China front, strategic bombing, and
yes, the atom bomb.
Contents: 2 22x34 inch maps, 840 die-cut counters, rules book and assorted Player Aid cards. $70.00
Pacific Battles, volume 1: X II
15 11 SPA
The Rising Sun I
6 (3) 6
I B
37 (4) 12
Pacific Battles is a wargame series covering the great land
battles of the Pacific theater in WWII. Units are battalions, with
companies and regiments. Most games in the series have players 9I
X
9I
commanding anywhere from a division to a corps worth of forces,
and employment of combined arms tactics becomes critical. 6 (2) 6 212
The system shows the evolution of tactical doctrine in both the
Japanese and Allied armies with Banzai charges, superior U.S. fire III III
coordination, naval bombardment, airpower, amphibious landings, 4 4 21 21
and engineer operations. Games in this volume include: The Fall 2 (5) 6 2 (3) 6
of Singapore, Struggle for Bataan and Guadalcanal.
Components: 2 22 x 34 inch mapsheet, 460 die cut counters, rules
booklet, player aid cards, storage bags and 1 die. 22
III
18
USAAF
$48. 00
2 (6) 7 2
QTY Title Price Total
War in the Pacific $420 5th Air Grp XX
HQ 1
War in the Pacific, Extn. $40
1 5 (4) 12
Pacific Battles, Vol 1 $48
USN Deluxe $70
Shipping
PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390
Name 661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com
Address
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1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
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V/MC # Exp.
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World at War 51

WaW4 Issue.indd 51 12/16/08 10:57:10 AM

 Independent
Operational Group Polesie:
Final Battle of the Polish Campaign, 1939
By Maciej Jonasz

Annual wreath-laying ceremony at the grave of the unknown soldier in Warsaw.

Photo by author (May 1995).

As
the situation became critical for
the Poles in mid-September 1939,
the movement of their remaining
military units into the southeast cor-
ner of the nation was ordered by the high command.
There, it was hoped, a final defensive perimeter could
be set up near the border with neutral but still friendly
Hungary and Romania. From that position the Polish
Army, with supplies from the western Allies coming
in from the south, could fight on in order to tie up as
many German divisions as possible when the prom-
ised and long-anticipated Anglo-French offensive fi-
nally began.
That overall plan had been formulated because there
was still faith among those in the Polish government
and military that the Anglo-Allies would live up to the
treaty they’d signed and the pledges they’d made. That
faith was one of the reasons so many commanders or-
dered their troops to stand fast and keep fighting even
52 #4
as the situation around them became hopeless and
they knew they had no chance of beating the invad-
ers. Many of the rank and file also had the same faith,
and it served to keep their morale high. That faith was
also reinforced by the exaggerated French news re-
ports concerning that nation’s actions on the German
border in the west, which also combined with rumors
about the French marching to the Ruhr while Royal
Air Force (RAF) bombers turned Berlin into a desert.
Despite that faith in the Allies, though, the strate-
gic concept of the “Romanian bridgehead” lost any
validity it may have had once Soviet troops crossed
the border on 17 September. When that took place, the
Polish units in the southeast were ordered to evacu-
ate into Romania, so they could then be transported
to the western front in order to continue the fight from
there.
As everything began to fall apart, then, the com-
mander of Poland’s IX Corps mobilization district,

WaW4 Issue.indd 52 12/16/08 10:57:13 AM

 Gen. Franciszke Kleeberg, gathered under his direct
control as many units as he could, and began reorga-
nizing them into ad hoc formations that he then in-
tended to lead toward the neutrals in the south as a co-
herent combat force. Some of those hastily organized
formations were battalion, regiment and even brigade-
sized. They were put together from the sub-units of
different formations that had been destroyed earlier on
in the fighting, and were then given orders to march as
rapidly as possible to the southeast. Kleeberg worked
to gather those units into a larger formation that would
stand a better chance of holding off any German forces
that might try to impede progress toward Romania.
On 21 September, however, Kleeberg belatedly re-
alized further progress southeast was impossible due
to the many German formations that had already man-
aged to insert themselves between his command and
the Romanian border. Then, after several engagements
with newly arriving Soviet formations, he decided the
only thing to do was move northwest to try to aid be-
sieged Warsaw.
As the number of troops under his command con-
tinued to grow, he took organizational and administra-
tive steps to make control easier. He again regrouped
into a larger corps-sized formation, which he then
WaW4 Issue.indd 53
named Independent Operational Group Polesie, after
the region of the country in which they were then op-
erating. The larger infantry formations were organized
into the 50th and 60th Infantry Divisions, and their regi-
ments received the numerical designations, raised by
100, of the 20th and 30th Infantry Divisions, which had
formerly had their replacement centers in the IX Corps
district.
The various cavalry sub-units, some of them al-
ready organized into ad hoc regiments and brigades,
became the Zaza Cavalry Division. There was also the
Podlaska Cavalry Regiment, which had earlier fought
as part of Independent Operational Group Narew. It
had suffered severe losses during its time in the north
and, even though it had since absorbed several cavalry
sub-units, it was only a shadow of its former self.
The last unit of the group was the 13th Observa-
tional Flight, which consisted of three light recon-
naissance and utility aircraft. That unit had no spare
parts or technical support; its men performed miracles
to keep their planes operational and the group com-
mander informed of the situation across the area.
In all, then, the formations of the group, despite
their impressive designations, were all under-strength
and were particularly lacking in artillery and heavy
World at War 53
12/16/08 10:57:14 AM
 equipment. The few artillery pieces available were
running out of ammunition, and they were often mu-
seum-quality guns of World War I vintage, or even
older, which had been retrieved from mothballing.
Most were so old they hadn’t even been mobilized for
the war at the start of the month, and had initially been
left in their parent units’ replacement centers. Some
even lacked sights.
The total numeric strength of the entire group was
about equal to that of a full-strength Polish infantry
division on a war footing, but its firepower was more
like that of an infantry regiment. Despite that weak-
ness, however, morale within the group was high.
Only those soldiers with a real will to continue to fight,
despite the clearly looming national defeat, entered its
ranks. Further, they not only had combat experience
from their earlier encounters with the Germans, they
also had a desire to avenge their fallen comrades while
defending their own “fatherland” until the end.
When news came Warsaw had capitulated, yet an-
other new direction had to be chosen for the group’s
next move. Kleeberg decided to move into the Swi-
etokrzyskie Mountains, where the group could dis-
perse to fight a guerilla-style war. Along the way, he
also wanted to pass through a large military stockpile
near the town of Deblin, where a sizeable quantity of
equipment and ammunition was said to still remain
untouched.
Unknown to Kleeberg, the German XIV Motor-
ized Corps, led by Gen. Gustav von Wietersheim, was
moving on a direct collision course with the group.
That corps’s 13th Motorized Infantry Division was
driving east through Deblin, while its brother 29th Mo-
torized Infantry Division moved on a parallel course to
the north of it.
54 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 54
1 October: Contact
The first shots of the new battle were fired when a
reconnaissance patrol of three armored cars from the
13th Motorized Infantry Division ran into a picket line
of Uhlans (lancers) from the Plis Cavalry Brigade on
the road just east of the town of Kock. Those lancers
were armed with a 37 mm Bofors anti-tank gun; so
they engaged the oncoming enemy, waiting until the
Germans were within 200 yards before opening fire.
The first two vehicles were destroyed in rapid succes-
sion, but the third shot missed. That last armored car
went into reverse as it opened fire with its machinegun
to try to cover its escape. It was also destroyed, how-
ever, as the Poles got off two more shots. It all hap-
pened so quickly the German crews never managed to
send off a contact report.
Later that day, sub-units of the Zaza Cavalry Di-
vision moved west and successfully attacked Kock,
which they found occupied by the reconnaissance bat-
talion of the 13th. That German force retreated out of
the town and set up a defensive position on the road to
Deblin, which lay off to the west.
2 October: Opening Moves
After learning of the fight at Kock, the commander
of the 13th, Gen. Paul Otto, came to the conclusion he
was only facing a group of Polish “marauders” who
happened to be roaming across that part of the coun-
tryside. He therefore dispatched only his 93rd Motor-
ized Infantry Regiment to deal with the threat. At 11:00
a.m. elements of the 93rd, accompanied by Otto and
a correspondent from the Neue Magdeburger Zeitung
(New Magdeburg Newspaper), stormed back into
Kock. The place was then defended only by the Wilk
and Olek Infantry Battalions, which were later relieved
12/16/08 10:57:14 AM
 south of the village of Czarna. In an attempt to flush
them out, he launched an attack with elements of the
2nd Uhlan Regiment, only to see those horsemen beat-
en back with heavy losses.
By late in the afternoon the opposing commanders
had a better understanding of what they were facing,
and they accordingly both formulated new battle plans
for the next day. For the rest of the day there was little
fighting, and most of the shots still being fired were
from German artillery executing interdiction and ha-
rassment missions around the Poles’ positions.
3 October: Shoving Match
The results of the fighting of the previous day al-
lowed Kleeberg to identify his opponent as the 13th
Motorized Infantry Division from the XIV Motorized
Corps. He knew the XIV to be a two-division corps,
but there was no information as to the whereabouts
of that second unit. There was thus a possibility those
mobile Germans might pop up to hit the group from
any direction. Since, however, the Podlaska Cavalry
Regiment, which was screening the group to the north,
and 13th Flight, which was also performing reconnais-
sance missions in that direction, reported no signs of
the enemy, Kleeberg decided to maneuver north in

by the 179th Infantry Regiment. That German effort

was unsuccessful, with the attackers thrown back
to their starting position and Otto and the reporter
returning to the headquarters in Deblin.
At about that same time, the remainder of the
93rd attacked the town of Serokomla, north of Kock.
At first that move was successful, as the Germans
managed to surprise the defending Plis Cavalry
Brigade, and the attackers gained a foothold in the
outskirts of the town.
When the element of surprise was gone, though,
the Poles counterattacked, and the forward German
soldiers reacted the way they often would in difficult
situations through the rest of the battle. They were
mostly inexperienced, and they often didn’t see any
reason to lay down their lives in that late part of the
campaign, as it was obvious their side had already
won. They therefore surrendered, and did so with a
far greater ease than had been generally shown by
German troops in the earlier battles of September.
That German attitude, combined with those troops’
inexperience and relatively low morale, was why
the fighting that day turned out the way it did.
That afternoon the commander of the Plis Bri-
gade, Col. Plisowski, was informed of another
concentration of German troops in the small woods
World at War 55

WaW4 Issue.indd 55 12/16/08 10:57:16 AM

 order to be able to attack and, if possible, entirely de-
stroy the 13th Division before the other German unit
showed up.
His offensive plan involved two flanking attacks by
the 50th Infantry Division and the Edward Cavalry Bri-
gade. The 50th would strike west from the area around
Kock, while Edward pushed south from Czarna. Thus
the enemy units concentrated in front of Serokomla
would be cut off from the rest of the 13th Division and
could then be destroyed. The remaining units of the
group would continue defensive and screening ac-
tions. The Plis Brigade and the rest of the Zaza Divi-
sion were to defend Serokomla and its environs; the
60th Infantry Division was to shield the group from the
west, while the Podlaska Regiment continued screen-
ing in the north together with 13th Flight.
The German commander, though, was also plan-
ning offensive action against the Poles. His plans in-
volved an attack at Serokomla by the 93rd, while the
33rd Motorized Infantry Regiment pushed to the north-
east, across the Czarna River, to split in two all the
nearby Polish forces.
The fighting began shortly before 8:00 a.m. with
an attack by the Polish 50th Infantry Division along
two different routes. One attack, by the 179th Infantry
Regiment, went west along the road to Deblin, while
the second, by the 178th and 180th Infantry Regiments,
moved west across Czarna, about 2.5 miles north of
Kock. The main body of the 179th moved directly
along the road, but soon ran into stiff resistance from
dug-in German troops. Those Polish troops then broke
off their attack without having achieved any success.
The rest of the 179th, its 3rd Battalion, went around
the blocking German position on the south. It cut right
through the German screening force and then ran into
an enemy artillery battery that was firing into Kock.
That battery was swiftly eliminated, and the 3rd Bat-
talion continued to move toward the south. For the
remainder of the day it fought running battles against
increasingly strong German forces and, because of the
failure of the attack by the rest of the 179th, it ended up
being isolated and suffered heavy losses. The survi-
vors of 3rd Battalion finally managed to break through
the German lines surrounding them and got back to
their regiment. Because of the heavy losses suffered
by the 3rd, however, it was out of the rest of the fight.
The Edward Brigade came south without at first
encountering any enemy resistance, only to then run
into a battery of German heavy howitzers firing into
Serokomla, which it destroyed with a surprise attack.
Edward then pressed a little farther south, still without
facing any resistance. When news of the failure of the
50th Division’s attack came in, Edward’s movement
was halted and the brigade returned to its jump off po-
sition. Its commander didn’t believe his unit had the
strength to overcome any serious German resistance
on its own.
56 #4
WaW4 Issue.indd 56
Around noon, attacks were launched by two Ger-
man regiments. The first, by the 93rd toward Serokom-
la, failed despite having strong artillery support. The
second, by the 33rd, fell on the positions of the skel-
etal 135th Infantry Regiment on the Czarna River. The
fighting there was severe, and the attackers were only
beaten back after the defenders had suffered some 160
casualties out of a total of about 200 men. With that
the fighting ended for the rest of the day, as both sides
used the pause to reshuffle their units and bring up re-
inforcements.
The 50th Infantry Division broke contact with the
enemy and moved north to take up positions around
the small town of Adamow, making a forced march
during the night. The Zaza Division shifted west to fill
the gap between the 50th and 60th Infantry Divisions,
the latter of which had gone south to the village of Lip-
iny. Meanwhile the Podlaska Cavalry Regiment and
the aircraft of the 13th Flight continued to screen the
group on the north while still reporting “no contact”
with the enemy in that direction.
4 October: German Success
Gen. Paul Otto, commander of the 13th Motorized
Infantry Division, came under strong pressure from
corps headquarters to destroy the Polish formations
facing him. Accordingly, around noon he committed
to battle his 66th Motorized Infantry Regiment by mov-
ing it in the direction of Adamow and Golow. That unit
crossed the Czarna River despite fierce Polish resis-
tance and, by nightfall, was in the defensive line in
front of Adamow. There was also continued skirmish-
ing along the other sectors of the front while, in the
north, the Podlaska Cavalry Regiment made contact
with the lead elements of the 71st Motorized Infantry
Regiment from the 29th Motorized Infantry Division.
5-6 October: Culmination
After the movements and actions of the previous
day, Kleeberg decided his forces were in a position to
launch a decisive attack to end the battle before the
new enemy division moving in from the north (29th)
could attack with its full strength. Starting at 8:00
a.m. he had the 60th Infantry Division launch an at-
tack to the east and southeast. Despite heavy German
resistance and only minimal participation by Polish
artillery, the attack continued until nightfall, with all
of 60th Division’s sub-units eventually gaining their
objectives. During that fighting, another daring Polish
cavalry raid managed to break far enough into the Ger-
man rear area to surprise and eliminate another artil-
lery battery.
To the east the Germans continued their offensive
efforts against the 50th and Zaza Divisions. The ex-
hausted Polish 180th Infantry Regiment was pushed out
of Adamow. Heartened by that success, the Germans
pivoted north, but a strong Polish counterattack then
pushed them back into Adamow, but was then unable
12/16/08 10:57:17 AM
 fighting might result in the destruction of his entire
division. Even the arrival of the 29th Division and
its successful move from the north didn’t restore
optimism in him. He therefore decided to maneuver
so as to break contact with the Poles and withdraw.
He was actually in the process of issuing that order
when Kleeberg’s delegation arrived at his headquar-
ters.
Throughout the night the Poles busied them-
selves destroying their weapons and preparing to
go into captivity. There were many, though, who re-
fused to surrender and, under cover of darkness, fled
the group’s encampments, either to join the under-
ground resistance or go to join Polish units abroad. A
few were killed during the night by German artillery
fire from batteries that hadn’t yet been informed of
the cease-fire.
Conclusions
So ended the last battle of the 1939 campaign in
Poland. In it, the units that formed the ad hoc In-
dependent Operational Group Polesie achieved a
difficult goal: they managed to defeat a fresh, full-
strength German motorized infantry division despite
the fact they were almost out of ammunition and were

to push them any farther. In the north the men of

the Podlaska Regiment spent the morning prepar-
ing defensive positions, as they were well aware of
the approaching German division, and they knew
they had to hold if the rest of the group was to suc-
ceed in the south.
Overall – despite the tactical success scored by
the Polish 60th Infantry Division, the more or less
successful defense conducted by the 50th, and the
determined attitude of Podlaska Regiment—the
situation was deteriorating for Group Polesie. Am-
munition, especially for the artillery, was running
low. The enemy, meanwhile, was committing a
second full motorized infantry division to the bat-
tle.
Considering those factors, Kleeberg decided to
send out a party to request a cease-fire. Unknown
to him, though, the commander of the Germans’
13th Motorized Infantry Division was also having
doubts about continuing the fight. In the previ-
ous day’s fighting, his division had suffered heavy
losses that couldn’t be justified by the small tacti-
cal gains that had been made in return. At the same
time, the Polish defense continued to remain co-
herent, while their counterattacks were threatening
to collapse his left flank. He concluded continued
World at War 57

WaW4 Issue.indd 57 12/16/08 10:57:19 AM

 Gen. Franciszek Kleeberg
Kleeberg was born in 1888 in the Polish southeast, an area then under Austro-Hungarian occupation. He was
a son of a freedom fighter from the 1863 uprising against Russia and, like his parent, was also a Polish national-
ist. In 1908 he joined the Austro-Hungarian Army as an officer. That, despite the hatred of the Austro-Hungarian
occupation, was considered an acceptable thing to do by the Polish populace.
He fought in World War I under the Austro-Hungarian battle flag and, in 1915, he transferred to the newly
forming Polish legions, where he served in the artillery. Early in 1918 the Central Powers signed an accord with
the newly established Ukrainian client-state government that, among other things, handed over the southeast por-
tion of Poland to Kiev. Kleeberg was among those who protested the change. He renounced his Austro-Hungarian
citizenship and began calling himself a Pole. As a result, he was demoted from major to captain and was trans-
ferred to the Italian front.
When Poland was reborn as an independent nation late in 1918, Kleeberg immediately joined the newly form-
ing national army. After successfully serving in the Russo-Polish War,
he was rewarded for his excellent performance by being sent to study
at the French Ecole Superieure de Guerre in 1924. Sadly for Kleeberg,
upon his return to Poland in 1926, he managed to get on the bad side
of Marshall Jozef Pilsudski. That feud resulted in his assignment to the
purely administrative command of the IX Corps district rather than the
operational command he certainly deserved. Despite those career set-
backs, Kleeberg was still able to carve out for himself an honorable
place in Polish military history by fighting and, at least tactically, win-
ning the last battle fought in the country in 1939.
After surrendering Group Polesie, Kleeberg had an opportunity to
escape imprisonment during that first night, but he chose to remain with
his troops. That choice cost him his life, when a long-term intestinal ail-
ment, left untreated in German captivity, killed him on 5 April 1941. He
was buried in Dresden until 1969, when his body was moved to Poland
for reburial. Ironically, while being driven to the airport, Kleeberg’s
body was escorted by an East German motorized infantry unit. Today
he remains buried outside the town of Kock.

thoroughly outgunned by their opponents at every lev-

el. They managed to achieve their victory through the
use of aggressive tactics that kept the German division
off balance. Their cavalry raids destroyed significant
numbers of the Germans’ artillery, while every Ger-
man territorial gain was hotly disputed.
The aggressiveness underlying the operations of
Group Polesie was undoubtedly the key factor that
allowed for its success. Their enemy was fully mo-
torized and therefore far more mobile. Had the Poles
acted defensively, the Germans would have been able
to out-maneuver them and destroy them piecemeal.
At the same time, the commander of the German
13th Division was shown to have a lack of tactical
imagination. He should have used his units’ higher
mobility and firepower to fracture and divide the Pol-
ish defense. By the end of the battle he had only made
one such attempt, when he tried to split the Polish line
between Serokomla and Kock. When that failed, his
recourse was to go over to a frontal attack in the di-
rection of Adamow. At the same time, he conducted
only a weak static defense against the Polish flanking
move that almost brought his division to the brink of
destruction.
58 #4
Statue of Gen. Kleeberg at the Kock
military cemetery. Photo by author.
Another factor that weighed in the outcome of the
battle was the gap in experience and motivation be-
tween the Polish and German troops. The Poles were
highly motivated, and had previous combat experi-
ence against other German forces. On the other side,
the Germans were inexperienced in combat and lacked
the motivation inherent in the psychology of their Pol-
ish opponents’ desperate situation. The few German
tactical successes in the fighting can be explained by
their side’s firepower superiority, particularly in ma-
chineguns and artillery.
The Germans also had no concerns about running
out of ammunition, no matter how fierce the fighting
became. In fact, the Poles captured some ammunition
containers on which they found the stenciled inscrip-
tion: Nicht Sparen Munition. That slogan is probably
best translated into idiomatic English as: “Don’t be
stingy with the ammo.” That was a shocking concept
to the Poles, who had continually found themselves

WaW4 Issue.indd 58 12/16/08 10:57:22 AM

 running low on, or entirely out of, ammunition starting
only a few days after the war had begun.
What that final battle of 1939 came down to, then,
was the experience and motivation of the soldiers
combined with the aggressiveness and skill of their of-
ficers. The over-arching lesson of the death struggle
of Independent Operational Group Polesie should
therefore be remembered by those studying military
art and science today: though superior weapons and
firepower are important, the human factor is still criti-
cal in battle.
at
Bibliography
Panstwowe Przedsiebiorstwo Wydawnictw Kartograficznych – Wydzial
Produkcyjny Wroclaw. Nasza Ojczyzna: altas historyczny dla klasy IV.
Wroclaw: Wroclawskie Zaklady Graficzne Zaklad Nr. 1, 1983.
Wojsko Polskie w II Wojnie Swiatowej, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Bellona, 1994.
Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny im Wandy Wasilewskiej. Walka i Zwyciestwo:
Wklad Narodu Polskievo nad Hitlerowskimi Niemcami, 1939-1945.
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Obronly Narodwej, 1985.
Zbyszewski Andrzej. Pazdziernikowa Bitwa, 1939. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ob-
rony Narodowej, 1988.

World at War Strategy & Tactics

Issue # Game Topic & Lead Article Issue # Game Topic & Lead Article
5 The Finnish Front, 1941-42 255 First Battle over Britain, 1917-1918
6 The Greater East Asia War 256 Marlborough’s Battles: Ramillies & Malplaquet
7 Greek Tragedy 257 Chosin: X Corps Escapes the Trap
8 Arriba Espana! 258 The Santiago Campaign (Spanish-American War)
9 Dest. Army Group Center 259 Battle for China (WWII)

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World at War 59

WaW4 Issue.indd 59 12/16/08 10:57:23 AM

 Send your air group to the skies!

Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe is an update of the classic Avalon Hill game covering the US
strategic bombing campaign over Europe in World War II. As US com-
mander, your mission is to eliminate German industrial complexes. You
select the targets, direct the bombers, and plan a strategy intended to defeat
the Luftwaffe. As the German commander, the entire arsenal of Nazi aircraft
is at your disposal. Turns represent three months each, with German rein-
forcements keyed to that player’s production choices. Units are wings and
squadrons, and they’re rated by type, sub-type, firepower, maneuverability
and endurance. There are rules for radar, electronic warfare, variable pro-
duction strategies, aces, target complexes, critical industries and diversion
of forces to support the ground war. The orders of battle are much the same
as in the original game, though the German player now has to plan ahead if
he wants to get jets.
There are also other new targets on the map, such as the German electric
power grid. In the original game the US player had to bomb all the targets
on the map to win. Given the way the victory point system now works, the
Americans need bomb about four out of the five major target systems to
win, thereby duplicating the historic result.
Contents: 1 22x34" map, 280 die-cut counters, rules and PACs. $50.00

Battle Over Britain

Hitler’s war machine has rolled like a juggernaut across the Continent,
crushing all opposition. Only Britain still stands, isolated and defiant, readying
itself for a mortal struggle between the Luftwaffe and the Royal Air Force. For
the first time in history, air power will decide the fate of a nation.
In this Battle Over Britain air game, the outcome of the battle is in your
hands. You must plan the strategies and the decisive moves that will bring
victory. The Strategic Game recreates the entire battle in five-day turns and
confronts you with the same fateful choices faced by the actual commanders.
In the Combat Game you experience the fury and tension of aerial combat in six
raids that decide the outcome of the battle. In the Advanced Game, you must
combine sound strategy and winning tactics. This is the definitive treatment of
the battle, allowing you to relive the daily action of this decisive campaign.

Contents: Two 34 x 22 inch full color maps, one 22 x 17 inch British airfield display,
one 34 x 17 inch screen, three counter sheets, one 40 page rules folder, one 20-sided die
and one plastic counter tray.

60 #4

WaW4 Issue.indd 60 12/16/08 10:57:27 AM

 E
:
aydit
er
ion RAF
o-P
ew l
l N T The Battle of Britain, 1940
Al
&
w
ire
France has fallen. England stands alone against the might of a triumphant Germany,
ta defended only by the Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons of the Royal Air Force. Hitler
Soli orders his mighty Luftwaffe to destroy the RAF in preparation for Operation Sealion—the
invasion of England. German fighters and bombers fill the English skies and the RAF
responds.
Now you command the RAF or the Luftwaffe in history’s greatest air campaign—the
Battle of Britain. Improving on his award winning solitaire classic, designer John Butterfield
ramps up the historical accuracy, tension and play options with three complete games.
RAF: Lion puts you in control of British Fighter Command, responding to German raids.
The game’s unique card system generates targets and forces, which may remain hidden
until after you commit your squadrons. Your foe is no mindless system: the Luftwaffe
has priorities and a strategy. Scenarios range from one raid day, taking an hour to
complete, to the full campaign, playable in 12 hours.
RAF: Eagle puts you in control of the Luftwaffe forces raiding England. You schedule raids
and assign missions to your bombers and fighters, attempting to deliver the knockout
blow. Can you take out the British radar system and cripple their aircraft production?
The game controls the RAF response to your strategies. How does a foe so close to
defeat keep coming back?
RAF: 2-Player pits you against a live opponent, one controlling Fighter Command and the
other the raiding Luftwaffe forces. Historical features include: German high command
priorities, close escort, free hunt, the Channel Patrol, Jabos, day and night bombing,
radar, the Observer Corps, weather, ULTRA intercepts, squadron patrols, “big wings,”
altitude advantage, ace squadrons and flak.
Game Scale
Time: each game turn equals a “raid day” with six two-hour segments.
Units: British squadrons and German Gruppen.
Map: one inch equals 20 miles (32 kilometers). Contents:
• 176 Die cut counters
• 165 Cards
• 3 34” x 22” Map
• Rule booklets
• Player Aid cards & display
• 2 Dice
• Storage bags
QTY Title Price Total
Luftwaffe $50
Battle Over Britain $20
RAF: Lion vs Eagle $80
Available Spring 2009
Shipping
PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390
Name 661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com
Address
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Phone # 29 6 Asia, Australia
World at War 61

WaW4 Issue.indd 61 12/16/08 10:57:29 AM

 available now!
China: The Middle Kingdom
China: The Middle Kingdom covers the full scope of
Chinese history, from its beginnings as a collection of warring
feudal states, to the current cold war between China and Taiwan.
In this epic game based on the classic Avalon Hill Britannia
system, four players each control several factions simultaneously,
with each faction having their own objectives and situations, such
as conquering certain provinces. The winner is the player who
scores the most points by the end of the game. This breathtaking
game unfolds on an illustrated map of China with 432 counters,
covering 50 separate countries and peoples, including all of the
major dynasties of Chinese history, the arrival of the European
powers, both World Wars and the Japanese invasion, right up
to the end of the civil war between the Communists and the
Nationalists. The game occurs over 24 turns, starting from 403 BC, during the
“Warring States” period as China begins to rise from its feudal age. The game
has two shorter campaign scenarios covering the first half and second half of
the full campaign game.
Battles between armies can be dramatically affected by the presence
of mountains, emperors, heroes, new inventions, and even the Great Wall.
Rebellions, barbarian invasions, and uprisings may spring up from anywhere,
and signal the end of one dynasty and the birth of a new dynasty. Diplomacy
is as important as military strength. Each player continually must defend
against multiple enemies on multiple fronts. $60

Highway to the Reich

Highway to the Reich is a tactical simulation of the largest airborne operation in
history. Over 35,000 men belonging to 1st Allied Airborne Army dropped from
the skies of Holland. Their objective: capture and hold a highway. The result:
a salient into German territory that lacked only the last objective, and was thus
a tragic defeat.
The 2,000-plus counters detail Gen. Brereton’s airborne corps of three divi-
sions, the units of 30th Corps, and Model’s scattered and disheveled forces at
company level for infantry; battery level for artillery, anti-tank and anti-air, and
troop-level for tanks and armored cars.
The four maps cover from the front along the Meuse-Escaut Canal to
the area, nearly 200 hexes away, surrounding Arnhem Highway Bridge.
Each map is positioned to cover the operational area of one airborne
division in order to allow one-division scenarios.
All the activities of each formation are completed before those of
another are begun. Attacks start with a preliminary barrage, followed
by fire attack by maneuver companies, and then close action with tanks
and assault troops. All activities involve comparisons of involved units’
capabilities. Optional rules focus on hidden movement and multi-player
variations, as well as giving the Allied player the opportunity to execute
his own operational plan. The revisions have made this classic game
easier and faster to play than ever before. $160

Contents:
Four 22” x 34” maps Player Aid Cards
2,520 die-cut counters Campaign Analysis
Rule & scenario books Six-sided Dice
6 Organization Charts

62 #4

WaW4 Issue.indd 62 12/16/08 10:57:35 AM

 available now!
Flying Circus:
Aerial Combat in WWI
Flying Circus: Aerial Combat in WWI depicts the fun and flavor of World War I aerial dogfight-
ing. You fly the colorful and agile aircraft of WWI as you make history in the world’s first use of
aircraft in a military role.
This is the basic game. You have everything you need to play single aircraft duels to multi-air-
craft dogfights. Each aircraft has its own unique characteristics reflected in its ratings and special
abilities. The basic game rules cover all the maneuvers that made WWI aerial combat: barrel rolls,
stall turns, Immelmanns, vertical rolls and Chandelles. Outmaneuver your opponent to line up your
guns and watch his planes go down in flames!
Gamers who have played the Down in Flames game series will find many similarities in game
play, however, previous experience is not necessary. The basic game rules can be read in less than
20 minutes and you can play your first game immediately. Includes: 110 full color playing cards & rules sheet. $
23

This is the deluxe game. You will need the basic game
card deck to play this expanded version. Then you will
have everything you need to play single aircraft duels and
team play with multiple flights in swirling dogfights. This
deluxe game adds rules for altitude, pilot abilities—in-
Shipping Charges
cluding a deck of 25 pilot cards for historical campaigns— 1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
bombers, rear gunners, scouts and other optional rules. $10 $2 UPS Ground/USPS Priority Mail
This deluxe game also includes cards and rules for playing 20 2 Canada
multi-mission games of famous WWI campaigns such as
26 4 Europe, South America
Cambrai and Meuse-Argonne, along with a “Campaign
Analysis” article detailing the development of the aircraft, 28 6 Asia, Australia
their tactics and strategy. $40
QTY Title Price Total
Contents: China The Middle Kingdom $60
110 Deluxe deck cards (bombers, scouts, plus more fighters & action cards)
Deluxe Game rules booklet Highway to the Reich $160
6 Campaign Cards Flying Circus-Basic $23
Pilot Log
36 Pilot & altitude cards Flying Circus-Deluxe $40
Dice marker Shipping

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PO Box 21598 Signature
Bakersfield CA 93390
661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com Phone #
World at War 63

WaW4 Issue.indd 63 12/16/08 10:57:38 AM

 Strategy & Tactics magazine covers all of military history
and its future possibilities. The articles focus on the ‘how’ and
‘why’ of war, and are richly illustrated with maps, diagrams
and photos. Use the subscription card or order online.
Don’t miss a single issue!

Each issue is packed full of:

• In-depth analysis
• Detailed maps
• Orders of Battle

Diagram from article on Colombian

Troops in Korea, #255.

Map portion from upcoming article on Hannibal’s War, issue #254.

P.O. Box 21598
Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598
ph: (661) 587-9633 • Fax: (661) 587-5031
www.StrategyAndTacticsPress.com

64 #4

WaW4 Issue.indd 64 12/16/08 10:57:44 AM