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Query
What does the evidence tell us about what works in different contexts when working with
parliaments to tackle corruption?
Content Summary
1. The role of parliaments in curbing corruption As part of their legislative, oversight and
2. What works in engaging with parliaments in representation functions, parliaments have a key
different contexts role to play in the fight against corruption, as the
3. References institution holding government accountable to
citizens. As they represent the people, MPs also
need to be exemplary in performing their duties, to
Caveat embody the ethical values of their community, and
Evidence of what works when engaging with to adhere to the highest standards of integrity.
parliaments is very scarce, due to limited Many actors are involved in parliamentary
systematic assessments of the impact of strengthening programmes, which typically involve
parliamentary development initiatives. More support for institutional reform and development,
research is necessary to address this knowledge skill transfer and capacity building, human support
gap. As a result, this Helpdesk answer provides services and support to peer networks of
an overview of the role of parliament in curbing parliamentarians.
corruption and of donors’ approaches to support
While there is a growing interest in strengthening
this role, drawing lessons from existing literature.
parliaments across the world, there have been
very few systematic efforts to conduct impact
evaluations of parliamentary support, making it
difficult to draw lessons on what works when
engaging with parliament in which context and
why. One of the most important lessons that
emerges from the literature is that, due to their
inherently political nature, parliamentary
strengthening interventions need to be neutral,
country specific, based on a solid understanding
of the political economy and informed by local
needs assessments.
U4 is a resource centre for development practitioners who wish to effectively address corruption challenges in
their work. Expert Answers are produced by the U4 Helpdesk – operated by Transparency International – as
quick responses to operational and policy questions from U4 Partner Agency staff.
What works in engaging with parliaments against corruption
them under pressure to respond. At the same corruption institutions, such as ACAs. This
time, parliaments are well placed to ensure an depends, however, on the institutional context and
enabling environment for a free and vibrant media the types of audits they conduct (DFID, 2015). To
to make sure that the media can play this foster effectiveness of such collaborations, the
supportive role. This fruitful collaboration between institutional capacities of both PACs and SAIs
a representative parliament and an independent need to be strengthened for both institutions to
media was illustrated in Uganda in the 1990s perform their oversight functions. Such capacity
where the media and parliament mutually enhancement can be achieved by providing
reinforced each other. The media provided adequate staffing and resources, training and
extensive coverage of several corruption scandals access to information. Both institutions also need
that in turn allowed parliaments to tackle several to be independent from partisan and political
high-profile cases of fraud (The International Bank influence. Finally, the availability of information
for Reconstruction and Development/The World and potential for information exchanges are key
Bank, 2006). determinants of their effectiveness (McGee,
2002).
Cooperation with and coordination of
watchdog institutions
Representation
Parliaments can also cooperate with external
oversight tools such as supreme audit institutions Parliamentarians represent citizens, are
(SAIs), ombudsmen or anti-corruption agencies accountable to the electorate and need to ensure
(ACAs). Parliaments can promote the creation of that their influence over government processes
strong watchdog agencies with adequate reflect citizens’ concerns. These representation
resources and strengthening cooperation between concerns are especially important to create the
parliaments and these institutions to ensure that political will to fight corruption by channelling the
their reports receive adequate attention and their interests of the people and mobilising broad-
recommendations are followed-up by parliament based support for anti-corruption reform (The
and government (IUP, 2001; GOPAC, 2013). In International Bank for Reconstruction and
particular, ombudsmen and SAIs are key Development/The World Bank, 2006).
institutions to partner with for effective oversight of
the operations, practices and expenditures of Voice and accountability mechanisms that ensure
government agencies. SAIs can work closely with citizens’ participation in the political debate are
finance and account committees and provide likely to reinforce parliaments’ legitimacy in
them with audit reports they can use in their representing the people. There are many avenues
oversight role, provided PACs are granted that provide opportunities for building dialogue
adequate resources and powers to initiate and with civil society, such as constituency outreach,
follow-up inquiries into audits presented by the public hearings and consultations. Parliament, for
audit institutions. example, can organise parliamentary workshops
with civil society groups prior to the introduction of
In fact, a recent study analysing the interactions major pieces of legislation or develop various
between parliaments and audit agencies in the tools to strengthen accountability, such as report
budget process finds that the quality of these card methods and service delivery surveys to
interactions is a critical factor to ensure the generate citizen feedback on the level of
effective functioning of budget accountability satisfaction with public services (GOPAC, 2005).
mechanisms. Since those linkages are often In principle, and even though they are perceived
ineffective, the overall effectiveness of the budget by Transparency International’s Global Corruption
oversight system is undermined. The author Barometer data to be among the most corrupt
concludes that, in many cases, these types of institutions in many countries of the world, political
dysfunctions are systemic rather than agency parties have an important role to play in this
specific, and that the agility and coordination of process when they are not themselves involved in
the various components of the budget oversight corruption.
system may be more important than the
effectiveness of each individual oversight agency Integrity of parliamentarians
to ensure effective oversight of budget processes
(Santiso, 2015). As they represent citizens, members of parliament
need to reflect the ethical standards of their
Working with SAIs can be especially promising as community, be exemplary in performing their
they have been found to be more effective at mandate and adhere to the highest standards of
reducing corruption compared with other anti- integrity. This is a pre-requisite for
promoting/restoring trust in the institution which, activities (USAID, 2006). This points to the need
according to Transparency International’s Global to balance the protections of parliamentary
Corruption Barometer data, is often perceived as immunity with the need for greater transparency
one of the most corrupt institutions in many and controls on corruption.
countries of the world. Only in this way can the
credibility and legitimacy of democratic processes 2. What works in engaging with
be ensured. parliaments against corruption
This necessitates strengthening the integrity of
political parties, particularly during electoral The knowledge gap
competition for power by regulating political party Direct support to parliaments aims to strengthen
funding and campaign finance as, in many cases, parliaments for democratisation and good
parliamentarians are implicated in political governance and typically involves support for
corruption scandals involving vote buying, institutional reform and development, skill transfer
contributions from illegal sources, illegal use of and capacity building (training, expertise,
state resources, etc (The International Bank for networking), human support services (secretarial
Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, and libraries, for example) and physical
2006). Legislation or codes of conduct for political infrastructure (NORAD, 2010; GSDRC, 2013).
parties can be instrumental in setting disclosure Many actors are involved in parliamentary
rules, contributions, donations and expenditure strengthening programmes, ranging from bilateral
limits, etc. and multilateral donors, to parliamentary
networks, political party foundations and civil
This would also involve establishing effective society organisations (NORAD, 2010; Hudson and
ethical regimes for parliamentarians, through the Wren, 2007). While those programmes do not
development and implementation of integrity laws always have an explicit anti-corruption focus, they
and codes of ethics, regulations of conflicts of are expected to strengthen the capacity of
interest, asset declarations rules, etc. and parliaments to perform their legislative, oversight
mechanisms to ensure effective implementation of and representation functions and thereby increase
government accountability, with a concomitant
these ethical rules. While there is a broad
impact on reducing opportunities for corruption.
consensus on their importance, evidence of the
impact of such approaches on reducing Efforts to assess the impact of parliamentary
parliamentary and political corruption is scarce. strengthening have been limited, making the
While such codes of conduct are often poorly identification of lessons and articulation of
implemented, some studies have shown that they informed recommendations problematic. As a
are perceived by parliamentarians as helpful in result, evidence on what works in parliamentary
certain situations such as preventing technical strengthening is scarce (Hudson and Wren,
infringements, protecting them when dealing with 2007).
constituents and subjecting them to greater
scrutiny both inside and outside parliaments. A 2012 review of the state of knowledge on donor
Factors contributing to the effectiveness of the approaches to parliamentary development
assistance and their effectiveness also concludes
codes include the existence of broad support
that there is an important knowledge gap on what
among parliamentarians, MPs’ involvement in the
works in parliament development assistance, due
development of the code, the existence and to inconsistent and under-resourced efforts to
nature of sanctions established for violating the collect evidence. There is also a lack of
code, the prevailing political culture and training information on how the various actors involved
activities undertaken to raise awareness and build have adapted different approaches and
MPs’ ethical skills (Martini, 2013). programmes to specific contexts. The evaluation
literature in this area of intervention consists
The issue of parliamentary privileges and mostly of either ad hoc single programme
immunities and the extent to which they should be evaluations or broad thematic reviews, with no
protected from prosecution also needs to be comparative data on funding levels and activities,
addressed in a comprehensive parliamentary and little analysis of what has worked under
ethical regime. There is anecdotal evidence that different conditions and why. The report
immunity may be misused by parliamentarians, for recommends undertaking more systematic
example, by using a seat in parliament specifically targeted evaluation exercises and further research
to enjoy impunity for their illegal or corrupt to address these knowledge gaps (SIDA, 2011).
Capacity building programmes vary across donors donor funded programmes and projects” (GOPAC
and organisations, but there is debate over and The Parliamentary Network 2013).
whether to engage is such programmes at all, as
well as whether training should focus on
parliamentarians or professional staff. For Lessons learned
example, a paper on the Pacific region argues Although impact evaluation of parliament
that while there have been substantial training strengthening initiatives are limited, reviews of
investments, parliamentary performance in many donor-supported programmes conducted over the
countries has not improved accordingly years have identified a set of common
(Kinyondo, 2012). The study’s findings conclude recommendations and lessons learned. One of
that training providers should give priority to the most important lessons that cuts across all
parliamentary staff rather than members of recommendations is that parliament strengthening
parliaments, as a longer-term solution to interventions need to be country-specific and
strengthening parliaments in the region. This informed by local needs assessments (Kinyondo
would enhance their ability to provide technical
and Pelizzo, 2013).
support to MPs and help address the question of
institutional memory in a context of a high
• Parliamentary strengthening requires a
turnover of MPs, among other advantages. This
approach should be combined with improved comprehensive and long-term approach as it
recruitment processes for parliamentary staff, as involves influencing the democratic
literature shows that higher educational parliamentary political culture of a country.
backgrounds enhance the ability of staff to fulfil Effectiveness and impact can only be
their duties and to benefit from training. achieved through long-term interventions that
can run through two, preferably three
Peer networks of parliamentarians electoral cycles (NORAD, 2010; Hubli, 2007;
A third area of intervention consists of building Hudson and Wren, 2007; Hubli and Schmidt,
and supporting parliamentary networks at the 2005).
regional and global levels and promoting • Parliamentary strengthening should be
knowledge exchanges among peers. This is anchored in local demand and needs.
especially relevant for anti-corruption work, as Interventions should be based on a needs
corruption is a global challenge that often has a assessment produced with the participation
transnational dimension. Such networks allow of the targeted parliament to support broad-
joined advocacy, develop communities of based local ownership. Externally driven
practitioners, establish peer-support mechanisms approaches or those based on conditionality
and share experiences and best practices. are not sustainable (NORAD, 2010; Hubli,
Networks such as the Parliamentary Network on 2007; GSDRC, 2008; Hudson and Wren,
the World Bank or the Commonwealth 2007).
Parliamentary Association can contribute to the • Training and capacity building initiatives need
fight against corruption by mainstreaming anti- to be tailored and customised to country-
corruption in their agendas, while the Global specific needs. In particular, when delivering
Organisation of Parliamentarians against training, it is recommended to conduct a
Corruption is an example of a single-purpose comprehensive training needs assessment
network specifically dedicated to fight corruption prior to designing and delivering training
(The International Bank for Reconstruction and programmes to identify all salient features
Development/World Bank, 2006). that need to be addressed (language, focus,
cultural and constitutional frameworks, etc.)
GOPAC and the Parliamentary Network on the (Kinyondo and Pelizzo, 2013).
World Bank have issued guidelines to strengthen • Successful interventions need to involve a
oversight through parliamentarian-donor wide range of recipients and stakeholders,
collaboration. These guidelines were developed to including local organisations and interest
support donors’ engagement in recipient countries groups, opposition MPs and parties as well
and improve the transparency, accountability and as members of government (Hudson and
parliamentary oversight of donor funded projects Wren, 2007).
and loans by engaging with parliamentarians “so • Parliamentary strengthening is politically
that the design of projects are responsive to the sensitive (NORAD, 2010). Such interventions
country developmental needs and adequate are political in nature, and donors run the risk
parliamentary oversight can be exerted over of being suspected of pursuing their own
hidden agenda (Hubli, 2007). To overcome
this, support to parliament should appear to of the electoral cycle or in case of a political
be neutral. Channelling support through transition (Hubli, 2007).
multilateral agencies which are perceived to
be more impartial and neutral and less prone While these recommendations are valid and
to have ulterior motives can help overcome relatively consensual in the literature, the local
this challenge (NORAD, 2010; Hubli, 2007; political will is a major factor of success of
Hudson and Wren, 2007). An alternative can parliament strengthening initiatives (Kinyondo and
be to use peer-support approaches that Pelizzo, 2013). Parliament strengthening
involve networks of parliamentarians, as peer programmes are more likely to succeed in
advice is often more acceptable than donor countries where there is a demonstrated political
“guidance” (NORAD, 2010). SIDA also will to address parliamentary weaknesses and to
recommends involving parliamentarians in create an enabling environment for parliamentary
programming since parliamentarians are activity. This can be demonstrated by the level of
more likely to accept technical assistance investment in technical support, institutionalisation
from peers or longer-term consultants and of political parties and democratisation of political
advisors, particularly those who are able systems (Kinyondo and Pelizzo, 2013).
tolerate as peers to parliamentary partners
(Hubli and Schmidt, 2005).
• Parliamentary strengthening needs to be References
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