2012 BAR REVIEWER bars,
establishments in the Ermita-Malate Area
ATTY. LARRY D. GACAYAN
Professor of Law
PART II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1. Define police power.
It is the power vested in the
legislature by the Constitution to make, ordain,
establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws for the good and welfare of the
State and its people. (ERMITA MALATE HOTEL
VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967)
2. What are the basic
purposes/aspects of police power:
a. to promote the general welfare, comfort
and convenience of the people; (ASSOCIATION
OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY, 175
SCRA 343; US VS. TORIBIO, 15 Phil. 85
b. to promote and preserve public health;
(VILLANUEVA VS. CASTANEDA, September 21,
1987; DECS VS. SAN DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533
[NMAT]; LORENZO VS. DIRECTOR OF HEALTH,
50 Phil. 595—apprehend and confne lepers in a
leprosarium)
c. to promote and protect public safety;
(AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195; TAXICAB
OPERATORS VS. JUINIO, 119 SCRA 897 )
d. to maintain and safeguard peace and
order; (GUAZON VS. DE VILLA)
e. to protect public morals; (DE LA CRUZ
VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569; ERMITA MALATE
HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967; JMM
PROMOTIONS VS. CA, 260 SCRA 319; VELASCO
VS. VILLEGAS, February 13, 1983)
f. to promote the economic security of the
people. (ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ, 101 Phil.
11155)
2-a. May an Ordinance of the City of
Manila validly require people/couples
checking in the different motels in the
city to [1] register at the motel’ s desk
facing a public street; and [2] show their
identification card, etc.?
A. Yes. It is a valid exercise of police
power to promote public morals, i.e., curb
prostitution or illicit relationships. ERMITA
MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31,
1967)
2-b. May the City of Manila validly
prohibit the operation of night clubs,
sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke
beerhouses, and similar
and gives the existing establishments
three (3) months to transfer to any place
outside said area under pain of
imprisonment of up to 1 year and fine of
P5,000.00 or change the nature of their
business to gift shops, restaurants, etc. ?
A. The Ordinance is unconstitutional.
It violates the due process clause by depriving
the owners of said establishments of their
legitimate businesses. It likewise violates the
equal protection clause. There is no logic in
allowing said establishments in other parts of
the City of Manila but not in the Ermita-Malate
area. Finally, even assuming that the said
Ordinance is intended to promote public
morals, the means employed is constitutionally
infrm and not a valid exercise of police power.
(CITY OF MANILA, represented by Mayor
Alfredo Lim VS. JUDGE PERFECTO LAGUIO,
JR. and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 118127, April 12,
2008)
2-c. May the City of Manila validly prohibit
hotels and motels, etc., at the Ermita-
Malate area, to offer “ short time”
admission therein?
A. The Ordinance is unconstitutional
and is not a valid exercise of police power.
There is nothing immoral in staying in a motel
or hotel for a period of three (3) hours only
because a person’s stay therein could be for
purposes other than having sex or using illegal
drugs. Further, there is nothing that would
prevent people engaged in illicit relationships
to check in in said motels by paying 12 hours
or more though they will just stay there for 3
hours. (WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR
ALFREDO LIM, G.R. No. 122846, January
20, 2009.)
3. Distinguish police power with power of
eminent domain.
The distinctions are:
1. The power of eminent domain is the
inherent right of the State to condemn or to
take private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation while police
power is the power of the state to promote
public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property without
compensation;
2. In the exercise of police power,
enjoyment of a property is restricted because
the continued use thereof would be injurious to
public welfare. In such case, there is no
compensable taking provided none of the
property interests is appropriated for the use or
for the beneft of the public. Otherwise, there
should be compensable taking if it would result
to public use.
3. Properties condemned under police
power are usually noxious or intended for
noxious purpose; hence , no compensation shall
be paid. Likewise, in the exercise of police
power, property rights of private individuals are
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state. (DIDIPIO EARTH SAVERS
MULTI PURPOSE ASSOCIATION VS. DENR SEC.
ELISEA GOZU, ET AL., 485 SCRA 586)
4. What are the tests for a valid
exercise of police power
a. the interests of the public, not mere
particular class, require the exercise of police
power; (LAWFUL SUBJECT)
b. the means employed is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive to
individuals. (LAWFUL MEANS). In short, the
end does not justify the means.
5. Define due process.
Due process is a law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial
(Per Daniel Webster in the DARTMOUTH
COLLEGE CASE)
6. What are the Kinds of Due
Process?
a. substantive due process---requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with
the rights of the person to life, liberty or
property. In short, it is to determine whether it
has a valid governmental objective like for the
interest of the public as against mere particular
class.
b. Procedural due process---one which
hears before it condemns, or the procedure as
pointed out by Daniel Webster.
7. What are the requisites of
“ judicial due process” ?
As held in BANCO ESPANOL VS.
PALANCA, 37 Phil. 921. The requisites are:
1. There must be an impartial court or
tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
decide the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired
over the person of the defendant or over the
property subject of the proceedings;
3. The defendant must be given the
opportunity to be heard;
4. Judgment must be rendered only after
lawful hearing.
8. What are the requisites of
due process before administrative
bodies?
As held in TIBAY VS. CIR, 69 Phil. 635, the
requisites are:
a. the right to a hearing which includes the
right to present evidence;
b. the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented;
c. the decision must have something to
support itself;
d. the evidence must be substantial;
e. the decision must be based on the
evidence presented during the hearing;
f. the tribunal or body must act on its own
independent consideration of the law or facts;
g. the board or body shall in all
controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the
proceedings can know the various issues
involved.
9. If an accused was represented
by a non-lawyer during the trial of his
criminal case, what right of the said
accused was violated? Is he entitled to a
new trial?
If an accused was represented by a non-lawyer
during the entire trial (though she thought that
he was a lawyer), his right to due process was
violated and therefore, he entitled to a new
trial. (DELGADO VS. CA, November 10,
1986). However, even if he was not
represented by a non-lawyer at the start of the
criminal trial, particularly when the prosecution
presented its evidence, but was represented
by a lawyer when he presented his evidence,
there is no violation of his right to due process
or right to counsel. (CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE,
G.R. No. 179642, February 12, 2009)
10. What are the requisites of
procedural due process in disciplinary
actions against students?
As held in GUZMAN VS. NU, 142 SCRA 706,
the requisites are:
 1. the students must be informed in writing
of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;
2. they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel;
3. they shall be informed of the evidence
against them;
4. they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf;
5. the evidence must be duly considered
by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.
11. What are the requisites of due
process before an employee may be
dismissed from his work?
The requisites of Due Process before
the NLRC are:
1. Notice; and
2. Hearing
12. Is due process satisfied in
administrative proceedings if the
respondent is not assisted by counsel?
There is no law, whether the Civil
Service Act or the Administrative Code of 1987,
which provides that a respondent in an
administrative case should be assisted by
counsel in order that the proceedings therein is
considered valid. Not only, that, petitioner
herein was given the opportunity several times
to engage the services of a lawyer to assist him
but he confdently informed the investigators
that he could protect himself. (LUMIQUED VS.
EXENEA, 282 SCRA 125)
12-a. Is there a violation of a person’s
right to due process before an
administrative body like the Civil Service
Commission if a party was not allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses against him
despite his request?
No. The right to due process is not violated
even if a party to an administrative case was
not allowed to cross-examine the other party or
his witnesses. What he is entitled to is the right
to be heard. (ATTY. ROMEO ERECE VS. LYN
MACALINGAY, ET AL., G.R. No. 166809,
April 22, 2008)
12-b. How about in investigations
involving disciplinary actions against
students, are the latter entitled to cross-
examine the complainant and his
witnesses?
A. No. The right to due process on the part of a
student is not violated even if he was not
allowed to cross-examine the other party or his
witnesses. Due process is served if was given
the chance to present his evidence. (DE LA
SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. JUDGE WILFREDO
REYES, RTC 36, Manila, G.R. No, 127980,
December 19, 2007)
12-c. Is there a violation of the right to
due process if members of a faction of the
Liberal Party were expelled from said
party in a meeting where they were not
even notified nor given the chance to be
heard?
No. Due process could be invoked only before
tribunals created by the State through which
governmental acts or functions are performed.
The right to due process guards against
unwarranted encroachment by the State into
fundamental rights and cannot be invoked in
private controversies involving private rights.
(ATIENZA VS. COMELEC & MANUEL ROXAS
III, ET AL., February 16, 2010)
13. What are the requisites for a
valid classification?
As held in People vs. Cayat, 68
Phil. 12, the requisites are:
a. There must be real and substantial
distinctions;
b. It must be germane tot he purposes of
the law;
c. It must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and
d. It must apply equally to all members of
the same class.
14. Is there violation of the equal
protection clause if policemen who are
charged of a criminal offense punishable
for more than six (6) years will remain
suspended until after the his acquittal
unlike other public officers whose
maximum suspension even when facing
graft and corrupt charges is only three (3)
months?
No there is o violation. In HIMAGAN VS.
PEOPLE, the Supreme Court held that the fact
that policemen charged with a criminal offense
punishable by more than 6 years are to be
suspended during the entire duration of the
case unlike other government employees is
valid since it rests on valid classifcation
because policemen carry weapons and the
badge of the law which can be used to harass
or intimidate witnesses against them.
14-a. Is there a violation of the
right to equal protection of the laws of
appointed government officials who are
deemed automatically resigned upon the
filing of their certificate of candidacy
while elected officials are not?
No, there is real and substantial distinction.
Most elected officials have a fxed term under
the Constitution and said term could not be
shortened by means of a law. (QUINTO VS.
COMELEC, February 22, 2010)
14-b. Is there violation of the
equal protection clause if policemen and
soldiers are given allowances in the
General Appropriations Act while other
government workers are not since the
allowances of all government workers
were incorporated already in their
salaries under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989?
No. There is real and substantial distinction.
Policemen and soldiers are in charge of the
defense of the country and could be transferred
to virtually anywhere in the country. Since their
basic pay does not vary on location, the
continued grant of COLA to them is intended to
help them offset the effects of living in higher
cost areas. (GUTIERREZ VS. DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, March 18, 2010)
15. What are the requisites of a
valid search warrant or warrant of arrest?
No search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. (Section 2, Art. III)
In addition, Rule 126 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure requires that no warrant
shall be issued for more than one (1) specifc
offense and that in the implementation of a
search warrant when the respondent is not
present, witnesses are required. Finally, a
Circular issued by the Supreme Court requires
that no warrant or warrant of arrest shall be
implemented during the night, week-ends or
holidays, except in exceptional circumstances.
15-a. What are the two (2) kinds of
probable cause?
The two (2) kinds of probable cause
are:
The executive determination of probable cause
by the Prosecutor where he determines
whether to fle a criminal case in court or not;
and
Judicial determination of probable cause to be
done by the judge for the purpose of issuing a
warrant of arrest against the accused. (LEVISTE
VS. JUDGE ALAMEDA, August 3, 2010)
NOTE: Under the Human Security Act/Anti-
Terrorism Law, Republic Act No. 9372, Approved
on March 6, 2007 and effective on July 15, 2007
(This Law shall be automatically suspended one
(1) month before and two (2) months after the
holding of any election) a person may be taken
into custody by the police if there is a written
authorization by the Anti-Terrorism Council and
such detention may be extended upon written
approval of the Commission of Human Rights in
case of actual or imminent terrorist attack..
Sec. 18. Period of detention without judicial
warrant of arrest.- The provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, notwithstanding,
any police or law enforcement personnel, who,
having been duly authorized in writing by
the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody
of a person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism shall, WITHOUT INCURRING
ANY CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DELAY IN THE
DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE
PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES, DELIVER SAID
CHARGED OR SUSPECTED PERSON TO THE
PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY WITHIN A PERIOD
OF THREE (3) DAYS counted from the moment
said charged or suspected person has been
apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken
into custody by the said police, or law
enforcement personnel: Provided, That the
arrest of those suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism
must result from the surveillance under Section
7 and examination of bank deposits under
Section 27 pf this Act.
The police or law enforcement
personnel concerned shall, before detaining the
person suspected of the crime of terrorism,
present him or her before any judge at the
latter’s residence or office nearest the place
where the arrest took place at any time of the
day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge,
among other things, to ascertain the identity of
the police or law enforcement personnel and
the person or persons they have arrested and
presented before him or her, to inquire of them
the reasons why they have arrested the person
and determine by questioning and personal
observation whether or not the subject has
been subjected to any physical, moral or
psychological torture by whom and why. The
judge shall then submit a written report of what
he/she had observed when the subject was
brought before him to the proper court that has
jurisdiction over the case of the person thus
arrested.
The judge shall forthwith submit his
report within 3 calendar days from the time the
suspect was brought to his/her residence or
office.
Immediately after taking custody of
a person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism, the police or law enforcement
personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the
court nearest the place of apprehension or
arrest; provided, That where the arrest is made
during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after
office hours, the written notice shall be served
at the residence of the judge nearest the place
where the accused was arrested. The penalty of
10 years and 1 day to 12 years imprisonment
shall be imposed upon the police or law
enforcement personnel who fails to notify any
judge as provided in the preceding paragraph.
Section 19. Period of Detention in
the event of an actual or imminent terrorist
attack.- In the vent of an actual or imminent
terrorist attack,, suspects may not be detained
for more than three days without the written
approval of a municipal, city, provincial or
regional official of a Human Rights Commission,
or judge of the municipal, regional trial court,
the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of
Appeals nearest the place of arrest. If the arrest
is made during Saturdays, Sundays or holidays,
or after office hours, the arresting police of law
enforcement personnel shall bring the person
thus arrested to the residence of any of the
officials mentioned above that is nearest the
place where the accused was arrested. The
approval in writing of any of the said officials
shall be secured by the police or law
enforcement personnel concerned within fve
days after the date of the detention of the
persons concerned; Provided, however, That
within three days after the detention the
suspects whose connection with the terror
attack or threat is not established, shall be
released immediately.
16. In case the place to be
searched as indicated in the search
warrant is erroneous because it is
different from the place mentioned by the
applicants who searched the place
indicated by them in their affidavit, are
the things seized admissible in evidence?
No. As held in PEOPLE VS. CA, 291
SCRA 400, WHAT IS MATERIAL IN DETERMINING
THE VALIDITY OF A SEARCH IS THE PLACE
STATED IN THE WARRANT ITSELF, NOT WHAT
THE APPLICANTS HAD IN THEIR THOUGHTS, OR
HAD REPRESENTED IN THE PROOFS THEY
SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ISSUING THE
WARRANT.
17. What are the different
instances when a warrantless search and
seizure is allowed under our existing
jurisprudence?
Warrantless search is allowed in the following
instances:
1. customs searches;
2. searches of moving vehicle;
3. seizure of evidence in plain view;
4. consented searches;
5. search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
6. stop and frisk measures. (PEOPLE VS.
ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626)
18. May a judge deputize his
Clerk of Court to take the deposition of
the applicant for a search warrant subject
to clarificatory questions after his hearing
in other cases?
No. As held in Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA
823, the examination of the complainant ant
the witnesses he may produce must be done
personally by the judge. Otherwise, the warrant
shall be void. As such, the SC held in PENDON
VS. CA, November 16, 1990 that when the
questions asked to the applicant for a search
warrant was pre-typed, the same is not valid
since there could have been no searching
questions.
19. May a search warrant be
issued for the crimes of search warrant
for estafa, falsification, tax evasion and
insurance fraud?
No, such would be a “general
warrant” and violates the rule that a warrant
shall be issued for one (1) specifc offense.
(Asian Surety vs. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312)
 20. What is a “ scatter-shot
warrant” ?
It is a search warrant issued for more
than one (1) specifc offense like a search
warrant issued for more than one specifc
offense like one for estafa, robbery, theft and
qualifed theft”. (TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE, July
14, 1995; PEOPLE VS. CA, 216 SCRA 101)
21. May a judge validly issue a
warrant of arrest based from the
Information and the Resolution of the
Prosecutor finding probable cause against
the accused?
No. There will be no basis for the
issuance since the Prosecutor is neither the
complainant nor the witness to the case. He
could not have determined probable cause
based from the said documents. (VICENTE
LIM,SR. AND MAYOR SUSANA LIM VS.HON.
N. FELIX , G.R. NO. 99054-57). As held in the
case of Soliven vs. Makasiar, decided under the
1987 Constitution, the Court noted that the
addition of the word personally after the word
determined and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue
warrants to other respondent officers as to may
be authorized by law does not require the judge
to personally examine the complainant and his
witness in his determination of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.What the
Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. Following established doctrine and
procedures, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the
reports and the supporting documents
submitted by the fscal regarding the existence
of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest;
(2) If on the basis thereof he fnds
no probable cause, he may disregard the
fscal's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
The case of People vs. Honorable
Enrique B. Inting reiterates the following
doctrines:
(1) The determination of
probable cause is a function of the judge. It is
not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for
the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the
judge alone makes this detemination.
(2) The preliminary inquiry made
by the prosecutor does not bind the judge. It
merely assist him to make the determination of
probable cause. The judge does not have to
follow what the prosecutor's present to him. By
itself, the prosecutor's certifcation of probable
cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the
affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes,
and all other supporting documents behind the
prosecutor's certifcation which are material in
assisting the judge to make his determination.
(3) Preliminary inquiry should be
distinguished from the preliminary investigation
proper. While the former seeks to determine
probable cause for the issuance of warrant of
arrest, the latter ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or be released.
22. As to the requirement that
the judge must “personally” determine
probable cause, must he examine the
complainant and his witnesses face to
face in order to comply with the said
constitutional provision?
It depends.
In connection with the issuance of a
SEARCH WARRANT, he must personally
examine the complainant and the witnesses,
with searching questions, face to face.
In connection with the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, however, the word
“ personally” after the word determined does
not necessarily mean that the judge should
examine the complainant and his witnesses
personally or face to face before issuing the
warrant of arrest but the exclusive
responsibility on the part of said judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. As such, there is no need to examine the
complainant and his witnesses face to face. It is
sufficient if the judge is convinced of the
existence of probable cause upon reading the
affidavits or deposition of the complainant and
his witnesses. SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR, 167
SCRA 393
23. Is the judge bound by the
findings of existence of “probable cause”
by the Prosecutor as indicated in his
Certification in the information so that
the issuance of a warrant of arrest is only
ministerial? If not satisfied of the
existence of probable cause, may the
judge require the Prosecutor to submit
additional evidence?
 The judge is not bound by the
fndings of the Prosecutor because the said
fnding is only “probable cause” that a crime
was committed. Probable cause to justify the
issuance of a warrant of arrest is a judicial
function vested only in the judge. In fact, he
can require the Prosecutor to submit additional
evidence if he is not convinced of the existence
of probable for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. (P. vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465; Placer
vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463).
24. Is "Operation Kapkap" being
done by the police because the suspect
has something bulging in his waist and
keeps on touching his abdomen as if
touching a gun valid?
As held in PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE,
G.R. No. 87059, June, 1992, 210 SCRA 174,
“OPERATION KAPKAP” or warrantless search
without probable cause is unconstitutional.
Such search is valid only if covered by Section
5, Article 113 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful.- A peace officer or private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is
a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving fnal
judgment or temporarily confned while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confnement to another.
Compare this case to MANALILI VS.
PEOPLE, October 9, 1997. The policemen saw
several suspicious looking men at dawn who
ran when they went near them. As the
policemen ran after them, an unlicensed
frearm was confscated. The search was
declared valid by the Supreme Court. Note,
however, that in MALACAT VS. CA, 283 SCRA
159, the SC held that mere suspicions not
sufficient to validate warrantless arrest.
25. May the Iloilo Police arrests
without warrant or search the person
disembarking from a ship without
warrant based solely on an information
relayed to them by an informant that the
suspect’ s bag contains marijuana?
No. As held in PEOPLE vs.
AMMINUIDIN, 163 SCRA 402 a warrantless
arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This
was effected while he was coming down the
vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than
the other disembarking passengers. He had
not committed nor was actually committing or
attempting to commit an offense in the
presence of the arresting officers. He was not
even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no
probable cause that, as the prosecution
incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the
constitutional requirement of a warrant.
26. In arrests without warrant
based on the fact that a crime has just
been committed, what kind of knowledge
is required on the part of the arresting
officer?
In PEOPLE VS. GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 246, the
Supreme Court held that t he policeman
arrested the accused-appellant on the basis
solely of what Reynaldo Castro had told him
and not because he saw the accused-appellant
commit the crime charged against him. Indeed,
the prosecution admitted that there was no
warrant of arrest issued against accused-
appellant when the latter was taken into
custody. Considering that the accused-
appellant was not committing a crime at the
time he was arrested nor did the arresting
officer have any personal knowledge of facts
indicating that accused-appellant committed a
crime, his arrest without a warrant cannot be
justifed.
27. What is the effect on the
illegality of the arrest by the subsequent
act of the accused in posting bond for his
provisional liberty and entering a plea
during his arraignment?
By entering a plea of not guilty
during the arraignment, the accused-appellant
waived his right to raise the issue of illegality of
his arrest. IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT OBJECTION
TO A WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE
PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF AN
ACCUSED MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE ENTERS
HIS PLEA, OTHERWISE, THE OBJECTION IS
DEEMED WAIVED. THE FACT THAT THE ARREST
WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE
SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND
DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS RIGHT TO CONVICT
THE GUILTY WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO
THE CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED. (PEOPLE
VS. GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 246)
28. Is a warrantless search and
seizure by a private individual valid?
Yes since the constitutional provision
is not applicable to him. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. ANDRE MARTI, G.R. NO.
81561, January 18, 1991; SILAHIS
INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. VS. ROGELIO
SOLUTA, ET AL., 482 SCRA 660)
29. What are the requisites of a
valid search incidental to a valid arrest?
As held in NOLASCO VS. PANO,
139 SCRA 541, a search incidental to a valid
arrest must be done at the place where the
accused is arrested or its immediate vicinity or
on the person of the accused. As such, if
accused was arrested while inside a jeepney,
there is no valid search incidental to a valid
arrest if she will be brought to her residence
and thereafter search the said place. Or as held
in ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 588, if the
accused was arrested in the street during a
buy-bust operation, the search of his house
nearby is not a valid search incidental to a valid
arrest.
30. If the accused was validly
arrested without warrant inside a night
club for illegal possession of firearm, may
the arresting officers validly search his
car parked several meters from the place
of arrest based on “search incidental to a
valid arrest” ?
Where the gun tucked in a person’s
waist is plainly visible to the police, no search
warrant is necessary and in the absence of any
license for said frearm, he may be arrested at
once as he is in effect committing a crime in
the presence of the police officers. No warrant
is necessary in such a situation, it being one of
the recognized exceptions under the Rules. As a
consequence of the accused’s valid warrantless
arrest inside the nightclub, he may be lawfully
searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126. This is a
valid search incidental to a lawful arrest.
In fact, the subsequent
discovery in his car which was parked in a
distant place from where the illegal
possession of firearm was committed
[after he requested that he will bring his
car to the Police Station after his
warrantless arrest) , of a drug
paraphernalia and shabu, CANNOT BE
SAID TO HAVE BEEN MADE DURING AN
ILLEGAL SEARCH because of his consent,
not due to search incidental to a valid
arrest. As such, the items do not fall
under the exclusionary rule and the
unlicensed firearms, drug paraphernalia
and the shabu, can be used as evidence
against the accused. (PEOPLE VS. GO, 354
SCRA 338)
31. May the police authorities
validly search the rented apartment of a
suspect without a search warrant or
without the consent of the said person
BUT WITH THE CONSENT OF THE OWNER
OF THE APARTMENT?
No. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212
SCRA 547 abandoned the ruling in Lopez vs.
Commissioner. In order that there is a valid
consent to a warrantless search, the consent
must come from the person directly affected by
said warrantless search.
32. What is the “ plain view
doctrine” in connection with warrantless
search and seizure?
As held in PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ, 341 SCRA
25, the “ plain view” doctrine, which may
justify a search without warrant, APPLIES
ONLY WHERE THE POLICE OFFICER IS NOT
SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE AGAINS THE
ACCUSED, BUT INADVERTENTLY COMES
ACROSS AN INCRIMINATING OBJECT. As
such, “plain view doctrine could not be
used to justify the seizure of an
unlicensed firearm in People vs. Damaso,
supra, which was seen on top of a table
after the opening of the apartment’s door
without a warrant nor consent of the
occupant therein.
32-a. The police received an
information that accused’s house is surrounded
by fully grown marijuana. Thereafter, the police
went to the place of the accused and it turned
out that the information was correct. The
accused was arrested and the police took his
pictures infront of his marijuana plants and
other pictures with him after uprooting the
same. Is the seizure of the marijuana plants
justifed under the “plain view doctrine”?
No, the seizure is not valid. Nor can it
be justifed under the plain view doctrine. In
order that the plain view doctrine could be
validly applied, the marijuana plants must have
been INADVERTENTLY FOUND. In this case, the
policement went there specifcally to look for it.
(PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ, 341 SCRA 25)
33. Define probable cause in
connection with the issuance of a search
warrant.
The "probable cause" for a valid search
warrant, has been defned "as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched".
(Quintero vs. NBI, June 23, 1988). This probable
cause must be shown to be within the personal
knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses
he may produce and not based on mere
hearsay. (P. VS. SY JUCO, 64 PHIL. 667; ALVAREZ
VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33; US VS. ADDISON, 28 PHIL.
566).
34. What is the “sufficiency test”
in connection with applications for a
search warrant?
"The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or
affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
warrant is whether it was drawn in a manner
that perjury could be charged thereon and
the affiant be held liable for damage
caused. The oath required must refer to the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge
of the applicant of a search warrant and/or his
witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a
person whom one considers to be reliable."
(DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE VS. THE HON.
EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC
33, Manila & People of the Philippines, GR No.
82870, December 14, 1989)
35. May the police and military
authorities validly search the citizens
without warrant in checkpoints set up by
them? What is the extent of the search
that they may conduct?
In RICARDO VALMONTE VS. GEN
RENATO DE VILLA, GR No. 83988, September
29, 1989, the Supreme Court held that
warrantless searches and seizures in military
and police checkpoints are not illegal as these
measures to protect the government and
safeguards the lives of the people. The
checkpoints are legal as where the survival of
the organized government is on the balance, or
where the lives and safety of the people are in
grave peril. However, the Supreme Court
clarifed that the military officers manning the
checkpoints may conduct VISUAL SEARCH
ONLY, NOT BODILY SEARCH.
36. Is an unlicensed firearm
seized in the house of the accused
without warrant by the military
authorities, after they were given
consent by the said owner of the house
for them to search for rebel soldiers,
admissible in evidence?
No. In VEROY VS. LAYAGUE, 210
SCRA 97, the Supreme Court held that the
owner of the house allowed the policemen to
enter his house because they will be searching
for rebel soldiers but when inside the house,
they instead seized an unlicensed frearm. As
such, there was no consent to search for
frearms and as a consequence, the frearm is
not admissible as evidence.
37. If the judge finds that there's
probable cause, must he issue a warrant
of arrest as a matter of course?
It depends:
1. SAMULDE VS. SALVANI, SEPTEMBER
26, 1988 (No because a warrant is issued in
order to have jurisdiction of the court over the
person of an accused and to assure the court of
his presence whenever his case is called in
court. As such, if the court believes that the
presence of the accused could be had even
without a warrant of arrest, then he may not
issue said warrant. Note: This case involves a
minor offense)
2. GOZO VS. TAC-AN, 300 SCRA 265. If
the offense committed is a serious one like
that obtaining in this case for murder, the
Judge must issue a warrant of arrest after
determining the existence of probable cause)
38. If the applicant for a search
warrant testifies that his knowledge of
the facts and circumstances was derived
from a “ highly reliable informant”, would
such fact sufficient to convince the court
of the existence of “probable cause”?
No, knowledge based on hearsay
information does not justify the existence of
probable cause. (Prudente vs. Dayrit, supra.) In
fact, when the statements in the affidavits of
witnesses are mere generalities, mere
conclusions of law, and not positive statements
of particular acts, the warrant issued by virtue
thereof is not valid. Ponsica vs. Ignalaga, July
31,1987)
39. In the seizure of alleged
pirated tapes, what must the applicant
submit to the court in order that the
search warrant to be issued shall be valid?
In Century Fox vs. CA, 164 SCRA
655 and COLUMBIA PICTURES VS. CA, 261
SCRA 144, it was held that the master copy of
the allegedly pirated tape should be presented
before the judge in order to convince him of the
existence of probable cause)
40. What is the effect on the
evidence obtained in violation of Sections
2 and 3 of Article III?
Any evidence obtained in violation of
Sections 2 and 3 of Article III shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
41. Under the Human Security
Act/Anti-Terrorism Law, Republic Act No.
9372, Approved on March 6, 2007 and
effective on July 15, 2007, may police
authorities the listen to, intercept and
record, with the use of any mode, form or
kind or type of electronic or other
surveillance equipment or intercepting
and tracking devices, or with the use of
any other suitable ways or means for that
purpose, any communication, message,
conversation, discussion, or spoken or
written words of a person without
violating the right to privacy?
Yes under Sections 7 and 8 of the law
which provides:
Section 7. Surveillance of suspects
and interception and recording of
communications. The provisions of RA 4200
(Anti-Wiretapping Law) to the contrary
notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement
official and the members of his team may, upon
a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen
to, intercept and record, with the use of any
mode, form or kind or type of electronic or
other surveillance equipment or intercepting
and tracking devices, or with the use of any
other suitable ways or means for that purpose,
any communication, message, conversation,
discussion, or spoken or written words between
members of a judicially declared and outlawed
terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons or of any person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism.
Provided, That surveillance,
interception and recording of communications
between lawyers and clients, doctors and
patients, journalists and their sources and
confdential business correspondence shall not
be authorized.
42. Under the Human Security
Act/Anti-Terrorism Law, Republic Act No.
9372, Approved on March 6, 2007 and
effective on July 15, 2007, may police
authorities examine the bank accounts of
individuals without violating their right to
privacy?
Yes under Sections 27 and 28 of the
said law. It provides:
Section 27. Judicial authorization
required to examine bank deposits, accounts
and records.
The justices of CA designated as
special court to handle anti-terrorism cases
after satisfying themselves of the existence of
probable cause in a hearing called for that
purpose that:
A person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism;
Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization or group of persons;
Of a member of such judicially declared and
outlawed organization, association or group of
persons, may authorize in writing any police or
law enforcement officer and the members of his
team duly authorized in writing by the anti-
terrorism council to:
examine or cause the examination of, the
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets,
and records in a bank or fnancial institution;
and
gather or cause the gathering of any relevant
information about such deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets, and records from a bank
or fnancial institution. The bank or fnancial
institution shall not refuse to allow such
examination or to provide the desired
information, when so ordered by and served
with the written order of the Court of Appeals.
Sec. 28. Application to examine
deposits, accounts and records.
The written order of the CA
authorizing the examination of bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records:
A person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism;
Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization or group of persons;
Of a member of such judicially declared and
outlawed organization, association or group of
persons, in a bank or fnancial institution-
-SHALL ONLY BE GRANTED BY THE
AUTHORIZING DIVISION OF THE CA UPON AN
EX-PARTE APPLICATION TO THAT EFFECT OF A
POLICE OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL who
has been duly authorized by the Anti-Terrorism
Council to fle such ex-parte application and
upon examination under oath or affirmation of
the applicant and his witnesses he may
produce to establish the facts that will justify
the need and urgency of examining and
freezing the bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records:
Of A person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism;
Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization or group of persons;
Of a member of such judicially declared and
outlawed organization, association or group of
persons.
43. May a wife validly seize the
diaries, checks and greeting cards of the
alleged paramours of her husband in the
latter’ s clinic and use the same as
evidence in a legal separation case
between them?
As held in ZULUETA VS. CA,
February 10, 1996, the evidence obtained by
the wife who forcibly opened the drawers at the
clinic of her doctor-husband and took diaries,
checks and greeting cards of his alleged
paramours is inadmissible as evidence. This is
so because the intimacies of husband and wife
does not justify the breaking of cabinets to
determine marital infdelity.
43. Is the freedom of speech and
expression affected by the Human
Security Act?
Yes, under Section 26 of the law, it
provides that persons who have been charged
with terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism---even if they have been granted bail
because evidence of guilt is not strong—can be:
“Prohibited from using any cellular phones,
computers, or other means of communications
with people outside their residence.”
44. What is the rule on criticisms
on the acts of public officers?
A public official should not be too
onion-skinned with reference to comments
upon his official acts. The interest of the
government and the society demands full
discussion of public affairs. (US vs. Bustos, 37
Phil. 731)
45. May the above rule
applicable to private individuals who are
public figures or private individuals who
are candidates for public office?
As held by the Supreme Court in the
case of BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER &
CECILLE AFABLE VS. COURT OF APPEALS &
RAMON LABO, JR., 444 SCRA 28 [November
25, 2004 , the article involving a private
individual running for Mayor of Baguio City is
still within the mantle of protection guaranteed
by the freedom of expression provided in the
Constitution since it is the public’s right to be
informed of the mental, moral and physical
ftness of candidates for public office. This was
recognized as early as the case of US VS.
SEDANO, 14 Phil. 338 [1909] and the case of
NEW YORK TIMES VS. SULLIVAN, 376 U.S. 254
where the US Supreme Court held:
“… it is of the utmost
consequence that the people should
discuss the character and qualifications of
candidates for their suffrages. The
importance to the State and to society of
such discussions is so vast, and the
advantages derived so great, that they
more than counterbalance the
inconvenience of private persons whose
conduct may be involved, and occasional
injury to the reputations of individuals
must yield to the public welfare, although
at times such injury may be great. The
public benefit from publicity is so great
and the chance of injury to private
character so small, that such discussion
must be privileged. “
Clearly, the
questioned articles constitute fair
comment on a matter of public interest as
it dealt with the character of the private
respondent who was running for the top
elective post in Baguio City at that time.
46. May the COMELEC validly
prohibit columnists, radio announcers and
TV commentator for commenting for or
against any issue during the plebiscite
period since they can air their views in a
program sponsored by the COMELEC
itself?
No, such would be an undue interference on
the freedom of expression. IT IS STILL A
RESTRICTION ON THE COLUMNIST,
ANNOUNCER OR COMMENTATOR’S CHOICE OF
THE FORUM WHERE HE MAY EXPRESS HIS VIEW.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern
and importance. The people's right to be
informed and to be able to freely and
intelligently make a decision would be better
served by access to an unabridged discussion
of the issues, INCLUDING THE FORUM. The
people affected by the issues presented in a
plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by
restrictions on the forum where the right to
expression may be exercised. (PABLITO V.
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 90878,
January 29, 1990)
47. What are the requisites that
a newspaper must comply in order that its
news item on an ongoing trial in court will
not be actionable for being libelous?
In Elizalde vs. Gutierrez,76 SCRA 448,
it was held that in order that any news item
relating to a judicial proceeding will not be
actionable, the same must be [a] a true and fair
report of the actual proceedings; [b] must be
done in good faith; and [c] no comments nor
remarks shall be made by the writer}
48. What are the tests of
obscenity?
The three (3) tests as held in Miller
vs. California, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 are:
Whether the average person applying to
contemporary community standards
would find the work appeals to prurient
interest;
Whether the work depicts or describes a
patently offensive sexual conduct;
Whether the work as a whole lacks
serious literary , artistic, political or
scientific value.
49. May the City Mayor order the
confiscation without a search warrant
magazines which he believes to be
obscene? What is the correct procedure
for him to follow?
No. (Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362). A
City Mayor may not order the warrantless
seizure of magazines which he believes to be
obscene; otherwise, he will become the
complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same
time. He should obtain a search warrant from a
judge by following the procedure laid down by
the Rules on how to secure a search warrant.
50. May public school teachers
validly file mass leaves, instead of going
on strike, after their demand to the
government was not met”
In GESITE et al. vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, 444 SCRA 51 held that “these mass
actions were to all intents and purposes a
strike; they constituted a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from,
work which it was the teachers’ duty to
perform, undertaken for essentially economic
reasons.” It is undisputed fact that there was a
work stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose
was to realize their demands by withholding
their services. The fact that the conventional
term “strike” was not used by the striking
employees to describe their common course of
action is inconsequential, SINCE THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE SITUATION, AND NOT ITS
APPEARANCE, WILL BE DEEMED CONTROLLING.
The right of government employees
to organize IS LIMITED TO THE FORMATIONS OF
UNIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS ONLY, WITHOUT
INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE. (Bangalisan
vs. CA, 276 SCRA 619)
51. What is the procedure to be
followed in the application of rally
permits before the City or Municipal
Mayor in accordance with BP Bilang 880?
The applicants for a permit to hold an
assembly should inform the licensing authority
of the date, the public place where and the
time when it will take place. If it were a private
place, only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required.
Such application should be fled well ahead in
time to enable the public official concerned to
appraise whether there may be valid objections
to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at
another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modifcation that
the clear and present danger test be the
standard for the decision reached. If he is of
the view that there is such an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they
can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority. (BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), and
GABRIELA vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City
Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine
National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO,
NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and
Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO
BULAONG, G.R. No. 169848, May, 2006)
52. Is BP 880 unconstitutional for
being vague (Void for Vagueness
Doctrine) and overbroad (Overbreadth
Doctrine)?
No. It is very clear that it deals only
on public assemblies that deals with rallies,
mass actions and similar acts and not all kinds
of public assemblies. As such, it is not vague.
Neither is the law overbroad. It
regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly and petition only to the extent
needed to avoid a clear and present danger of
the substantive evils Congress has the right to
prevent.
53. Is the Calibrated Pre-emptive
Response (CPR) of the Arroyo
Administration towards rallyists
constitutional?
The Court reiterates its basic policy
of upholding the fundamental rights of our
people, especially freedom of expression and
freedom of assembly. For this reason, the so-
called calibrated preemptive response policy,
the policy of dispersing rallyists through water
cannons, has no place in our legal frmament
and must be struck down as a darkness that
shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our
people and is used by some police agents to
justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880
cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it
does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it
merely regulates the use of public places as to
the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far
from being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is
for the beneft of rallyists, not the government.
The delegation to the mayors of the power to
issue rally “permits” is valid because it is
subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear and
present danger” standard. (BAYAN,
KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS (KMP), and GABRIELA vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO
ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National
Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO
Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western
Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG,
G.R. No. 169848, May, 2006)
54. May the MTRCB suspend for
three (3) months the airing of the program Ang
Dating Daan of Brother Eliseo Soriano as a
result of vulgar and uncouth language he
uttered against the host of the program Ang
Tamang Daan of the Iglesia Ni Kristo?
Yes as “subsequent punishment”. In fact, it is a
valid “prior restraint” measure on the part of
the MTRCB (SORIANO VS. LAGUARDIA, April 29,
2009) [Dissenting Opinion: The suspension of
the program is illegal. It constitutes “prior
restraint”. He is prevented from hosting the
program during the succeeding days even if he
will just say the “Lord’s Prayer” or to greet
“good morning” to his viewers. Per Justice
Antonio Carpio]
54-a. May the City of Cauayan,
Isabela, validly close the Bombo Radio Stations
therein on the ground that their building was
constructed on an “agricultural land” [that is
why the City did not issue business permit for it
to operate] which has not been converted to
“commercial land” by the DAR despite the fact
that it has been there for so many years and
was questioned only when the said station was
critical of the Dy’s in Isabela who own the only
other radio station therein?
A. The act of the City of Cauayan, Isabela
constitutes prior restraint. It shall pay P10M in
damages for the losses suffered by Bombo
Radyo as a result of the illegal closure.
(NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK
INC. and
CONSOLIDATED
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. vs. HON.
CEASAR G. DY, FELICISIMO G. MEER,
BAGNOS MAXIMO, RACMA FERNANDEZ-
GARCIA and THE CITY OF CAUAYAN, G.R.
Nos. 170270 &179411, April 2, 2009)
54-b. Distinguish “ clear and
present danger” , “dangerous tendency
rule” and “ balancing of interest test”.
Clear and present danger and
dangerous tendency rule (whether the words
used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils
that the State has the right to prevent)
Dangerous tendency rule (If the
words uttered create a dangerous tendency
which the State has the right to prevent, then
such words are punishable)
The balancing-of-interest test (When
a particular conduct is regulated in the interest
of the public order, and the regulation results in
an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of
speech, the duty of the courts is to determine
which of the 2 conflicting interests demand
greater protection under the circumstances
presented.)

55. May Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile prevent the movie producer of the
EDSA I Revolution movie from including
his participation during the uprising since
it violates his right to privacy?
No, as between Enrile’s right to
privacy and the freedom of expression on the
part of the movie producer, the latter’s right
prevail because Enrile’s part in the movie deals
solely on his acts as a public officer then. To
exclude him as integral part of the revolution
would be a distortion of history. (AYER
PRODUCTION VS. JUDGE CAPULONG, JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, ET AL., 160 SCRA 861)
56. May the mother of a
murdered Mayor stop the filming of the
life story of her son which would include
his alleged love affairs which would
blacken his memory?
Yes. As between the right to privacy
invoked by the mother and the freedom of
expression invoked by the movie producer, the
state shall balance their respective interests.
Since the movie producer is primarily after
profts only, the right to privacy shall prevail.
(Lagunzad vs. Gonzales).
57. What are the two (2) aspects
of the RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION
AND WORSHIP ? Distinguish each.
a. Freedom to believe; and
b. Freedom to act.
IN the frst, such freedom is absolute. He may
indulge in his own theories about life and
death; worship any god he chooses, or none at
all. He may not be punished even if he cannot
prove what he believes.
In the second, if the individual externalizes
what he believes, his freedom to do so
becomes subject to the authority of the State.
This is so because religious freedom can be
exercised only with due regard to the rights of
others. Example: “Go forth and multiply---
cannot marry several times just to comply.
58. May a Jehovah’s Witnesses
Member who is the Court Interpreter of
RTC Branch 253, Las Pinas City, be held
liable for “ grossly immoral conduct” for
living with a married man while her very
own marriage was still subsisting?
No. As held in ESTRADA VS.
SOLEDAD ESCRITOR, 492 SCRA 1
(Resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration), 408 SCRA 1, the
Supreme Court held that she is not liable
for grossly immoral conduct because:
She is a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Watch Tower Society;
That the conjugal arrangement was in
conformity with their religious beliefs;
That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio
has the approval of her congregation.
Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed
a “DECLARATION OF PLEDGING FAITHFULNESS”
in accordance with her religion which allows
members of the Jehovah’s witnesses who have
been abandoned by their spouses to enter into
marital relations. The Declaration thus makes
the resulting union moral and binding within
the congregation all over the world except in
countries where divorce is allowed. Escritor’s
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as
she has made out a case for exemption from
the law based on her fundamental right to
religion. However, this mode of living with
another other than his or her spouse by a
married person does not apply in places where
divorce is allowed.
59. May children of Jehovah’s Witnesses in
public schools be forced to sing the
National Anthem; recite the Patriotic
Pledge; and Salute the Flag under pain of
being expelled for non-compliance?
No since such is in violation of their
religious beliefs. (ROEL EBRALINAG, ET AL VS.
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS
OF CEBU, March 1, 1993). Religious freedom is
superior to the statute requiring the pupils to
sing the National Anthem; recite the Patriotic
Pledge; and Salute the Flag. The doctrine laid
down in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education was
reversed.
60. How may the right to travel be
impaired?
The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.
61. Is the right to travel affected
by the Human Security Act?
Yes, Section 26 provides that
persons who have been charged with terrorism
or conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they
have been granted bail because evidence of
guilt is not strong—can be:
Detained under house arrest;
Restricted from traveling; and/or
Upon application of the prosecutor, the
suspect’s right to travel shall be limited to the
municipality or city where he resides or where
the case is pending, in the interest of national
security and public safety. Travel outside of said
municipality or city, without the authorization
of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the
terms and conditions of the bail which shall
then be forfeited as provided in the Rules of
Court.
These restrictions shall be terminated
upon acquittal of the accused; or the dismissal
of the case fled against him; or earlier upon
the discretion of the court or upon motion of
the prosecutor.
62. May Former President Marcos
validly compel the government to issue
him his travel papers in order that he
could return to the Philippines from his US
exile in accordance with his constitutional
right to travel?
No. (FERDINAND MARCOS, ET AL. VS.
HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET AL., G.R. NO.
88211, September 15, 1989 and the Resolution
of the Motion for Reconsideration dated
October 27, 1989). What is provided by the
Philippine Constitution is the right to travel and
not the right to return. These two (2) rights are
different under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. THE RIGHT TO
RETURN TO ONE'S COUNTRY IS NOT AMONG
THE RIGHTS SPECIFICALLY GUARANTEED BY
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, WHICH TREATS ONLY OF
THE LIBERTY OF ABODE AND THE RIGHT TO
TRAVEL, BUT IT IS OUR WELL-CONSIDERED
VIEW THAT THE RIGHT TO RETURN MAY BE
CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED
PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNDER
OUR CONSTITUTION, IS PART OF THE LAW OF
THE LAND.
63. What is the “ residual power”
of the President?
It is the power of the President in balancing
the general welfare and the common good
against the exercise of rights of certain
individuals. The power involved is the
President's RESIDUAL POWER to protect the
general welfare of the people.
64. May a person out on bail be
validly allowed to travel abroad?
Yes, subject to the following requisites (
Manotoc vs. CA, 142 SCRA 149):
He must however [1] convince the
courts of the urgency of his travel, [2] the
duration thereof, and [3] that his sureties are
willing to undertake the responsibility of
allowing him to travel.
65. Is the right to information on
matters of public concern absolute?
No. While the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized and access to official records…
shall be afforded the citizen, it must be subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law
as well as reasonable conditions imposed by
public officials in custody of said records like
the payment of the expenses of reproduction of
public documents; the request must be done
during office hours, etc.
66. May the COMELEC be
compelled to publish the names of the
nominees of the different party-list
groups for the May 14, 2007 elections
despite the prohibition on such
publication as embodied by the Party-List
Act?
YES, the COMELEC must publish
the same despite the prohibition in the law.
Such prohibition violates the right to
information on matters of public concern on the
part of the citizen. (BANTAY REPUBLIC VS.
COMELEC, MAY 4, 2007)
67. May the President validly
prohibit members of her Cabinet as well
as other officers in the executive
department from attending investigations
in aid of legislation by Congress?
No. Such would violate the right of
the people to information on matters of public
concern. It is only through said investigations
that the people will be informed of the workings
of the different departments of the
government. (SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC.
EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., G.R. No. 16977,
April 20, 2006 )
68. May a Barangay validly
exercise the power of eminent domain?

Yes, subject to the approval by the
President.( Barangay Matictic vs. Elbinias, 148
SCRA 83)
69. What are the requisites
before an expropriator may validly obtain
a writ of possession to take over
possession of the expropriated property?
It depends:
1. If the expropriation is for a “National
government projects” or “national
infrastructure projects”, like those covered
by the “Build-Operate-Transfer”, RA 8974 shall
be followed. This means that there must be a
[a] Complaint for expropriation which is
sufficient in form and in substance; and [2] the
100% of the market value of the property
sought to be expropriated must frst be paid to
the owner of the property. (REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE GINGOYON, 478
SCRA 474)
2. In ordinary expropriation cases, the rule
is that in the case of BIGLANG-AWA VS. JUDGE
BACALLA, 354 SCRA 562. It provides:
PURSUANT TO SECTION 2, RULE 67
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN THE ROBERN
DEVELOPMENT CASE, THE ONLY REQUISITES
FOR THE IMMEDIATE ENTRY BY THE
GOVERNMENT IN EXPROPRIATION CASES ARE:
the filing of a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance; and
the making of a deposit equivalent to the
ASSESSED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
SUBJECT TO EXPROPRIATION.
3. If the expropriation is being done by a
Local Government Unit, the Supreme Court
decision in the case of THE CITY OF ILOILO
VS. JUDGE LEGASPI, RTC 22, ILOILO CITY,
444 SCRA 269, shall be complied with:
1. the complaint for expropriation fled in
court is sufficient in form and substance; and
2. the expropriator must deposit the
amount equivalent to 15% of the fair
market value of the property to be
expropriated based on its current tax
declaration.
70. Who determines the just
compensation in expropriation cases?
What are the factors to be considered in
determining the same?
Determination of just compensation
is a judicial function with the assistance or
recommendation of the court-appointed
commissioners. (Manotok vs. CA, May 21,1987)
The factors to be considered in
determining the just compensation/market
value are:
1. cost of acquisition;
2. the current value of like proerties;
3. its actual or potential uses;
4. particular case of lands;
5. their size, shape, location; and
6. the tax declarations thereon.
Finally, note that as held in the case
of Republic vs. Santos, 141 SCRA 30, the
market value as recommended by the board of
commissioners appointed by the court were
at best only ADVISORY AND PERSUASIVE
AND BY NO MEANS FINAL OR BINDING.
(BERKENKOTTER, INC. VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, December 14, 1992).
71. What are the requisites of
“ taking” in expropriation cases?
The Requisites of taking are:
a. the expropriator must enter the
property;
b. the entrance must not be for just a
momentary period;
c. the entry must be under warrant of color
or title;
d. the property must be devoted for public
use; and
e. the owner must be ousted from
benefcial use of his land. (Rep. vs. Castellvi, 58
SCRA 336)
72. May a private property
already used as a private cemetery be
expropriated for a public purpose?
No, a private property which is
already devoted to public use may not be
expropriated for another public purpose. (City
of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil.
349).
72-a. In case the government
will not be able to use the land
expropriated for the purpose for which it
was intended, may the landowner ask for
its reversion to him?
Yes, provided he complies with the
following:\
Return the just compensation paid by the
government;
pay the legal interest;
pay the necessary expenses incurred by the
government in maintaining the lot; and
pay the pecuniary value of the services in
managing it to the extent that the landowner
will be benefted thereby. (MACTAN CEBU
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS.
LOZADA, February 25, 2010)
73. What are the rights of a
person under custodial investigation
under the “ Mahinay Doctrine” or the
“ Expanded Miranda Doctrine” ?
The rights are:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or
under custodial investigation must be informed
in a language known to and understood by him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown a copy of the warrant of arrest, if any;
Every other warnings, information or
communication must be in a language known
to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has the right
to remain silent and that any statement he
makes may be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the
right to be assisted at all times and have the
presence of an independent and competent
lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no
lawyer or cannot afford the services of a
lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a
lawyer may also be engaged by any person in
his behalf, or may be appointed by the court
upon petition of the person arrested or one
acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested
has a lawyer, , he must be informed that no
custodial investigation in any form shall be
conducted except in the presence of his
counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed
that, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most expedient
means---telephone, radio, letter or
messenger---with his lawyer (either retained or
appointed), any member of his immediate
family; or any medical doctor, priest or minister
chosen by him or by any one from his
immediate family or by his counsel, or be
visited by/confer with duly accredited national
or international non-governmental organization.
IT SHALL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
OFFICER TO ENSURE THAT THIS IS
ACCOMPLISHED;
7. He must be informed that he has the
right to waive any of said rights provided it is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives
his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that
it must be done in writing AND in the presence
of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that
the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver
and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be
informed that he may indicate in any manner
at any time or state of the process that he does
not wish to be questioned with the warning that
once he makes such indication, the police may
not interrogate him if the same had not yet
commenced, or the interrogation has begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed
that his initial waiver of his right to remain
silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights
does not bar him from invoking it at any other
time during the process, regardless of whether
he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some information or statements;
11. He must be informed that any statement
OR EVIDENCE, as the case may be, obtained in
violation of any of the foregoing, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part,
SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
74. What are the rights of a
person under “ custodial detention” for
one suspected or arrested as a terrorist
under the Human Security Act?
The rights are embodied under
Section 21 thereof which states:
Section 21. Rights of a person under
custodial detention.- The moment a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism is apprehended or arrested and
detained, he shall forthwith be informed by the
arresting police or law enforcement officers to
whose custody the person concerned is
brought, of his or her right:
to be informed of the nature and cause of his
arrest, to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel of his or her choice, the police or law
enforcement officers concerned shall
immediately contact the free legal assistance
unit of the IBP or the Public attorney’s office
(PAO). It shall be the duty of the free legal
assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO’s thus
contacted to immediately visit the person
detained and provide him with legal assistance.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of the counsel of choice;
informed of the cause or causes of his
detention in the presence of his legal counsel;
allowed to communicate freely with his legal
counsel and to confer with them at any time
without restriction;
allowed to communicate freely and privately
without restrictions with the members of his
family or with his nearest relatives and be
visited by them; and
allowed freely to avail of the services of a
physician or physicians of choice.
75. Are the above rights
available to a suspect if he is under
investigation by a private person?
No. (THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. JOSE TING LAN UY, JR., et al., 475 SCRA
248). The claim that his affidavit is inadmissible
in evidence in accordance with section 12 [1] of
the Bill of Rights is not tenable. The
“investigation” under said provision refers to
“custodial investigation where a suspect has
already been taken into police custody and that
the investigating officers begin to ask questions
to elicit information and confessions or
admissions from the suspect. Succinctly stated,
custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-
trial stage when the investigation ceases to be
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has began to focus on a particular person as a
suspect (People vs. Duenas, Jr., 426 SCRA 666).
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the
accused are not available BEFORE
GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATORS ENTER THE
PICTURE. The protective mantle of section 12,
article III does not apply to administrative
investigations (People vs. Judge Ayson, 175
SCRA 216); confession to a private individual
(Kimpo vs. CA, 232 SCRA 53); verbal admission
made to a radio announcer who was not a part
of the investigation (People vs. Ordono, 334
SCRA 673); or even to a Mayor approached as
a personal confdante and not in his official
capacity (People vs. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589). In
fact, even a videotaped interview where the
accused willingly admit his guilt in the presence
of newsmen is not covered by the said
provision though the trial courts were warned
by the supreme Court to take extreme caution
in admitting similar confessions because of the
distinct possibility that the police, with the
connivance of unscrupulous media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize
coerced extrajudicial confessions and place
them beyond the exclusionary rule by having
an accused admit an offense on television
(People vs. Endino, 353 SCRA 307).
76. When is custodial investigation
deemed to have started so as to entitle
the suspect to be informed of his rights
under the “ Mahinay Doctrine” or the
“ Expanded Miranda Doctrine”?
Custodial investigation begins when it is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting confession from the
suspect in connection with an alleged offense.
THE PLACE OF INTERROGATION IS NOT
DETERMINATIVE OF THE EXISTENCE OR
ABSENCE OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
BUT THE TONE AND MANNER OF
QUESTIONING BY THE POLICE
AUTHORITIES. Thus, there was custodial
investigation when the police authorities,
upon their arrest of some of the accused,
immediately asked them regarding their
participation in the commission of the
crime , even while they were still walking
along the highway on their way to the
police station. (PEOPLE VS. BARIQUIT, 341
SCRA 600)
77. Are spontaneous admissions made
before a person could be informed of his
rights during custodial investigation
admissible as evidence?
Yes. Spontaneous statements voluntarily
given, as where appellant orally admitted
killing the victim before the barangay
captain (who is neither a police officer nor
a law enforcement agent), do not fall
under custodial investigation. Such
admission, even without the assistance of
a lawyer, does not violate appellant’s
constitutional rights AND THEREFORE
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. (PEOPLE VS.
DANO, G.R. NO. 117690, 339 SCRA 515, SEPT.
1, 2000; PEOPLE VS. MAYORGA, G.R. NO.
135405, 346 SCRA 458, NOVEMBER 29, 2000).
78. What are the requisites before an
extrajudicial confession is admissible?
To be admissible in evidence, an extrajudicial
confession must be: (i) voluntary; (ii) made
with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (iii) express; and (iv) in
writing.

A suspect’s confession, whether verbal or non-
verbal, when taken without the assistance of
counsel, without a valid waiver of such
assistance, regardless of the absence of
coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily
given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if
appellant’s confession were gospel truth.
(PEOPLE VS. DANO, G.R. NO. 117690, 339 SCRA
515, SEPT. 1, 2000; PEOPLE VS. SAMOLDE, G.R.
NO. 128551, 336 SCRA 632, JUL. 31, 2000).
To be admissible in evidence, an extrajudicial
confession must be: (i) voluntary; (ii) made
with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (iii) express; and (iv) in
writing.
A suspect’s confession, whether verbal or non-
verbal, when taken without the assistance of
counsel, without a valid waiver of such
assistance, regardless of the absence of
coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily
given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if
appellant’s confession were gospel truth.
79. Is the presence of a lawyer to assist
the suspect during custodial investigation
sufficient to comply with the
requirements of the Constitution?
No. As held in PEOPLE VS.
PATUNGAN, 354 SCRA 413, the mere
presence of a lawyer is not sufficient
compliance with the constitutional
requirement of assistance of counsel.
Assistance of counsel must be effective,
vigilant and independent. A lawyer who
could just hear the investigation going on
while working on another case hardly
satisfies the minimum requirements of
effective assistance of counsel. Not only
was the accused subjected to custodial
investigation without counsel, he was
likewise denied effective assistance of
counsel during the taking of his extra-
judicial confession.
80. From what time must the
counsel assist the suspect during
custodial investigation? Who must choose
such counsel?
In PEOPLE V. JIMENEZ, G.R. No.
82604. December 12, 1991, it was held that the
counsel must be present from the inception of
the custodial investigation not at any time
thereafter. Also, the lawyer who assists the
suspect under custodial interrogation should be
of the latter's own choice, not one foisted on
him by the police investigators or other parties.
In this case, the former judge whose assistance
was requested by the police was evidently not
of Marcos Jimenez' own choice; she was the
police officers' own choice; she did not ask
Marcos if he was willing to have her represent
him. This is not the mode of solicitation of legal
assistance contemplated by the Constitution.
Furthermore, the former judge was not present
when Marcos was being interrogated by the
police. While she asked him if he had
voluntarily given the statements contained in
the typewritten document, this is far from being
substantial compliance with the constitutional
duty of police investigators during custodial
interrogation.
81. Is the extrajudicial
confession of a suspect obtained without
the assistance of a lawyer, but speaks of
gospel truth, admissible in evidence?
No. In PEOPLE VS. GALIT, 135 SCRA
465, PEOPLE VS. PANFILO CABILES, 284 SCRA
199; and PEOPLE VS. TAN, 286 SCRA 207, it was
held that even if the confession of the accused
speaks the truth, if it was made without the
assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in
evidence regardless of the absence of coercion
or even if it was voluntarily given.
In order that a confession is
admissible, the following requisites must be
present:
a. the confession must be voluntary;
b. the confession must be made with the
assistance of a competent and independent
counsel;
c. the confession must be express; and
d. the confession must be in writing.
The above requirements, however,
are not applicable when the suspect makes an
spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, BUT GIVEN IN
AN ORDINARY MANNER WHEREBY THE
ACCUSED ORALLY ADMITTED HAVING
COMMITTED THE CRIME. This was the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of PEOPLE
VS. ANDAN, March 3, 1997 when the
accused made a voluntary and verbal
confession to the Municipal Mayor that he
committed the crime imputed to him. As such,
his uncounselled confession is admissible in
evidence.
82. What are the two (2) kinds of
coerced or involuntary confessions under
Section 12, Art. III of the Constitution?
The two (2) kinds of involuntary or coerced
confessions under Art. III, Section 12 of the
Constitution. These are:
a. confession which are the product of third
degree methods such as torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation; and
b. those which are given without the
beneft of Miranda Warnings. PEOPLE VS.
OBRERO, 332 SCRA 190
83. What is the status of coerced
confessions as evidence in court?
Coerced or involuntary confessions
are inadmissible as evidence being the “fruit of
the poisoned tree.”
84. Is the right to counsel
satisfied if the suspect was assisted by
the Station Commander of the Western
Police District while he was being
investigated by the policemen of the
same station? How about if the
investigation is being conducted by the
NBI and the suspect was ordered assisted
by a lawyer-applicant therein?
There is no compliance of the constitutional
requirement of competent and independent
counsel to assist an accused during custodial
investigation when the accused was assisted by
the Station Commander of the WPD, Atty. De
los Reyes, while being investigated by other
policemen of the same police station because
the interest of the police is naturally adverse to
the accused. In fact, the SC in the case of
PEOPLE VS. JANUARIO, 267 SCRA 608 held that
a lawyer applying for a position in the NBI could
not validly assist an accused being investigated
then by the NBI. (PEOPLE VS. OBRERO, 332
SCRA 190)
85. Is the right to counsel
available to a suspect during a police
line-up?
The Supreme Court had conflicting
decisions on this aspect but ended up with the
rule that since the accused will not be made to
make any testimony during the police line-up,
then he is not under custodial investigation and
therefore, there is no need for him to be
assisted by a lawyer. ( P vs. Usman Hassan, 157
SCRA 261; Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz, 162 SCRA
642; DE LA TORRE VS. CA, 294 SCRA 196 and
PEOPLE VS. HATTON)
86. Is there a valid custodial
investigation if the lawyer who assisted
him during custodial investigation is a
public attorney who was not chosen by
the accused himself but given to him free
of charge? Could the Fiscal also represent
the accused during custodial investigation
to satisfy the requirement of the
Constitution that the accused is assisted
by counsel?
The counsel must be the choice of
the accused or suspect. (P. vs. Alegria,
September 28, 1990) Also, the Fiscal could not
have protected the rights of the suspect, even
if they are known to each other, since the Fiscal
is there for the private complainant. (P. vs.
Matos-Viduaya, September 11, 1990)
86-a. The appellants were
arrested by the PAOCTF for Kidnapping
and Murder of two (2) minor children of a
businessman from Bulacan. While under
custodial investigation by Col. Cesar
Mancao, the lawyers given to assist them
tare the lawyers of PAOCTF. Was the
confessions obtained during the custodial
investigation admissible in evidence?
Yes. As held in the case of PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DOMINGO REYES,
ET AL., G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009,
the Supreme Court held that since the evidence
shows that the lawyers of PAOCTF assisted
them from the start up to the end of their
custodial investigation and that their rights
were protected, the same is admissible as
evidence especially so that there is no evidence
of compulsion.
86-b. What are the evidence of
voluntariness in the suspect’s
extrajudicial confession making it
admissible in evidence? May such
confession be used against a co-accusd?
Up to what extent?
In People vs. Pia, 229 Phil. 577
and PEOPLE VS. REYES, G.R. No. 178300,
March 17, 2009, the Supreme Court
enumerated the following as evidence of
voluntariness in the extrajudicial confession of
a suspect:
Their physical examination reports certify that
no external signs of physical injury or any form
of trauma were noted during their
examination In People v. Pia, we held that the
following factors indicate voluntariness of an
extra-judicial confession: (1) where the
accused failed to present credible
evidence of compulsion or duress or
violence on their persons; (2) where they
failed to complain to the officers who
administered the oaths; (3) where they
did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against their
alleged intimidators for maltreatment; (4)
where there appeared to be no marks of
violence on their bodies; and (5) where
they did not have themselves examined
by a reputable physician to buttress their
claim.
It should also be noted that the extra-judicial
confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores
are replete with details on the manner in which
the kidnapping was committed, thereby ruling
out the possibility that these were involuntarily
made. Their extra-judicial confessions clearly
state how appellants and their cohorts planned
the kidnapping as well as the sequence of
events before, during and after its occurrence.
The voluntariness of a confession may be
inferred from its language if, upon its face, the
confession exhibits no suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details which
could only be supplied by the accused.
With respect to appellant Reyes’s claim that the
extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo
and Flores cannot be used in evidence against
him, we have ruled that although an extra-
judicial confession is admissible only against
the confessant, jurisprudence makes it
admissible as corroborative evidence of other
facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-
accused . In People v. Alvarez , we ruled that
where the confession is used as circumstantial
evidence to show the probability of
participation by the co-conspirator, that
confession is receivable as evidence against a
co-accused. In People v. Encipido, we
elucidated as follows:
87. If the extrajudicial admission
or confession of the accused is declared
inadmissible as evidence, must the
accused be acquitted as a matter of right?
No. In PEOPLE VS. ROLANDO
FELIXMINIA y CAMACHO, GR No. 125333, March
20, 2002, the Supreme Court held that though
the extrajudicial confession of the accused was
declared inadmissible for violation of his right
to counsel, if there are evidence sufficient to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, like
circumstantial evidence, then he can still be
convicted of the crime charged. This is so
because [1] the compromising circumstances
were duly proven which were consistent with
each other and which lead with moral certainty
to the conclusion that he was guilty of the
crime charged; and [2] the totality of such
circumstances eliminated beyond doubt the
possibility of his innocence. In People vs.
Mahinay, it was held that conviction may be
had on circumstantial evidence provided the
following requisites are present: [a] there is
more than one circumstance; [b] the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven;
and [c] the combination of all circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
88. May a convicted person be released
from jail through recognizance?
No. In ATTY. JULIANA ADALIM-
WHITE VS. JUDGE ARNULFO BUGTAS, RTC
2 BORONGAN, SAMAR, 475 SCRA 175, it
was held that respondent Judge is guilty
of gross ignorance of the law for ordering
the release of Bagaporo pending the
approval of his application for parole and
before the completion of the minimum
period of the sentence imposed upon him.
It is patently erroneous to release a
convict on recognizance. Section 24, Rule
114 provides that there shall no bail for a
convict after final judgment. The only
exception is when the convict applies for
Probation before he commences to serve
his sentence and that the offense and the
penalty for the offense is within the
purview of the Probation Law.
Sections 5 and 16 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court (on the different kinds of bail) APPLIES
ONLY TO AN ACCUSED UNDERGOING
PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT DURING TRIAL OR
ON APPEAL. THEY DO NOT APPLY TO A PERSON
CONVICTED BY FINAL JUDGMENT AND ALREADY
SERVING SENTENCE.
89. May a judge require “cash
bond” only?
No. The Rules provides for four (4)
ways of posting bond and it is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge to require
cash bond only. (Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA
38).
90. May an accused charged of a
capital offense and the evidence of guilt
is strong be granted bail?
Yes. The purpose of the bond is to
assure the court of the presence of the accused
during the trial of his case. If the probability of
“flight” is nil, then the accused may be allowed
to post bail. (BELTRAN VS. THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, April, 2007)
 91. May a person subject of
extradition from another country and
where the cases against him in said
country are bailable, be allowed to post
bail pending the extradition hearings?
No. As held in UNITED STATES VS.
JUDGE PURUGGANAN & MARK JIMENEZ, 389
SCRA 623 through former Chief justice
Panganiban, the Supreme Court held that a
person facing extradition proceedings is not
entitled to bail even if the crime he was
charged of in a foreign country is bailable. This
is so because the constitutional provision on
the right to bail under Art. III of the 1987
Constitution applies only to criminal cases,
not in extradition proceedings. (EDUARDO
RODRIGUEZ VS. THE PRESIDING JUDGE,
RTC 17, MANILA, 483 SCRA 290). This is so
because of the possibility of flight. BUT IN
THE CASE OF GOVERNMENT OF
HONGKONG VS. OLALIA, 521 SCRA 470, it
was held that the potential extradite may
be granted bail if he can prove by clear
and convincing evidence that he is not a
flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition
court. “ Clear and convincing evidence” is
an evidence with a standard lower than
proof beyond reasonable doubt but more
than preponderance of evidence.
92. In extradition cases, is the
respondent therein entitled to notice and
hearing before the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against him?
No. In SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS.
JUDGE LANTION, 322 SCRA 160 (The Mark
Jimenez Case) , the Supreme Court on a 9-6
vote held that the extraditee is entitled to
notice and hearing when a request for
extradition by another country is still being
evaluated. However, on Motion for
Reconsideration in the same case, in a 9-6
decision, the Supreme Court held that the
prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice
and hearing while his case is still under
evaluation because this would defeat the
purpose of the arrest warrant since it could give
warning that respondents would be arrested
and even encourage them to flee but entitled
to notice and hearing if the case is already fled
in court. However, if bail was granted to an
extradite, the same may not be cancelled
without notice and hearing. Otherwise, his right
to due process will be violated. (EDUARDO
RODRIGUEZ VS. THE PRESIDING JUDGE,
RTC 17, MANILA, 483 SCRA 290)
93. What is the “ EQUIPOISE
RULE” ?
If the evidence in a criminal case is evenly
balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence tilts the scale of justice in favor of
the accused and he should be acquitted from
the crime charged. Where the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more
interpretations one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence
does not fulfll the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction because
of the accused’s constitutional presumption of
innocence.(PEOPLE VS. DE LOS SANTOS,
355 SCRA 415)
94. May the court reverse the
order of trial in a criminal case?
No. such would violate the right of
the accused to presumption of innocence. To be
required to present his evidence frst would be
making him prove his innocence and not the
State proving his guilt. (Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96
SCRA 322) However, if the accused does not
object to such a procedure, then a reverse
order of trial is allowed by the Rules. (Sacay vs.
Sandiganbayan, July 10,l986) In fact it should
be noted that under the newly adopted 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sec. 3e), Rule
119)the said procedure is now expressly
sanctioned. Thus:
"However, when the accused admits the
act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the
order of trial may be modifed accordingly."
95. What is the extent of the
obligation of a counsel de oficio for an
accused in a criminal case?
While an accused may be given a
counsel de ofcio which is not a lawyer of his
own choice because he could not afford the
services of a de parte lawyer, only the faithful
performance by counsel of his duty towards his
client can give meaning and substance to the
accused’s right to due process and to be
presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
Hence, a lawyer’s duty, especially that of a
defense counsel, must not be taken lightly. It
must be performed with all the zeal and vigor
at his command to protect and safeguard the
accused’s fundamental rights. The cavalier
attitude of Atty. Manolo Brotonel of the PAO
cannot go unnoticed. It is discernible in [a] his
refusal to cross-examine Oleby Nadera (the
complainant for RAPE); [b] the manner in
which he conducted Maricris Nadera’s cross-
examination; and [c] his failure not only to
present evidence for the accused but to inform
the accused of his right to do so, if he desires.
(PEOPLE VS. NADERA, JR., 324 SCRA 490)
96. If the accused has the right
to be present during the trial of his case,
can he also refuse to appear during the
hearings of his case?
No. During arraignment,
promulgation of the decision and when he
is to be identified by the witnesses for the
prosecution, he must be present.
However, he can validly waive his
presence after arraignment when he state
in open court or in an affidavit that
whenever a witness mentions his name
during the presentation of the
prosecution’ s evidence, he admits that he
is the one being referred to. (Aquino vs.
Military Commission, 63 SCRA 546; P vs.
Judge, 125 SCRA 269)
97. When may “ speedy trial” be raised by
the accused to cause the dismissal of his
case? What kind of delays must occur
before the same could be invoked?
In JAIME BERNAT VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, May 20, 2004, it was held
that the right to speedy trial is violated only if
the proceedings were attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The
determination of whether the delays are of said
nature is relative and cannot be based on mere
mathematical reckoning of time. Particular
regard to the facts and circumstances of the
case. As held in the case of DE LA PENA VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, certain factors shall be
considered and balanced to determine if there
is delay, as follows:
Length of the delay;
Reasons for the delay;
Assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and
Prejudiced caused by the delay.
There is no violation of the right to speedy
disposition of his case because petitioner failed
to assert his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of his case. During the 8-year period
prior to April 19, 2002, petitioner did not
complain about the long delay in deciding his
case.
98. May the right to speedy
disposition of cases be invoked for the
dismissal of cases pending before quasi-
judicial bodies like the Office of the
Ombudsman?
Yes, unreasonable delays like failure
to decide a complaint against the respondent
for more than three (3) years from the time all
the pleadings were fled violates the
respondent’s right to a speedy disposition of his
case and the case must be dismissed.
(DUTERTE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 289 SCRA 721;
ANGCHANGCO VS. OMBUDSMAN, 269 SCRA
301)
The determination of whether an accused had
been denied the right to speedy trial depends
on the surrounding circumstances of each case.
Although it took about 8 years before the trial
of this case was resumed, such delay did not
amount to violation of petitioner’s right to
speedy trial considering that such delay was
not attributable to the prosecution.
The factors to consider in determining whether
or not such right has been violated:
1. length of delay,
2. reasons for such delay, and
3. assertion or failure to assert such rights
by the accused and the prejudice caused by the
delay.
(ii) Speedy Trial Act of 1998. The authority of
the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of
his subordinates even after an information has
already been fled in court does not present an
irreconcilable conflict with the 30-day period
prescribed in Sec. 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of
1998. (SUMBANG VS. GEN. COURT
MARTIAL, G.R. NO. 140188, 337 SCRA 227,
AUG. 3, 2000; BLANCO VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NOS. 136757 – 58,
346 SCRA 108, NOV. 27, 2000; SOLAR
TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. HON. HOW,
G.R. NO. 140863, 338 SCRA 51, AUG. 22,
2000).
99. Was the failure of the court
to have a sign language expert to inform
the accused who is a deaf-mute of the
contents of the criminal information fatal
to the validity of the proceedings which
resulted in the conviction of the said
accused?
Yes because the accused was denied
of the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. As such,
the entire proceedings is null and void and
another trial be conducted in the presence of a
sign language expert to inform the accused of
the proceedings. (Sales vs. CA, 164 SCRA
717; P vs. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 653)
100. In an Information for
“ RAPE” , is there violation of the right to
be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against the accused if the
alleged rape took place “sometime from
January 1990 up to December 6, 1998” or
a period of almost nine (9) years, without
specifying the exact date when the
alleged rape took place?
None. The accused should have fled
a Motion for a Bill of Particular or a Motion to
Quash. When he failed to do any of the two (2),
he is deemed to have waived the defect in the
information. Clearly, he slumbered on his rights
and awakened too late. Finally, the date is not
an element in rape cases. (PEOPLE VS. JERRY
NAZARENO, April 8, 2008)
100-a. May an accused in a
“ Homicide” case be convicted of “Murder”
without violating his right to be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation
against him?
Yes. Even if the Information was
captioned “For: Homicide” only but the body of
the Information alleges “treachery” or “evident
premeditation” and the same was read to the
accused, he could be convicted of Murder. This
is so because it is the body of the Information
that is binding, not the caption thereof and
therefore, the accused was duly informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him. (P
vs. Resavaga, 159 SCRA 426)
101. What is the effect of the
testimony of a witness who did not return
to court for his cross examination? How
about if there is only partial cross-
examination?
A witness who did not return to court
for his cross-examination would render his
entire testimony inadmissible for being hearsay.
It likewise violated the right of confrontation on
the part of the accused. (Ortigas, JR. vs.
Lufthansa, 64 SCRA 610) If the witness was
partially examined, only the portion of his direct
testimony where he was cross-examined shall
be admissible as evidence.( P vs. Seneris, 99
SCRA 92, DELA CRUZ VS. PAPA, December 8,
2010)
102. What are the requisites of a
valid trial in absentia? May an accused
who jumped bail after arraignment be
validly convicted by the trial court?
The requisites of a valid trial in
absentia are the following:
The accused was duly arraigned;
The accused was notifed of the hearing; and
The accused’s absence [during the trial] is
unjustifable.
103. May an accused compel the
trial court to issue subpoena to a
Physician who is already working in the
United States to testify on his treatment
of the accused? Would the failure of said
witness to appear and testify for the
accused violates his right to subpoena
witnesses and the production of evidence
in his favor?
No. Such witness is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Philippine Courts. Further, his
right to subpoena witnesses and the production
of evidence will not be violated since the
hospital could produce said records and
another physician could testify on the contents
thereof. (Cavili vs. Hon. Florendo, 154 SCRA
610; Fajardo vs. Garcia, 98 SCRA 514)
104. May the accused be
presented by the prosecution as the
latter’ s witness?
No. Such would violate the right of
the accused against self-incrimination and if
such happened, the proceedings shall be null
and void. (Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663)
105. Generally, to what kind of
evidence does the right against self-
incrimination applies?
Generally, it applies only to
“testimonial compulsion.” As such, forcing a
person to give a sample of his urine to
determine whether a woman is pregnant
(Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62); whether a
person is suffering from sexually transmitted
disease (US vs. Tang Teng, 23 Phil. 145) or
under the influence of prohibited drugs
(PEOPLE VS. BANIHIT, G.R. NO. 132045, 339
SCRA 86, AUG. 25, 2000; PEOPLE VS.
CONTINENTE, G.R. NOS. 100801- 02, 339 SCRA
1, AUG. 25, 2000) does not violate the person’s
right against self-incrimination. Likewise forcing
one to try a pair of shoes, pants or shirt does
not fall under the above proscription.
106. How about forcing a person to give a
sample of his handwriting?.
 Though the same does not require
testimonial compulsion, the right against self-
incrimination will be violated by said act. This is
so because it involves the use of the
intelligence of the person. (Beltran vs. Samson,
50 Phil. 570)
107. Does the right against self-
incrimination applicable to civil and
administrative cases also?
Yes but unlike in criminal cases where
the accused could not be presented by the
prosecution and his right not to take the
witness stand is absolute, an adverse party in a
civil or administrative cases may be presented
by the other party but could refuse to answer
only if the question propounded calls for an
incriminatory answer.
108. May a court stenographer
who had resigned from the government
be compelled to transcribe her notes
under pain of contempt without violating
her right against involuntary servitude?
Yes. This is so because the testimony
was taken while she was still in the government
and as such, it was her obligation to transcribe
the same, having received her salary for the
day when the testimony was taken. (Aclaracion
vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131)
109. Is the Death Penalty already
abolished by the 1987 Constitution?
While the Supreme Court answered
the same in the affirmative in the cases of P
vs. Gavarra, 155 SCRa 327; P vs. Masangkay,
155 SCRA 113; P vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242; P
vs. Intino, September 26, 1988 it held in People
vs. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107 that it was merely
suspended.
110. Is death as a penalty a cruel
or unuasual punishment?
No. (P vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647). It is
only when the punishment is shocking to the
conscience of the community and
disproportionate to the offense charged that
the penalty becomes cruel and unusual. In fact,
the Supreme Court held in ECHEGARAY VS.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE that death through
Lethal Injection is the most humane way of
implementing the death penalty.
111. What are the requisites
before an accused may validly invoke
double jeopardy?
There is double jeopardy when there is:
[1] valid complaint of information;
[2] fled in a court of competent
jurisdiction;
[3] the accused was validly
arraigned; and
[4] the accused was convicted
or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused. (PEOPLE VS.
ALMARIO, 355 SCRA 1)
112. If the dismissal was with
the express consent of the accused, may
the dismissal result in double jeopardy?
Yes in two (2) instances.
As a general rule, if the dismissal is through
the instance of the accused or with his express
consent, there is no double jeopardy. However,
this rule admits of two (2) exceptions:
1) the motion to dismiss is based on
insufficiency of evidence or Demurrer to
Evidence; and
2) the motion to dismiss is based on the
denial of the accused’ s right to speedy
trial. (PEOPLE VS. ALMARIO, 355 SCRA 1)
-double jeopardy has set in. In these
two (2) instances, the correct description of
what happened is that the accused was
“acquitted” and not “the case was dismissed
with his consent”.
It must be pointed out, however, that in
PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL, 244 SCRA 202 and
PEOPLE VS. LEVISTE, 255 SCRA 238, the SC
reversed the dismissal of the criminal case by
the trial court based on “speedy trial” since the
same was not predicated “on the clear right of
the accused to speedy trial.” It is only when
there is a clear violation of the accused’s right
to speedy trial that the dismissal results in
double jeopardy.
112-a. The accused was arrested
with an unlicensed firearm in Mabalacat,
Pampanga. He was charged for violation
of PD 1866 with the RTC of Pampanga in
an Information signed by the City
Prosecutor of Angeles City. At the middle
of the trial, the Judge dismissed the case
without the consent of the accused. When
another information for the same offense
was filed by the Provincial prosecutor of
Pampanga, the accused moved for the
dismissal of the 2nd case based on double
jeopardy. Decide.
Double jeopardy has not set in
because the frst requisite of valid complaint or
information is not present. The City Prosecutor
of Angeles City has no jurisdiction to fle an
information for an offense that took place in
Mabalacat, Pampanga. (CUDIA VS. CA, 284
SCRA 173)
113. The accused was charged of
theft of electricity based on the City
Ordinance of Batangas City. After
arraignment, the case was dismissed
because it was found out that the same
has prescribed because it was filed after
more than 60 days. The Fiscal filed
another information based on the Revised
Penal Code. Has double jeopardy set in?
Yes. If the accused was charged of
“theft of electricity” based on the City
Ordinance of Batangas and not based on the
Revised Penal Code and later on the case is
dismissed by the judge due to the fact that the
crime has prescribed, the government can no
longer charge the accused of the same crime
under the Revised Penal Code since double
jeopardy has set in. If an act is punished by law
and an ordinance, acquittal or conviction in one
shall bar prosecution from the other. (PEOPLE
VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292)
114. The accused was charged of
grave coercion before the MTC and was
duly arraigned. The Judge dismissed it
without any motion form the accused
because the case is allegedly outside the
MTC’ s jurisdiction. Another information
for the same offense was filed with the
RTC which was likewise dismissed
because of lack of jurisdiction. As such,
the Fiscal filed a 3rd information for grave
coercion before the MTC. The accused
pleaded double jeopardy. Is he correct?
Yes. Since the accused was already
arraigned in the 1st information before the MTC
which has jurisdiction over the same and the
case was subsequently dismissed without his
express consent, then double jeopardy has set
in.
115. The accused was arraigned
of homicide and entered a plea of guilty
but prayed that he be given the chance to
prove incomplete self-defense which the
court granted. After presenting his
evidence to prove “ incomplete self-
defense” , the court acquitted him because
what was allegedly proven by him was
complete self-defense. May the accused
validly invoke double jeopardy if the
Prosecutor moves for the reinstatement
of the case for him to present the
evidence of the prosecution?
No because one of the requisites of
double jeopardy is missing. There was no valid
arraignment. This is so because his plea was
one of guilty and yet, he was acquitted. In this
case, he has to be re-arraigned for him to enter
a plea of “not guilty” in order that he could be
validly acquitted.(PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN,
17 SCRA 1119)
116. The accused was convicted
of frustrated murder. Within 15 days from
promulgation, he filed a Motion for New
Trial based on a “newly-discovered
evidence” which was granted by the
court. After the presentation of the
alleged “ newly-discovered evidence”, the
accused was acquitted. May the
prosecution appeal the acquittal since the
evidence presented was not really a
newly-discovered evidence but a
forgotten one and that even assuming
that the same is a newly-discovered
evidence, it was insufficient to overturn
the evidence of guilt as proven by the
prosecution.
In the case of P vs. Judge Hernando,
108 SCRA 121, the Supreme Court held that
indeed, the evidence presented was not “newly-
discovered evidence” and that assuming it to
be so, it was not sufficient to overturn the
evidence of guilt as shown by the prosecution’s
evidence. However, though the decision was
erroneous, double jeopardy has set in and the
government could no longer appeal the
decision. So even if the court obviously erred in
the appreciation of the evidence resulting in a
decision of acquittal instead of conviction,
appeal would put the accused in double
jeopardy. (Mazo vs. Mun. Court, 113 SCRA 217)
117. May the government appeal
a judgment of acquittal or for the
increase of the penalty imposed?
No since double jeopardy has set in. (PEOPLE
VS. HON. VELASCO, G.R. NO. 127444, 340 SCRA
207, SEPT. 13, 2000). As mandated by the
Constitution, statutes and cognate
jurisprudence, an acquittal is fnal and
unappealable on the ground of double
jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court
of a judgment of acquittal brought before the
Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had
unless there is a fnding of mistrial, as in
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan.
However, if the accused was the one who
appealed the decision of the CFI convicting him
of homicide (though he was charged of
murder), the appellate court may convict him of
murder if the evidence warrants and that the
lower court mis-appreciated the evidence. This
is so because if the accused appeals the
decision, the same will be subject to a complete
re-examination of the evidence on record.
(PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO, March 2, 2009)
118-a. May the government , by way of
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,
question the Decision of Acquittal by the
trial court, or for the increase of the
penalty imposed by the trial court?
Yes. In cases of: [1] in a judgment of acquittal
rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
[PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 491 SCRA
185, June 16, 2000]; and [2] where the
prosecution had been deprived of due process
due to misfeasance of the prosecutor.
[MERCIALES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 379
SCRA 345; PEOPLE VS. VELASCO, 340
SCRA 207, September 13, 2000], cited
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN & IMELDA
MARCOS, ET AL., February 7, 2012;
VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE, February 1, 2012;
YSIDORO VS. HON. TERESITA CASTRO,
February 6, 2012.
118-b. Jason Ivler was charged of: [1]
Reckless imprudence resulting to slight
physical injuries; and [2] Reckless
imprudence resulting to Homicide and
Damage to Property as a result of his
single negligent act of bumping the
vehicle of the victims. He entered a plea
of guilty in the first case and when he was
about to be arraigned in the second, he
invoked double jeopardy and prayed for
the dismissal of the 2nd case. Decide.
Yes, double jeopardy has set in. He could not be
tried again for the 2nd case. A single negligent
act could not be the subject of two (2) criminal
informations. [IVLER VS. JUDGE PEDRO, G.R.
No. 172716, November 17, 2010] (NOTE:
Very important in your Criminal Law. Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code allows complexing a
crime if it involves grave and less grave
felonies but the Ivler case does not. The
Supreme Court held that Art. 48 does not apply
to negligence cases)
118-c. May the private complainant
validly file a Motion for Reconsideration of
a Decision of the Supreme Court
ACQUITTING Hubert Webb and company of
Rape with Homicide and Murder without
violating the rule on double jeopardy?
No. The acquittal of Hubert Webb and his co-
accused by the Supreme Court in the Vizconde
Rape/Murder cases is fnal. Double jeopardy has
set in. (LEJANO VS. PEOPLE & PEOPLE VS.
HUBERT WEB ET AL., January 18, 2011)
118. What is the "Supervening Fact
Doctrine."
It simply provides that an accused’s
conviction shall not be a bar to another
prosecution for an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the former
complaint or information when the graver
offense developed due to supervening facts
arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge or that the facts
constituting the graver charge became known
only or were discovered after a plea was
entered in the former complaint or information.
(Section 7, Rule 117, 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure; P vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260; P vs.
Villasis, 46 O.G. 268; Melo vs. People, 85 Phil.
766; P vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 712; P vs. Adil, 76
SCRA 462; P. vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601; and P
vs. City Court of Manila, 121 SCRA 637
119. When may the “ex-post facto
law” rule be invoked?
Only if the law sought to be applied is a
“criminal law or penal”. Otherwise, the same
may not be invoked as when the questioned
law involves the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which is not a penal law. Ex
post facto law prohibits the retrospectivity of
penal laws. RA 8249 is not a penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not
penal in character. (PANFILO M. LACSON VS.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL., ROMEO ACOP &
FRANCISCO ZUBIA, JR., G.R. No. 128096,
January 20, 1999)
120. What are the different
forms of ex-post facto law?
In order that a law is an ex post facto
law, the same must be one—
a. which makes an act done criminal before
the passing of the law and which was innocent
when committed, and punishes such action;
b. which aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than when it was committed;
c. which changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed;
d. which alters the legal rules of evidence
and receives less or different testimony than
the law required a the time of the commission
of the offense in order to convict the defendant;
e. every law which, in relation to the
offense or its consequences, alters the situation
of a person to his disadvantage;
f. that which assumes to regulate civil
rights and remedies but in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right which when
done was lawful;
g. deprives a person accused of a crime of
some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty (KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, 35 SCRA
429; MEJIA VS. PAMARAN, 160 SCRA 457;
TAN VS. BARRIOS, 190 SCRA 686; PEOPLE
VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 211 SCRA 241).
Part III
Essay and MCQ Exercises
[Political Law]
____ 1. The implied power of the President
which justifes his/her not releasing or
“obligating” pork barrels of Senators and
Congressmen is known as:
a. Residual power;
b. Power of executive clemency;
c. Power of executive impoundment;
d. Power supervision.
____ 2. Section 7, Article II enumerates the
paramount considerations which the Philippines
has to observe in dealing with other countries.
Which is not considered paramount?
a. National interest;
b. The right to self-determination;
c. National economy;
d. Territorial integrity.
____ 3. Which is a valid ground or grounds to
declare martial law under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution?
a. In case of invasion or rebellion, or
when the public safety requires it;
b. In case of invasion, rebellion or insurrection;
c. in case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it;
d. in case of war or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it.
____ 4. Under Section 1, Art. XI, a government
official shall serve with the highest degree of:
a. competence;
b. intelligence;
c. responsibility
d. independence
____ 5. The doctrine of executive impoundment
is based on the President’s :
a. Power of control;
b. Power as commander-in-chief;
c. Implied power given to him by Congress
under the General Appropriations Act;
d. All of the above.
____ 6. In Ichong vs. Hernandez, the Supreme
Court held that the Retail Trade Nationalization
Act prohibiting aliens from engaging in retail
trade in the Philippines is constitutional. In
Espina vs. Executive Secretary Zamora, the
Supreme Court held that the Trade
Liberalization Act of 2000 allowing foreigners to
engage in retail trade is constitutional, under
what qualifcations:
a. they shall be allowed only to retail
groceries like coffee and sugar;
b. they shall only be allowed to retail
garments made in the Philippines only;
c. they shall only be allowed to retail cars
manufactured in their country of origin;
d. they shall be allowed a limited capital
only .
____ 7. Which is not correct as a proposition
insofar as the 250,000 population requirement
is concerned:
a. in the creation of a new province;
b. in the creation of a highly urbanized city
entitled to one member of the House of
Representative;
c. in the creation of additional legislative
district in a highly urbanized city;
d. in the creation of a new legislative
district in an existing province.
_____ 8. There is already a violation of a
conditional pardon which would justify the
immediate arrest of the convict as early as
when:
a. He was already convicted by the MTC of
a crime though on appeal to the RTC;
b. He was convicted by the RTC on Appeal
from the MTC Decision;
c. The Prosecutor fled a Criminal
Information against the convict before the MTC;
d. The Decisions of the MTC and RTC were
affirmed by the Court of Appeals but accused
fled a Petition for Review before the Supreme
Court.
____ 9. The President could not exercise the
power of executive clemency on his own alone
in cases of:
a. crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua or higher;
b. election offenses without the favorable
recommendation of the COMELEC;
c. crimes against the State;
d. impeachable officers who are convicted
by of graft the Sandiganbayan.
____ 10. A judge or justice may be investigated
only by the Office of the Ombudsman for
possible criminal liability if:
a. he is already found administratively
liable by the Supreme Court for the same act;
b. he is a recidivist;
c. he was caught in the act receiving a
bribe and the evidence of guilt is strong;
d. he was already found liable
administratively by the Supreme Court before
in a similar offense.
____ 11. The power of the University of the
Philippines to close its High School in UP Baguio
is based on:
a. its academic freedom;
b. its being independent from the
Department of Education under its Charter;
c. the power of the Board of Regents to
decide on the feasibility of operating its other
branches and that its operation in UP High
School Baguio results in defcit;
d. its being autonomous as the premier
State University in the country.
____ 12. The most basic State Policies under
the 1987 Philippine Constitution are the
maintenance of peace and order, protection of
life liberty , etc., but not:
a. of property;
b. promotion of general welfare;
c. protection of the environment;
d. maintenance of monopolies.
____ 13. Which of the following is not within the
powers of the COMELEC over Party-list Groups:
a. order the publication of the list of
nominees for the different party-list groups
because the Party-List law provides that the
same is confdential;
b. refuse the registration of a party-list
group because the members thereof belong to
religious groups;
c. change the 1st nominee of a party-list
group after election upon the Resolution of the
majority of the board of said party-list group
after it was determined that such group is
entitled to a seat in the House of
Representatives;
d. Register a party-list group whose
members are gays, lesbians, bisexual and
transgender since they are not specifcally
mentioned as “marginalized” in Veterans Party
vs. COMELEC.
____ 14. Which may be allowed in the
impeachment of an impeachable officer:
a. Trying an impeachable officer based on
several impeachment complaints fled on
different dates before the House of
Representatives but referred to the Committee
on Justice on the same day;
b. Trying an impeachable officer on several
impeachment complaints fled on the same day
but tried one after the other;
c. Trying an impeachable officer on a
second complaint fled within three (3) months
from the dismissal of another complaint by the
Committee on Justice but did not reached the
plenary;
d. Trying an impeachable officer within a
year from the dismissal of the 1st complaint but
the new complaint is based on an act
committed after the fling of the frst complaint.
____ 15. The aspect of the power of judicial
review wherein the courts could decide even
moot and academic cases is specifcally called:
a. legitimizing function;
b. educational or symbolic function;
c. checking function;
d. judicial function.
____ 16. Which is not an underlying principle
behind the State immunity from suit:
a. by reason of consent;
b. by reason of public policy;
c. by reason of sovereignty;
d. by reason of expediency.
_____ 17. Judicial power may be exercised even
in moot and academic cases if it involves:
a. culpable violation of the Constitution;
b. susceptible of repetition, yet evading
judicial review;
c. the need to lay down guiding principles on his close intimacy with the appointing
for other government officials to follow; power:
d. All of the above.
a. Highly technical;
____ 18. Even if one of the four (4) requisites of b. Policy determining;
judicial review is not present, the courts may c. Primarily confdential;
decide cases involving it if: d. Probationary employee.

a. it involves a Senator or Congressman as ____ 24. Which is the most correct proposition:
petitioner;
b. it involves a Provincial Governor as a. The COMELEC may continue to decide
petitioner; after the election the earlier case regarding the
c. it involves a Member of the Cabinet as qualifcation of a candidate for Senator which
the petitioner; was fled before the election since once
d. it involves paramount public interest. jurisdiction is acquired, it will remain with it;
b. Once a candidate for Congress is
____ 19. The Supreme Court acting as the proclaimed and has taken his oath, any
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) may question relating to his election, returns and
promulgate rules based on the Constitution qualifcations shall now be lodged at the
giving themselves allowances, appoint appropriate Electoral Tribunal;
personnel of the PET, create a separate seal c. The COMELEC may still determine the
different from that of the Supreme Court and qualifcations of members of party-list groups
others based on its: even after elections since it is the one which
registers such party-list group under the law
a. residual power; and the Constitution as well as proclaims their
b. doctrine of necessary implication; winning candidates of said groups for the
c. commander –in- chief; House of Representatives;
d. fscal autonomy. d. The COMELEC may disqualify party-list
groups in the next elections if they failed to get
___20. Which office or branch of the at least 2% of the votes cast and did not
government does not have expressed fscal participate in the two (2) previous elections, or
autonomy under the Constitution? vice versa, based on the party-list law.

a. Constitutional Commissions; ____25. The executive privilege may be

b. Judicial Department; invoked by the President or any member of his
c. Local Government units as to their Cabinet as well as the Generals of the Armed
share in national taxes; Forces of the Philippines if the information
d. Executive Department. sought by legislators from them:

____21. A declaration of national emergency by a. Affects national security;

the President of the Philippines is valid, even b. Has the effect of damaging our
without the approval of Congress if it is based diplomatic relations with another country;
on: c. Military secrets;
d. All of the above.
a. Section 23, Art. VI of the Constitution;
b. First Sentence, of Section 18, Art. VII of
the Constitution; ___26. The 40 years of age as a qualifcation
c. Section 17, Art. XII of the Constitution; does not apply to:
d. Section 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
a. The President;
____22. Who need not be confrmed by the b. Justices of the Supreme Court;
Commission on Appointments? c. Senators;
d. Vice President.
a. Consul to Timbukto;
b. Lt. Col. Pedro Penduko on his promotion __27. Which is not one of the “non-legislative
as full colonel; powers” of Congress:
c. Ambassador to the United Nations;
d. New justice of the Supreme Court. a. Canvass of the results of the
Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections;
____23. Which position does not necessarily b. Impeaching the President;
require the aptitude of the appointee but more c. Conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation;
d. Creating a new province. a. 2/3 votes of all the Members of the
Senate;
___28. The “residual power” of the President b. 1/3 votes or signatures of all the
emanates from his: Members of the House of Representatives?
c. 2/3 vote of both Houses of Congress
a. power to appoint; voting separately;
b. “calling out power” as commander-in- d. ¾ votes of all the Members of the
chief; Senate.
c. power of control;
d. pardoning power. __35. Which of the following instances where
the House of Representatives and the Senate
__29. The refusal of the President to allow are not expressly mandated by the Constitution
members of his Cabinet to appear in inquiries to vote separately and therefore may vote
in aid of legislation in Congress violates not jointly:
only Section 21 of Art. VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution but also: a. Declare the existence of a state of war;
b. Confrmation of a New Vice President
a. Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution; nominated by the President;
b. Section 1, Art. XI of the Constitution; c. Concurrence to a declaration of
c. Section 7, Art. III of the Constitution; amnesty by the President;
d. All of the above. d. In case there is conflict between
majority of the Members of the Cabinet and the
__30. Which of the following act of the President President on whether the latter is incapacitated
does not need the concurrence or confrmation to perform his duties.
of Congress or any Committee thereof:
__36. Which appointment needs confrmation
a. Treaty-making power; by the Commission on Appointments?
b. Granting Amnesty to rebel soldiers;
c. Tax Amnesty; a. Consul to Timbukto;
d. Appointment of Members of the Cabinet. b. Tagapangasiwa ng Bangko Sentral;
c. Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
__31. Which of the following ground for d. Justice of the Supreme Court.
impeachment was not part of the 1935 and
1973 Philippine Constitutions? __37. Which of the following instances results in
a valid approval into law by the President within
a. Treason; 30 days from receipt of a bill enacted by
b. Bribery; Congress::
c. Betrayal of Public Trust;
d. Other high crimes. a. Signing the approved bills at the
Philippine Embassy in New York, USA;
__32. Which appointment does not require b. Signing the approved bills inside the US
“merit and ftness to be determined by Congress;
competitive examination? c. Signing the approved bills over the
Pacifc Ocean on Board Singapore Airlines;
a. Highly technical; d. All of the above.
b. Primarily confdential;
c. Policy Determining; ___38. Aside from “utmost responsibility,
d. All of the above. integrity and loyalty”. What other quality must
a public servant possess?
__33. What kind of laws must exclusively a. industry;
originate from the House of Representatives? b. probity;
c. efficiency;
a. Revenue bills; d. leniency.
b. Appropriation bills;
c. Bills of local application; _____39. The Ombudsman has no power to
d. All of the above. investigate and fle a criminal or administrative
case against a City Mayor charged of:
__34. Which of the following votes are needed a. Raping his executive secretary inside
to “impeach” any of the impeachable officers? his office at City Hall during office hours;
b. Bribery;
c. Refusal to implement an Ordinance Philippines as well as members of his Cabinet,
passed by the City Council which he vetoed but it does not include:
was overridden by said body; a. advisory opinions to the President;
d. Padlocking the Office of Jadewell b. legal opinions of the DOJ Secretary to
Corporation at Burnham Park, Baguio City, at 9 the President;
p.m. on his frst day in office because he c. discussions by Members of the Cabinet
believes the latter’s contract with the City is not with the President during Cabinet Meetings;
valid. d. confdential instructions by the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and
_____40. Which is not within the power of the Local Government to the Provincial Governor of
Commission on Elections: Maguindanao to deliver a 12-0 results in favor
a. enforce laws and regulations relative to of the candidates for Senator of the incumbent
conduct of elections; President.
b. deciding appeals involving elections of
Sangguniang Kabataan members; ___46. Which power of executive clemency may
c. enforce laws relating to referendum and not be exercised alone by the President, as a
plebiscites; general rule:
d. enforce laws regarding People’s Initiative
to amend the Constitution. a. pardon;
b. amnesty;
_____41. Which court is not mandated by the c. commutations;
Constitution to decide cases before it within d. remit fnes and forfeitures.
three (3) months from the time said cases are
deemed submitted for decision? ___47. The vote needed to suspend or expel a
Senator or Congressman for disorderly
a. Regional Trial Courts; behavior is:
b. Sandiganbayan;
c. Court of Tax Appeals; a. 2/3 of the members of the House where
d. Municipal Trial Courts. he belongs;
b. 2/3 of both Houses voting separately;
______42. A member of the Judiciary must be a c. Majority of the Members of the House
person who possesses the four qualifcations where he belongs;
summarized by the word CIPI. What does the d. Majority of the members of both Houses
letter “P” stands for as a person with “proven”? voting separately.

a. Patriotism; ___48. The voting in each House of Congress on

b. Probity; matters affecting national security may be
c. Professionalism; entered in the journal upon the request of:
d. Philosophy.
1. 2/3 of the Members present;
_____43.. In a House of Representatives with a 2. ¾ of the Members present;
total of 240 members, what is the minimum 3. 1/5 of the total members of the House
number of Members must a party have to be holding such session;
entitled to 1 seat at the Commission of 4. 1/5 of the Members of the specifc House
Appointments? who are present.
a. 40;
b. 30; ___ 49. The prohibition on the President to
c. 20; make appointments two months before the
d. 10. next Presidential Election and up to the end of
his term, according to the Supreme Court in the
___44. Which is not considered a case of ARTURO DE CASTRO VS. JUDICIAL AND
“priority” for the government under our BAR COUNCIL, applies only to the:
declaration of principles and state policies?
a. sports; a. judiciary;
b. arts; b. constitutional commissions;
c. culture; c. executive department;
d. tourism. d. Ombudsman.

___45. Under the deliberative process ___50. Which need not exclusively originate
privilege granted to the President of the from the House of Representatives?
a. Bill amending the Senior Citizens Act;
b. Bill creating the City of Tacloban, Leyte; ____ 5. Res judicata in prison gray is known
c. Bill adding the position of as the right against:
Municipal/City Arbitrator for all cities and towns
in the country aside from the officials indicated e. unreasonable searches and seizures;
in the Local Government Code.; f. cruel and unusual punishment;
d. Bill appropriating supplemental budget g. double jeopardy;
for victims of Typhoon Sendong. h. non-imprisonment for debt.

____ 6. Which of the following acts violates the

[B. Constitutional Law] right against self-incrimination of a person?

____ 1. “Content-neutral” as a restriction to a. Requiring a man to give a sample of

freedom of expression deals with the:
Time and place where the speech is made;
Content or substance of the speech;
Association or group where the speaker
belongs;
Religious group of the speaker.
____ 2. As a rule, “tips” are not sufficient to vest
probable cause on the part of the police officers
to conduct warrantless searches and seizures,
except:
his semen for DNA Examination to determine
the paternity of a child;
b. Requiring a suspect to try a pair of
pants;
c. Requiring a person to read a particular
news item in order to compare his voice with
the voice of the assailant which was recorded
at the cellphone of the victim;
d. None of the above.
____ 7. Bail is a matter of discretion in cases
where:

a. In moving vehicles where there is no a. the accused is charged of a capital

sufficient time to secure a search warrant from
the courts;
b. Checkpoints;
c. Search involving hot logs;
d. all of the above.
____ 3. The general test of the validity of an
ordinance on substantive due process grounds
is best tested when assessed with the evolved
footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme
Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products, as cited in
White Light Corporation vs. City Mayor of
Manila, one of which is the:
a. clear and present danger test;
b. dangerous tendency test;
c. heightened or immediate scrutiny
test;
d. prior restraint test.
____ 4. In order that an Ordinance is considered
a valid police power measure, it:
a. must not prohibit but merely
regulate trade;
b. must allow the policemen to use
their discretion on whether a particular act
violates public morals or not;
c. authorizes the City or Municipal
Mayor to close down establishments which he
deems as promoting immoral acts;
d. authorizing the law enforcement
authorities to confscate magazines which are
obscene.
offense but the evidence of guilt is strong;
b. the accused was convicted by the RTC of
Homicide and was sentenced to 14 years and 1
day to 20 years imprisonment;
c. the accused was convicted by the RTC
of robbery and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day
up to 12 years imprisonment but jumped bail
several times during the trial of his case;
d. all of the above.
_____ 8. Who among the following officials may
not validly conduct custodial investigation?
a. Barangay Captain;
b. Barangay Bantay Bayan;
c. Investigator of the CIDG;
d. Investigator of the NBI.
____ 9. In an application for a rally permit, the
City Mayor:
a. may allow the rally but at a different
place as a result of the evidence of clear and
present danger;
b. may allow the rally in the same place
but at a different time; as a result of the
evidence of clear and present danger;
c. may deny the application for a rally
permit based on clear and present danger after
giving the applicant the chance to rebut the
evidence in his possession.
d. All of the above.
____ 10. In an expropriation case for the
construction of a school building to be owned
by the City of Manila, the government must
deposit an amount in order to be issued a writ
of possession equal to:
a. 100% of the fair market/zonal value of
the property sought to be expropriated based
on the latest tax declaration;
b. 100% of the assessed value of the
property sought to be expropriated based on
the latest tax declaration;
c. 15% of the market or zonal value based
on the latest tax declaration;
d. None of the above.
____ 11. Which is not a valid exercise of police
power:
a. To promote public morals;
b. To promote economic stability of the
people;
c. To promote free enterprise;
d. To promote public health;
____ 12. There is no violation of the right to due
process if:
a. When “A” was ordered dismissed from
his job immediately after his employer saw the
CCTV showing him stealing a company
property;
b. “X” was not given the opportunity to be
heard before declaring his classmate “Y” as the
class valedictorian despite the fact that he was
always frst in class from Grades 1 to 5 and
from 1st to 3rd Grading in Grade VI;
c. When the RTC decided the case after
the submission of the answer without
conducting a full-blown trial;
d. When Atty. “Z” was immediately cited
for contempt of court for being late in his court
appearance.
____ 13. Which of the following is not one of
the rights of an accused during criminal
proceedings:
a. Right to be presumed innocent;
b. Right to independent and competent
counsel of his own choice;
c. Right to speedy trial;
d. Right to confront witnesses face to face.
e. All of the above are the rights of an
accused during criminal proceedings.
____ 14. The presence of a lawyer for the
accused is not needed during:
a. Police line up;
b. Arraignment;
c. Custodial investigation for a minor
offense;
d. Promulgation of his sentence.
____ 15. In order that consent to a Warrantless
searches and seizure is valid; which is the most
correct proposition:
a. the owner of the house to be searched
must give his consent;
b. the owner of the place to be searched
must give his consent to the search of specifc
items sought by the searching party;
c. the wife will give her consent to the
search as a co-owner of the house to be
searched;
d. the husband and wife who own the
house to be searched must give their consent.
____ 16. Which of the following acts violates the
right against self-incrimination of a person?
a. Requiring a man to give a sample of
his semen for DNA Examination to determine
the paternity of a child;
b. Requiring a suspect to try a pair of
pants;
c. requiring a person to give a sample of
his urine for testing on whether she is pregnant
or not to be used in her prosecution for
adultery;
d. None of the above.
_____ 17. Which right of the citizen will be
violated if the PCGG Commissioners refuse to
attend a Senate Inquiry in aid of legislation as a
result missing funds of PHILCOMSAT, a
sequestered company:
a. Right to privacy;
b. Right to information;
c. Freedom of expression;
d. Freedom of Religion
____ 18. Which of the following is the right of
the accused to be invoked if the witness failed
to return for cross-examination:
a. Right to be presumed innocent;
b. Right to independent and competent
counsel of his own choice;
c. Right to speedy trial;
d. Right to confront witnesses face to face.
____ 19. The extrajudicial confession of “A” is
not admissible in evidence in which of the
following:
a. He went to the police station and
surrendered telling the 1st policeman he met at
the police station “I killed my brother because I
caught him in the act of sexual intercourse with
my wife” without being informed of his rights
during custodial investigation;
b. He told the jail guards responding to
shouts for help of an inmate stabbed by him
inside the comfort room of New Bilibid Prisons
without being informed of his rights during
custodial investigation;;
c. He told the Mayor that he killed and
raped his cousin after being threatened by said
official without informing him of his rights
during custodial investigation;
d. He answered the questions of the
policemen who invited him to shed light on
the death of his neighbor while walking along
the road towards the police station without
informing him of his rights during custodial
investigation.
___20. There is no double jeopardy in which of
the following instance:
a. A criminal case for estafa was
reinstated after six (6) months from the time it
was provisionally dismissed despite the
vigorous objections of the accused invoking his
tight to speedy trial, because the prosecution
could not locate its documentary exhibits after
arraignment;
b. A criminal case was reinstated by the
RTC after the Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside its earlier order declaring that there is
no probable cause in the fling of the case;
c. A criminal case for grave for grave
coercion was earlier dismissed by the MTC on
its own for lack of jurisdiction after
arraignment but admitted a second information
for the same crime upon being shown of the
latest Supreme Court decision stating that the
MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction in cases
of said nature.
d. A criminal case was reinstated after
dismissal based on demurrer to evidence based
on insufficiency of evidence since an
eyewitness surfaced with a videotape of the
commission of the crime.
____21. In extradition cases, which statement is
true:
a. Bail is allowed if the crime the
extraditee is charged in another country is
bailable;
b. Bail is allowed if the crime committed in
another country is also a crime punishable in
the Philippines and it is bailable here;
c. Bail may be allowed if the extraditee
could prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he is not a flight risk and that he will
assure the court that he will follow the
conditions imposed by the court;
d. Bail may be allowed if he is a member of
Congress and the crime he committed in
another country is not punishable by more than
6 years imprisonment.
____22. Based on the accused’s right to be
presumed innocent, he is entitled to acquittal in
case of:
a. Inconsistent testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses on material matters;
b. Non-compliance by the arresting
authorities of the requirements of Section 21 of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, RA
No. 9165;
c. The testimony of the private
complainant is unbelievable and contrary to
common human experience;
d. All of the above.
____23. There is no double jeopardy if after an
accused was convicted of the crime of
homicide before the RTC of Baguio City after he
was tried for Murder:
a. The Court of Appeals increased the
penalty to reclusion perpetua on appeal by the
accused because it found the evidence
sufficient to convict the accused for Murder;
b. The Court of Appeals increased the
penalty to reclusion perpetua on appeal by the
State because it found the evidence sufficient
to convict the accused for Murder;
c. The Prosecution fled a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision of the RTC
because the accused was convicted of
Homicide instead of Murder as charged in the
information;
d. The Solicitor General fled a petition for
certiorari as a result of the erroneous acquittal
of the accused by the RTC when no less than
the Supreme Court believes that there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt to fnd the accused
guilty as charged.
____ 24. Bail is a matter of right when—
a. The accused in a Murder case is 16
years old;
b. The accused is charged of 100 counts of
falsifcation of public documents;
c. The accused is charged of multiple
homicide;
d. The accused is charged of 100 counts of
BP Bilang 22 with aggregate amount of P100M
e. All of the above.
____25. The immunity from prosecution
whereby the accused could not be charged of
any crime whatsoever in addition to the crime
where he is testifying in court is:

a. Parliamentary immunity;
b. Transactional immunity;
c. Presidential immunity;
d. Use immunity.
____26. The right of a housemaid violated by
the act of her employer not to allow her to
transfer to another employment since she has
already received all her salaries up to
December 31, 2012.
a. Right to travel;
b. Right against involuntary servitude;
c. Right to locomotion;
d. All of the above.
____27. The freedom of expression, speech or
the press are not absolute. They may not be
validly invoked in the case of:
a. movies with explicit sex scenes and
violence like the Vizconde Story showing the
gruesome murders of three (3) women;
b. the life of a woman whose work is
having sex with a partner inside a locked room
with 200 paying male customers watching;
c. a lady actress completely in the nude
being the model of 200 UP fne arts students
for their fnal assignment in “painting”;
d. a lady Guest Relations Officer dancing
totally in the nude in a nightclub patronized by
high ranking government official who requested
her to dance that way.
____28. Which of the following may be validly
considered valid search and seizure under the
“plain view doctrine ?
a. While serving a validly issued search
warrant for an unlicensed frearm inside the
house of an accused, the policemen found a
sachet of metamphetamine hydrochloride in
one of the cabinets of the accused which they
seized;
b. While validating a tip that the house of
Mr. X in a far-flung barangay in Bangued, Abra,
is surrounded by fully grown marijuana plants,
the policemen indeed found 100 fully grown
marijuana which they uprooted and seized then
arrested Mr. X;
c. After the owner of an apartment leased
to Mr. Damaso was opened by the owner
thereof, Madam X, the police saw an unlicensed
M14 Armalite Rifle on top of a table therein
which they seized;
d. While boarding the car of the man
arrested in a nightclub for illegal possession of
frearm, the policeman accompanying the
suspect to the police station saw three (3)
sachets of shabu at the front seat of the car
which he seized.
____29. Due process may not be invoked in:
a. the expulsion of the members of some
disloyal members of the Liberal party without
notice and hearing;
b. outright dismissal of an employee who
uttered threatening remarks to his employers in
the presence of 20 co-employees;
c. expulsion of a UC Law Student who
allegedly wrote libelous and disparaging
remarks against the Dean in her Facebook
Account;
d. a court order requiring a lawyer to pay a
fne of P1,000.00 when, despite the lapse of 1
hr. from the scheduled hearing, he is still not in
court without any motion for postponement or
just text or telephone call to the court thereby
delaying the administration of justice.
____30. There is violation of the equal
protection clause if:
a. the government gives some tax
exemptions to establishments inside the export
processing zones but not outside it;
b. non-Igorots (Ibaloi and Kankana-ey)
speaking individuals are not allowed to work in
establishments within the Cordillera
Administrative Region;
c. The soldiers and policemen are given
allowances in addition to their salaries while
other government employees are not entitled
thereto;
d. When the registered voters of one
component city are not allowed to vote for
provincial officials while the registered voters of
the other 99 component cities in the Philippines
are allowed to do so.
____31. Which of the following violates the
“religious rights” provisions of the Constitution:
a. Muslims should work even on Fridays
during the Ramadan season because the same
is a regular working day under the Labor Code
of the Philippines and all employees regardless
of their religious inclinations are also working---
even if the same is against their religious
beliefs;
b. “Members of Iglesia ni Tukak” are
required to pay the same taxes as all others
though they believed that their tax should not
be more than 10% of their income in order not
to affect their right to survive;
c. Prohibiting churchgoers from shouting
some slogans against alleged corrupt while
going to church which is beside Malacanang;
d. Requiring them to train and join the the beneft of a full-blown hearing? Is there any
armed forces even if their religion prohibits constitutional right violated by such a
them from doing so since they believe that they procedure? Explain fully.
should not kill or be killed.
II
____32. There is no violation of the right to
information on matters of public concern in the May an accused in a criminal case be
following situation: allowed to travel abroad during the pendency
of his case in court? If so, what are the
a. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo requisites that he must comply with? If not, why
failed to provide a copy, even though she not?
earlier promised to do so, of the Japan
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement III
(JPEPA), to different businessmen who
requested for a copy of the same so that they May criminal proceedings in court,
could give their comments since it is a matter particularly the testimonies of witnesses, be the
of importance to them, before signing the same subject of a news item in a newspaper? If so,
as a treaty with Japan; what are the guidelines to be followed by the
b. PCGG entering into a compromise reporter in order not to violate the rights of the
agreement with the Marcoses allowing the accused?
latter from retaining 65% of the amounts
allegedly stolen by them without frst informing
the public about it (Chavez vs. PCGG);
c. The Government Negotiating Panel
entering in to an agreement with the MILF
giving the latter sovereignty over the lands and
waters within the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity;
enter into diplomatic relations with other
countries and perform other sovereign acts
outside the Philippine government;
d. When a government office refuses to
give copies of documents like how millions from
the national budget are to be spent for dole-
outs to the poor segments of the society.

___33. The right to counsel during custodial

investigation was violated if:

a. The lawyer given by the investigator of

the NBI to the accused is one who is applying
for a job at the NBI and was accepted as an
investigator 2 days later;
b. The lawyer given by the Investigator of
the Western Police District is Atty. De Los Reyes,
the Chief of the said office;
c. The lawyer representing the accused
was inside the investigation room of the Cebu
PNP assisting another client when the
investigator started asking questions and
joined said suspect only on the sixth question;
d. All of the above.

C. E S S A Y

May a court validly decide a civil case

for collection of a sum of money after the
defendant fled his verifed answer to the
complaint which was likewise verifed, without