Diocese of Bacolod vs COMELEC
2013 National Elections who supported and who opposed its
FACTS:
Petitioner Diocese of Bacolod is a Roman Catholic diocese and
is represented in this petition by its Bishop, the Most Rev.
Vicente M. Navarra. Petitioner Bishop Navarra is also filing this
petition in his individual and personal capacity as the
questioned orders are personally directed at him and also as a
concerned citizen, as the issues raised herein are matters of
paramount and transcendental importance to the public which
must be settled early given the far-reaching implicatilefons of
the unconstitutional acts of the respondents.
Named as respondents are the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and its Election Officer of Bacolod City Atty. Mavil
V. Majarucon.
On 21 February 2013, the petitioners have caused to be placed
on the front wall of the Bacolod Cathedral two sets of
Tarpaulin, each sized 6×10 feet, with the message Conscience
Vote (Team Buhay/Team Patay (Team Patay Tarpaulin). The
Team Patay Tarpaulin contained the names of both Anti- and
Pro-Reproductive Health Law senatorial candidates.
In their special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners sought the
nullification of the 22 February 2013 order issued by
respondent Atty. Majarucon, which orders them to remove the
supposed oversized Team Patay Tarpaulin of the Diocese of
Bacolod. They also sought to nullify the 27 February 2013
order issued by the COMELEC, through its Law Department,
which orders the immediate removal of the Team Patay
Tarpaulin and threatening the petitioner Bishop of Bacolod with
the filing of an election offense if he fails to cause its immediate
removal.
On March 5, 2013, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
COMELEC and Atty. Majarucon from removing the Team
Patay Tarpaulin.
ISSUES/GROUNDS:
Respondents’ orders directives to remove or cause the
removal of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin are
unconstitutional and void for infringing on petitioners’ right to
freedom of expression on their own private property.
Respondents’ orders/directives to remove or cause the
removal of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin are
unconstitutional and void for violating the principle of
separation of Church and State enshrined in Section 6 of
Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:
The assailed Orders/Directives to remove or cause the removal
of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin are not electoral
campaign materials and that the mention of the candidates in
the infringes on the petitioners’ right to freedom of expression
on their own private property:
the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins “are not electoral campaign
materials,” stressing that the mentioning of candidates’ name in
the second tarpaulin was merely incidental to the petitioners’
campaign against the RH Law, which they have firmly
campaigned against even when it was just a bill being
deliberated in Congress;
subject Team Patay Tarpaulins are “covered by the broader
constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression and of
conscience and not by the more narrow and limited election
laws, rules, and regulations”;
petitioners “have the constitutional right to communicate their
views and beliefs by posting the subject Team Patay
Tarpaulins on the Bacolod Cathedral, a private property owned
by the Diocese of Bacolod”;
the RH Law and the candidates and party-lists running in the
passage into a law are matters of public concern and a
legitimate subject of general interest and of discussion;
citing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Chavez v. PCGG
(G. R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998), the petitioners’ argued
that that public concern “…embraces a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know…”
citing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Adiong v.
COMELEC ( G. R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992), the
petitioners’ further argued that “debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide open.”
the content and the message of the subject Team Patay
Tarpaulin “plainly relates to broad issues of interest to the
community especially to the members of the Catholic
community” and that the subject tarpaulin “simply conveys the
position of the petitioners on the RH bill and the public officials
who supported or opposed it as it gains relevance in the
exercise of the people’s right of suffrage” in the advent of the
2013 polls; considering the petitioners’ message, through the
Team Patay Tarpaulin, was a matter of public concern, the
message being conveyed and the mode used for its
communication and expression to the public is entitled to
protection under the Free Expression clause of the Bill of
Rights of the 1987 Constitution; not being candidates or
political parties, the freedom of expression curtailed by the
questioned prohibition, using the logic of the Supreme Court in
Adiong v. COMELEC, is not so much that of the candidate or
the political party;
there is no compelling and substantial State interest that is
endangered or which will be endangered by the posting of the
subject Team Patay Tarpaulin which would justify the
infringement of the preferred right of freedom of expression.
The assailed orders/directives to remove or cause the removal
of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and
void for violating the principle of separation of Church and
State enshrined in Section 6 of Article II of the 1987
Constitution:
petitioners’ petition against the RH Law “is not only a matter of
exercise of its freedom of expression and of conscience but is
also a matter of Catholic faith, morals, belief, and of duty”;
the Diocese of Bacolod has taken on the issue of the RH Law
as part of her mission as part of its continued advocacy and
obedience to the Catholic Church’s teachings;
in line with what they believe to be their duty in the faith, the
petitioners have declared the RH Law as being anti-life, anti-
morals, anti-family, anti-marriage, and contrary to the teachings
of the Catholic Church. Consequently, petitioners have called
on its members and followers not to support any candidate who
is anti-life, and to support those who are pro-life;
considering that the views and position of the petitioners on the
RH Bill is inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith,
and moral teachings, the posting of the subject Team Patay
Tarpaulin has already gone beyond mere exercise of freedom
of expression and of conscience, but also of the right and
privilege of the Church to propagate and spread its teachings
which should be insulated from any form of encroachment and
intrusion on the part of the State, and its agencies and officials;
section 6 of the Article II of the 1987 Constitution
monumentalizes the principle of separation of Church and
State;
at the core of its advocacy against the RH Bill is the Gospel of
Life which is a matter of Catholic doctrine, creed and dogma;
the petitioners believe, as a matter of faith, that in these times
when there is a great conflict between a culture of death and a
culture of life, the Church should have the courage to proclaim
the culture of life for the common good of society;
the questioned orders are unpardonable intrusion into the
affairs of the Church and constitute serious violations of the
principle of separation of Church and State which the State and
its officials, including the herein respondents, are bound to
respect, observe, and hold sacred.
PRAYER:
Petition be given due course;
Issue a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction restraining respondents from further
proceedings in enforcing their orders for the removal of the
subject Team Patay Tarpaulin;
Declare the questioned orders of respondents as
unconstitutional and void and permanently restrain the
respondents from enforcing them or any other similar orders;
and
Issue other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable under
the premises.
THE ISSUES TO BE ARGUED:
Whether or not the 22 February 2013 Notice/Order by Election
Officer Majarucon and the 27 February 2013 Order by the
COMELEC Law Department are considered judgments/final
orders/resolutions of the COMELEC which would warrant a
review of this Court via a Rule 65 Petition.
(a) Whether or not petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts
doctrine and jurisprudential rules governing appeals from
COMELEC decisions;
(b) Assuming arguendo that the aforementioned Orders are not
considered judgments/final orders/resolutions of the
COMELEC, whether there are exceptional circumstances
which would allow this Court to take cognizance of the case.
Whether or not it is relevant to determine whether the
tarpaulins are “political advertisement” or “election
propaganda” considering that petitioner is not a political
candidate.
Whether or not the tarpaulins are a form of expression
(protected speech), or election propaganda/political
advertisement.
(a) Assuming arguendo that the tarpaulins are a form of
expression, whether or not the COMELEC possesses the
authority to regulate the same.
(b) Whether or not this form of expression may be regulated.
Whether or not the 22 February 2013 Notice/Order by Election
Officer Majarucon and the 27 February 2013 Order by the
COMELEC Law
Department violate the Constitutional principle of separation of
church and state.
Whether or not the action of the petitioners in posting its
tarpaulin violates the Constitutional principle of separation of
church and state.
Hierarchy of courts
This brings us to the issue of whether petitioners violated the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts in directly filing their petition
before this court.
Respondents contend that petitioners’ failure to file the proper
suit with a lower court of concurrent jurisdiction is sufficient
ground for the dismissal of their petition.57 They add that
observation of the hierarchy of courts is compulsory, citing
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor.58 While respondents claim
that while there are exceptions to the general rule on hierarchy
of courts, none of these are present in this
case.59chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On the other hand, petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona60 on this
court’s discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition
filed directly to it if warranted by “compelling reasons, or [by]
the nature and importance of the issues raised. . . .”61
Petitioners submit that there are “exceptional and compelling
reasons to justify a direct resort [with] this
Court.”62chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion,63 we explained the necessity of
the application of the hierarchy of
courts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the
hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be
ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the
policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with
causes that are also well within the competence of the lower
courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only
when absolutely necessary or when serious and important
reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.64
In Bañez, we also elaborated on the reasons why lower courts
are allowed to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, citing Vergara v.
Suelto:65chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to
it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing
with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue
the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only
where absolutely necessary or where serious and important
reasons exist therefore. Hence, that jurisdiction should
generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings
before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other
tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or
another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where
the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court,
it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s
procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to
be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers
must strictly observe.66 (Emphasis omitted)
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts
was created by this court to ensure that every level of the
judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and
efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts
from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them.
They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which
may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution.67 To
effectively perform these functions, they are territorially
organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs
generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily,
they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts
from the evidence as these are physically presented before
them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial
jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual case’ that makes
ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The
consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There
are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level
would not be practical considering their decisions could still be
appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate
court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by
the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures
more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court.
But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over
most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can
have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts
and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not
necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to
determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking
new ground or further reiterating — in the light of new
circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or
bar — existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance
or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this
court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly
performs that role.
In other words, the Supreme Court’s role to interpret the
Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights
when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the
doctrine in respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never
been the purpose of such doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad
rule.68 This court has “full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions
for certiorari . . . filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling
reasons69 or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly
and specifically raised in the petition.”70 As correctly pointed
out by petitioners,71 we have provided exceptions to this
doctrine:
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are
genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at
the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes
availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail
the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive
branches of the government.72chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice
not only petitioners’ right to freedom of expression in the
present case, but also of others in future similar cases. The
case before this court involves an active effort on the part of
the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has
become a rare occasion when private citizens actively engage
the public in political discourse. To quote an eminent political
theorist:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he theory of freedom of expression involves more than a
technique for arriving at better social judgments through
democratic procedures. It comprehends a vision of society, a
faith and a whole way of life. The theory grew out of an age
that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of new society
in which man's mind was free, his fate determined by his own
powers of reason, and his prospects of creating a rational and
enlightened civilization virtually unlimited. It is put forward as a
prescription for attaining a creative, progressive, exciting and
intellectually robust community. It contemplates a mode of life
that, through encouraging toleration, skepticism, reason and
initiative, will allow man to realize his full potentialities. It spurns
the alternative of a society that is tyrannical, conformist,
irrational and stagnant.73
In a democracy, the citizen’s right to freely participate in the
exchange of ideas in furtherance of political decision-making is
recognized. It deserves the highest protection the courts may
provide, as public participation in nation-building is a
fundamental principle in our Constitution. As such, their right to
engage in free expression of ideas must be given immediate
protection by this court.
A second exception is when the issues involved are of
transcendental importance.74 In these cases, the imminence
and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights
outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to
constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents
courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly
faced with the need for substantial protection.
In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the
paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of
expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court.
The principles laid down in this decision will likely influence the
discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the
context of elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the
right to vote for one’s chosen candidate, but also the right to
vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope of
influencing their votes. It may be said that in an election year,
the right to vote necessarily includes the right to free speech
and expression. The protection of these fundamental
constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort
to this court.
Third, cases of first impression75 warrant a direct resort to this
court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists
that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of
the United States v. Purganan,76 this court took cognizance of
the case as a matter of first impression that may guide the
lower courts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the
important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it
best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings
constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as
yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts. 77
This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression
involving as it does the issue of whether the right of suffrage
includes the right of freedom of expression. This is a question
which this court has yet to provide substantial answers to,
through jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this court is
allowed.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by
this court. In Drilon v. Lim,78 this court held
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
. . . it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming
modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the
consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the
concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its
discussion.79 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined
judicial power, that can rule with finality on whether COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts
contrary to the Constitution through the assailed issuances.
Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be
ignored. This case was filed during the 2013 election period.
Although the elections have already been concluded, future
cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution.
Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for
direct resort to this court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ.
COMELEC is a constitutional body. In Albano v. Arranz,80 cited
by petitioners, this court held that “[i]t is easy to realize the
chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each
and every province were [to] arrogate itself the power to
disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission
on Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily
reduced to impotence.”81chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of
COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower courts,
any ruling on their part would not have been binding for other
citizens whom respondents may place in the same situation.
Besides, this court affords great respect to the Constitution and
the powers and duties imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a
ruling by this court would be in the best interest of respondents,
in order that their actions may be guided accordingly in the
future.
Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents’
acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression.
In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on
this basic right constitute an exceptionally compelling reason to
justify the direct resort to this court. The lack of other sufficient
remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow
direct resort to this court.
Eighth, the petition includes questions that are “dictated by
public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders
complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal
was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.” 82 In the
past, questions similar to these which this court ruled on
immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of courts included
citizens’ right to bear arms,83 government contracts involving
modernization of voters’ registration lists,84 and the status and
existence of a public office.85chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import.
Hence, a direct action to this court is permitted.
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must
occur at the same time to justify a direct resort to this court.
While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the
present case falls under the recognized exceptions and, as
such, may be resolved by this court directly.cralawred
ABUEVA vs WOOD G.R. No. L-21327 January 14, 1924
JOHNSON, J

The parties:
Petitioners are members of the Independence Commission. The
creation of the commission was ratified and adopted by the
Philippine Legislature on the 8th day of March, 1919. Twenty six
of the petitioners are members of the House of Representatives
and four are members of the Senate of the Philippine Islands and
they all belong to the democratic party;
Respondents are Leonard Wood, the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas,
Presidents of the Independence Commission. Sued as well are the
Acting Auditor, the Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the
Independence Commission.
This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court by the
petitioners for the writ of mandamus to compel the respondents
to exhibit to the petitioners and to permit them to examine all the
vouchers and other documentary proofs in their possession,
showing the disbursements and expenditures made out of the
funds of the Independence Commission.
FACTS:
By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands
provided for a standing appropriation of one million
pesos(P1,000,000) per annum, payable out of any funds in the
Insular Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, to defray the
expenses of the Independence Commission, including publicity
and all other expenses in connection with the performance of its
duties; that said appropriation shall be considered as included in
the annual appropriation for the Senate and the House of
Representatives, at the rate of P500,000 for each house, although
the appropriation act hereafter approved may not make any
specific appropriation for said purpose; with the proviso that no
part of said sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular
Auditor until it shall be necessary to make the payment or
payments authorized by said act
Petitioners averred that as members of the Independence
Commission they are legally obliged to prevent the funds from
being squandered, and to prevent any investments and illicit
expenses in open contravention of the purposes of the law.
Petitioners have verbally and by writing requested the
respondents to permit them to examine the vouchers and other
documentary proofs relating to the expenditures and payments
made out of the funds appropriated for the use of the
Independence Commission.
Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit the
petitioners from examining said vouchers and documentary
proofs.
ISSUE: Can the Court compel the respondents to address the
claims of the petitioners
HELD:
Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and
head of the executive department of the Philippine Government,
is not subject to the control or supervision of the courts.
Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as Chairman of the
Independence Commission, are mere agents of the Philippine
Legislature and cannot be controlled or interfered with by the
courts.
As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of
the action because section 24 of the Jones Law provides that:
“The administrative jurisdiction of the Auditor over accounts,
whether of funds or property, and all vouchers and records
pertaining thereto, shall be exclusive”
The determination of whether the accounts of the expenses of the
Commission of Independence should be shown to the plaintiffs or
not is a question of policy and administrative discretion, and is
therefore not justiciable.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission Digested
DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION
FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and
the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor
were candidates for the position of members of the National
Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.
On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed
Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov.
15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8,
which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other
things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the
National Assembly or that the election of said position be
nullified.
On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution
(No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.
Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the
Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy
upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
RULING:
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy
involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission
may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the
limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the
reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and
that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral
Commission is not a separate department of the government, and
even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of
the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justiciable and appropriate cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly."
The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality
all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as
effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express
prohibition in the Constitution.
Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for
the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the
last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the
National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935,
confirming the election of the petitioner to the National
Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither
does it appear that said body had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of the election of members of the
legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the
legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional
power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for
the filing of said election protests.
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and
that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935,
cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such
time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral
commission is hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner.
THE SUPREME COURT
G.R. No. 127022 June 28, 2000
FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., BOOMTOWN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Spouses CYNTHIA D. CHING and CHING TIONG
KENG, Spouses CARMEN SOCO and LORENZO ONG ENG CHONG,
Spouses SOLEDAD B. YU and YU SY CHIA and LETICIA NOCOM
CHAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO J. GANA, PATROCINIO E.
MARGOLLES, ALICE E. SOTTO, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO,
EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C.
ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (formerly CFI of Rizal) and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS, METRO MANILA,
respondents, ALEJANDRO B. REY, petitioner-intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 127245
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR,
LAND MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO J. GANA, PATROCNIO E.
MARGOLLES, ALICE E. SOTTO, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO,
EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA, LUCIA A. LAPERAL, NORMA C.
ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, PELTAN DEVELOPMENT INC.,
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (formerly CFI) of RIZAL, and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PURISIMA, J.:
This resolves petitioners' Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc
these consolidated cases, which the Third Division decided on
September 2, 1999. The motions for reconsideration seasonably
filed by the petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and Firestone
Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending.
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989,
as amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993:
. . ., the following are considered en banc cases:
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question;
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the
death penalty;
3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls;
5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission
on Audit;
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a
judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a
lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of
more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed;
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least
three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en
banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership
of the court en banc; and
9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual
membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its
attention.
The cases at bar involve a vast tract of land with an area of
around ninety-nine (99) hectares presumptively belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to
private individuals by a court alleged to be without jurisdiction.
Since the validity of the said decision and the original certificate
of title as well as transfer certificates of title issued pursuant
thereto hinges on the classification of subject area at the time it
was so adjudicated, determination of the validity of the
disposition thereof is in order.
The assailed decision does not indicate the classification of the
land in question, when the herein private respondents obtained
their decree of registration thereover.
In Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the Court
conceded that it is not infallible. Should any error of judgment be
perceived, it does not blindly adhere to such error, and the
parties adversely affected thereby are not precluded from
seeking relief therefrom, by way of a motion for reconsideration.
In this jurisdiction, rectification of an error, more than anything
else, is of paramount importance.
Here, there was submitted to the Court en consulta, petitioners'
Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases
for the consideration of the Court. A pleading, entitled "FOR THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT EN BANC, EN CONSULTA," was
presented but when the same was first brought to its attention on
March 7, 2000, the Court opined that since the Third Division had
not yet acted on subject motions to refer the cases to the Banc, it
was then premature for the Court to resolve the consulta.
However, the Court succinctly cautioned that the action of the
Third Division on the matter would just be tentative.
On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 to deny
petitioners' motion to transfer these cases to the Banc. Thus, on
March 14, 2000, the Court deliberated on the consulta and
thereafter, voted 9-5 to accept the cases for the Banc to pass upon
in view of the finding that the cases above entitled are of
sufficient importance to merit its attention. Evidently, the action
of the Court under the premises is a legitimate and valid exercise
of its RESIDUAL POWER within the contemplation of paragraph 9
of the Resolution En Banc of November 18, 1993, which reads:
"All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual
membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its
attention." (emphasis supplied)
Untenable is the contention of Justice Panganiban that the Chief
Justice and the eight (8) Associate Justices who voted to treat
these consolidated cases as En Banc cases, have not given any
cogent or compelling reason for such action. Considering that
paragraph 9 of the Resolution of this Court dated November 18,
1993, has been cited to support the majority opinion, it is
decisively clear that these consolidated cases have been found to
be of sufficient importance to merit the attention and disposition
of the entire Court en banc and therefore, the prayer of the
Republic of the Philippines and the private petitioners for the
Court en banc to hear and resolve their pending motions for
reconsideration, is meritorious. The aforesaid finding by the
Court constitutes a reason cogent and compelling enough to
warrant the majority ruling that the Court En Banc has to act
upon and decide petitioners' motions for
reconsideration.1âwphi1.nêt
It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En
Banc entertains a case for its resolution and disposition, it does
so without implying that the Division of origin is incapable of
rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court
simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en banc
attention and consideration. Neither can it be concluded that the
Court has taken undue advantage of sheer voting strength. It was
merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable
opinion of the majority of its actual membership — that, indeed,
subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting the action and
decision of the whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all
the members of this highest Court of the land are always embued
with the noblest of intentions in interpreting and applying the
germane provisions of law, jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions
of the Court — to the end that public interest be duly safeguarded
and rule of law be observed.
Reliance by Justice Panganiban on the ruling of the Court in the
Sumilao case is misplaced. The said case is not on all fours with
these cases. In the Sumilao case, before it was brought to the Banc
en consulta, the motion for reconsideration of the decision
therein rendered had been voted upon by the Second Division
with a vote of 2-2. The Court ruled that the stalemate resulting
from the said voting constituted a denial of the motion for
reconsideration.
In the two consolidated cases under consideration, however, the
Motions for Reconsideration of the petitioners, Republic of the
Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending and
unresolved.
Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues
raised, let alone the enormous value of the area in litigation,
which is claimed as government property, there is merit in the
prayer of petitioners that their pending motions for
reconsideration should be resolved by the Court En Banc.
WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases are considered and
treated as en banc cases; and petitioners' motions for
reconsideration are hereby set for oral argument on July 18,
2000, at 11:00 a.m. Let corresponding notices issue.
SO ORDERED.
Teresita Fabian vs Aniano Desierto
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of
PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT)
which was engaged in the construction business with a certain
Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of
the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between
Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship,
but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats.
She eventually filed an administrative case against Agustin which
eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman,
Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later
referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is
final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme
Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that:
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot
validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of
the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate
jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give
the SC a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states
that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC contemplated therein is to
be exercised over “final judgments and orders of lower courts,”
that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It
does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.
But what is the proper remedy?
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals
on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and
conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906,
October 7, 2008
Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers
from Bulacan who were suspected of being members of the New
People’s Army, were forcibly taken from their home, detained in
various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units.
After several days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo recognized their abductors as members of the armed
forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they
were being held in place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected
leader of the communist insurgents. While in captivity, they met
other desaperacidos (including the still-missing University of the
Philippines students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who
were also suspected of being communist insurgents and
members of the NPA. After eighteen months of restrained liberty,
torture and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to
escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo.
Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be
protected by existing laws.
Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a
textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. At its core
is the immunity of one’s person against government intrusion.
The right to security of person is “freedom from fear,” a
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity and security.
To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos,
run to, if the Orwellian sword of the State, wielded recklessly by
the military or under the guise of police power, is directed
against them? The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of
amparo, in addition to the rights and liberties already protected
by the Bill of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning “to protect,” is
borne out of the long history of Latin American and Philippine
human rights abuses—often perpetrated by the armed forces
against farmers thought to be communist insurgents, anarchists
or brigands. The writ serves to both prevent and cure extralegal
killings, enforced disappearances, and threats thereof, giving the
powerless a powerful remedy to ensure their rights, liberties, and
dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that has been
embodied in positive law, gives voice to the preys of silent guns
and prisoners behind secret walls.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (G.R. No. 180906 07
October 2008)
PARTIES:
PETITIONERS: SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and CHIEF
OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
Supreme Court: Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order
Supreme Court: Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to treat their
Existing Petition as Amparo Petition
1. Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals summarily heard the Petition of Amparo.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment which is the
subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
FACTS:
On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter
referred to as “Raymond”) and Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter
referred to as “Reynaldo”) were abducted by military men
belonging to the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were members and
supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA). After eighteen (18)
months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on 13
August 2007.
On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for
Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order before
the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents from
depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a
Resolution dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the
Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their agents,
representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and further
enjoined them from causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo.
Forthwith, they filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to
Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting
Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs.
While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007. Raymond and
Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion
to treat their existing peti tion as amparo petition.
On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23
August 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule. The
Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and
remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the
summary hearing and decide the petition.
On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege
of the writ of amparo. The Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary
of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the
Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation
reports as to the custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm the
present places of official assignment of two military officials
involved, and produce all medical reports and records of
Raymond and Reynaldo while under military custody.
Aggrieved, the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff
of the AFP filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is
sufficient for amparo petitions.
Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the
right to security of a person may be invoked.
ANSWER:
It depends on the credibility and candidness of the victims in
their statements.
No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS
Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the
quantum of evidence required – With the secret nature of an
enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the
victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the
information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the
victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend
on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral
statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other
evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they
suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they
were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated,
the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them
comes as no surprise.
2. ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO
PETITION
Permutations of the Right to Security – A closer look at the right
to security of person would yield various permutations of the
exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is
“freedom from fear.” In its “whereas” clauses, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that “a world in
which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and
freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people.” Some scholars postulate that
“freedom from fear” is not only an aspirational principle, but
essentially an individual international human right. It is the “right
to security of person” as the word “security” itself means
“freedom from fear.” Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
xxx
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily
and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the
1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body
cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical
injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the
body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and
painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury
increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal
law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because
they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.
xxx
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection
of one’s rights by the government. In the context of the writ of
amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life
and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III,
Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State “guarantees full respect for
human rights” under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order
and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life,
liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights especially
when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
Freedom from fear as a right – In the context of Section 1 of the
Amparo Rule, “freedom from fear” is the right and any threat to
the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear
is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being
baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree
of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of
the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past
experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is
more correct to say that the “right to security” is actually the
“freedom from threat.” Viewed in this light, the “threatened with
violation” Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo
Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in
the earlier part of the provision.
Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security
may be invoked –While the right to security of person appears in
conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the
Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist
independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need
not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security
of person to be invoked.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 December 2007.
THE TRIAL COURTS
Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. – There are hereby
created thirteen (13) Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the
following judicial regions:
Section 14. Regional Trial Courts.
Section 15. Qualifications. – No persons shall be appointed
Regional Trial Judge unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, at least thirty-five years of age, and for at least ten
years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines
or has held a public office in the Philippines requiring admission
to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.
Section 16. Time and duration of sessions. – The time and
duration of daily sessions of the Regional Trial Courts shall be
determined by the Supreme Court: Provided, however, That all
motions, except those requiring immediate action, shall be heard
in the afternoon of every Friday, unless it falls on a holiday, in
which case, the hearing shall be held on the afternoon of the next
succeeding business day: Provided, further, That the Supreme
Court may, for good reasons, fix a different motion day in
specified areas
Section 17. Appointment and assignment of Regional Trial Judges.
– Every Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region which
shall be his permanent station, and his appointment shall state
the branch of the court and the seat thereof to which he shall be
originally assigned. However, the Supreme Court may assign
temporarily a Regional Trial Judge to another region as public
interest may require, provided that such temporary assignment
shall not last longer than six (6) months without the consent of
the Regional Trial Judge concerned.
A Regional Trial Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to
any branch or city or municipality within the same region as
public interest may require, and such assignment shall not be
deemed an assignment to another station within the meaning of
this section.
Section 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each
branch. – The Supreme Court shall define the territory over
which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its
authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the
territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions,
whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts over the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction.
The power herein granted shall be exercised with a view to
making the courts readily accessible to the people of the different
parts of the region and making the attendance of litigants and
witnesses as inexpensive as possible.
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he
demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the
gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where
such gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now
provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in such other
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. – Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or
body, except those now falling under the exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions; and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers
and consuls.
Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of
the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by
the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial
Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to
the
Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the
petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an
error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of
the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.
Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The
Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the Regional
Trial Courts to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and
domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases
which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies
and agencies, and/or such other special cases as the Supreme
Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
Section 24. Special Rules of Procedure. – Whenever a Regional
Trial Court takes cognizance of juvenile and domestic relation
cases and/or agrarian cases, the special rules of procedure
applicable under present laws to such cases shall continue to be
applied, unless subsequently amended by law or by rules of court
promulgated by the Supreme Court.
CHAPTER III
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS,
AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
Section 25. Establishment of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. – There shall be
created a Metropolitan Trial Court in each metropolitan area
established by law, a Municipal Trial Court in each of the other
cities or municipalities, and a Municipal Circuit Trial Court in
each circuit comprising such cities and/or municipalities as are
grouped together pursuant to law.
Section 26. Qualifications. – No person shall be appointed judge of
a Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, at least 30 years of age, and, for at least five years,
has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines, or has
held a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the
practice of law as an indispensable requisite.
Section 27. Metropolitan Trial Courts of the National Capital
Region. – There shall be a Metropolitan Trial Court in the
National Capital Region, to be known as the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Metro Manila, which shall be composed of eighty-two
(82) branches. There shall be:
… proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
Section 28. Other Metropolitan Trial Courts. – The Supreme Court
shall constitute Metropolitan Trial Courts in such other
metropolitan areas as may be established by law whose
territorial jurisdiction shall be co-extensive with the cities and
municipalities comprising the metropolitan area.
Every Metropolitan Trial Judge shall be appointed to a
metropolitan area which shall be his permanent station and his
appointment shall state branch of the court and the seat thereof
to which he shall be originally assigned. A Metropolitan Trial
Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch
within said metropolitan area as the interest of justice may
require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment
to another station within the meaning of this section.
Section 29. Municipal Trial Courts in cities. – In every city which
does not form part of a metropolitan area, there shall be a
Municipal Trial Court with one branch, except as hereunder
provided:
…
Section 30. Municipal Trial Courts. – In each of the municipalities
that are not comprised within a metropolitan area and a
municipal circuit there shall be a Municipal Trial Court which
shall have one branch, except as hereunder provided:
… actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
Section 31. Municipal Circuit Trial Court. – There shall be a
Municipal Circuit Trial Court in each area defined as a municipal
circuit, comprising one or more cities and/or one or more
municipalities. The municipalities comprising municipal circuits
as organized under Administrative Order No. 33, issued on June
13, 1978 by the Supreme Court pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 537, are hereby constituted as municipal circuits for
purposes of the establishment of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, and the appointment thereto of Municipal Circuit Trial
Judges: Provided, however, That the Supreme Court may, as the
interests of justice may require, further reorganize the said
courts taking into account workload, geographical location, and
such other factors as will contribute to a rational allocation
thereof, pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 537
which shall be applicable insofar as they are not inconsistent with
this Act.
Every Municipal Circuit Trial Judge shall be appointed to a
municipal circuit which shall be his official station.
The Supreme Court shall determine the city or municipality
where the Municipal Circuit Trial Court shall hold sessions.
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. –
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value,
or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (as amended by R.A, No.
7691)
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not
exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro
Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the
demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of
which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there
are several claims or causes of action between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of
the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of
action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of
the same or different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as
amended by R.A. No. 7691)
Section 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land
registration cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the
Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land
registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or
opposition, or contested lots the where the value of which does
not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such
value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by
agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one,
or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property.
Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same
manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (as amended by
R.A. No. 7691)
Section 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. – In the absence
of all the Regional Trial Judges in a province or city, any
Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Circuit
Trial Judge may hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus or applications for bail in criminal cases in the province or
city where the absent Regional Trial Judges sit.
Section 36. Summary procedures in special cases. – In
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts with at least
two branches, the Supreme Court may designate one or more
branches thereof to try exclusively forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, those involving violations of traffic laws, rules and
regulations, violations of the rental law, and such other cases
requiring summary disposition as the Supreme Court may
determine. The Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or
procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without
regard to technical rules. Such simplified procedures may provide
that affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of
oral testimony and that the periods for filing pleadings shall be
non-extendible.
Section 37. Preliminary investigation. – Judges of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, except those in the National Capital Region, of
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
have authority to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes
alleged to have been committed within their respective territorial
jurisdictions which are cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts.
The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in Section 1, paragraphs (a), (b),
(c), and (d), of Presidential Decree No. 911: Provided, however,
That if after the preliminary investigation the Judge finds a prima
facie case, he shall forward the records of the case to the
Provincial/City Fiscal for the filing of the corresponding
information with the proper court.
No warrant of arrest shall be issued by the Judge in connection
with any criminal complaint filed with him for preliminary
investigation, unless after an examination in writing and under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, he finds
that a probable cause exists.
Any warrant of arrest issued in accordance herewith may be
served anywhere in the Philippines.
Section 38. Judgments and processes. –
(1) All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in
writing, stating clearly the facts and the law on which they were
based, signed by the Judge and filed with the Clerk of Court. Such
judgment shall be appealable to the Regional Trial Courts in
accordance with the procedure now prescribed by law for
appeals to the Court of First Instance, by the provisions of this
Act, and by such rules as the Supreme Court may hereafter
prescribe.
(2) All processes issued by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in cases
falling within their jurisdiction, may be served anywhere in the
Philippines without the necessity of certification by the Judge of
the Regional Trial Court.
Republic Act No. 7691 March 25, 1994
AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS,
AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
"(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
where the demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
"(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate,
where the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro
Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00);
"(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and
marital relations;
"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions;
"(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now
provided by law; and
"(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such
other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00)."
Section 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.
– Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city
or municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and
"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof."
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and
probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not
exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro
Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the
demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of
which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees:
Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes
of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of
the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;
"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases,
the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and
"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or,
in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared
for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots."
Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land
Registration Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the
Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land
registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or
opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does not
exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value
to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement
of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from
the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their
decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner
as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts."
Section 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the
jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and
Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act,
shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro
Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
Section 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act shall be considered amended or modified
accordingly.
Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases
that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. However, by
agreement of all the parties, civil cases cognizable by municipal
and metropolitan courts by the provisions of this Act may be
transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The
executive judge of the appropriate Regional Trial Courts shall
define the administrative procedure of transferring the cases
affected by the redefinition of jurisdiction to the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.
Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: March 25, 1994
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
In re: Valenzuela
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998
Narvasa, C.J.
Facts:
On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments
of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of
RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These
appointments were deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly
prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.”
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar
Council to discuss the constitutionality of appointments to the
Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the forthcoming 1998
Presidential elections. Senior Associate Justice Florenz Regalado,
Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, was in the position that “election ban had no
application to the CA based on the Commission’s records”. This
hypothesis was then submitted to the President for consideration
together with the Council’s nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA.
The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official
communication from the Executive Secretary transmitting the
appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed on March
11, 1998 (day immediately before the commencement of the ban
on appointments), which implies that the President’s Office did
not agree with the hypothesis.
The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4,
1998 the transmission of the “list of final nominees” for the
vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by the Constitution (from
Feb 13, date present vacancy occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJ
sent the reply on May 6 that no session has been scheduled after
the May elections for the reason that they apparently did not
share the same view (hypothesis) proposed by the JBC shown by
the uniformly dated March 11, 1998 appointments. However, it
appeared that the Justice Secretary and the other members of the
Council took action without waiting for the CJ reply. This
prompted CJ to call for a meeting on May 7. On this day, CJ
received a letter from the President in reply of the May 6 letter
where the President expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only
applied to executive appointments, the whole article being
entitled “EXECUTIVE DEPT”. He posited that appointments in the
Judiciary have special and specific provisions, as follows:
Article 8 Sec 4
“The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.”
Article 8 Sec 9
“The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts
shall be appointed by the President from the list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
 On May 12, CJ received from Malacañang, the
appointments of the 2 Judges of the RTC mentioned. Considering
the pending proceedings and deliberations on this matter, the
Court resolved by refraining the appointees from taking their
oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998
claiming he did so without knowledge on the on-going
deliberations. It should be noted that the originals of the
appointments for both judges had been sent to and received by
the CJ on May 12 and is still in the latter’s office and had not been
transmitted yet. According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so
because of the May 7 Malacañang copy of his appointment.
In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no
presidential elections, Art. 8 shall apply where vacancies in SC
shall be filled within 90 days otherwise prohibition in Art. 7 must
be considered where the President shall not make any
appointments. According to Fr. Bernas, the reason for
prohibition is in order not to tie the hands of the incoming Pres
through midnight appointments.
Issue:
whether, during the period of the ban on appointments
imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the, Constitution, the
President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary,
in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII; whether he can
make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban
in the interest of public service.
Held:
The provisions of the Constitution material to the inquiry
at bar read as follows: 3
Sec. 15, Article VII:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII :
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Sec. 9, Article VIII :
The members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts
shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for, every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments
within ninety days from the submission of the list.
During the period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the
Constitution — “(t)wo months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end his term” — the
President is neither required to make appointments to the courts
nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII
simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the
courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited
by Section 15 of Article VII. It is not noteworthy that the
prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every
six years.
Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those
made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
appointments made within the two months preceding a
Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared
elections offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. — (1) Any person who gives,
offer or promises money or anything of value gives or promises
any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or
makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or
cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association,
corporation, entity, or community in order to induce anyone or
the public in general to vote for or against any candidate or
withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any
aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a
convention or similar selection process of a political party.
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position,
promotion, or giving salary increases. — During the period of
forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a
regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any
head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency
or instrumentality, whether national or local, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or
hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary, or
casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior
authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the
authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled
is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency
concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner
that may influence the election.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15,
Article VII consist of the so-called “midnight” appointments.
There may well be appointments to important positions which
have to be made even after the proclamations of a new President.
Such appointments, so long as they are “few and so spaced as to
afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the
appointee’s qualifications,” can be made by the outgoing
President.
Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to
contemplate not only “midnight” appointments — those made
obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the
time of their making — but also appointments of the Presidential
election.
The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only
the making of temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the
appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling
vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President’s
power of appointments, it is the Supreme Court’s view that, as a
general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to
the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils
outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court
vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies
can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier
pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six years.
Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled
temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments are
long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier
pointed out, their making is considered an election offense.
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for
an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the
executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case
should the membership of the Court be so reduced that it will
have no quorum, or should the voting on a particularly important
question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such
a case, however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII
nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.
DE CASTRO VS. JBC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen
from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential
election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII,
that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also
considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of
the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from
making appointments within two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief
Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically
considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior
of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
However, the last two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the
next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme
Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant
to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article
VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII
(Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in
Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s
power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation
from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period
within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the
JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from
some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so
once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of
Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the
President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in
the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice)
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department),
provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same
character, in that they affect the power of the President to
appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with
the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section
16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear,
would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in
Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for
the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato
Corona’s departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw
the need to create a separate, competent and independent body
to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a
body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of
the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the
moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative
from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio
members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially
altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth
(8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives
from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-
half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the
legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the
framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body,
thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to
the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with
the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the
Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents
also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the
consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a
unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding
adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if
only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would
deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle
of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2)
representatives of Congress to be members of the JBC does not
render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the
presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely
provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are
undeniably presidential appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case
herein as it is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a
judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek
judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with
eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress,
defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the
Congress to perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the
1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is
that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and
unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative
of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” preceding
“representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room
for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of
the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the
intention that more than one (1) representative from the
legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular
word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is
founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given
to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of
the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is
always used in association with other words or phrases and its
meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the
foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the
word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only
a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional
provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort
extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission.
Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the
minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is
undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the
JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying
reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be
divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress,
or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents’ contention that each representative
should be admitted from the Congress and House of
Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the
records of Constitutional Commission, held that “Congress,” in
the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one
body. While it is true that there are still differences between the
two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to
them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case
of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses
exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required
between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the
private sector and the three branches of government would have
an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of
the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more
quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice
speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each,
would “negate the principle of equality among the three branches
of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.”
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC
be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of
another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it,
goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other
members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary
is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate
should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law
to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer.
Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what
may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and
accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to
the whims and caprices of the government and the people who
run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current
composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are
nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of
operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical
composition of the Judicial and Bar Council IS declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of
Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in
accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:

NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior
decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBC’s action of allowing
more than one member of the congress to represent the JBC to be
unconstitutional

FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth
member was added to the JBC as two representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-
half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings
held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from
the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.
Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C.
Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner
has questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative
each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Respondent contends that the phrase “ a representative of
congress” refers that both houses of congress should have one
representative each, and that these two houses are permanent
and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the
bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their
respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of
the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7
members only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate
and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting
members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of
the constitution.

HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that

the phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed as
to having only one representative that would come from either
house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only
intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body
refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the
passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of
the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two
houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a
vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This,
however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because
no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the
JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire
legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC
be composed of seven (7) members only.

FALLO: The motion was denied.