Bar Matter No. 553. June 17, 1993.
*
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC,
INC., respondent.
Attorneys; Words and Phrases; Meaning of “Practice of
Law.”—Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and
contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter
may or may not be pending in a court.
Same; Same; Same.—When a person participates in a trial
and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law.
One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights
and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to
look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and
the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. One
who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.
Same; The practice of giving out legal information constitutes
practice of law.—What is palpably clear is that respondent
corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is
more apparent than real. In providing information, for example,
about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains
the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will
simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client,
and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper
course of action to be taken as may be provided-for by said law.
That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it
will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely
within the jurisprudential definition of “practice of law.”
________________
* EN BANC.
379
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 379
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since
law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely
to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal
advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
Same; Same.—Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed
out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish
that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop
of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of
legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly
beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.
Same; Same; The services offered by respondent cannot be
performed by paralegals here as distinguished from the United
States.—Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals.
As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities
there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while
there are none in the Philippines. As the concept of the “paralegal”
or “legal assistant” evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the
major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal
Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been
proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of
paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional
ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc.
and the American Paralegal Association. In the Philippines, we
still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may
be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some
persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed
limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal
services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission
therefor.
Same; Lawyers may not advertise their services or expertise.—
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements,
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. He is not
supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
380
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
80
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the adoption
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort
to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the
lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of
the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation.
Same; Exceptions.—Of course, not all types of advertising or
solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define
the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of
two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed
and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions.
Same; Same.—The first of such exceptions is the publication
in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards
of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and
informative data.
Same; Same.—The use of an ordinary simple professional card
is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced.
The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law
firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or
office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable.
Same; Legal profession here has been under attack on its
integrity.—Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present
situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication
of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve
to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the
legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack
lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if
unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all
efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal
profession.
ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court.
381
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 381
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
R E S O L UT I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court “to order the respondent to cease It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements
and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the above reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of
same tenor as that of Annexes ‘A’ and ‘B’ (of said petition) the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making community in the integrity of the members of the bar and
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
profession other than those allowed by law.” offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
as follows: In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of
Annex A publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims
SECRET MARRIAGE? that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the
P560.00 for a valid marriage. rendering of “legal support services” through paralegals with
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
ANNULMENT. VISA. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
THE Please call: 521-0767, advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm of John R. Bates and Van O’Steen vs. State Bar of
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla. Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
2

Court on June 7, 1977.

Annex B
Considering the critical implications on the legal
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce
Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers’ Association (PLA),
through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office
(4) U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women
hours.
Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems,
Federacion Internacional de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their
Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa.
respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter,
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
their memoranda. The said bar associations readily
3
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
responded and extended their valuable services and
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation
382
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED and gratitude.
________________
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., 1 Rollo, 5. A facsimile of the scales of justice is printed together with and
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
on the left side of “The Legal Clinic, Inc.” in both advertisements which were
CLINIC, INC. 1
Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
published in a newspaper of general circulation.
522-2041; 521-0767
2 433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 87 S Ct. 2691.
 3 Resolution dated January 15, 1991, Rollo, 60; Resolution dated
December 10, 1991, Rollo, 328.
383
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 383
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are
whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law
and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the
subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits
of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present
hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this
bar matter.
1. 1.Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent
endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., “legal support
services” vis-a-vis “legal services”, common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents
like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitute practice
of law?
xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to
make issue with respondent’s foreign citations. Suffice it to state
that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today
it is alright to advertise one’s legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its
opposition to respondent’s act of establishing a “legal clinic” and of
concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision
of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from
undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice
as aforedescribed. 4
xxx
A. The use of the name “The Legal Clinic, Inc.” gives the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers
________________
4 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Basilio H. Alo, IBP Director for Legal
Affairs, 1, 10; Rollo, 209, 218.
384
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal
services to the public, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition
in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements
have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can
be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by respondent—
“The Legal Clinic, Inc.” Such a name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like
a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems.
More importantly, the term “Legal Clinic” connotes lawyers, as the
term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent’s name, as published in the
advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the)
scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression
that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers
legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear
with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer
from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still
remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely
offering “legal support services” as claimed by it, or whether it
offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between
“legal services” and “legal support services,” as the respondent
would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for
doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are
being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the
performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the
advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general
public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize a Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when
a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. x x x.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry
385
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 385
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a
marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious
that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the
legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our
law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered “the dark
side” of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02.—A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex “A” of the Petition,
which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words “Just
Married” on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
“secret marriage,” if not suggesting a “secret marriage,” makes
light of the “special contract of permanent union,” the inviolable
social institution,” which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral
publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article “Rx for Legal Problems” is to be reviewed, it can
readily be concluded that the above impressions one may gather
from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are
being encouraged or committed (a bigamous marriage in Hong
Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction
of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
 Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the “legal support
services” respondent offers do not constitute legal services as
commonly
386
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
understood, the advertisements in question give the impression
that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that
it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader,
members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning
the integrity of the Bar.
xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined
from causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or
any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further performing or
offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal
research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence,
and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the
conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches
upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit
such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can
be better performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer
experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements
for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from “encroaching”
upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer
using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a
typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to
allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for
the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of, illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to
perform all of its services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public
in general and which should be made available exclusively to
members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
387
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 387
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent’s
services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to
suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine Law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be
required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is
not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be
illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before
deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
 If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be
directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored.
But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a “paralegal”
for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of
regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may
prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation’s
Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and
every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Rules of Court. 5 Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent “The
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx
Respondent asserts that it “is not engaged in the practice of law
but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and
laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines” (pars. 2 and 3, Comment).
This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent’s acts of holding out
itself to the public under the trade name “The Legal Clinic, Inc.,”
and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within
the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent’s own commercial advertisement which
________________
5 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Jose A. Grapilon, Chairman, Committee on
Bar Discipline, and Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico, 16-18, 27-29; Rollo 414-416, 425-
427.
388
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields
of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent “The
Legal Clinic, Inc.” is offering and rendering legal services through
its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of
deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to
their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the
latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the
practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by
acorporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it.
Legal Clinic, Inc.” holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely,
the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme
Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons
and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in
it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in
unethical law practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers’ Association:
The Philippine Lawyers’ Association’s position, in answer to the
issues stated herein, are to wit:
1. 1.The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
 2. 2.Such practice is unauthorized;
3. 3.The advertisements complained of are not only unethical,
but also misleading and patently immoral; and
4. 4.The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to suppress
and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for
its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical,
misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx
_______________
6 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Rafael D. Abiera, Jr., Chairman,
Committee on Lawyers’ Rights and Legal Ethics, and Atty. Arturo M. del
Rosario, President, 5-6; Rollo, 241-242.
389
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 389
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of law. It
claims that it merely renders “legal support services” to lawyers,
litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5
of Respondent’s Comment). But its advertised services, as
enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services
on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding
foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages,
absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa
related problems, immigration problems; the Investment Law of
the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of
the aforesaid laws, the legal principles and procedures related
thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call
for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited
Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are
embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as “the
practice of law.” 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle:
In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount
consideration should be given to the protection of the general
public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or
entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous
four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or
sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations.
Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdictions
as an aid to the administration of justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would
qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses
of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these
do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable
Court may decide to take measures to protect the general public
from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general
public in the guise of being
________________
Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong, President, and Atty.
7
Mariano M. Magsalin, Vice-President, 2, 4-5; Rollo, 93, 95-96.
390
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
“paralegals” without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected
from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of
legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised
not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by “paralegals.” Clearly,
measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling
prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified
to offer such services.”8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent,
however, seems to give the impression that information regarding
validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and
foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters, will be
given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent’s
name—The Legal Clinic, Inc.—does not help matters. It gives the
impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as
claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading
impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
“paralegals” are involved in the The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent’s allegations are further belied by the very
admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of
Respondent corporation in the aforementioned “Starweek” article.”
5. Women Lawyer’s Association of the Philippines:
Annexes “A” and “B” of the petition are clearly advertisements
to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under
the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex “A” of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an
advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters
it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to
said agency and pay
________________
8 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 1-2; Rollo; 105-106.
9 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 10-11; Rollo, 370-
371.
391
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 391
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
P560 for a valid marriage in the Philippines are solemnized only
by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an
agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other
countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their
special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners
legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the subject matter of this petition, for
one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the
illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such
as act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to
project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this
country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
9
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they
could go about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor
should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals
and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be
able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code
of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court
held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federation International de Abogadas:
xxx
 1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law,
such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether
run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by
Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can
be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty
of unlawful practice of law.
“x x x Of necessity, no one xxx acting as a consultant can render effective
service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must
be careful not to suggest a course of
_______________
10 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Leticia E. Sablan, Officer-in-Charge,
WLAP Free Legal Aid Clinic, 1-2; Rollo, 169-170.
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392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
conduct which the law forbids. It seems x x x clear that (the consultant’s)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge of the law, and his
use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice of law x x x. It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with the broad features of the law x x x. Our
knowledge of the law—accurate or inaccurate—moulds our conduct not
only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A
good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who
draws plans and specifications in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
“But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a decision
of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my
opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal
advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and
incidental to a major non-legal problem.
“It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
“If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building
code and the like, then an architect who performed this function would
probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted
by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of
industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the
labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill in such matters, and without regard
to legal training or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the
defendant have tendered to the smaller employers the same service that
the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
“The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious
393
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 393
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men
who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that
the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the
graduates in their business.
“In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider
his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine
defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client’s obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such
is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant’s primary efforts are
along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame
within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of
building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar,
he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program,
he drew employees’ wills.
“Another branch of defendant’s work is the representation of the
employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining,
with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone
may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly
skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free
to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an exception where the business turns on a
question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are
not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-
way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or
if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that
defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion
here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
“Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially before trial
examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the
Congress may regulate the representation of parties before such agency.
The State of New Jersey is without
394
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits.
The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the
right to appear ‘in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative.’ Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. ‘Counsel’ here means a licensed attorney, and ‘other
representative’ one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely legal.” (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.)
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in
a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law provided that:
1. (a)The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem;
2. (b)The services performed are not customarily reserved to
members of the bar;
3. (c)No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any
particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the
Code of Professional Responsibility succinctly states the rule of
conduct:
“Rule 15.08—A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or
occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his
client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.”
1.10 In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to render
wedding services (See Annex “A”, Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in “Rx for Legal Problems” on the Sharon-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services, then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on
divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes
“A” and “B”, Petition). Purely giving information materials may not
constitute practice of law. The business is similar to that of a
bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and
determines by himself
395
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 395
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely
giving information, the Legal Clinic’s paralegals may apply the law
to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
“ It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports
to say what the law is amounts to legal practice. And the mere fact that
the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular
reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. x x x Apparently it
is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms,
with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved
and accepted texts. Dacey’s book is sold to the public at large.There is no
personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does
there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of
attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE—
THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to
offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person. Similarly the defendant’s publication does not purport
‘to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person in a particular situation—in the publication and
sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitute the unlawful
practice of law x x x. There being no legal impediment under the statute
to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any
printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against
defendant having an, interest in any publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with
any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the
finding that for the charge of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave
legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the
purchaser’s asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal
remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of
law, particularly with refer-
396
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
ence to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to
specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be
affirmed.” (State v. Winder, 348 NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in Statsky,
supra at p. 101.)
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are “strictly
non-diagnostic, non-advisory.” It is not controverted, however, that
if the services “involve giving legal advice or counseling,” such
would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this
light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary
for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx
2.10. Annex “A” may be ethically objectionable in that it can
give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is
a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex “B” may likewise be ethically objectionable. The
second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the
first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only “paralegal
services” or “legal support services”, and not legal services are
available.” 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase “practice
of law” becomes exigent for a proper determination of the
issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note
that the clause “practice of law” has long been the subject of
judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid
down general principles and doctrines explaining the
meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take
into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is
to give advice or render any kind of service that involves
legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of
________________
11 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lily C. Limpe, President, and Atty.
Barbara Anne C. Migallos, 8-12, 23-24; Rollo, 139-143, 154-155.
12 Annotation: 111 ALR 23.
397
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 397
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in
a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law
generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of
documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients
before public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to
law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in a trial and advertises
himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who 15
confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and
then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to
look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving 16
advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights
of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a
practice of law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper
17
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that
extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, after citing the19
doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine
whether certain acts constitute “practice of law,” thus:
Black defines “practice of law” as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
_______________
13 Howton vs. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1.
14 West Virginia State Bar vs. Earley, 109 S.E. 2d 420, 144 W.Va. 504; Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.I.) 179 A. 139, 144.
15 People vs. Castleman, 88 Colo. 229.
 16 Depew, et al. vs. Witchita Assn. of Credit Men., Inc., 142 Kan. 403.
17 Fitchette vs. Taylor, 94 ALR 356.
18 Mandelaum vs. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 290 NYS 46218.
19 201 SCRA 210 (1991).
398
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law.”
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St.
23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:
“x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
persons, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the
law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner,
referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any
act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co.,
102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).”
This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.
Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177), stated:
“The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them
in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263).
399
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 399
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
“Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of
work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal
skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions
of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that
part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office.
It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under
the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666,
citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,
144).”
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of
activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations
that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute
“practice of law.”
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal
support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent’s own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
“Legal support services basically consist of giving ready
information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which
are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive
use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of
information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document
400
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case;
fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations;
educational of employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of other countries that they may
find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that
they can avail of preparatory to emigration to that foreign country,
and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in
court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or
software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate
legal departments, courts, and other entities engaged in dispensing
or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will
not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for
the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as
if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper
course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said
law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
“practice of law.” Such a conclusion will not be altered by the
fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is
not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal
research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
________________
20 Comment of Respondent, 3; Rollo, 15.
401
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 401
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article
published in the January 13, 1991 issue of theStarweek/The
Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled “Rx for
Legal Problems,” where an insight into the structure, main
purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given
by its own “proprietor,” Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The
Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria
Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client’s
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion
domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care of it. The
Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law,
medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These
specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors
and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the
trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients
who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. “When they
come, we start by analyzing the problem. That’s what doctors do
also. They ask you how you contracted what’s bothering you, they
take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms, and so
on. That’s how we operate, too. And once the problem has been
categorized, then it’s referred to one of our specialists.”
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery
or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a
matter of minutes. “Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or
an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were
a hospital, the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa ospital,
out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It’s just like a common
cold or diarrhea,” explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which require more extensive “treatment” are dealt
with accordingly. “If you had a rich relative who died and named
you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There
would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put
in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right
to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with that problem. Now, if there were
other heirs contesting your rich relative’s will, then you would
need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather evidence to
402
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
support the case.” 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry
out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it
is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit
of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in
this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the
U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that
the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop
of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail
of legal services from simple documentation to complex
litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services
are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather,
are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services
being offered by private respondent which constitute practice
of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as
such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court,
and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and
an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can
he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and exercise little control. 27

professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent’s
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or position that the concept in the United States of paralegals
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted
to the disciplinary control of the court. 24 in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent
The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for
wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral
thesis. adoption as it has done.
________________ Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals.
As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
21 Rollo, 130-131. universities there which offer studies and degrees in
22 Memorandum of U.P. WILOCI, 12-13; Rollo, 372-373. paralegal education, while there are none in the
23 Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court. Philippines. As the concept of the “paralegal” or “legal
28

24 Phil. Ass’n. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar assistant” evolved in the United States, standards and
Co., et al., 42 SCRA 302 (1971). guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of
403 the major standards or guidelines was developed by the
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 403 American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc. Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973).
The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants.
limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have There are also associa-
been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules _______________
specifically so provide. The practice of law is not a lawful
25

business except for members of the bar who have complied 25 7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, 863, 864.
with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of 26 Mounier vs. Regcinh, 170 So. 567.
court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by 27 Lowell Bar Ass’n. vs. Loeb, 52 N.E. 2d 27, 315 Mass. 176; 7 C.J.S.,
reason of attainments previously acquired through education Attorney & Client 64, 865.
and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing 28 Comment of Respondent, 2; Rollo, 14.
profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, 404
counsel with, protect, or defend the rights, claims, or 404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
interpretation, operation and effect of law. The justification
26 tions of paralegals in the United States with their own code
for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to of professional ethics, such as the National Association of
the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
competition, but in the protection of the public from being Association. 29
 In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and
limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal
service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly
licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal
services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission
therefor. 30
________________
29 Position Paper, U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle (WILOCI), 11-12, citing
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism, 214-224, West Publishing Co. (1974)
and Shayne, The Paralegal Profession, Oceana Publications, 1977, Appendix
II & III; Rollo, 116-117.
30 Illustrations: (a) A law student who has successfully completed his third
year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school’s clinical legal education program approved by the
Supreme Court (Rule 138-A, Rules of Court);
1. (b)An official or other person appointed or designated in accordance
with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines in a case
in which the government has an interest (Sec. 33, Rule 138, id.);
2. (c)An agent or friend who aids a party-litigant in a municipal court
for the purpose of conducting the litigation (Sec. 34, Rule 138, id.);
3. (d)A person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity
and ability, who is appointed counsel de oficio to defend the accused
in localities where members of the bar are not available (Sec. 4,
Rule 116, id.);
4. (e)Persons registered or specially recognized to practice in the
Philippine Patent Office (now known as the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer) in trademark, service mark
and trade name cases (Rule 23, Rules of Practice in Trademark
Cases);
5. (f)A non-lawyer who may appear before the National Labor Relations
Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if (1) he represents himself
as a party to the case; (2) he represents an organization or its
members, provided that he shall be made to present written proof
that he is properly authorized; or (3) he is a duly-accredited member
of any legal aid office duly recognized by
405
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 405
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy
that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a
person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot
practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot
be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
31
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to
seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice
law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts. He is not supposed to use
33
or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall 34
he pay or give something of value to representatives of the
mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to
attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of
35
Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring
his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer
________________
 the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant
cases referred thereto by the latter (New Rules of Procedure of the National violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession. It being
Labor Relations Commission); a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that “the practice of
1. (g)An agent, not an attorney, representing the lot owner or claimant soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
in a case falling under the Cadastral Act (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259); and thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” It is highly
2. (h)Notaries public for municipalities where completion and passing unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
the studies of law in a reputable university or school of law is merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a
deemed sufficient qualification for appointment (Sec. 233, trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
Administrative Code of 1917). See Rollo, 144-145. to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
31 7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, 866; Johnstown Coal & Coke Co. of New defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
York vs. U.S., 102 Ct. Cl. 285. money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. “The most
32 Florida Bar vs. Brumbaugth, 355 So. 2d 1186. worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
33 Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility. lawyer, * * * is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
34 Rule 3.01, id. professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced
35 Rule 3.04, id. but must be the outcome of the character and conduct.” (Canon 27,
406 Code of Ethics.)
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ________________
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their 36 Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the 37 People vs. Smith, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206.
importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like self- 38 74 Phil. 579 (1944).
laudation. 36 39 The advertisement in said case was as follows: “Marriage license
The standards of the legal profession codemn the lawyer’s promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his 407
goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services
37 VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 407
or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
postulate that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best
case of The Director of Religious Affairs vs. Estanislao R. advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation
Bayot an advertisement, similar to those of respondent
38 for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
which are involved in the present proceeding, was held to 39 earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
constitute improper advertising or solicitation. efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads: way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success.
He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are
prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and
define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The
exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which
are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily
implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable
law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and
informative data. “Such data must not be misleading and
may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date
and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices
in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of
references; and, with their written consent, the names of
clients regularly represented.” 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical
which is published
________________
40 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, Fourth Edition (1989), 79-80.
41 Op cit., 80.
42 Op cit., 80, citing Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.
408
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may
not properly publish his brief biographical and informative
data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published
in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the
bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also
permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents
of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to
task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by
said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find
and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively
cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of
Arizona, which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
45
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal
fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
________________
43 Op cit., 80, 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 69 (Mar. 19, 1932); A.B.A. Op. 133
(Mar. 13, 1935); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24, 1930); and Canon 43, Canons of
Professional Ethics.
44 Op cit., 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 11 (May 11, 1927); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24,
1930); A.B.A. Ops. 53 (Dec. 14, 1931), 123 (Dec. 14, 1934), (July 12, 1941), 241
(Feb. 21, 1942), 284 (Aug. 1951); and 286 (Sept. 25, 1952).
45 Supra, Fn. 2.
409
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception
is provided for, expressly or impliedly whether in our former
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary
rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions
stated therein are “not applicable in any state unless and
until it is implemented by such authority in that state.” This
goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as
that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if
and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception.
Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the
American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the
attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped
significantly with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
47
Trustworthy...................................................................
Professional..................................................................
Honest...........................................................................
Dignified.......................................................................
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation
of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only
serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair,
criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert
all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the
legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the
lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
409 services
_______________
46 Id., 810, 825.
47 Position Paper of the Philippine Bar Association, 12, citing the
American Bar Association Journal, January 1989, p. 60; Rollo, 248.
410
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
46 Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
except in allowable instances or to aid a layman in the
48
unauthorized practice of law. Considering that Atty. Rogelio
49
P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the
Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the
legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
from 71% to 14% Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
from 71% to 14% determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into
from 65% to 14% an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
from 45% to 14% adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative
that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different
proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our
law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for
or engage in the practice of law in this country. This
interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising,
cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by
respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto
action, after due ascertainment of the factual background
50
and basis for the grant of respondent’s corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the
instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for
such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and
ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar
tenor and purpose as
________________
48 In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1929); The Director of Religious Affairs vs.
Bayot, supra, Fn 38.
49 U.S. vs. Ney & Bosque, 8 Phil. 146 (1907); People vs. Luna, 102 Phil.
968 (1958).
50 Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 6(1), P.D. No.
902-A and Sec. 121, Corporation Code.
411
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 411
Mendoza vs. Mabutas
Annexes “A” and “B” of this petition, and from conducting,
directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as
indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,Griño-
Aquino, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Meloand Quiason, JJ., concur.
Respondent restrained and enjoined from issuing or
causing the publication of the questioned advertisement.
Notes.—Lawyers may not engage in forum-shopping by
splitting actions or appeals (Tan vs. Court of Appeals, 199
SCRA 212).
Reason for award of attorney’s fees must be stated in the
court’s decision (Policarpio vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA
729).
——o0o——
© Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines
Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P.
de Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for
prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as
Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that
he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of
determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and
jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to
the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the
said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director
has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that
one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office,
and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring
members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their
being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing
applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is
in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General,
maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely
or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual
practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by
lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific
and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by
the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent
Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or
qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the
Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more
of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere
application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the
respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known
as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States
Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has
also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. .
..
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United
States of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe
examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States
Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our
Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would
appear to have been holding tests or examinations the passing of which
was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent
Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director
of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been
questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it
careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with
respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any
member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or
administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to
whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation
and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included
in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment
and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before
a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate
and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do
the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part
of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs,
 and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor
at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting
at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
(Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs.
Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis
ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the
Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In
the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office
involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and
training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the
Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this,
but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and
application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of
facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an
invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals,
or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not
be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the
Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any
printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than
one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in
public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the
application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to
patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal
representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any
mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation
of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation,
under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the
cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a
petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing
of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in
case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time
after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted,
any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention
is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the
demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale,
or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being
met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the
patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of
the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the
patented article or working of the patented process or machine of
production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines
is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is
necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the
applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call
for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the
bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the
act, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law
or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design,
any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a
compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the
Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of
business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the
Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to
a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or
technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of
the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in
reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial
functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the
Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on
 payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis
supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction
that exists up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is
his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the
proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing
a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the
commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but
also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public
use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis
supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of
his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the
Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of
course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary,
may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the
assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and
documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention
or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an
application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients,
is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land,
prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law
to require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to
submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He
contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after
the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he
(respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to
the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys
and a register agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are
entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to
represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation
and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the
Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle
the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing
admitted to practice before any United States Court or the highest
court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the
requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may
be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his
name entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to
practice and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner
of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the
Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material;
and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he
is of good moral character and of good repute and possessed of
the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to
enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is
otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation
and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In
order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person
seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has
the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral
character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific
and technical matters must be submitted and an examination
which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The
taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any
person who has served for three years in the examining corps of
the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the
United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United
States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations
governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons
representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may
require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being
recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that
they shall show they are of good moral character and in good
repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable
them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service,
and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or
other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their
 applications or other business before the Office. The
Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular
case from further practice before his office any person, agent or
attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of
gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules
and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter,
deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective
business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by
advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion
shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be
reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or
so suspended by the district court of the United States for the
District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such
proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine.
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165
being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is
authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons
desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an
examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for
purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the
conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from
the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to
hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to
practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes
the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they
possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable
service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which
showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the
Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important
point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our
Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of
persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of
bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not
inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient
administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the
laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608
of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to
the approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations
necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as
amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of
the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and
regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code.
We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not
only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other
bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and
to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and
clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to
submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are
allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no
reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less
complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance
sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of
customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of
Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or
otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first
pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the
Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good
standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the
reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation
and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and
other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish
facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial
or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions
are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the
respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the
Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same
before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.
No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ.,concur.
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
Adm. Case No. 2474. September 15, 2004. *
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY.
LEO J. PALMA, respondent.
Attorneys; Duties; Integrity; At the outset, it must be stressed
that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards
among its members.—At the outset, it must be stressed that the
law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among
its members. There is no distinction as to whether the
transgression is committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or
in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
at another. Thus, not only his professional activities but even his
private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the
good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at
any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper
authorities.
_______________
* EN BANC.
307
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004
07
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
Same; Disbarment; Nature; A disbarment case is sui generis
for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.—In re
Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely
civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court
into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in
a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case
against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case
does not affect its course, then the judgment of annulment of
respondent’s marriage does not also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof—
clear preponderance of evidence—in disciplinary proceedings
against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.
Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Villareal, Rosacia, Dino & Patag for complainant.
Capulong & Ladrido for respondent.
PER CURIAM:
“The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who
measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral
fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules
of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but
require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character.
These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after
admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or
else incur the risk of suspension or removal.” 1
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the
instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma,
3 alleging as grounds “deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in
office,
_______________
1 In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. L-363, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 661.
 308 three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Eduardo Lorenzo.
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral _______________
conduct.”
Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), April 21, 1983 at pp. 49-51.
The facts are undisputed:
2

309
Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70’s.
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004 309
Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala &
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer
On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of
assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his growing business
First Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City a petition for
concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his
3

declaration of nullity of the marriage between respondent

personal counsel.
and Lisa, docketed as Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P. In the
Consequently, respondent’s relationship with
Decision dated November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the
complainant’s family became intimate. He traveled and dined
4

marriage null and void ab initio.

with them abroad. He frequented their house and even
2

Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant

tutored complainant’s 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa
complaint for disbarment, imputing to respondent the
Cojuangco (Lisa), then a student of Assumption Convent.
5

following acts:
On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainant’s
“a. In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed
family, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong. It was only
in him by complainant and his family and taking undue advantage
the next day that respondent informed complainant and
of his tutoring sessions with Maria Luisa, respondent secretly
assured him that “everything is legal.” Complainant was
courted her. The great disparity in intelligence, education, age,
shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a married
experience and maturity between Maria Luisa and respondent
man and has three children. Upon investigation, complainant
gave the latter an overwhelming moral ascendancy over Maria
found that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring
Luisa as to overcome her scruples and apprehensions about
sessions. Immediately, complainant sent his two sons to
respondent’s courtship and advances, considering that he is a
Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to Manila and discuss
married man with three (3) children;
the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded.
b. Respondent courted Maria Luisa with persistence and
Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the
determination and even pursued her in her travels abroad under
supposed marriage, respondent requested from his
false pretenses that he was traveling on official business for
(complainant’s) office an airplane ticket to and from
complainant. To break down the final resistance of Maria Luisa
Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent
and assuage her pangs of guilt, he made representations that there
misrepresented himself as “bachelor” before the Hong Kong
was no legal impediment whatsoever to his marrying;
authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c)
c. With his moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa and his
respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has
misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or
prohibition to his contracting a second marriage, respondent
succeeded in inducing and beguiling her into marrying him.
Without complying with the requirements of Philippine law that
he should first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma and that the “advice” of Maria
Luisa’s parents should first be obtained she being only twenty-two
(22) years of age, respondent succeeded in contracting marriage
with her in Hongkong on June 22,
_______________
3 Annex “D”, Complaint, Rollo at pp. 13-19.
4 Annex “F”, Id., at pp. 32-36.
5 Dated November 8, 1982, Id., at pp. 1-6.
310
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
1982 by falsely representing himself before the Hongkong
authorities that he is a ‘bachelor.’ x x x.”
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
6
cause of action. He contended that the complaint fails to
allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct
or violation of his lawyer’s oath. There is no allegation that
he acted with “wanton recklessness, lack of skill or ignorance
of the law” in serving complainant’s interest. Anent the
charge of grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he
married complainant’s daughter with “utmost sincerity and
good faith” and that “it is contrary to the natural course of
things for an immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely
loves.”
In the Resolution dated March 2, 1983, we referred the
7
case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for
investigation, report and recommendation. Former Assistant
Solicitor General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili conducted the
investigation.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1983, the First Division of
this Court issued in G.R. No. 64538 a Resolution (a) setting
8 9
_______________
6 Dated February 8, 1983, Id., at pp. 53-56.
7 Supra.
8 “Leo J. Palma vs. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, etc.”
In Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P, for declaration of nullity of marriage mentioned earlier,
the trial court issued an order dated January 17, 1983 denying respondent’s motion for
reconsideration/new trial. This prompted him to file with this Court a petition for
certiorari assailing the said order.
In this Resolution, this Court ordered respondent judge “to conduct a new trial in
the case below and to allow petitioner to file his answer, which answer should be filed
within ten (10) days from finality of this Resolution. The records show that respondent
judge acted with undue haste in declaring petitioner in default on the complaint filed
on August 24, 1982 and in rendering his ex parte decision of November 2, 1982 as well
as in refusing to give due course to the timely appeal filed by petitioner and instead
ordering the execution of the judgment.”
9 Rollo, at pp. 197-198.
311
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004 311
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
aside the CFI Decision dated November 2, 1982 in Civil Case
No. Pq–0401-P declaring the marriage between respondent
and Lisa null and void ab initio; and (b) remanding the case
to the CFI for proper proceeding and determination. To this
date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.
On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an
Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground that 10
the final outcome of Civil Case No. Pq–0401-P poses a
prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding. It was
denied.
Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an
Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Restraining Order. In the 11
Resolution dated December 19, 1984, we enjoined the OSG
from continuing the investigation of the disbarment
proceedings. 12
 Thereafter, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. On October
19, 1998, Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo issued the
following order:
“Considering the length of time that this case has remained
pending and as a practical measure to ease the backlog of this
Commission, the parties shall within ten (10) days from notice,
manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this
case or supervening events have transpired which render this case
moot and academic or otherwise, this case shall be deemed closed
and terminated.” 13
In his Manifestation, complainant manifested and confirmed
14
his continuing interest in prosecuting his complaint for
disbarment against respondent.
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 199-201.
11 Dated December 13, 1984.
12 OSG Records at p. 5. The OSG issued the Order dated December 20,
1984 suspending the scheduled hearing until the Court orders otherwise.
(OSG Records at p. 1)
13 Records of the Commission on Bar Discipline at p. 11.
14 Dated November 13, 1998, Id., at p. 13.
312
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
On the other hand, respondent sought several postponements
of hearing on the ground that he needed more time to locate
vital documents in support of his defense. The scheduled
hearing of December 4, 2001 was reset for the last time on
January 24, 2002, with a warning that should he fail to
appear or present deposition, the case will be deemed
submitted for resolution. Respondent again failed to appear
15
on January 24, 2002; hence, the case was considered
submitted for resolution. 16
On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros
V. San Juan submitted a Report and Recommendation
finding respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct and
violation of his oath as a lawyer. She recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) years. Thus:
“The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not
respondent committed the following acts which warrant his
disbarment:
1. a)Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence
reposed in him by complainant;
2. b)His misrepresentation that there was no legal
impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second
marriage;
3. c)The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct and
violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Respondent admits that he married Maria Luisa in Hongkong
representing himself as a bachelor, however, he claimed that the
marriage certificate stated a condition no different from term
“spinster” with respect to Luisa.
There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well versed in
the law knew fully well that in marrying Maria Luisa he was
entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent betrayed
the trust
_______________
15 Order dated December 4, 2001, Id., at p. 51.
16 Order dated January 24, 2002, Id., at p. 97.
313
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004 313
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
reposed in him by complainant. He was treated as part of the
family and was allowed to tutor Maria Luisa.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent
committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a
lawyer, and it is recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.
SO ORDERED.”
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above
Report and Recommendation, but it reduced respondent’s
penalty to only one (1) year suspension.
Except for the penalty, we affirm the IBP’s Report and
Recommendation.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession
does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its
members. There is no distinction as to whether the
transgression is committed in the lawyer’s professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may
not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time
and a mere citizen at another. Thus, not only his
17
professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the
latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and
prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be
the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities. 18
Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the
best of his ability. In fact, the complaint does not allege that
he acted with “wanton recklessness, lack of skill and
ignorance of the law.”
_______________
In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 (1970).
17
Bustamante-Alejandro vs. Alejandro, AC No. 4256, February 13,
18
2004, 422 SCRA 527.
Rule 7.03, Canon 7 provides:
“A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”
314
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a
good lawyer, however, professional competency alone does
19
not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral
character is always an indispensable requirement.
The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married
Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth
Hermosisima. The Certification from the Local Civil 20
Registrar of Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on
December 19, 1971 at Cardial’s Private Chapel, Cebu City.
On the other hand, the Certificate of Marriage from the 21
Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong, proves
respondent’s subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982.
That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondent’s second
marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor
P. Lazatin, Elizabeth’s classmate and family friend. 22
Undoubtedly, respondent’s act constitutes grossly immoral
conduct, a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack
of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality. 23
This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality.
Thus, we have somehow come up with a common definition of
what constitutes immoral conduct,i.e., “that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.” Measured
24 against this ethics of his profession,” warranting respondent’s
definition, respon- disbarment.
(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta, respondent 27 married
_______________ complainant while his first wife was still alive, their
marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that “the act of
TSN, April 21, 1983, at p. 98.
respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to
19

Annex “A”, Rollo at p. 7.

honesty, justice, decency and morality.” Thus, lacking the
20

Annex “C” and Annex “D”, Id., at pp. 12 and 13.

good moral character required by the Rules of Court,
21

TSN, July 12, 1982, at pp. 1-42.

respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
22

Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313 (1957).

(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin, respondent lured an innocent
23
28

7 C.J.S. 959.
woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his
24

315
lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004 315
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma _______________
dent’s act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent 25 Adm. Case. No. 6148, February 27, 2004, 424 SCRA 42.
young woman into marrying him. And third, he 26 A.C. No. 5170, November 17, 1999, 318 SCRA 229.
misrepresented himself as a “bachelor” so he could contract 27 101 Phil.313 (1957).
marriage in a foreign land. 28 106 Phil. 256 (1960).
Our rulings in the following cases are relevant: 316
(1) In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo, respondent entered into
25 316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
sever them. There, we ruled that “[S]uch pattern of of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of
misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the
marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for practice of law.
the rearing of our children, for the development of values (5) In Toledo vs. Toledo, respondent abandoned his wife,
29

essential to the survival and well-being of our communities,
and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole.” As such,
“there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be
disbarred.”
(2) In Tucay vs. Tucay, respondent contracted marriage
26
with another married woman and left complainant with
who supported him and spent for his law education, and
thereafter cohabited with another woman. We ruled that he
“failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of a member of the bar.” For this, respondent
was disbarred.
(6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., respondent abandoned his
30

whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that lawful wife and child and resumed cohabitation with his
such acts constitute “a grossly immoral conduct and only former paramour. Here, we ruled that “abandoning one’s wife
indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a
married woman,” constitute grossly immoral conduct
warranting disbarment.
The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of
trust and abuse of confidence. It was respondent’s closeness
to the complainant’s family as well as the latter’s complete
trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship
with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be
complainant’s legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latter’s
back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in
the night, he attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover,
he availed of complainant’s resources by securing a plane
ticket from complainant’s office in order to marry the latter’s
daughter in Hongkong. He did this without complainant’s
knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure
complainant that “everything is legal.” Clearly, respondent
had crossed the limits of propriety and decency.
Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really
loved Lisa and since he married her, he cannot be charged
with immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a
brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such relation-
_______________
29 117 SCRA 768, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963.
30 128 SCRA 485, Adm. Case No. 1392, April 2, 1984.
317
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004 317
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
ship, the man and the woman are obliged to live together,
observe mutual respect and fidelity. How could respondent
31
perform these obligations to Lisa when he was previously
married to Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest
thing he could have done was to walk away.
Respondent’s culpability is aggravated by the fact that
Lisa was just a 22-year old college student of Assumption
Convent and was under psychological treatment for
emotional immaturity. Naturally, she was an easy prey.
32
Anent respondent’s argument that since the validity of his
marriage to Lisa has not yet been determined by the court
with finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the
present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a
subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage has no
bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. As we held
in In re Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is
33
neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.
Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an
34
affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect
its course, then the judgment of annulment of respondent’s
35
marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing
actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof—clear
preponderance of evidence—in disciplinary proceedings
against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches. 36
The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, is that they “shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.”
_______________
31 Article 109 of the Civil Code.
32 TSN, April 21, 1983 at pp. 90-93.
33 31 SCRA 562 (1970).
34 Calub vs. Suller, 323 SCRA 556 (2000).
35 Rayos Ombac vs. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93 (1998).
36 Macarubbo vs. Macarubbo, supra.
318
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
This is founded on the lawyers’ primordial duty to society as VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004 319
spelled out in Canon 1 which states: Sambarani vs. Commission on Elections
“CANON 1—A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws SO ORDERED.
of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.” Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Panganiban, Ynares-
It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Professional Responsibility ranked the above responsibility Martinez,Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
first in the enumeration. They knew then that more than Quisumbing, J., No part (close association with
anybody else, it is the lawyers—the disciples of law—who are DOLE).
most obliged to venerate the law. As stated in Ex Parte Wall: 37 Carpio-Morales, J., On Official Leave.
“Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound Chico-Nazario, J., On Leave.
to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all Respondent disbarred for grossly immoral conduct and
men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample violation of his oath as a lawyer.
them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues Note.—Disbarment should never be decreed where any
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. (T’boli
to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.” AgroIndustrial Development, Inc. vs. Solilapsi, 394 SCRA
Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the 269 [2002])
Attorney’s Oath which every lawyer in the country has to
take before he is allowed to practice. ——o0o——
In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct
and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1) © Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
year suspension recommended by the IBP is not 22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The bulk of In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
jurisprudence supports the imposition of the extreme penalty January 9, 1973.
of disbarment. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR
WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY OF THE PHILIPPINES.
of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a RESOLUTION
lawyer, and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
PER CURIAM:
Let respondent’s name be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar Confidant, the On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integra-
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout 23
the country with copies of this Decision. VOL. 49, JANUARY 9, 1973 23
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
_______________
tion submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the
1

37 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556. “earnest recommendation”—– on the basis of the
319 saidReport and the proceedings had in Administrative Case
No. 526 of the Court, and “consistently with the views and
2 4
counsel received from its [the Commission’s] Board of
Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide
sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar”—– that “this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar
as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of
an appropriate Court Rule.”
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the
Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due
hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable
to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On
August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in
opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the
Court. Written oppositions were admitted, and all parties
3 unifying the Philippine Bar.
were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda.
_______________
Created by Supreme Court Resolution of October 5, 1970 “for the
1
The petitioners and the Negros Occidental Bar Association submitted
memoranda in favor of Bar integration, while the Manila Bar Association
submitted a memoranda opposing Bar integration.
24
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed
significant developments relative to the matter of the
integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there
had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar
integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar
Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of
4 In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277
entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the
Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor.” The
measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep.

purpose of ascertaining the advisability of the integration of the Bar in this

Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
jurisdiction,” the Commission is composed of Supreme Court Associate
“SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro (Chairman), Senator Jose J. Roy, retired Supreme
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of
Court Associate Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, Supreme Court Associate
the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order
Justice (then Court of Appeals Presiding Justice) Salvador V. Esguerra, U.P.
to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
Law Center Director Crisolito Pascual, Ex-Senator Tecla San Andres Ziga,
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
and San Beda Law Dean and Constitutional Convention Delegate Feliciano
public responsibility more effectively.
Jover Ledesma (Members).
“SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby
2 Filed on July 11, 1962 (by a Committee composed of Jose W. Diokno,
appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not
Roman Ozaeta, Jose P. Carag, Eugenio Villanueva, Jr. and Leo A.
otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Panuncialman), the petition represented the unanimous consensus of 53 Bar
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose
Associations (from all over the Philippines) reached in convention at the Far
shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme
Eastern University Auditorium in Manila on June 23, 1962.
Court.
3 Written oppositions were submitted by Attys. Cesar Fajardo and Vicente
“SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.”
L. Arcega, the Camarines Norte Lawyers League, Atty. Fructuoso S. Villarin,
The Report of the Commission abounds with arguments on
the Camarines Sur Bar Association and the Manila Bar Association.
the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all
necessary factual data bearing on the advisability
(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also
embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments,
comments and observations of the rank and file of the
Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as
well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the
Commission and presented to them by that body in a
national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well
as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether
or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
25
VOL. 49, JANUARY 9, 1973 25
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
The following are the pertinent issues:
1. (1)Does the Court have the power to integrate the
Philippine Bar?
2. (2)Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
3. (3)Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar
at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a
statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice,
for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the
Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of
itsReport, thus:
“Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of
the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This
requiresmembership and financial support (in reasonable amount)
of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law
and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court
“The term ‘Bar’ refers to the collectivity of all persons whose
names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or
Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
“Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an
entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore,
signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national
organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the
lawyer as an officer of the court.
“Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an
instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters-
cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized
action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the
legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar
autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the
Supreme Court.
“The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
1. “(1)Assist in the administration of justice;
2. “(2)Foster and maintain on the part of its members high
ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence,
public service and conduct;
26
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
1. “(3)Safeguard the professional interests of its members ;
2. “(4)Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and
brotherhood;
3. “(5)Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence,
law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the
relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and
publish information relating thereto;
4. “(6)Encourage and foster legal education;
5. “(7)Promote a continuing program of legal research in
substantive and adjective law, and make reports and
recommendations thereon; and
6. “(8)Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
effectively.
“Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible
for the legal profession to:
1. “(1)Render more effective assistance in maintaining the
Rule of Law;
2. “(2)Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuses of
tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers;
3. “(3)Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the
disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy
judges and prosecuting officers;
4. “(4)Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend
itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that
politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
5. “(5)Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and
prosecuting officers;
6. “(6)Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up
any monopoly of local practice maintained through
influence or position;
7. “(7)Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and
deceased lawyers;
8. "(8)Provide placement services, and establish legal
27
VOL. 49, JANUARY 9, 1973 27
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
1. aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout
the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal
service;
2. “(9)Distribute educational and informational materials that
are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces;
3. “(10)Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal
education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the
standards of the profession throughout the country;
4. “(11)Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate
minimum fees schedules;
5. “(12)Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal
research;
6. “(13)Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal
rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive
legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the
Filipino lawyer; and
7. “(14)Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful
country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the
solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the
nation.”
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may
integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power,
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, “to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law.” Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the
Court’s constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing
that “the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar,” Republic Act 6397
neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court’s
inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the
integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will “raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.”
Resolution of the second issue—– whether the unification
of the Bar would be constitutional—– hinges on the effects
28
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
of Bar integration on the lawyer’s constitutional rights of
freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the
nature of the dues exacted from him.
 The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the
discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration on corollary right not to associate).
pages 44 to 49 of its Report: “Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar
“Constitutionality of Bar Integration when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for the
“Judicial Pronouncements.
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
“In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has
lawyer is already a member.
been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
“Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
“The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
“—– Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as
practice of law.
he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the
“—– The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege ; a
payment of annual dues.
privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer
“Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only
owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue, therefore, is
profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of
a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not
the most important functions of the State, the administration of
involuntary membership in any other aspect.
justice, as an officer of the court.
“The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of
“—– Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public
elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the
interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be
end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the
regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer’s public
people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s
responsibilities.
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services,
“—– These public responsibilities can best be discharged
may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
through collective action; but there can be no collective action
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
without an organized body; no organized body can operate
regulatory program—– the lawyers.
effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just
“Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a
that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most
exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has
efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule
long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and
of court that requires all-lawyers to pay annual dues to the
control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to
Integrated Bar.
regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.
“1. Freedom of Association.
“2. Regulatory Fee.
“To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar
“For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does
29
not mean that the Court levies a tax.
VOL. 49, JANUARY 9, 1973 29
“A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
30
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court
has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an
incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated
Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses.
The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to
impose such an exaction.
“The only limitation upon the State’s power to regulate the Bar
is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden.
The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that
might result from his required payment of annual dues.
“3. Freedom of Speech.
“A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on
any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views be
opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
“For the Integrated Bar to use a member’s due to promote
measures to which said member is opposed, would not nullify or
adversely affect his freedom of speech.
“Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to
practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult
to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to
use the member’s dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was
established.
“The objection would make every Governmental exaction the
material of a ‘free speech’ issue. Even the income tax would be
suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never
been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to
be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance
of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as
irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet
been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies
of Government.
“4. Fair to All Lawyers.
31
VOL. 49, JANUARY 9, 1973 31
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
“Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising
because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new
regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which
they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work,
they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and
discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner
than they have been able to do in the past. Because the
requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by
the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and
old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a
new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it
is not unequal, it is not unfair.”
To resolve the third and final issue—– whether the Court
should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time—–
requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity
as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar
integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada
and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the
following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the
members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of
the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the
individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4)
greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of
unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership
campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar;
(8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more
effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and
responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the
public. No less than these salutary consequences are
envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the
Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in
the event of integration, Government authority will dominate
the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism
will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be
possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics
will intrude into its affairs.
32
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils
prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to
materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience
in England, Canada and the United States. In all the
jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none
of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it
has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar’s
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the
administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar
integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar Integration show that in the national
poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of
the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090
lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in
their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in
favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent)
voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-
committal. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar
associations and lawyers’ groups all over the Philippines
have submitted resolutions and other expressions of
unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration,
while not a single local Bar association or lawyers’ group has
expressed opposition thereto. Finally, of the 13,802
individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission,
12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80
per cent) voted against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-
committal. All these clearly indicate an overwhelming
5
nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the
Philippine Bar is “perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjec-
_______________
All figures are as of January 8, 1973.
5
33
VOL. 49, JANUARY 11, 1973 33
Cadano vs. Cadano
tionable,” and, within the context of contemporary conditions
in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested
in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby
ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in
accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on
January 16, 1973.
Concepcion C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,Fernan
do, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio andEsguerra,
JJ., concur.
Integration of the Philippine Bar ordained.
 —–—–—–—–—– versations or communications or in the course of a political
campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn
© Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the lawyer
to disciplinary action.
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Same; Same; Same; Post-litigation utterances and
In re Almacen publications of lawyer critical of courts may be the basis of
No. L-27664. February 18, 1970. disciplinary action.—Post-litigation utterances or publications,
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.VICENTE RAUL actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend
ALMACEN in L-27654, ANTONIO H. the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism
CALERO VS.VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAYO and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public
Remedial law; Civil procedure; Appeals; Review of Court of confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of
Appeals, discretionary.—The supervisory jurisdiction vested upon justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be
the Supreme Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary
give every losing party another hearing. This axiom Is implied in sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives
Sec. 4 of Eule 45 of the Rules of Court, inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and
Same; Same; Motion for reconsideration; Requirements.—For ethics of the legal fraternity.
a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of Same; Special civil action; Contempt; Termination of case is no
appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon defense.—The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding
the adverse party but also notify the adverse party of the time and has terminated has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this
place of hearing. was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
Same; Legal ethics; Criticism of courts and judges.—A lawyer, modification thereof, however, came when, in PeopleVo Alarcon, 69
both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, may criticize in Phil. 265, the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the act the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel,
of courts and judges. But it is the cardinal condition of all such which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re
walls of decency and propriety. Brillantes, 42 O.G. 59, a contempt proceeding, where the editor of
Same; Same; Same; Acts as lawyer and citizen.—In his the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an
relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar examinations were
so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of
Thus, statements made by an attorney in private con- the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed.
563 Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expresed by Chief
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 56 Justice Moran in his dissent inAlarcon to the effect that there may
3 still be contempt by publication even after a case has been
In re Almacen terminated. More than this however, is the fact that the pendency
or non-pendency of a proceeding is immaterial in a disciplinary
action against a lawyer as an officer of the court and to preserve PETITION to Surrender Lawyer^ Certificate of Title.
the purity of the legal profession.
Same; Legal ethics; Disciplinary proceedings; Nature;Supreme The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Court does not sit as judge, prosecutor and investigator in RESOLUTION
administrative proceeding against lawyers.—Disciplinary
CASTRO, J.:
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen’s “Petition to
suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title/1 filed on Sep^ tember
one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is “a
no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme
564
Court.’1 He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a
5 SUPREME COURTREPORTS ANNOTATED
tribunal “peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for
64
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
In re Almacen
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be with impunity.” His client’s he continues, who was deeply
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary aggrieved by this Court’s
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
565
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 565
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court In re Almacen
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
“unjust judgment,” has become “one of the sacrificial victims
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
before the altar of hypocrisy.” In the same breath that he
preserving the purity of the ltgal profession and the proper and
alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members of this Court, saying “that justice as administered
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
blind, but also deaf and dumb.” He then vows to argue the
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can
cause of his client “in the people’s forum,” so that “the people
thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court,”
Same; Same; Same; Indefinite suspension may be ordered.—
and that “whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that
Where the demonstrated persistence of the misconduct of the
were committed must never be repeated.” He ends his
lawyer leaves the court unable to assess or determine how long
petition with a prayer that
that suspension should last and that disbarment should not be
“x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired,
certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN
the erring lawyer was merely suspended indefinitely. In such a
TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
case at any time after the suspension becomes effective, the lawyer
event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title
may prove to the Court that’he is once again fit to resume the
to assume the practice of the noblest profession.”
practice of law.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the
aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967,
theManila Times published statements attributed to him, as
follows:
“Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did
it to expose the tribunal’s ‘unconstitutional and obnoxious’practice
of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
“Because of the tribunal’s ‘short-cut justice,’ Almacen deplored,
his client was condemned to pay F120,000, without knowing why
he lost the case.
x x x decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for
“There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in
this petition, ‘where our Supreme Court is composed of men who
are calloused to oiir pleas for justice, who ignore without reason
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.’
x x x
“He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by
which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme
Court ‘wiii become responsive to all cases brought to its attention
without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
566
566 SUPREME COURTREPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
unconstitutional and obnoxious “lack of merit” or “denied
resolutions.’“ (Italics supplied)
Atty. Almacen’s statement that
“x x x our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity,”
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of
the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection
therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had “accused
the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must
clear itself,” and that “his charge is one of the constitutional
bases for impeachment.”
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case
entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, in 1
which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant The trial
court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his
client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the
its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy
of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and
place of hear* ing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18,
1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For
‘lack of proof of service,” the trial court denied both motions.
To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his
first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on
August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which
he attached the required registry return card. This second
motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn
by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of
Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22,
1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff
interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal
bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.
_______________
1 Docketed as Civil Case 8909 on September 17,1966 in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal.
567
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 567
In re Almacen
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court’s
decision in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the
appeal, in the following words:
“Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by
plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the
opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for
the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 6, 1966
(pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of
time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece
of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co,, Inc. vs. Batu Construction
& Co., G.R. No, L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt
the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal
was perfected out of time.”
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging
that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the
same time he filed a pleading entitled “Latest decision of the
Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration”
citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza. L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966,
as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion for reconsideration, thus:
“Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967
and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant-
appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8,
1967, dismissing the appeal.
“Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions
between this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965,
relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs.
Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme
Court concerning the question raised by appellant’s motion, the
ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
“There is no substantial distinction between this case and that
of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
“In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying
the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds
568
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962. v
hich was much earlier than the date of promulgation o^ the
decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965.
Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory
and the Supreme Court issued it ‘without prejudice to appellee’s
restoring the point in the brief/ In the main decision in said case
(Rep. vs. Venturanza), the Supreme Court passed upon the
issuesub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary
to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the
Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.”
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We
refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the
appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time.
Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence,
the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the
said date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his
disappointment by filing his “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s
Certificate of Title/’ already adverted to—a pleading that is
interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its
individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as
it is unprofessional.
 Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28,
1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have
actually -surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for
him to make good his proffer. No word came froir him. So he
was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had
earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court
could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested
“that he has no pending petition in connection with Case
G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now
final and executory;” that this Court’s September 28, 1967
resolution did not
569
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 569
In re Almacen
require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that
since his offer was not accepted, he “chose to pursue the
negative act.”
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a
member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this
Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty.
Almacen to show cause “why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him.” Denying the charges contained in the
November 17 resolution, he asked for permission “to give
reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him x x x in an open and public hearing.” This Court
resolved (on December 7) “to require Atty. Almacen to state,
within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such
request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived
and incident submitted for decision/’ To this resolution he
manifested that since this Court is “the complainant,
prosecutor and Judge,” he preferred to be heard and to
answer questions “in person and in an open and public
hearing” so that this Court could observe his sincerity and
candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation
“in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person,”
To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was
allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was
heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is
unchastened, offers no apology. Far from being contrite, Atty.
Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations,
this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and
innuendo. Thus:
“At the start, let me quote passages from the Hoiy Bible, Chapter
7, St. Matthew:—
“‘Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you
judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall
be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother’s eye,
and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how canst thou say
to thy brother, “Let me cast out the speck from thy eye”; and behold, there
is a beam in thy
570
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and
then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother’s eyea.
“ ‘Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to
them; for this is the Law and the Prophets.’
x x x
“Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements
mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of
what he stated, compatible with his lawyer’s oath that ‘he will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he
vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements
contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members df the
Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of
a member of the noble profession of law.
 x x x ‘the story is current, though nebulous as to its truth, it is still
“Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by
TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND
AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest
interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the
members have shown callousness to our various pleas for
JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, x x x
x x x not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the
“To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals
for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and
above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE,—what did we get
from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our
pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards
our particular case.
x x x
“Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of
the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution,
you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of
natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your
respondent for acts he said in good faith.
“Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and
supplications for JUSTICE. CHARITY, GENEROSITY and
571
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 571
In re Almacen
FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn
denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your
respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the
same statement witn emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this the way of
life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said:—
being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it
is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me
frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable
commodity in the Philippines.’
x x x
“We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS,
members, xxx We were provoked. We were compelled by force of
necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the
decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We
never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties.
But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed
finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you
have not performed your duties with ^circumspection, carefulness,
confidence and wisdom’, your Respondent rise to claim his God-
given right to apeak the truth and his Constitutional right of free
speech.
x x x
“The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and
the further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly
shared by our President, xxx
x x x
“What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things
that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland’s famous
apostrophe during the French revolution, ‘O Liberty, what crimes
are committed in thy name’, we may dare say, ‘O JUSTICE, what
technicalities are committed in thy name’ or more appropriately, ‘O
JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name.’
x x x
 “We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of
any abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering that
yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be
generated so as to curtail these abuses.
x x x We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we
572
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
“The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be
found in all courts and government offices. We have added oniy
two more symbols, that it is aiso deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense
that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice;
dumb in the sense, that Inspite of our beggings, supplications, and
pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED,
not one word was spoken or given xxx We refer to no human defect
or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the
impersonal state of things and nothing more.
x x x first-impression cogency, but fail to withstand critical
“As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the
members of this Court and for which reason we offered to
surrender our lawyer’s certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because
what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer
was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may
decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in
the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to
uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this
Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.”
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which
he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this
Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition
for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms expressed 2
against this Court’s practice of rejecting petitions by minute
resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state
iiie facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial
know the abject frustration of a lawyer whq tediously collates
the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls
his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse
unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions
rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and
_______________
2 See e.g. “Mounting Discontent against the Supreme Court’s Minute
Resolution,” 32 Lawyers J. p. 825; “Lack of Merit Resolutions are Obnoxious,”
31 Lawyers J. p. 329.
573
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 573
In re Almacen
ought never to have been lodged at all, The rest do exhibit a
3
scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in
giving due course to petitions for certiorari. Be this as it may,
were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every
petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively
the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper
role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the
U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide “only those
cases which present questions whose resolutions will have
immediate importance beyond the particular facts and
parties involved.’ Pertinent here is the observation of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio
Shotv, 94 L. ed 562, 566 :
“A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to
the same petition different reasons may read different justices to
the same result xxx.
“Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even
confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been
suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for
denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court
may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has
placed the control of tire Court’s business, in effect, within the
Court’s discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed
of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same
three terms the Court denied, respectively, l,2G0, 1,105, 1,189
petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its
work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for
refusing to take these cases. The time that would be required is
prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different
reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in
concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes
review undesirable.”
_______________
In the years 1966, 1967 and 1968, this Court rejected by minute
3
resolutions 803, 682 and 848 petitions, respectively, and resolved by extended
decisions or resolutions 584, 611 and 760 cases, respectively. For the period
covering the first six months of the year 1969, this Court rejected by minute
resolutions 445 petitions, and resolved by extended decisions or resolutions
279 cases.
574
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
Six years ago, in Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al, L-
21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court through the
then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered
view on this matter. There, the petitioner’s counsel urged
that a “lack of merit” resolution violates Section 12 of Article
VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
“In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question
has been raised before; and we held that these ‘resolutions’ are not
‘decisions’ within the above constitutional requirement, They
merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained
in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even
ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion;
and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial. For one
thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeals’ opinion.
“By the way, this mode of disposal has—as intended—helped
the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the
practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review
are often merely ordered ‘dismissed’.”
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on
petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had
the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for
compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is
to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the
supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the
Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party
another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court which recites:
“Review of Court of Appeals’ decision discretionary.—A review is
not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be
granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully
measuring the court’s discretion, indicate the character of reasons
which will be considered:
1. “(a)When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord
 with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court;
575
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 575
In re Almacen
1. “(b)When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far
sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for
the exercise of the power of supervision.”
Recalling Atty. Almacen’s petition for review, we found, upon
a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings and records,
that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered
the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and
applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away
from the “accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings/’
it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a
number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this
Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far
back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew—or ought to have
known—that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the
running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only
serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he
did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of
hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was
unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs.
Batu Construction & Co., supra:
“The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions
in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which
provides that such notice shall state the time and place of hearing
and shall be served upon all the parties concerned at least three
days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no
motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such
notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is
nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v.
Damasco, L-18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42
Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v, Municipality of
Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117).
The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place
of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that
party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear
him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any
period within which he may file his reply or opposition.”
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to
576
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
review the lower court’s judgment, he has only himself to
blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the
remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of
right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a “whipping boy.” But he made
sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in
offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the
liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating
rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that
there Is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous
outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty.
Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that
it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each
time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious
case. That is why lawyers are given wide latitude to differ
with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts’
rulings but also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon
and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a
judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such
4 5
right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a
concluded litigation, because then the court’s actuations are
6 fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into
thrown open to public consumption. 7 the tapestry of justice. Hence., as- citizen and officer of the
_______________
4 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); In re Gomez, 48 Phil. 376; Salcedo
vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 736 (Malcolm, J., dissenting); Austria
Masaquel, G.R. L-22536, Aug. 81, 1967; Cabansag vs. Fernandez, et al.,G.R.
L-8974, Oct. 18, 1957.
5 In re Gomez, supra.
6 In re Gomez, supra; In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 (1930); In re
Abistado, 57 Phil. 668 (1932); People vs. Alarcon; In re Contempt Proceedings,
Mangahas, 69 Phil. 265 (1939). See Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S.
331, 90 L. ed. 1295; In re Bozorth, 118 A. 2d 432; In re Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d
432 (1959); In re Pryor, 26 Am. Rep. 474; Hill v. Lymttn, 126 NYS 2d
286; Craig v. Hecht, 68 L. ed. 293 (Concurring opinion of Justice Taft).
7 Strebel v. Figueras, 96 Phil. 321 (1954),
577
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970
In re Almacen
“Our decisions and all our official actions/’ said the Supreme
Court of Nebraska, “are public property, and the press and
8
the people have the undoubted right to comment on them,
criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers,
like other public servants, must answer for their official
actions before the chancery of public opinion.”
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction
to an attack on one’s integrity, competence and honesty, with
“imminent danger to the administration of justice,” is the
reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on
those who assail their actuations. This danger lurks 9
especially in such a case as this where those who sit as
members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer
who vigorously assails their actuations. For courageous and
10
court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right,
but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings
and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
vs. _______________
8 State v. Bee Pub. Co., 83 N.W. 204, Sullivan, J. See also Slate ex rel Atty.
Gen. v. Circuit Ct., 72 N. W. 193.
9 In re Jameson, 340 Pae. 2d 432 (1959).
10 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376;Cabansag
v. Fernandez, L-18974, Oct. 18, 1957; Austria vs. Masaquel, L-22536, Aug. 31,
1967; Re Troy (1920), 111 Atl. 723; State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Circuit
Ct. (1897), 65 Am. St. Rep. 90; Goons v. State, 134 N.E. 194;Stale vs.
Sweetland, 54 N.W. 415; Hill vs. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286; Case of Austin, 28
Am. Dec. 657.
11 State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (NS) 585;Re
577 Pryor, 26 Am. Rep. 747; Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 637; Case of
Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657; Brannon v. State, 29 So. 2d 918; Mcdgar Evers v.
Stair, 131 So. 2d 653; Re Ades, 6 F 2d 467.
578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and 12
expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the 13
executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted
in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both
_______________
 12 “A judge as a public official,” said Justice Thornal in State v,
Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, “is neither sacrosanct, nor immune to public
criticism of his conduct in office.”
13 In re Bozorth, 118 Atl. 432: “The harsh and sometimes unfounded
criticism of the members of any of the three branches of our Government may
be unfortunate lot of public officials xxx, but it has always been deemed a
basic principle that such comment may be made by the public xxx. Nor should
the judicial branch xxx enjoy any more enviable condition than the other two
branches.”
In Bridges v. California, 86 L. ed. 192, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the
majority, said: “x x x an enforced silence, liowever, limited, solely in the name
of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment,
suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.” Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the minority opinion, said: “Judges as
persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity from
criticism than other persons or institutions. Just because the holders of
judicial office are identified with the interest of justice they may forget their
common human frailties and fallibilities. There have sometimes been
martinets upon the bench as there have sometimes been wielders of authority
whor have used the paraphernalia of power in support of what they called
their dignity. Therefore judges must be kept mindful of their limitations and
of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism
expressed with candor however blunt. ‘A man cannot be summarily laid by
the heels because his words may make public feeling more unfavorable in
case the judge should be asked to act at some later date, any more than he
can for exciting public feeling against a judge for what he already has done.’
xxx Courts and judges must take their share of the gains and pains
of t discussion which is unfettered except by laws of libel, by self-restraint, and
by good taste. Winds of doctrine should freely blow for the promotion of good
and the correction of evil. Nor should restrictions be permitted that cramp
the feeling of freedom in the use of tongue or pen regardless of the temper of
the truth of what may be uttered.”
579
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 579
In re Almacen
as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels
the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
“An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place
accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a
citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of
the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts.” (In re
Ades, 6 F Supp. 487)
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of
the traditional work of the lawyer. In the prosecution of
appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In articles
written for law journals he dissects with detachment the
doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare
for all to see the flaws and inconsistencies of the doctrines
(Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief
Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the
expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity,
impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They
have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct
judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts, x x x To
say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under
liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession
and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his
djity to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained, xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it
his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right.
Nor is he “professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to
legal animadversion as a citizen.’ (Case of Austin, 28 Am.
Dec. 657, 665).
“Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat
opportunity to become conversant with the character and efficiency
of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no
other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able
and upright bench.” (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart 116
N.W. 212, 216)
580
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of
courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best
position to give advice and who might consider it their duty
to speak disparagingly. “Under such a rule/’ so far as the bar
As Mr, Justice Field puts it:
“x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do
not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are
admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due
to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules
_______________
Sec. 3, Rule 138.
14

Sec. 20(b), Rule 138.

is concerned, “the merits of a sitting judge may he rehearsed,
15

581
but as to his demerits there must be profound silence.” (State
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 581
v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
In re Almacen
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of
shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
judges personally for their judicial acts.” (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts
Law. 4d. 647, 652)
and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
The lawyer’s duty to render respectful subordination to the
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice.
It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
Hence, in the assertion of their clients’ rights, lawyers—even
action.
those gifted with superior intellect—are enjoined to rein up
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person
their tempers.
obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment.
“The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more
His investiture into the legal profession places upon his
learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and
shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself “with all good
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an
fidelity x x x to the courts;” and the Rules of Court
14

army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the

constantly remind him “to observe and maintain the respect
tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the
due to courts of justice and judicial officers.” The first canon
15

foremost in rendering respectful submission.” (In Re Scouten, 40

of legal ethics enjoins him “to maintain towards the courts a
Atl. 481)
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
“We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at
supreme importance.*’
what he feels is others’ lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into
a belief that he may attack a court’s decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of
right.” (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs.
Ferrer, L-22979, June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in
private conversations or communications or 16
_______________
See e.g. Re Chopac, 66 F. Supp., where an attorney was suspended for
16
three years for writing a judge a letter in which he said that the judge in
signing an order took “ad-vantage of your office to rule with passion and
vehemence.” Also People v. Green, 3 P. 65, where an attorney was disbarred
for stopping a judge upon the street and addressed abusive, insulting
language to him. See also Johnson v. State, 44 So. 671; In re McCawan, 170
P. 1101: State v. Calhoon, 102, 2d 604; Re Huppe, 11 Pac. 2d 793; State v.
Rhodes, 131 NW 2d 118; Re Rogers, 212 Pac. 1034; In re Griffin, 1 NYS 7; In
re Wilkes, 3 NYS 753; Re Manheim, 99 NYS 87; Re Greenfield, 262 NYS 2d
349- In re Klein, 262 NYS 2d 416; In re Smith, 36 A 130.
582
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting
17
language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to
disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an
examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a “judge as a public official is neither
sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in
office,” the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhcan,102
So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that “any conduct of a
lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands condemnation and the
application of appropriate penalties,” adding that:
“It would be contrary to every democratic theory to hold that a
judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms
which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are
not aimed at the destruction of public confidence in the judicial
system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the
administration of justice is the direct product of false and
scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise”
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was
suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled
“JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA,” which accused a municipal
judge of having committed judicial error, of being so
prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of
being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a
prefatory statement he wrote: “They say that Justice is
BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it
is also DEAF and DUMB!” The court did not hesitate to find
that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a
lawyer, had a right to do.
“The entire publication evidences a desire on the part of the
accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into
disrepute with the general public.”
_______________
17 In re Humphrey, 163 P. 60; In re Thatcher, 89 KE. 39; In Snyder’s
Case, 76 ALR 666; Re Troy, 111 A. 723; State v. Sprigs, 155 P. 2d 285.
583
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 583
In re Almacen
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of
California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney
who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time
was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The
circular which referred to two decisions of the judge
concluded with a statement that the judge “used his judicial
office to enable said bank to keep that money.” Said the
court:
“We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no
limit to the criticism members of the bar may make regarding the
capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it
extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence
and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart.
116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex
parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep, 637. In the first case
mentioned it was observed, for instance:
“ ‘It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by
an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such
a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author.’
“Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of
graver character than those made by the respondent here. But, in
our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are
permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest
observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and
fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that
the public confidence in the due administration of justice be
upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be
maintained. In re Collins,, 81 Pac. 220.”
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso, v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734,
an attorney, representing a woman who had been granted a
divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of
review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the
press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and
others. The letter began:
“Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so
that my name is protected from the libel, lies, and
584
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
perjury committed in the eases involved, I shall be compelled to
resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case
warrants.”
Further, he said: “However let me assure you I do not intend
to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged/’ and said
that he was engaged in dealing with men and not
irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men.
Ordering the attorney’s disbarment, the Supreme Court of
Illinois declared:
“x x x Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever
there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is
the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the
proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration
of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and
respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and
offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who
are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law
into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity,
Cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly
an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of
judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorised suit,
together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended
and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.”
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the
courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and
greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were
bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized
any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was
charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered
suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
“A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the
authority of the court against whose members it was made, bring
its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an
unbiased arbiter of the people’s right, and interfere with the
administration of justice, xxx
 “Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under
the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him
585
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1979 585
In re Almacen
of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a
citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases
that have reached finai determination, are not exempt from fair
and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney
transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held
responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well
understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court,
is always a vigilant defender of civil rights.” In Re Troy, 111 Atl.
723. 725.
6. In In Re Rod-more, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was
suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court
an affidavit reflecting’ upon the judicial integrity of the court
from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court
said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying
suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully
retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that
the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he
considered grave injustice. The Court said:
“We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit
in the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial
officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on
the administration of justice and creating the mpression that
judicial action is influenced by corrupt or in proper motives. Every
attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right
and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is
vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act
of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or
would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has
improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such
charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will
be encouraged, and the person making them protected, xxx While
we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a ca^e decided
against him, or the right of the public generally, to criticise the
decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the
habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the
performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not
against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to
subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice
and in the administration of justice; ana vhen such charges are
made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to pro-
586
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
tect the administration of justice, the attorney making such
charges is guilty of professional misconduct.’
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this
statement:
“I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience,
barring possible temporary observations more or less vituperative,
and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might
have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor
against a widow residing here.”
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
“x x x the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds
of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted
attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives
and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of
improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license
from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all
good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.”
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney
apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an
attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he
impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a
case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a
sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days,
saying that:
“The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one
most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such members
does not measure up to the requirements of the iaw itself, as well
as to the ethics of the profession. xxx
“The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial
determination is of prime importance under our system and ideals
of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment
that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public
officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise,
would be served by denying this right of free speech to any
individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that
members of the bar who are
587
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 587
In re Almacen
sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and
with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at
all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth
and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is
necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired
by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a
community toward the judiciary by the filthy, wanton, and
malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the
public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to
deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of
whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the
judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar
the law itself demands retribution—not the court.”
9. In Bar Ass’n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440,
the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action
using in respect to the several judges the terms “criminal,
corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,” “criminal confederates,”
“colossal and confident insolence/’ “criminal prosecution,”
“calculated brutality,” “a corrupt deadfall,” and similar
phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of
the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215,
the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be
allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than
in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning
both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief
Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeais
in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The
letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters
contained this paragraph:
“You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better
right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a
widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or
umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage, xxx The point is this: Is a proper
588
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the
court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and
faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee
chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School,
aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students,
or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a
statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not
require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is
made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read
it.”
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension
of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as
follows:
“The question remains whether the accused was guilty of
professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter
addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very
purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and
the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because
of acts done by him and his associates in .their official capacity.
Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good
purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of
an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would
not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their
judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused
of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable
attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or
desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position,
can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods Fanctioned
by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile,
or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no
redress in any action triable by a jury, ‘The sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not
constitute an actionable publication.’ 18 Am. & Eng, Enc. Law (2d
Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this
letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts
charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different
principles are applicable thereto.
“The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but
so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the
Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to
which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, frort
the penalty here sought to be
589
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 589
In re Almacen
enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to
the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court.
When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice
personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize,
but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain
the respect due to courts and judicial officers. ‘This obligation is
not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the
judges personally for their official acts/ Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.
(U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as
regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault
by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a
personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words
addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or
elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from
criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The
distinction made is, we think, entirely logical and well sustained
by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod, supra. While
the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right
of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are
ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for
assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the
court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. ‘Is it in the
power of any person/ said the court, *by insulting or assaulting the
judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his
passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to
forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by
tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the
evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own
hands? xxx No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office
under such conditions/
“That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge
personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a
professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly
decided. ‘An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a
personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and
reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct
and will be disciplined by the court/ Matter of Manheim, 133 App.
Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87, The same is held in Re Griffin (City
Ct.) 1 N.Y, 7 and in re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it
appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter
to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated,
in reference to his decision: ‘It is not law; neither is it
590
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80/ And it was
decided that, while such misconduct was not a contempt under the
state, the matter should be ‘called to the attention of the Supreme
Court, which has power to discipline the attorney.’ ‘If,’ says the
court, ‘counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled
at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust
rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it
will not be long before the general public may feel that they may
redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of
a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration
of justice will fall into bad repute/
‘The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in
this respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an
attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge,
which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while
not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the
conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one
of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly
disbarred in having ‘willfully failed to maintain respect due to him
[the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as
an attorney/ As recognizing the same principle, and in support of
its application to the facts of this case, we cite the follow-ing; Es
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22
Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v.
Green, 7 Colo. 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith’s
Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten’s Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl.
481.
“Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have
been so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a
penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning
to others, xxx”
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F* 641, the court affirmed a
lawyer’s suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a
newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the
sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two
years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac, 411, the court held that an
attorney’s unjustifiable attack against the official acts and
decisions of a judge constitutes “moral turpitude.” There, the
attorney was disbarred for criticizing not only the judge, but
his decisions in general, claiming that the
591
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 591
In re Almacen
judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in
his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published
newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court
in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts
and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public,
for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney,
dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of
years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral
turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His
disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an
intention to resign from the bar.
 The teaching derived from the above disquisition and
impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made
by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations,
whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the
permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism
and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert
public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited witk disbarment or other
lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme
Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the
duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the
legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers
in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those
catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of
comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the
power of courts to punish for contempt which, although
resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different
end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of
such condemnable practices.
592
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may
afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel
branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as
“absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the
rights of the petitioaer Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
popular will expressed at the polls/’ this Court, although
conceding that
“It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause
and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy
of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to
exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding
without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,”
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion,
the statements made disclosed
“x x x an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and
an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby
charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of
the laws, the rights to the parties, and of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and
flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco’s client x x x.”
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the
author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to the
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who,
invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news
item carried in his paper, caused to be published in a local
newspaper a statement expressing his regret “that our High
Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it
is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow
mindedness of the majority of its members,” and his belief
that ‘In the wake of so many blunders and injustices
deliberately committed during these last years, xxx the only
remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court,” which tribunal he
denounced as “a constant peril to liber-
593
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 593
In re Almacen
ty and democracy” and “a far cry from the impregnable
bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned
jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary/’ He there also announced that one of the first
measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of
Congress would have for its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in
contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his
invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court
declared:
“But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be
published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or
comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and
still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel
Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this
Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which
he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and
reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the
members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded,
in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court,
and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. Bat
the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court
for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into
disrepute and degrading the administration of justice x x x.
“To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last
years committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices/
that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse
party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered,
in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people los>e their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder
and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the
594
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other,
is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court,
to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as
such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a
very shaky foundation.”
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize
that
“xxx an attorney as an officer of the court is under special
obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the
courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of
attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A, [N.S.],
586, 594.)”
3, In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings
against Alfonso Ponce Entile, et al., supra, where counsel
charged this Court with having “repeatedly fallen*’ into the
pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous “erroneous”
pronouncements, “in disregard of the law on jurisdiction” of
the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of
counsel’s misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the
sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
“As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in
the motion for reconsideration, implications there are which
inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this
Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court
of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the
tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge
that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making ‘any reference to and analysis of the
pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court.
The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding
has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime,
this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir
for a modification thereof, however, came when, inPeople vs.
Alarcon the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented
20

that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has with the holding of the majority,
committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point
of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew _______________
to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit
18 Medinn vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; In the matter of the Intestate Estate of
in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court
Rosario Olba, Contempt proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312,
on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to
315; People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 579; People vs. Ventvranza, et al, 85 Phil. 211,
respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and
214; De Joya, et al vs. CFI of Rizal 99 Phil. 907, 914; Sison vs. Sandejas, L-
respect due this Court. They bring into question
D270, April 29, 1959: Paragas vs. Cruz, L-24438, July 30, H.65: Cornejo vs.
595
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 595 Tmu 85 Phil 772, 775.
19 In re Gomez, 41 Phil. 376; In re Lozano, 54 Phil. 801; In re Abistado,57
In re Almacen
Phil. 668; People vs. Alareon, 69 Phil. 1965; Cornejo vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772,
the capability of the members—and some former members—of this
775. State vs. Dist. Court, 151 Pac. 2d 1002: In re Shannon, 27 Pac, 352; State
Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone
ex rel Grice vs. Dist. Court, 97 Pac. 1032; Weston vs. Commonwealth, 77 S.E.
of sarcasm which counsel labeled as ‘so-called’ the ‘rule against
2d 405; State vs. Kaiser, 13 P. 964; State vs. Bee Pub. Co. 83 N.W.
splitting of jurisdiction.’ ”
204; Patterson vs. Colorado, 51 L. ed. 879; Re Hart, 116 N.W. 212.
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in
69 Phil. 265.
other cases which, in the interest of brevity, need not now be
20
18

596
reviewed in detail.
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited
In re Almacen
cases—all of them involved contumacious statements made
speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule
in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that. in line with the
above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may
settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, a
ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or
21

contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila

malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case
Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an
and not after the conclusion thereof, Atty. Almacen would
19

editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations

now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his
studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called
upon to account were made only after this Court had written
finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the
validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the
case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view
expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarconto
the effect that there may still be contempt by publication
even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:
“A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily
punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends
to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise
criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is
sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the
influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the
courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In
the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is
extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated
to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them.
In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending,
as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by
the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists,
with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is
the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if
public confidence in them is destroyed.”
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty, Almacen by the
circumstance that his statements and actuations now under
consideration were made only after the judgment in his
client’s appeal had attained finality. He could as much be
liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated
during the pendency of the said appeal.
_______________
21 42 O.G. 59.
597
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 597
In re Almacen
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he
could be held liable for contempt for such post-litigation
utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor
of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted
the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns
Atty. Almacen’s professional identity, his sworn duty as a
lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the
exercise of the disciplinary power inherent in our authority
and duty to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal
profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of
callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a
case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole
objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the
legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose
misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to *be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to
the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By
constitutional mandate, ours is the solemn duty, amongst
22
others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of
law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding
authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law
those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued
membership in the Bar. Thus—
“The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is
an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one
which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To
deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of
attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint.
Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and
cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys
to practice—and in this state that power is vested in this court—
has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion, to exclude them from practice. “
23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law
is a representation to all that he is worthy of their
_______________
22 Article VIII, Section 12, Constitution.
23 Re Simpson, 83 N.W. 541.
598
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
confidence and respect. So much so that—
“x x x whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney
is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of
the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court
which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it
is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment
of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar
and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right,
but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise
of a just and sound judicial discretion.” 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend
has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It
has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of
Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being
unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of
whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty,
Almacen here in question are properly the object of
disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer’s certificate is, of
course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen’s part.
Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in
its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went
farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed
of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against
this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles
with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for
and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his
client as “a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy/’ he
categorically denounces the justice administered by this
Court to be ftot only blind “but also deaf and dumb.” With
unmitigated acerbity, he virtually rakes this Court and its
members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the
perpetration of ‘‘silent injustices” and “short-cut justice”
while at the same time
_______________
24 Re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39, 84.
25 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
599
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 599
In re Almacen
branding its members as “calloused to pleas of justice.” And,
true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client
“in the people’s forum”, he caused the publication in the
papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort
to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect
toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he
expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his
vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually
tarred and feathered the Court and its members, as
inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and
unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almaeen’s
petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself.
The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes
they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of
legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but
to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public
attention to himself and, more important of all, bring this
Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public
confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and
•texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely
negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth.
It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross
misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer’s oath and gross
transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it
cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion
of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need
therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of
immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity
in a viable democracy, the Court is not., and should not be,
above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be
intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as
the court of last resort And more than this, valid and healthy
criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and
requires detachment and disinterestedness,
600
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
real qualities approached only through constant striving to
attain them. Any criticism of the Court must possess the
quality of judiciousness and must be informed by perspective
and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the
exercise of our authority in the premises, that, as Atty.
Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are
the “complainants, prosecutors and judges” all rolled up into
one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not
a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at
hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary
proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not—and does not
involve—a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not 27
being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
28
and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to
_______________
26 See Norman Dorsen, Frontiers of Civil Liberties, pp. 60-61; Griswold, “Of
Time and Attitudes,” 74 Harvard Law Review, 81, 94; Paul A. Freund,The
Supreme Court of the United States, (1961) pp. 176-177; see also Freund, On
Law and Justice (1968) ch. 4.
In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577; De DuranL 10 Ann. Cas.
27
1913, 1220.
State vs. Peck, 91 Atl. 274; 286; Fairfield County Bar vs. Taylor, 22 Atl.
28
441.
601
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 601
In re Almacen
the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be
29
no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain
degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a
body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the
individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and
distinct from the individual personalities of its members.
Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court,
the individual members act not as such individuals but only
as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are
lost in the majesty of their of-fice. So that, in a very real
30
sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can
only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof—
as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed ab grave hazard
should the administration of justice be threatened by the
retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of
law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons
to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is
vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate
just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction
legally invested upon it. So that even if it be conceded that
31
the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties,
that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the
exercise of that power
_______________
Ex Parte Tyler, 40 Pac. 33, 34; Treadwell’s case, 7 Pac. 724; Deles vs.
29
Aragona, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 634, 644, and the cases therein cited.
Sarcos vs. Castillo, et al., L-29755, January 21, 1969.
30
Cf. Radiowealth, Inc. vs. Agregado, 47 O.G., No. 12 (Supp.) pp. 87, 89,
31
citing Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 2, P. 870; Perfecto vs. Meer,85
Phil. 552, 553; Ex parte Alabama State Bar Ass’n., 8 So. 768.
602
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Almacen
because public policy demands that they, acting as a Court,
exercise the power in ali cases which call for disciplinary
action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined
anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of
complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent,
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of
the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his
transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these
may range from mere suspension to total removal or
disbarment. The 32 discretion to assess under the
circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being
neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the
imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar
be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to
the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of
considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However,
heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end
desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to
hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do
disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of
candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is
our view that suspension will suffice under the
circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his
misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering
apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long
that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled
to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are
empowered to do not alone be-
_______________
32 Section 27, Kuie 138, Rules of Court.
603
VOL. 31, FEBRUARY 18, 1970 603
 In re Almacen
cause jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter but 33
also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to
completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is
no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in
degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the
compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best
shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how long or how short that suspension
shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes
effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit
to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended
from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension
to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Secretary of
Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for
thfeir information and guidance.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes,
J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Bar
redo and Villamor, JJ.,concur.
Fernando, J., did not take part.
Petitioner indefinitely suspended.
Notes.—Criticism or attack directed to the Court.—In In re
Gomez, 43 Phil. 376, the respondent lawyer, who was an
unsuccessful litigant, was alleged to have remarked that the
Supreme Court had decided an election contest
_______________
33 Melville vs. Wettengel, 57 Pa. 2d 699; People vs. Winogard, 287 Pac.
864; People vs. Kelly, 285 Pac. 767; People vs. Harris, 112 N.E. 978;People vs.
Anderson, 112 N.E. 273; In re Gullickson, 181 Atl. 716;Haitmanek vs.
Turano, 158 A. 878; Grimsell vs. Wilcox, 98 A. 799; States vs. Kern, 233 N.W.
629; In re Borchardt, 192 N.E. 383; State vs. Trapley, 259 Pac. 783; State vs.
Jennings, 159 S.E. 627; In re Jacobson, 126 S.E. 2d 346; Mulvey vs. O’Niell,
44 Atl. 2d 880; State ex rel Oklahoma Bar Ass’n vs. Hatcher, 209 Pac. 2d
873; Cleveland Bar Ass’n vs. Wilkerson, 156 N.E. 2d 136; In re Eddy, 292
N.Y.S. 619.
604
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Meris vs. Cuesta
in favor of his rival because of a secret conference and a
banquet given by the Governor-General to said rival and the
Court. Upon being charged with contempt of court, the
lawyer was held to have been guilty of impropriety, but, in
the interest of liberty of the press and freedom of public
comment, the court dismissed the matter as one that should
not be dignified by further proceedings.
It has also been held to be unprofessional, and deserving
of the highest form of rebuke, for a lawyer to attribute to a
judge a statement which he did not make in his
decision(Ferrer vs. De Inchausti, 38 Phil. 905).
And in Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86, it was ruled that
the submission of a motion, once previously denied by the
appellate court which had granted the motion foi new trial,
and once previously denied by the trial court asking for the
disqualification of the judge on a ground not provided, which
motion the judgment construed as misbehavior intended to
make the public believe he was not capable of administering
justice to the accused, left the judge no other recourse, if he
was to maintain his self-respect, than to take action in
finding the attorney who presented the motion for
disqualification in contempt of court.
————————
© Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Bar Matter No. 553. June 17, 1993. *
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely
INC., respondent. within the jurisprudential definition of “practice of law.”
Attorneys; Words and Phrases; Meaning of “Practice of
Law.”—Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which ________________
requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
* EN BANC.
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
379
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 379
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is
Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and
law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely
contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter
to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal
may or may not be pending in a court.
advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
Same; Same; Same.—When a person participates in a trial
Same; Same.—Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed
and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law.
out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish
One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights
that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop
and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to
of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of
look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for
legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly
the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. One
beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.
and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.
Same; Same; The services offered by respondent cannot be
Same; The practice of giving out legal information constitutes
performed by paralegals here as distinguished from the United
practice of law.—What is palpably clear is that respondent
States.—Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals.
corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is
there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while
more apparent than real. In providing information, for example,
there are none in the Philippines. As the concept of the “paralegal”
about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains
or “legal assistant” evolved in the United States, standards and
the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the
simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client,
major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper
proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of
course of action to be taken as may be provided-for by said law.
paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional
That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it
ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc.
and the American Paralegal Association. In the Philippines, we
still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may
be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some
persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed
limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal
services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission
therefor.
Same; Lawyers may not advertise their services or expertise.—
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements,
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. He is not
supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
380
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
80
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the adoption
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort
to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the
lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of
the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation.
Same; Exceptions.—Of course, not all types of advertising or
solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define
the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of
two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed
and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions.
Same; Same.—The first of such exceptions is the publication
in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards
of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and
informative data.
Same; Same.—The use of an ordinary simple professional card
is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced.
The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law
firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or
office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable.
Same; Legal profession here has been under attack on its
integrity.—Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present
situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication
of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve
to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the
legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack
lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if
unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all
efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal
profession.
ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court.
381
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 381
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
R E S O L UT I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court “to order the respondent to cease CLINIC, INC. 1
Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the 522-2041; 521-0767
same tenor as that of Annexes ‘A’ and ‘B’ (of said petition) It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making above reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the
profession other than those allowed by law.” community in the integrity of the members of the bar and
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
as follows: offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought
in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
Annex A In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of
publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims
SECRET MARRIAGE?
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
rendering of “legal support services” through paralegals with
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
THE Please call: 521-0767,
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
LEGAL 5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla. of John R. Bates and Van O’Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
2

Annex B Court on June 7, 1977.

GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce
through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office
hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems,
Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Considering the critical implications on the legal
profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar
Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers’ Association (PLA),
(4) U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women
Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Federacion Internacional de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their
respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter,
their memoranda. The said bar associations readily
3

Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina responded and extended their valuable services and
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic. cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation
382 and gratitude.
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc. ________________
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
 1 Rollo, 5. A facsimile of the scales of justice is printed together with and
on the left side of “The Legal Clinic, Inc.” in both advertisements which were
published in a newspaper of general circulation.
2 433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 87 S Ct. 2691.
3 Resolution dated January 15, 1991, Rollo, 60; Resolution dated
December 10, 1991, Rollo, 328.
383
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 383
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are
whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law
and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the
subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits
of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present
hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this
bar matter.
1. 1.Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent
endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., “legal support
services” vis-a-vis “legal services”, common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents
like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitute practice
of law?
xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to
make issue with respondent’s foreign citations. Suffice it to state
that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today
it is alright to advertise one’s legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its
opposition to respondent’s act of establishing a “legal clinic” and of
concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision
of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from
undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice
as aforedescribed. 4
xxx
A. The use of the name “The Legal Clinic, Inc.” gives the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers
________________
4 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Basilio H. Alo, IBP Director for Legal
Affairs, 1, 10; Rollo, 209, 218.
384
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal
services to the public, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition
in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements
have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can
be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by respondent—
“The Legal Clinic, Inc.” Such a name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like
a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems.
More importantly, the term “Legal Clinic” connotes lawyers, as the
term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent’s name, as published in the
advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the)
scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression
that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers
legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear
with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer
from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still
remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely
offering “legal support services” as claimed by it, or whether it
offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between
“legal services” and “legal support services,” as the respondent
would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for
doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are
being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the
performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the
advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general
public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize a Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when
a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. x x x.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry
385
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 385
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a
marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious
that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the
legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our
law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered “the dark
side” of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02.—A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex “A” of the Petition,
which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words “Just
Married” on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
“secret marriage,” if not suggesting a “secret marriage,” makes
light of the “special contract of permanent union,” the inviolable
social institution,” which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral
publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article “Rx for Legal Problems” is to be reviewed, it can
readily be concluded that the above impressions one may gather
from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are
being encouraged or committed (a bigamous marriage in Hong
Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction
of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the “legal support
services” respondent offers do not constitute legal services as
commonly
386
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
understood, the advertisements in question give the impression
that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that
it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader,
members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning
the integrity of the Bar.
xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined
from causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or
any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further performing or
offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal
research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence,
and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the
conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches
upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit
such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can
be better performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer
experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements
for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from “encroaching”
upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer
using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a
typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to
allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for
the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of, illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to
perform all of its services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public
in general and which should be made available exclusively to
members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
387
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 387
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent’s
services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to
suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine Law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be
required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is
not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be
illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before
deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be
directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored.
But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a “paralegal”
for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of
regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may
prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation’s
Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and
every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Rules of Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx
Respondent asserts that it “is not engaged in the practice of law
but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and
laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines” (pars. 2 and 3, Comment).
This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent’s acts of holding out
itself to the public under the trade name “The Legal Clinic, Inc.,”
and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within
the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent’s own commercial advertisement which
________________
5 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Jose A. Grapilon, Chairman, Committee on
Bar Discipline, and Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico, 16-18, 27-29; Rollo 414-416, 425-
427.
388
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields
of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent “The
Legal Clinic, Inc.” is offering and rendering legal services through
its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of
deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to
their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the
latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the
practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by
acorporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it.
Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent “The
Legal Clinic, Inc.” holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely,
the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme
Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons
and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in
it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in
unethical law practice. 6 foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages,
3. Philippine Lawyers’ Association:
The Philippine Lawyers’ Association’s position, in answer to the
issues stated herein, are to wit:
1. 1.The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. 2.Such practice is unauthorized;
3. 3.The advertisements complained of are not only unethical,
but also misleading and patently immoral; and
4. 4.The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to suppress
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services
on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding
absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa
related problems, immigration problems; the Investment Law of
the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of
the aforesaid laws, the legal principles and procedures related
thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call
for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited
Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are
embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as “the
practice of law.”
7

and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for
its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, 4. U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle:
misleading and immoral advertising.
In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount
xxx consideration should be given to the protection of the general
public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or
_______________ entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous
6 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Rafael D. Abiera, Jr., Chairman,
four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or
Committee on Lawyers’ Rights and Legal Ethics, and Atty. Arturo M. del
sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations.
Rosario, President, 5-6; Rollo, 241-242.
Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
389
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdictions
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 389
as an aid to the administration of justice, there are in those
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would
Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of law. It
qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
claims that it merely renders “legal support services” to lawyers,
While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses
litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary
of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5
do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable
of Respondent’s Comment). But its advertised services, as
Court may decide to take measures to protect the general public
enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
public in the guise of being
________________
7 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong, President, and Atty.
Mariano M. Magsalin, Vice-President, 2, 4-5; Rollo, 93, 95-96.
390
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
“paralegals” without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected
from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of
legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised
not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by “paralegals.” Clearly,
measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling
prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified
to offer such services.” 8 391
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent,
however, seems to give the impression that information regarding
validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and
foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters, will be
given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent’s
name—The Legal Clinic, Inc.—does not help matters. It gives the
impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as
claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading
impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
“paralegals” are involved in the The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent’s allegations are further belied by the very
admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of
Respondent corporation in the aforementioned “Starweek” article.”
5. Women Lawyer’s Association of the Philippines:
Annexes “A” and “B” of the petition are clearly advertisements
to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under
the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex “A” of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an
advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters
it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to
said agency and pay
________________
8 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 1-2; Rollo; 105-106.
9 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 10-11; Rollo, 370-
371.
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 391
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
P560 for a valid marriage in the Philippines are solemnized only
by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an
agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other
countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their
special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners
legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the subject matter of this petition, for
one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the
illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such
as act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to
project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this
country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
9 It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they
could go about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor
should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals
and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be
able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code
of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court
held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federation International de Abogadas:
xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law,
such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether
run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by
Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can
be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty
of unlawful practice of law.
“x x x Of necessity, no one xxx acting as a consultant can render effective
service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must
be careful not to suggest a course of
_______________
10 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Leticia E. Sablan, Officer-in-Charge,
WLAP Free Legal Aid Clinic, 1-2; Rollo, 169-170.
392
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
conduct which the law forbids. It seems x x x clear that (the consultant’s)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge of the law, and his
use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice of law x x x. It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with the broad features of the law x x x. Our
knowledge of the law—accurate or inaccurate—moulds our conduct not
only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A
good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who
draws plans and specifications in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
“But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a decision
of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my
opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal
advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and
incidental to a major non-legal problem.
“It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
“If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building
code and the like, then an architect who performed this function would
probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted
by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of
industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the
labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill in such matters, and without regard
to legal training or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the
defendant have tendered to the smaller employers the same service that
the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
 “The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious
393
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 393
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men
who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that
the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the
graduates in their business.
“In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider
his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine
defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client’s obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such
is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant’s primary efforts are
along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame
within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of
building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar,
he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program,
he drew employees’ wills.
“Another branch of defendant’s work is the representation of the
employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining,
with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone
may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly
skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free
to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an exception where the business turns on a
question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are
not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-
way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or
if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that
defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion
here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
“Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially before trial
examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the
Congress may regulate the representation of parties before such agency.
The State of New Jersey is without
394
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits.
The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the
right to appear ‘in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative.’ Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. ‘Counsel’ here means a licensed attorney, and ‘other
representative’ one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely legal.” (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.)
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in
a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law provided that:
1. (a)The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem;
2. (b)The services performed are not customarily reserved to
members of the bar;
3. (c)No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information.
 All these must be considered in relation to the work for any
particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the
Code of Professional Responsibility succinctly states the rule of
conduct:
“Rule 15.08—A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or
occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his
client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.”
1.10 In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to render
wedding services (See Annex “A”, Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in “Rx for Legal Problems” on the Sharon-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services, then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on
divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes
“A” and “B”, Petition). Purely giving information materials may not
constitute practice of law. The business is similar to that of a
bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and
determines by himself
395
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 395
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely
giving information, the Legal Clinic’s paralegals may apply the law
to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
“ It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports
to say what the law is amounts to legal practice. And the mere fact that
the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular
reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. x x x Apparently it
is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms,
with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved
and accepted texts. Dacey’s book is sold to the public at large.There is no
personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does
there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of
attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE—
THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to
offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person. Similarly the defendant’s publication does not purport
‘to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person in a particular situation—in the publication and
sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitute the unlawful
practice of law x x x. There being no legal impediment under the statute
to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any
printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against
defendant having an, interest in any publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with
any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the
finding that for the charge of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave
legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the
purchaser’s asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal
remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of
law, particularly with refer-
396
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
ence to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to
specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be
affirmed.” (State v. Winder, 348 NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in Statsky,
supra at p. 101.)
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are “strictly
non-diagnostic, non-advisory.” It is not controverted, however, that
if the services “involve giving legal advice or counseling,” such
would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this
light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary
for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx
2.10. Annex “A” may be ethically objectionable in that it can
give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is
a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex “B” may likewise be ethically objectionable. The
second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the
first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only “paralegal
services” or “legal support services”, and not legal services are
available.” 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase “practice
of law” becomes exigent for a proper determination of the
issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note
that the clause “practice of law” has long been the subject of
judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid
down general principles and doctrines explaining the
meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take
into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is
to give advice or render any kind of service that involves
legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of
________________
11 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lily C. Limpe, President, and Atty.
Barbara Anne C. Migallos, 8-12, 23-24; Rollo, 139-143, 154-155.
12 Annotation: 111 ALR 23.
397
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 397
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in
a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law
generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of
documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients
before public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to
law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in a trial and advertises
himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who 15
confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and
then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to
look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving 16
advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights
of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a
practice of law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper
17
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner,
extent, practicing law. 18
referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, after citing the 19
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
whether certain acts constitute “practice of law,” thus: defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one
Black defines “practice of law” as: who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co.,
102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).”
_______________ This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.
Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177), stated:
13 Howton vs. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1.
“The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
14 West Virginia State Bar vs. Earley, 109 S.E. 2d 420, 144 W.Va. 504; Rhode
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.I.) 179 A. 139, 144.
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
15 People vs. Castleman, 88 Colo. 229.
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
16 Depew, et al. vs. Witchita Assn. of Credit Men., Inc., 142 Kan. 403.
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them
17 Fitchette vs. Taylor, 94 ALR 356.
in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
18 Mandelaum vs. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 290 NYS 46218.
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
19 201 SCRA 210 (1991).
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
398
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
262, 263).
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
399
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 399
them in matters connected with the law.” Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
“Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of
court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St.
work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
of law when he:
on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
“x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
persons, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal
skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions
of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that
part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office.
It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under
the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666,
citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,
144).”
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of
activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations
that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute
“practice of law.”
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal
support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent’s own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
“Legal support services basically consist of giving ready
information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which
are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive
use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of
information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document
400
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case;
fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations;
educational of employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of other countries that they may
find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that
they can avail of preparatory to emigration to that foreign country,
and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in
court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or
software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate
legal departments, courts, and other entities engaged in dispensing
or administering legal services.
20
While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will
not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for
the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as
if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper
course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said
law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
“practice of law.” Such a conclusion will not be altered by the
fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is
not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal
research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
________________
20 Comment of Respondent, 3; Rollo, 15.
401
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 401
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article
published in the January 13, 1991 issue of theStarweek/The
Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled “Rx for
Legal Problems,” where an insight into the structure, main
purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given
by its own “proprietor,” Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The
Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria
Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client’s
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion
domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care of it. The
Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law,
medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These
specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors
and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the
trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients
who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. “When they
come, we start by analyzing the problem. That’s what doctors do
also. They ask you how you contracted what’s bothering you, they
take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms, and so
on. That’s how we operate, too. And once the problem has been
categorized, then it’s referred to one of our specialists.”
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery
or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a
matter of minutes. “Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or
an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were
a hospital, the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa ospital,
out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It’s just like a common
cold or diarrhea,” explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which require more extensive “treatment” are dealt
with accordingly. “If you had a rich relative who died and named
you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There
would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put
in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right
to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with that problem. Now, if there were
other heirs contesting your rich relative’s will, then you would
need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather evidence to
402
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
support the case.”21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry
out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it
is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit
of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in
this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the
U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that
the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop
of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail
of legal services from simple documentation to complex
litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services
are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather,
are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services
being offered by private respondent which constitute practice
of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as
such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court,
and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is
an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if
he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject
to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction
wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his
thesis.
________________
Rollo, 130-131.
21
Memorandum of U.P. WILOCI, 12-13; Rollo, 372-373.
22
Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
23
Phil. Ass’n. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar
24
Co., et al., 42 SCRA 302 (1971).
403
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is
limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have
been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. The practice of law is not a lawful
25
business except for members of the bar who have complied
with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of
court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by
reason of attainments previously acquired through education
and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing
profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise,
counsel with, protect, or defend the rights, claims, or
liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law. The justification
26
for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to
the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from being
advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can
exercise little control.
27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent’s
position that the concept in the United States of paralegals
as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted
in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent
cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for
judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral
adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals.
As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in
paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines. As the concept of the “paralegal” or “legal
28
assistant” evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of
the major standards or guidelines was developed by the
403
American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the recognized law school’s clinical legal education program approved by the
Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Supreme Court (Rule 138-A, Rules of Court);
Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants.
There are also associa- 1. (b)An official or other person appointed or designated in accordance
with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines in a case
_______________ in which the government has an interest (Sec. 33, Rule 138, id.);
2. (c)An agent or friend who aids a party-litigant in a municipal court
25 7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, 863, 864.
for the purpose of conducting the litigation (Sec. 34, Rule 138, id.);
26 Mounier vs. Regcinh, 170 So. 567.
3. (d)A person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity
27 Lowell Bar Ass’n. vs. Loeb, 52 N.E. 2d 27, 315 Mass. 176; 7 C.J.S.,
and ability, who is appointed counsel de oficio to defend the accused
Attorney & Client 64, 865.
in localities where members of the bar are not available (Sec. 4,
28 Comment of Respondent, 2; Rollo, 14.
Rule 116, id.);
404
4. (e)Persons registered or specially recognized to practice in the
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Patent Office (now known as the Bureau of Patents,
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
Trademarks and Technology Transfer) in trademark, service mark
tions of paralegals in the United States with their own code and trade name cases (Rule 23, Rules of Practice in Trademark
of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Cases);
Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal 5. (f)A non-lawyer who may appear before the National Labor Relations
Association. 29
Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if (1) he represents himself
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and as a party to the case; (2) he represents an organization or its
limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal members, provided that he shall be made to present written proof
service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly that he is properly authorized; or (3) he is a duly-accredited member
licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited of any legal aid office duly recognized by
representation in behalf of another or to render legal
services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and 405
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 405
therefor. 30
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy
________________
that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a
29 Position Paper, U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle (WILOCI), 11-12, citing
person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism, 214-224, West Publishing Co. (1974)
practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot
and Shayne, The Paralegal Profession, Oceana Publications, 1977, Appendix
be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
II & III; Rollo, 116-117.
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
30 Illustrations: (a) A law student who has successfully completed his third
law. That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
31

year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a

persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to
seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice
law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts. He is not supposed to use
33
or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall 34
he pay or give something of value to representatives of the
mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to
attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of
35
Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring
his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer
________________
the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in
cases referred thereto by the latter (New Rules of Procedure of the National
Labor Relations Commission);
1. (g)An agent, not an attorney, representing the lot owner or claimant
in a case falling under the Cadastral Act (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259); and
2. (h)Notaries public for municipalities where completion and passing
the studies of law in a reputable university or school of law is
deemed sufficient qualification for appointment
Administrative Code of 1917). See Rollo, 144-145.
31 7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, 866; Johnstown Coal & Coke Co. of New
York vs. U.S., 102 Ct. Cl. 285.
32 Florida Bar vs. Brumbaugth, 355 So. 2d 1186.
33 Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility.
34 Rule 3.01, id.
35 Rule 3.04, id.
406
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-
laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession codemn the lawyer’s
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or
skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services
37
or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the
case of The Director of Religious Affairs vs. Estanislao R.
Bayot an advertisement, similar to those of respondent
38
which are involved in the present proceeding, was held to
39
constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant
violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession. It being
a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that “the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a
(Sec. 233,
trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. “The most
worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, * * * is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced
but must be the outcome of the character and conduct.” (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.)
________________
Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.
36
People vs. Smith, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206.
37
74 Phil. 579 (1944).
38
The advertisement in said case was as follows: “Marriage license
39
promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation
on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
407
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a
way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success.
He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are
prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and
define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The
exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which
are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily
implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable
law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and
informative data. “Such data must not be misleading and
may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date
and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices
in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of
references; and, with their written consent, the names of
clients regularly represented.” 42
407
The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical
which is published
________________
40 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, Fourth Edition (1989), 79-80.
41 Op cit., 80.
42 Op cit., 80, citing Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.
408
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
40 Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may
not properly publish his brief biographical and informative
data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published
in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the
bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
 The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also
permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents
of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to
task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by
said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find
and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively
cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of
Arizona, which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
45
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal
fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
________________
43 Op cit., 80, 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 69 (Mar. 19, 1932); A.B.A. Op. 133
(Mar. 13, 1935); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24, 1930); and Canon 43, Canons of
Professional Ethics.
44 Op cit., 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 11 (May 11, 1927); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24,
1930); A.B.A. Ops. 53 (Dec. 14, 1931), 123 (Dec. 14, 1934), (July 12, 1941), 241
(Feb. 21, 1942), 284 (Aug. 1951); and 286 (Sept. 25, 1952).
45 Supra, Fn. 2.
409
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 409
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception
is provided for, expressly or impliedly whether in our former
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary
rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions
stated therein are “not applicable in any state unless and
until it is implemented by such authority in that state.” This 46
goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as
that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if
and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception.
Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the
American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the
attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped
significantly with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
47
Trustworthy................................................................... from 71% to 14%
Professional.................................................................. from 71% to 14%
Honest........................................................................... from 65% to 14%
Dignified....................................................................... from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation
of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only
serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair,
criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert
all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the
legal profession.
 In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the
lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services
_______________
Id., 810, 825.
46
Position Paper of the Philippine Bar Association, 12, citing the
47
American Bar Association Journal, January 1989, p. 60; Rollo, 248.
410
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
except in allowable instances or to aid a layman in the
48
unauthorized practice of law. Considering that Atty. Rogelio
49
P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the
Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the
legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into
an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative
that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different
proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our
law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for
or engage in the practice of law in this country. This
interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising,
cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by
respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto
action, after due ascertainment of the factual background
50
and basis for the grant of respondent’s corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the
instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for
such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and
ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar
tenor and purpose as
________________
48 In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1929); The Director of Religious Affairs vs.
Bayot, supra, Fn 38.
49 U.S. vs. Ney & Bosque, 8 Phil. 146 (1907); People vs. Luna, 102 Phil.
968 (1958).
50 Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 6(1), P.D. No.
902-A and Sec. 121, Corporation Code.
411
VOL. 223, JUNE 17, 1993 411
Mendoza vs. Mabutas
Annexes “A” and “B” of this petition, and from conducting,
directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as
indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,Griño-
Aquino, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Meloand Quiason, JJ., concur.
Respondent restrained and enjoined from issuing or
causing the publication of the questioned advertisement.
 Notes.—Lawyers may not engage in forum-shopping by
splitting actions or appeals (Tan vs. Court of Appeals, 199
SCRA 212).
Reason for award of attorney’s fees must be stated in the
court’s decision (Policarpio vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA
729).
——o0o——
© Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
Adm. Case No. 2474. September 15, 2004. *
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY.
LEO J. PALMA, respondent.
Attorneys; Duties; Integrity; At the outset, it must be stressed
that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards
among its members.—At the outset, it must be stressed that the
law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among
its members. There is no distinction as to whether the
transgression is committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or
in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
at another. Thus, not only his professional activities but even his
private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the
good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at
any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper
authorities.
_______________
* EN BANC.
307
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004 3 alleging as grounds “deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in
07
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
Same; Disbarment; Nature; A disbarment case is sui generis
for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.—In re
Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely
civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court
into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in
a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case
against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case
does not affect its course, then the judgment of annulment of
respondent’s marriage does not also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof—
clear preponderance of evidence—in disciplinary proceedings
against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.
Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Villareal, Rosacia, Dino & Patag for complainant.
Capulong & Ladrido for respondent.
PER CURIAM:
“The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who
measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral
fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules
of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but
require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character.
These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after
admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or
else incur the risk of suspension or removal.” 1
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the
instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma,
office,
_______________
1 In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. L-363, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 661.
308
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral
conduct.”
The facts are undisputed:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70’s.
Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala &
Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer
assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his growing business
concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his
personal counsel.
Consequently, respondent’s relationship with
complainant’s family became intimate. He traveled and dined
with them abroad. He frequented their house and even
2 complaint for disbarment, imputing to respondent the
tutored complainant’s 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa
Cojuangco (Lisa), then a student of Assumption Convent.
On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainant’s
family, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong. It was only
the next day that respondent informed complainant and
assured him that “everything is legal.” Complainant was
shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a married
man and has three children. Upon investigation, complainant
found that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring
sessions. Immediately, complainant sent his two sons to
Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to Manila and discuss
the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded.
Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the
supposed marriage, respondent requested from his
(complainant’s) office an airplane ticket to and from
Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent
misrepresented himself as “bachelor” before the Hong Kong
authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c)
respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has
three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and
Eduardo Lorenzo.
_______________
2 Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), April 21, 1983 at pp. 49-51.
309
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004 309
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of
First Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City a petition for 3
declaration of nullity of the marriage between respondent
and Lisa, docketed as Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P. In the
Decision dated November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the
4
marriage null and void ab initio.
Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant
5
following acts:
“a. In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed
in him by complainant and his family and taking undue advantage
of his tutoring sessions with Maria Luisa, respondent secretly
courted her. The great disparity in intelligence, education, age,
experience and maturity between Maria Luisa and respondent
gave the latter an overwhelming moral ascendancy over Maria
Luisa as to overcome her scruples and apprehensions about
respondent’s courtship and advances, considering that he is a
married man with three (3) children;
b. Respondent courted Maria Luisa with persistence and
determination and even pursued her in her travels abroad under
false pretenses that he was traveling on official business for
complainant. To break down the final resistance of Maria Luisa
and assuage her pangs of guilt, he made representations that there
was no legal impediment whatsoever to his marrying;
c. With his moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa and his
misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or
prohibition to his contracting a second marriage, respondent
succeeded in inducing and beguiling her into marrying him.
Without complying with the requirements of Philippine law that
he should first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma and that the “advice” of Maria
Luisa’s parents should first be obtained she being only twenty-two
(22) years of age, respondent succeeded in contracting marriage
with her in Hongkong on June 22,
_______________
3 Annex “D”, Complaint, Rollo at pp. 13-19.
4 Annex “F”, Id., at pp. 32-36.
5 Dated November 8, 1982, Id., at pp. 1-6.
310
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
1982 by falsely representing himself before the Hongkong
authorities that he is a ‘bachelor.’ x x x.”
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
6 9
cause of action. He contended that the complaint fails to
allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct
or violation of his lawyer’s oath. There is no allegation that
he acted with “wanton recklessness, lack of skill or ignorance
of the law” in serving complainant’s interest. Anent the
charge of grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he
married complainant’s daughter with “utmost sincerity and
good faith” and that “it is contrary to the natural course of
things for an immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely
loves.”
In the Resolution dated March 2, 1983, we referred the
7 the final outcome of Civil Case No. Pq–0401-P poses a
case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for
investigation, report and recommendation. Former Assistant
Solicitor General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili conducted the
investigation.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1983, the First Division of
this Court issued in G.R. No. 64538 a Resolution (a) setting
8 9
_______________
6 Dated February 8, 1983, Id., at pp. 53-56.
7 Supra.
8 “Leo J. Palma vs. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, etc.”
In Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P, for declaration of nullity of marriage mentioned earlier,
the trial court issued an order dated January 17, 1983 denying respondent’s motion for
reconsideration/new trial. This prompted him to file with this Court a petition for
certiorari assailing the said order.
In this Resolution, this Court ordered respondent judge “to conduct a new trial in
the case below and to allow petitioner to file his answer, which answer should be filed
within ten (10) days from finality of this Resolution. The records show that respondent
judge acted with undue haste in declaring petitioner in default on the complaint filed
on August 24, 1982 and in rendering his ex parte decision of November 2, 1982 as well
as in refusing to give due course to the timely appeal filed by petitioner and instead
ordering the execution of the judgment.”
Rollo, at pp. 197-198.
311
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004 311
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
aside the CFI Decision dated November 2, 1982 in Civil Case
No. Pq–0401-P declaring the marriage between respondent
and Lisa null and void ab initio; and (b) remanding the case
to the CFI for proper proceeding and determination. To this
date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.
On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an
Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground that 10
prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding. It was
denied.
Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an
Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Restraining Order. In the 11
Resolution dated December 19, 1984, we enjoined the OSG
from continuing the investigation of the disbarment
proceedings. 12
Thereafter, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. On October
19, 1998, Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo issued the
following order:
“Considering the length of time that this case has remained
pending and as a practical measure to ease the backlog of this
Commission, the parties shall within ten (10) days from notice,
manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this
case or supervening events have transpired which render this case
moot and academic or otherwise, this case shall be deemed closed
and terminated.” 13
In his Manifestation, complainant manifested and confirmed
14
his continuing interest in prosecuting his complaint for
disbarment against respondent.
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 199-201.
11 Dated December 13, 1984.
12 OSG Records at p. 5. The OSG issued the Order dated December 20,
1984 suspending the scheduled hearing until the Court orders otherwise.
(OSG Records at p. 1)
13 Records of the Commission on Bar Discipline at p. 11.
14 Dated November 13, 1998, Id., at p. 13.
312
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
On the other hand, respondent sought several postponements
of hearing on the ground that he needed more time to locate
vital documents in support of his defense. The scheduled
hearing of December 4, 2001 was reset for the last time on
January 24, 2002, with a warning that should he fail to
appear or present deposition, the case will be deemed
submitted for resolution. Respondent again failed to appear
15
on January 24, 2002; hence, the case was considered
submitted for resolution. 16
On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros
V. San Juan submitted a Report and Recommendation
finding respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct and
violation of his oath as a lawyer. She recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) years. Thus:
“The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not
respondent committed the following acts which warrant his
disbarment:
1. a)Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence
reposed in him by complainant;
2. b)His misrepresentation that there was no legal
impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second
marriage;
3. c)The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct and
violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Respondent admits that he married Maria Luisa in Hongkong
representing himself as a bachelor, however, he claimed that the
marriage certificate stated a condition no different from term
“spinster” with respect to Luisa.
There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well versed in
the law knew fully well that in marrying Maria Luisa he was
entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent betrayed
the trust
_______________
15 Order dated December 4, 2001, Id., at p. 51.
16 Order dated January 24, 2002, Id., at p. 97.
313
 VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004 313
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
reposed in him by complainant. He was treated as part of the
family and was allowed to tutor Maria Luisa.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent
committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a
lawyer, and it is recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.
SO ORDERED.”
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above
Report and Recommendation, but it reduced respondent’s
penalty to only one (1) year suspension.
Except for the penalty, we affirm the IBP’s Report and
Recommendation.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession
does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its
members. There is no distinction as to whether the
transgression is committed in the lawyer’s professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may
not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time
and a mere citizen at another. Thus, not only his
17
professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the
latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and
prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be
the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities. 18
Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the
best of his ability. In fact, the complaint does not allege that
he acted with “wanton recklessness, lack of skill and
ignorance of the law.”
_______________
In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 (1970).
17
Bustamante-Alejandro vs. Alejandro, AC No. 4256, February 13,
18
2004, 422 SCRA 527.
Rule 7.03, Canon 7 provides:
“A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”
314
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a
good lawyer, however, professional competency alone does
19
not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral
character is always an indispensable requirement.
The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married
Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth
Hermosisima. The Certification from the Local Civil 20
Registrar of Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on
December 19, 1971 at Cardial’s Private Chapel, Cebu City.
On the other hand, the Certificate of Marriage from the 21
Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong, proves
respondent’s subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982.
That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondent’s second
marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor
P. Lazatin, Elizabeth’s classmate and family friend. 22
Undoubtedly, respondent’s act constitutes grossly immoral
conduct, a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack
of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality. 23
This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality.
Thus, we have somehow come up with a common definition of
what constitutes immoral conduct,i.e., “that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.” Measured
24 against this ethics of his profession,” warranting respondent’s
definition, respon- disbarment.
(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta, respondent 27 married
_______________ complainant while his first wife was still alive, their
marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that “the act of
TSN, April 21, 1983, at p. 98.
respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to
19

Annex “A”, Rollo at p. 7.

honesty, justice, decency and morality.” Thus, lacking the
20

Annex “C” and Annex “D”, Id., at pp. 12 and 13.

good moral character required by the Rules of Court,
21

TSN, July 12, 1982, at pp. 1-42.

respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
22

Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313 (1957).

(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin, respondent lured an innocent
23
28

7 C.J.S. 959.
woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his
24

315
lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004 315
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma _______________
dent’s act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent 25 Adm. Case. No. 6148, February 27, 2004, 424 SCRA 42.
young woman into marrying him. And third, he 26 A.C. No. 5170, November 17, 1999, 318 SCRA 229.
misrepresented himself as a “bachelor” so he could contract 27 101 Phil.313 (1957).
marriage in a foreign land. 28 106 Phil. 256 (1960).
Our rulings in the following cases are relevant: 316
(1) In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo, respondent entered into
25 316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
sever them. There, we ruled that “[S]uch pattern of of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of
misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the
marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for practice of law.
the rearing of our children, for the development of values (5) In Toledo vs. Toledo, respondent abandoned his wife,
29

essential to the survival and well-being of our communities,
and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole.” As such,
“there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be
disbarred.”
(2) In Tucay vs. Tucay, respondent contracted marriage
26
with another married woman and left complainant with
who supported him and spent for his law education, and
thereafter cohabited with another woman. We ruled that he
“failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of a member of the bar.” For this, respondent
was disbarred.
(6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., respondent abandoned his
30

whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that lawful wife and child and resumed cohabitation with his
such acts constitute “a grossly immoral conduct and only former paramour. Here, we ruled that “abandoning one’s wife
indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a
married woman,” constitute grossly immoral conduct
warranting disbarment.
The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of
trust and abuse of confidence. It was respondent’s closeness
to the complainant’s family as well as the latter’s complete
trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship
with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be
complainant’s legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latter’s
back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in
the night, he attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover,
he availed of complainant’s resources by securing a plane
ticket from complainant’s office in order to marry the latter’s
daughter in Hongkong. He did this without complainant’s
knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure
complainant that “everything is legal.” Clearly, respondent
had crossed the limits of propriety and decency.
Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really
loved Lisa and since he married her, he cannot be charged
with immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a
brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such relation-
_______________
29 117 SCRA 768, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963.
30 128 SCRA 485, Adm. Case No. 1392, April 2, 1984.
317
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004 317
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
ship, the man and the woman are obliged to live together,
observe mutual respect and fidelity. How could respondent
31
perform these obligations to Lisa when he was previously
married to Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest
thing he could have done was to walk away.
Respondent’s culpability is aggravated by the fact that
Lisa was just a 22-year old college student of Assumption
Convent and was under psychological treatment for
emotional immaturity. Naturally, she was an easy prey.
32
Anent respondent’s argument that since the validity of his
marriage to Lisa has not yet been determined by the court
with finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the
present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a
subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage has no
bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. As we held
in In re Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is
33
neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.
Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an
34
affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect
its course, then the judgment of annulment of respondent’s
35
marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing
actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof—clear
preponderance of evidence—in disciplinary proceedings
against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches. 36
The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, is that they “shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.”
_______________
31 Article 109 of the Civil Code.
32 TSN, April 21, 1983 at pp. 90-93.
33 31 SCRA 562 (1970).
34 Calub vs. Suller, 323 SCRA 556 (2000).
35 Rayos Ombac vs. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93 (1998).
36 Macarubbo vs. Macarubbo, supra.
318
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
This is founded on the lawyers’ primordial duty to society as
spelled out in Canon 1 which states:
“CANON 1—A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.”
It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of
Professional Responsibility ranked the above responsibility
first in the enumeration. They knew then that more than
anybody else, it is the lawyers—the disciples of law—who are
most obliged to venerate the law. As stated in Ex Parte Wall: 37
“Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound
to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all
men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample
them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example
to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.”
Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the
Attorney’s Oath which every lawyer in the country has to
take before he is allowed to practice.
In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct
and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1)
year suspension recommended by the IBP is not
commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The bulk of
jurisprudence supports the imposition of the extreme penalty
of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY
of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a
lawyer, and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let respondent’s name be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout
the country with copies of this Decision.
_______________
37 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556.
319
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004 319
Sambarani vs. Commission on Elections
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Panganiban, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez,Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., No part (close association with
DOLE).
Carpio-Morales, J., On Official Leave.
Chico-Nazario, J., On Leave.
Respondent disbarred for grossly immoral conduct and
violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Note.—Disbarment should never be decreed where any
lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. (T’boli
AgroIndustrial Development, Inc. vs. Solilapsi, 394 SCRA
269 [2002])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. March 8, 2011.*
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED
“RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE
FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE
SUPREME COURT”
Courts; Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Freedom of Expression;
Academic Freedom; The legal reasoning used in the past by this
Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in
administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech
in open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to
respondents’ invocation of academic freedom.—Established
jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers
speak their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath
to observe ethical standards of their profession, and in particular,
avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or
any court for that matter, for a decision it has
rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for
such decision’s reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism
against a member of this Court is not the real issue here but
rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone’s
attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by
respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent members of
the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable
professional conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court
through improper intervention or interference as third parties to a
pending case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was
respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act
on their Statement, which they formally submitted, through Dean
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Court’s proper
disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and
academic freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth
discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this
Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in
administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech
in open court or in court submissions can simi-
_______________
* EN BANC.
544
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
44
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
larly be applied to respondents’ invocation of academic
freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because respondents are not merely
lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young
aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-observance of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated
by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by
this Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A reading of the Show Cause
Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that
respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had
charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said
Resolution—it was the manner of the criticism and the
contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties
nor counsels in the Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230,
have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said
pending case for the “proper disposition” and consideration of the
Court that gave rise to said Resolution.—It is respondents’
collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show
Cause Resolution, has interfered with respondents’
constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. It
appears that the underlying assumption behind respondents’
assertion is the misconception that this Court is denying them the
right to criticize the Court’s decisions and actions, and that this
Court seeks to “silence” respondent law professors’ dissenting view
on what they characterize as a “legitimate public issue.” This is far
from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will
plainly show that it was neither the fact that respondents had
criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of
its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It
was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by
which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in
theVinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the
petitioners in the said pending case for the “proper disposition”
and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution.
The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the
statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for
under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication,
and later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s
Restoring Integrity Statement.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to criticize the
courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally
 545
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 545
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be
protected from due influence or interference.—Indeed, in a long line
of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions, this
Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial
officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern
that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due
influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only
citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly
affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose
statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether
judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment
and common decency.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of expression is not
an absolute—there are other societal values that press for
recognition, and one such societal value that presses for recognition
in the case at bar is the threat to judicial independence and the
orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and
unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions pose.—The
accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the
Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be
deemed as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for
Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act
4880,Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, relied upon by
respondents in the Common Compliance, held that: From the
language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear
that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be
passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The
realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal
interpretation.Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It
would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for
recognition. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) One such societal value
that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to
judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice
that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions
and institutions pose.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not inconsistent with
the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers
who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and
speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party in a
pend-
546
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
46
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
ing case, without observing proper procedure, even if
purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.—It is not contested
that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed
academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine
what they will teach their students and how they will teach. We
must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution
that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach
and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not
inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court
to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for
contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their
capacity as teachers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The constitutional right to
freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed
by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts
and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the
justice system; To the mind of the Court, the reason that freedom of
expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with
greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.—A novel
issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been
passed upon in any previous case before this Court, is the question
of whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke
academic freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for
intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or
influence the outcome of a case or degrade the
courts. Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the
“free speech” defense in other bar discipline cases, academic
freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this
case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed above is
that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of members
of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers
to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in
the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the
reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case
of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of
law professors.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Lawyers when they teach
law are considered engaged in the practice of law—their actions as
law professors must be measured against the same canons of
professional
547
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 547
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the
fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the
fact that they are lawyers.—It would do well for the Court to
remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition
in Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (1991), lawyers when they
teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike
professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not
teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the
ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law
professors must be measured against the same canons of
professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar
as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined
with the fact that they are lawyers. Even if the Court was willing
to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common Compliance that
their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to
“participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or
supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the
administration of justice” under Canon 4 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have
fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1,
11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and
to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the
Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given
particular situations. With more reason that law professors are not
allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their
students exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a
whole and not just their preferred portions thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No matter how firm a
lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is simply
no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in public
behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into
disrepute.—The Court has already clarified that it is not the
expression of respondents’ staunch belief that Justice Del Castillo
has committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has
found so unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution. No matter
how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of his cause
there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging
in public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal
profession into disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly
upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re
Almacen and Saberong,should be applied in this case with more
548
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
48
 Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
reason, as the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case,
denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in
a public statement using contumacious language, which with
temerity they subsequently submitted to the Court for “proper
disposition.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court fails to see how it
can ennoble the profession if it allows respondents to send a signal
to their students that the only way to effectively plead their cases
and persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive—the
mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions
logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and
unproductive recriminations.—Still on motive, it is also proposed
that the choice of language in the Statement was intended for
effective speech; that speech must be “forceful enough to make the
intended recipients listen.” One wonders what sort of effect
respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among
others, callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic
values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see how it can
ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to send a signal to
their students that the only way to effectively plead their cases
and persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive. This
brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which
were deliberately quoted in full in the narration of background
facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between the civil tenor of
these letters and the antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In
truth, these foreign authors are the ones who would expectedly be
affected by any perception of misuse of their works.
Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary reach of
this Court, they still obviously took pains to convey their objections
in a deferential and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the
Court why respondents could not do the same. These foreign
authors’ letters underscore the universality of the tenet that legal
professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due
respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express
his opinions logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated
rhetoric and unproductive recriminations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the criticism comes
from persons outside the profession who may not have a full grasp
of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other interests
in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate
or
549
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Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
ignore them, but when law professors are the ones who appear
to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse,
would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court
cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave
implication on legal education in our country.—Speaking of the
publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the
respondents’ reliance on various news reports and commentaries in
the print media and the internet as proof that they are being
unfairly “singled out.” On the contrary, these same annexes to the
Common Compliance show that it is not enough for one to criticize
the Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary or contempt
action. This Court takes into account the nature of the criticism
and weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the
Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons outside the
profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from
individuals whose personal or other interests in making the
criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore
them. However, when law professors are the ones who appear to
have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse,
would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court
cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave
implication on legal education in our country.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is established in
jurisprudence that where the excessive and contumacious language
used is plain and undeniable, then good intent can only be
mitigating.—With respect to the 35 respondents named in
the Common Compliance, considering that this appears to be
the first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary
proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to give them the
benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-
intentioned in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is
established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and
contumacious language used is plain and undeniable, then good
intent can only be mitigating. x x x Thus, the 35 respondents
named in the Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their
claim of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under
Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to
refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to
influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the courts
and the administration of justice.550
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
50
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In the Court’s view, Prof.
Vasquez was the only one among the respondents who showed true
candor and sincere deference to the Court—he was able to give a
straightforward account of how he came to sign the Statement; All
that this Court expected from respondents is not for them to
sacrifice their principles but only that they recognize that they
themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair.—
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the
differences in his Compliance compared to his colleagues. In our
view, he was the only one among the respondents who showed true
candor and sincere deference to the Court. He was able to give a
straightforward account of how he came to sign the Statement. He
was candid enough to state that his agreement to the Statement
was in principle and that the reason plagiarism was a “fair topic of
discussion” among the UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of
the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the
uncertainty brought about by a division of opinion on whether or
not willful or deliberate intent was an element of plagiarism. He
was likewise willing to acknowledge that he may have been remiss
in failing to assess the effect of the language of the Statement and
could have used more care. He did all this without having to
retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for
undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and without
baseless insinuations of deprivation of due process or of
prejudgment. This is all that this Court expected from
respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that
they recognize that they themselves may have committed some
ethical lapse in this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing
that at least one of the respondents can grasp the true import of
the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these reasons, the
Court finds Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance satisfactory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if one is not bound by
the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the
Philippine Bar, civility and respect among legal professionals of
any nationality should be aspired for under universal standards of
decency and fairness.—As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his
Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of the State of
Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of
this Court, he should be excused from these proceedings. However,
he should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
Philippine law school he should
551
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by the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to
his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.
For even if one is not bound by the Code of Professional
Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar, civility and
respect among legal professionals of any nationality should be
aspired for under universal standards of decency and fairness.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While the Court can
understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a
website a signed document may have to be reformatted and
signatures may be indicated by the notation (SGD), what is
unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a
signed document for the Court’s consideration that did not contain
the actual signatures of its authors.—The Court can understand
why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a website a
signed document may have to be reformatted and signatures may
be indicated by the notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are
willing to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for
posting to eliminate blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially
this Court, of a signed document for the Court’s consideration that
did not contain the actual signatures of its authors. In most cases,
it is the original signed document that is transmitted to the Court
or at the very least a photocopy of the actual signed document.
Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why he deviated
from this practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring
Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the
dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this Court even
with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim
fears of vandalism with respect to court submissions for court
employees are accountable for the care of documents and records
that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately
chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not contain the
actual signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in itself
a display of lack of candor.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court is surprised that
someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and
stringent standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the
explanation that there was no misrepresentation when he allowed
at least one person to be indicated as having actually signed the
Statement when
552
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
52
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
all he had was a verbal communication of an intent to sign.—
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his
reputation for perfection and stringent standards of intellectual
honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no
misrepresentation when he allowed at least one person to be
indicated as having actually signed the Statement when all he had
was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of
Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that
the former intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was
truly determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his
dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he could not have
waited until all the professors who indicated their desire to sign
the Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the
Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was truly
impossible to secure some signatures, such as that of Justice
Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen should
have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to
secure.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Due Process; In
general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type
hearing.—As respondents are fully aware, in general,
administrative proceedings do not require a trial type hearing. We
have held that: The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absoluteabsence
of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial
of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to
present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential to due process, the
requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Disciplinary Proceedings;
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis—neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers, and not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.—In relation to
bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v.
Aparicio, 525 SCRA 444
553
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 553
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
(2007), that: Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in
no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges
as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account
for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and
the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or
a prosecutor.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent law professors of their
stature are supposed to be aware of the jurisprudential doctrines
regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases; By
simply reading a hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable person,
even one who “fundamentally agreed” with the Statement’s
principles, could foresee the possibility of court action on the same
on an implicit recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a
matter this Court should simply let pass.—We find it significant
that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how as early as
September 2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics
case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the
October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the
Statement upon his return from abroad, predicted that the Court
would take some form of action on the Statement. By simply
reading a hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable person, even
one who “fundamentally agreed” with the Statement’s principles,
could foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an
implicit recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter
this Court should simply let pass. This belies respondents’ claim
that it is necessary for them to refer to any record or
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evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases
for the Show Cause Resolution. If respondents have chosen not to
include certain pieces of evidence in their respective compliances
or chosen not to make a full defense at this time, because they
were counting on being granted a hearing, that is respondents’ own
look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be
aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-
necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They should bear the
consequence of the risk they have taken.
Same; Same; Same; Academic Freedom; All lawyers, whether
they are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners,
are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct
themselves with good fidelity towards the courts—there is no
exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of
their status in the academic community or the law school to which
they belong.—In a democracy, members of the legal community are
hardly expected to have monolithic views on any subject, be it a
legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and
vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain
rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not
claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court
demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to
another under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether
they are judges, court employees, professors or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken
an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar,
to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There
is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless
of their status in the academic community or the law school to
which they belong.
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Courts; Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Freedom of Expression; The
majority’s action impermissibly expands the Court’s administrative
powers and, more importantly, abridges constitutionally protected
speech on public conduct guaranteed to all, including members of
the bar.—I find the Compliance of the 37 legal scholars satisfactory
and therefore see no need to admonish or warn them for supposed
use of
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disrespectful language in their statement commenting on a
public issue involving the official conduct of a member of this
Court. The majority’s action impermissibly expands the Court’s
administrative powers and, more importantly, abridges
constitutionally protected speech on public conduct guaranteed to
all, including members of the bar.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the scheme of our
constitutional values, this species of speech—prime political speech
critical of conduct of public officials and institution, delivered in
public forum—enjoys the highest protection, rooted on the deeply-
held notion that “the interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs.”—Along
with other sectors, the law faculty of the University of the
Philippines (UP), which counts among its ranks some of this
country’s legal experts, responded by issuing a statement,
bewailing what the professors see as the Court’s indifference to the
perceived dishonesty in the crafting of the Vinuya ponenciaand its
aggravating effect on the Vinuya petitioners’ cause, refuting
Justice del Castillo’s defenses, underscoring the seriousness of the
issue, and calling for the adoption of individual and institutional
remedial measures. This is prime political speech critical of
conduct of public officials and institution, delivered in public
forum. Under the scheme of our constitutional values, this species
of speech enjoys the highest protection, rooted on the deeply-held
notion that “the interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs.” Indeed,
preceding western jurisprudence by nearly five decades, this
Court, in the first score of the last century, identified the specific
right to criticize official conduct as protected speech, branding
attempts by courts to muzzle criticism as “tyranny of the basest
sort.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Academic Freedom; The UP law
faculty statement is far removed from speech the Court has rightly
sanctioned for proffering no useful social value, solely crafted to
vilify its members and threaten its very existence.—In testing
whether speech critical of judges and judicial processes falls
outside the ambit of constitutionally protected expression, spilling
into the territory of sanctionable utterances, this Court adheres to
the “clear and present danger” test. Under this analytical
framework, an utterance is constitutionally protected unless “the
evil consequence of the comment
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or utterance [is] ‘extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high.’ ” It appears that the evil consequences
the UP law faculty statement will supposedly spawn are (1) the
slurring of this Court’s dignity and (2) the impairment of its
judicial independence vis-à-vis the resolution of the plagiarism
complaint in Vinuya. Both are absent here. On the matter of
institutional degradation, the 12-paragraph, 1,553-word statement
of the UP law faculty, taken as a whole, does not exhibit that
“irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy
the courts and their members” typical of unprotected judicial
criticism. On the contrary, the statement, taken as a whole, seeks
to uphold the bedrock democratic value of keeping judicial
processes free of any taint of dishonesty or misrepresentation.
Thus, the UP law faculty statement is far removed from speech the
Court has rightly sanctioned for proffering no useful social value,
solely crafted to vilify its members and threaten its very existence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The 8 February 2011 Resolution of
the Court in A.M. No. 10-17-17-SC, denying reconsideration to its
earlier ruling finding no merit in the Vinuya petitioners’ claim of
plagiarism, gives the lie to the conclusion that the UP law faculty
statement posed any danger, much less one that is “extremely
serious,” to the Court’s independence.—On the alleged danger of
impairment of this Court’s judicial independence in resolving the
plagiarism charge in Vinuya, this too, did not come to pass. In the
Resolution of 8 February 2011 in A.M. No. 10-17-17-SC, the Court
denied reconsideration to its earlier ruling finding no merit in the
Vinuya petitioners’ claim of plagiarism. Not a single word in the 8
February 2011 Resolution hints that the UP law faculty statement
pressured, much less threatened, this Court to decide the motion
for reconsideration for the Vinuya petitioners. Thus, the 8
February 2011 Resolution gives the lie to the conclusion that the
UP law faculty statement posed any danger, much less one that is
“extremely serious,” to the Court’s independence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The conclusion that the UP law
faculty statement disrespects the Court and its members is valid
only if the statement is taken apart, its dismembered parts
separately scrutinized to isolate and highlight perceived offensive
phrases and words, but such approach defies common sense and
departs from this Court’s established practice in scrutinizing speech
critical of the
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judiciary.—The conclusion that the UP law faculty statement
disrespects the Court and its members is valid only if the
statement is taken apart, its dismembered parts separately
scrutinized to isolate and highlight perceived offensive phrases and
words. This approach defies common sense and departs from this
Court’s established practice in scrutinizing speech critical of the
judiciary. People v. Godoy, instructs that speech critical of judges
must be “read with contextual care,” making sure that disparaging
statements are not “taken out of context.” Using this approach,
and applying the clear and present danger test, the Court in Godoy
cleared a columnist and a publisher of liability despite the
presence in the assailed news article of derogatory yet isolated
statements about a judge. We can do no less to the statement of
the members of the UP law faculty, who, after all, were impelled
by nothing but their sense of professional obligation to “speak out
on a matter of public concern and one that is of vital interest to
them.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; On the supposed unpleasant tone of
the statement, critical speech, by its nature, is caustic and biting,
and it is for this same reason that it enjoys special constitutional
protection; It is important to remember that the social function of
lawyers is not only to preserve order, but also to permit challenges
to the status quo.—On the supposed unpleasant tone of the
statement, critical speech, by its nature, is caustic and biting. It is
for this same reason, however, that it enjoys special constitutional
protection. “The constitution does not apply only to sober, carefully
reasoned discussion. There may be at least some value in
permitting cranky, obstreperous, defiant conduct by lawyers on the
ground that it encourages a public culture of skepticism, anti-
authoritarianism, pluralism, and openness. It is important to
remember that the social function of lawyers is not only to
preserve order, but also to permit challenges to the status quo.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judges; Supreme Court Justices, as
public officials, and the Supreme Court, as an institution, are
entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other public
officials and institutions.—Supreme Court Justices, as public
officials, and the Supreme Court, as an institution, are entitled to
no greater immunity from criticism than other public officials and
institutions. The members of this Court are sustained by the
people’s resources and
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our actions are always subject to their accounting. Thus,
instead of shielding ourselves with a virtual lese-majeste rule,
wholly incompatible with the Constitution’s vision of public office
as a “public trust,” we should heed our own near century-old
counsel: a clear conscience, not muzzled critics, is the balm for
wounds caused by a “hostile and unjust accusation” on official
conduct.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Academic Freedom; The academic
bar, which the UP law faculty represents, is the judiciary’s partner
in a perpetual intellectual conversation to promote the rule of law
and build democratic institutions.—The academic bar, which the
UP law faculty represents, is the judiciary’s partner in a perpetual
intellectual conversation to promote the rule of law and build
democratic institutions. It serves the interest of sustaining this
vital relationship for the Court to constructively respond to the
academics’ criticism. Instead of heeding the UP law faculty’s call
for the Court to “ensur[e] that not only the content, but also the
processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible
and beyond question,” the majority dismisses their suggestion as
useless calumny and brands their constitutionally protected speech
as “unbecoming of lawyers and law professors.” The Constitution,
logic, common sense and a humble awareness of this Court’s role in
the larger project of dispensing justice in a democracy revolt
against such response.
Carpio-Morales, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Courts; Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Freedom of Expression;
Academic Freedom; There was no reasonable ground to motu
proprio initiate the administrative case, in view of (1) the therein
discussed injudiciousness attending the Resolution, anchored on an
irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt, and (2) the
Court’s conventionally permissive attitude toward the “expression of
belief” or “manner of criticism” coming from legal academics,
lawyer-columnists, and civic circles, in a number of high-profile
cases.—I maintain my position that, in the first place, there was no
reasonable ground to motu proprio initiate the administrative case,
in view of (1) the therein discussed injudiciousness attending the
Resolution, anchored on an irregularly concluded finding of
indirect contempt with adverse declarations prematurely
describing the subject Statement of the UP Law Faculty that could
taint the disciplinary action,
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and (2) the Court’s conventionally permissive attitude toward
the “expression of belief” or “manner of criticism” coming from
legal academics, lawyer-columnists, and civic circles, in a number
of high-profile cases, most notably at the height of the “CJ
Appointment Issue” during which time the motion for
reconsideration of the Court’s decision was similarly pending.
Villarama, J., Separate Opinion:
Courts; Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Freedom of Expression;
Academic Freedom; I am willing to afford respondents the benefit of
the doubt as to their intentions concerning the forceful language
employed in certain portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement—
a reading of the Statement, with particular focus on its final
paragraphs, will not leave the reader with feelings of contempt for
the Court but only a feeling that the Court must champion the
cause of integrity.—After a careful study of the respondents’
submissions, I respectfully submit that the above submissions are
SATISFACTORY in view of respondents’ claim of good faith and
the fact that a re-examination of the Statement indeed admits of
such claim. Consistent with respondents’ claims, the tenor of the
Statement was to call the Court’s attention to the grave allegations
and its effects on the integrity and credibility of the Court and the
Judiciary. Indeed, the general wording of the Statement and its
ending paragraphs lend support to respondents’ averments that
the Statement was prompted by the sincere and honest desire to
protect the integrity and credibility of the Judiciary, especially the
Supreme Court. Given such submissions, I am willing to afford
respondents the benefit of the doubt as to their intentions
concerning the forceful language employed in certain portions of
the Restoring Integrity Statement. This is especially so considering
that the subject statements present no clear and present danger of
a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent as to take it
out of the protective mantle of the freedom of speech and
expression under the Bill of Rights. A reading of the Statement,
with particular focus on its final paragraphs, will not leave the
reader with feelings of contempt for the Court but only a feeling
that the Court must champion the cause of integrity. Furthermore,
it should be noted that our society has developed to the point
where critical analysis of information is not in short supply. The
public is nowadays not only
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more well informed, but it has access to information with
which citizens could make their own independent assessment of
pending issues of public concern, including the fitness and
integrity of the members of this Court to render fair and impartial
judgment on the cases before them. However, given the fact that
some isolated portions of the statement were arguably
disrespectful, respondents should be reminded to be more
circumspect in their future statements.
Same; Same; That respondent Dean Leonen acted upon the
wrong information given to him, though telling of some degree of
carelessness on his part, is not gross negligence that is tantamount
to bad faith—there being no intent or inexcusable negligence, there
is no ground to find him liable under Canon 10 and Rules 10.01
and 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.—As regards
Dean Leonen, I likewise submit that his explanation is sufficient to
exonerate him from the charge of violation of Canon 10 and Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03, all of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. While it appears that Dean Leonen mistakenly
relied on hearsay information that Justice Mendoza had
authorized him to indicate Justice Mendoza as a signatory to the
Statement, still, Dean Leonen’s lapses appear more the result of
overzealousness rather than bad faith or a deliberate intent to do
falsehood or to mislead the Court. Indeed, under the circumstances
as they appeared to him, and considering that there were other
professors who had authorized him to indicate them as signatories,
it was not all too remiss on his part to indicate Justice Mendoza as
a signatory to the Statement upon the information given to him by
his administrative staff. That he acted upon the wrong information
given to him, though telling of some degree of carelessness on his
part, is not gross negligence that is tantamount to bad faith.
Hence, there being no intent or inexcusable negligence, there is no
ground to find him liable under Canon 10 and Rules 10.01 and
10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Sereno, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Courts; Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Freedom of Expression;
Academic Freedom; It is unfortunate when a tribunal admits that
its core of independence can be shaken by a twelve-paragraph, two-
page commentary from academia—by issuing the Show Cause
Order, and
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affirming it in the current Decision, the Court puts itself in the
precarious position of shackling free speech and expression.—The
history of the Supreme Court shows that the times when it
emerged with strength from tempests of public criticism were
those times when it valued constitutional democracy and its own
institutional integrity. Indeed, dangers from pressure and threat
presented by what is usually constitutionally deemed as free
speech can arise only when the Court allows itself to be so
threatened. It is unfortunate when a tribunal admits that its core
of independence can be shaken by a twelve-paragraph, two-page
commentary from academia. By issuing the Show Cause Order,
and affirming it in the current Decision, the Court puts itself in
the precarious position of shackling free speech and expression.
The Court, which has the greater duty of restraint and sobriety,
but which appears to the public to have failed to transcend its
instinct for self-preservation and to rise above its own hurt, gains
nothing by punishing those who, to its mind, also lacked such
restraint.
Same; Same; Same; That the Court was put in the spotlight
and garnered unwanted attention was caused by a myriad of
factors, not the least of which was Justice Del Castillo’s own
published defense entitled “The Del Castillo ponencia in Vinuya”
pending the resolution of the complaint against him by the Ethics
Committee, and the categorical statement made by the Acting Chief
of the Court’s Public Information Office to the media that the Chief
Justice had no plans of investigating the plagiarism charges.—The
negative public exposure caused by such acts of plagiarism cannot
be attributed solely to the UP Law Faculty. That the Court was
put in the spotlight and garnered unwanted attention was caused
by a myriad of factors, not the least of which was Justice Del
Castillo’s own published defense entitled “The Del Castillo
ponencia in Vinuya” pending the resolution of the complaint
against him by the Ethics Committee, and the categorical
statement made by the Acting Chief of the Court’s Public
Information Office to the media that the Chief Justice had no plans
of investigating the plagiarism charges. These twin acts attracted
negative reaction, much of which came from the legal profession
and the academe. The issue itself—alleged plagiarism in a judicial
decision, including the alleged use of plagiarized materials to
achieve a result opposite to the theses of the said materials—
resonated in the public’s consciousness and stirred a natural
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 desire in the citizenry to raise calls to save an important
public institution, namely, the judiciary. The responses published
by different sectors constituted nothing more than an exercise of
free speech—critical commentary calling a public official to task in
the exercise of his functions.
Same; Same; Same; Contempt; Whatever designation the
majority may find convenient to formally characterize this
proceeding, however, the pretext is negated by the disposition in the
Resolution of 19 October 2010 itself and its supporting rationale—
the substance therein demonstrates that the present proceeding is
one for indirect contempt.—Despite the assertion that the present
case is merely an exercise of the Court’s disciplinary authority over
members of the bar, a closer look reveals the true nature of the
proceeding as one for indirect contempt, the due process
requirements of which are strictly provided for under Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court. The majority attempts to skirt the issue
regarding the non-observance of due process by insisting that the
present case is not an exercise of the Court’s contempt powers, but
rather is anchored on the Court’s disciplinary powers. Whatever
designation the majority may find convenient to formally
characterize this proceeding, however, the pretext is negated by
the disposition in the Resolution of 19 October 2010 itself and its
supporting rationale. The majority directed respondents to SHOW
CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the
Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the
Bar. Yet the substance therein demonstrates that the present
proceeding is one for indirect contempt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The allegation and conclusion that
the faculty members purportedly “undermine the Court’s honesty,
integrity, and competence,” make it clear that the true nature of the
action is one for indirect contempt.—The central argumentation in
the Show Cause Order is evidence of the original intent of the
proceeding. The allegation and conclusion that the faculty
members purportedly “undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity,
and competence,” make it clear that the true nature of the action is
one for indirect contempt. The discussion in the Resolution of 19
October 2010 hinged on the tribunal’s need for self-preservation
and independence, in view of the “institutional attacks” and
“outside interference” with its functions—charges which more
appropriately fall
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under its contempt authority, rather than the authority to
determine fitness of entering and maintaining membership in the
bar.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The power of contempt is not an
all-encompassing tool to silence criticism.—The essence of a court’s
contempt powers stems from a much-needed remedy for the
violation of lawful court orders and for maintaining decorum
during proceedings, as an essential auxiliary to the due
administration of justice. It is not an all-encompassing tool to
silence criticism. Courts must exercise the power of contempt for
purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a
safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they fulfill. It
must be wielded on the preservative, rather than on the vindictive,
principle.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Instead of regarding criticism as
perpetually adversarial, the judiciary would do well to respect it,
both as an important tool for public accountability, and as the only
soothing balm for vindication of felt injustice; Judicial legitimacy
established through demonstrated intellectual integrity in decision-
making rightly generates public acceptance of such decisions, which
makes them truly binding.—The power to cite for contempt, as well
as the power to discipline, are mechanisms to be exercised solely
towards the orderly administration of justice. Such powers must be
weighed carefully against the substantive rights of the public to
free expression and academic freedom. In this critical balancing
act, the tribunal must therefore utilize, to the fullest extent,
soundness and clarity of reasoning, and must not appear to have
been swayed by momentary fits of temper. Instead of regarding
criticism as perpetually adversarial, the judiciary would do well to
respect it, both as an important tool for public accountability, and
as the only soothing balm for vindication of felt injustice. Judicial
legitimacy established through demonstrated intellectual integrity
in decision-making rightly generates public acceptance of such
decisions, which makes them truly binding. William Howard Taft,
who served as a federal appellate judge before becoming the
President of the United States, understood the weight of public
evaluation in this wise: “If the law is but the essence of common
sense, the protest of many average men may evidence a defect in a
judicial conclusion though based on the nicest reasoning and
profoundest learning.”564
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Same; Same; Same; Same; There must always reside, in the
recesses of our minds, the clear distinction between what is merely
legal and what is legitimate; Legitimacy is a “tenuous commodity,
particularly for unelected judges,” and it can only be maintained by
a sustained perception of fairness, as well as by the retention of the
moral authority of individual judges.—We who occupy this august
chamber are right not because our word is accorded legal finality
on matters that are before us. We are right only when we have
been proven right. There must always reside, in the recesses of our
minds, the clear distinction between what is merely legal and what
is legitimate. Legitimacy is a “tenuous commodity, particularly for
unelected judges,” and it can only be maintained by a sustained
perception of fairness, as well as by the retention of the moral
authority of individual judges. This required characteristic of the
Court is diminished when its members do not act through the
rational strength of their decisions, but are instead perceived to
have done so in the misunderstanding of the Court’s disciplinary
powers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In my view of a constitutional
democracy, the judiciary is required to demonstrate moral authority
and legitimacy, not only legality, at all times.—In my view of a
constitutional democracy, the judiciary is required to demonstrate
moral authority and legitimacy, not only legality, at all times. It
has often been said that the rule of law requires an independent
judiciary that fairly, impartially and promptly applies the law to
cases before it. The rule of law requires a judiciary that is not
beholden to any political power or private interests, whose only
loyalty is to the people and to the Constitution that the people
have ordained as their fundamental governing precept. It requires
integrity, independence and probity of each individual judge. To be
independent, the judiciary must always remember that it will lose
public support and in a certain sense, its legitimacy, if it does not
demonstrate its integrity in its judicial decisions. It must show a
keen nose for the fundamental importance of upholding right over
wrong.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Direct and informed criticism of
judicial decisions strengthens accountability.—To maintain a life of
intellectual integrity, those of us in the judiciary must be buffeted
by the winds of healthful criticism. Direct and informed criticism of
judicial decisions strengthens accountability. As Taft is noted for
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writing: “[n]othing tends more to render judges careful in
their decisions and anxiously solicitous to do exact justice than the
consciousness that every act of theirs is to be subject to the
intelligent scrutiny of their fellow men, and to their candid
criticism .... In the case of judges having a life tenure, indeed, their
very independence makes the right freely to comment on their
decisions of greater importance, because it is the only practical and
available instrument in the hands of a free people to keep such
judges alive to the reasonable demands of those they serve.”
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Academic Freedom; The value of
academic freedom, as a necessary constitutional component of the
right to freedom of expression, lies in the ability of the common
man, aided by the expertise available in the academe, to hold a
magistrate accountable in the exercise of his official functions,
foremost of which is the issuance of written decisions.—This is
where academic freedom, when exercised in appropriate measure,
is most helpful. Milton encapsulates free speech as simply the
right to “argue freely according to conscience.” The value of
academic freedom, as a necessary constitutional component of the
right to freedom of expression, lies in the ability of the common
man, aided by the expertise available in the academe, to hold a
magistrate accountable in the exercise of his official functions,
foremost of which is the issuance of written decisions. Paragraph
23 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of
Lawyersstates: “Lawyers like other citizens are entitled to freedom
of expression, belief, association and assembly. In particular, they
shall have the right to take part in public discussion of matters
concerning the law, the administration of justice and the
promotion and protection of human rights and to join or form local,
national or international organizations and attend their meetings,
without suffering professional restrictions by reason of their lawful
action or their membership in a lawful organization…”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Faced with the duty of
balancing lawyers’ fundamental right to free speech which has now
been expressly recognized in the international arena, against the
Court’s desire to preserve its exalted role in society by disciplining
for offensive language, the Court must examine whether it has
already encroached into constitutionally-prohibited interference
with the basic rights of individuals.—The Basic Principles on the
Role of Lawyers
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“have been formulated to assist Member States in their task
of promoting and ensuring the proper role of lawyers,” and these
“should be respected and taken into account by Governments
within the framework of their national legislation and practice and
should be brought to the attention of lawyers as well as other
persons, such as judges, prosecutors, members of the executive and
legislature, and the public in general.” Thus, faced with the duty of
balancing lawyers’ fundamental right to free speech which has now
been expressly recognized in the international arena, against this
Court’s desire to preserve its exalted role in society by disciplining
for offensive language, this Court must examine whether it has
already encroached into constitutionally-prohibited interference
with the basic rights of individuals.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The academe is not to be an
applause machine for the judiciary—it is to help guide the judiciary
by illuminating new paths for the judiciary to take, by alerting the
judiciary to its inconsistent decisions, and by identifying gaps in
law and jurisprudence; In a certain sense, because the law faculty
can discharge a most meaningful role in keeping the judiciary
honest, there must be recognition given to the special role of the law
faculty in upholding judicial independence.—The realm of public
opinion is where the academe, especially our schools and
universities, plays a most crucial role in ensuring judicial
legitimacy. Not by blindly legitimizing its acts, but by constantly
reminding the judiciary of its presence as a helpful but critical ally.
The academe is not to be an applause machine for the judiciary; it
is to help guide the judiciary by illuminating new paths for the
judiciary to take, by alerting the judiciary to its inconsistent
decisions, and by identifying gaps in law and jurisprudence. In this
regard, the law school has a special place. Phoebe Haddon writes:
“[t]he value and preservation of academic freedom depend on an
academic environment that nurtures, not silences, diverse views.
The law school faculty has a special responsibility to maintain a
nurturing environment for diverse views because of the importance
of the marketplace of ideas in our teaching and the value we
theoretically place on the role of persuasive discourse in the quest
for knowledge. Faculty autonomy takes on significance because it
can protect freedom of inquiry.” In a certain sense, therefore,
because the law faculty can discharge a most meaningful role in
keeping the judiciary honest, there must be recognition
567
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 567
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
given to the special role of the law faculty in upholding
judicial independence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The legal academe is the
preserver of the noble standards of legal reasoning and legal
scholarship—it must itself demonstrate strength and independence
and not be punished when doing so.—The testing ground for
integrity in judicial decision-making is provided in large measure
by the legal academe, when it probes, tests and measures whether
judicial decisions rise up to the definition of just and well-reasoned
decisions as they have been defined by centuries-old norms of legal
reasoning and legal scholarship. If we have a legal academe that is
slothful, that is not self-disciplined, that covets the closeness to the
powers-that-be which an unprofessional relationship with the
judicial leadership can bring, then this refining role of the legal
academe is lost. The legal academe is the preserver of the noble
standards of legal reasoning and legal scholarship. It must itself
demonstrate strength and independence and not be punished when
doing so.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Show
Cause Resolution.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Molo, Sia, Velasco, Tuazon & Ty for Nicholas L. Ty.
Cruz & Reyes Law Offices for Mark R. Bocobo.
Zamora, Poblador, Vasquez & Bretaña for Atty. Raul T.
Vasquez.
Carag, Zaballero & San Pablo for Dan P. Calica.
Puyat, Jacinto & Santos for Gwen Grecia-De Vera.
Sanidad, Abaya, Te, Viterbo, Enriquez & Tan Law
Offices for Atty. Theodore O. Te.
Santos, Paruñgao, Aquino, Abejo & Santos Law
Officesfor Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Atty. Theodore O. Te.
Ongkiko, Manhit, Custodio & Acorda for Dean Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen.568
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
Quisumbing, Torres for respondents Jose Gerardo A.
Alampay, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo and
Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez and Gatmaitan for Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen, Tristan A. Catindig, Carina C. Laforteza and
Theodore O. Te.
Castillo, Laman, Tan, Pantaleon & San Jose for Rommel
J. Casis and Dina D. Lucenario.
Maria Karla L. Espinosa, Myra Janina R. Bañaga, Feliz
Marie M. Guerrero and Angelo D. Manlangit for Evalyn G.
Ursua.
Gauioa & Gatmaytan for Dante Gatmaytan.
Yorac, Arroyo, Chua, Caedo & Coronel Law Firm for
Arthur P. Autea, Jay L. Batongbacal, Concepcion L.
Jardeleza, Sandra Marie O. Coronel and Susan D.
Villanueva.
Arthur Autea and Associates for Arthur P. Autea.
Free Legal Assistance Group for Froilan M. Bacungan,
Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T.
Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway,
Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Evelyn (Leo) Battad,
Solomon F. Lumba, Miguel Armovit, Rosa Maria J. Bautista,
Rosario O. Gallo, Jose C. Laureta, Antonio M. Santos and
Owen Lynch.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of
the 37 respondent law professors1 in response to the Resolu-
_______________
1 Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin,
Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P.
Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay
L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F.
Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Ger
569
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 569
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
tion dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution),
directing them to show cause why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause
Resolution clearly dockets this as an administrative matter,
not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of
Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice
Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution.
Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an
allegedly irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt
as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales
(Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the
October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present
decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary
proceeding firmly in mind, the Court finds that with the
exception of one respondent whose compliance was
adequate and another who manifested he was not a
member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted
explanations, being mere denials and/or tangential to the
issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered
defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call the
attention of respondent law professors, who are members of
the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the
Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as
citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic.
_______________
ardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J.
Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie
O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña,
Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S.
Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty,
Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D.
Lucenario; Rollo, pp. 24-25.
570
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
involved in this case are as follows:
CANON 1—A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
RULE 1.02—A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.
CANON 10—A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court.
 Rule 10.01—A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02—A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a
fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03—A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11—A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
RULE 11.05—A lawyer shall submit grievances against a
Judge to the proper authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our
view that when lawyers speak their minds, they must ever be
mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of
their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive
language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for
571
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 571
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
that matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially
during the pendency of a motion for such decision’s
reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a
member of this Court is not the real issue here but rather
this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone’s
attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine
by respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent
members of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and
acceptable professional conduct and speech and violated the
Rules of Court through improper intervention or interference
as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be
stressed that it was respondents themselves who called upon
the Supreme Court to act on their Statement,2 which they
formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
(Dean Leonen), for the Court’s proper disposition.
Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic
freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing
here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this Court
to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in
administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate
speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be
applied to respondents’ invocation of academic freedom.
Indeed, it is precisely because respondents are not merely
lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of
young aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-
observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if
purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be
ignored nor glossed over by this Court.
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’
actuations, it is apropos to revisit the factual antecedents of
this case.
_______________
2 Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court; Rollo, pp. 4-9.
572
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice
Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v.
Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated.
On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the
“Malaya Lolas”), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
theVinuya decision, raising solely the following grounds:
I. OUR OWN CONSTITUTIONAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORIES
REJECT THIS HONORABLE COURTS’ (SIC) ASSERTION THAT THE
EXECUTIVE’S FOREIGN POLICY PREROGATIVES ARE VIRTUALLY
UNLIMITED; PRECISELY, UNDER THE RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, SUCH PREROGATIVES ARE
PROSCRIBED BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
STANDARDS, INCLUDING THOSE PROVIDED FOR IN THE RELEVANT
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF WHICH THE PHILIPPINES IS A
PARTY. 4 INTERNATIONAL LAW—AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES
II. THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS CONFUSED DIPLOMATIC
PROTECTION WITH THE BROADER, IF FUNDAMENTAL, RESPONSIBILITY
OF STATES TO PROTECT THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ITS CITIZENS—
ESPECIALLY WHERE THE RIGHTS ASSERTED ARE SUBJECT OF ERGA
OMNES OBLIGATIONS AND PERTAIN TO JUS COGENS NORMS. 5 bears out the fact not only of extensive plagiarism but of (sic)
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H.
Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Baga-
_______________
3 Counsel of record for the Malaya Lolas (petitioners in G.R. No. 162230)
is the Roque & Butuyan Law Offices.
4 Malaya Lolas’ Motion for Reconsideration dated May 31, 2010, p. 1.
5 Id., at p. 8.
6 The contents of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration were
posted on Atty. Roque's blog on July 18, 2010, the day before its
filing. Seehttp://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-
plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/ (last accessed on January 20, 2011).
573
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 573
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
res (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for
the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds
for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other
arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE
COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST
THREE SOURCES—AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED
IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF
SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE
INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES
EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7
They also claimed that “[i]n this controversy, the evidence
also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by
the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment
for denying the Petition.”8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works
allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were namely: (1)
Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article “A Fiduciary
Theory of Jus Cogens;”9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing
Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark
Ellis’ article “Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an
International Crime.”11
_______________
7 Malaya Lolas’ Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19,
2010, p. 8.
 8 Id., at p. 36. (Emphasis supplied.) 13 The article was posted on July 19, 2010 at 12:02
9 Which appeared in the Yale Law Journal in 2009. a.m. Seehttp://www.gmanews.tv/story/196407/sc-justice-plagiarized-parts-of-
10 Cambridge University Press, 2005. ruling-on-comfort-women (Last accessed on January 20, 2011).
11 Published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 14 See http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/insideOpinion.htm?f=2010/july/2
in 2006. 2/harryroque.isx&d=2010/july/22 (Last accessed January 24, 2011).
574 15 The link indicated in Julian Ku’s blog entry was not a newspaper report
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED but the Newsbreak article posted in GMA News TV’s website.
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by 16 Id.
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism 575
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 575
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C. the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled “SC and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women,” on the The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four
Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA sentences and citations that are identical to sentences and
News TV website also on July 19, 2010.13 citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the
“Plagiarized and Twisted,” appeared in the Manila Standard petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion was filed
Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. today.
Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus
acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his cogens discussion is that it implies that the prohibitions against
work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus
plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the opposite. The
the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the Supreme Court’s decision is available
alleged plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio here:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/16223
Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise: 0.htm17
The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to
reconsideration filed yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court his colleagues on the Court in reply to the charge of
yesterday. The motion is available here: plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging- Reconsideration.18
plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/ In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly
plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis,
_______________ wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:
12 See Annex 4 of the 35 respondents’ Common Compliance filed on November
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my
19, 2010. The article’s time of posting was indicated as 7:00 a.m.; Rollo, p. 304.
attention in the last few days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I
am compelled, as a question of the integrity of my work as an
academic and as an advocate of human rights and humanitarian
law, to take exception to the possible unauthorized use of my law
review article on rape as an international crime in your esteemed
Court’s
_______________
17 Prof. Criddle’s response was posted on July 19, 2010 at 2:44 EST. See link
below:
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/19/international-law-plagiarism-charge-
bedevils-philippines-supreme-court-justice/ (Last accessed on January 20, 2011).
18 This letter was subsequently published in the Philippine Star as shown by
Annex 7 of the 35 respondents’ Common Compliance filed on November 19,
2010;Rollo, pp. 309-310.
576
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et
al.(G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible
plagiarism by the Philippine chapter of the Southeast Asia Media
Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-
based Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as
trustee.
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive
discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said Judgment of your
esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed Court
may have misread the arguments I made in the article and
employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic since the
article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal
remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006 has been made
available to your esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court
will take the time to carefully study the arguments I made in the
article.
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court
as to the issues raised by this letter.
With respect,
(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20
_______________
19 Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares, through the Center for International
Law, have collaborated in the past with the SEAMLDI. The Center for
International Law, which has Atty. Roque as Chairman and Atty. Bagares as
Executive Director, hosted the 2nd South East Asia Media Legal Defense
Conference held in October 2009 in Cebu
City. Seehttp://www.roquebutuyan.com/centerlaw/index.html and
http://jmsc.asia/seasiamediadefense2009/program/ (Both last accessed on
January 20, 2011).
20 http://www.scribd.com/doc/39856111/Letter-to-Republic-of-the-
Philippines-Supreme-Court-Ellis (Last accessed on January 20, 2011).
577
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 577
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27,
2010, the Court formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13,
Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En
Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred
the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics
Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC.
 On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief
Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice Del Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover
Castillo.21 letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, The Honorable
entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines
the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Chief Justice
Supreme Court” (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s Subject: Statement of faculty
website22 and on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A report regarding the from the UP College of Law
statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such on the Plagiarism in the case of
as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
date. The statement was likewise posted at the University of Your Honors:
the Phil- We attach for your information and proper disposition a
statement signed by thirty[-]eight (38)28 members of the faculty of
_______________ the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be
considered by the Supreme Court en banc.
21 Per Curiam Decision, In the Matter of Charges of Plagiarism, etc.,
Respectfully,
against Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC,
(Sgd.)
October 12, 2010.
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
22 http://www.newsbreak.ph/2010/08/09/restoring-integrity/ (Last
accessed on January 24, 2011). _______________
23 http://harryroque.com/2010/08/09/restoring-integritya-statement-by-
the-faculty-of/ (Last accessed on January 20, 2011). 26 See paragraph 2.9, Dean Leonen Compliance dated November 19,
24 http://www.gmanews.tv/story/198182/resignation-of-sc-justice-in- 2010;Rollo, p. 327.
plagiarism-issue-sought (Last accessed on January 20, 2011). 27 The date of posting of the Statement is not indicated on the UP Law
25 http://www.sunstar.com.ph/manila/faculties-hit-plagiarized-ruling(Last website.See http://law.upd.edu.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
accessed on January 20, 2011). d=166:restoring-integrity-a-statement-by-the-faculty-of-the-up-college-of-
578 law&catid=52:faculty-news&Itemid=369 (Last accessed on January 20, 2011).
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 28 Although the Dean’s letter indicated that 38 faculty members signed the
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by statement, an examination of the attachment showed that the number of
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism purported signatories was only 37.
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court 579
ippines College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly onAugust VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 579
10, 201026 and at said college’s website.27 Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
the Statement of the University of the Philippines College of and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
 Dean and Professor of Law
(Emphases supplied.)
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted
letter did not contain the actual signatures of the alleged
signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law
professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each
name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law
faculty Statement is reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE
OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed
against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a
time of war. After they courageously came out with their very
personal stories of abuse and suffering as “comfort women”,
waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from
their own government as well as from the government of
Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse
in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230
(28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a
singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of
the Philippines College of Law views the charge that an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed
plagiarism and misrepresentation inVinuya v. Executive
Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only
affronts to the individual scholars whose work have been
appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious
threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine
Judicial System.
In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and
misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s own. In
the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at
worst. It constitutes a taking of someone else’s ideas and
expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went
into committing such ideas and ex-
580
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
pressions into writing, and then making it appear that such
ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It
is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial system that allows
plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since
all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to allow
plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of
laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete
perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source
material shows that the ponente merely copied select portions
of other legal writers’ works and interspersed them into the
decision as if they were his own, original work. Under the
circumstances, however, because the Decision has been
promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the
Court’s and no longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court also
bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of
any mention of the original writers’ names and the
publications from which they came, the thing speaks for
itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from
the ponente of this case and the spokesman of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes
from the original articles is a reference to the ‘primary’
sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not
acceptable, because the original authors’ writings and the
effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary
sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion
of the footnotes together with portions of their writings in
fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it
provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to
appropriate the original authors’ work of organizing and
analyzing those primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be
expected to be familiar with all legal and scholarly journals.
This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity
with sources all the more demands correct and careful
attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a
matter of diligence and competence expected of all
Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original
writers, Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent,
that the High Court
581
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the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
actually misrepresents the conclusions of their workentitled
“A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens,” the main source of the
plagiarized text. In this article they argue that the
classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual
slavery as crimes against humanity have attained the status
of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek
remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet,
the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at
the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual
dishonesty of copying works without attribution
by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying
works in order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International
Law, because it deals with State liability and responsibility
for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and
the role of the injured parties’ home States in the pursuit of
remedies against such injury or damage. National courts
rarely have such opportunities to make an international
impact. That the petitioners were Filipino “comfort women”
who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second World
War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford
them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on
this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven
years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners
seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed
the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized
materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted
sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court added insult to
injury by failing to actually exercise its “power to urge and
exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of
theVinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with
false sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack
of concern for even the most basic values of decency and
respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and
the standing of the Philippine legal profession before other
Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute
honesty in its decisions and cannot accept excuses for failure
to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all
members of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the
very foundation of its authority and power in a democratic
society. Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy
that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear
and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this
would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial
system. And in light of the significance of this
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the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women,
but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the
horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the
Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners
on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its
moral authority without ensuring that its own conduct,
whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond
reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only
the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing
its own decisions, are credible and beyond question.
The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed and
not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction,
then at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It is
an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a
higher standard of professional care and practical
scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are critical to
improving the system of administration of justice in the
Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the
position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all
controversies: a position that requires competence and
integrity completely above any and all reproach, in
accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and
professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn
duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the
profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the
University of the Philippine College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in
breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of the
Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity
and credibility of the entire Supreme Court and
undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial
system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and
the establishment of legal precedents through dubious
means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of
the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function
of
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the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice
to all those who have been left without legal or
equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching
nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor and
dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is
necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice to
any other sanctions that the Court may consider
appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to
review the manner by which it conducts research,
prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order
to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide
clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to
ensure only the highest quality of legal research and
writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law,
Quezon City, 27 July 2010.
(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Dean and Professor of Law
(SGD.) FROILAN M. (SGD.) PACIFICO A.
BACUNGANDean (1978- AGABINDean (1989-1995)
1983)
(SGD.) MERLIN M. (SGD.) SALVADOR T.
MAGALLONADean (1995-CARLOTADean (2005- CATINDIG
1999) 2008)and Professor of Law (SGD.) SANDRA (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
REGULAR FACULTY MARIE O. CORONEL
(SGD.) CARMELO V. (SGD.) JAY L. (SGD.) ROSARIO O. (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
SISONProfessor BATONGBACALAssistant GALLO
Professor (SGD.) CONCEPCION (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. (SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. L. JARDELEZA
SALVADOR DAWAYAssociate BATTAD Assistant Professor (SGD.) ANTONIO (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
Dean and Associate Professor G.M. LA VIÑA
(SGD.) CARINA C. (SGD.) SUSAN D.
584 LAFORTEZA VILLANUEVA (Underscoring
29

584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS supplied.)

ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by _______________

the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism

29 Rollo, pp. 4-9.
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
585
(SGD.) DANTE B. (SGD.) GWEN G. DE
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 585
GATMAYTANAssociate VERAAssistant Professor
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
Professor
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
(SGD.) THEODORE O. (SGD.) SOLOMON F.
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
TEAssistant Professor LUMBAAssistant Professor
(SGD.) FLORIN T. (SGD.) ROMMEL J. Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof.
HILBAYAssistant Professor CASISAssistant Professor Christian J. Tams made known his sentiments on the alleged
LECTURERS plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We quote Prof. Tams’ letter
(SGD.) JOSE (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA here:
GERARDO A. Glasgow, 18 August 2010
ALAMPAY Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. (G.R. No. 162230)
(SGD.) ARTHUR P. (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice
AUTEA Your Excellency,
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of
J. BAUTISTA international law at the University of Glasgow. I am writing to you
(SGD.) MARK R. (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS in relation to the use of one of my publications in the above-
BOCOBO mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.
(SGD.) DAN P. (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of
CALICA your Court’s Judgment, in the section addressing the concept of
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter shows,
the relevant sentences were taken almost word by word from the
introductory chapter of my book Enforcing Obligations Erga
Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I
note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of
the Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from another
author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive
passages reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be
considered an appropriate form of referencing.
I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used
to support the Judgment’s cautious approach to the erga
omnesconcept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows that my
book’s central thesis is precisely the opposite: namely that the erga
omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a firm place in
contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter
notes that “[t]he present study attempts to demystify aspects of the
‘very mysterious’ concept and thereby to facilitate its
implementation” (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding section
notes that “the preceding chapters
_______________
30 This was received by the Court on August 20, 2010. It was also reported on
Newsbreak that same day. See (http://www.newsbreak.ph/2010/08/20/third-
author-plagiarized-by-sc-justice-complains/).
586
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
show that the concept is now a part of the reality of international
law, established in the jurisprudence of courts and the practice of
States” (p. 309).
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see
how my work should have been cited to support—as it seemingly
has—the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned at the
way in which your Honourable Court’s Judgment has drawn on
scholarly work without properly acknowledging it.
On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your
Honourable Court.
I remain
Sincerely yours
(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams 31
In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty.
Bagares’ exhibits during the August 26, 2010 hearing in the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics
Committee noted that Exhibit “J” (a copy of the Restoring
Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the
names of certain faculty members with the letters (SGD.)
beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty.
Roque to present the signed copy of the said Statement
within three days from the August 26 hearing.32
_______________
31 See Annex 2 of the 35 respondents’ Compliance dated November 19,
2010. A full-color PDF replica of Prof. Tams’ letter was also linked on Atty.
Roque’s blog entry dated August 22, 2010. See blog entry here—
http://harryroque.com/2010/08/22/third-author-plagiarized-by-sc-justice-
complains-from-newsbreak/ (last accessed on January 20, 2011) and the letter
here - http://harryroque.files. wordpress.com/2010/08/tams-letter-to-supreme-
court.pdf (last accessed on January 21, 2011).
32 Per Curiam Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 12, 2010.
587
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 587
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics
Committee was given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty
Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of
the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in
all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement
was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have
signed the same. However, the 37 actual signatories to the
Statement did not include former Supreme Court Associate
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented
in the previous copies of the Statement submitted by Dean
Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel
R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the Statement although
his name was not included among the signatories in the
previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total
number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained
at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Courten
banc since the same Statement, having been formally
submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already
under consideration by the Court.33
In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en
banc made the following observations regarding the UP Law
Faculty Statement:
“Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the
educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an
established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed
dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he
cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at
a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles
supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks
which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a
grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
_______________
33 Id.
588
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been
committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of
dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the
land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by
imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case,
its dismissal on the basis of “polluted sources,” the Court’salleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuyacase], as well
as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the
Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.34 x x x.
(Underscoring ours.)
In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:
“While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is
critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a
general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many
types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to
becomeharmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must “insist on being
permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice.”
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the
faculty’s less than objective comments except to discredit the April
28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s
honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its
reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not
controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames
and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within
the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law the same period why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03
the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe for submitting through his letter dated August 10, 2010,
fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attor- during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the
investigation before the Ethics Committee, for the
_______________ consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a
true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty
34 Resolution dated October 19, 2010; Rollo, pp. 23-29.
Statement.38
589
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 589 _______________
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism 35 Id., at pp. 26-27.
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court 36 The Show Cause Resolution inadvertently referred to Canon 10 but
neys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of should refer to Canon 1.
justice.”35 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring 37 Show Cause Resolution; Rollo, pp. 27-28.
supplied.) 38 Id., at p. 28.
Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, 590
Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. 590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose In the same Resolution, the present controversy was
Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, docketed as a regular administrative matter.
Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by
Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Respondents in Response to the October
Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution
Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing
Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. granted by the Court, respondents filed the following
Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. pleadings:
Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to (1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for
show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of 35 of the 37 respondents, excluding Prof. Owen Lynch
the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of
members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
Responsibility.37
 (2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, of the Court, and have violated ‘Canons 11 and 13 and Rules
2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.”41
to the same charge in par. (1); By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the
(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for following points:
Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in relation to the same charge in (a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions
par. (1); In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect
(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for to legal processes42 and the courts43 and of tending to
Dean Leonen, in relation to the charge of violation of influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the
Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and Court44 in the issuance of their Statement, respondents assert
(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel that their intention was not to malign the Court but rather to
for Prof. Owen Lynch. defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was
(Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. purportedly evidenced by the portion of their Statement
Raul Vasquez) “focusing on constructive action.”45 Respondents’ call in the
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed Statement for the Court “to provide clear and concise
on November 19, 2010 a common compliance which was guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest
signed by their respective counsels (the Common quality of legal research and
Compliance). In the “Preface” of said Common Compliance,
respondents stressed that “[they] issued the Restoring _______________
Integrity
39 Common Compliance; Rollo, p. 201.
591
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 591 40 Id.
41 Id., at pp. 201-202. (Emphases supplied.)
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism 42 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1.
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court 43 Id., Canon 11.

Statement in the discharge of the ‘solemn duties and trust 44 Id., Canon 13.

reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law,’ and 45 Common Compliance; Rollo, p. 203.

as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public 592

592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
concern and one that is of vital interest to them.”39They
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
likewise alleged that “they acted with the purest of
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
intentions” and pointed out that “none of them was involved
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
either as party or counsel”40 in the Vinuya case. Further,
writing in adjudication,” was reputedly “in keeping with
respondents “note with concern” that the Show Cause
strictures enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the
Resolution’s findings and conclusions were
development of the legal system by initiating or supporting
“aprejudgment—that respondents indeed are in contempt,
efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the
have breached their obligations as law professors and officers
administration of justice’ ” (under Canon 4 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility) and to “promote respect for the
law and legal processes” (under Canon 1, id.).46Furthermore,
as academics, they allegedly have a “special interest and duty
to vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation
because these unwelcome occurrences have a profound
impact in the academe, especially in our law schools.”47
Respondents further “[called] on this Court not to
misconstrue the Restoring Integrity Statement as an
‘institutional attack’ x x x on the basis of its first and ninth
paragraphs.”48 They further clarified that at the time the
Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it
appeared to them the Court “was not going to take any action
on the grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation.”49 According to respondents, the bases for
their belief were (i) the news article published on July 21,
2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court
Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez was reported to have
said that Chief Justice Corona would not order an inquiry
into the matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice
Del Castillo which they claimed “did nothing but to downplay
the gravity of the plagiarism and
_______________
46 Id., at p. 204.
47 Id., at p. 205.
48 Id., at p. 208.
49 Id., at pp. 208-209.
50 Respondents were referring to the article by Donna Pazzibugan
entitled “High Court Not Probing ‘Plagiarism,’” which according to footnote
28 of the Common Compliance may be accessed at
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/2010072182283/
High-court-not-probing-plagiarism> as of November 12, 2010.
593
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the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
misrepresentation charges.”51 Respondents claimed that it
was their perception of the Court’s indifference to the
dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice
Del Castillo that impelled them to urgently take a public
stand on the issue.
(b) The “correctness” of respondents’ position that Justice
Del Castillo committed plagiarism and should be held
accountable in accordance with the standards of
academic writing
A significant portion of the Common Compliance is
devoted to a discussion of the merits of respondents’ charge of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying onUniversity
of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals52 and
foreign materials and jurisprudence, respondents essentially
argue that their position regarding the plagiarism charge
against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and that they
are therefore justified in issuing their Restoring Integrity
Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance
included, among others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010
of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D.,53sent to Chief Justice
Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging that
the Vinuya decision likewise lifted without proper attribution
the text from a legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz
that appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De Derecho
Internacional and from an International Court of Justice
decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law Review Article
entitled “Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and
International Human Rights Law” by Michael O’Flaherty
and John Fisher, in support of their charge that Justice Del
Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper
_______________
 51 Common Compliance; Rollo, p. 209.
52 372 Phil. 287 (1999).
53 According to his letter, Atty. Payoyo is a former UP Law Professor,
former chief editor of the Philippine Law Journal and a recipient of the
Court’s centennial award in international law.
594
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54
(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being “singled out” by
the Court when others have likewise spoken on the
“plagiarism issue”
In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise
asserted that “the plagiarism and misrepresentation
allegations are legitimate public issues.”55 They identified
various published reports and opinions, in agreement with
and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on the issue of
plagiarism, specifically:
(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and
Purple Romero;56
(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57
(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published
on July 25, 2010;58
(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo
published in the Philippine Star on July 30, 2010;59
(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office
Director General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in the
Business Mirror on August 5, 2010;60
(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8,
2010;61
_______________
54 G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
55 Common Compliance; Rollo, p. 211.
56 Annex 4; id., at pp. 304-306.
57 Annex 5; id., at p. 307.
58 Annex 6; id., at p. 308.
59 Annex 7; id., at pp. 309-310.
60 Annex 8; id., at p. 311.
61 Annex 9; id., at p. 312.
595
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(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s
call for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published
in the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on
July 31, 2010;62
(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean
Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law on the calls for the resignation of Justice
Del Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin, the
Philippine Star and the Business Mirror on August 11,
2010;63
(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del
Castillo from a former dean of the Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional
Association, the Judges Association of Bulacan and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines—Bulacan Chapter
published in the Philippine Star on August 16,
2010;64and
(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University
College of Law published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer on August 10, 2010.65
 In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this
Court has singled them out for sanctions and the charge in
the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they
may have violated specific canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is unfair and without basis.
(d) Freedom of expression
In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance,
respondents briefly discussed their position that in issuing
their Statement, “they should be seen as not only to be
performing their duties as members of the Bar, officers of the
court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a democracy
who are
_______________
62 Annexes 10 and 11; Id., at pp. 313-314.
63 Annexes 12, 13 and 14; Id., at pp. 315-317.
64 Annex 15; Id., at pp. 318-319.
65 Annex 16; Id., at p. 320.
596
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constitutionally protected in the exercise of free speech.”66In
support of this contention, they cited United States v.
Bustos,67 In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen,68 and In the
Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality
of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.69
(e) Academic freedom
In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance,
respondents asserted that their Statement was also issued in
the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an
institution of higher learning. They relied on Section 5 of the
University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided
that “[t]he national university has the right and
responsibility to exercise academic freedom.” They likewise
adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee,
Loyola School of Theology70 which they claimed recognized
the extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free
and healthy discussion and communication of a faculty
member’s field of study without fear of reprisal. It is
respondents’ view that had they remained silent on the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have
“compromised [their] integrity and credibility as teachers;
[their silence] would have created a culture and generation of
students, professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the
competence and discipline for research and pleading; or,
worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the
public that plagiarism and misrepresentation are
inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has
no bearing or relevance to one’s conduct.”71
_______________
66 Id., at p. 215.
67 37 Phil. 731 (1918).
68 G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562.
69 137 Phil. 471 (1969).
70 160-A Phil. 929 (1975).
71 Common Compliance; Rollo, p. 217.
597
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In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this
Court to consider the following portion of the dissenting
opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v.
Hernandez,72 to wit:
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm
and impartial course from the bench than by an attempt to compel
respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or
injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs
lawyers of independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of
the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low,
and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional
intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which
affects in no way the outcome of a case.73
On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe
they are entitled, the Common Compliance stated, thus:
“WHEREFORE:
A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy,
professors of law, members of the Bar and officers of
the Court, respectfully pray that:
1. the foregoing be noted; and
2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings
in the Show Cause Resolution, including its conclusions
that respondents have: [a] breached their “obligation as
law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, … and
not to promote distrust in the administration of justice;”
and [b] committed “violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13
and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.”
_______________
72 61 Phil. 724 (1935).
73 Id., at pp. 733-734, cited in the Common Compliance; Rollo, p. 219.
598
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B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant
the foregoing prayer, respondents respectfully pray, in
the alternative, and in assertion of their due process
rights, that before final judgment be rendered:
1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;
2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to
refute and/or address the findings and conclusions of
fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including especially
the finding and conclusion of a lack of malicious intent),
and in that connection, that appropriate procedures and
schedules for hearing be adopted and defined that will
allow them the full and fair opportunity to require the
production of and to present testimonial, documentary,
and object evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010)and In the
Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-
7-17-SC); and
3. respondents be given fair and full access to the
transcripts, records, drafts, reports and submissions in
or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses who were or could have been
called in In The Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism,
etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74
Compliance and Reservation of
Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista
Although already included in the Common Compliance,
Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed
a separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista
Compliance), wherein she adopted the allegations in the
Common Compliance with some additional averments.
_______________
74 Common Compliance; Rollo, pp. 219-220.
599
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Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights
allegedly entitled her to challenge the findings and
conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore, “[i]f
the Restoring Integrity Statement can be consideredindirect
contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
such may be punished only after charge and hearing.”75
Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the
Statement “in good faith and with the best intentions to
protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to
resign.”76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that
her deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of
theMalaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the
Statement.
On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista
cited jurisprudence77 which in her view highlighted that
academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to
institutions of higher learning such that schools have the
freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what
may be taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may be
admitted to study and that courts have no authority to
interfere in the schools’ exercise of discretion in these
matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She
claims the Court has encroached on the academic freedom of
the University of the Philippines and other universities on
their right to determine how lessons shall be taught.
Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement
was an exercise of respondents’ constitutional right to free-
_______________
75 Bautista Compliance; Id., at p. 179. (Emphasis supplied.)
76 Id., at p. 180. (Emphasis supplied.)
77 Mercado v. AMA Computer College–Parañaque City, Inc., G.R. No.
183572, April 13, 2010; Morales v. Board of Regents of the University of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 161172, December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA 227;University
of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, supranote
49; Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine v. University of the Philippines
Board of Regents, G.R. No. 152309, Resolution, September 18, 2002.
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dom of expression that can only be curtailed when there is
grave and imminent danger to public safety, public morale,
public health or other legitimate public interest.78
Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof.
Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by registered mail (the
Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez
narrated the circumstances surrounding his signing of the
Statement. He alleged that the Vinuyadecision was a topic of
conversation among the UP Law faculty early in the first
semester (of academic year 2010-11) because it reportedly
contained citations not properly attributed to the sources;
that he was shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the
Office of the Dean on his way to his class; and that, agreeing
in principle with the main theme advanced by the Statement,
he signed the same in utmost good faith.79
In response to the directive from this Court to explain why
he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar under
the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also took the
position that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a
democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He
invited the attention of the Court to the following authorities:
(a) In re: Vicente Sotto;80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in American
Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he “never had
any intention to unduly influence, nor entertained any correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the
illusion that he could or should Statement] and could have been more careful.”86 He ends his
discussion with a respectful submission that with his
_______________ explanation, he has faithfully complied with the Show Cause
Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in
78 Bautista Compliance; Rollo, p. 185; citing Integrated Bar of the
any manner violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the
Philippines v. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010.
Court.
79 See Vasquez Compliance; Rollo, p. 428.
Separate Compliance of Dean
80 82 Phil. 595 (1949).
Leonen regarding the charge of vio-
81 Supra note 68.
lation of Canon 10 in relation to his
82 AmJur 2d §52.
submission of a “dummy” of the UP
601
Law Faculty Statement to this Court
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 601
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by _______________
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court 83 Vasquez Compliance; Rollo, p. 430.
influence, [the Court] in its disposition of 84 Id., at p. 431.
the Vinuyacase” and that “attacking the integrity of [the
83
85 Id., at p. 430.
Court] was the farthest thing on respondent’s mind when he 86 Id.
signed the Statement.”84 Unlike his colleagues, who wish to 602
impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the 602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
views on what constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
his Compliance that: the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
“13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
12 October 2010, some espoused the view that willful and In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were
deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an essential three drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty Statement,
element of the same. Others, like respondent, were of the which he described as follows:
opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the • “Restoring Integrity I” which bears the entire roster
intent of the perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in of the faculty of the UP College of Law in its signing
the academe. This uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37)
academic discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable faculty members subject of the Show Cause Resolution.
Court has ruled that plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque
steal another’s work and to pass it off as one’s own.”85 (Emphases and Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-
supplied.) SC.
Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was • “Restoring Integrity II” which does not bear any
willing to concede that he “might have been remiss in actual physical signature, but which reflects as
 signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of
the faculty with the notation “(SGD.)”. A copy
of Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically
posted in the UP College of Law on 10 August 2010.
Another copy ofRestoring Integrity II was also officially
received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of the
UP College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three
weeks before the filing of Restoring Integrity I.
• “Restoring Integrity III” which is a reprinting
of Restoring Integrity II, and which presently serves as
the official file copy of the Dean’s Office in the UP
College of Law that may be signed by other faculty
members who still wish to. It bears the actual
signatures of the thirty- seven original signatories
to Restoring Integrity I above their printed names and
the notation “(SGD.”) and, in addition, the actual
signatures of eight (8) other members of the faculty
above their handwritten or typewritten names.87
For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring
Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant since
what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain are the
discrepancies in the signature pages of these two
documents. Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to
this Court.
_______________
87 Dean Leonen Compliance; Rollo, pp. 324-325.
603
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On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity
II were prepared and came about, Dean Leonen alleged,
thus:
2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively
broad agreement in the faculty on a draft statement, Dean Leonen
instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it among the
faculty members so that those who wished to may sign. For this
purpose, the staff encoded the law faculty roster to serve as the
printed draft’s signing pages. Thus did the first printed draft of the
Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I, come into
being.
2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity
Statement, Dean Leonen was unaware that a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Honorable Court’s Decision in Vinuya vs.
Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had already
been filed, or that the Honorable Court was in the process of
convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC.
2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity
I among the members of the faculty. Some faculty members visited
the Dean’s Office to sign the document or had it brought to their
classrooms in the College of Law, or to their offices or residences.
Still other faculty members who, for one reason or another, were
unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at that time, nevertheless
conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that they would sign as
soon as they could manage.
2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging
thatRestoring Integrity I had been circulated long enough, Dean
Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a style
and manner appropriate for posting in the College of Law.
Following his own established practice in relation to significant
public issuances, he directed them to reformat the signing pages so
603
that only the names of those who signed the first printed draft
would appear, together with the corresponding “(SGD.)” note
following each name. Restoring Integrity II thus came into
being.88
_______________
 88 Id., at pp. 325-326. Dean Leonen claimed that he “had no reason to doubt his
604 administrative officer, however, and so placed full reliance on
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by _______________
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court 89 Id., at p. 326.

According to Dean Leonen, the “practice of eliminating 90 Id., in Footnote 2.

blanks opposite or above the names of non-signatories in the 91 Id., at pp. 326-327.

final draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so 605

VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 605
much for aesthetic considerations as to secure the integrity of
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
such documents.”89 He likewise claimed that “[p]osting
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
statements with blanks would be an open invitation to
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
vandals and pranksters.”90
her account”92 as “[t]here were indeed other faculty members
With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as
among the signatories in Restoring Integrity II when in who had also authorized the Dean to indicate that they were
fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen signatories, even though they were at that time unable to
affix their signatures physically to the document.”93
attributed the mistake to a miscommunication involving his
However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution,
administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:
Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the circumstances
2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring
surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendoza’s
Integrity II with the reformatted signing pages, Dean Leonen
signature. It would turn out that this was what actually
noticed the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza among the
transpired:
“(SGD.)” signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not among those
2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff
who had physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was
talked to Justice Mendoza on the phone, he [Justice Mendoza]
previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his staff
indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement
to the inclusion of the Justice’s name among the “(SGD.)”
as he fundamentally agreed with its contents. However, Justice
signatories in Restoring Integrity II.
Mendoza did not exactly say that he authorized the dean to sign
2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that
the Restoring Integrity Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could
she had spoken to Justice Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06
authorize the dean to sign it for him as he was about to leave for
August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza had authorized
the United States. The dean’s staff informed him that they would,
the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he
at any rate, still try to bring the Restoring Integrity Statement to
agreed fundamentally with its contents. Also according to her,
him.
Justice Mendoza was unable at that time to sign the Restoring
2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice
Integrity Statement himself as he was leaving for the United
Mendoza was unable to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement
States the following week. It would later turn out that this account
before he left for the U.S. the following week.
was not entirely accurate.91 (Underscoring and italics supplied.)
 2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to
Justice Mendoza when he went to the College to teach on 24
September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This time,
Justice Mendoza declined to sign.94
According to the Dean:
“2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the
true import of the call he received from Justice Mendoza in
late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the
time the hard copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement was
brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he declined
to sign it
_______________
92 Id., at p. 327.
93 Id., in Footnote 3.
94 Id., at pp. 331-332.
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the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
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because it had already become controversial. At that time, he
predicted that the Court would take some form of action
against the faculty. By then, and under those circumstances, he
wanted to show due deference to the Honorable Court, being a
former Associate Justice and not wishing to unduly aggravate the
situation by signing the Statement.”95 (Emphases supplied.)
With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in
the signature page of Restoring Integrity II when he was
one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the
erroneous description in Dean Leonen’s August 10, 2010
letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the
Court was signed by 38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it
was explained in the Compliance that:
“Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signedRestoring
Integrity I when it was circulated to him. However, his name was
inadvertently left out by Dean Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of
the signing pages in Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed
that his name was still included in the reformatted signing pages,
and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that 38
members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice
Mendoza.)”96
Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have
submitted a dummy of the Statement that was not a true and
faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized that the
main body of the Statement was unchanged in all its three
versions and only the signature pages were not the same.
This purportedly is merely “reflective of [the Statement’s]
essential nature as a ‘live’ public manifesto meant to
continuously draw adherents to its message, its signatory
portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other
printings of [the Statement] may be made in the future, each
one re-
_______________
95 Id., at p. 332.
96 Id., at p. 328, in footnote 4.
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flecting the same text but with more and more
signatories.”97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy, Dean
Leonen claims that “this is not an instance where it has been
made to appear in a document that a person has participated
in an act when the latter did not in fact so participate”98 for
he “did not misrepresent which members of the faculty of the
UP College of Law had agreed with theRestoring Integrity
Statement proper and/or had expressed their desire to be
signatories thereto.”99
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not
committed any violation of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and
10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court
the contents of the Statement or the identities of the UP Law
faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire
to be signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts that he
did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he “coursed
[the Statement] through the appropriate channels by
transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for
the latter’s information and proper disposition with the hope
that its points would be duly considered by the Honorable
Court en banc.”100 Citing Rudecon Management Corporation v.
Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the required quantum
of proof has not been met in this case and that no dubious
character or motivation for the act complained of existed to
warrant an administrative sanction for violation of the
standard of honesty provided for by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.102
Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of
nearly identical reliefs as the Common Compliance, including
the prayers for a hearing and for access to the records,
evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only in this
case
_______________
97 Id., at p. 334, in footnote 7.
98 Id., at p. 335.
99 Id., at pp. 335-336.
100 Id., at p. 338.
101 480 Phil. 652 (2004).
102 Dean Leonen Compliance; Rollo, p. 338.
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the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation
involving Justice Del Castillo.
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch
(Lynch Manifestation)
For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to
this Court that he is not a member of the Philippine bar; but
he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He
alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at the UP
College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same
capacity in 2010. He further alleges that “[h]e subscribes to
the principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court
of the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials.”103 In
signing the Statement, he believes that “the right to speak
means the right to speak effectively.”104Citing the dissenting
opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v.
Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that “[f]or speech to be
effective, it must be forceful enough to make the intended
recipients listen”106 and “[t]he quality of education would
deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression, when the very
teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage
and self-assertiveness to
_______________
103 Lynch Manifestation; Rollo, p. 188; citing New York Times, Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964) quoted with approval by the Court in Lopez v.
Court of Appeals, 145 Phil. 219 (1970).
104 Id.
105 G.R. No. 95445, August 6, 1991, 200 SCRA 323.
 106 Quoted by Prof. Lynch from the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and
Gutierrez, Jr. in the Manila Public School Teachers Association case (Id.at p. 10.03?
338).
609 _______________
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 609
107 Quoted by Prof. Lynch from the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Cruz in
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism the Manila Public School Teachers Association case (Id. at 343).
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court 108 Supra note 69.

their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers.”107Relying 109 Lynch Manifestation; Rollo, p. 189.

on the doctrine in In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory 110 Id.

Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. 610

610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Commission on Elections,108 Prof. Lynch believed that the
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
Statement did not pose any danger, clear or present, of any
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
substantive evil so as to remove it from the protective mantle
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause
guarantee on free speech).109 He also stated that he “has read
Resolution set for hearing and in relation to such hearing,
the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause
are respondents entitled to require the production or
Resolution” and that “he signed the Restoring Integrity
presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
Statement for the same reasons they did.”110
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No.
Issues 162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the transcripts of, and the witnesses and evidence presented, or
submissions of respondents, the material issues to be could have been presented, in the ethics case against Justice
resolved in this case are as follows: Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?
1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents
their freedom of expression? DISCUSSION
2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents
academic freedom as law professors?
their freedom of expression.
3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily
It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the
explain why they should not be disciplined as Members of the
issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has interfered with
Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of
respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free speech
the Code of Professional Responsibility?
and expression. It appears that the underlying assumption
4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen
behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this
satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined as a
Court is denying them the right to criticize the Court’s
decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to “silence”
respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they
characterize as a “legitimate public issue.”
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause
Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that
respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that
they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that
motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the
criticism and the contumacious language by which
respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in
theVinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the
petitioners in the said pending case for the “proper
disposition” and consideration of the Court that gave rise to
said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly
enumerated the statements that the
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Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the
circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and
later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s
Restoring Integrity Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents
expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of
plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as “not
only as an established fact, but a truth”111when it was “[o]f
public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation
precisely to determine the truth of such allegations.”112 It was
also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that there was
a pending motion for reconsideration of
the Vinuya decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution made no
objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity
Statement that respondents claimed to be “constructive” but
only asked respondents to explain those portions of the said
Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be
considered as fair or constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks
which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a
grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been
committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of
dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the
land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by
imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case,
its dismissal on the basis of “polluted sources,” the Court’salleged
indif-
611
_______________
111 Show Cause Resolution; Rollo, p. 25.
112 Id., at p. 26.
113 To date, said motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision is still
pending resolution by the Court.
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ference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as
the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court
for even the most basic values of decency and respect.114 x x x.
(Underscoring ours.)
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized
respondents’ freedom of expression when it stated that:
“While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is
critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a
general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many
types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to
becomeharmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must “insist on being
permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice.”
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the
faculty’s less than objective comments except to discredit the April
28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s
honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its
reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not
controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames
and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse
the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law
professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe
fidelity according to the oath they have taken as
attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice.115 x x x.” (Citations omitted; emphases
and underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in
respondents’ submissions, this Court has held that the right
to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced
_______________
114 Show Cause Resolution; Rollo, pp. 25-26.
115 Id., at pp. 26-27.
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against the equally primordial concern that the independence
of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens
but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly
affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers
whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers,
whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of
fair comment and common decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the
Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco both guilty of
contempt and liable administratively for the following
paragraph in his second motion for reconsideration:
“We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record
that the resolution of this court, denying our motion for
reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an
outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the
means within our power in order that this error may be corrected
by the very court which has committed it, because we should
not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press
publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial
outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this
honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes
of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely
that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected
party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider
unjust, increase the proselytes of ‘sakdalism’ and make the
public lose confidence in the administration of
justice.”117(Emphases supplied.)
613
The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as
neither justified nor necessary and further held that:
_______________
 116 Supra note 72.
117 Id., at p. 726.
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[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the
essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that
the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did
not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good
reasons, that it has acted erroneously.”118(Emphases supplied.)
_______________
118 Id., at pp. 727-728.

force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were 615
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 615
sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are
Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which
annoying and good practice can never sanction them by
respondents culled their quote from the minority view of
reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the
Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements
free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment,
made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the
particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of
respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in
questions submitted for resolution.
the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing at
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J.
all to interfere in the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting
Francisco’s motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the
respondents’ theory, Salcedo is authority for the following
court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the
principle:
course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in
“As a member of the bar and an officer of this court,
his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty
of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of
bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its
which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a
integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the
threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the
high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and
mind of the reader against the court, thus creating
160), of being what he now is: a priest of justi,ce (In
anatmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it
reThatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so
odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that
doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration of
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with
harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many
seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is
cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the
of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago.This
foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to
cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the
court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of
which those who are aggrieved turn for protection
relief.”119(Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined
andreprimanded for his injudicious statements in his
pleading, by accusing the Court of “erroneous ruling.” Here,
the respondents’ Statement goes way beyond merely
ascribing error to the Court.
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings
contrary to their position. In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance and the
Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the
Courtindefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for
filing and releasing to the press a “Petition to Surrender
Lawyer’s Certificate of Title” in protest of what he claimed
was a great injustice to his client
_______________
119 Id., at pp. 728.
120 Supra note 68.
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committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the
petition was described, thus:
“He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal “peopled
by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity.” His client’s he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by
this Court’s “unjust judgment,” has become “one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” In the same
breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules
and the members of this Court, saying “that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” He then
vows to argue the cause of his client “in the people’s forum,”
so that “the people may know of the silent injustices
committed by this Court,” and that “whatever mistakes,
wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be
repeated.” He ends his petition with a prayer that
“x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to
receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and
counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any
time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and
confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice
of the noblest profession.”121
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed
foreign jurisprudence on the principle that a lawyer, just like
any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon
actuations of public officers, including judicial authority.
However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism
of the courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must
conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case
engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the legal
authorities sustaining this view. To quote from that decision:
_______________
121 Id., at pp. 564-565.
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But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that
it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the
judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism
is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person
obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his
shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He
vows solemnly to conduct himself “with all good fidelity x x x to the
courts;” and the Rules of Court constantly remind him “to observe
and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers.” The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him “to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for
the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.”
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
“x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if
they do not by express declaration take upon themselves,
when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be
obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all
times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open
court, but includes abstaining out of court from all
insulting language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts.” (Bradley v.
Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer’s duty to render respectful subordination to
the courts is essential to the orderly administration of
justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients’ rights, lawyers —
even those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up
their tempers.
“The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or
more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his pa-
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tience and temper to submit to rulings which he
regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect
are as necessary to the orderly administration of
justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army.The
decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the
tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times
be the foremost in rendering respectful submission.” (In Re
Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
xxxx
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide
his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney
in private conversations or communications or in the course of a
political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring
into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject
the attorney to disciplinary action.”122 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the
Vasquez Compliance, observed that:
[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the
court to a pending cause, respecting the same, has
always been considered as misbehavior, tending to
obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such
persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a
constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in
court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by
publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a
profound personal interest in the enforcement of the
fundamental right to have justice administered by the
courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from
outside coercion or interference. x x x.
 Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness,
soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending
case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded
it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an
error
_______________
122 Id., at pp. 580-582.
123 Supra note 80.
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if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it
should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its
decision. x x x.
xxxx
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the
last years committing deliberately “so many blunders and
injustices,” that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one
party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the
adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would
tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court,
and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of
justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is,
under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino
people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection
of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people
lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into
their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be
the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the
courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound
to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which
he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration
of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a
very shaky foundation.”124 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases
are still good law can be easily gleaned even from more
recent jurisprudence.
619
In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively
disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition of a fine, for
making
_______________
124 Id., at pp. 599-602.
125 329 Phil. 270 (1996).
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the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
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malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the guise of
an administrative complaint and held, thus:
“As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the
sacred task of administering justice, graver responsibility is
imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of
the courts and to show respect to its officers. This does not mean,
however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we stated
inTiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an
officer of the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right
as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to
avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580
[1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it
his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right.
Nor is he “professionally answerable to a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to
legal animadversion as a citizen.” (Case of Austin, 28 Am
Dec. 657, 665).
xxxx
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this
Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
xxxx
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is
guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised
responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding
obligation. Free
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dom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. x x x.
xxxx
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary
language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates
or promotes distrust in judicial
administration (Rheem,supra), or tends necessarily to
undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members
of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this
Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and
abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107
[1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs.
Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive,
manifestly baseless, and malicious statements
in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs.
Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January
1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing,
G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295
[1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for
remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA
87 [1989]).
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an
administrative complaint which is clearly unfounded and impelled
by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor
under his duty of fidelity to his client. x x x.”126 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found
respondent lawyer guilty of simple misconduct for using
intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine
upon him, we had the occasion to state:
“The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8—A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
_______________
126 Id., at pp. 276-279.
127 A.C. No. 6567, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 359.
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 Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
Rule 8.01—A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
CANON 11—A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
Rule 11.03—A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has
tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of
their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case
with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify
the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic
but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating
but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of
the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he
is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.”128
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain
portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment
and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Even In the
Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality
of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common
Compliance, held that:
_______________
128 Id., at pp. 367-368.
129 Supra note 69.
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“From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it
would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No
law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a
literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an
absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times
and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered
and unrestrained. There are other societal values that
press for recognition.x x x.”130 (Emphasis supplied.)
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the
case at bar is the threat to judicial independence and the
orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless
and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions pose.
This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and
Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer
from the practice of law for issuing to the media statements
grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a
pending case, to wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee
of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this
Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms,
is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interest. One of
these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration
of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the pending case, without observing proper procedure,
integrity of the system of administering justice. For the even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it
can be secured only within the context of a functioning and has not been passed upon in any previous case before this
orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law
other words, of viable professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an
administrative proceeding for intemperate statements
_______________ tending to pressure the Court or influence the
outcome of a case or degrade the courts.
130 Id., at p. 494.
Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the
131 248 Phil. 542 (1988).
“free speech” defense in other bar discipline cases, academic
624
free-
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by _______________
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court 132 Id., at p. 579.
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted 133 Prof. Juan-Bautista and Prof. Lynch.
by the general community. x x x.”132 (Emphases supplied.) 625
For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 625
respondents133 that the Statement presents no grave or Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
imminent danger to a legitimate public interest. the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
The Show Cause Resolution does not and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
interfere with respondents’ academic dom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this
freedom. case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed above
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of
jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical
undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to
their students and how they will teach. We must point out uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the
that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of
dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies
and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.
inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that,
Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v.
action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled Monsod,134 lawyers when they teach law are considered
with undue intervention in favor of a party in a engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other
disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law,
respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical
standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law
professors must be measured against the same canons of
professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of
the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is
inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’
proposition in the Common Compliance that their issuance of
the Statement was in keeping with their duty to “participate
in the development of the legal system by initiating or
supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of
the administration of justice” under Canon 4 of the Code of
Profes-
_______________
134 G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991, 201 SCRA 210, 214, where the
Court ruled that:
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.” (Citing 111 ALR 23.)
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626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
sional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have
fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of
Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes
and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence
the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding
which canons to abide by given particular situations. With
more reason that law professors are not allowed this
indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students
exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a
whole and not just their preferred portions thereof.
The Court’s rulings on the submissions
regarding the charge of violation of Can-
ons 1, 11 and 13
Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of
freedom of expression and academic freedom, the Court
considers here the other averments in their submissions.
With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations
presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of their position
regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo,
and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the
correct action on said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the
expression of respondents’ staunch belief that Justice Del
Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this
Court has found so unbecoming in the Show Cause
Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the
righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for
denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that
tends to put the courts and the legal profession into
disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in
such cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong,should be
applied in this case with more reason, as the respondents,
not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and
urged it to change its decision therein, in a public statement
using contumacious language,
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and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
which with temerity they subsequently submitted to the
Court for “proper disposition.”
 That humiliating the Court into reconsidering
theVinuya Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas was one of
the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the following
paragraphs from the same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for
justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the
world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and
exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny
relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered
and misinterpreted texts.
xxxx
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of
theVinuya case does violence to the primordial function of
the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all
those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such
as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis was
wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech
and conduct. These are two separate matters to be properly
threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it
highly inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the
discussion devoted in one of the compliances arguing the
guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance,
respondents even go so far as to attach documentary evidence
to support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del
Castillo in the present controversy. The ethics case of Justice
Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a motion
for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the filing
of respondents’ submissions in this administrative case. As
_______________
135 Rollo, pp. 6-7.
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Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
respondents themselves admit, they are neither parties nor
counsels in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo.
Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said
ethics case, it is not proper procedure for respondents to
bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it
has no bearing on their own administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of
language in the Statement was intended for effective speech;
that speech must be “forceful enough to make the intended
recipients listen.”136 One wonders what sort of effect
respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as,
among others, callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for
the basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see
how it can ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to
send a signal to their students that the only way to
effectively plead their cases and persuade others to their
point of view is to be offensive.
This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof.
Tams which were deliberately quoted in full in the narration
of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between
the civil tenor of these letters and the antagonistic
irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors
are the ones who would expectedly be affected by any
perception of misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that
they are beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still
obviously took pains to convey their objections in a
deferential and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the
Court why respondents could not do the same. These foreign
authors’ letters underscore the universality of the tenet that
legal professionals must deal with each other in good faith
and due respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who
can express his opinions logically and soberly without resort
to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive recriminations.
_______________
136 Lynch Manifestation; Rollo, p. 188.
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As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to
spur the Court to take “constructive action” on the plagiarism
issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the
Statement was primarily meant for this Court’s
consideration, why was the same published and reported in
the media first before it was submitted to this Court? It is
more plausible that the Statement was prepared for
consumption by the general public and designed to capture
media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in
the most controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration filed in theVinuya case by Atty. Roque,
who is respondents’ colleague on the UP Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a
lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the Court,
particularly when respondents knew fully well that the
matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of
the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s
issuance, were still both sub judice or pending final
disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely
publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time
the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did
not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and
they had issued the Statement under the belief that this
Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge against
Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of
time from the drafting and printing of the Statement on July
27, 2010 and its publication and submission to this Court in
early August when the Ethics Committee had already been
convened. If it is true that the respondents’ outrage was
fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the
Court then, when it became known that the Court did intend
to take action, there was nothing to prevent respondents
629
from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening
event into account in the interest of fairness.
Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we
likewise find no merit in the respondents’ reliance on various
630
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
news reports and commentaries in the print media and the
internet as proof that they are being unfairly “singled out.”
On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common
Compliance show that it is not enough for one to criticize the
Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary137 or
contempt138 action. This Court takes into account the nature
of the criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of the
same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from
persons outside the profession who may not have a full grasp
of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other
interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may
perhaps tolerate or ignore them. However, when law
professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of the
boundaries of fair commentary and worse, would justify the
same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot
remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication
on legal education in our country.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the
Common Compliance, considering that this appears to be
the first time these respondents have been involved in
disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to
give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most
part well-intentioned in the issuance of the Statement.
However, it is established in jurisprudence that where the
excessive and contumacious language used is plain and
undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. As this
Court expounded in Salcedo:
“In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it
wasnot his intention to offend the court or to be recreant to
the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases
which need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well
settled rule in all places where the same conditions and practice as
those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no ex-
_______________
137 In the case of members of the Bar.
138 In the case of members of the Bar and/or non-lawyers.
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cuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that the
phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid defense:
“Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence
that the language used was justified by the facts is not
admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office
should always be observed and enforced.” (In re
Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of
intention constitutes at most an extenuation of
liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco’s state of mind, according to him
when he prepared said motion. This court is disposed to
make such concession. However, in order to avoid a
recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following
the bad example, from taking the same course, this court
considers it imperative to treat the case of said attorney
with the justice it deserves.”139(Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common
Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim of good
faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11
and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the
Court on pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the
administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably
notes the differences in his Compliance compared to his
colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the
respondents who showed true candor and sincere deference
to the Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of
how he came to sign the Statement. He was candid enough to
state that his agreement to the Statement was in principle
and that the reason plagiarism was a “fair topic of
discussion” among the UP Law faculty prior to the
631
promulgation of the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty
_______________
139 Salcedo v. Hernandez, supra note 72 at 729-730.
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Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
brought about by a division of opinion on whether or not
willful or deliberate intent was an element of plagiarism. He
was likewise willing to acknowledge that he may have been
remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language of the
Statement and could have used more care. He did all this
without having to retract his position on the plagiarism
issue, without demands for undeserved reliefs (as will be
discussed below) and without baseless insinuations of
deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that
this Court expected from respondents, not for them to
sacrifice their principles but only that they recognize that
they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in
this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at
least one of the respondents can grasp the true import of the
Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these reasons,
the Court finds Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he
is a member of the Bar of the State of Minnesota and,
therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court,
he should be excused from these proceedings. However, he
should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in
a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of
responsible and professional conduct to his students even
without the threat of sanction from this Court. For even if
one is not bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility
for members of the Philippine Bar, civility and respect among
legal professionals of any nationality should be aspired for
under universal standards of decency and fairness.
The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s
Compliance regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean
Leonen to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt
with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03
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the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
and for submitting a “dummy” that was not a true and
faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies
thatRestoring Integrity II was not a true and faithful
reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity
I, because looking at the text or the body, there were no
differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the
discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of
the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity Iand Restoring
Integrity II) by claiming that it is but expected in “live”
public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more
and more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He
likewise stresses that he is not administratively liable
because he did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law
faculty who “had agreed with the Restoring Integrity
Statement proper and/or who had expressed their
desire to be signatories thereto.”140
To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean
Leonen’s implied view that the signatures in the Statement
are not as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or
not, the Statement was formally submitted to this Court at a
specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its
signatories at that point. The value of the Statement as a UP
Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities of the
persons who have signed it, since the Statement’s persuasive
authority mainly depends on the reputation and stature of
the persons who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is
apparent from respondents’ explanations that their own
belief in the “importance” of their positions as UP law
professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the
matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean
Leonen’s predicament is the fact that he did not from the
beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to
_______________
140 Dean Leonen Compliance; Rollo, p. 336.
634
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead,
submittedRestoring Integrity II with its retyped or
“reformatted” signature pages. It would turn out, according
to Dean Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the
retyping of the signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed
staff.First, an unnamed administrative officer in the dean’s
office gave the dean inaccurate information that led him to
allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among the
signatories of Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed
staff also failed to type the name of Atty. Armovit when
encoding the signature pages of Restoring Integrity IIwhen
in fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.
The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on
a bulletin board or a website a signed document may have to
be reformatted and signatures may be indicated by the
notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are willing to accept
that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to
eliminate blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court,
especially this Court, of a signed document for the Court’s
consideration that did not contain the actual signatures of its
authors. In most cases, it is the original signed document
that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a
photocopy of the actual signed document. Dean Leonen has
not offered any explanation why he deviated from this
practice with his submission to the Court ofRestoring
Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was nothing to
prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to
this Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean
Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism with respect to court
submissions for court employees are accountable for the care
of documents and records that may come into their custody.
Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court
the facsimile that did not contain the actual signatures and
his silence on the reason therefor is in itself a display of lack
of candor.635
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the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
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Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations
yield the answer. In the course of his explanation of his
willingness to accept his administrative officer’s claim that
Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated as a signatory, Dean
Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had
likewise only authorized him to indicate them as signatories
and had not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at around
the time Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted and
submitted to this Court, at least one purported signatory
thereto had not actually signed the same. Contrary to Dean
Leonen’s proposition, that is precisely tantamount to making
it appear to this Court that a person or persons participated
in an act when such person or persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his
reputation for perfection and stringent standards of
intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there
was no misrepresentation when he allowed at least one
person to be indicated as having actually signed the
Statement when all he had was a verbal communication of
an intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he
had was only hearsay information that the former intended
to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined
to observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the
Court, we see no reason why he could not have waited until
all the professors who indicated their desire to sign the
Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the
Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was
truly impossible to secure some signatures, such as that of witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then Dean misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No.
Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo
that he was able to secure. (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of,
We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he and evidence that were presented or may be presented in the
could not wait for actual signatures before submission of the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The prayer for a
Statement to this Court. As respondents all asserted, they hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC
were neither parties to nor counsels in the Vinuyacase and was substantially echoed in Dean Leonen’s separate
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s Compliance, she
636 similarly expressed the sentiment that “[i]f the Restoring
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt,
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism 637
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 637
was neither a pleading with a deadline nor a required Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
submission to the Court; rather, it was a voluntary the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
submission that Dean Leonen could do at any time. and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Court, such may be punished only after charge and
Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court is willing hearing.”141 It is this group of respondents’ premise that these
to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due process.
to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his objectives. In due The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good intentions, the Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the
Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for necessity of a hearing in this case springs largely from its
failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt
the Court as required under Canon 10. in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October
Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on
production/presentation of evidence the majority’s purported failure to follow the procedure in
bearing on the plagiarism and misrep- Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground for
resentation issues in G.R. No. 162230 opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.
and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is
to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are unmeritorious. not an indirect contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which
In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As
asked for alternative reliefs should the Court find their explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case
Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause was docketed as an administrative matter.
Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be
allowed to require the production or presentation of
 The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-
B, Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings initiated motu
proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
“SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other
proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme
Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General
or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in
which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner
provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the
report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme
Court.” (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a
formal investigation, through a referral to the specified
officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the
Court. Fur-
_______________
141 Bautista Complaince; Rollo, p. 179.
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the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
thermore, it is only if the Court deems such an investigation
necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-
A will be followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative
proceedings do not require a trial type hearing. We have held
that:
“The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to
be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where
he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal
or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy.”142(Emphases supplied.)
In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the
occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio143 that:
“Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis.Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in
no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges
as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls
_______________
142 Placido v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 180888,
September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 697, 704-705.
143 A.C. No. 7298, June 25, 2007, 525 SCRA 444, citing In re: Atty. Vicente
Raul Almacen, supra note 68.
639
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the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as
an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to
the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.”144(Emphases
supplied.)
In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of
Court–Br. 81, Romblon–On the Prohibition from Engaging in
the Private Practice of Law,145 we further observed that:
[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without
further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the
facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination
of their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer
without need of any further investigation after considering
his actions based on records showing his unethical
misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image
of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public
interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice
of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that
revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of
the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in
their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided
the basis for the determination of respondents’ administrative
liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under
the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy,
that no evidentiary hearing is required before the
respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct
already established by the facts on record.
xxxx
_______________
144 Id., at p. 453.
145 A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 378.
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640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal
charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant
lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately
exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant
lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be
heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the
opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-
query and Manifestation filed before this Court.”146 (Emphases
supplied.)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly
had no right to a hearing and their reservation of a right they
do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have
they shown in their pleadings any justification for this Court
to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not
specifically stated what relevant evidence, documentary or
testimonial, they intend to present in their defense that will
necessitate a formal hearing.
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present
records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on the plagiarism
and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the findings of this
Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution
were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the
conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that case. This is
the primary reason for their request for access to the records
and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous.
To illustrate, the only incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that is
relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the submission of
the actual signed copy of the Statement (or Restoring
Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there.
Apart from that fact, it bears repeating that the proceedings
in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this case.
_______________
146 Id., at pp. 396-398.
641
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the
Show Cause Resolution that the respondents issued a
Statement with language that the Court deems objectionable
during the pendency of the Vinuya case and the ethics case
against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no
further than the four corners of the Statement itself, its
various versions, news reports/columns (many of which
respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their
Common Compliance) and internet sources that are already
of public knowledge.
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to
explain are the language of the Statement and the
circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing,
dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the Court does not
see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice
Del Castillo could possibly shed light on these facts. To be
sure, these facts are within the knowledge of respondents
and if there is any evidence on these matters the same would
be in their possession.
We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance
he narrated how as early as September 2010, i.e., before the
Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del
Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the October 19, 2010
Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the
Statement upon his return from abroad, predicted that the
Court would take some form of action on the Statement. By
simply reading a hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable
person, even one who “fundamentally agreed” with the
Statement’s principles, could foresee the possibility of court
action on the same on an implicit recognition that the
Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court should
641
simply let pass. This belies respondents’ claim that it is
necessary for them to refer to any record or evidence in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases for the Show
Cause Resolution.642
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of
evidence in their respective compliances or chosen not to
make a full defense at this time, because they were counting
on being granted a hearing, that is respondents’ own look-
out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be
aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the
non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They should
bear the consequence of the risk they have taken.
Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to
the records of, and evidence presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC should be denied for lack of merit.
A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are
hardly expected to have monolithic views on any subject, be it
a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately
and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound
by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This
Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded
from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect
and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under
established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are
judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners,
are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath,
as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to
conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts.
There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law
professors, regardless of their status in the academic
community or the law school to which they belong.
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as
follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably
noting his submission, the Court finds his Compliance to
be satisfactory.643
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 643
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents,
namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M.
Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona,
Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P.
Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te,
Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D.
Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel
J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit,
Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R.
Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra
Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo,Concepcion L.
Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza,
Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M.
Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty,
Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D.
Lucenario, is foundUNSATISFACTORY. These 35
respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly
duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain
from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence
the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and
the administration of justice and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is
found UNSATISFACTORY. He is
furtherADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a
member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and
professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his
dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar
act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine
bar, is excused from these proceedings. However, he is
reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of
responsible
644
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
and professional conduct to his students even without the
threat of sanction from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for
access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J.), Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Abad,
Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Carpio-Morales, J., Please see Dissenting Opinion.
Nachura, J., On Leave.
Brion, J., I certify that Mr. Justice Brion left his
concurring vote.
 Del Castillo, J., No Part. 4 In the Resolution of 19 October 2010, 37 professors were required to
Villarama, Jr., Please see Separate Opinion. show cause why no disciplinary sanction should be imposed on them for
Sereno, J., I dissent and reserve the right to issue a violating the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Separate Opinion. Canon 1—A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
DISSENTING OPINION the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
CARPIO, J.: Rule 1.02—A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
I find the Compliance of the 37 legal scholars1satisfactory defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
and therefore see no need to admonish or warn them2 for Canon 11—A lawyer shall observe and maintain respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
_______________ others.
Rule 11.05—A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to
1 All belonging to the faculty of the University of the Philippines College
the proper authorities only.
of Law including the incumbent dean, four former deans, members of the
Canon 13—A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and
regular faculty and instructors. Professor Owen Lynch, a visiting professor
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
and a member of the Minnesota bar, filed a manifestation joining causes with
appearance of influencing the court.
the respondents.
Today’s Resolution admonishes the incumbent dean, Marvic MV.F.
2 The majority excludes from their finding Atty. Raul T. Vasquez whose
Leonen, and warns 35 other professors for “speech and conduct
Compliance they find satisfactory.
unbecoming of lawyers and law professors.”
645
Significantly, the 37 academics did not counsel or abet activitiesof
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 645
any sort and none of them is counsel to any of the parties inVinuya v.
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
Executive Secretary, thus Rule 1.02 and Canon 13 are irrelevant. Rule
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
11.05 is similarly inapplicable because none of the professors authored
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
any of the materials used in Vinuya hence, their grievance to the
supposed use of disrespectful language in their
purported plagiarism and misrepresentation is not specific and
statement3commenting on a public issue involving the official
personal to cloak them with legal personality to institute a complaint
conduct of a member of this Court. The majority’s action
646
impermissibly expands the Court’s administrative
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
powers4and, more impor-
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
_______________
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
3 “Restoring Integrity: A Statement By The University Of The Philippines tantly, abridges constitutionally protected speech on public
College Of Law On The Allegations Of Plagiarism And Misrepresentation In conduct guaranteed to all, including members of the bar.
The Supreme Court.” First. The matter of Justice Mariano del Castillo’s
reported misuse and non-attribution of sources in
hisponencia in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary5 is an issue of
public concern. A day before the Vinuya petitioners’ counsels
filed their supplemental motion for reconsideration on 19
July 2010 raising these allegations, a national TV network
carried a parallel story online.6 On the day the pleading was
filed, another national TV network7 and an online news
magazine,8 carried the same story. Soon, one of the authors
allegedly plagiarized commented that the work he and a co-
author wrote was misrepresented in Vinuya.9 Justice del
Castillo himself widened
_______________
against Justice Mariano del Castillo. On the other hand, Canon 1
and Canon 11, accommodate and do not trump the constitutional
guarantee of free speech.
5 G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010.
6 The news article “SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort
women” by Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero appeared in the website of
ABS-CBN on 18 July 2010 (see http://www.abs-
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
the scope of publicity by submitting his official response to
the allegations to a national daily which published his
comment in full.10 Justice del Castillo’s defenses of good faith
and non-liability11 echoed an earlier statement made by the
Chief of the Court’s Public Information Office.12These
unfolding events generated an all-important public issue
affecting no less than the integrity of this Court’s decision-
making—its
_______________
misused in the Court’s ruling in Vinuya, had since filed formal complaints
with the Court.
10 Justice del Castillo’s comment appeared in The Philippine Star’s

cbnnews.com/nation/07/18/10/sc-justice-plagiarized-parts-ruling-comfort- “Letters to the Editor” section on 30 July 2010 captioned “The Del Castillo

women). Ponencia in Vinuya By Mariano C. Del Castillo, Associate Justice”

7 GMA-7 (see http://www.gmanews.tv/story/196407/sc-justice-plagiarized- (seehttp://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=598044

parts-of-ruling-on-comfort-women) &publicationSubCategoryId=135).

8 Newsbreak (see http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_ 11 Justice del Castillo wrote:

content&task=view&id=7981&Itemid=88889005.) It must be emphasized that there was every intention to attribute

9 Commenting on a blog entry on the news stories ABS-CBN, GMA-7 and all sources, whenever due. At no point was there ever any malicious

Newsbreak carried, Professor Evan Criddle, co-author of the article A intent to appropriate another’s work as our own. x x x x

Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 Yale J. Int’l L. 331 (2009), stated: xxxx

“Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens Incidentally, it was stated in the Newsbreak article posted by Aries

discussion is that it implies that the prohibitions against crimes against C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero on July 19, 2010 that “x x x there is no

humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article rule or provision in the judiciary against copying from other’s work

emphatically asserts the opposite.” and passing these off as original material.” Dean Pacifico Agabin

(seehttp://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/19/international-law-plagiarism-charge- concurred with this observation when he “pointed out, ‘It is not

bedevils-philippines-supreme-court-justice/). The two other authors, prohibited under the Code of Judicial Ethics, or any statutes. It is just

Christian J. Tams and Mark Ellis, whose works were reportedly a matter of delicadeza… It bears on the honesty of the judge to give

647 credit where credit is due.”

VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 647
 Finally, Section 184(k) of Republic Act No. 8293 (Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines) provides that “any use made of a
work for the purpose of any judicial proceedings x x x” shall not
constitute infringement of copyright.
12 Who informed the public: “You can’t expect all justices in the Supreme
Court to be familiar with all these journals.”
(seehttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100721-
282283/High-court-not-probing-plagiarism).
648
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
core constitutional function—thus inexorably inviting public
comment.
Along with other sectors, the law faculty of the University
of the Philippines (UP), which counts among its ranks some
of this country’s legal experts,13 responded by issuing a
statement,14 bewailing what the professors see as the Court’s
indifference to the perceived dishonesty in the crafting of the
Vinuya ponencia and its aggravating effect on
the Vinuya petitioners’ cause, refuting Justice del Castillo’s
defenses, underscoring the seriousness of the issue, and
calling for the adoption of individual and institutional
remedial measures.15
_______________
13 Dean Pacifico Agabin, an alumnus of Yale Law School, is an authority
in constitutional law, author of numerous scholarly publications and active
appellate litigator who frequently appeared before the Court to argue
landmark public law cases. Dean Merlin Magallona is a recognized expert in
international law, a published scholar and former Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs. Professor Tristan Catindig, a Harvard Law School alumnus, is a
commercial law expert and author of numerous publications on the subject.
14 The respondents claim that they spoke in their capacity as lawyers,
law professors and citizens (Common Compliance, pp. 2, 16).
15 Summed in the penultimate paragraph of their statement:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high
standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional competence
expected of the Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and
credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines the
foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing implicitly the
decision of cases and the establishment of legal precedents through
dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya
case does violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as
the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those
649
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 649
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
This is prime political speech critical of conduct of public
officials and institution, delivered in public forum. Under the
scheme of our constitutional values, this species of speech
enjoys the highest protection,16 rooted on the deeply-held
notion that “the interest of society and the maintenance of
good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs.”17 Indeed, preceding western jurisprudence by nearly
five decades, this Court, in the first score of the last century,
identified the specific right to criticize official conduct as
protected speech, branding attempts by courts to muzzle
criticism as “tyranny of the basest sort.”18
_______________
who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the
petitioners therein;
 (4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of
the dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court
as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice to any other
sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate; (5) The Supreme
Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it
conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in
order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and
concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest
quality of legal research and writing in pleadings, practice, and
adjudication.
16 Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA
441, 538, Carpio, J., concurring.
17 United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 740 (1918). Jurisprudence
privileges this right by requiring the very high quantum of proof of actual
malice to establish liability for libelous comment on public conduct (Vasquez
v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 238 (1999); Flor v. People, G.R. No. 139987, 31
March 2005, 454 SCRA 440).
18 The relevant passage reads:
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of
vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is,
therefore, a fit subject for proper
650
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
Second. In testing whether speech critical of judges and
judicial processes falls outside the ambit of constitutionally
protected expression, spilling into the territory of
sanctionable utterances, this Court adheres to the “clear and
present danger” test.19 Under this analytical framework, an
utterance is constitutionally protected unless “the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance [is] ‘extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’ ”20
It appears that the evil consequences the UP law faculty
statement will supposedly spawn are (1) the slurring of this
Court’s dignity and (2) the impairment of its judicial
independence vis-à-vis the resolution of the plagiarism
complaint in Vinuya. Both are absent here. On the matter of
institutional degradation, the 12-paragraph, 1,553-word
statement of the UP law faculty, taken as a whole, does not
exhibit that “irrational obsession to demean, ridicule,
degrade and even destroy the courts and their members”
typical of unprotected judicial criticism.21 On the contrary,
the statement, taken as a whole, seeks to uphold the bedrock
democratic value of keeping judicial processes free of any
taint of dishonesty or misrepresentation. Thus, the UP law
faculty statement is far
_______________
comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a
judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the
part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. x x x x
(United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 741 (1918)).
It was only in 1964 that the United States Supreme Court enunciated a
comparable doctrine, with refinements (see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 [1964]).
19 Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152 (1957); People v. Godoy, 312
Phil. 977 (1995); In re Almacen, No. L-27654, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA
562.
20 Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152, 161 (1957).
21 See e.g. Column of Ramon Tulfo in the Philippine Daily Inquirer Issues
of 13 and 16 October 1989, A.M. No. 90-4-1545-0, 17 April 1990 (Resolution).
651
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Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
removed from speech the Court has rightly sanctioned for
proffering no useful social value, solely crafted to vilify its
members and threaten its very existence.22
On the alleged danger of impairment of this Court’s
judicial independence in resolving the plagiarism charge
inVinuya, this too, did not come to pass. In the Resolution of
8 February 2011 in A.M. No. 10-17-17-SC,23 the Court denied
reconsideration to its earlier ruling finding no merit in
the Vinuya petitioners’ claim of plagiarism. Not a single word
in the 8 February 2011 Resolution hints that the UP law
faculty statement pressured, much less threatened, this
Court to decide the motion for reconsideration for
theVinuya petitioners. Thus, the 8 February 2011 Resolution
gives the lie to the conclusion that the UP law faculty
statement posed any danger, much less one that is
“extremely serious,” to the Court’s independence.
Third. The conclusion that the UP law faculty statement
disrespects the Court and its members is valid only if the
statement is taken apart, its dismembered parts separately
scrutinized to isolate and highlight perceived offensive
phrases and words. This approach defies common sense and
departs from this Court’s established practice in scrutinizing
speech critical of the judiciary. People v. Godoy24 instructs
that speech critical of judges must be “read with contextual
care,” making sure that disparaging statements are not
“taken out of context.”25 Using this approach, and applying
the clear and
_______________
22 In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949). See also Column of Ramon Tulfo in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer Issues of 13 and 16 October 1989, id.
23 In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism etc., Against Associate
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo.
24 People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977 (1995).
25 We held:
On the issue of whether the specified statements complained of are
contumacious in nature, we are inclined, based
652
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
present danger test, the Court in Godoy cleared a columnist
and a publisher of liability despite the presence in the
assailed news article of derogatory yet isolated statements
about a judge. We can do no less to the statement of the
members of the UP law faculty, who, after all, were impelled
by nothing but their sense of professional obligation to “speak
out on a matter of public concern and one that is of vital
interest to them.”26
On the supposed unpleasant tone of the statement, critical
speech, by its nature, is caustic and biting. It is for this same
reason, however, that it enjoys special constitutional
protection. “The constitution does not apply only to sober,
carefully reasoned discussion. There may be at least some
value in permitting cranky, obstreperous, defiant conduct by
lawyers on the ground that it encourages a public culture of
skepticism, anti-authoritarianism, pluralism, and openness.
It is important to remember that the social function of
lawyers is not only to preserve order, but also to permit
challenges to the status quo.”27
Supreme Court Justices, as public officials, and the
Supreme Court, as an institution, are entitled to no greater
immunity from criticism than other public officials and insti-
_______________
on an overall perusal and objective analysis of the subject article, to
hold in the negative. We have read and reread the article in its
entirety and we are fully convinced that what is involved here is a
situation wherein the alleged disparaging statements have been taken
 out of context. If the statements claimed to be contum[acious] had been
read with contextual care, there would have been no reason for this
contempt proceeding. Id., at p. 994 (emphasis supplied).
26 Common Compliance, p. 2.
27 W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech For Lawyers, 28 Hastings Const. L.Q.
305, 440 (2001).
653
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Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
Accordingly, I vote to consider respondents’ explanation in
their common and individual Compliance as satisfactory and
to consider this matter closed and terminated.
_______________
28 In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr.
Amado A.P. Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20, and
21, 2007, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, 8 August 2008, 561 SCRA 395, 489,
Carpio, J., dissenting.
29 The Constitution provides that “[P]ublic officers and employees must,

tutions.28 The members of this Court are sustained by the at all times, be accountable to the people x x x x” (Article XI, Section 1).

people’s resources and our actions are always subject to their 30 Constitution, Article XI, Section 1.

accounting.29 Thus, instead of shielding ourselves with a 31 United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 741 (1918).

virtual lese-majeste rule, wholly incompatible with the 654

654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constitution’s vision of public office as a “public trust,”30 we
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
should heed our own near century-old counsel: a clear
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
conscience, not muzzled critics, is the balm for wounds
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
caused by a “hostile and unjust accusation” on official
DISSENTING OPINION
conduct.31
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Fourth. The academic bar, which the UP law faculty
Consistent with my dissent from the Court’s October 19,
represents, is the judiciary’s partner in a perpetual
2010 Resolution, I maintain my position that, in the first
intellectual conversation to promote the rule of law and build
place, there was no reasonable ground to motu
democratic institutions. It serves the interest of sustaining
proprioinitiate the administrative case, in view of (1) the
this vital relationship for the Court to constructively respond
therein discussed injudiciousness attending the Resolution,
to the academics’ criticism. Instead of heeding the UP law
anchored on an irregularly concluded finding of indirect
faculty’s call for the Court to “ensur[e] that not only the
contempt with adverse declarations prematurely describing
content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its
the subject Statement of the UP Law Faculty that could taint
own decisions, are credible and beyond question,” the
the disciplinary action, and (2) the Court’s conventionally
majority dismisses their suggestion as useless calumny and
permissive attitude toward the “expression of belief” or
brands their constitutionally protected speech as
“unbecoming of lawyers and law professors.” The “manner of criticism” coming from legal academics, lawyer-
columnists, and civic circles, in a number of high-profile
Constitution, logic, common sense and a humble awareness
cases, most notably at the height of the “CJ Appointment
of this Court’s role in the larger project of dispensing justice
Issue” during which time the motion for reconsideration of
in a democracy revolt against such response.
the Court’s decision was similarly pending.
 SEPARATE OPINION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This treats of respondents’ compliance with the Court’s
Resolution dated October 19, 2010, which required
respondents, who are professors of the University of the
Philippines College of Law, to show cause why they should
not be disciplined as members of the bar for having published
a Statement entitled, “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation
in the Supreme Court” which appeared to contain statements
that were disrespectful to the Court. The Court’s directive
reads as follows:655
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and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
“WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Attys. Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P.
Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T.
Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De
Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A.
Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J.
Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig,
Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L.
Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C.
Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S Quimbo, Antonio M.
Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G.
Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D.
Lucenario, members of the faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law, are directed to SHOW CAUSE, within
ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Resolution, why they
should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of
Canons 11, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Further, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is directed to SHOW
CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution, why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10,
Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting, through his letter
dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No.
162330,Vinuya v. Executive Secretary and of the investigation
before the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, for the
consideration of the Court En Banc, a dummy which is not a true
and faithful reproduction of the purported statement, entitled
“Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University
of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.” x x x”
In their Compliance, 35 of the respondents, excluding
Professors Owen J. Lynch and Raul V. Vasquez, take
common defense that the statements contained inRestoring
Integrity were mere expressions of their opinion, dispensed in
accordance with their duties as members of the bar and as
profes-
_______________
1 The Show Cause Resolution inadvertently mentioned Canon 10.
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sors of law. They aver that they acted with the purest
intentions, guided by their duty of candor, fairness and good
faith to the Court, and deny that it was their intention to
malign the Court as an institution for its decision inVinuya v.
Executive Secretary.2 They claim that any reference
to Vinuya in their statement was made only to establish and
accent the grave consequences of the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation allegedly committed by
one of the Court’s members. Indeed, they claim that the
Statement was intended “to defend the integrity and
credibility of the entire Supreme Court” and ensure
continued confidence in the legal system and the Judiciary by
calling on the Court to take constructive action in the face of
the damaging allegations. They also add that the Statement
was meant to address what they perceived as indifference on
the part of the Court owing to certain statements reportedly
made by Supreme Court Administrator and spokesperson,
Atty. Jose Midas P. Marquez (that Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona would not take any action on the charges) and their
reading of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo’s letter replying to
the allegations.
Respondents affirm their loyalty and respect for the Court
and claim that as professors of law, they have a special
interest in guarding against plagiarism and
misrepresentation to ensure intellectual honesty among their
students. They allegedly released the Statement in support of
“efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in
the practical training of law students and assist in
disseminating information regarding law and jurisprudence.”
Citing similar commentaries on the issue, they likewise
invoke freedom of speech and academic freedom to justify the
publication of their stand on the matter.
Finally, respondents argue that the Resolution amounted
to a prejudgment of their liability for contempt and breach of
_______________
2 G.R. No. 162230, April 8, 2010.
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Canons 1, 11, 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus, they invoke their right to
due process and plead for an opportunity to present evidence
relative to the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC entitled In
the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo.
Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista, in her separate
Compliance and Reservation, reiterates the above
reservation of her right to due process and request for
hearing. She likewise supplements the above submissions
with additional arguments in support of her assertion that
she signed the Statement in the exercise of her freedom of
expression.
As to Prof. Owen J. Lynch, Prof. Lynch filed a
Manifestation invoking freedom of expression and asserting
that the statement did not pose a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. He
also manifests that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar
as he is an American citizen who is a member of the bar of
the State of Minnesota.
Prof. Raul V. Vasquez, for his part, likewise submits that
he never had any intention of maligning the Court and
alleges that he signed the Statement as he was
fundamentally in agreement with its contents. He further
states that he might have been remiss in correctly assessing
the effects of the language employed in the Statement and
says that he could have been more careful.
As regards the charge of violating Canon 10 and Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting to the Court a copy of
the Restoring Integrity Statement that was not a true and
faithful reproduction thereof, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
submitted the following explanations.
657
Dean Leonen denies misrepresenting the contents of the
Statement or which faculty members signed and/or signified
their intention to sign the same. He avers that there are
actu-
658
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the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
ally three versions of the Statement, all with the same
contents, but with different signature pages. Two versions
were submitted to the Court: one with the signature pages
containing the full roster of faculty members and the actual
signatures of the signatories (which version he callsRestoring
Integrity I) and the other with the retyped signature page
containing just the names of the members who signed, with
the notation “(SGD.)” beside their names. This second version
he referred to as Restoring Integrity II. According to him,
these two copies arose because after the original version
containing the full roster of faculty members was circulated
for signature, he had the signature pages re-typed to
eliminate the blanks prior to posting in the bulletin board.
(He alleges that the practice of re-typing the signature pages
was meant to ensure the integrity of the public issuance as
posting the Statement with blanks would open it to
vandalism.)
When the re-typed signature page was presented to him
by his staff, he noticed that the name of retired Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza was indicated as a signatory even
though the latter did not sign the Statement. He asked his
administrative staff about the inclusion and the latter
claimed that she spoke to Justice Mendoza on the phone
before the latter flew for the United States. According to his
staff, Justice Mendoza allegedly authorized him to sign on
behalf of Justice Mendoza since the latter agrees with the
contents of the Statement but was just unable to personally
affix his signature because he was leaving for the United
States the following week. Dean Leonen claims that he did
not have any reason to disbelieve his staff because there were
indeed other faculty members who authorized him to sign the
Statement for them. Thus, he placed full faith and confidence
in his staff’s claim and allowed the inclusion of Justice
Mendoza’s name as one of the signatories in Restoring
Integrity II which he later submitted to the Court. Because of
this information, also, he believed that the total number of
signatories to the Statement was already 38.659
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Dean Leonen adds that in September 2010, he received a
call from Justice Mendoza, who said that he will no longer
sign the statement “considering that it had already become
controversial and that he did not wish to unduly aggravate
the situation.” On October 21, 2010, after receiving a copy of
this Court’s Show Cause Resolution, he met with his staff
and reviewed what had transpired in connection with their
efforts to secure Justice Mendoza’s signature. It was then
that he learned that while Justice Mendoza initially agreed
to sign the statement, Justice Mendoza did not exactly
authorize him to sign for the latter. Rather, Justice Mendoza
merely inquired “if he could authorize the dean to sign it for
him as he was leaving for the United States.” He then
realized the full import of the call he received from Justice
Mendoza in September.
As regards the omission of the name of Atty. Miguel R.
Armovit in the re-typed signature pages of Restoring
Integrity II, Dean Leonen explains that the omission was due
simply to inadvertence.
After a careful study of the respondents’ submissions, I
respectfully submit that the above submissions are
SATISFACTORY in view of respondents’ claim of good faith
and the fact that a re-examination of the Statement indeed
admits of such claim. Consistent with respondents’ claims,
the tenor of the Statement was to call the Court’s attention to
the grave allegations and its effects on the integrity and
credibility of the Court and the Judiciary. Indeed, the general
wording of the Statement and its ending paragraphs lend
support to respondents’ averments that the Statement was
prompted by the sincere and honest desire to protect the
integrity and credibility of the Judiciary, especially the
Supreme Court. Given such submissions, I am willing to
afford respondents the benefit of the doubt as to their
intentions concerning the forceful language employed in
certain portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement. This is
especially so considering
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and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
that the subject statements present no clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to
prevent as to take it out of the protective mantle of the
freedom of speech and expression under the Bill of Rights. A
reading of the Statement, with particular focus on its final
paragraphs, will not leave the reader with feelings of
contempt for the Court but only a feeling that the Court must
champion the cause of integrity. Furthermore, it should be
noted that our society has developed to the point where
critical analysis of information is not in short supply. The
public is nowadays not only more well informed, but it has
access to information with which citizens could make their
own independent assessment of pending issues of public
concern, including the fitness and integrity of the members of
this Court to render fair and impartial judgment on the cases
before them. However, given the fact that some isolated
portions of the statement were arguably disrespectful,
respondents should be reminded to be more circumspect in
their future statements.
As regards Dean Leonen, I likewise submit that his
explanation is sufficient to exonerate him from the charge of
violation of Canon 10 and Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03, all of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. While it appears that
Dean Leonen mistakenly relied on hearsay information that
Justice Mendoza had authorized him to indicate Justice
Mendoza as a signatory to the Statement, still, Dean
Leonen’s lapses appear more the result of overzealousness
rather than bad faith or a deliberate intent to do falsehood or
to mislead the Court. Indeed, under the circumstances as
they appeared to him, and considering that there were other
professors who had authorized him to indicate them as
signatories,3 it was not all too remiss on his part to indicate
Justice Mendoza as a signatory to the Statement upon the
information given to him
_______________
3 Footnote 3 of the Compliance of Dean Leonen, p. 5.
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by his administrative staff. That he acted upon the wrong
information given to him, though telling of some degree of
carelessness on his part, is not gross negligence that is
tantamount to bad faith. Hence, there being no intent or
inexcusable negligence, there is no ground to find him liable
under Canon 10 and Rules 10.01 and 10.02 of theCode of
Professional Responsibility.
Similarly, there is no cogent reason to hold him liable for
violation of Rule 10.03 as it likewise does not appear that
Dean Leonen violated any rule of procedure or misused any
procedural rule to defeat the ends of justice. The submission
of the Statement to the Court, it should be noted, was ad hoc.
I therefore vote to NOTE and CONSIDER the
explanations submitted by respondents in their
Compliance/s SATISFACTORY with a REMINDER that
they be more circumspect in their future statements
considering that the Court also has its own sensibilities.
I also vote to consider this administrative
matterCLOSED and TERMINATED.
DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
The history of the Supreme Court shows that the times
when it emerged with strength from tempests of public
criticism were those times when it valued constitutional
democracy and its own institutional integrity. Indeed,
dangers from pressure and threat presented by what is
usually constitutionally deemed as free speech can arise only
when the Court allows itself to be so threatened. It is
unfortunate when a tribunal admits that its core of
independence can be shaken by a twelve-paragraph, two-
page commentary from academia. By issuing the Show Cause
Order, and affirming it in the current Decision, the Court
puts itself in the precarious posi-
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tion of shackling free speech and expression. The Court,
which has the greater duty of restraint and sobriety, but
which appears to the public to have failed to transcend its
instinct for self-preservation and to rise above its own hurt,
gains nothing by punishing those who, to its mind, also
lacked such restraint.
I join the dissents of Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita
Carpio-Morales, and Martin S. Villarama. To be taken
together with this Opinion is my earlier Dissenting Opinion
dated 19 October 2010. The effect and intent of the
“Restoring Integrity” Statement must be examined in the
context of what this Court has done to contribute to the
controversy as well as the reception by the public of the
pronouncements of this Court on the plagiarism charges in
connection with the Decision in G.R. No. 162230, Vinuya, et
al. v. Executive Secretary, promulgated on 28 April 2010.
A few days after the Malaya Lolas (petitioners in G.R. No.
162230) filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of
the Vinuya Decision, the Acting Chief of the Court’s Public
Information Office informed the media that the Chief Justice
had no plans of inquiring into the plagiarism charges against
Justice Mariano C. del Castillo raised in said motion. He
stated further that: “You can’t expect all justices in the
Supreme Court to be familiar with all these journal
articles.”1 Justice del Castillo defended himself by submitting
his official statement to the Philippine Star, which published
it on 30 July 2010. In the meantime, Dr. Mark Ellis, one of
several authors whose works was allegedly plagiarized, sent
a letter dated 23 July 2010 to the Court, expressing concern
about the alleged plagiarism of his work and the misreading
of the arguments therein “for cross purposes.”
_______________
1 The news item is also available on the publication’s website
athttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirer headlines/nation/view/20100721-
282283/High-court-not-probing-plagiarism.
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On 31 July 2010, the Daily Tribune, the Manila Standard,
and other newspapers of national circulation reported that
Senator Francis Pangilinan, a member of the bar, demanded
the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in order to “spare the
judiciary from embarrassment and harm.” On 25 July 2010,
the Philippine Daily Inquirer discussed the plagiarism issue
in their editorial entitled “Supreme Theft.” On 5 August 2010,
another member of the bar wrote about plagiarism in his
column entitled “What’s in a Name?” published in the
Business Mirror.2 On 8 August 2010, the Philippine Daily
Inquirer published former Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban’s opinion, to the effect that the issue “seeps to
the very integrity of the Court.” That same opinion also
raised the question of whether the justices who concurred in
the Vinuya ponencia were qualified to sit as members of the
Ethics Committee.
Dean Marvic M.V. F. Leonen of the University of the
Philippines College of Law transmitted to the Court a
statement entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement By The
Faculty Of The University Of The Philippines College Of Law
On The Allegations Of Plagiarism And Misrepresentation In
The Supreme Court,” the cover letter of which was dated 11
August 2010. Shortly thereafter, several schools published
their own declarations on the matter.
A week after the UP Law Faculty’s statement was
transmitted to the Court, Professor Christian Tams
expressed his own views. In a letter addressed to the Chief
Justice,3 Professor Tams said: “…I am at a loss to see how my
work should have been cited to support—as it seemingly
has—the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned
at the way in which your Honourable Court’s Judgment has
drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging it.”
Other authors soon
_______________
2 Atty. Adrian S. Cristobal, Jr., Plagiarism, in What’s in a Name?,
Business Mirror, 5 August 2010.
3 Dated 18 August 2010.
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followed suit, articulating their own dismay at the use of
their original works, through internet blogs, comments and
other public fora.4
Thus, the negative public exposure caused by such acts of
plagiarism cannot be attributed solely to the UP Law
Faculty. That the Court was put in the spotlight and
garnered unwanted attention was caused by a myriad of
factors, not the least of which was Justice Del Castillo’s own
published defense entitled “The Del Castillo ponencia
in Vinuya” pending the resolution of the complaint against
him by the Ethics Committee, and the categorical statement
made by the Acting Chief of the Court’s Public Information
Office to the media that the Chief Justice had no plans of
investigating the plagiarism charges. These twin acts
attracted negative reaction, much of which came from the
legal profession and the academe. The issue itself—alleged
plagiarism in a judicial decision, including the alleged use of
plagiarized materials to achieve a result opposite to the
theses of the said materials—resonated in the public’s
consciousness and stirred a natural desire in the citizenry to
raise calls to save an important public institution, namely,
the judiciary. The responses published by different sectors
constituted nothing more than an exercise of free speech—
critical commentary calling a public official to task in the
exercise of his functions.
The respondents herein, who were not parties to any
pending case at the time, forwarded the “Restoring Integrity”
_______________
4 Evan Criddle, who co-authored the article, “A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens,” with Evan Fox-Decent, wrote a comment in reply to a post written
about the issue in a legal blog. The blog entry to which Criddle commented is
the Opinio Juris entry entitled “International Law Plagiarism Charge
Bedevils Philippines Supreme Court Justice,” located at
<http://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/19/international-law-plagiarism-charge-
bedevils-philippines-supreme-court-justice/>; Criddle’s comment was made on
19 July 2010 at 2:44 pm EST.
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Statement as a public expression of the faculty’s stand
regarding the plagiarism issue. Such an open communication
of ideas from the citizenry is an everyday occurrence—as
evidenced by dozens of letters of appeals for justice received
regularly by this Court from a myriad of people, and the
placards displayed along Padre Faura Street every Tuesday.
The commentators and participants in the public discussions
on the Vinuya Decision, both on the Internet and in
traditional media, included legal experts and other members
of the bar, with even a former Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court numbered among them. Yet only members of the UP
Law Faculty were deemed to be the cause for the majority’s
trepidation that the Court’s honesty, integrity, and
competence was being undermined. The Show Cause Order
went so far as to hold the respondent faculty members
responsible for threatening the independence of the judiciary.
Despite the assertion that the present case is merely an
exercise of the Court’s disciplinary authority over members of
the bar, a closer look reveals the true nature of the
proceeding as one for indirect contempt, the due process
requirements of which are strictly provided for under Rule 71
of the Rules of Court. The majority attempts to skirt the
issue regarding the non-observance of due process by
insisting that the present case is not an exercise of the
Court’s contempt powers, but rather is anchored on the
Court’s disciplinary powers. Whatever designation the
majority may find convenient to formally characterize this
proceeding, however, the pretext is negated by the
disposition in the Resolution of 19 October 2010 itself and its
supporting rationale.
The majority directed respondents to SHOW CAUSE,
within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the Resolution,
why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar.
Yet the substance therein demonstrates that the present
proceeding is one for indirect contempt, particularly in the
following portions:666
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“We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly that any publication,
pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the
officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or
tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt
of court and is punishable.5
… … …
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to
become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary.6
… … …
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the
faculty’s less than objective comments except to discredit the April
28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s
honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for
reconsideration.”7 (Emphasis supplied)
The jurisprudence adverted to by the majority dwell on
contempt, foremost of which is In re Kelly, one of the first and
leading cases discussing contempt. Citing Ex Parte Terry, the
Supreme Court in that case held that acts punishable as
contempt are those “…tending to obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to
the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their
authority.”8 Significantly, before he was cited for contempt,
Respondent Amzi B. Kelly was first given the opportunity to
appear before the Court, submit a written Answer, and
present his oral argument.
The footnote citation in Footnote 4 of the 19 October 2010
Resolution, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, refers to “In the Matter of
_______________
5 From page four of the Resolution dated 19 October 2010.
6 From page four of the Resolution dated 19 October 2010. The footnote
points to a case docketed as A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC.
7 From page five of the Resolution dated 19 October 2010.
8 35 Phil. 944, 951 (1916).
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the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P.
Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20
and 21, 2007,” a case for indirect contempt lodged against the
publisher of a national daily. In this case, the Court not only
gave respondent a chance to explain himself, but also created
an Investigating Committee regarding the subject matter of
the alleged contemptible act:
“From October 30, 2007 to March 10, 2008, the Investigating
Committee held hearings and gathered affidavits and testimonies
from the parties concerned.
The Committee invited respondent Macasaet, Dañguilan-Vitug,
Delis, and ACA Marquez to a preliminary meeting, in which they
were requested to submit their respective affidavits which served
as their testimonies on direct examination. They were then later
cross-examined on various dates: respondent Macasaet on January
10, 2008, Dañguilan-Vitug on January 17, 2008, Delis on January
24, 2008, and ACA Marquez on January 28, 2008. The Chief of the
Security Services and the Cashier of the High Court likewise
testified on January 22 and 24, 2008, respectively.”9
This approach of using jurisprudence on contempt to
justify adverse findings against herein respondents is
continued in the current Decision. The majority cites the
1935 case Salcedo v. Hernandez10 which identified the
proceedings specifically as contempt, even though the
respondent was a member of the bar. The 1949 case of In Re
Vicente Sotto,11 from which the majority quotes heavily—and
which the majority states is “still good law”—is explicitly
identified as a proceeding for contempt of court. In Zaldivar
v. Sandiganbayan and Gonzales, the Court issued a
Resolution “to require respondent Gonzalez to explain in
writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he
should not be punished for contempt of court
667
_______________
9 A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, 8 August 2008, 561 SCRA 395.
10 61 Phil. 724, G.R. No. 42992, 8 August 1935.
11 82 Phil. 595, 21 January 1949.
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and/or subjected to administrative sanctions…”12 only after
a Motion to Cite in Contempt was filed by the petitioner.
Even as the Court discussed its exercise of both its contempt
powers and disciplinary powers over the respondent attorney
in the said case, it still gave him ample time and opportunity
to defend himself by allowing him to file an Omnibus Motion
for Extension and Inhibition, a Manifestation with
Supplemental Motion to Inhibit, a Motion to Transfer
Administrative Proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and an Urgent Motion for Additional Extension
of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam.
The case of In Re Almacen,13 also cited in the current
Decision, was in the nature of a contempt proceeding even as
it adverted to duties of members of the bar, as can be gleaned
from the following:
“So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective
mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against
scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls
over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, Atty.
Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt
charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is
now called upon to account were made only after this Court had
written finis to his appeal.”
Atty. Almacen filed with the Court a “Petition to
Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,” after his clients had
lost the right to file an appeal before the Court due to his own
inadvertence. And yet, the Court still gave him the “ampliest
[sic] latitude” for his defense, giving him an opportunity to
file a written explanation and to be heard in oral argument.
_______________
12 248 Phil. 542, 7 October 1988.
13 G.R. No. L-27654, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 562.
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All of the above negate the claim that this is not a
contempt proceeding but purely an administrative one.
The central argumentation in the Show Cause Order is
evidence of the original intent of the proceeding. The
allegation and conclusion that the faculty members
purportedly “undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity, and
competence,” make it clear that the true nature of the action
is one for indirect contempt. The discussion in the Resolution
of 19 October 2010 hinged on the tribunal’s need for self-
preservation and independence, in view of the “institutional
attacks” and “outside interference” with its functions—
charges which more appropriately fall under its contempt
authority, rather than the authority to determine fitness of
entering and maintaining membership in the bar.
The Show Cause Order failed to specify which particular
mode of contempt was committed by the respondents (as
required in the Rules of Court). Its language and tenor also
explicitly demonstrated that the guilt of respondents had
already been prejudged. Page three (3) of the Order states:
“The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the
institutional attack that lay ahead.” Page four (4) makes the
conclusion that: “The publication of a statement…was totally
unnecessary, uncalled for, and a rash act of misplaced
vigilance.”
The Order also violated respondents’ right to due process
because it never afforded them the categorical requirements
of notice and hearing. The requirements for Indirect
Contempt as laid out in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court demand
strict compliance: 1) a complaint in writing which may either
be a motion for contempt filed by a party or an order issued
by the court requiring a person to appear and explain his
con-
669
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670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
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and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
duct, and 2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear
and explain his conduct.14
The essence of a court’s contempt powers stems from a
much-needed remedy for the violation of lawful court orders
and for maintaining decorum during proceedings, as an
essential auxiliary to the due administration of justice.15It is
not an all-encompassing tool to silence criticism. Courts must
exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are
impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard
not for the judges but for the functions they fulfill.16 It must
be wielded on the preservative, rather than on the vindictive,
principle.17
So careful is the approach ordinarily taken by the Court in
cases of contempt that it places a premium on the conduct of
a hearing, to such a point that it administratively sanctioned
a lower court judge for issuing a Show Cause Order sua
sponte and finding the respondent guilty of criminal
contempt without the benefit of a hearing. In the case
of Castaños v. Judge Escaño, Jr.,18 the Court held:
“It is an oft-repeated rule that the power to punish for contempt
is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice.
Judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end
in view of utiliz-
_______________
14 Pacuribot v. Judge Lim, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-97-1382, 17 July 1997.
15 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 45.
16 Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes v. CA, G.R. Nos. 135180-81, 16
August 2000, 338 SCRA 282, 299, citing Yasay, Jr. v. Recto, 313 SCRA 739 [1999],
citing Dee v. SEC, 199 SCRA 238 (1991).
17 Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778; Peo. v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265.
18 A.M. No. RTJ-93-955, 12 December 1995.
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ing their contempt powers for correction and preservation, not for
retaliation or vindication.
It is true that, in the case at bench, respondent judge, after
having received a copy of Agapito’s affidavit in connection with the
petitioner’s administrative charges against him, directed Agapito
to show cause within three days from notice why he should not be
held in contempt of court…but, without the benefit of hearing
required in Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, respondent
judge, in an Order, dated February 22, 1993, sentenced Agapito
guilty for contempt of court on account of the allegations he made
in his affidavit, dated November 18, 1992. Such failure to afford
Agapito the opportunity to be heard as a matter of due process of
law deserves administrative sanction.”
In finding Judge Escaño, Jr. guilty of grave abuse of
judicial authority, the Court stated:
“When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so
basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of
his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in
order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if
every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot
justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.
Moreover, witnesses against erring judges cannot come out in the
open to help the Judiciary in disrobing its inept members if we
allow judges to abuse their judicial discretion, more particularly
with respect to the exercise of their contempt powers.”
As Justice Carpio-Morales finds in her Dissenting Opinion
to the Resolution of 19 October 2010, this action of the Court
is tainted with injudiciousness precisely because:
“…the Resolution is not what it purports to be. Ostensibly, the
Resolution is a show cause order that initiates what would become
a newly docketed regular administrative matter. There is more
than meets the eye, however. When stripped of its apparent
complexion, the Resolution shows its true colors and presents itself public evaluation in this wise: “If the law is but the essence of
as a pro- common sense, the protest of many average men may
672 evidence a
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
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nouncement of guilt of indirect contempt without proper recourse of 19 October 2010, at 2.

left to the parties.”19 673

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Thus, Justice Carpio Morales reiterates in her Dissenting
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
Opinion to the current Decision her belief that this
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
proceeding is in essence one for indirect contempt:
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
“Consistent with my dissent from the Court’s October 19, 2010
defect in a judicial conclusion though based on the nicest
Resolution, I maintain my position that there was no reasonable
reasoning and profoundest learning.”20
ground to motu proprio initiate the administrative case, in view of
We who occupy this august chamber are right not because
(i) the therein discussed injudiciousness attending the Resolution,
our word is accorded legal finality on matters that are before
which was anchored on an irregularly concluded finding of indirect
us. We are right only when we have been proven right. There
contempt with adverse declarations prematurely describing the
must always reside, in the recesses of our minds, the clear
subject Statement, that could taint the disciplinary action.”
distinction between what is merely legal and what is
The power to cite for contempt, as well as the power to
legitimate. Legitimacy is a “tenuous commodity, particularly
discipline, are mechanisms to be exercised solely towards the
for unelected judges,”21 and it can only be maintained by a
orderly administration of justice. Such powers must be
sustained perception of fairness, as well as by the retention
weighed carefully against the substantive rights of the public
of the moral authority of individual judges. This required
to free expression and academic freedom. In this critical
characteristic of the Court is diminished when its members
balancing act, the tribunal must therefore utilize, to the
do not act through the rational strength of their decisions,
fullest extent, soundness and clarity of reasoning, and must
but are instead perceived to have done so in the
not appear to have been swayed by momentary fits of temper.
misunderstanding of the Court’s disciplinary powers.
Instead of regarding criticism as perpetually adversarial,
“To maintain not only its stature, but also, more importantly,
the judiciary would do well to respect it, both as an important
its independence, the judiciary must adhere to the discipline of
tool for public accountability, and as the only soothing balm
judicial decision-making, firmly rooting rulings in the language of
for vindication of felt injustice. Judicial legitimacy
the documents in issue, precedent and logic. That is, the strength
established through demonstrated intellectual integrity in
of the judiciary's independence depends not only on the
decision-making rightly generates public acceptance of such
constitutional framework, but also on the extent to which the
decisions, which makes them truly binding. William Howard
judiciary acknowledges its responsibility to decide ‘according to
Taft, who served as a federal appellate judge before becoming
law’…”22
the President of the United States, understood the weight of
 Furthermore, as one American Federal Supreme Court
decision said:
“Secrecy of judicial action can only breed ignorance and distrust
of courts and suspicion concerning the competence and
impartiality of judges; free and robust reporting, criticism, and
debate can contribute to public understanding of the rule of law
and to compre-
_______________
20 William Howard Taft, Criticisms of the Federal Judiciary, 29 Am. L. Rev.
641, 642 (1895).
21 Michael Abramowicz and Thomas Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial
Decision-Making, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 965 (2009) at 983.
22 Thomas Vanaskie, The Independence and Responsibility of the Federal
Judiciary, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 745.
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hension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system, as
well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting it to the
cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability.”23
The Code of Judicial Conduct prescribes the standards for
a judicial response to free speech which, highly-charged
though it may be, is necessarily protected. Rule 3.04 in
particular states that: “A judge should be patient, attentive
and courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to
litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A
judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of
mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the
courts for the litigants.” The Supreme Court has itself, on
occasion, demanded of lower court judges that they be
“dignified in demeanor and refined in speech, [and] exhibit
that temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint…”24
Nothing can be gained from the Court’s exercise of a heavy
hand in a matter which has originated from the Court itself.
On the contrary, there is much to lose in imposing penalties
on the outspoken merely because the outspoken have earned
the ire of the Court’s members.
They who seek to judge must first themselves be judged.
By occupying an exalted seat in the judiciary, judges in effect
undertake to embrace a profession and lead lives that
demand stringent ethical norms.25 In his dealings with the
public, a judge must exhibit great self-restraint; he should be
the last person to be perceived as a tyrant holding imperious
sway over his domain,26 and must demonstrate to the public
that in
_______________
23 Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791 (1976)
24 Dagudag v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017, 19 June 2008, 555
SCRA 217, 235.
25 Ariosa v. Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-92-798, 15 November 2000.
26 Torcende v. Sardido, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1238, 24 January 2003.
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the discharge of his judicial role, he “possess[es] the virtue
of gravitas. He should be…dignified in demeanor, refined in
speech and virtuous in character… [H]e must exhibit that
hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint… a judge should always keep his passion guarded.
He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason.”27
In my view of a constitutional democracy, the judiciary is
required to demonstrate moral authority and legitimacy, not
only legality, at all times. It has often been said that the rule
of law requires an independent judiciary that fairly,
impartially and promptly applies the law to cases before it.
The rule of law requires a judiciary that is not beholden to
any political power or private interests, whose only loyalty is
to the people and to the Constitution that the people have
ordained as their fundamental governing precept. It requires
integrity, independence and probity of each individual judge.
To be independent, the judiciary must always remember that
it will lose public support and in a certain sense, its
legitimacy, if it does not demonstrate its integrity in its
judicial decisions. It must show a keen nose for the
fundamental importance of upholding right over wrong.
To maintain a life of intellectual integrity, those of us in
the judiciary must be buffeted by the winds of healthful
criticism. Direct and informed criticism of judicial decisions
strengthens accountability. As Taft is noted for writing:
“[n]othing tends more to render judges careful in their
decisions and anxiously solicitous to do exact justice than the
consciousness that every act of theirs is to be subject to the
intelligent scrutiny of their fellow men, and to their candid
criticism .... In the case of judges having a life tenure, indeed,
their very independence makes the right freely to comment
on their decisions of greater importance, because it is the
only
_______________
27 Juan de la Cruz v. Carretas, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043, 5 September 2007,
532 SCRA 218, 227-229.
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676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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practical and available instrument in the hands of a free
people to keep such judges alive to the reasonable demands of
those they serve.”28
This is where academic freedom, when exercised in
appropriate measure, is most helpful. Milton encapsulates
free speech as simply the right to “argue freely according to
conscience.”29 The value of academic freedom, as a necessary
constitutional component of the right to freedom of
expression, lies in the ability of the common man, aided by
the expertise available in the academe, to hold a magistrate
accountable in the exercise of his official functions, foremost
of which is the issuance of written decisions. Paragraph 23 of
the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of
Lawyers30 states:
“Lawyers like other citizens are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly. In particular, they
shall have the right to take part in public discussion of matters
concerning the law, the administration of justice and the
promotion and protection of human rights and to join or form local,
national or international organizations and attend their meetings,
without suffering professional restrictions by reason of their lawful
action or their membership in a lawful organization…”
The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers “have been
formulated to assist Member States in their task of
promoting and ensuring the proper role of lawyers,” and
these “should be respected and taken into account by
Governments within the framework of their national
legislation and practice and should be brought to the
attention of lawyers as well as other
_______________
28 Supra note 19.
29 In Areopagitica, John Milton’s philosophical defense of free speech,
cited by Justice Isagani Cruz (Dissenting Opinion), National Press Club v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 102653, 5 March 1992, 207 SCRA 1.
30 Adopted by the Eight United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7
September 1990.
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persons, such as judges, prosecutors, members of the
must be recognition given to the special role of the law
faculty in upholding judicial independence.
_______________
31 Phoebe Haddon, Academic Freedom and Governance: A Call for

executive and legislature, and the public in general.” Thus, Increased Dialogue and Diversity, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1561.

faced with the duty of balancing lawyers’ fundamental right 678

678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
to free speech which has now been expressly recognized in
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the international arena, against this Court’s desire to
the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
preserve its exalted role in society by disciplining for
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
offensive language, this Court must examine whether it has
The testing ground for integrity in judicial decision-
already encroached into constitutionally-prohibited
making is provided in large measure by the legal academe,
interference with the basic rights of individuals.
when it probes, tests and measures whether judicial
The realm of public opinion is where the academe,
decisions rise up to the definition of just and well-reasoned
especially our schools and universities, plays a most crucial
decisions as they have been defined by centuries-old norms of
role in ensuring judicial legitimacy. Not by blindly
legal reasoning and legal scholarship. If we have a legal
legitimizing its acts, but by constantly reminding the
academe that is slothful, that is not self-disciplined, that
judiciary of its presence as a helpful but critical ally. The
covets the closeness to the powers-that-be which an
academe is not to be an applause machine for the judiciary; it
unprofessional relationship with the judicial leadership can
is to help guide the judiciary by illuminating new paths for
bring, then this refining role of the legal academe is lost. The
the judiciary to take, by alerting the judiciary to its
legal academe is the preserver of the noble standards of legal
inconsistent decisions, and by identifying gaps in law and
reasoning and legal scholarship. It must itself demonstrate
jurisprudence.
strength and independence and not be punished when doing
In this regard, the law school has a special place. Phoebe
so.
Haddon writes: “[t]he value and preservation of academic
Those who occupy the most powerful positions in this
freedom depend on an academic environment that nurtures,
country must always be ready to hold themselves accountable
not silences, diverse views. The law school faculty has a
to the people. I believe that the tradition of deference to the
special responsibility to maintain a nurturing environment
judiciary has limits to its usefulness and these times do not
for diverse views because of the importance of the
call for the unbroken observance of such deference as much
marketplace of ideas in our teaching and the value we
theoretically place on the role of persuasive discourse in the as they call for a public demonstration of honesty in all its
forms.
quest for knowledge. Faculty autonomy takes on significance
I dissent from the Majority Decision admonishing Dean
because it can protect freedom of inquiry.”31 In a certain
Marvic M. V. F. Leonen and issuing a warning to the thirty-
sense, therefore, because the law faculty can discharge a
five faculty members in connection with the “Restoring
most meaningful role in keeping the judiciary honest, there
Integrity” Statement. I find the Common Compliance of the
thirty-five faculty members, dated 18 November 2010, as well
as the Compliance submitted by Professor Rosa Maria T.
Juan Bautista on 18 November 2010 and by Professor Raul
Vasquez on 19 November 2010, to be satisfactory. I also find
the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen dated 18 November
2010 and of Professor Owen J. Lynch dated 19 November
2010 similarly satisfactory, and vote to consider this matter
closed and terminated.
Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance satisfactory; Common
Compliance by 35 respondents unsatisfactory, they are
reminded to give due respect to the Court; Separate
Compliance by Dean
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Marvic M.V.F. Leonen unsatisfactorymj, he is admonished;
Prof. Lynch excused from these proceedings; and respondents’
request for hearing denied.
Notes.—The Court is not unaware that academic freedom
has been traditionally associated with freedom of thought,
speech, and expression and the press, but since it is a
dynamic concept, the Constitution has left it to the courts to
develop further its parameters. (University of the Philippines
vs. Civil Service Commission, 356 SCRA 57 [2001])
There is no doubt that the fundamental freedom to
criticize government necessarily includes the right to criticize
the courts, their proceedings and decisions. (In the Matter of
the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P.
Macasaet Published in Malaya dated September 18, 19, 20
and 21, 2007, 561 SCRA 395 [2008])
Freedom of expression as well as freedom of the press may
not be unrestrained, but neither must it be reined in too
harshly. (Tulfo vs. People, 565 SCRA 283 [2008])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Fourteenth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of
July, two thousand nine.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9999
AN ACT PROVIDING A MECHANISM FOR FREE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Free Legal
Assistance Act of 2010".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the declared policy of the State to
value the dignity of every human person and guarantee the rights of
every individual, particularly those who cannot afford the services of legal
counsel.
Furthermore, it is the policy of the State to promote a just and dynamic
social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the
nation and free the people from poverty through policies and programs
that provide adequate social services and improve the quality of life for
all.
In addition, the State shall guarantee free legal assistance to the poor
and ensure that every person who cannot afford the services of a counsel
is provided with a competent and independent counsel preferably of
his/her own choice, if upon determination it appears that the party cannot
afford the services of a counsel, and that services of a counsel are
necessary to secure the ends of justice and protect of the party.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As provided for in this Act, the term legal
services to be performed by a lawyer refers to any activity which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experiences which shall include, among others, legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of instruments and contracts, including appearance
before the administrative and quasi-judicial offices, bodies and tribunals
handling cases in court, and other similar services as may be defined by
the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Requirements for Availment. - For purposes of availing of the
benefits and services as envisioned in this Act, a lawyer or professional
partnership shall secure a certification from the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO), the Department of Justice (DOJ) or accredited association of the
Supreme Court indicating that the said legal services to be provided are
within the services defined by the Supreme Court, and that the agencies
cannot provide the legal services to be provided by the private counsel.
For purpose of determining the number of hours actually provided by the
lawyer and/or professional firm in the provision of legal services, the
association and/or organization duly accredited by the Supreme Court
shall issue the necessary certification that said legal services were
actually undertaken.
The certification issued by, among others, the PAO, the DOJ and other
accredited association by the Supreme Court shall be submitted to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for purposes of availing the tax
deductions as provided for in this Act and to the DOJ for purposes of
monitoring.
Section 5. Incentives to Lawyers. - For purposes of this Act, a lawyer or
professional partnerships rendering actual free legal services, as defined
by the Supreme Court, shall be entitled to an allowable deduction from
the gross income, the amount that could have been collected for the
actual free legal services rendered or up to ten percent (10%) of the
gross income derived from the actual performance of the legal
profession, whichever is lower: Provided, That the actual free legal
services herein contemplated shall be exclusive of the minimum sixty
(60)-hour mandatory legal aid services rendered to indigent litigants as
required under the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Services for Practicing
Lawyers, under BAR Matter No. 2012, issued by the Supreme Court.
Section 6. Information, Education and Communication (IEC) Campaign. -
The DOJ, in cooperation with the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), is
hereby mandated to conduct an annual IEC campaign in order to inform
the lawyers of the procedures and guidelines in availing tax deductions
and inform the general public that a free legal assistance to those who
cannot afford counsel is being provided by the State. 1avv ph!1
Section 7. Reportorial Requirement. - For purposes of determining the
effectiveness and social impact of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ
shall submit an annual report to both Houses of Congress indicating
therewith the number of parties who benefited from this Act.
The report shall state in detail, among others, the geographic location,
demographic characteristics and socioeconomic profile of the
beneficiaries of this Act.
Section 8. Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). - Within ninety
(90) days from the date effectivity of this Act, the BIR shall formulate the
necessary revenue regulations for the proper implementation of the tax
component as envisioned in this Act.
The Supreme Court shall formulate the necessary implementing rules
and regulations with respect to the legal services covered under this Act
and the process of accreditation of organizations and/or associations
which will provide free legal assistance.
Section 9. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional or invalid, the other provisions not affected by such
declaration shall remain in full force and effect.
Section 10. Repealing Clause. - Any law, decree, ordinance or
administrative circular not consistent with any provision of this Act is
hereby amended, repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 11. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,