G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990
Petitioner,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales
& Olongapo City, Branch III and SERAPIO ABUG, respondents.
FACTS: Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance
of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent
herein, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of
authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging employment agency by
charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to
four separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article
39 of the Labor Code. 1
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an
offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the
four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be
illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised
or offered any employment for a fee. " 2
ISSUE: WON Abug is guilty of illegal recruitment.
HELD: YES. As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on
the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a
presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in
recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to
whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the
course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring (of) workers. "
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of
recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule
in Article 13(b) win constitute recruitment and placement even if only one
prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that
where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two
or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be
deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be
deemed" create that presumption.
G.R. No. 161757 January 25, 2006
SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division; HON. ERNESTO S.
DINOPOL, in his capacity as Labor Arbiter, NLRC; NCR, Arbitration Branch, Quezon
City and DIVINA A. MONTEHERMOZO,Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner, Sunace International Management Services (Sunace), a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, deployed
to Taiwan Divina A. Montehermozo (Divina) as a domestic helper under a 12-month
contract effective February 1, 1997.1 The deployment was with the assistance of a
Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang, President of Jet Crown International Co., Ltd.
After her 12-month contract expired on February 1, 1998, Divina continued working
for her Taiwanese employer, Hang Rui Xiong, for two more years, after which she
returned to the Philippines on February 4, 2000.
Shortly after her return or on February 14, 2000, Divina filed a complaint2 before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against Sunace, one Adelaide Perez, the
Taiwanese broker, and the employer-foreign principal alleging that she was jailed for
three months and that she was underpaid.
On April 6, 2000, Divina filed her Position Paper4 claiming that under her original one-
year contract and the 2-year extended contract which was with the knowledge and
consent of Sunace, the following amounts representing income tax and savings were
deducted:
and while the amounts deducted in 1997 were refunded to her, those deducted in
1998 and 1999 were not. On even date, Sunace, by its Proprietor/General Manager
Maria Luisa Olarte, filed its Verified Answer and Position Paper, 6claiming as follows,
quoted verbatim:
4. There is no basis for the grant of tax refund to the complainant as the she finished
her one year contract and hence, was not illegally dismissed by her employer. She
could only lay claim over the tax refund or much more be awarded of damages such
as attorney’s fees as said reliefs are available only when the dismissal of a migrant
worker is without just valid or lawful cause as defined by law or contract.
Reacting to Divina’s Position Paper, Sunace filed on April 25, 2000 an ". . . answer to
complainant’s position paper"7alleging that Divina’s 2-year extension of her contract
was without its knowledge and consent, hence, it had no liability attaching to any
claim arising therefrom, and Divina in fact executed a Waiver/Quitclaim and Release
of Responsibility and an Affidavit of Desistance, copy of each document was annexed
to said ". . . answer to complainant’s position paper."
The Labor Arbiter, rejected Sunace’s claim that the extension of Divina’s contract for
two more years was without its knowledge and consent in this wise:
The Labor Arbiter rejected too Sunace’s argument that it is not liable on account of
Divina’s execution of a Waiver and Quitclaim and an Affidavit of Desistance.
Observed the Labor Arbiter:
On appeal of Sunace, the NLRC, by Resolution of April 30, 2002,14 affirmed the Labor
Arbiter’s decision.
Court of Appeals affirmed the Labor Arbiter and NLRC’s finding
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozo/s employment was
made with the knowledge and consent of Sunace.
HELD: NO. The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the above-
quoted telefax message, that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign
"principal" (sic) and therefore was aware of and had consented to the execution of
the extension of the contract is misplaced. The message does not provide evidence
that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after the expiration on February
1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the
Taiwanese broker communicated regarding Divina’s allegedly withheld savings does
not necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of the contract. As Sunace
points out in its Reply20 filed before the Court of Appeals,
As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to
the petitioner that the private respondent had t[aken] already her savings from her
foreign employer and that no deduction was made on her salary. It contains nothing
about the extension or the petitioner’s consent thereto.21
The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to
the principal, employer Xiong, not the other way around.23 The knowledge of the
principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.
There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound
under the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy
thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Divina’s
claims arising from the 2-year employment extension. As the New Civil Code
provides,
Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its
agency relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the
original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Divina
and entered into a new and separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924
of the New Civil Code reading
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78763 July 12,1989
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and APOLINARIO M.
SIGNO, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent Signo was employed in petitioner company as supervisor-
leadman since January 1963 up to the time when his services were terminated on
May 18, 1983.
In 1981, a certain Fernando de Lara filed an application with the petitioner company
for electrical services at his residence at Peñafrancia Subdivision, Marcos Highway,
Antipolo, Rizal. Private respondent Signo facilitated the processing of the said
application as well as the required documentation for said application at the
Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. In consideration thereof, private respondent received
from Fernando de Lara the amount of P7,000.00. Signo thereafter filed the
application for electric services with the Power Sales Division of the company.
It was established that the area where the residence of de Lara was located is not yet
within the serviceable point of Meralco, because the place was beyond the 30-meter
distance from the nearest existing Meralco facilities. In order to expedite the
electrical connections at de Lara's residence, certain employees of the company,
including respondent Signo, made it appear in the application that the sari-sari store
at the corner of Marcos Highway, an entrance to the subdivision, is applicant de
Lara's establishment, which, in reality is not owned by the latter.
As a result of this scheme, the electrical connections to de Lara's residence were
installed and made possible. However, due to the fault of the Power Sales Division of
petitioner company, Fernando de Lara was not billed for more than a year.
Petitioner company conducted an investigation of the matter and found respondent
Signo responsible for the said irregularities in the installation. Thus, the services of
the latter were terminated on May 18, 1983.
On August 10 1983, respondent Signo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid
wages, and separation pay.
After the parties had submitted their position papers, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision (p. 79, Rollo) on April 29, 1985, which stated, inter alia:
WHEREFORE, respondent Meralco is hereby directed to reinstate
complainant Apolinario M. Signo to his former position as Supervisor
Leadman without backwages, considering that he is not at all faultless. He is
however, here warned, that commission of similar offense in the future,
shall be dealt with more severely.
Both parties appealed from the decision to the respondent Commission. On March
12, 1987, the respondent Commission dismissed both appeals for lack of merit and
affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Signo should be dismissed from petitioner
company on grounds of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.
HELD: NO. The power to dismiss is the normal prerogative of the employer. An
employer, generally, can dismiss or lay-off an employee for just and authorized
causes enumerated under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code. However, the right
of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State,
basically in the exercise of its paramount police power. This is so because the
preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, more vital than
the preservation of corporate profits (Euro-Linea, Phil. Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75782,
December 1, 1987,156 SCRA 78).
There is no question that herein respondent Signo is guilty of breach of trust and
violation of company rules, the penalty for which ranges from reprimand to dismissal
depending on the gravity of the offense. However, as earlier stated, the respondent
Commission and the Labor Arbiter found that dismissal should not be meted to
respondent Signo considering his twenty (20) years of service in the employ of
petitioner, without any previous derogatory record, in addition to the fact that
petitioner company had awarded him in the past, two (2) commendations for
honesty. If ever the petitioner suffered losses resulting from the unlisted electric
consumption of de Lara, this was found to be the fault of petitioner's Power Sales
Division.
G.R. No. 98107 August 18, 1997
BENJAMIN C. JUCO, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL HOUSING
CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent
National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. On
May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a
crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds.
On March 25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC
with the Department of Labor.
On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC thru Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled that
petitioner was illegally dismissed from his employment by respondent as there was
evidence in the record that the criminal case against him was purely fabricated,
prompting the trial court to dismiss the charges against him. Hence, he concluded
that the dismissal was illegal as it was devoid of basis, legal or factual.
Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal
of the complainant as illegal and ordering the respondent to immediately
reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority rights with full
back wages inclusive of allowance and to his other benefits or equivalent
computed from the time it is withheld from him when he was dismissed on
March 27, 1977, until actually reinstated. 9
On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14,
1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter
Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 10
ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code.
HELD: YES. In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government
owned corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399,
otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporation, dated January
1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned
by the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation
law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service
Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the
Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation. 13 Considering the fact that the NHA had been
incorporated under Act 1459, the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that
it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to
the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case
of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National Housing
Corporation, 14 where we held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the
Department of Labor and Employment, it being a government-owned and/or
controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, we also held that
the workers or employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form
unions or employee's organization and that there is no impediment to the holding of
a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code.
G.R. No. 87676 December 20, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL PARKS
DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL PARKS DEVELOPMENT
SUPERVISORY ASSOCIATION & THEIR MEMBERS, respondents.
FACTS: On June 15, 1987, two collective bargaining agreements were entered into
between NPDC and NPDCEA (TUPAS local Chapter No. 967) and NPDC and NPDCSA
(TUPAS Chapter No. 1206), for a period of two years or until June 30, 1989.
On March 20, 1988, these unions staged a stake at the Rizal Park, Fort Santiago, Paco
Park, and Pook ni Mariang Makiling at Los Banos, Laguna, alleging unfair labor
practices by NPDC.
On March 21, 1988, NPDC filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila, Branch III, a
complaint against the union to declare the strike illegal and to restrain it on the
ground that the strikers, being government employees, have no right to strike
although they may form a union.
On March 24, 1988, the lower court dismissed the complaint and lifted the
restraining order for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the case "properly falls under
the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor," because "there exists an employer-
employee relationship" between NPDC and the strikers, and "that the acts
complained of in the complaint, and which plaintiff seeks to enjoin in this action, fall
under paragraph 5 of Article 217 of the Labor Code, ..., in relation to Art. 265 of the
same Code, hence, jurisdiction over said acts does not belong to this Court but to the
Labor Arbiters of the Department of Labor." (p. 142, Rollo.).
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 14204). On
March 31, 1989, the Court of appeals affirmed the order of the trial court, hence,
this petition for review. The petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred:
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner, National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a
government agency, or a private corporation, for on this issue depends the right of
its employees to strike.
HELD: In Jesus P. Perlas, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 84637-39, August
2, 1989, we ruled that the NPDC is an agency of the government, not a government-
owned or controlled corporation, hence, the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over its
acting director who committed estafa. We held thus:
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an
Executive Committee on January 14,1963, for the development of the
Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No.
30). It was later designated as the National Parks Development Committee
(NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda
R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-
Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the
Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on
December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD
No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the
Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a
regular government agency under the Office of the President and allotments
for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC
(Exh. 10-A Perlas, Item No. 2, 3). (Italics ours.)
Since NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil service rules
and regulations (Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution). Its employees are civil service
employees (Sec. 14, Executive Order No. 180).
While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and join
unions of their choice, there is as yet no law permitting them to strike. In case of a
labor dispute between the employees and the government, Section 15 of Executive
Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987 provides that the Public Sector Labor- Management
Council, not the Department of Labor and Employment, shall hear the dispute.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals and the lower court erred in holding that the labor
dispute between the NPDC and the members of the NPDSA is cognizable by the
Department of Labor and Employment.