Compilation

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
COMPILATION OF
WRITTEN REPORTS
SUBMITTED BY:
1AA
SUBMITTED TO:
ATTY. EDWIN REY SANDOVAL
May 27, 2017

University of Santo Tomas | Faculty of Civil Law (A.Y. 2016 – 2017)
Table of Contents
Andres, Christine Joyce: Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (2001) ........................................ 3
Angangan, Richard Vincent: Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph Lantion (2000) ......... 7
January 18, 2000 (Decision) ........................................................................................ 7
October 17, 2000 (Decision) ...................................................................................... 10
Angeles, Mark Vincent: Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers (2016) ...................... 12
Bandillo, Jean: Maquiling v. COMELEC (2013) ........................................................... 22
Batino, Apryl Sharien: Abdula v. Guiani (2000) .......................................................... 25
Bertolano, Ramilyn: Aniag, Jr. v. COMELEC (1994)................................................... 27
Borja, Merryl Angelic: People v. Doria (1999) ............................................................ 29
Cadiz, Ma. Charlene: ISAE v. Quisimbing (2000) ........................................................ 31
Cariaga, Camille Grace: Stop-and-Frisk Search (Terry Search) ................................. 32
Manalili v. Court of Appeals (1997) ............................................................................ 32
Malacat v. Court of Appeals (1997) ............................................................................ 36
Casim, Miguel Alfonso: Valmonte v. De Villa (1989) .................................................. 39
Castro, Marianne: ........................................................................................................ 41
People v. Johnson (2000) .......................................................................................... 41
People v. Canton (2002) ............................................................................................ 44
Clarin, Stephanie Anne: SJS v. Dangerous Drugs Board (2008) ................................ 47
Concha, Renlay: Ople v. Torres (1998) ....................................................................... 50
Corpuz, Junius Benedict: Alejano v. Cabuay (2005) .................................................. 57
Julian, Cheenie Mae: Chavez v. Gonzales (2008) ...................................................... 59
Kasan, Alyahza: ........................................................................................................... 64
Bayan v. Ermita (2006) .............................................................................................. 64
IBP v. Atienza (2010) ................................................................................................. 67
Koh, Anna Patricia: ..................................................................................................... 69
Borjal v. Court of Appeals (1999) ............................................................................... 69
Vasquez v. Court of Appeals (1999) .......................................................................... 70
Magcalas, Ceri Kay Minette: Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals (1996) ................... 71
Mallari, Riadale Mikaela: Ang LADLAD LGBT Party v. COMELEC (2010) ................. 73
Monton, Rejean: Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (1993) ..... 77
Nomil, Joyce Wyne: Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos (1994) ........................................... 80
Purzuelo, Danielle: Pastor Austria v. NLRC (1999) ..................................................... 82
Quiambao, Eloisa: Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC (2016) ........................................ 84
Quintin, Ed Vinson: Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC (2015) ................................... 87
Recalde, Denielle: Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes (2015) .................................. 89
Ronda, Maria Danya: Mapa v. Sandiganbayan (1994) ................................................ 91
Sagun, Ervin: Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (2015) ............................................................ 92
Sibal, Tricia: Chavez v. PCGG (1998) ......................................................................... 95
Soriano, Joe Carlo: Jacinto v. Court of Appeals (1997) .............................................. 98
Tambiloc, Aura Jane Nikolle: Quinto V. COMELEC (2010) ..................................... 100
Umandap, Allison: People v. Obrero (2000) ............................................................. 102
Villanueva, Katrina: ................................................................................................... 104
People v. Andan (1997) ........................................................................................... 104
People v. Endino (2001) .......................................................................................... 107
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Andres, Christine Joyce University of Santo Tomas | Faculty of Civil Law (A.Y. 2016 – 2017)
Andres, Christine Joyce: Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (2001)
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division)

and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 148560, 19 November 2001, EN BANC (Bellosillo, J.)
One must always remember that the Courts follow the presumption that a law is in
harmony with the Constitution. This presumption is based on the idea that it is forbidden
for one branch of the Government to encroach upon the powers of another. Therefore,
“every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its
constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort.”
Facts:
Then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a “Asiong Salonga” and a.k.a “Jose
Velarde” and his cohorts (Petitioners) were accused of the crime of plunder under RA
7080 “An Act Defining And Criminalizing the Crime of Plunder” as amended by Section
12 of RA 7659 by Office of the Ombudsman.
Respondents assail that the petitioners acquired ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount of FOUR BILLION NINETY-SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17) through a series or combination or similar means that
are contrary to law.
Petitioner Joseph Estrada then assailed that the Plunder Law is unconstitutional
for being “defectively fashioned that it crosses the thin but distinct line which divides the
valid from constitutionally infirm.” Specifically, he contends that the legislature failed to
establish a statutory definition for the words used in the law such as “combination” and
“series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt act or criminal acts” found in
Section 1, par. (d), and Section 2, and the word “pattern” in Section 4. He concluded that
these words are impermissibly vague and overbroad; thus, denying him to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him; hence, violative of his fundamental
right to due process. Therefore, the petitioner called for the facial review of its validity.
Issue: Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
Ruling:
No. The Court found nothing ambiguous or vague that will confuse the petitioner
based on the following reasons:
1. A law will not be rendered uncertain and void merely because it used general terms
or because of the use of words or terms without defining them. After all, there is
no constitutional demand requiring the Congress to define each and every word it
uses in a law. The Congress’s inability to define the words it used in a statute will
not necessarily result in ambiguity as long as the legislative will is clear. Aside from
that, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will
be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,
unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning
to those words.
2. It is also evident that the Congress intended the words "combination" and "series"
to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative
deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law.
Therefore, the words should be interpreted in their general meaning:
a. Combination: at least two acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec.1 par (d)
b. Series: there must be 2 or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same
enumeration
c. Pattern: consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d)
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Given the foregoing, the petitioners’ contention that the said law is “void-for-
vagueness” is manifestly misplaced.
As for the petitioners’ the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad,
the Court adopted the observations of Justice Vicente Mendoza during the deliberations
and concluded that the allegations do not justify the Petitioners’ call for a facial review of
its validity.
Facial Challenge
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is

overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. This permits a
party to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him, it is not
unconstitutional but it might be when or if applied to others not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected.
The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily
apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression
is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a
statute drawn with narrow specificity."
For facial challenge to a legislative act to be successful, the challenger must

establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid because
a facial challenge is a challenge to a statute in which the plaintiff alleges that the
legislation is always unconstitutional, and therefore void.
Is this applicable to all kinds of statutes or laws?
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for
this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct.
With respect to such statute, the established rule is that “one to whom application
of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which
its application might be unconstitutional.
Void-For-Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrine
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application only to free
speech cases. They are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in
free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
also produce “chilling effect” upon unprotected speech for it does not inform the people
what kind of speech or act is not allowed.
They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute.

With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly
it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional."
If a statute is invalidated, there are two possible outcomes:

1. “On its face invalidation”: invalidation of statutes results in striking them down
entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the
case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be
made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. These kinds
invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In
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determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are

alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the
conduct with which the defendant is charged. It produces mass acquittal. This is
what is not allowed in criminal statutes.
2. Statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as
applied' to a particular defendant."
Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine
The said doctrine is commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a
criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.
It can only be invoked against that kind of legislation that is utterly vague on its
face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
When can we say that a statute is vague?
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards

that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application.
When this happens, the said statute is violative of the Constitution in 2 aspects:
1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and,
2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle
When is this doctrine not applicable?
There are 2 situations where this is not applicable:

1. Against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which
nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or,
2. To those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of
activities
The first situation can be solved by proper construction while no challenge may be
mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities.
When is this doctrine applicable?
The doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from
ambiguity. In other words, the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot
be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.
It is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all
its possible applications. “A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others.”
Therefore, this doctrine is not applicable in a legislation couched in imprecise

language – but which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased. It can
only be applied on a “perfectly vague” act whose obscurity is evident on its face.
Is there a test to determine whether a statute is vague?
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether
the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice.
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The doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld and not absolute precision as to its certainty. Flexibility is permissible as long as
the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.
Overbreadth Doctrine
Too broad: The doctrine decrees that a “a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.”
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Angangan, Richard Vincent University of Santo Tomas | Faculty of Civil Law (A.Y. 2016 – 2017)
Angangan, Richard Vincent: Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph Lantion (2000)

January 18, 2000 (Decision)
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ,
respondents.
G.R. No. 139465, 18 January 2000, EN BANC (Melo, J.)
Facts:
On June 17,1999, The Department of Foreign Affairs received a U.S Note Vebale
No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez
(Jimenez). On June 18,199, the said document was forwarded and received by the
Department of Justice. Attached to the extradition documents were Grand Jury Indicment,
the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S District Court, Southern District of Florida, and
other supporting documents. The charges to against private respondent are as follows:
i. 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States;
2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
ii. 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax;4 counts; Maximum Penalty:5
years/count)
iii. 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; 2 counts; Maximum
Penalty: 5 years/count)
iv. 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; 6 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5
years/count)
v. 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts; Maximum
Penalty: less than 1 year)
vi. On July 1, 1999, Mr. Jimenez through his counsel, wrote a letter to the Sec.
of Justice requesting to serve Jimenez copies of the Extradition Documents
and be given sufficient time to comment on the request.
The Sec. of Justice denied the request of Mr. Jimenez for the following reasons;
i. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United
States enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the
procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and
admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements are under Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1069. Evaluation by the Department of the documents is not a
preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal
cases. Thus, the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all
criminal prosecutions are not available. It merely determines the
compliance of the Requesting Government with the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law and treaty. After the filing of the petition
for extradition, the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the
court with copies of the petition.
ii. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign
governments in all extradition requests. Furthermore, Article 7 of the RP-
US Extradition Treaty provides that the Philippine Government must
represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out
of a request for extradition. Thus, it must comply with the request of the
United States Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject
information.
iii. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that
"Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and
to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted
persons must be processed expeditiously.
Thus, Mr. Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court of NCR docketed as Civil
Case no. 99-94684, Mr. Jimenez in his petition, prayed for the following:
a. Mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the
extradition documents, and to give him opportunity to comment on, or
oppose, and evaluate the extradition request impartially, fairly and
objectively)
b. Certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner’s letter dated July 13,1999)
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c. Prohibition (Restrain the Petitioner from considering the extradition

request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Director of NBI from performing any act
directed to the extradition of Mr. Jimenez to the United States)
d. Issuance of a Temporary restraining order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
e. On August 9, 1999 Hon. Ralph C. Lantion of the Regional Trial Court of
NCR ruled in favor of Mr. Jimenez. Subsequently, Hon. Hilario G. Davide,
then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines ordered Hon.
Ralph Lantion to cease and desist from enforcing the assailed order dated
August 9, 1999 issued by the latter in Civil Case no. 99-94684. Moreover,
Due to Transcendental Importance of the matter, the Supreme Court
brushed aside the procedural matters which concerns the proceedings of
the said case.
Issues:
1. Whether the evaluation procedure is not a preliminary investigation nor akin

to preliminary investigation of criminal cases.
2. Whether the due process right granted by Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court on the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and
other supporting documents and the right to submit counter-affidavits and
other supporting documents within 10 days from receipt is dispensable.
3. Whether the right of the people to information on matters of public concern
granted under Sec. 7 of Art. III of the 1987 Constitution is violated.
Ruling:
I.
No. The Extradition Request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the requesting
state and addressed it to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Latter then is tasked to
evaluate the extradition request. The Secretary has the Authority to make technical
assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers in form and
substance, then, under his assessment, he determined that the crimes indicated are not
extraditable, he may outrightly deny such request. Lastly, he makes the determination
whether the request is politically motivated or a military offense which is not punishable
under non-military legislation.
The Extradition process is similar to power of investigation which consists in

gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful tool in an administrative
agency’s performance of quasi-judicial functions. in the case of Ruperto vs. Torres, the
court laid down the test of determination whether an administrative body is exercising its
quasi-judicial function or merely investigatory functions applies to an administrative body
authorized to evaluate extradition documents. If the only purpose of the investigation is
to verify the evidence submitted before it based on the facts presented to it, then such is
limited only to evaluation of the Extradition documents whether it can be filed in court.
However, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. It

may result to the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extraditee;
1. Provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of
the request. This is because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a
contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought
pending presentation of the request (Par. 1, Art. 9 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty) to prevent flight but he shall be automatically discharged after 60
days (Par. 4 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) or 20 days (Sec. 20[d] PD
1069) if no request is submitted. Otherwise, he can be continuously
detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Par. 5, Art 9, RP-US Extradition
Treaty).
2. Temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court (Sec. 6, PD 1069).
The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure is that:
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1. There is yet no extradite; BUT

2. It results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his
immediate incarceration.
Extradition Petition
Upon findings of the Sec. of Foreign Affairs, the Extradition request and its
supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he may now
give it to the Sec. of Justice for the filing to the proper Regional Trial Court. The Sec. of
Justice may authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Par. 1, Sec. 5,
PD 1069). The presiding judge shall issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee
to appear and to answer the petition. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears
that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends
of justice particularly to prevent flight. (Par. 1, Sec. 6, PD 1069).
Extradition Hearing
The Extradition law is silent whether the Extradition proceedings is criminal, civil,
or a special proceeding. The provisions of the Rules of Court shall apply during the
Extradition Hearing (Par. 1, Sec. 9, PD 1069). The attorney in charge of the extradition
case may represent the Requesting state throughout the proceedings (Sec. 8, PD
1069). The Court’s decision is based on the application of the dual criminality rule and
other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty to whether the
offense in connection of the extradition request is a military or a political one (Par. 3,
Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The decision shall be final and immediately
executory and appealable with the Court of Appeals where the provisions of the Rules of
Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply except for
the required 15-day period to file brief (Sec. 13, PD 1069).
II.
The petitioner construe that the silence of the law means the unavailability of the
right. The supreme court ruled in the negative. In the absence of a law or principle of law,
the court applies the rules of fair play. The application of the basic twin due process rights
of notice and hearing will not violate the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty
nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. In an
interstate extradition proceeding, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies
of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his
right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right. Mr. Jimenez’s due process
right, though not guarded by an existing statute or treaty, are protected by constitutional
guarantees.
III.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern granted under
Sec. 7 of Art. III of the 1987 Constitution is not violated in this case because the
government has no official action during the evaluation of the Extradition request. Thus,
the invocation of such right is premature. It is only after when such request is filed to the
Court of Justice where the determination whether to grant or deny the request is vested
and, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern.
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October 17, 2000 (Decision)

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ,
respondents.
G.R. No. 139465, 17 October 2000, EN BANC (Puno, J.)
Facts:
On January 18, 2000, the honorable Supreme Court Ruled in favor of Private
Respondent Mark Jimenez and ordered the petitioner to furnish private respondent copies
of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. On February 3, 2000, the
petitioner filed timely his motion for reconsideration. The petitioner, in his pleading, stated
that the Honorable court failed to appreciate the following facts and points of substance
and of value which, if considered, would alter the results of the case, thus;
i. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to
the filing of an extradition petition in court and a preliminary investigation.
ii. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a
denial of fundamental fairness.
iii. In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing requirement satisfies
no higher objective.
iv. The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the Philippine
Extradition Law is intended to prevent flight.
v. There is a need to balance the interest between the discretionary powers of
government and the rights of an individual.
vi. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice
and hearing may be dispensed with in this case results in a non-
sequitur conclusion.
vii. Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the Executive Branch
necessitating notice and hearing.
viii. By instituting a 'proceeding' not contemplated by PD No. 1069, the Supreme
Court has encroached upon the constitutional boundaries separating it from the
other two co-equal branches of government
ix. Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition
proceedings.
Consequently, Mr. Jimenez through his counsel, filed a comment opposing the
motion for reconsideration of the Petitioner.
Issue: Whether the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Ruling:
We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
P.D. No. 1069. which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the
time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as
its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition
court;
"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service of Notices. -

(1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as
soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on
the day and hour fixed in the order . . . Upon receipt of the answer, or should the
accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the
presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be
promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case."
In addition, granting the prospective extraditee the right of notice and hearing, would
defeat the very purpose of the aforementioned law.
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Moreover, an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation

wherein all rights of the accused is in operation as protected by the Article III Bill of rights
of the 1987 Constitution. The proceeding on an extradition request does not determine
the guilt of the accused rather the completeness and validity of such request. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the courts of the requesting state. Thus, the rights granted
by the constitution to the accused in determining his guilt or innonce cannot be invoked.
In the case of United States v. Galanis, the United States Supreme Court held that;
“An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional
safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from
extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.”
In an Extradition proceedings, the Judge does not determine the guilt of the
prospective extraditee, the former merely determine whether the Extradition Request by
the foreign state is valid and in accordance with the treaty and domestic laws.
P.D. No. 1069. which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty grants the
prospective extraditee the right to secure copy of the extradition request together with the
supporting documents and other evidence only after the extradition request is filed in the
court of justice. the right of the prospective extraditee is temporarily witheld during the
evaluation proceedings which best serve the interest of the state and prevent the flight or
the escape of the prospective extraditee.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision

in the case at bar promulgated on January18, 2000 is REVERSED. The assailed Order
issued by the public respondent judge on August 9, 1999 is SET ASIDE. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on August 17, 1999 is made PERMANENT. The
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25 is enjoined from conducting further proceedings
in Civil Case No. 99-94684
11 | P a g e
Angeles, Mark Vincent University of Santo Tomas | Faculty of Civil Law (A.Y. 2016 – 2017)
Angeles, Mark Vincent: Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers (2016)
WILFREDO MOSQUEDA et al., petitioner vs. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS &

EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. et al., respondents
G.R. NO. 189185, 16 August 2016, EN BANC (Bersamin, J.)
Facts:
This appeal through consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assails the
decision promulgated on January 09, 2009, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed
and set aside the judgment rendered on September 22, 2007 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch 17, in Davao City upholding the validity and constitutionality of Davao City
Ordinance No. 0309-07, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The

assailed September 22, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) 11th Judicial
Region, Branch 17, Davao City, upholding the validity and constitutionality of Davao City
Ordinance No. 0309-07, is hereby REVERSED ad SET ASIDE.
FURTHER, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 28 January 2008

enjoining the City Government of Davao, and any other person or entity acting in its
behalf, from enforcing and implementing City Ordinance No 0309-07, is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Antecedents
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City, enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007,
to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural
entities within Davao City – see attached copy of the ordinance
City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance on February 09, 2007. The
ordinance took effect on March 23, 2007 after its publication in the newspaper Mindanao
Pioneer.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc., (PBGEA, et al.) and
two of its members filed its petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the
ordinance. They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of
police power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of
property; and lacked publication pursuant to Section 511 of Republic Act 7160 (Local
Government Code).
On May 8, 2007, the residents living within and adjacent to the banana plantation
in Davao City led by Wilfredo Mosqueda submitted their Motion for Leave to Intervene
and Opposition to the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction. The RTC granted their motion
on June 4, 2007
On June 20, 2007, the RTC granted the prayer for issuance of the writ of the
preliminary injunction, and subsequently issued the writ.
Judgment of the RTC
Promulgated on September 22, 2007 on the assailed city ordinance 0309-07

WHEREFORE, the finding of the subject valid and constitutional in all aspect of
the grounds assailed by the petitioner, said ordinance.
Accordingly, the order of this court dated June 20, 2007, granting the writ of
preliminary injunction as prayed for by petitioner is ordered cancelled and set aside as
result of this decision.
12 | P a g e
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised the police power
under the General Welfare Clause if the Local Government Code, that the ordinance
being a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial
spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it exposed
resident in greater risk caused by aerial drift.
However, RTC recognized the impracticability of the 3-month transition period

under Section 5 of the ordinance.
Decision of the CA
PBGEA, et al., appealed which CA granted its application and consequently issued
a TRO to meanwhile enjoin the effectivity of the ordinance.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, reversing the

judgment of the RTC. It declared Section 5 of the ordinance as void and unconstitutional
for being unreasonable and oppressive; the ban ran afoul with the Equal Protection
Clause inasmuch as Section 3 (a) of the ordinance – which defined the term aerial
spraying – did not make reasonable distinction between hazards and benefits, classes of
pesticide and fungicide, and levels of concentration.
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting
people and environment to the imposition of the ban.
It also ruled that the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone within and around
the agricultural plantations under Section 6 of the ordinance constituted the taking of the
property without due process, because the landowners are forced to cede property
without just compensation; there was no showing that the 30-meter surrounding belt is
obnoxious to the public welfare.
Also, the absence of separability clause makes the ordinance unconstitutional.
The City of Davao and intervenors filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, but the CA denied the motions of August 7, 2009.
Hence, now this consolidated appeals by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues:
In G.R. No. 189185, petitioners Mosqueda, et al. rely on the following grounds, namely:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED FUNDAMENTAL PRECEPTS
AND CONCEPTS OF LAW WHICH, PROPERLY CONSIDERED,
NECESSARILY LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DAVAO
ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND VALID
II
THE DAV AO ORDINANCE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
III
THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY THE DAV AO ORDINANCE IS MORE
THAN REASONABLY RELATED TO THE PURPOSE IT SEEKS TO
ACHIEVE
IV
THE DAV AO ORDINANCE IS VALID, BEING DEMONSTRABLY
REASONABLE AND FAIR
v
THE REQUIREMENT RELATING TO THE 30-METER BUFFER
13 | P a g e
ZONE ARE [SIC] CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW,

BEING AV ALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
In G.R. No. 189305, petitioner City of Davao submits the following as the issues to be
considered and resolved, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT. OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 5 OF ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07, SERIES OF
2007 IS OPPRESSIVE AND AN UNREASONABLE
EXERCISE OF DELEGATED POLICE POWER
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07 IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION;
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07
CONSTITUTES TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT
COMPENSATION, THUS, VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
IV
WHETHER OR NOT AERIAL SPRAYING OF FUNGICIDES IS SAFE
TO THE PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Ruling:
We deny the petitions for review for their lack of merit.
I
Preliminary considerations:
The significant role of the banana industry
in ensuring economic stability and food security
Banana exportation plays a significant role in the maintenance of the country's

economic stability and food security. Banana is a consistent dollar earner and the fourth
largest produced commodity in the Philippines. In 2010, the Philippines figured among
the top three banana-producing countries in the world. In 2014, fresh bananas accounted
for 17% of the country's top agricultural export commodities, gaining a close second to
coconut oil with 18%. The Davao Region (Region XI) was the top banana producing
region in 2013, with a production growth rate of 16.4%, and 33.76% share in the total
agricultural output of the Region.
Despite these optimistic statistics, the banana industry players struggle to keep up
with the demands of the trade by combatting the main threat to production posed by two
major fungal diseases: The Panama Disease Tropical Race 4 (Fusarium oxysprum fsp.
cubense) and the Black Sigatoka leaf spot disease (Mycosphaerella fjiensis more/et).
Pesticides have proven to be effective only against the Black Sigatoka disease.
II
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City
enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07
under its corporate powers
The petitioners assert that Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid act of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City pursuant to its delegated authority to exercise police
power in the furtherance of public welfare and in ensuring a sound and balanced
14 | P a g e
environment for its constituents. The respondents negate this assertion, describing the
ordinance as unreasonable, discriminatory and oppressive.
The petitioners' assertion of its authority to enact Ordinance No0309-07 is upheld.
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-

pronged test: the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate
powers of the local government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the
conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes,
as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy).
We next ascertain whether the City of Davao acted within the limits of its corporate
powers in enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07.
The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations in order to promote the general welfare. Such legislative powers spring from
the delegation thereof by Congress through either the Local Government Code or a
special law. The General Welfare Clause in Section 16 of the Local Government Code
embodies the legislative grant that enables the local government unit to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote and maintain
local autonomy.
Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely: the general

legislative power and the police power proper.
Section 458 of the Local Government Code explicitly vests the local government
unit with the authority to enact legislation aimed at promoting the general welfare.
In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced and healthful
ecology, the local government unit takes its cue from Section 15 and Section 16, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution. Following the provisions of the Local Government Code and
the Constitution, the acts of the local government unit designed to ensure the health and
lives of its constituents and to promote a balanced and healthful ecology are well within
the corporate powers vested in the local government unit.
The respondents pose a challenge against Ordinance No. 0309-07 on the ground
that the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City has disregarded the health of the plantation
workers, contending that by imposing the ban against aerial spraying the ordinance would
place the plantation workers at a higher health risk because the alternatives of either
manual or truck-boom spraying method would be adopted; and that exposing the workers
to the same risk sought to be prevented by the ordinance would defeat its purported
purpose.
We disagree with the respondents.
With or without the ban against aerial spraying, the health and safety of plantation
workers are secured by existing state policies, rules and regulations implemented by the
FPA, among others, which the respondents are lawfully bound to comply with.
Furthermore, the constitutional right to health and maintaining environmental

integrity are privileges that do not only advance the interests of a group of individuals.
The benefits of protecting human health and the environment transcend geographical
locations and even generations. This is the essence of Sections 15 and 16, Article II of
the Constitution. In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. we declared that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications.
15 | P a g e
III
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates
the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance ·must not· only be enacted within the corporate powers of the
local government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. In order to
declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following
substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.
A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers
only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought
to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution. Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a
sufficient justification for the Government's action. This means that in exercising police
power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the
ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose.
The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application

within three months can readily be appreciated given the vast area of the affected
plantations and the corresponding resources required therefor. To recall, even the RTC
recognized the impracticality of attaining a full-shift to other modes of spraying within three
months in view of the costly financial and civil works required for the conversion. CA has
proper observation on its ruling.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone
will consume considerable time and financial resources given the topography and
geographical features of the plantations. As such, the conversion could not be completed
within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents and other affected
individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month period
under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits
would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under
Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the
imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial
use of their property that amounts to taking without just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., we have thoroughly explained that taking only
becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its
property. The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing
the effects of aerial spraying within and near the plantations. Although Section 3(e) of the
ordinance requires the planting of diversified trees within the identified buffer zone, the
requirement cannot be construed and deemed as confiscatory requiring payment of just
compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to compensation if the taking amounts
to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial or productive uses of the land. The
respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely deprived of their
landholdings because they can still cultivate or make other productive uses of the areas
to be identified as the buffer zones.
16 | P a g e
IV
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates
the Equal Protection Clause
A serious challenge being posed against Ordinance No. 0309-07 rests on its
supposed collision with the Equal Protection Clause. The respondents submit that the
ordinance transgresses this constitutional guaranty on two counts, to wit: (1) by
prohibiting aerial spraying per se, regardless of the substance or the level of concentration
of the chemicals to be applied; and (2) by imposing the 30-meter buffer zone in all
agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the sizes of the landholding.
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.
The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals determined

according to a valid classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently
from another. In other words, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial
distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class
The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the justification given by the

Government for its conduct is gauged by using the means-end test. This test requires
analysis of: (1) the interests of the public that generally require its exercise, as
distinguished from those of a particular class; and (2) the means employed that are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort
to three levels of scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict
scrutiny.
The petitioners advocate the rational basis test. In particular, the petitioning
residents of Davao City argue that the CA erroneously applied the strict scrutiny approach
when it declared that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because the ban
included all substances including water and vitamins. The respondents agree with the
CA, however, and add that the ordinance does not rest on a valid distinction because it
has lacked scientific basis and has ignored the classifications of pesticides observed by
the FPA.
We partly agree with both parties.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach
appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the
reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2)
examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a
substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons or
things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
Applying the test, the established classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 is to
be viewed in relation to the group of individuals similarly situated with respect to the
avowed purpose. This gives rise to two classes, namely: (1) the classification under
Ordinance No. 0309-07 (legislative classification); and (2) the classification based on
purpose (elimination of the mischief). The legislative classification found in Section 4 of
the ordinance refers to "all agricultural entities" within Davao City. Meanwhile, the
classification based on the purpose of the ordinance cannot be easily discerned because
the ordinance does not make any express or implied reference to it. We have to search
the voluminous records of this case to divine the animus behind the action of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod in prohibiting aerial spraying as an agricultural activity. The
effort has led us to the following proposed resolution of the Sangguniang Panglungsod
series of 2007
17 | P a g e
The proposed resolution identified aerial spraying of pesticides as a nuisance

because of the unstable wind direction during the aerial application, which (1) could
potentially contaminate the Davao City watersheds and ground water sources; (2) was
detrimental to the health of Davao City residents, most especially those living in the
nearby plantations; and (3) posed a hazard to animals and other crops. Plainly, the
mischief that the prohibition sought to address was the fungicide drift resulting from the
aerial application; hence, the classification based on the intent of the proposed ordinance
covered all agricultural entities conducting aerial spraying of fungicides that caused drift.
The assailed ordinance thus becomes riddled with several distinction issues.
A brief discussion on the occurrence of the drift that the ordinance seeks to address
is necessary.
Primary drift is the off-site movement of spray droplets at, or very close to,
the time of application. For example, a field application using a boom in a gusty
wind situation could easily lead to a primary drift. Primary spray drift is not product
specific, and the active ingredients do not differ in their potential to drift. However,
the type of formulation, surfactant, or other adjuvant may affect spray drift potential.
Secondary drift is associated with pesticide vapor. Pesticide vapor drift is

the movement of the gas that forms when an active ingredient evaporates from
plants, soil, or other surfaces. And while vapor drift is an important issue, it only
pertains to certain volatile products. Vapor drift and other forms of secondary drift
are product specific. Water-based sprays will volatize more quickly than oil-based
sprays. However, oil based sprays can drift farther, especially above 95°F,
because they are lighter.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from
the conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted
boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort
and alleged health risks to the community and to the environment. A ban against aerial
spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve."
In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the
classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the seeks
to eliminate. A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose
or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the
intended purpose of the law.
Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be
"overinclusive" because its impending implementation will affect groups that have no
relation to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose. It can be noted that the
imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the
substance to be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be
conducted. In this respect, the CA has correctly observed this matter.
We clarify that the CA did not thereby apply the strict scrutiny approach but only
evaluated the classification established by the ordinance in relation to the purpose. This
is the essence of the rational basis approach. The petitioners should be made aware that
the rational basis scrutiny is not based on a simple means-purpose correlation; nor does
the rational basis scrutiny automatically result in a presumption of validity of the ordinance
or deference to the wisdom of the local legislature.
However, we do not subscribe to the respondents' position that there must be a

distinction based on the level of concentration or the classification imposed by the FP A
on pesticides: This strenuous requirement cannot be expected from a local government
unit that should only be concerned with general policies in local administration and should
not be restricted by technical concerns that are best left to agencies vested with the
appropriate special competencies.
18 | P a g e
The overinclusiveness of Ordinance No. 0309-07 may also be traced to its Section
6 by virtue of its requirement for the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone. ·This
requirement applies regardless of the area of the agricultural landholding, geographical
location, topography, crops grown and other distinguishing characteristics that ideally
should bear a reasonable relation to the evil sought to be avoided.
The establishment and maintenance of the buffer zone will become more
burdensome to the small agricultural landholders because: (1) they have to reserve the
30-meter belt surrounding their property; (2) that will have to be identified through GPS;
(3) the metes and bounds of the buffer zone will have to be plotted in a survey plan for
submission to the local government unit; and (4) will be limited as to the crops that may
be cultivated therein based on the mandate that the zone shall be devoted to "diversified
trees" taller than what are being grown therein. It is seriously to be doubted whether
such circumstance will prevent the occurrence of the drift to the nearby residential areas.
The discriminatory nature of the ordinance can be seen from its policy as stated in
its Section 2.
Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings that are the only
ideal venues for the investment of machineries and equipment capable of aerial spraying.
It effectively denies the affected individuals the technology aimed at efficient and cost-
effective operations and cultivation not only of banana but of other crops as well.
The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and

unreasonable in light of the existence and availability of more permissible and practical
alternatives that will not overburden the respondents and those dependent on their
operations as well as those who stand to be affected by the ordinance.
V
The Precautionary Principle
still requires scientific basis
The principle of precaution originated as a social planning principle in Germany. In

the 1980s, the Federal Republic of Germany used the Vorsogeprinzip ("foresight
principle") to justify the implementation of vigorous policies to tackle acid rain, global
warming and pollution of the North Sea. It has since emerged from a need to protect
humans and the environment from increasingly unpredictable, uncertain, and
unquantifiable but possibly catastrophic risks such as those associated with Genetically
Modified Organisms and climate change, among others.
In this jurisdiction, the principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure

for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) involves matters of evidence in cases
where there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human
activity and environmental effect. In such an event, the courts may construe a set of facts
as warranting either judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving and protecting
the environment.
It is notable, therefore, that the precautionary principle shall only be relevant if

there is concurrence of three elements, namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental
damage and serious or irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is relatively
certain, or ·that the causal link between an action and environmental damage can be
established, or the probability of occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not
precautionary measures, may be taken. Neither will the precautionary principle apply if
there is no indication of a threat of environmental harm, or if the threatened harm is trivial
or easily reversible.
We cannot see the presence of all the elements. To begin with, there has been no
scientific study. Although the precautionary principle allows lack of full scientific certainty
in establishing a connection between the serious or irreversible harm and the human
activity, its application is still premised on empirical studies.
19 | P a g e
The only study conducted to validate the effects of aerial spraying appears to be
the Summary Report on the Assessment and Fact-Finding Activities on the Issue of Aerial
Spraying in Banana Plantations. Yet, the fact-finding team that generated the report was
not a scientific study that could justify the resort to the precautionary principle. In fact, the
Sangguniang Bayan ignored the findings and conclusions of the fact-finding team that
recommended only a regulation, not a ban, against aerial spraying.
The recommendation was in line with the advocacy of judicious handling and
application of chemical pesticides by the DOH-Center for Health Development in the
Davao Region in view of the scarcity of scientific studies to support the ban against aerial
spraying.
VI
Ordinance No. 0309-07 is an ultra vires act
The petitioners represent that Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid exercise of

legislative and police powers by the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City pursuant to
Section 458 in relation to Section 16 both of the Local Government Code. The
respondents counter that Davao City thereby disregarded the regulations implemented
by the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), including its and classification of safe
pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.
We uphold the respondents.
The power to legislate under the General Welfare Clause is not meant to be an
invincible authority. In fact, Salaveria and Abendan emphasized the reasonableness and
consistency of the exercise by the local government units with the laws or policies of the
State. More importantly, because the police power of the local government units flows
from the express delegation of the power by Congress, its exercise is to be construed in
strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting the power
should be construed against the local legislative units.
Although the Local Government Code vests the municipal corporations with
sufficient power to govern themselves and manage their affairs and activities, they
definitely have no right to enact ordinances dissonant with the State's laws and policy.
The function of pesticides control, regulation and development is within the

jurisdiction of the FPA under Presidential Decree No. 1144. The FP A was established in
recognition of the need for a technically oriented government entity that will protect the
public from the risks inherent in the use of pesticides.
Evidently, the FPA was responsible for ensuring the compatibility between the
usage and the application of pesticides in agricultural activities and the demands for
human health and environmental safety. This responsibility includes not only the
identification of safe and unsafe pesticides, but also the prescription of the safe modes of
application in keeping with the standard of good agricultural practices.
In enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 without the inherent and explicit authority to do
so, the City of Davao performed an ultra vires act. As a local government unit, the City of
Davao could act only as an agent of Congress, and its every act should always conform
to and reflect the will of its principal.
Moreover, Ordinance No. 0309-07 proposes to prohibit an activity already covered

by the jurisdiction of the FP A, which has issued its own regulations under its
Memorandum Circular No. 02, Series of 2009, entitled Good Agricultural Practices for
Aerial Spraying of Fungicide in Banana Plantations.
While Ordinance No. 0309-07 prohibits aerial spraying in banana plantations within
the City of Davao, Memorandum Circular No. 02 seeks to regulate the conduct of aerial
spraying in banana plantations pursuant to Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1144, and
in conformity with the standard of Good Agricultural Practices (GAP). Memorandum
Circular No. 02 covers safety procedures, handling and post-application, including the
qualifications of applicators, storing of fungicides, safety and equipment of plantation
20 | P a g e
personnel, all of which are incompatible with the prohibition against aerial spraying under
Ordinance ·No. 0309-07.
Although Memorandum Circular No. 02 and Ordinance No. 0309-07 both require
the maintenance of the buffer zone, they differ as to their treatment and maintenance of
the buffer zone. Under Memorandum Circular No. 02, a 50-meter "no-spray boundary"
buffer zone should be observed by the spray pilots, and the observance of the zone
should be recorded in the Aerial Spray Final Report (ASFR) as a post-application safety
measure. On the other hand, Ordinance No. 0309-07 requires the maintenance of the 30
-meter buffer zone to be planted with diversified trees. Devoid of the specific delegation
to its local legislative body, the City of Davao exceeded its delegated authority to enact
Ordinance No. 0309-07. Hence, Ordinance No. 0309-07 must be struck down also for
being an ultra vires act on the part of the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City.
Finally, the unconstitutionality of the ban renders nugatory Ordinance No. 0309-07
in its entirety. Consequently, any discussion on the lack of the separability clause
becomes entirely irrelevant.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on

certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; PERMANENTLY ENJOINS respondent City of Davao, and all
persons or entities acting in its behalf or under its authority, from enforcing and
implementing Ordinance No. 0309-07; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
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Bandillo, Jean: Maquiling v. COMELEC (2013)
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, respondents.
G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 2013, EN BANC (Sereno, C.J.)
Facts:
Rommel Arnado (Arnado) is a natural-born Filipino citizen. He lost his Filipino

citizenship as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United
States of America. Afterwards, he applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 9225
(R.A. No. 9225) and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July
10, 2008; thereupon an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, he took again his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his U.S. citizenship.
Arnado then filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte for the May 2010 Local and National elections. However, another mayoralty
candidate, Linog C. Balua (Balua) filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
Certificate of Candidacy. Balua insisted that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, as attested to by the Bureau of Immigration
indicated in a certification that the nationality of Arnado is “USA-American.” In addition, a
computer-generated travel record also indicates that Arnado has been using his US
passport in entering and departing the Philippines.
When required to answer, Arnado failed to file his answer. Arnado garnered the
highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. It was only after his proclamation that he filed his
verified answer.
The COMELEC First Division held that Arnado appears to have substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, that his act of consistently using his US
passport after renouncing his US citizenship effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation and subsequently annulled Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Arnado sought reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. Then, another

mayoralty candidate, Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), who garnered the second
highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened the case. Maquiling argues that
while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in the case and that he being
the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be
proclaimed as the winner.
COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and
granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, Maquiling brought this petition before
the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
2. Whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable
to this case.
Ruling:
1. YES. The Supreme Court held that the use of foreign passport after renouncing
one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run
for an elective position.
22 | P a g e
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American

citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements
for eligibility to run for public office. By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed
to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws
of the foreign country. However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently
and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs
positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it
is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former
Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local
elective position.
The Supreme Court agreed with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a
foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily
and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not
retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen
by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him
a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Thus, Arnado’s act of using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding
the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
2. NO. Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes

from among the qualified candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election
as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
The Supreme Court have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC and
Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes
cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner
of an election.
The disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office
is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that
existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also
the proclamation. The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As
discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his
certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based
on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been
counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code
will not apply.
Doctrine of Rejection of the Second-Placer
The well-settled doctrine in the 1912 case of Topacio v. Paredes which is the
jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in an election contest must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to
the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible
candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that “the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question
23 | P a g e
is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots.” As held by the
Supreme Court, this phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum.
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even
have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one
process with another and explaining the effects thereof.
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Batino, Apryl Sharien: Abdula v. Guiani (2000)
Mayor Bai Unggie Abdula and Odin Abdula, petitioner, vs. HON. Japal M. Guiani ,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge, of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cotabato City, respondent.
G.R. No. 118821, 18 February 2000, Third Division (Gonzaga-Reyes, J.)
Facts:
At bench is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest
issued by herein respondent Japal M. Guiani, then presiding judge of Branch 14 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, ordering the arrest of petitioners without bail in
Criminal Case No. 2376 for murder.
Issue: Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued against petitioners is valid.
Ruling:
The second issue which will be the focus of this synopsis is in connection with
Section 2 of Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution which states, “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath of affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
It must be emphasized that only a judge may issue a search warrant of a warrant
of arrest, he is mandated by the Constitution to determine probable cause personally.
With respect to the first issue raised by the petitioners that respondent judge had
no legal authority to order the reinvestigation of the criminal charge considering that the
said charge has been previously dismissed as against them, the court ruled that
respondent did not abuse his discretion in doing so.
On the second issue, as to the legality of the warrant of arrest issued by respondent
judge, petitioners cited the case of Allado v. Diokno arguing that the warrant for his arrest
should be recalled considering that the respondent judge “did not personally examine the
evidence nor did he call the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their credible
accounts”. As proof, he points to the fact that the information was filed at around 4:00 pm
of January 2, 1995 and the order of arrest was immediately issued the following day or
on January 3, 1995. Moreover, petitioner argues, respondent judge did not even issue an
order stating that there is probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest, a clear
violation of the guidelines setforth in the Allado case.
Respondent, in his Comment, denies any irregularity in the issuance of the warrant
of arrest.
The OSG in defending the respondent, argues that:

• The allegation that respondent did not personally examine the evidence is nor
supported by current jurisprudence.
• Pronouncement in Soliven vs. Makasiar that “In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause, the judge is not required to personally examine the complaint
and his witnesses”.
• Judges enjoys a wide degree of latitude in the determination of probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrest depending on the circumstance of each case.
• That petitioners could not point out a single flaw in the evidence presented by the
prosecutor to negate the existence of probable cause.
The court find merit in the contention of the petitioners. \
It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires that the judge to determine
probable cause “personally”. This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to place a
greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges. `
25 | P a g e
In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the questioned warrant as
there was “no reason for him to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant
Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that the probable cause
was found to exist as against those charged in the information filed”. The admission is an
admission that respondent relied solely and completely on the certification made by the
fiscal that probable cause exists as against those charged in the information and issued
the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor’s findings and
recommendations. Clearly, respondent judge abdicated his duty under the Constitution
to determine on his own the issue of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest.
Consequently, the warrant of arrest should be declared null and void.
The court in coming up with the decision cited the case of Ho. vs. People
enumerating the duties of a judge in determining probable cause personally:
• The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose
different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon.
The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should
be issued against the accused.
• Since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report
of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The contents of the prosecutor's report will support his
own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused for an offense
and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently.
Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare
report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or
nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order.
• It is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the
preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. What
is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting
documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn
statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon
which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which
to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.
The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's
recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case.
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Bertolano, Ramilyn: Aniag, Jr. v. COMELEC (1994)
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE, respondents.
G.R. No. 104961, 7 October 2004, EN BANC (Bellosillo, Jr., J.)
Facts:
In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing,
carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or
bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations,
and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC
also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates
engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike
forces, and establishing spot checkpoints.
Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House
of Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the
House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the
firearms from petitioner’s house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a
checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP
searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He
then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only
complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard.
Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against
petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to
show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that

the rules and regulations of an administrative body must respect the limits defined by law;
that the Omnibus Election Code provides for the disqualification of any person/candidate
from running for or holding a public office, i.e., any person who has either been declared
by competent authority as insane or incompetent or has been sentenced by final judgment
for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced
to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude; that
gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned
in the resolution are not within the letter or spirit of the provisions of the Code; that the
resolution did away with the requirement of final conviction before the commission of
certain offenses; that instead, it created a presumption of guilt as a candidate may be
disqualified from office in situations (a) where the criminal charge is still pending, (b)
where there is no pending criminal case, and (c) where the accused has already been
acquitted, all contrary to the requisite quantum of proof for one to be disqualified from
running or holding public office under the Omnibus Election Code, i.e., proof beyond
reasonable doubt. As a result, petitioner concludes, Resolution No. 2327 violates the
fundamental law thus rendering it fatally defective.
But, the issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the

11 May 1992 synchronized elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat
in Congress in the elections that ensued. Consequently, it is now futile to discuss the
implications of the charge against him on his qualification to run for public office.
However, there still remains an important question to be resolved, i.e., whether he can be
validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House
of Representatives the two firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered
from the warrantless search of his car.
Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP conducted the
search. According to him, without a warrant and without informing the driver of his
fundamental rights the policemen searched his car. The firearms were not tucked in the
waist nor within the immediate reach of Arellano but were neatly packed in their gun cases
and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car. Thus, the search of his car that yielded
the evidence for the prosecution was clearly violative of Secs. 2 and 3, par. (2), Art. III, of
the Constitution.
27 | P a g e
Petitioner further maintains that he was neither impleaded as party respondent in

the preliminary investigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor nor included in the
charge sheet. Consequently, making him a respondent in the criminal information would
violate his constitutional right to due process.
Petitioner disputes the charge that he violated Sec. 33 of R.A. 7166, which
prohibits any candidate for public office during the election period from employing or
availing himself or engaging the services of security personnel or bodyguards since,
admittedly, Arellano was not a security officer or bodyguard but a civilian employee
assigned to him as driver by the House of Representatives. Specifically, petitioner further
argues, Arellano was instructed to return to Congress, as he did, the firearms in
compliance with the directive of its Sergeant-at-Arms pursuant to the "Gun Ban," thus, no
law was in fact violated.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to
return the firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant
less search of his car.
Ruling:
A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate

authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as
the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search.
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by

an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a
lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the
seizure of evidence in plain view, 17 as well as the search conducted at police or military
checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless
search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is merely limited to a visual search.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers

conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search
that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. The
existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search is determined by the facts
of each case. Thus, we upheld the validity of the warrantless search in situations where
the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed within
his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back
of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the
car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent
any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and
Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from
the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also
shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up
the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation
of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was
a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to
due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity
to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself a
respondent in the case.
Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the
firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against
the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
28 | P a g e
Borja, Merryl Angelic: People v. Doria (1999)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENCIO DORIA y
BOLADO, AND VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA “NENETH”, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 125299, 22 January 1999, EN BANC (Puno, J.)
Facts:
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police which caught accused Doria
red-handed of selling prohibited drugs and during the operation the police officers
searched for the marked bills that they used in buying said drugs which happened to be
in the house of Gaddao, according to Doria. When they reached her house, the police
officers came upon a box. He saw that one of the box’s flaps was open and inside the
box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared
similar to the marijuana earlier “sold” to him by “Jun.” His suspicion aroused, PO3
Manlangit entered “Neneth’s” house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box
and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants
in violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The trial court found the existence of an “organized/syndicated crime group” and
sentenced both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500, 000.00 each.
Hence, this present petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria was lawful.
2. Whether or not the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao and the
search of her person and residence, and the admissibility of the pieces of
evidence obtained therefrom was valid.
Ruling:
1. We hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful.

Warrantless arrest is allowed in the three instances as provided by Section 5 of
the Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: “Sec. 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when
an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) when the person to
be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.”
Under Section 5(a), as above quoted, a person may be arrested without a

warrant if he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an
accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation,
the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without
warrant.
2. The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and
residence, the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different
matters. Our constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant
and any evidence obtained without warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
29 | P a g e
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust

operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was
not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no
occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest
in “hot pursuit.” In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen
pounced her.
This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correct found that
the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
The “plain view” doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a)
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent
to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.
The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or

properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course
of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and it
discovery inadvertent.
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed
to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where
the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view
and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or
if its content are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and
may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experiences observer
could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article
is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.
The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite
search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the
poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial
court. The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana was found
in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she
herself is guilty of the crime charged.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig
City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified.
Accused-appellant Florencio Doria is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) and accused-
appellant Violeta Gaddao is acquitted. SO ORDERED.
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Cadiz, Ma. Charlene: ISAE v. Quisimbing (2000)
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs.

HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 128845, 1 June 2000, First Division (Kapunan, J.)
Facts:
International School Inc. is a domestic educational institution for the dependents

of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. It employs both local and
foreign educators. The foreign hires are granted with benefits which are not accorded to
local hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave
travel allowance. Moreover, foreign hires are receiving salary which is twenty-five percent
higher than the local hires.
During the negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, the

International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE), a legitimate labor union, contested the
difference between the salary rates of the local and foreign hires. ISAE claims that the
point-of-hire classification employed by International School Inc. (the School) is an invalid
classification and grant of higher salaries to foreign hires constitutes racial discrimination.
On the other hand, the School explained that the point-of-hire classification constitutes a
valid classification. There is a substantial distinction between foreign and local hires. The
foreign hires will have to leave their domicile abroad, be employed for a limited tenure
and face economic disadvantages in the Philippines. However, local hires enjoy security
of tenure. Hence, to attract competent professionals and remain competitive on an
international level, according foreign hires with a higher salary is justified.
Issue: Whether or not the grant of higher salaries to foreign hires is discriminatory.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the grant of higher salaries to foreign hires than local
hires cry discrimination. That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond
contention. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to “to give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities.” The Constitution also provides that “labor is entitled to humane conditions
of work” and “equality of employment opportunities for all”. The basis of “equal pay for
equal work” principle was also derived from principles on International Law, International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Labor Code.
The point-of-hire classification employed by the School cannot be used to justify

the grant of higher salaries to foreign hires. It is an invalid classification because there is
no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by the foreign and local hires.
In this case, the school failed to show that the foreign hires perform work which is 25%
substantially greater than the local hires.
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies
to the School, its “international character” notwithstanding. If an employer accords
employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform
equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer
pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he
receives less or why others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The
employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why
the employee is treated unfairly.
Accordingly, discrimination in terms of wages is also abhorred by the Labor Code.

The labor code protects employees against any kind of discrimination at work. Hence, it
provides that the State “shall ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or
creed.” The School cannot invoke its need to entice foreign competent professionals and
remain competitive in the international market to justify the distinction it employed
31 | P a g e
between the salaries of the local and foreign hires. This was made to the prejudice of
local hires. Hence, it violated the “equal pay for equal work” principle
Cariaga, Camille Grace: Stop-and-Frisk Search (Terry Search)
Stop-and-Frisk Search (Terry Search)

(from the case Terry vs Ohio, June 10, 1968, 392 US 1)
While he was patrolling in downtown Cleveland, Police Detective McFadden

noticed Petitioner Terry and another man named Chilton repeatedly walking up and down
the same street. Officer McFadden saw Terry and Chilton proceed alternately back and
forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window (Zucker’s Store),
which they did for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was followed by
a conference between Terry and Chilton, and during one of the conferences, they were
joined by a third man name named Katz. The officer believed that the Petitioner and the
other men were “casing” a store for a potential robbery. Given the nature of the behavior
of the three men, Officer McFadden decided to approach them. The officer identified
himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men “mumbled something”,
whereupon McFadden spun petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing, and
found in his (petitioner) overcoat pocket a pistol. Petitioner Terry was then charged with
carrying a concealed weapon.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that it is a reasonable search where
a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to conclude that criminal
activity may be happening and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing
of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Therefore, the search done by the police officer to seize from Terry the revolver was
reasonable and the said weapon was properly admitted in evidence against him (Terry).
Manalili v. Court of Appeals (1997)

ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 113447, 9 October 1997 (280 SCRA 400) Third Division (Panganiban, J.)
Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ decision1 in affirming the trial court’s
decision2 to convict Manalili of Illegal Possession of Marijuana Residue (Violation of
Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425).
At about 2:10 PM of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti- Narcotics Unit of the
Kalookan City Police Station, named Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas, were
conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
The surveillance was being made because of an information that drug addicts were
roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. Upon alighting from the vehicle,
the policemen chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs.
The man was observed to have reddish eyes and have been walking in a swaying
manner. When the man tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and
introduced themselves as police officers. The police asked the man what he was holding
in his hands. The man tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu then asked the man if he could
see what the said man had in his hands. The man showed the wallet and allowed Pat.
Romeo Espiritu to examine it. After examining the wallet, the police officers found
suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. Pat. Espiritu kept the wallet and its
marijuana contents.
The man was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over the confiscated wallet and
1 People of the Philippines vs Alain Manalili y Dizon, G.R. Cr No. 07266, April 19, 1993
2
Crim. Case No. C-30549
32 | P a g e
its suspected marijuana contents. After investigation, the man turned out to be Alain
Manalili. The substance found on Manalili’s wallet was sent to the National Bureau of
Investigation Forensic Chemistry Section for chemical analysis. The substance was
confirmed to be crushed marijuana leaves.
However, Manalili’s version of what happened was different. According to Manalili,

at about 2:00 PM of April 11, 1988, he was aboard a tricycle at A. Mabini street near the
Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three policemen ordered the
driver of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger were under
the influence of marijuana. The policemen brought the accused and the tricycle driver,
named Loreto Medenilla, inside the Ford Fierra which the policemen were riding in. The
policemen then bodily searched the accused and the tricycle driver. Manalili asked the
policemen why he was being searched and the policemen replied that he (accused) was
carrying marijuana. However, nothing was found on the accused and the tricycle driver.
The policemen allowed the tricycle driver to go but brought Manalili to the police station
where they said they would again search the accused. On the way to the police station,
Manalili saw a neighbor, named Roberto Abes, and signaled the latter to follow him. Upon
arriving at the police station, the accused was asked to remove his pants in the presence
of the said neighbor and another companion. Nothing was found, except for dirt and dust.
The accused was led to a cell, and was then informed that the police officers found
marijuana inside the pockets of his pants. On the same day, the accused was brought in
the office of an inquest Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was
found on his person but the Fiscal told the accused not to say anything. The tricycle driver
and the accused’s neighbor also testified that no marijuana was found on the body of the
accused.
The trial court convicted Manalili of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely
because of the strength of the arresting officer’s testimony. The trial court said that
Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were neutral and disinterested witnesses, testifying only
on what transpired during the performance of their duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based on speculations, surmises,
or conjectures. Hence, this present petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is admissible.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the policemen were material and substantial, and not minor.
3. Whether or not the evidence is sufficient to prove Manalili’s guilt.
Ruling:
1. The evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is admissible.
Petitioner Manalili contended that the admission of the marijuana leaves found in
his possession was a product of an illegal search. However, the Supreme Court
concluded that the search conducted by Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas was valid,
being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In Terry vs Ohio3, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the
vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):
“. . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him

reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where
in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing
of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon
3
Terry vs Ohio, June 10, 1968, 392 US 1
33 | P a g e
seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were
taken.”
In allowing the search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of
effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person in
appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause.
In admitting in evidence the two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US
Supreme Court held that what justified the limited search was the more immediate interest
of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was
dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him. However, it did not abandon the rule that police must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure,
excused only by exigent circumstances.
In the Philippines, Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides the
general rule that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional. Any evidence obtained
in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a “fruit of the
poisonous tree”. However, the case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated 5 recognized
exceptions to the general rule against warrantless search and seizure, to wit: (1) Search
incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) Search of moving vehicles, (3) Seizure in plain view, (4)
Customs search, and (5) Waiver by the accused themselves of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Stop-and-Frisk has already been adopted as another
exception to the general rule against a search without warrant. In Posadas vs Court of
Appeals4, the Court held that there were many instances where a search and seizure
could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-
and-frisk.
*In the case at hand, the policemen observed during their surveillance that Manalili
had red eyes and was wobbling like drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which
according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his
experience as a member of the Anti- Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such
suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were “high”. The policemen
therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually “high” on
drugs. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that
Manalili is deemed to have waived the constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizure when he failed to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under
Rule 45 (Petition for Certiorari), the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by
the petitioner. Issues not raised during the trial cannot be pleaded for the first time on
appeal.
2. The Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the inconsistencies in the testimonies
of the policemen were not substantial enough.
Petitioner contended that the 2 arresting officers’ (Patrolmen Espiritu and

Lumabas) testimony contained “polluted, irreconcilable, and unexplained” contradictions
which did not support petitioner’s conviction. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, and
ruled that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses, particularly when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is accorded great weight and respect. The Supreme
Court will only abandon this rule if there are substantial facts and circumstances
overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court which, if considered, would materially
affect the result of the case. As long as the witnesses concur on the material points, slight
differences in their remembrance of details will not affect the essential veracity of their
statements. In the case at hand, there were no substantial facts and circumstances
overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
Court of Appeals was correct in upholding the credibility of the 2 arresting officers as
witnesses.
4
188 SCRA 288, 292-293, August 2, 1990, per Gancayco, J., concurred in by all
members of the First Division, namely: Narvasa, Cruz, Grino-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.
34 | P a g e
3. The evidence is sufficient to prove Manalili’s guilt.

The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possess
the said drug. The first element is present since the substance found in Manalili’s
possession was identified to be crushed marijuana leaves, an object considered as a
prohibited drug. The second element is also present because petitioner lacks authority to
possess said leaves. Finally, the third element is present because petitioner’s awareness
of the prohibition against the use of marijuana was undeniable, considering that he was
high on drugs when stopped by the policemen and that he resisted when asked to show
the thing he was holding. Such behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was
holding marijuana and that it was prohibited by law.
35 | P a g e
Malacat v. Court of Appeals (1997)
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 123595, 12 December 1997 (283 SCRA 159), EN BANC (Davide, Jr., J.)
Facts:
On August 27, 1990, at about 6:30PM, in response to bomb threats reported seven
days earlier, Rodolfo Yu along with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) was
in foot patrol along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug Store at
Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men posted at opposite
sides of the corner of Quezon boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. According to the
testimony of Rodolfo Yu, these men were acting suspiciously with “their eyes moving very
fast”. Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed the
Muslim-looking men for about thirty minutes. The police officers approached the men,
who then fled in different directions. As the policemen chase the group, Yu caught up with
and apprehended Petitioner Malacat. Upon searching Petitioner, Yu found a
fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner’s front waist line. Yu’s companion, police
officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver
was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu
placed an “X” mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.
On cross-examination, Yu declared that he recognized petitioner to be the same

person who attempted to detonate a grenade on August 25, 1990 (prior to the day when
Malacat was apprehended). The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen
chased petitioner and his companions, but the policemen were unable to catch any of the
latter. Yu further admitted that the group of Muslim-looking men were merely standing
when the policemen saw them on August 27. Although they were not creating any
commotion, since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions
approached them. Yu also did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly
recovered from the petitioner.
Josefino G. Serapio, the investigating officer, declared that when the suspects
were brought in for investigation, he informed them of their rights to remain silent and to
be assisted by competent and independent counsel. Despite Serapio’s advice, petitioner
and Casan manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the assistance
of a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioner’s uncounseled confession, there being no PAO
lawyer available, wherein petitioner admitted possession of the grenade.
The trial court ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental
to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner later voluntarily admitted such fact to the police
investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient
evidence existed to establish petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by petitioner, it ruled that the arrest was lawful
on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was attempting
to commit an offense.
Petitioner appealed in the Supreme Court claiming that: (1) The Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the finding of the trial court that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was
valid and legal; (2) The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the ruling in People vs
Mengote does not find application in the instant case.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision. The search made on
Malacat was not valid.
The general rule about arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed
to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests,
36 | P a g e
searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject
to certain exception. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5.- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful- A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped***
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5 (a)

has been denominated as one “in flagrante delicto”, while that under Section 5(b) has
been described as a “hot pursuit” arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs
searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent
searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a “stop-and-frisk”.
At the outset, the trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a
search incidental to lawful arrest. There two types of warrantless searches differ in terms
of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the

validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority
of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made- the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter
may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property
found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a “stop-and-frisk”

as a” limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons”, as laid down in Terry vs
Ohio, thus:
“We merely hold today that where a police officer observes an unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others
in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any
weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from
whom they were taken.”
Other notable points of Terry vs Ohio are that while probable cause is not required
to conduct a “stop-and-frisk”, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1)
the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
37 | P a g e
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against the police officer.
In the case at hand, there are at least 3 reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid.
First, the Supreme Court harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a
member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim
is neither supported by any police report or record nor verified by any other police officer
who allegedly chased that group. Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or
conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his
eyes were "moving very fast" — an observation which leaves the Supreme Court doubtful
since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m.,
thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner
and were not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-
examination. Third, there was at all no ground to believe that petitioner was armed with a
deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
"discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the
distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was
indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial
court: When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not
yet aware that a hand grenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any
bulging object in his person.
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights
solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution. Petitioner
Malacat was acquitted.
38 | P a g e
Casim, Miguel Alfonso: Valmonte v. De Villa (1989)
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR

PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners, vs. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents.
G.R. No. 83988, 29 September 1989, EN BANC (Padilla, J.)
Facts:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,
AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility
and peripheral areas, for establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace
and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region.
As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints
in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic,

taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's
Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association whose members are all members of
the IBP.
Petitioners filed for a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or,
in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation
of checkpoints, for the protection of the people.
Petitioners claimed that because of the installation of said checkpoints, the

residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at
the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search
warrant or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9
July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan,
was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and refusing to
submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off despite of warning shots
fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claimed that he had gone through these
checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search and check-up without
a court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contended that the said checkpoints give the respondents a
blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order
in violation of the Constitution and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not
killed, had been harassed.
The trial court ruled that petitioners' concern for their safety at being harassed by
the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints
as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, during their
routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right
against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and

Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, it was held that
individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were violated are not
qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.
Issue: Whether or not the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people
against unreasonable search and seizures.
39 | P a g e
Ruling:
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition. The constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invoked only by those whose
rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable
or unreasonable search and seizure in any case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and
searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without
stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful
search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was
a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and
seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved per the facts of
each case.
When the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, his
actions did not constitute unreasonable search.
The Supreme Court ruled that the setting up of the questioned checkpoints in
Valenzuela and in other areas may be considered as a security measure to enable the
NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining
peace and order for the benefit of the public. These were provided to prevent plots to
destabilize the government, in the interest of public security.
The shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so
clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA, the
prevalence of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in
such urban centers most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which
all sum up to as ABNORMAL TIMES.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
The manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in

uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at
the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of
the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Regarding the guidelines for the implementation of checkpoints sought by

petitioners, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were
temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and
military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional Command
Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director.
40 | P a g e
Castro, Marianne:
People v. Johnson (2000)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEILA JOHNSON Y

REYES, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 138881, 18 December 2000, Second Division (Mendoza, J.)
Facts:
Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and
a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A and working as a registered nurse. She is a
former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American. On June 16, 1998, she
arrived in the Philippines to visit her son’s family in Calamba, Laguna. On June 25, she
checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day to head
back to the US. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady
frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area.
When she frisked Leila Johnson, she felt something hard on the latter’s abdominal
area. Mrs. Johnson explained that she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just
undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the
explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile. She
was directed to Mrs. Johnson to the nearest women’s room for inspection. SPO1 Rizalina
Bernal accompanied Ramirez in the women’s room while Embile stayed outside. Inside
the women’s room, Ramirez asked what the hard object on her stomach was but Mrs.
Johnson gave the same reply. Ramirez then asked her to bring out the thing under her
girdle.
Mrs. Johnson brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to
Embile. According to NBI Chemist George de Lara the confiscated packs, contained a
total of 580.2 grams of a substance was methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Embile took Mrs. Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security
Office (1st RASO). Her passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures
were taken and her personal belongings were itemized.
On the other side of the story, Mrs. Johnson alleged that she was standing in line
at the last boarding gate when she was approached by Embile and two female
officers. She was handcuffed and taken to the women’s room wherein she was subjected
to a body search and asked to undress. She insisted that nothing was found on her
person. She was later taken to a room where her passport and purse containing $850.00
were taken from her, for which no receipt was issued to her. She was then transferred to
the office of a Col. Castillo. Col. Castillo and about eight security guards came in with two
white packages.
They told her to admit that the packages were hers. But she refused. She was
detained at the 1st RASO office until noon of June 28, 1999 when she was taken before
a fiscal for inquest. She claimed that throughout the period of her detention, she was
never allowed to talk to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S. Embassy or any of
her relatives in the Philippines.
The RTC rendered a decision finding accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act) and imposed
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of suit. The Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu) are hereby confiscated in favor of the government and the Branch
Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to cause the transportation thereof to the Dangerous
Drugs Board for disposition in accordance with law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there has been a gross violation of constitutional rights.
2. Whether or not the prosecution failed to fully ascertain the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride to justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
41 | P a g e
3. Whether or not the prosecution has the burden of proof the absence of her license
failed to possess or use methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
4. Whether or not the guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
1. Accused-appellant argues that the shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible because
she was forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she was detained at the
1st RASO office, without the assistance of counsel and without having been informed of
her constitutional rights.
There is no basis for accused-appellants invocation of Art. III, 12(1) and (3). The
constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under
custodial investigation but was validly arrested under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that warrantless arrest by peace officer or
private person, is lawful when: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
A custodial investigation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers

after a person has been taken [in] custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any
significant way and that the investigator is trying to elicit information from him. No
statement was taken from accused-appellant during her detention and used in evidence
against her. What is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a
valid search made on her person. Persons may lose the protection of the search and
seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting
a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.
Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures to prevent airplane

hijacking and terrorism where public safety and security are at stake. Travellers are
constantly reminded on the procedures and inspections which portrays reduced privacy
expectations. Additionally, the Solicitor General correctly points out that accused-
appellant was required to affix her signature to the packs. Only the signatures of Embile
and Ramirez along with their testimony were presented by the prosecution. However,
there is no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellants passport, airline ticket,
luggage, and other personal effects.
Personal property to be seized are only: (a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen or
embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and (c) Used or intended to be
used as the means of committing an offense. Accordingly, the above items seized from
accused-appellant should be returned to her.
2. Accused-appellant argues that the examination conducted by the NBI forensic chemist
was a qualitative one which merely yielded positive findings for shabu, but failed to
establish its purity
This contention is likewise without merit. The expert witness, George De Lara,
stated that the chromatography test conducted would have indicated the presence of
impurities by separating and identifying the components of a mixture such if there’s a
presence of potassium aluminum sulphate (tawas), however, there was none. The
Solicitor-General has also pointed out, if accused-appellant was not satisfied with the
results, she should have asked for an independent examination of the substance by
another chemist but she did not.
3. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the negative allegation
in the information that she did not have a license to possess or use methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
The contention has no merit. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
there is nothing in R.A. No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act which requires the
42 | P a g e
prosecution to present a certification that accused-appellant has no license or permit to

possess shabu. Mere possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per se and the
burden of proof is upon accused-appellant to show that she has a license or permit under
the law to possess the prohibited drug.
4. Accused-appellant contends that the evidence presented by the prosecution is not

sufficient to support a finding that she is guilty of the crime charged.
This contention must likewise be rejected. No evidence has been presented to

suggest any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting accused-
appellant. Moreover, there was no other witnesses presented in accused’s behalf. Her
denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denial
as a rule is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. Such defense can just be easily concocted. The Court is convinced
that the requirements have been complied with by the prosecution in this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Fine imposed is reduced to P50,000.00. The passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle and
other personal effects not yet returned to the accused-appellant are hereby ordered
returned to her.
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People v. Canton (2002)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SUSAN CANTON, appellant.

G.R. No. 148825, 27 December 2002, First Division (Davide, Jr., C.J.)
Facts:
Susan was a departing passenger bound to Saigon, Vietnam. When she passed
through the metal detector booth in NAIA emitted a sound in which Mylene Cabunoc, a
civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT)
and the frisker on duty asked to search her. Mylene felt something bulging at her
abdominal area which felt like rice granules. She felt similar packages in front of SUSANs
genital area and thighs. She asked SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the latter
refused and said: Money, money only. Mylene reported the matter to her supervisor,
SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes.
SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and
bring SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination. In the ladies
room, she directed SUSAN to remove her skirt, girdles and panty. Mylene and Lorna
discovered three packages individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape,
on Susan’s abdominal area, in front of her genital area and from her right thigh. They
brought the gray plastic packs to the customs examination table, opened the same and
found that they contained white crystalline substances, submitted for laboratory
examination and yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug.
SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office, testified
that no investigation was ever conducted on SUSAN. He said that he informed SUSAN
of her constitutional rights. However, SUSAN signed a receipt of the articles seized from
her even without a counsel despite telling her that she had the option to sign it or not.
The RTC rendered a decision finding SUSAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua a fine of P1 million. SUSAN filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial but the RTC denied.
Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the accused was caught in flagrante delicto and that the warrantless
search was incidental to a lawful arrest.
2. Whether or not the frisker went beyond the limits of the Terry search doctrine.
3. Whether or not the Ruling in People vs. Johnson is applicable on this case.
4. Whether or not there is a violation of constitutional rights due to warrantless arrest.
5. Whether or not there is a violation of constitutional rights for being under custodial
investigation without counsel.
6. Whether the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena is substantial in the case.
7. Whether or not the imposition of the penalty is correct.
Ruling:
1. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure
conducted in this case were incidental to a lawful arrest. SUSANs arrest did not precede
the search. The airport security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on
SUSANs body; hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being committed. It
was only after the strip search upon the discovery by the police officers of the white
crystalline substances inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN
was arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a
lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a
lawful arrest before a search can be made;
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2. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined only to
search for weapons under the Terry search doctrine.
SUSAN maintains that, following the doctrine in Terry v. Ohio, stop and frisk search
should be limited to the patting of her outer garments in order to determine whether she
was armed or dangerous.
The Terry search or the stop and frisk situation refers to a case where a police officer
approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly
criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection. To assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he could validly conduct
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him.
3. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the instant case.
SUSAN questions the application of People v. Johnson. She stresses that it should
be Katz v. United States which upholds the Fourth Amendment of the United States of
America that protects people and not places.
SUSANs reliance on Katz v. U.S. is misplaced, there being no similar facts. The case
of People v. Johnson, involves similar facts and issues in the present case. The
maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere invokes adherence to precedents and
mandates not to unsettle things which are established. When the court has once laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same.
4. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a
warrant
.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that warrantless
arrest by peace officer or private person is lawful: (a) When, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
The Accused’s subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified, since it was effected
upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.
5. The constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial investigation

was not violated.
SUSAN alleges that there was a violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution
when the frisker started inquiring, detained and submit her to a strip search in the ladies’
room, she was under custodial investigation without counsel.
Under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only when a person
is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation refers to the questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody and that the
investigator is trying to elicit information from him. The purpose of this is to
prohibit incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere,
resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights. In
this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no
custodial investigation was conducted after SUSANs arrest. Also, no statement was taken
from her during her detention and used in evidence against her.
6. The admission of the medical report was erroneous.
SUSAN assails the propriety of the admission of the medical report executed by Dr.
Ma. Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it was neither testified nor offered in evidence.
45 | P a g e
The admission of the questioned document was not properly identified. And even
without the medical report, appellants conviction will stand, as the courts finding of guilt
was not based on that document.
7. SUSANs conviction and the penalty imposed on her are correct.
The three packages of shabu recovered from SUSAN are admissible in evidence
against her. Supported by this evidence and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
her conviction must inevitably be sustained. There being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
Revised Penal Code. Courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law. For
possession of regulated drugs, the law fixes the range of the fine from P500,000 to P10
million. The trial courts imposition of fine amounting to P1 million is well within the range
prescribed by law.
Furthermore, other items seized from the appellant should be returned to her.
Under Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Personal
property to be seized in warrantless search are only: (a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen
or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or (c) Used or intended to be
used as the means of committing an offense.
The judgment of the RTC of Pasay City is hereby AFFIRMED. The appellants
passport, plane tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be returned to her.
46 | P a g e
Clarin, Stephanie Anne: SJS v. Dangerous Drugs Board (2008)
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner, vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner, vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

respondent.
G.R. No. 157870, 158633, and 161658, 3 November 2008, EN BANC (Velasco, Jr., J.)
Facts:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No.

(RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and
persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other
personalities is put in issue.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, a candidate for re-election in the May 10, 2004
elections, seeks to nullify Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in
addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution. Both Section 36(g) of RA
9615 and COMELEC Resolution 6486 creates an additional qualification that all
candidates for local and national election must first be certified drug free.
G.R. No 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency)
Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the
Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
from enforcing paragraph (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that
they are constitutionally infirm for three reasons. First, it constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power. Second, it trench in the equal protection clause. Third, the constitutional
right against unreasonable searches is breached.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency)
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., also seeks to struck down as unconstitutional

paragraph (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for infringing on the constitutional
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against
self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection
guarantees.
Issues:
1. Whether mandatory drug testing to national and local elective post in constitutional.
2. Whether random drug testing to secondary and tertiary students is constitutional.
3. Whether random drug testing to private and public employees is constitutional.
4. Whether that mandatory drug testing to persons accused of crimes is constitutional.
Ruling:
1. NO. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it his hereby declared as
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm
of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and no effect. The Constitution is
the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with
the Constitution.
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Furthermore, Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are
subject to certain limitations found in the Bill of Rights and other provisions, such as
Section 3, Article VI of the Constitution prescribing the candidates for senators. In the
same vein, if the Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC is also without such power.
Ostensibly, the unconstitutionality of Section 36(g) of RA 9165 as sought to be

implemented by the COMELEC Resolution No. 6486, should be declared unconstitutional
on the ground that it effectively enlarges the qualification or eligibility requirements for
one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
2. YES. Guided by the cases of Vernon and Board of Education, the Court is of the
view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure,
the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to
this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with
respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult,
and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools;
(3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of
their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants
for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
3. YES. As in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but
random drug test prescribed by Section 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees
of public and private officers is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason.
The reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling
state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in
the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random drug testing, we
hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under limited context of the case,
reasonable, and ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees
also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law
and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the
public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees,
the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional
command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them
with utmost responsibility.
4. NO. Unlike the situation covered by Section 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court
finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes.
In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for drug testing for students emanates primarily from the
waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school,
and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional
soundness of the mandatory, random and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from
the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before
the public prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one
(1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the
prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The
ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
48 | P a g e
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare
fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves
to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone
waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
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Concha, Renlay: Ople v. Torres (1998)
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, v. RUBEN D. TORRES, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. 127685, 23 July 1998, EN BANC (Puno, J.)
The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone.” It is the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
(Samuel Warren and Justice Louis Brandeis)
Facts:
On the 12th of December 1996, former President Fidel Ramos signed

“Administrative Order (AO) No. 308 – Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System.”
The objective of the said administrative order is to provide convenience to Filipino

citizens and foreign residents in transacting business with the government. It requires a
computerized system, in which the personal information needed and population reference
number will be collected and generated from the National Statistics Office (NSO). As a
result, there will be an orderly identification of individuals which will serve as protection
against fraud or misrepresentations.
Despite its novel purposes, former Senator Blas F. Ople found it unconstitutional,
thus he filed a petition against the respondents (heads of different executive agencies)
before the Supreme Court assailing that A.O. No. 308 violates two important constitutional
grounds – (1) usurpation of power of Congress to legislate; and (2) it impermissibly
intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
Senator Ople contends that the establishment of a national computerized

identification system requires a legislative act, thus A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional for
usurping the power of Congress to legislate. In return, respondents argue that the petition
is not a justiciable case as would warrant a judicial review. It was issued within the
executive and administrative powers of the president without encroaching on the
legislative powers of Congress.
In addition, he also avers that the appropriation of public funds by President Ramos
for the implementation of A.O. 308 is unconstitutional for usurping the exclusive right of
Congress to appropriate public funds for expenditure. The respondents denied and said
that funds necessary for implementation may be sourced from the budgets of concerned
agencies.
Furthermore, he argued that the implementation of A.O. 308 requires a system

which will violate the bill of rights enshrined in the constitution. In the contrary,
respondents claimed that it actually protects an individual’s interest in privacy.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition is a justiciable case as would warrant a judicial
review.
2. Whether or not A.O. No. 308 usurps the power of Congress to legislate and
appropriate public funds.
3. Whether or not A.O. No. 308 violates the right to privacy.
Ruling:
I
It is a justiciable case.
The Supreme Court, in the words of Justice Puno, said that as a Senator, petitioner
is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of
A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of
the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No.
308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
50 | P a g e
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. What Senator Ople
assails is that A.O. No. 308 is invalid per se and infirmed on its face. His action is not
premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the
respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting
for the rules.
II
A.O. No. 308 usurps the legislative power of Congress to enact laws.
Justice Puno wrote that the line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is
not indistinct. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President
executes the laws. As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. Corollary
to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of
laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively.
Based from the precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that
is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is an
ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
The Court rejects the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy
of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is because it establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the
extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies,
etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of
the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident
that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
The Court also said it is incorrect to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308
is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and
creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government
agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification
card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with
government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty
exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O.
No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public.
It is here that administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and application.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that
Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are
entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent
source of power to make laws."
III
It violates the right to privacy.
Assuming that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right
to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone."
In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court
gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional
foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras
of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.
51 | P a g e
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, the Court adopted the Griswold ruling that
there is a constitutional right to privacy.
The Court said that “If we extend our judicial gaze, we will find that the right of
privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is
expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:”
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be

inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil
Code provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace
of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts
by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the
rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other
private communications.
The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is
an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Act 42 and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population
Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among
concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer
application designs."
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some
science fictions are now science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use
of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that uses various technologies
in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual for identification. It is
noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and
what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its
52 | P a g e
coverage. Considering the banquest of options available to the implementers of A.O. No.
308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
underplayed as the dissenters do. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of
our authorities to resist.
It is plain and the Supreme Court holds that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring
that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed
for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O.
No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling
authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may
pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of
the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that
the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify
the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights
seeks to prevent.
The Court rejects the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and the use of biometrics
technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of
privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has
exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable. The factual circumstances of the case determine the
reasonableness of the expectation. However, other factors, such as customs, physical
surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this
expectation. The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not
assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. As technology advances, the
level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a
minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology
used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
Next, the Solicitor General urges the Court to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment
of the right of privacy by using the rational relationship test. He stressed that the purposes
of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of basic
government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3)
generate population data for development planning. He concludes that these purposes
justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the
end.
The Supreme Court disagrees. In Morfe v. Mutuc, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police
power measure. The Court declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to make
an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses,
did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote
morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a
statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The
law is clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn
to avoid abuses.
In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose,
but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And SC now holds
that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, the court will give the challenged
law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the
authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
53 | P a g e
Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right
can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally.
They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law,
rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by
the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to
prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the
stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by the Constitutions.
The Court said that “Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon
that the Court is not per se against the use of computers to accumulate, store, process,
retrieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to
achieve the efficiency which both government and private industry seek. Many
information systems in different countries make use of the computer to facilitate important
social objective, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more
efficient management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of
telecommunications and streamlining of financial activities.”
In no uncertain terms, the Court also underscore that the right to privacy does not
bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely
requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions.
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined
standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that
invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for
this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life
of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute
and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual,
in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a
system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs
to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the
state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other
words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of
a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization —
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In
modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private
life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.
IV
Conclusion
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass
society. The threats emanate from various sources — governments, journalists,
employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive
branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender
their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate
delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power
to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of
the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will
live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat
is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to
forget." Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in
labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. The Court closes with the statement
that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
Therefore, the petition is granted and the Supreme Court declared A.O. No. 308
null and void for being unconstitutional.
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Separate Opinions
Justice Romero voted for the nullification of A.O. No. 308. In his separate opinion,
he differentiated a man from a beast. He emphasized the privacy as the main difference
since man is a rational being equipped with various sensibilities. He also mentioned its
importance in the legal world as supported by its initial recognition as an aspect of tort
and law and its landmark article published in the Harvard Law Review by Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis. Moreover, he said that it is incorporated in the Philippine constitutions
and statutes in spite of the fact that there’s no exact translation of the word “privacy” in
the Filipino language. In addition, he said that with the recent advent of the Information
Age with its high-tech devices, the right to privacy has expanded to embrace its public
law aspect. In conclusion, he said that the A.O. No. 308 has terrifying possibilities in
making inroads into the private lives of the citizens, a virtual Big Brother looking over our
shoulder, that it must, without delay, be "slain upon sight" before our society turns
totalitarian with each of us, a mindless robot.
Justice Vitug also voted for the nullification of the A.O No. 308 for being an undue
and impermissible exercise of legislative power by the Executive. In the contrary, he found
it difficult to assume that A.O No. 308 will be misused to the extent that possible benefits
or its merits should be ignored. He claimed that with technological advancements, this
change is inescapable and one day we will need to deal with it. He believes that the
imperative should be to install specific safeguards and control measures that may be
calculated best to ward-off probable ill effects of any such device. He agreed that A.O.
No. 308 appears to be so extensively drawn that could, indeed, allow unbridled options
to become available to its implementers beyond the reasonable comfort of the citizens
and of residents alike. Based from the foregoing, the subject covered by the questioned
administrative order can have far-reaching consequences that can tell on all individuals,
their liberty and privacy, that, to his mind, should make it indispensable and appropriate
to have the matter specifically addressed by the Congress of the Philippines, the policy-
making body of our government, to which the task should initially belong and to which the
authority to formulate and promulgate that policy is constitutionally lodged.
Justice Panganiban also voted for the nullification of A.O. No. 308, but he concurs
only in the result and only on the ground that an executive issuance is not legally sufficient
to establish an all-encompassing computerized system of identification in the country. He
said that the subject matter contained in AO 308 is beyond the powers of the President
to regulate without a legislative enactment. He reserves judgment on the issue of whether
a national ID system is an infringement of the constitutional right to privacy or the freedom
of thought until after Congress passes, if ever, a law to this effect. Only then, and upon
the filing of a proper petition, may the provisions of the statute be scrutinized by the
judiciary to determine their constitutional foundation. Until such time, the issue is
premature; and any decision thereon, speculative and academic. He further emphasized
that this Court, as shown by the voting of the justices, has not definitively ruled on these
points. The voting is decisive only on the need for the appropriate legislation, and it is
only on this ground that the petition is granted by this Court.
Dissenting Opinions
Justice Kapunan voted to dismiss the petition. He claimed that there is nothing in
the whole breadth and length of A.O. No. 308 that suggests a taint constitutional infirmity.
The National Computerized Identification Reference system to which the NSO, GSIS and
SSS are linked as lead members of the IACC is intended to establish uniform standards
for ID cards issued by key government agencies (like the SSS). He resolved that the
issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a valid exercise of power by the President and not a
usurpation of legislative power properly belonging to Congress.
Having resolved that the President has the authority and prerogative to issue A.O.
No. 308, Justice Kapunan submits that it is premature for the Court to determine the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the National Computerized Identification
Reference System. Judicial intervention calls for an actual case or controversy which is
defined as "an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory." A.O. No. 308 does not create any concrete or substantial
55 | P a g e
controversy. It provides the general framework of the National Computerized Identification

Reference System and lays down the basic standards (efficiency, convenience and
prevention of fraudulent transactions) for its creation. There is nothing in A.O. No. 308 to
serve as sufficient basis for a conclusion that the new system to be evolved violates the
right to privacy. Said order simply provides the system's general framework. Without the
concomitant guidelines, which would spell out in detail how this new identification system
would work, the perceived violation of the right to privacy amounts to nothing more than
mere surmise and speculation. The majority laments that as technology advances, the
level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. That may be true. However, court should
tread daintily on the field of social and economic experimentation lest they impede or
obstruct the march of technology to improve public services just on the basis of an
unfounded fear that the experimentation violates one's constitutionally protected rights.
Justice Mendoza also voted to dismiss the petition in this case. He said that cannot
find anything in the text of Administrative Order No. 308 of the President of the Philippines
that would warrant a declaration that it is violative of the right of privacy. So far as the
Order provides, all that is contemplated is an identification system based on data which
the government agencies involved have already been requiring individuals making use of
their services to give. Indeed, techniques such as fingerprinting or electronic photography
in banks have become commonplace. He said that despite all arguments, this is a fact of
life to which we must adjust, as long as the intrusion into the domain of privacy is
reasonable. In Morfe v. Mutuc, the Court dealt the coup de grace to claims of latitudinarian
scope for the right of privacy by quoting the pungent remark of an acute observer of the
social scene, Carmen Guerrero-Nakpil:
Privacy? What's that? There is no precise word for it in Filipino, and as far
as I know any Filipino dialect and there is none because there is no need
for it. The concept and practice of privacy are missing from conventional
Filipino life. The Filipino believes that privacy is an unnecessary
imposition, an eccentricity that is barely pardonable or, at best, an esoteric
Western afterthought smacking of legal trickery.
Furthermore, he said that Senator Ople’s argument is anchored on two erroneous

assumptions: one, that all the concerned agencies, including the SSS and the GSIS,
receive budgetary support from the national government; and two, that the GAA is the
only law whereby public funds are appropriated. Both assumptions are wrong. The SSS
and GSIS do not presently receive budgetary support from the National Government.
They have achieved self-supporting status such that the contributions of their members
are sufficient to finance their expenses. One would be hard pressed to find in the GAA an
appropriation of funds to the SSS and the GSIS. Furthermore, their respective charters
authorize the SSS and the GSIS to disburse their funds
56 | P a g e
Corpuz, Junius Benedict: Alejano v. Cabuay (2005)
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY

ALEJANO, PN (MARINES), et al., petitioners, vs. GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, et al.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 160792, 25 August 2005, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)
Facts:
In the incident dubbed as the Oakwood Mutiny which happened in the early
morning of July 27,2003, some 321 armed soldiers took control of the Oakwood Premier
Luxury Apartments in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers planted explosives
in the immediate surroundings of the building and publicly renounced their support for the
administration and called for the resignation of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and several cabinet members.
After several negotiations with authorities, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered and
returned to their barracks. Days after the incident, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) issued a directive to turn over custody of the officers who led the
mutiny to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP). In
addition, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’état against all those
who took part in the incident.
Having been detained by the ISAFP, said officers filed a petition for habeas corpus
with the Supreme Court which then issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing the
respondents to produce the persons of the detainees in the Court of Appeals for hearing.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of the detainees on the
ground that the detainees are already charged of coup d’état which is a valid and legal
ground for their detention, and that the opening of the letter of then Lt. Sg. Antonio
Trillanes IV was a violation of his right to privacy of communication, it does not justify the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The appellate court also ordered Gen. Pedro
Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention
Center to uphold faithfully the constitutional rights of the detainees.
Issues:
1. That the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the Supreme Court.
2. That the Court of Appeals erred in not acknowledging the appropriateness of the
remedy the petitioners seek; and
3. That the Court of appeals erred in asserting the legality of the conditions of the
detained officers’ detention.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. The order of the Supreme Court showed that it referred to
the Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into the cause of the junior officers’ detention.
Had the Court ruled for the detainees’ release, the Court would not have referred the
hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals. The Court would have forthwith released
the detainees had the Court upheld petitioners’ cause.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the
proper remedy to address the detainees’ complaint against the regulations and conditions
in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective which is
to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine
whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the
detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention
is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
The petitioners also content that the regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the
ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers from seeing the detainees their
clients any time of the day or night violates their right to a counsel. The detainee
petitioners claim that the regulated visits made it difficult for them to prepare for the
important hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission.
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Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated
the detainees’ right to privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and
read the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo. They further claim
that the ISAFP officials violated their right against cruel and unusual punishment when
the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees from having contact with their visitors.
Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron grills
of the detention cells, limiting the light and ventilation in their cells.
The fact that the detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those
of the public. Republic Act 7438, which specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of
detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of the detention officer to adopt and
implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his
escape. Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides:
“b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the
immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation,
or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting
and conferring privately chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family
with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual
needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years,
and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with
custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his
escape. “
The last paragraph of the same Section 4(b) makes the express qualification that
notwithstanding its provisions, the detention officer has the power to undertake
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety of the detainee and
prevent his escape. The schedule of visiting hours does not render void the detainees
indictment for criminal and military offenses to warrant the detainees release from
detention. The ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees’ right to
counsel.
Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors
and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to unusual and
excessive punishment. This argument does not have any merit. The United States case,
Bell v. Wolfish, pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt, detention inevitably interferes with his desire to live comfortably. The
fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees desire to live
comfortably does not convert those restrictions into punishment. It is when the restrictions
are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish.
The Court also notes the petitioners’ argument that the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center violated the detainees’ right to privacy when the ISAFP officials opened
and read the letters handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of the
petitioners for mailing. The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities
were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the
detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for
mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only
open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
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Julian, Cheenie Mae: Chavez v. Gonzales (2008)
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the

Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.
G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, EN BANC (Puno, C.J.)
FACTS:
It is established that freedom of the press is crucial and so inextricably woven into
the right to free speech and free expression, that any attempt to restrict it must be met
with an examination so critical that only a danger that is clear and present would be
allowed to curtail it.
In June 5, 2005, a year after the 2004 national and local elections, Press Secretary
Ignacio Bunye told the reporters that the opposition was planning to release an audiotape
of a mobile conversation allegedly between the then Philippine President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo and Commission on Election Commissioner Garcilliano. On June 7,
2005, Atty. Allan Paguia released an allegedly authentic tape recording of the wiretap
conversation. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul
Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those
broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping
Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that
persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to
arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was being
committed in their presence. On June 9, 2005 in a case briefing, Secretary Gonzales
ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations which
caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the wiretappped conversation. On June
11, 2005, National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued a press release
warning all radio and television networks to observe the Anti-Wiretapping Act and
pertinent circulars on program standards, and that the airing/broadcasting or the false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations of the said companies. On
June 14, 2005, the NTC assured the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP)
that there is no violation of the constitutional freedom of speech, of expression, of the
press and of information.
Alleging that the acts of the respondents are violations of freedom of expression,
of the press and of information, Francisco Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the
rules of court against Secretary Gonzales and the NTC praying for the issuance of writs
of certiorari and prohibition to annul the proceedings and to prevent the unlawful,
unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Petitioner Chavez has legal standing to raise this petition.
Respondents allege that the petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing for
having failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. This court
resolves the issue by applying the liberal policy on locus standi. Where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if need be,
technicalities of procedure. This court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield
procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal
questions that greatly impact public interest.
2. Whether or not the acts of respondent violate constitutional provisions on freedom
of speech, of expression, of the press and of information.
Free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment. There is to be
no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in
libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings
59 | P a g e
unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has the right
to prevent.5
The vital need of a constitutional democracy for freedom of speech is undeniable.

It has the broadest scope, the widest latitude. The ideas that may be expressed under
this freedom are confined not only to those that are conventional or acceptable to the
majority. To be true and meaningful, freedom of speech and of the press should allow
and even encourage the articulation of the unorthodox view. To paraphrase Justice
Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees
with us.
The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly

all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as
well as political causes and is not confined to any particular field of human interest. The
constitutional protection assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free
press for religious, political, economic, scientific, news or informational ends inasmuch as
the constitution's basic guaranty of freedom to advocate ideas is not confined with the
creation of ideas that are conventional or shared by majority. The constitutional protection
is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The protection afforded free speech extends to
speech or publications that are entertaining as well as instructive or informative. All forms
of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the clause of
freedom of speech and of expression. However, while all forms of communication are
entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause, the freedom to film,
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded
to the newspaper and other print media.
DIFFERENTIATION: THE LIMITS & RESTRAINTS OF FREE SPEECH
Freedom of expression is not absolute nor is it an unbridled license that gives

immunity for every possible use of language and prevents punishment to those who
abuse this freedom. Thus, not all speech is treated the same. Some types of speech may
be subjected to regulation by the state under its pervasive police power in order that it
may not be injurious to the equal rights of others or those of the community or society.
Distinctions have been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the permissible
scope of restrictions on various categories of speech. Techniques of reviewing alleged
restrictions on speech have been applied differently in each category.
Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests; (1) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits
limitations on speech once a ‘rational connection’ has been established between the
speech restrained and the danger contemplated, (2) balancing of interest test used as
a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests,
and requires a conscious and detailed consideration in the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation, (3) clear and present danger rule
which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial
danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has the right to prevent.
This rule requires that the evil sought to be presented must be substantive, extremely
serious and the degree of imminence is extremely high. As articulated in our
jurisprudence, we applied either the dangerous tendency doctrine or clear and present
danger test; recently, we have generally adhered to the latter.
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Press is the chief source of information on current affairs. It is the most pervasive
and perhaps most powerful vehicle of opinion on public questions. It is the sharpest
weapon in the fight to keep the government responsible and efficient. Without a vigilant
press, the mistakes if every administration would go uncorrected and its abuses
unexposed.
5 Gonzales versus Commission on Elections
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The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is
a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses
of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged with the balm of clear conscience. 6
ANATOMY OF RESTRICTIONS: PRIOR RESTRAINT, CONTENT-NEUTRAL AND

CONTENT-BASED REGULATIONS
Philippine jurisprudence has recognized four aspects of freedom of the press (1)
freedom form prior restraint, (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication, (3)
freedom of access to information, and (4) freedom of circulation.
The parameter of determining whether or not there is prior restraint is etched on a

case-to-case basis. Prior restraint refers to governmental restrictions on the press of
other forms of information in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom
from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship and regardless of
whether it is wielded by executive, legislative and judicial branch of the government. Any
law that requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be made
commits an infringement of the constitutional right and remedy can be had at the courts.
However, not all prior restraints are invalid. Certain previous restraint may be permitted
by the constitution, but determined only upon careful evaluation of the challenged acts as
against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against. A distinction has to
be made whether the restraint is (1) content-neutral regulation i. e merely concerned with
the incidents of speech or one that merely controls the time, place or manner and under
well-defined standards; or (2) content-based restraint or censorship i.e the restriction is
based on the subject matter of the speech.
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only
substantial governmental interest is required for its validity. Because regulations of this
type are not designed to suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the
strictest form of judicial scrutiny, but are intermediate approach between the rationality
that is required of any other law and the compelling interest standard applied to content-
based restrictions. The test is called intermediate because the court will not merely
rubberstamp the validity of the law but also requires that the restrictions be narrowly-
tailored to promote an important or significant governmental interest that is unrelated to
the suppression of expression.
With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the
type of harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring about. Prior restraint on
speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by showing
a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground. As
formulated, the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that would
bring about subsequent evils that the Congress has the duty to prevent. It is a question
of proximity and degree.
The regulation which restricts the speech content must serve an important or
substantial government interest which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
It must also be reasonable and narrowly drawn to fit the regulatory purpose with the least
restrictive means undertaken. Prior restraint based on a content-neutral regulation is
subjected to intermediate review while a content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity and is only justified by compelling reason and the restrictions
imposed must neither be overbroad nor vague.
It is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to the
clear and present danger rule as they are content-based restrictions.
6 United States versus Bustos
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DICHOTOMY OF FREE PRESS: Print versus Broadcast Media
According to US courts, the three major reasons why broadcast media stands
apart from print media are; (1) the scarcity of frequencies by which the medium operates
[airwaves are physically limited while print medium may be limitless], (2) its pervasiveness
as a medium, and (3) its unique accessibility to children.
As pointed out by the respondents, Philippine jurisprudence has also echoed the
differentiation in treatment between broadcast and print media. Nevertheless, a review of
Philippine case law on broadcast media will show that as we deviated with the American
conception of Bill of Rights, we likewise did not adopt en masse the US conception of free
speech as it relates to broadcast media, particularly as to which test would govern
content-based prior restraints.
The distinction between broadcast and traditional print media was first enunciated
in the case of Eastern Broadcasting Corporation versus Dans wherein it was held that all
forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of speech and expression clause. The test of limitations on freedom of
expression continues to be clear and present danger rule, that the words are used in such
circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger and that
they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The stricter terms of control seem to have been adopted in answer to the view that,
owing to their particular impact on audiences, films, videos and broadcasting require a
system of prior restraints whereas it is now accepted that books and other printed media
do not. These media are viewed as beneficial to the public in a number of respects, but
are also seen as possible sources of harm.
It is necessary for legislative bodies, courts and government agencies to regulate

both and develop a new regulatory framework and rationale to justify the differential
treatment between broadcast and print media.
THE CASE AT BAR
Having settled the applicable standard to content-based restrictions on broadcast

media, we now apply such to the case at bar. To recapulate, a governmental action that
restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny,
with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality
by the clear and present danger rule. This rule equally applies to all kinds of media,
including broadcast media.
The procedural map applied in cases like this is; the test, the presumption, the
burden of proof, the party to discharge the burden and the quantum of evidence
necessary. Based on the records of the case at bar, the respondents have failed to hurdle
the clear and present danger test. It appears that the great evil which the government
wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in an alleged violation of the anti-
wiretapping law. The respondents' evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present
danger test. Firstly, the statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the
voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also a
suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions of the tape, one
supposed to be the complete version and another tampered version. Thirdly, the evidence
of the respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent,
especially considering the tape's different versions. The identity of the wiretappers, the
manner of its commission, and other relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this
case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its
airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
The court ruled that not every violation of the law will justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and
doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which, even if violated, will only have
an adverse effect on a person's private comfort but does not endanger national security.
62 | P a g e
There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more,
cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of the law is
just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to
restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of injurious effects of the violation
to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded
by the constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech
and of the press. In calling for careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference
of all these factors in determining compliance with the clear and present danger test, the
Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violation
of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil
consequence. But, again, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the
exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater
evils. Failure of respondents to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the
Court has no option but to hold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no
showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the
national security of the State.
There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on record. The
warnings given to the media from no less than the NTC, a regulatory agency that can
cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio and broadcast media. They also come from
the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the Chief Executive, who wields the awesome
power to prosecute those perceived to be violating laws of the land. After the warnings,
the KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent Joint Press Statement. After
the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left to fight alone this battle for freedom of speech
and of the press. The silence on the sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is
too deafening to be the subject of misinterpretation.
The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts should

always be exercised with care and in light of the distinct facts of the case for there are no
hard and fast rules when it comes to slippery constitutional questions. The limits and
construct of relative freedom is NEVER set in stone. Issues revolving in their construct
must be decided on a case to case basis, always based on peculiar shapes and shadows
of each case. But in cases where the challenged acts are patent invasions of the
constitutionally protected right, we should be swift in striking down as nullities per se. A
blow too soon struck for freedom is preferred than a blow too late.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is granted, writs of certiorari and prohibition
are issued nullifying the official statements made by the respondents on June 8 and June
11, 2005 warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the
President and other personalities for constituting unconstitutional prior restraint of the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
63 | P a g e
Kasan, Alyahza:
Bayan v. Ermita (2006)
BAYAN, et al., petitioners, vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive

Secretary, et al., respondents.
Jess Del Prado, et al., petitioners, vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his official capacity as
The Executive Secretary, et al., respondents.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, et al., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY, et al., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 169838, 169848, and 169881, 25 April 2006, EN BANC (Azcuna, J.)
Facts:
The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838, allege that they are citizens
and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals
were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently
dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in
G.R. No. 169848, who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a
peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently
dispersed by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they
participated in marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they
claim, put the country under an undeclared martial rule, and the protest was likewise
dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries.
The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No. 169881,
allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and
those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly,
are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated Preemptive
Response (CPR) being followed to implement it.
KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be
conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto
Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They
further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-
sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of
the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers
blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They
were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were
arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others
only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to
stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy
recently announced.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a
violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also
curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause
as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the
expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass
actions in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or
influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also,
the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the
government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot
pass the strict scrutiny test.
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Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is
unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for
redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also
characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows
their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear
standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent
and grave danger) are inconsistent.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the
standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being
vague and for lack of publication.
Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the
right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing
a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits
provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and
convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the
five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant
public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.
As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes
action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or
executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance
policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the
exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Issue: Whether or not Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the Calibrated Preemptive
Response (CPR) unconstitutional.
Ruling:
B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that
simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to
in Osmea v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a content-neutral regulation of the
time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers
to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful
cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither are the
words opinion, protesting and influencing in the definition of public assembly content
based, since they can refer to any subject. The words petitioning the government for
redress of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be
avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to rally,
demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action
held in a public place. So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of
the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.
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As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and
sufficient standard the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the
same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the
same power independently under Republic Act No. 7160 is thus not necessary to resolve
in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.
At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by
B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum
tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is
and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal
firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely
confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other
hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly
restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and
manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for the benefit of
rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally
permits is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound clear and present
danger standard.
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IBP v. Atienza (2010)
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., petitioners, vs. HONORABLE

MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA, respondent.
G.R. No. 175241, 24 February 2010, First Division (Carpio-Morales, J.)
Facts:
On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo
Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a
permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.
to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral
organizations.
Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally
on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola
Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94949. The petition having been unresolved
within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this Court on June 22, 2006 a petition
for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 172951 which assailed the appellate court’s inaction
or refusal to resolve the petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act
of 1985.
The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006, August 30, 2006 and November 20,
2006, respectively, denied the petition for being moot and academic, denied the relief that
the petition be heard on the merits in view of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 94949,
and denied the motion for reconsideration.
The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz
discussed with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police
District (MPD) earlier barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that
the participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program.
The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action, docketed as I.S.
No. 06I-12501, against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a
venue not indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadiz filed a Counter-Affidavit of
August 3, 2006.
In the meantime, the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, by the first
assailed issuance, that the petition became moot and lacked merit. The appellate court
also denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration by the second assailed issuance.
Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari, to which respondent
filed his Comment of November 18, 2008 which merited petitioners’ Reply of October 2,
2009.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial
question to the criminal case filed against him (Cadiz).
2. Whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in
IBP’s rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
1. No. The Court finds it improper to resolve the same in the present case.
Under the Rules, the existence of a prejudicial question is a ground in a petition to

suspend proceedings in a criminal action. Since suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal action may be made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge or
the investigating prosecutor, the latter cannot take cognizance of a claim of prejudicial
question without a petition to suspend being filed. Since a petition to suspend can be filed
67 | P a g e
only in the criminal action, the determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question
should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before this Court in an
appeal from the civil action.
2. Yes. The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of
1985 practically codified the 1983 ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing. In juxtaposing
Sections 4 to 6 of the Public Assembly Act with the pertinent portion of
the Reyes case, the Court elucidated as follows:
x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be valid
objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It
is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the
view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether
favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.
Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority. (italics and underscoring supplied)
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when
he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of
his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the
changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit,
since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of

repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit
adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or
modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render
illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for
his action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue
for an assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for
the appellate court not to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific
statutory provision, not to have modified the permit "in terms satisfactory to the applicant."
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Koh, Anna Patricia:

Borjal v. Court of Appeals (1999)
ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO, respondents
G.R. No. 126466, 14 January 1999, Second Division (Bellosillo, J.)
Facts:
A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal
and Soliven—petitioners, for writing and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory
and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao—respondent, attacking among others the
solicitation letters he sent to support a conference to be launched concerning resolving
matters on transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous activities.
Wenceslao, however, was never named in any of the articles nor was the
conference he was organizing. The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the
private respondent for damages which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition
for review was filed before the Supreme Court contending that private respondent was
not sufficiently identified to be the subject of the published articles.
Issue: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.
Ruling:
No. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable
although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended
party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at
least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. These
requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. The element of identifiability
was not met since it was Wenceslao who revealed he was the organizer of said
conference and had he not done so the public would not have known.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press and
that privileged communications must be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries
on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for
libel or slander.
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every

discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man
is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a
public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact
or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression
of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion
happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the
facts.
The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared
objective of the conference, the composition of its members and participants, and the
manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being
genuinely imbued with public interest. Respondent is also deemed to be a public figure
and even otherwise is involved in a public issue. The court held that freedom of
expression is constitutionally guaranteed and protected with the reminder among media
members to practice highest ethical standards in the exercise thereof.
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Vasquez v. Court of Appeals (1999)
RODOLFO R. VASQUEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 40, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 118971, 15 September 1999, EN BANC (Mendoza, J.)
Facts:
Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore

Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37 families from the area went to see then
National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their
complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo. After their meeting with
Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed
by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day,
April 22, 1986, a news article appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa.
Thus, Jamie Olmedo accused Rodolfo R. Vasquez of the crime of libel committed.
That on or about April 22, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with
malicious intent of impeaching the reputation and character of Jaime Olmedo, chairman
of Barangay 66, Zone 6 in Tondo, Manila, and with evident intent of exposing him to public
hatred, contempt, ridicule, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
maliciously caused the publication of an article entitled 38 Pamilya Inagawan ng Lupa
in Ang Tinig ng Masa, a daily newspaper sold to the public and of general circulation in
the Philippines in its April 22, 1986 issue. With which statements, the said accused meant
and intended to convey, as in fact he did mean and convey false and malicious
imputations that said Jaime Olmedo is engaged in land grabbing and involved in illegal
gambling and stealing of chickens at the Tondo Foreshore Area, Tondo, Manila, which
statements, as he well knew, were entirely false and malicious, offensive and derogatory
to the good name, character and reputation of said Jaime Olmedo, thereby tending to
impeach, besmirch and destroy the honor, character and reputation of Jaime Olmedo, as
in fact, the latter was exposed to dishonor, discredit, public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
Issue: Whether or not Vasquez is liable for libel even if he is not the one who published
the article.
Ruling:
No. In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other
residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area were not only acting in their self-interest but
engaging in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty is discharged
faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent. The recognition of this right
and duty of every citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement placing on
him the burden of proving that he acted with good motives and for justifiable ends.
For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if
it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement
was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case
of New York Times v. Sullivan, which this Court has cited with approval in several of its
own decisions. This is the rule of actual malice. In this case, the prosecution failed to
prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made
them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false
or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of
official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations
would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all,
infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter
citizens from performing their duties as members of a self-governing community. Without
free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would
be stifled. In accordance with Art. 361, if the defamatory matter either constitutes a crime
or concerns the performance of official duties, and the accused proves the truth of his
charge, he should be acquitted.
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Magcalas, Ceri Kay Minette: Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals (1996)
IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION and
HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 119673, 26 July 1996, EN BANC (Puno, J.)
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting the establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
The Non-Establishment Clause

The state shall remain neutral when it comes to religious differences. The government
should not support any particular religion by defending it against an attack by another
religion.
Facts:
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), a duly organized religious organization, has a

television program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and
on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner’s religious
beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.
Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992, petitioner

submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (now
MTRCB) the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board
classified the series as “X” or not for public viewing on the ground that they offend and
constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC
ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV
programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA
ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program
“Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia
ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion.
The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good
customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited
the airing of petitioner’s religious program
Ruling:
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and
should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to
overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be
struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for
“attacking” either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the
evidence, will show that the so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply
held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the
respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by
the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be
prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly
suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by
petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they
may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion
71 | P a g e
by protecting it against an attack by another religion. In fine, respondent board cannot

squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions,
even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country.
In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the
clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held:
“The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such
right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that
there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right
to prevent.” In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that “. . . it is
only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be
justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.”
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the
respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the
conclusion that the subject videotapes constitute impermissible attacks against another
religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about
especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech,
including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the
showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already
on ground.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated

March 24, 1995 is affirmed insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent
MTRCB to review petitioners TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and is reversed
and set aside insofar as it sustained the action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating
petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121.
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Mallari, Riadale Mikaela: Ang LADLAD LGBT Party v. COMELEC (2010)
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY, represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 190582 (618 SCRA 32), 8 April 2010, EN BANC (Del Castillo, J.)
Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify

themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Said
organization applied for registration with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) as a
political party for purposes of participating in the party-list election. In its application it
stated that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that
LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative
societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang
Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong
Bayani- OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition on, among others, moral grounds or
religious-based grounds, invoking the moral condemnation of homosexuality and
homosexual conduct. Relying on the Bible and the Koran, it contended that the
petitioner’s accreditation was denied not necessarily because of their group consists of
LGBT’s but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is
recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in
having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring
down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set
of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.7
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC violated the Non-establishment clause of the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC violated the Equal Protection of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not the COMELEC violated the Freedom of Expression and Assembly
clause of the Constitution.
Held:
Yes, the COMELEC violated the Non-Establishment Clause of the

Constitution.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious
matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality.” The Court thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the
exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed

Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance
some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.
Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have
primarily secular effects.
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not
difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure – religious beliefs, convictions about
the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the
Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
7
Cruz and Cruz, Constitutional Law 2015, 272.
73 | P a g e
these “generally accepted public morals” have not been convincingly transplanted into
the realm of law.
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that “there should have been a finding
by the COMELEC that the group’s members have committed or are committing immoral
acts.” The OSG argues: x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same
gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not
translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction
ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands
full of disqualification cases against both the “straights” and the gays.” Certainly, this is
not the intendment of the law.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course,
do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning
morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and
should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we
cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate
morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors
of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value.
Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is
not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of
civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection
clause.
Yes, the COMELEC violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason
to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has
expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or
expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume
that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here –
that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a legitimate state interest that
is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The
COMELEC’s differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot
contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no
legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group. From
the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have
the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other
political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome.
74 | P a g e
Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized
and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs
from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any
other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different
circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that homosexuals
are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause. We are not
prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated
treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply
unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it
be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the
COMELEC made “an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the
circumstances of the case.”
In granting the petition, the Court further invoked the principle of non-
discrimination, as provided for also under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the United Declaration of Human Rights. Article 26 of the ICCPR provides that
“all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.” In turn, Article 21 of the UDHR states that
“everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through
freely chosen representatives.”8
Yes, the COMELEC violated the Freedom of Expression and Assembly

Clause.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a

democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received
but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere
must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest,
it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise
stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason
than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. This position
gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this
country. It follows that both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity
of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to
participate in the party-list system, and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral
objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent,
therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from
publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the
political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has,
indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.
Note: At this time, the Court are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles
contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and
obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of
international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged
principles of international law to ascertain their true status.
The Court also hasten to add that not everything that society – or a certain segment
of society – wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary
human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that
8
Cruz, Constitutional Law 2015, 274
75 | P a g e
much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that
identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law
obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human
rights, and is a result of the notion that if “wants” are couched in “rights” language, then
they are no longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a
declaration formulated by various international law professors, are – at best – de lege
ferenda – and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much
of contemporary international law is characterized by the “soft law” nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and
respect for human rights, most of than well which amount to no more or ing desires,
without the support of either State practice As a final note, we cannot help but
observe that the social issues presented by this case are opinio juris.
76 | P a g e
Monton, Rejean: Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (1993)
ROEL EBRALINAG, et al., petitioners, vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF

SCHOOLS OF CEBU, respondent.
MAY AMOLO, et al., petitioners, vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF

SCHOOLS OF CEBU, et al., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 95770 and 95887, 1 March 1993, EN BANC (Grino-Aquino, J.)
Facts:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed
alleging that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the petitioners’ expulsion in violation of latter’s
right to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of
speech, religion and worship.
The petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students who are
members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses. They were expelled from
their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265
and by Department Order No. 8 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS), making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of
worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or
anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State.
They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the
intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control.
The same issue was raised in 1959 in Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education,
et al., 106 Phil. 2 (1959) and Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150
(1960). In which the court ruled:
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an
emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of
freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect.
Under a system of complete separation of church and state in the
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting
the flag does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute is no more
a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official
or by a candidate for admission to the bar.
The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation

in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover,
exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize
the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority.
The expulsion as of October 23, 1990 of the 43 petitioning students prompted

some Jehovah's Witnesses in Cebu to appeal to the Secretary of Education Isidro Cariño
but the latter did not answer their letter. On October 31, 1990, the students and their
parents filed these special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition alleging
that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion. They prayed, among others, that judgment regarding the expulsion
be declared null and void and that the court compel the respondents to readmit the
students to their respective schools. And while the determination of the merits of these
cases is still pending, they prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining
the respondents from enforcing the expulsion of the petitioners and to re-admit them to
their respective classes. On November 27, 1990, the Court granted the petition and
issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
77 | P a g e
On May 13, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the
petitions defending the expulsion orders issued by the public respondents arguing, among
others, that the flag salute is devoid of any religious significance and that the State's
compelling interests do not warrant exemption of the school children of the Jehovah's
Witnesses from the flag salute ceremonies on the basis of their own self-perceived
religious convictions. The Court, however, upon the examination of the facts of the case,
believes that the time has come to re-examine the Gerona ruling which upheld the
expulsion of the students.
Issue: Whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account
of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a
band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting
the patriotic pledge.
Ruling:
NO. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed
from one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present
generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their
rights to free speech ** and the free exercise of religious profession and worship.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority

and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to
his Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs.
Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531).
Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the
flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their
respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings (Annex
F, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887, p. 50 and Rollo of G.R. No. 95770, p. 48). Since they do not
engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
The situation that the Court directly predicted in Gerona that:
The flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted
with very few participants, and the time will come when we would have
citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the
flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism — a
pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the school
population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an exemption.
(Gerona, p. 24.)
has not come to pass. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses
from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this
religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will
shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated
in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for
national heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the
petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public
schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of
government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also
receive training for a vocation of profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism,
respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of
citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part
of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring
about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious
group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their
78 | P a g e
religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully constituted
authorities.
We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses

with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs,
however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to
participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA
523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their
religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to
discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the
sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention
during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may
possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State
has a right (and duty) to prevent (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).
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Nomil, Joyce Wyne: Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos (1994)
MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS,

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 113092, 1 September 1994, Second Division (Regalado, J.)
Facts:
In 1985, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, a civic organization,

launched a fund drive for the renovation of the chapel in Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.
Martin Centeno (Centeno) and Vicente Yco (Yco) approached Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles (Judge Angeles), a resident of Tikay, to solicit from her a contribution of
P1,500.00, without a permit from Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD).
Judge Angeles consequently filed a complaint against Centeno and Yco for
violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1564 (Solicitation Permit Law) before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. MTC found Centeno and Yco guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and both were sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 each. It was
recommended, however, that both accused be pardoned on the basis of the finding that
they acted in good faith.
Centeno and Yco appealed to the RTC. However, Yco subsequently withdrew his
appeal, hence the case proceeded only with respect to Centeno. Respondent Judge
Victoria Villalon-Pornillos (Judge Villalon-Pornillos) affirmed the decision of the lower
court but increased the penalty from P200.00 to imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of
P1,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency. Motion for
reconsideration of the decision was likewise denied by the RTC; hence, this petition for
review before the High Court.
Issues:
1. Whether the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in the broadest
sense so as to include a religious purpose
2. Whether State regulations on the freedom of religion constitute abridgment or
restriction on the free exercise clause guaranteed under the Constitution
3. Whether solicitation for religious purpose may be subjected to the police power of
the state
Ruling:
1. NO. The 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words
"charitable" and "religious" separately and independently of each other. PD No.
1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes" which means the
framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious
purposes within its coverage. Accordingly, "charitable" and "religious," which are
integral parts of an enumeration using the disjunctive "or" should be given different,
distinct, and disparate meanings. The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished
under the said law because the law does not contemplate solicitation for religious
purposes.
2. NO. The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a

double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance
of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and
freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the
individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the constitution
embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains
subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have
appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every
case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible end,
as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom. Whence, even the exercise of
80 | P a g e
religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the State
may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens
from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before
permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and
his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The State is
likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the
interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. It does not follow,
therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that
everything which may be so called can be tolerated. It has been said that a law
advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one
interfering with the "free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally
has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion. Thus, the
general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any
religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds,
is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a
religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous
restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its
exercise.
3. YES. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to determine
whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or
for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. That solicitation of contributions
under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly abused is a
matter of common knowledge. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good
faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged
the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy. The
objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy and
proper charities which naturally suffer when the confidence of the public in
campaigns for the raising of money for charity is lessened or destroyed. Some
regulation of public solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest. To conclude,
solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State
in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that
solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of
Presidential Decree no. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held
criminally liable therefor.
The decision appealed was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Centeno was acquitted of
the offense charged, with costs de officio.9
9
De officio: Each party bears his own expenses.
81 | P a g e
Purzuelo, Danielle: Pastor Austria v. NLRC (1999)
PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA, petitioner, vs. HON. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fourth Division), CEBU CITY, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 124382, 16 August 1999, First Division (Kapunan, J.)
“Strong fences make good neighbors, is the rationale of the principle of the separation
of the Church and the State. The idea advocated by this principle is to delineate the
boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoid encroachments of their
respective exclusive jurisdictions.”
Facts:
The Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law.
The petitioner was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his
services were terminated.
On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several

communications from Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit
accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife,
Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.
On October 16, 1991, Austria went to the office of Pastor Buhat, who was the
president of the Negros Mission, to persuade him to convene the Executive Committee
to settle a dispute between Pastor Austria and Pastor David Rodrigo. But that meeting
ended in a heated altercation between Pastor Austria and Pastor Buhat.
A fact-finding committee was, thereafter, created to investigate Austria. Sensing

that the investigation would be one-sided, Pastor Austria wrote to SDA President, and
chairman of the fact-finding committee, Pastor Rueben Moralde, to request that certain
members be excluded in the investigation and resolution of the case. Out of the six (6)
members requested to inhibit, only two (2) were actually excluded, namely: Pastor Buhat
and Pastor Rodrigo.
On October 29, 1991, the petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing that he
committed: 1) Misappropriation of denominational funds; 2) Willful breach of trust; 3)
Serious misconduct; 4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and 5) Commission of an
offense against the employer's duly authorized representative.
On November 14, 1991, Pastor Austria filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint
for illegal dismissal against the SDA and its officers and prayed for reinstatement with
back wages and benefits, moral and exemplary damages and other labor law benefits.
Labor Arbiter:
Labor Arbiter Cesar D. Sideo rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, ordering
the SDA to reinstate Pastor Austria to his former position, including payment for
backwages, damages, attorney’s fees, and other rights.
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC):

The SDA appealed to the NLRC and a decision was rendered in favor of
respondent. Pastor Austria filed a motion for reconsideration and the NLRC issued a
resolution reversing its original decision and reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
The SDA filed a motion for reconsideration to NLRC saying that the Labor Arbiter
had no jurisdiction over the complaint due to the constitutional provision on the separation
of church and state since the case allegedly involved an ecclesiastical affair to which the
State cannot interfere. The NLRC sustained the argument posed by SDA and dismissed
the complaint of Austria.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was then ordered by the court to file its
comment. OSG stated that the question of employment of the petitioner is secular in
nature, not ecclesiastical.
82 | P a g e
Issues:
1. Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical
affair, and, as such, involves the separation of church and state?
2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the
complaint filed by petitioner against the SDA?
3. Whether or not such termination is valid?
Ruling:
1. NO. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what
is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister
as an employee, which is purely secular because it has no relationship with the
practice of faith, worship or doctrines. An ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns
doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement
within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government
of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those
deemed unworthy of membership”. In the case at bar, the matter of terminating an
employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act
of expelling a member from the religious congregation.
2. YES. As the SDA was exercising its management prerogative which is secular in
nature, the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint.
3. In termination cases, the settled rule is that the burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause rests on the employer.
The requisites for a valid dismissal are: (a) the employee must be afforded due
process, i.e., he must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself,
and; (b) the dismissal must be for a valid cause as provided in Article 282 of the
Labor Code. Without the concurrence of these twin requirements, the termination
would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.
Moreover, before the services of an employee can be validly terminated, Article

277 (b) of the Labor Code and Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code further require the employer to furnish the employee
with two written notices, to wit: (a) a written notice served on the employee
specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee
reasonable opportunity to explain his side; and (b) a written notice of termination
served indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds
have been established to justify his termination.
Respondent SAD failed to substantially comply with the above requirements. While
admittedly, private respondents sent a notice of termination, this does not cure the
initial defect of lack of the proper written charge required by law. They were also
unable to prove the allegations they have written in the notice of termination.
The Court sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was terminated
from service without just or lawful cause. Having been illegally dismissed,
petitioner is entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority
right and the payment of full backwages without any deduction corresponding to
the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The challenged Resolution of

public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, rendered on 23 January 1996,
is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 15 February
1993, is reinstated and hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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Quiambao, Eloisa: Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC (2016)
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, respondents
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D.
VALDEZ, respondents
G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, 8 March 2016, EN BANC, (Perez, J.)
Facts:
Grace Poe-Llamanzares was born September 3, 1968 in Iloilo to unknown

biological parents. Was seen abandoned in Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. Had a
“Foundling Certificate” and was named Grace Militar. When she was 5 years old, she
was adopted by the couple Fernando Poe Jr. and Susan Roces. Her name was changed
to Grace Poe.
Petitioner migrated to the United States. Became a US citizen on October 18,

2001 and received her US passport on December 19, 2001.
Petitioner’s father died in December 2004. She was with him on his deathbed.
She stayed until February 3, 2005, then went back to the US.
On May 24, 2005, petitioner returned to the Philippines while husband stayed in
the US.
Bought condo on February 20, 2006.

US house sold on April 27, 2006.
Husband went to the Philippines in May 2006.
Per petitioner, she “turned her attention to regaining her natural-born Filipino
citizenship” thus availed of RA 9225, the Filipino Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act. She had Oath of Allegiance on July 7, 2006. She renounced her US citizenship on
October 26, 2010.
Per respondents.
1. Residency requirements not met.
The petitioner, on her filing her senatorial certificate of candidacy for the
May 13, 2013 elections, placed her “period of residence in the Philippines”
at 6 years and 6 months.
She should have stated period of residency at 7 years and 11 months so as

to be eligible for the 2016 presidential elections.
Furthermore, her residency should just be counted only from July 7, 2006,
the date she re-acquired her natural-born status.
Petitioner exhibited deliberate intent to mislead.
2. Not a natural-born citizen.

The petitioner is a “foundling.” The 1935 Constitution of the Philippines
does not expressly mention foundling/s as natural-born citizens. Expressio
unius est expressio alterius.
Per petitioner.
1. Residency requirements met.
The petitioner stated that she has the requisite 10-year residency
requirement for the presidential candidacy. Her senatorial COC period was
a good faith mistake on her part.
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Cannot categorize her good faith mistake as under Admission Against

Interest because even though this is admissible evidence in court, it is not
conclusive.
Furthermore, this should not be an estoppel for her to rectify or correct her
mistake.
2. A natural-born citizen.
The petitioner rationalized that not because “foundling” was not found
textually demonstrable in the 1935 Constitution, that it was intentionally
excluded from the enumeration. The Con Convention deliberations were
shown and the delegates’ intent of having foundlings included in the
enumeration was shown. It was not included because they were just too
few of them.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner met the 10-year residency requirement to be eligible as
a presidential candidate for the May 9, 2016 elections.
2. Whether or not petitioner is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Ruling:
Residency Requirement of Petitioner.
Pursuant to Section 2, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines:

“No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.” (emphasis
included)
Cited Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec whereby the SC decreed that residence is

domicile for election purposes and requisites include physical present, animus manendi
or intent to remain, and animus non-revertendi or intent to abandon the old domiciliary.
All evidence shown by the petitioner point to her being able to attain the 10-year
residency requirement needed to be a presidential candidate.
Evidence included: early plans of abandoning US domicile right after her father’s
death, estimates from movers in March 2005, return to the Philippines in May 2005,
staying in parents’ residence with her family, permanent driver being assigned for her
family’s needs, children immediately being enrolled in local Metro Manila schools.
Pursuant to all the evidence presented regarding petitioner’s intent, the period of
residence of petitioner immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 presidential elections will
be 10 years and 11 months.
Natural-born Citizenship of Petitioner.
Foundlings are children with “unknown” parents. Even though not expressly-
mentioned in the 1935 Constitution, it was the 1934 Con Con’s record of deliberations
which reinforced the intent of the framers of the Constitution that foundlings are among
the considered natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
Even though the Philippines is not a signatory to the treaties of 1930 Hague
Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness, the Philippines recognizes
generally accepted principles of international law, through its incorporation doctrine (and
another is the transformation doctrine wherein international law applies to the state), as
binding and in full force and effect in the nation. These treaties, including the more recent
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positions of the international community, recognize the foundling’s right to a name, to a

nationality, and right against statelessness.
Furthermore, the petitioner’s natural-born status was sufficiently proven by all the
circumstantial evidence presented: statistics included probability as high as 99.+% for
children born in the locality where the petitioner was found to be of Filipino parents, found
in a Roman Catholic parish, in the Philippines, no main port of entry for foreigners/aliens
nearby, facial and physical features/body configuration of the petitioner was taken into
consideration.
Per SC, “All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner
for her candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the
COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse
of discretion from root to fruits. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Resolutions are hereby annulled and set aside.
Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is

DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local
Elections of 9 May 2016.”
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Quintin, Ed Vinson: Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC (2015)
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, et al., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 205728, 21 January 2015, EN BANC (Leonen, J.)
All governmental authority emanates from our people. No unreasonable restrictions of

the fundamental and preferred right to expression of the electorate during political
contests no matter how seemingly benign will be tolerated.
Facts:
Petitioners posted a tarpaulin within a private compound housing the San

Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. It was posted on the front walls of the Cathedral within
the public view. It contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“Team Buhay” or “Team Patay”. The classification was drawn depending on those who
voted for the passing of Reproductive health (RH) law.
Accordingly, respondent Atty. Majarucon of the Commision on Elections

(COMELEC) issued a notice to remove Campaign materials due to failure to comply
within the size requirement of materials. Petitioner Bishop replied requiring a definite
ruling of the COMELEC regarding the said tarpaulin.
However, another letter was served ordering the immediate removal of the
materials and in the event, that the failed to comply, they will be constrained to file an
election offense against petitioners.
Meanwhile, during oral arguments, COMELEC conceded that the tarpaulin was
neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the
tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who
helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech,
petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.
Issues:
1. Whether COMELEC had legal basis and/or authority to regulate expression of
private citizens
2. Whether the assailed notice of removal is a content based or content-neutral
regulation
3. Whether the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.
Ruling:
1. NO. COMELEC cites the Constitution supporting their position that they had the
power to regulate during election period to ensure free, orderly, honest, and
credible elections which includes the regulation of the tarpaulin in question.
However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party.
COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in their issuances.

The above provisions regulating the posting of campaign materials only apply to
candidates and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two.
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates
and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political
party, or party-list group.
2. The regulation is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from
the size of its medium.
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Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject

matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes
controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the
speech. The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin
content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
As a restriction of the fundamental freedom, Content-based regulation bears

heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys
a high degree of protection.
The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any relationship to

any political candidate should not be held hostage by the possibility of abuse by those
seeking to be elected. The message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a
social issue that it deeply believes. Through rhetorical devices, it communicates the
desire of Diocese that the positions of those who run for a political position on this social
issue be determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily advocates a stand on a
social issue; only secondarily — even almost incidentally — will cause the election or non-
election of a candidate.
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.
3. NO. The church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court.
The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does
not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious
speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the
tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
The tarpaulin, on its face, "does not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic
church." That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of
the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the
ambit of religious speech.
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Recalde, Denielle: Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes (2015)
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT,

et al., petitioners, vs. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015, EN BANC, (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal
standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward
of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the
Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the
named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their
petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the
Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file
this petition.
Facts:
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE,
entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with
JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait.
On May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon
Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was
also done to determine the area’s underwater composition.
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait
(PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial
Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended
the approval of JAPEX’s application for an ECC.
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and
JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on
November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150
meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until
February 8, 2008.
Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions
both dated December 17, 2007. The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine
mammals in the Tañon Strait by two individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards
of the marine mammals. The second petition was filed by a non-governmental
organization representing the interests of fisherfolk, along with individual representatives
from fishing communities impacted by the oil exploration activities. They commonly seek
that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of
the 1987 Constitution.
Issues:
Procedural:
1. Whether or not the case is already moot and academic due to the termination of
the Service Contract 46.
2. Whether or not marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal standing to
pursue the case; and
Substantial:
3. Whether or not the service contract violated the Philippine Constitution or other
domestic laws.
Ruling:
In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the important procedural point
of whether the case was moot because the service contract had been terminated. The
Court declared that mootness is “not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts in resolving a case.” Due to the alleged grave constitutional violations and
paramount public interest in the case, not to mention the fact that the actions complained
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of could be repeated, the Court found it necessary to reach the merits of the case even
though the particular service contract had been terminated.
Secondly, the case will still push through in favor of the petitioners. However, that
does not necessarily mean that the Court affirmed the legal standing of the Resident
Marine Mammals, particularly the Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises and Other
Cetacean Species. The Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond natural
and juridical persons, even though it recognized that the current trend in Philippine
jurisprudence “moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in
environmental cases.” Instead, the Court explained, “the need to give the Resident
Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any
Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws.”
On the last issue, the Court ruled in the affirmative. The contract entered into by
the Department of Energy Secretary Angelo Reyes was unconstitutional. They held that
while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil extraction, the contract did
not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements. Section 2 Article XII of the 1987
Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by
the president and reported to congress. Because the JAPEX contract was executed
solely by the Energy Secretary, and not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court
held that it was unconstitutional. Further, the Court also ruled that the contract violated
the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally
prohibits exploitation of natural resources in protected areas. In order to explore for
resources in a protected area, the exploration must be performed in accordance with an
environmental impact assessment (EIA). The Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic
surveys before any EIA was performed; therefore, its activity was unlawful. Furthermore,
the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of energy resources can
only be authorized through a law passed by the Philippine Congress. Because Congress
had not specifically authorized the activity in Tañon Strait, the Court declared that no
energy exploration should be permitted in that area.
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Ronda, Maria Danya: Mapa v. Sandiganbayan (1994)
PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., et al., petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

G.R. No. 100295, 26 April 1994, EN BANC (Puno, J.)
Facts:
Petitioners Placido L. Mapa and Lorenzo Vergara was charged with violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. They were granted an immunity from suit by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) provided that he will testify as
witness in the criminal proceedings in United States v. Ferdinand Marcos, where
Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos were being tried for charges of corruption.
The petitioners flew to New York to testify and all the expenses were shouldered by the
PCCG. During the trial, Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella, the American prosecutor
dispensed the testimony of the petitioners. Thereafter, Imelda Marcos was acquitted.
Since the petitioners were not able to testify, it was contended that this nullifies the
immunity granted to them.
Issue: Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG is still in force and effect.
Ruling:
Yes. Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States, there are
two types of statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are as follows: 1) The
transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness
can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or
transaction; and 2) Use and-derivative-use immunity, where a witness is only assured
that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against
him or her in a subsequent prosecution.
Under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, the PCGG has the separate power
to grant immunity to any person from being prosecuted provided they will meet the
conditions provided by the PCGG. The petitioners have satisfied the requirements both
of the law and the parties' implementing agreements when they gave information to the
prosecution and made themselves available as witnesses in the said RICO cases. Their
failure to testify was not of their own making. It was brought about by the decision of the
US prosecutors who may have thought that their evidence was enough to convict the
Marcoses. Since petitioners' failure to testify was not of their own choosing nor was it due
to any fault of their own, justice and equity forbid that they be penalized by the withdrawal
of their immunity. Indeed, initially, the PCGG itself adopted the posture that the immunity
of petitioners stayed and should not be disturbed. Also, the grant of section 5 immunity
must not be strictly construed against the petitioners. It simplistically characterized the
grant as special privilege, as if it was gifted by the government, ex gratia. In taking this
posture, it misread the raison d'etre and the long pedigree of the right against self-
incrimination vis-a-vis immunity statutes.
The days of inquisition brought about the most despicable abuses against human
rights. Not the least of these abuses is the expert use of coerced confessions to send to
the guillotine even the guiltless. To guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian
method, the right against self-incrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of all
civilized countries. Over the years, however, came the need to assist government in its
task of containing crime for peace and order is a necessary matrix of public welfare. To
accommodate the need, the right against self-incrimination was stripped of its
absoluteness. Immunity statutes in varying shapes were enacted which would allow
government to compel a witness to testify despite his plea of the right against self-
incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionality, a witness is
given what has come to be known as transactional or a use-derivative-use immunity.
Quite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonanza from government. Those given
the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it – the surrender of their precious right to
be silent. Our hierarchy of values demands that the right against self-incrimination and
the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect and protection. Laws that tend
to erode the force of these preeminent rights must necessarily be given a liberal
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interpretation in favor of the individual. The government has a right to solve crimes but it
must do it, rightly.
Sagun, Ervin: Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (2015)
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015, EN BANC (Bersamin, J.)
Facts:
Year 2014, Sen. Enrile was charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan for
their alleged involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriation under the PDAF.
When his warrant was issued, Sen. Enrile voluntarily surrendered to the CIDG and was
later confined and detained at the PNP General Hospital, he then filed a motion to fix bail
where he argued that:
1. He should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right;
2. Although charged with plunder his penalty would only be reclusion temporal
considering that there are two mitigating circumstances, his voluntary surrender
and that he is already at the age of 90;
3. That he is not a flight risk and his medical condition must be seriously considered.
The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the grounds that:

1. He is charged with a capital offense;
2. That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his bail because the
prosecution has not yet presented its evidences.
Sen. Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for denying his motion to fix bail?
Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the
objective of bail and unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s fragile health and advanced
age. Bail is a matter right and is safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to ensure
the personal appearance of the accused during trial or whenever the court requires and
at the same time recognizing the guarantee of due process which is the presumption of
his innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme Court further explained that Bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged should be allowed
independently of the merits charged, provided his continued incarceration is injurious to
his health and endanger his life. Hence, the Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen.
Enrile be granted the right to bail it will enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and attended, which will then enable him to attend trial therefore
achieving the true purpose of bail.
RATIO:
1. Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed
innocent.
Purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial. Amount
of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required,
but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfil this purpose.
Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest

in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the
accused’s presence at trial.
2. Bail may be granted as a matter of right of of discretion.
Right to bail is expressly afforded by Sec. 13, Art. III (Bill of Rights). This
constitutional provision is repeated in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of Rules of Court.
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Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetual or life

imprisonment, not bailable.- No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
Gen. Rule- Any person, before being convicted of any criminal offence, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetual or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail
shall be recognized.
All criminal cases within MeTC, MTC, MTC in Cities or MCTC are bailable.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by RTC for any offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetual, or life imprisonment or even riot to conviction when
evidence of guilt is not strong.
Granting of Bail is Discretionary:

1. upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment
2. if RTC has imposed penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years, provided none of the
circumstances under par. 3 Sec. 5 Rule 114 is present, as follows:
a. he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
b. he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification
c. he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
d. the circumstance of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
or
e. there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal
3. Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or

reclusion perpetual is subject to judicial discretion.
For purposes of bail, determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong lies
within the discretion of the trial court.
Bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the
trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution. The hearing,
which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily
determine whether or not the evidence of guit against the accused is strong.
The trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes vs.
Catral.
a. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Sec. 18 Rule 114)
b. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not prosecution refused to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Sec. 7& 8, Rule 114)
c. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary evidence
of the prosecution;
d. If the evidence of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond (Sec. 19 Rule 114). Otherwise petition should be denied.
4. Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail.
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The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international

community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
The national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extradites upon a clear and convincing
showing:
(1) that the detainee will not be flight risk or a danger to the community
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances
SC=Enrile’s social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered
to the authorities indicate that the risk of his fought is highly unlikely. His personal
disposition demonstrated his utter respect for legal processed of this country. With his
solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service
and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
His currently fragile state of health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail. Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required special medical attention.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration
is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Court balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through
ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the
guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
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Sibal, Tricia: Chavez v. PCGG (1998)
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD

GOVERNMENT (PCGG, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998, First Division (Panganiban, J.)
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official

who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed
unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country’s
economy, alleges that what impelled him to bring the action were several news bannered
in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to
(1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded
accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information (section 7, article III, 1987
Constitution) and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions
involving the national interest (section 28, article II, 1987 Constitution), demands that
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s
task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the
alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of “paramount public interest,” since
it has a “debilitating effect on the country’s economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to
the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to
know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.
On the other hand, respondents do not deny forging a compromise agreement with
the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner’s action is premature, because there
is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any
disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become
effective and binding.
Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject
Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval, and that the Republic opposed such
move on the principal grounds that (1) said Agreements have not been ratified by or even
submitted to the President for approval, pursuant to Item No. 8 of the General Agreement;
and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with their undertakings therein, particularly
the collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. The Republic also cited an
April 11, 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the Sandiganbayan dismissed
a similar petition filed by the Marcoses’ attorney-in-fact.
Furthermore, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in his May 4, 1998 Memorandumto

then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, categorically stated that he did not
authorized to approve the Compromise Agreements of December 28, 1993 or any
agreement at all with the Marcoses, and would have disapproved them had they been
submitted.
Issue: Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the
details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.
Ruling:
Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries and officials who
are or may be directly or indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the
terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to
such alleged ill-gotten wealth. The court also held that the General and Supplemental
Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the
Marcos heirs are in violation of the Constitution.
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According to the Supreme Court, the “information” and the “transactions” referred
to in the subject provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent.
There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right
may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. However, there are some
of the recognized restrictions. These are matters relating to national security and
intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, and
other confidential information.
In regards with the national security, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law
holding that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to
state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. But where
there is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold
documents and other information, provided that they are examined “in strict confidence”
and given “scrupulous protection. Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges
prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable
safeguards for the sake of national interest.
The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that trade or industrial
secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as
banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) are also exempted
from compulsory disclosure.
Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to
the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts may not
inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law
enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to the whereabouts of
fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.
The Ethical Standards Act further prohibits public officials and employees from
using or divulging “confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason
of their office and not made available to the public.
Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic

correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house
of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is

no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern like public interest is a term that eludes
exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for
the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest
or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
In consideration to a public concern, the need to give the general public adequate
notification of various laws that regulate and affect the actions and conduct of citizens.
The Court held that official acts of public officers done in pursuit of their official functions
are public in character; hence, the records pertaining to such official acts and decisions
are within the ambit of the constitutional right of access to public records.
In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their
official functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of
transparency of governmental affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an
opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the
government are honestly, faithfully and competently performing their functions as public
servants. Undeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free flow of thought; but
thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that the public would gain a better
perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as
participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective
manner. Certainly, it is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas
among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes
desired by the people.
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In regards with the nature of the Marcoses’ alleged iIll-gotten wealth, then
President Corazon C. Aquino was specifically mandated to “[r]ecover ill-gotten properties
amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and [to] protect the interest
of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts.”
Executive Order No. 1, created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the
President in the recovery of vast government resources allegedly amassed by former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates both here and
abroad.
EO No. 14 was issued giving additional powers to the PCGG which, taking into
account the overriding considerations of national interest and national survival, required
it to achieve expeditiously and effectively its vital task of recovering ill-gotten wealth.
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from

the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth
is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. We may also add that “ill-
gotten wealth,” by its very nature, assumes a public character. Based on the
aforementioned Executive Orders, “ill-gotten wealth” refers to assets and properties
purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use
of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their public
office; or their use of powers, influences or relationships, “resulting in their unjust
enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.” Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly
originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong
to the people. As such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury,
subject only to the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged
by competent courts. Another declared overriding consideration for the expeditious
recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national economic recovery.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is upon the PCGG and
its officers and other government representatives to disclose sufficient public information
on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and
holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information must pertain to definite propositions of the
government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of
being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. There is a need to observe the same
restrictions on disclosure of information in general such as on matters involving national
security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.
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Soriano, Joe Carlo: Jacinto v. Court of Appeals (1997)
Merlinda Jacinto, et al, petitioners, vs, Court of Appeals, et al., respondents

G.R. No. 124540, 14 November 1997, EN BANC (Puno, J.)
Although the Constitution vests in them the right to organize, to assemble peaceably
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances, there is no like express
provision granting them the right to strike. Rather, the constitutional grant of the right to
strike is restrained by the proviso that its exercise shall be done in accordance with law.
Facts:
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan

Manila. They incurred unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions then
staged. Hence, the Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) Sec. Isidro
Cariño immediately issued a return-to-work order, emphasizing that under Civil service
law and rules, strikes, unauthorized mass leaves and other forms of mass actions by civil
servants which disrupt public services are strictly prohibited. However, it was ignored by
petitioners. Sec. Cariño issued formal charges and preventive suspension orders against
them. They were administratively charged with gross misconduct; gross neglect of duty,
etc. for joining unauthorized mass actions; ignoring report-to-work directives; etc. During
the investigation, petitioners did not file their answers or controvert the charges against
them. As a consequence, Sec. Cario, in his decisions found them guilty as charged and
imposed the penalty of dismissal, except with respect to petitioners Merlinda Jacinto and
Adelina Agustin who were meted only six (6) months suspension.
The decisions were appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which
dismissed the appeals for lack of merit and then to the Civil Service Commission which
set aside the Orders of the MSPB in the contested resolutions. The Civil Service
Commission, in separate resolutions, found the petitioners (except Merlinda Jacinto)
guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; imposed upon them the
penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay; and automatically reinstated them to
the service without payment of back salaries.
In the case of Petitioner Merlinda Jacinto, the CSC found her guilty of Violation of
Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations; imposed upon her the penalty of reprimand;
and automatically reinstated her in the service without payment of back salaries.
The questioned CSC resolutions were referred to the Court of Appeals by the
Supreme Court.
Respondent Court found that the petitioners absented themselves from their
classes in furtherance of or in connection with the mass action for the purpose of
pressuring the government to grant their demands. Citing the resolution of this Court
in MPSTA vs. Laguio that the mass actions staged by the public schoolteachers from
September 17 to September 19, 1990, were to all intents and purposes a strike, it denied
the petition, since the right to strike did not extend to civil service employees. In the case
of Merlinda Jacinto, Respondent Court found no error on the part of the CSC in finding
her guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. Neither did it find the
petitioners entitled to backwages for the period of their preventive suspension, as they
were not exonerated of the charges against them.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the public school teachers are penalized for the exercise of their
right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for redress of grievances.
Ruling:
Only Improper Exercise of the Right to Peaceful Assembly and to Petition for a
Redress of Grievances. Thus,
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The Supreme Court held that the petitioners here, except Merlinda Jacinto, were
not penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission found them
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented
themselves without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in
order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-
holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they were
responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time -- recess, after classes,
weekends or holidays -- to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper
authorities within the bounds of law, no one -- not the DECS, the CSC or even this Court
-- could have held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed
rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity
necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the
prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their act by its nature was enjoined
by the Civil Service law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made
answerable.
There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition

the government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form
associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted
activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly
Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article
XIII.
The Supreme Court further held that while we recognize and appreciate the toil
and hardship of our public schoolteachers in fulfilling the states responsibility of educating
our children, and realize their inadequately addressed plight as compared to other
professionals, we have the equal task of promoting the larger public interest which
withholds from them and other similarly situated government workers the right to engage
in mass actions resulting in work stoppages for any purpose. Although the Constitution
vests in them the right to organize, to assemble peaceably and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances, there is no like express provision granting them the right to
strike. Rather, the constitutional grant of the right to strike is restrained by the proviso that
its exercise shall be done in accordance with law.
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Tambiloc, Aura Jane Nikolle: Quinto V. COMELEC (2010)
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., petitioners, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 189698, 22 February 2010, EN BANC (Puno, C.J.)
Facts:
Pursuant to R.A. No. 9369, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678
wherein a person holding a public appointive office or position will be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy (COC). As they
intended to run in the coming elections, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A.
Tolentino, Jr., appointed public officials, immediately filed a petition for prohibition and
certiorari, seeking the declaration of Section 4(a) of the said resolution as null and void.
They contended that since the law considers one a candidate only at the start of the
campaign period, they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices when
they file their COCs. They further contended that the provision considering them, to the
exclusion of elective officials, as ipso facto resigned from office upon the filing of their
CoCs, discriminates and violates the equal protection clause in the 1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, the COMELEC, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), asserted that petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition, which is also
an improper remedy. Having not filed their COCs yet, the petitioners were not affected by
the assailed provision; thus, petition was unripe for judicial determination. Their interest
in the present case was merely speculative and contingent. It further argued that said
provision was merely copied from the law.
The Court, in its decision on December 1, 2009, agreed that the petition is that for
declaratory relief over which it does not exercise original jurisdiction. However, since a
challenge on the constitutionality of the questioned provisions arises, it may step in to
resolve the instant petition. The Court held that, although not yet candidates, petitioners
have the standing to raise the constitutional issue, because they are qualified voters.
Laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on
voters. Moreover, considering only persons holding appointive positions, but not all other
civil servants, as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their COCs, unduly
discriminates against the first class. Although there is a substantial distinction between
appointive and elective officials, such distinction would still be invalid for it is not germane
to the purpose of the law. Lacking is the valid justification of the preferential treatment.
Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought
to be prevented by the measure remain. Hence, this is a clear violation of the equal
protection clause. Furthermore, the Court found the assailed provisions to be suffering
from the infirmity of being overbroad. It pertains to all civil servants holding appointive
posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not,
and is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be
partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or
barangay level.
Hence, motion for reconsideration and motions for reconsideration-in-intervention

were filed by the respondent and the movants-intervenors.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause
when they accord differential treatment to elective and appointive officials.
2. Whether or not the assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of
overbreadth.
Ruling:
The Court held that the provisions assailed in the case at bar, are not violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Subject to reasonable classification, the
equal protection of the law simply requires equality among equals. Substantial distinctions
between appointive and elective officials do exist; that the former hold their office by virtue
of their designation by an appointing authority, while the latter, of the mandate of the
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electorate. Likewise, while the former are prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political or electoral activities except to vote, the latter, by nature of their positions, are
allowed to.
Moreover, the Court found a reasonable justification in excluding elected officials

from the scope of the deemed resign provisions. It noted that an election is the
embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of
the people…Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a
definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the
deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In
other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be
served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast,
there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.”
Furthermore, in addressing evils through the imposition of laws, it has been a long-
standing rule to take one step at a time. In addressing such, it is inevitable that by drawing
lines and making choices, inequity is said to exist among those included or excluded.
Nonetheless, the courts deference to legislative judgment is expected as long as such
choices are deemed reasonable. It can now be said that the dichotomized treatment of
appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law, satisfying
all the requisites of the reasonableness test. Also, since the ruling in Mancuso v. Taft,
from which the assailed Decision was based, has already been overruled, to rely on it,
given that the American law in question here is where we copied the assailed provisions,
is unwarranted.
Lastly, the Court held that the assailed provisions do not suffer from overbreadth.
It is a shortsighted view to only assume that the evils sought to be prevented are existing
only when the appointive official running for elective office holds an influential post. It fails
to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by the
partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse
perpetuated by a powerful political machine that has amassed the scattered powers of
government workers so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an unbreakable grasp
on the reins of power. As to the limitation on the candidacy regardless of the type of office
sought, the rules and guidelines set by Resolution No. 8678 were issued specifically for
the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, which are partisan in character. It is
noteworthy that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies
of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the said 2010 Elections. Hence,
the overbreadth challenge cannot be upheld. To attack a statute’s constitutionality for
being over broad, the overbreadth must be real and substantial.
Wherefore, the Court granted the Motions for Reconsideration, reversed and set
aside its December 1, 2009 Decision, and declared the assailed provisions as NOT
unconstitutional.
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Umandap, Allison: People v. Obrero (2000)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY OBRERO y

CORLA, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 122142, 17 May 2000, Second Division (Mendoza, J.)
Ratio: (Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution: Rights of an Accused)

Perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to the accused without any effort to find out
from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own
counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him is merely ceremonial and
inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect.
Overview:
The accused was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. He was
apprehended and brought to the police station where he was provided with a lawyer who
is a station commander of another police station, and was interrogated.
Accused: Jimmy Obrero

Victims: Emma Cabrera (robbery victim) and Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta (maids
of Emma Cabrera; homicide victims)
Facts:
Jimmy Obrero is a delivery boy employed by Angie Cabosas whose business was
selling chickens to customers. Jimmy was asked to deliver chickens to Emma Cabrera, a
regular customer.
In Jimmy’s extrajudicial confession, he stated that the day before the robbery, his
fellow employee, Ronnie Liwanag, proposed that they rob Emma so he can go to La
Union to visit his family. On the day of the robbery, only two helpers were present at
Cabrera’s residence, thus decided to carry out the plan.
However, during the course of the robbery, Ronnie stabbed and killed Nena
Berjuega, one of the helpers while Jimmy stabbed the younger maid, Remedios Hitta who
later died. Thereafter, they divided the money.
The extrajudicial confession was done in Tagalog and was signed by Jimmy
Obrero in the presence of Atty. De Los Reyes, who is a PC captain of the WPD
Headquarters in UN Avenue and who happened to be there during that time because he
was representing a client accused of illegal recruitment. He was then asked by Lt. Javier
of WPD Homicide Section to assist Jimmy Obrero in executing an extrajudicial
confession.
At the trial, Jimmy Obrero pleaded not guilty of the crime charged. He said that he
came back from his errand and remitted the amount of P2000 which had been paid to
him. He also claimed that after being informed of the charges against him, he was beaten
up and detained for a week and made to execute an extrajudicial confession. He denied
having known or seen Atty. De Los Reyes before and stated that he did not understand
the contents of the extrajudicial confession which he signed because he did not know
how to read.
The trial court found Jimmy Obrero guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The court held
that the accused consented to giving his extrajudicial confession and that absent any
showing that the assisting lawyer, though a station commander but of another police
station, was remiss in his duty as a lawyer, the Court will hold that the proceedings were
regularly conducted.
Issue: Whether or not Jimmy Obrero's extrajudicial confession is valid and admissible in
evidence
Ruling:
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Jimmy Obrero's extrajudicial confession is considered inadmissible.

In this case, accused-appellant assails the validity of this extrajudicial confession
which forms the basis of his conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide. He claims
that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted him in executing his confession, was not the counsel
of his own choice. That was the reason, he said, he refused to sign the booking and
information sheet. He said he signed the extrajudicial confession five times as a sign that
it was involuntarily executed by him.
Art. III, 12 of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts:

(1)......Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2)......No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3)......Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section
17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this

constitutional provision: (1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as
torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of 12, and
(2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject
of paragraph 1 of the same 12.
Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United

States from which Art. III, 12(1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced.
Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the
atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel.
Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in
custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) He must be informed of
his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be
used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is
indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
What renders the confession of Jimmy inadmissible is the fact that he was not
given the Miranda rights effectively. There was only perfunctory reading of the Miranda
rights to Jimmy without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel
and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him.
This kind of giving of warnings has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate
to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Especially in this case, care should
have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that Jimmy was specifically
asked these questions considering he only finished Grade 4 in elementary school.
Moreover, the Constitution requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial

interrogations be competent and independent. In the case at bar, he cannot be
considered an ‘’independent counsel’’ as contemplated by the law because he was station
commander of the WPD at the time he assisted Jimmy Obrero. As PC Captain and Station
Commander of the WPD, Atty. De los Reyes was part of the police force who could not
be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted the accused in the
investigation. Hence, Jimmy Obrero's extrajudicial confession is considered inadmissible.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court held that the decision in Criminal Case No. 90-
82187 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Manila, convicting accused-appellant
Jimmy Obrero y Corla of the crime of robbery with homicide is REVERSED and accused-
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
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Villanueva, Katrina:
People v. Andan (1997)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLITO ANDAN y

HERNANDEZ alias BOBBY, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 116437, 3 March 1997, EN BANC (Per Curiam)
Facts:
On 19 February 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag,

Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, 20 years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima
School of Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
She was to prepare for her final examinations on 21 February 1994. Marianne wore a
striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags containing her
school uniforms, some personal effects and more than P2,000.00 in cash.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when Pablito Andan y Hernandez
invited her inside his house, using the ploy that the blood pressure of his wife's
grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as the old
woman was her distant relative. Andan then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to
the kitchen and raped her.
That night, Andan pulled Marianne to transfer her to the nearby vacant lot. When
the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. Upon hearing her moan,
he hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of
the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it.
On the following day, the body of Marianne was discovered. Marianne's gruesome
death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a
team of police officers to look for the criminal. Upon thorough investigation, all
circumstantial evidence leads to the guilt of Andan.
On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced Andan
in his parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police
headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, Andan denied any knowledge of
Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the
victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, Andan relented and said that his
neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that he was merely a
lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne.
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police
headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and
proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, Andan approached him and
whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led Andan to the Office of the
Chief of Police and there, Andan broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will
tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the
room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first
asked for a lawyer to assist Andan but since no lawyer was available, he ordered the
proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police,
representatives of the media and Andan's own wife and son, Andan confessed his guilt.
He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he
hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated
saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered
his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday.
Andan’s confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media

nationwide. The next two days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and
television reporters came. Andan was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession
to the mayor and reenacted the crime.
With these, Andan was charged with rape with homicide. On arraignment,
however, Andan entered a plea of "not guilty." In a decision dated 4 August 1994, the trial
court convicted Andan and sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act 7659. The
trial court also ordered Andan to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
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P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages. Hence, the
automatic review.
Issue: Whether or not Andan’s confession to the police, the mayor, and the newsmen
may be admitted as evidence against Andan.
Ruling:
Yes. While the confession to the police authorities and the two bags were
inadmissible in evidence, Andan’s confession to the police, the mayor, and the newsmen
may be admitted as evidence against Andan.
Per Article III, Section 12 of the Philippine Constitution, “Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2)
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision
is inadmissible in evidence against him.”
The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust
into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures
where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.
The in communicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a
later judicial determination of what really transpired. When the police arrested Andan,
they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed,
Andan was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents'
house. Andan was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police.
It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he
was investigated and interrogated. His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
So too were the two bags recovered from Andan's house. The victim's bags were the
fruits of Andan's uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence
also inadmissible.
On the other hand, however, Andan's confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question Andan at
all. No police authority ordered Andan to talk to the mayor. It was Andan himself who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor
did not know that Andan was going to confess his guilt to him. When Andan talked with
the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled
confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Andan's confessions to the
media were properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by
news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed
voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on
Channel 7; and Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9, interviewed
Andan on various dates, with the interviews recorded on video and showed that Andan
made his confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and
other relatives. They did not force Andan to grant them an interview and reenact the
commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They
interviewed him on separate days and not once did Andan protest his innocence. Instead,
he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the
commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the
news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive
atmosphere in the interview of Andan by the news reporters.
Thus, Andan's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12
(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with
the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to
the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without
105 | P a g e
need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights
that government has the duty to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill
of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and
unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,
Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-appellant
Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code and is sentenced to the penalty of death. Accused-appellant is also ordered
to indemnify the heirs of the victim, AAA, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her
death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.
106 | P a g e
People v. Endino (2001)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWARD ENDINO (at large)

and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 133026, 20 February 2001, Second Division (Bellosillo, J.)
Facts:
On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, Gerry
Galgarin alias Toto, uncle of Edward Endino, lunged at Dennis Aquino and stabbed him
repeatedly on the chest. Dennis' girlfriend, Clara Agagas, who was with him, stunned by
the unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop.
Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to free himself from his attacker.
However, his escape was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and
fired at Dennis. The latter died as a consequence.
Two days after the said attack, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino
was filed against Edward Endino and Gerry Galgarin and warrants were issued for their
arrest. On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested in Sitio Sto. Niño, Antipolo,
Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police and in the
following day was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi
and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan Police Force for Galgarin to be taken to
Palawan and be tried accordingly. On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-
CBN television station where Galgarin was interviewed by reporters.
Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt
while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. The former even requested
Edward to give himself up to the authorities. The said interview was shown over the ABS-
CBN evening news program TV Patrol.
During trial, Galgarin disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and
claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He further
asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible
under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec. 12, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.
However, the trial court found Galgarin guilty of murder qualified by Treachery,
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis
Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as
actual damages. Hence, this appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the ABS-CBN interview recording Galgarin’s confession is

admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The videotaped confession clearly showed Galgarin unburdening his guilt
willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such admission does not form
part of the custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men
in an attempt to draw sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Moreover, if he had
indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the
newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him.
However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for
admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is
prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further
admitting similar confessions.
For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extra-judicial confessions and place them
beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such
a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil
107 | P a g e
our criminal justice system. It is not suggested that videotaped confessions given before
media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers
are impermissible.
Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a
difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp
judgments in determining whether a confession was given under coercive physical or
psychological atmosphere. A word of counsel then to lower courts: "we should never
presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This
type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined
and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous
task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating
polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and
protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution."
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant
guilty of Murder qualified by Treachery is affirmed with the modification that accused-
appellant is further ordered to compensate the decedents heirs P50,000.00 as moral
damages for their emotional and mental anguish.
108 | P a g e
1AA – Case List
Andres, Christine Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (2001)

Angangan, Richard Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph Lantion (2000)
Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association
Angeles, Mark Vincent
(2016)
Bandillo, Jean Maquiling v. COMELEC (2013)
Batino, Apryl Sharien Abdula v. Guiani (2000)
Bertolano, Ramilyn Aniag, Jr. v. COMELEC (1994)
Borja, Angelic People v. Doria (1999)
Cadiz, Ma. Charlene International School Alliance of Educators v. Hon. Quisumbing (2000)
Manalili v. Court of Appeals (1997)
Cariaga, Camille Grace
Malacat v. Court of Appeals (1997)
Casim, Miguel Valmonte v. De Villa (1989)
People v. Leila Johnson (2000)
Castro, Marianne
People v. Susan Canton (2002)
Clarin, Stephanie Anne SJS v. Dangerous Drugs Board (2008)
Concha, Renlay Ople v. Torres (1998)
Corpuz, Junius Alejano v. Cabuay (2005)
Julian, Cheenie Mae Chavez v. Sec. Raul Gonzales (2008)
Bayan v. Ermita (2006)
Kasan, Alyahza
IBP v. Mayor Atienza (2010)
Borjal v. Court of Appeals (1999)
Koh, Patricia
Vasquez v. Court of Appeals (1999)
Magcalas, Minette Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals (1996)
Mallari, Riadale Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC (2010)
Monton, Rejean Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (1993)
Nomil, Joyce Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos (1994)
Purzuelo, Danielle Pastor Dionisio Austria v. NLRC (1999)
Quiambao, Eloisa Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC (2016)
Quintin, Edvinson The Diocese of Bacolod et al. v. COMELEC (2015)
Recalde, Denielle Resident Marine Mammals v. Sec. Reyes (2015)
Ronda, Danya Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (1994)
Sagun, Ervin Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (2015)
Sibal, Tricia Chavez v. PCGG (1998)
Soriano, Joe Carlo Jacinto v. Court of Appeals (1997)
Tambiloc, Aura Quinto v. COMELEC (2010)
Umandap, Allison People v. Obrero (2000)
People v. Andan (1997)
Villanueva, Katrina
People v. Endino (2001)
109 | P a g e
~Nothing Follows~
110 | P a g e

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

May 27, 2017

Andres, Christine Joyce: Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (2001)

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division)

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is

For facial challenge to a legislative act to be successful, the challenger must

Is this applicable to all kinds of statutes or laws?

Void-For-Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrine

They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute.

If a statute is invalidated, there are two possible outcomes:

determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are

When can we say that a statute is vague?

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards

When is this doctrine not applicable?

There are 2 situations where this is not applicable:

When is this doctrine applicable?

Therefore, this doctrine is not applicable in a legislation couched in imprecise

Is there a test to determine whether a statute is vague?

Angangan, Richard Vincent: Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph Lantion (2000)

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding

c. Prohibition (Restrain the Petitioner from considering the extradition

1. Whether the evaluation procedure is not a preliminary investigation nor akin

The Extradition process is similar to power of investigation which consists in

However, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. It

The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure is that:

1. There is yet no extradite; BUT

October 17, 2000 (Decision)

"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service of Notices. -

Moreover, an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation

WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision

Angeles, Mark Vincent: Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers (2016)

WILFREDO MOSQUEDA et al., petitioner vs. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS &

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The

FURTHER, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 28 January 2008

Judgment of the RTC

Promulgated on September 22, 2007 on the assailed city ordinance 0309-07

However, RTC recognized the impracticability of the 3-month transition period

On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, reversing the

Also, the absence of separability clause makes the ordinance unconstitutional.

Hence, now this consolidated appeals by petition for review on certiorari.

ZONE ARE [SIC] CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW,

We deny the petitions for review for their lack of merit.

Banana exportation plays a significant role in the maintenance of the country's

The petitioners' assertion of its authority to enact Ordinance No0309-07 is upheld.

To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-

Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely: the general

We disagree with the respondents.

Furthermore, the constitutional right to health and maintaining environmental

The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application

The position of the respondents is untenable.

The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals determined

The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the justification given by the

We partly agree with both parties.

The proposed resolution identified aerial spraying of pesticides as a nuisance

Secondary drift is associated with pesticide vapor. Pesticide vapor drift is

However, we do not subscribe to the respondents' position that there must be a

The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and

The principle of precaution originated as a social planning principle in Germany. In

In this jurisdiction, the principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure

It is notable, therefore, that the precautionary principle shall only be relevant if

The petitioners represent that Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid exercise of

We uphold the respondents.

The function of pesticides control, regulation and development is within the

Moreover, Ordinance No. 0309-07 proposes to prohibit an activity already covered