G.R. No. 188921 April 18, 2012 4.

, 2012 4. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-H of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in Barrio
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square meters
LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO, Petitioners, under Declaration of Real Property No. 406, and TCT No. 77225 in the name of Spouses Dante
vs. Y. Romero and Aurora Cruz-Romero.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO and VITTORIO C. ROMERO, Respondents.
5. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3815-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-227224 situated in Barrio
DECISION Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of four hundred ninety-four
square meters under TCT No. 113514 in the name of Aurora Cruz vda. de Romero.

SERENO, J.:
6. A parcel of land located in Barangay Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area
of more or less three hundred seventy-nine square meters under Declaration of Real Property
This is a Petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, praying for the reversal of the
No. 16136. It is not yet registered under Act 496 or the Old Spanish Mortgage Law, but
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 14 April 2009 and the subsequent Resolution2 dated 21 July 2009.
registrable under Act 3344 as amended. The improvement thereon, a building classified as a
warehouse, is covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 16136 A.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioners which alleged grave
abuse of discretion in the Resolutions dated 14 December 2007 and 29 January 2008 issued by Judge
7. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of
Maria Susana T. Baua in her capacity as presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen,
more or less two hundred four square meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 16139.
Pangasinan. The said Resolutions dismissed petitioners’ complaint against private respondents Aurora C.
It is not yet registered under Act 496 or Act 3344 as amended. The improvement thereon is
Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.
covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 16140.

Petitioners allege that upon their father’s death on 18 October 1974, their mother, respondent Aurora
8. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an
Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who held several real and personal properties in trust for her
area of more or less eleven thousand six hundred forty-six square meters under Declaration
children.3 Since that year until the present, she continues to be the administrator of the properties,
of Real Property No. 724 and TCT No. 284241 in the name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de Romero.
businesses, and investments comprising the estate of her late husband.

9. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an

Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that several Deeds of Sale were registered
area of more or less one thousand two hundred fifty-six square meters under Declaration of
over parcels of land that are purportedly conjugal properties of their parents. These included the
Real Property No. 725 and TCT No. 284242 in the name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de Romero.4
following real and personal properties:

Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother Vittorio – through fraud,
1. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-G of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in Barrio
misrepresentation and duress – succeeded in registering the above-mentioned properties in his name
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square meters
through of Deeds of Sale executed by their mother, Aurora.5 Vittorio allegedly employed force and threat
under Declaration of Real Property No. 16142 and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
upon her, and even administered drugs that rendered her weak and vulnerable. Thus, Aurora signed the
290013 in the name of Vittorio C. Romero. A warehouse stands on the lot, covered by
Deeds of Sale without reading or knowing their contents.
Declaration of Real Property No. 16142.

2. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-D of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in Barrio
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square meters
under Declaration of Real Property No. 405, and TCT No. 77223 in the name of Spouses Dante
Y. Romero and Aurora Cruz-Romero.
3. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-E of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in Barrio
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square meters
under Declaration of
On 18 December 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title, and
Conveyance of Title (Amended)6 against private respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.
Respondents filed their Answer, arguing that the properties in question were acquired long after the
death of their father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot be considered conjugal. They
allege that the lots covered by TCT Nos. 290010, 290011, 113514, and Tax Declaration Nos. 16136 and
11639 were paraphernal properties of Aurora which she had mortgaged. Vittorio purportedly had to
shell out substantial amounts in order to redeem them. The lots covered by TCT Nos. 77223, 77224, and
77225 were sold by Aurora herself as attorney-in-fact of her children on 23 November 2006, since her
authority to do so had never been revoked or modified.

Real Property No. 407 and TCT No. 77224 in the names of Spouses Dante Y. Romero and On 14 December 2007, the RTC rendered its Resolution dismissing petitioners’ complaint, stating thus:
Aurora Cruz-Romero.
xxx(T)he case under Special Proceedings No. 5185 remains pending in that no distribution of the assets
of the estate of the late Dante Y. Romero, nor a partition, has been effected among his compulsory heirs.
Thus, the contending claims of plaintiffs and defendants in this case could not be adjudicated nor passed
upon by this Court without first getting a definitive pronouncement from the intestate court as to the
share of each of the heirs of the late Dante Y. Romero in his estate.
Even the claim of defendant Aurora C. Romero that some of the properties being claimed by plaintiffs in
this case are her own, the same being paraphernal, is an issue which must be taken up and established in
the intestate proceedings.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
The RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration, citing Section 3, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court which
bars an heir or a devisee from maintaining an action to recover the title or possession of lands until such
lands have actually been assigned. The court ruled that "plaintiffs must first cause the termination of
Special Proceedings No. 5185 to its logical conclusion before this case could be entertained by the
Court."8
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in rendering the said Resolutions,
petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. On 14 April 2009, the CA rendered the assailed
judgment dismissing the Petition, ruling that the properties involved in this case are part of the estate
left to the heirs of Judge Romero, the partition of which is already subject of an intestate proceeding
filed on 6 January 1976 in the then Court of First Instance (CFI).9 The CA based its judgment on the
findings of the RTC that the inventory of the estate of Judge Romero submitted to the CFI included the
same parties, properties, rights and interests as in the case before it.
Petitioners now come to us on a Rule 45 Petition, arguing that the probate court may rule on issues
pertaining to title over property only in a provisional capacity. They assert that the CA erred in dismissing
their appeal, just because the intestate proceeding has not yet terminated. Petitioners, as heirs, are
purportedly allowed to exercise their option of filing a separate civil action in order to protect their
interests.
Thus, the singular issue in the case at bar is whether or not petitioners in this case may file a separate
civil action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title, despite the pendency of the settlement
proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero.
Ruling of the Court
The probate court has jurisdiction to determine the issues in the present case
Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate or intestate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate of deceased persons or the appointment of
executors, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.10 They cite Ongsingco v. Tan,11Baybayan v. Aquino12 and several cases which state that
when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person,
but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, the intestate court has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate these questions. Petitioners conclude that the issue of ownership of the
properties enumerated in their Petition and included in the inventory submitted by respondent Aurora
Romero to the intestate court, must be determined in a separate civil action to resolve title.13
The rulings in Ongsingco and Baybayan are wholly inapplicable, as they both arose out of facts different
from those in the case at bar. Baybayan involved a summary settlement for the estate of the decedent,
in which a parcel of land representing the share of decedent’s nephews and nieces was already covered
by a TCT under the name of a third party. To defeat the writ of partition issued by the probate court, the
third party, petitioners Baybayan et al., had to file a separate civil action for quieting of their title and for
damages. The issue before the Court then devolved upon the propriety of the probate court’s order to
amend the Complaint for quieting of title before the regular court. More importantly, Baybayan
pertained to a civil action involving third parties who were not heirs, and not privy to the intestate
proceedings in the probate court. The present action was instituted precisely by heirs of Judge Romero,
against their brother, who is also an heir, and their mother, who is the administrator of the estate.
In Coca v. Borromeo,14 this Court allowed the probate court to provisionally pass upon the issue of title,
precisely because the only interested parties are all heirs to the estate, subject of the proceeding, viz:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional
question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the testate or
intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has
qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question
of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested
parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of title
should be ventilated in a separate action.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion
during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from (the) inventory. The only interested parties are
the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.15 (Citations omitted.)
While it is true that a probate court’s determination of ownership over properties which may form part
of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature, this rule is applicable only as between the representatives
of the estate and strangers thereto. Indeed, as early as Bacquial v. Amihan,16 the court stated thus:
xxx The rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their
interests are allowed to do so protect the same, but not for a decision on their action. In the case of In
re Estate of the deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de Garcia, Teresa Garcia vs. Luisa Garcia, et al., 67 Phil.,
353, this court held:
A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to
determine whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to
the deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to
the right of interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question on the ownership or existence of
the right or credit.
To this same effect are rulings in various states of the United States.
* * * That the probate court is without jurisdiction to try the title to property as between the
representatives of an estate and strangers thereto is too well established by the authorities to require
argument.
There is also authority abroad that where the court is without jurisdiction to determine questions of
title, as for example, as between the estate and persons claiming adversely, its orders and judgments
relating to the sale do not render the issue of title res judicata.17 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)
In any case, there is no merit to petitioners’ claim that the issues raised in the case at bar pertain to title
and ownership and therefore need to be ventilated in a separate civil action. The issue before the court
is not really one of title or ownership, but the determination of which particular properties should be
included in the inventory of the estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has listed the properties alleged
by petitioners to have been conjugal properties of their parents and, therefore, part of the estate that
was illegally sold to the respondent. Some of these real properties identified seem to be the same real
properties that form part of the inventory of the estate in the intestate proceedings.18
Not only do petitioners assert their legal interest as compulsory heirs, they also seek to be the owners,
pro indiviso, of the said properties. To anchor their claim, they argue that the properties are conjugal in
nature and hence form part of their inheritance. For his defense, Vittorio contends that the lots are the
paraphernal properties of Aurora that she had mortgaged, and that Vittorio subsequently redeemed.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals,19 the Supreme Court declared that the determination of whether a
property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with the
probate court:
xxx (T)he jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the ownership of
properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so
because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of
the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the
estate and payment of all the debts and expenses.Thereafter, distribution is made of the decedent's
liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an
action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community property
he has in his possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce
proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the
distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all
matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of
third parties are affected.
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the
properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively.
This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate
the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings.20 xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the allegedly illegal sale are
conjugal and constitute part of their share in the estate. To date, there has been no final inventory of the
estate or final order adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can competently
rule on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the probate court that
can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the same to the heirs, after the debts of the estate
have been paid.
Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners from filing the present action
Petitioners next contend that even if the probate court has the power to rule on their Complaint, the
submission of the issues in this case to the probate court is merely optional, and not mandatory upon
them. Hence, they argue, they still have the right to bring these issues in a separate civil action, if they so
choose. They argue further that Section 3, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable to the
present case.
The said provision states that:
Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned. – When an executor or administrator is appointed and
assumes the trust, no action to recover the title or possession of lands or for damages done to such lands
shall be maintained against him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the court assigning such
lands to such heir or devisee or until the time allowed for paying debts has expired.
Petitioners believe that the above rule is subject to certain exceptions. They invoke the doctrine that
while heirs have no standing in court to sue for the recovery of property of the estate represented by an
administrator, these heirs may maintain such action if the administrator is unwilling to bring the suit, or
has allegedly participated in the act complained of.
On this contention, petitioners’ theory must again fail. There is nothing on the record that would prove
that Aurora defied the orders of the probate court or entered into sale agreements in violation of her
trust. In fact, petitioners are really accusing a co-heir, their brother Vittorio, of having acquired certain
properties which they allege to be properties of their parents.
Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, part of the estate, Aurora Romero’s acts as the
administrator of the estate are subject to the sole jurisdiction of the probate court. In Acebedo v.
Abesamis,21 the Court stated:
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a pronouncement that it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should be threshed
out in a separate action.
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an
immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with
the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court.22
Again, petitioners do not pose issues pertaining to title or ownership. They are, in effect, questioning the
validity of the sales made by the administrator, an issue that can only be properly threshed out by the
probate court. Paragraph 13 of petitioners’ Complaint alleges as follows:
13. The purported transfers and sales executed by Defendant Aurora C. Romero to and in favor of
Defendant Vittorio C. Romero are nullities since all were simulated, entered into without the intent and
volition of Defendant Aurora C. Romero, attended by force, intimidation, duress and fraud and not
supported with any valid or sufficient consideration and with the sole depraved intentions of depriving
the other compulsory heirs of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero of their rightful share in the
estate.23 (Emphasis omitted.)
Indeed, implicit in the requirement for judicial approval of sales of property under administration is the
recognition that the probate court has the power to rescind or nullify the disposition of a property under
administration that was effected without its authority.24 That petitioners have the prerogative of
choosing where to file their action for nullification – whether with the probate court or the regular court
– is erroneous. As held in Marcos, II v. Court of Appeals:
xxx (T)he authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with limited jurisdiction, as a probate court
over the estate of deceased individual, is not a trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once invoked, and
made effective, cannot be treated with indifference nor should it be ignored with impunity by the very
parties invoking its authority.
that letters of administration be granted to them. Similar to the case at bar, the petitioners in Peñaverde
also sought the annulment of titles in the name of their co-heir:
The two cases filed by petitioners are: (1) Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, which seeks letters of administration
for the estate of Mariano Peñaverde; and (2) Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which seeks the annulment of
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano Peñaverde and the annulment of titles in his
name as well as the reopening of the distribution of his estate.
Evidently, in filing Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, petitioners sought to share in the estate of Mariano,
specifically the subject land previously owned in common by Mariano and his wife, Victorina.This is also
what they hoped to obtain in filing Civil Case No. Q-95-24711.
Indeed, a petition for letters of administration has for its object the ultimate distribution and partition of
a decedent's estate. This is also manifestly sought in Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which precisely calls for
the "Reopening of Distribution of Estate" of Mariano Peñaverde. In both cases, petitioners would have to
prove their right to inherit from the estate of Mariano Peñaverde, albeit indirectly, as heirs of Mariano's
wife, Victorina.1âwphi1
Under the circumstances, petitioners are indeed guilty of forum-shopping.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the parties to Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471 and Civil Case No. Q-
95-24711 are identical. There is also no question that the rights asserted by petitioners in both cases are
identical, i.e., the right of succession to the estate of their aunt, Victorina, wife of Mariano. Likewise, the
reliefs prayed for --- to obtain their share in the estate of Mariano --- are the same, such relief being
founded on the same facts ---their relationship to Mariano's deceased wife, Victorina.27
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. As the properties herein are already subject of an intestate
proceeding filed on 6 January 1976, the 14 April 2009 judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
104025 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the
sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication; to determine
who are the heirs of the decedent; the recognition of a natural child; the status of a woman claiming to
be the legal wife of the decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the testator; and to pass
upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights.25(Citations omitted.)

Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly orchestrated by petitioners’ co-heir, Vittorio,
can only be determined by the probate court, because it is the probate court which is empowered to
identify the nature of the property, and that has jurisdiction over Aurora’s actions and dispositions as
administrator. In Peñaverde v. Peñaverde,26 the Court even adjudged the petitioners guilty of forum-
shopping for filing a separate civil action despite the pendency of the said petitioners’ own case seeking
G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON
YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC),
through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of
law. In particular, petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing
Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of
Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras
Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint,
they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving
behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their
subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who
are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate
of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his
passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of
action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by
the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as
Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject complaint
failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had
established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters
of administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s
compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s
son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted
of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth;
(c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011
due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Certificate of Compliance was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246,15 sought direct recourse
to the Court through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of
the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.16 It is well-
settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. 17 In this
relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its
face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. 18Accordingly, if the allegations
furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed,
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they
are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the
latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently
warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s
lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary
action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo
Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the
decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made
in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession
and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by
which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. SAN JUAN, in his capacity as Special Administrator, petitioners,
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made vs.
in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch VII), and URSULA D.
Court of Appeals x x x: PASCUAL, respondents.

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that G.R. No. L-45394 July 23, 1990
matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a
special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of
Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a
decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the
PEDRO DALUSONG, petitioner,
recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
vs
HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, JUDGE, BRANCH VII, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, and
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of URSULA D. PASCUAL, respondents.
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the
G.R. Nos. 73241-42 July 23, 1990
issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-
opened.24 OFELIA D. PARUNGAO and ROSARIO DUNCIL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (Third Civil Cases Division), BENJAMIN P. REYES and
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there
OSCAR REYES, respondents.
lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties
involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a
cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions
before it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be
made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No.
T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on
Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper
special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal
effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and
the rights concomitant therewith.
SO ORDERED.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The instant petitions have been consolidated as they arose from the same facts and involve similar
issues. Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18,1972. He was survived by his
sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters as follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes- Ruperto
Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines Pascual Reyes-Jose P. Reyes, Benito Reyes, and Manna Reyes Manalastas;
(3) Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto Reyes and Benjamin Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half-
blood Pedro Dalusong.
On December 3, 1973, the heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the then Court of
First Instance of Pampanga for the administration of his estate. Atty. Marcela Macapagal, Clerk of Court
of Branch VII was appointed special administratrix. Macapagal was, however, replaced by Reynaldo San
Juan.

On February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of
Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles thereto to her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime
or on November 2, 1966 executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are
included in the estate of Dr. Pascual (subject of Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M) and therefore should
be excluded from the inventory.
On August 1, 1976; the trial court issued an order excluding from the inventory of the estate the
properties donated to Ursula, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussion, let the properties listed in
paragraph 2 of the motion of February 12, 1976 filed by Ursula D. Pascual thru
counsel be, as it is hereby ordered, excluded from the inventory of the estate of
the deceased Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, without prejudice to its final determination in a
separate action. Special Administrator Reynaldo San Juan is hereby ordered to
return to Court the custody of the corresponding certificates of titles of these
properties, until the issue of ownership is finally determined in a separate action.
(G.R. No. 45262, pp. 23-24)
The Order is now the subject of G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394. On January 5, 1977, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the trial court from enforcing the August 1, 1976 Order.
Among the properties included in the "donation mortis causa" in favor of Ursula was Lot 24, Block No. 15
of the subdivision plan Psd-3231, located at 1109-1111 R. Papa St., Tondo, Manila as evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17854. The records show that on May 15, 1969, Emilio Pascual executed
a deed of donation of real property inter vivos over the abovementioned lot in Manila in favor of Ofelia
D. Parungao, petitioner in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 a minor with her mother, Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift
and donation for and in her behalf. When Parungao reached the age of majority or on December 20,
1976, she tried to have the donation registered. However, she found out that the certificate of title was
missing from where it was supposed to be kept, prompting her to file a petition for reconstitution of title
with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The petition was granted in October 1977. Parungao
registered the deed of donation with the Register of Deeds of Manila who cancelled Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 17854 and issued in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092 in the name of Ofelia
Parungao. She then filed a motion for exclusion in Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M.
In the meantime, on September 23, 1976, Ursula Pascual executed a deed of absolute sale over the
Tondo property in favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyes.
On May 2, 1978, Benjamin Reyes, private respondent in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092, Register of Deeds of Manila and/or
reconveyance of deed of title against Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil, with the then Court of First
Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 115164.
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim Parungao and Duncil, denied Reyes' assertion of
ownership over the Tondo property. On November 6, 1978, Ofelia Parungao filed a complaint for
recovery of possession over the Tondo property against Benjamin Reyes and his nephew Oscar Reyes
with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 119359. In her
complaint, Parungao also alleged that as early as 1973, the defendants occupied two (2) doors of the
apartment situated at the Tondo property by mere tolerance of the previous owner, Dr. Emilio Pascual,
and later by her until April 8, 1978 when she formally demanded that the defendants vacate the
premises. Parungao prayed that the defendants be evicted from the premises.
The two cases were consolidated. On June 3, 1982, the then Court of First Instance, Branch 8 rendered a
joint decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: In Civil Case No. 115164 —
1) Declaring TCT No. 129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao null and void; and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel said title and to restore, in lieu
thereof, TCT No. 17854 in the name of Emilio D. Pascual;
2) Ordering Ofelia D. Parungao to pay plaintiff Benjamin P. Reyes the sum of Two
Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, as and for attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of suit
including all fees which the Register of Deeds may prescribe for the full
implementation of this decision. For lack of merit, the counterclaim is dismissed.
In Civil Case No. 119359 —
1) Dismissing the complaint for want of merit; and
2) On the counterclaim, ordering Ofelia Parungao to pay defendant defendants the
sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos as and for attorney's fees.'
Parungao appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. The decision was, however,
affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
The Intermediate Appellate Court decision is now the subject matter in G.R. Nos. 73241-42.
On January 29, 1986, we issued a minute resolution denying the above petition for lack of merit. The
resolution became final and executory on March 10, 1986 and on this same day the entry of judgment
was effected. The entry of judgment was however set aside in the resolution dated January 19, 1987 on
the ground that the January 29, 1986 resolution was not received by the petitioners' counsel of record.
The petitioner was granted leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the January 29, 1986 resolution.
The motion for reconsideration is now before us for resolution petition.
The issues raised in these petitions are two-fold: (1) In G.R. No. L-45394, petitioner Pedro Dalusong
questions the jurisdiction of the probate court to exclude the properties donated to Ursula Pascual in its
Order dated August 1, 1976, and (2) In G.R. No. L-45262 and G.R. Nos. 73241-42 Ruperto Reyes,
Reynaldo C. San Juan, in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of Emilio Pascual (petitioner in
G.R. No.
L- 45262), Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 7324142) question the appellate
court's finding that the "Donation Mortis Causa" executed by Emilio Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula
Pascual was actually a Donation Inter Vivos.
We first discuss the issue on jurisdiction. The questioned August 1, 1976 order of the then Court of First
Instance of Pampanga in S.P. Proc. No. 73-30-M categorically stated that the exclusion from the
inventory of the estate of the deceased Dr. Emilio D. Pascual was "without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action." The provisional character of the exclusion of the contested
properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the probate court. This
was stressed in the case of Cuizon v. Ramolete (129 SCRA 495 [1984]) which we cited in the case
of Morales v. Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V (146 SCRA 373 [1986]):
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether
testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if
there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title because the probate court cannot do so (Mallari v. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694;
Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).i•t•c-aüsl
Similarly, in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, (91 SCRA 540) we held
that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should
not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto
but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448449 and 473;
Lachenal v. Salas,
L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).
On the second issue, it may be noted that the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the authenticity of the
1969 donation to Parungao because of its finding that the 1966 donation to Pascual was inter vivos. The
petitioners do not press the authenticity of the 1969 donation as their challenge centers on whether or
not the 1966 donation was inter vivos. However, the trial court has a lengthy discussion reflecting
adversely on the authenticity of the 1969 donation to Parungao.
The petitioners assert that the 1966 donation was null and void since it was not executed with the
formalities of a will. Therefore, the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45262 insist that the donated properties
should revert to the estate of Emilio Pascual while the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 insist that the
donation of real property inter vivos in favor of Ofelia Parungao be given effect.
The subject deed of donation titled "DONATION MORTIS CAUSA" duly notarized by a certain Cornelio M.
Sigua states:
That Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, Filipino, single, of age and resident of Apalit, Pampanga,
hereinafter called the DONOR and Ursula D. Pascual, Filipino, single, also of age,
resident of and with postal address at Apalit, Pampanga, hereinafter called the
DONEE, have agreed, as they do hereby agree, to the following, to wit:
That the said DONOR, Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, for and in consideration of the love
and affection which he has and bears unto the said DONEE, as also for the
personal services rendered by the said DONEE to the said DONOR, does hereby by
these presents voluntarily GIVE, GRANT, and DONATE MORTIS CAUSA unto the
said DONEE URSULA D. PASCUAL, her heirs and assigns, all of my rights, title and
interest, in and to the following parcels of land with all the improvements thereon,
situated in the Municipality of Apalit, Pampanga, and more particularly described
and Identified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(Enumerated herein are 41 parcels of land)
Also included in this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA are all personal properties of the
DONOR in the form of cash money or bank deposits and insurance in his favor, and
his real properties situated in other towns of Pampanga, such as San Simon, and in
the province of Rizal, San Francisco del Monte and in the City of Manila.
That the said donor has reserved for himself sufficient property to maintain him
for life; and that the said DONEE does hereby ACCEPT and RECEIVE this DONATION
MORTIS CAUSA and further does express his appreciation and gratefulness for the
generosity of said DONOR; (Rollo of G.R. No. L-45262, pp. 12-16)
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the provisions of the DONATION MORTIS CAUSA the appellate court ruled that the deed of
donation was actually a donation inter vivos although denominated as DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
It is, now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor which
makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As early as the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al., (44
Phil. 668 [1928]) this Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos" or
"mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation but on the provisions
stated in such deed. This Court explained in Concepcion v. Concepcion (91 Phil. 823 [1952]) —
...But, it is a rule consistently followed by the courts that it is the body of the
document of donation and the statements contained therein, and not the title that
should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor. Here, the
donation is entitled and called donacion onerosa mortis causa. From the body,
however, we find that the donation was of a nature remunerative rather than
onerous. It was for past services rendered, services which may not be considered
as a debt to be paid by the donee but services rendered to her freely and in
goodwill. The donation instead of being onerous or for a valuable consideration, as
in payment of a legal obligation, was more of remuneratory or compensatory
nature, besides being partly motivated by affection.
 We should not give too much importance or significance to or be guided by the
use of the phrase 'mortis causa in a donation and thereby to conclude that the
donation is not one of inter vivos. In the case of De Guzman et al. v. Ibea et al. (67
Phil. 633), this Court through Mr. Chief Justice Avancena said that if a donation by
its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles
it mortis causa.
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista v.
Sabiniano, G.R. No. L- 4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the case of Laureta v. Mata, et al. (44 Phil. 668), the court held that the
donation involved was inter vivos. There, the donor Severa Magno y Laureta gave
the properties involved as —
... a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my
affection toward him and of the fact that he stands high in my estimation, I hereby
donate 'mortis causa to said youth all the properties described as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee cannot take
possession of the properties donated before the death of the donor, and in the
event of her death the said donee shall be under obligation to cause a mass to be
held annually as a suffrage in behalf of my sold, and also to defray the expenses of
my burial and funerals.'
It will be observed that the present case and that of Laureta above cited are
similar in that in both cases the donation was being made as a reward for services
rendered and being rendered, and as a token of affection for the donee; the
phrase 'mortis causa was used; the donee to take possession of the property
donated only after the death of the donor; the donee was under obligation to
defray the expenses incident to the celebration of the anniversary of the donor's
death, including church fees. The donation in both cases were duly accepted. In
said case of Laureta this Court held that the donation was in praesenti and not a
gift in futuro.
These principles were repeated in the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (27 SCRA 1076 [1969]), to wit:
Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the
disposition made. 'Did the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property
donated upon the execution of the donation? If this is so, as reflected from the
provisions contained in the donation, then it is inter vivos; otherwise, it is merely
mortis causa, or made to take effect after death.' (Howard v. Padilla and Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-7064 and L-7098, April 22, 1955.
Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt that the so-called DONATION
MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his
sister Ursula Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered
by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the donee was
immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The provision as regards the reservation of
properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation
confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately
after the execution of the deed of donation.
With these findings we find no need to discuss the other arguments raised by the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1) In G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394 the petitions are DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on
January 5, 1977 is hereby LIFTED; and

2) In G.R. Nos. 73241-42, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. This DENIAL is FINAL.
In the later case of Bonsato et al. v. Court of appeals, et al. (95 Phil. 481 [1954]) this Court, distinguished
the characteristics of a donation inter vivos and "mortis causa" in this wise:
SO ORDERED.

Did the late Domingo Bonsato, make donations inter vivos or dispositions post
mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should
reveal any or all of the following characteristics:

(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain
the ownership (fun or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal v.
Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman v. Ibea 67 Phil., 633);
G.R. No. 128781 August 6, 2002
TERESITA N. DE LEON, ZENAIDA C. NICOLAS and the HEIRS OF ANTONIO NICOLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PABLO P. INVENTOR and RAMON NICOLAS, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which prays that the
Decision dated February 28, 1997 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1997 issued by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 42958,1 be set aside; and, that another judgment be entered ordering the Presiding
Judge of Branch 123 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to give due course to petitioners’ notice
of appeal, to approve their record on appeal and to elevate the records of Sp. Proc. No. C-1679 to
respondent appellate court for further proceedings.
The factual background:
Herein petitioner Teresita N. de Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of Rafael C. Nicolas in
Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Rafael C. Nicolas". Said case was
subsequently consolidated with Sp. Proc No. C-18102 and Civil Case No. C-17407.3 Deceased spouses
Rafael and Salud Nicolas were the parents of petitioner Teresita N. de Leon, Estrellita N. Vizconde,
Antonio Nicolas (deceased husband of petitioner Zenaida Nicolas and predecessor of the petitioners
Heirs of Antonio Nicolas), Ramon Nicolas and Roberto Nicolas.
On September 19, 1994, private respondent Ramon G. Nicolas, an oppositor–applicant in the intestate
proceedings, filed a "Motion for Collation," claiming that deceased Rafael Nicolas, during his lifetime,
had given the following real properties to his children by gratuitous title and that administratrix-
petitioner Teresita failed to include the same in the inventory of the estate of the decedent:
"1. Title No. T-36734 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 14,119 sq. m. distributed as
follows:
1.1 10,110 sq. m. given to daughter Estrellita N. Visconde –
1.2 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas
2. Title No. T-40333 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 1,000 sq. m. given to son Antonio
Nicolas
3. Title No. T-36989 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 4,000 sq. m. given to daughter
Teresita N. de Leon (herein petitioner)
4. Title No. T-36987 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 283 sq. m. given to son Antonio
Nicolas
5. T-33658 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 6,109 sq. m. given to daughter Teresita N.
de Leon
6. T-68554 located at Caloocan City with an area of 690 sq. m. given to son Ramon
(Oppositor-Applicant herein)
7. T-10907 located at Caloocan City with an area of 310 sq. m. given to son Ramon but was
somehow transferred to Antonio Nicolas, and the property is now titled in the name of the
latter’s widow, Zenaida Carlos Nicolas."
xxx xxx x x x."4
On September 27, 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing Ramon "to submit pertinent documents
relative to the transfer of the properties from the registered owners during their lifetime for proper
determination of the court if such properties should be collated, and set it for hearing with notice to the
present registered owners to show cause why their properties may not be included in the collation of
properties."5
On October 10, 1994, respondent Ramon filed an Amended Motion for Collation specifying the
properties to be collated and attaching to said motion, the documents in support thereof, to wit:
"3. A more complete list of the properties to be collated is as follows:
1. Title No. T-36734 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 14,119 sq. m., xerox copy hereto
attached as Annex "A", distributed as follows:
1.1 10,110 sq. m. given to daughter Estrellita N. Visconde, under TCT No. V-554 of
Valenzuela Bulacan (Annex "B"), and later sold by Estrellita to Amelia Lim Sy for
P3,405,612.00 and the Deed of Sale hereto attached as Annex "B-1";
"1.2 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas, xerox copy hereto attached as
Annex "C";
2. Two lots, covered by TCT No. T-36989 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 4,000 sq. m.
and TCT No. T-33658 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 6,109 sq. m. "given to daughter
Teresita N. de Leon by a Deed of Sale, xerox copies are hereto attached as Annex "D", "D-1"
and "D-2";
The 4,000 sq. m. lot was sold by Petitioner Teresita for the amount of P1,888,000.00, xerox
copy of the Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "D-3";
4. Son Antonio received additional properties under a Deed of Sale, hereto attached as Annex
"E", which are those covered by TCT No. T-36987 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 283
sq. m.; TCT No. T-40333 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 1,000 sq. m. and TCT No. T-
 10907 located at Caloocan City with an area of 310 sq. m., xerox copies hereto attached as
Annexes "E-1", "E-2" and "E-3";
The lot with an area of 310 sq. m. is supposedly earmarked for Oppositor-applicant Ramon
but was somehow included in the Deed of Sale to son Antonio, and the property is now titled
in the name of the latter’s widow, Zenaida Carlos Nicolas;
5. TCT No. T-68554 located at Caloocan City with an area of 690 sq. m. where the ancestral
home is presently located;
6. Son Antonio received another property with an area of 1,876 sq. m. and sold for
P850,000.00, hereto attached as Annex "F";
7. Son Antonio received another property with an area of 1,501 sq. m. and sold for
P200,000.00, hereto attached as Annex "G";
xxx xxx x x x."6
A comparison with the original motion for collation reveals that the amended motion refers to the same
real properties enumerated in the original except Nos. 6 and 7 above which are not found in the original
motion.
On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order, to wit:
"Acting on the Amended Motion for Collation filed by oppositor-applicant Ramon G. Nicolas
and the comment thereto filed by petitioner-administratrix, the Court finds the following
properties to be collated to the estate properties under present administration, to wit:
(1). 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas described in paragraph 1.2 of the
Amended Motion For Collation, marked as Annex "C"; (the xerox copy of the
transfer certificate of title in the name of Antonio Nicolas did not state "the
number and the technical description of the property. The administratrix should
get hold of a certified copy of the title of Antonio Nicolas about subject property;
(2). Two lots, covered by TCT No. T-36989 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of
4,000 sq. m. and TCT No. T-33658 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 6,109
sq. m. given to daughter Teresita N. de Leon by a Deed of Sale;
(3). The property covered by TCT No. T-36987 located at Polo, Bulacan, with an
area of 283 sq. m.; the property covered by TCT No. T-40333 located at Polo,
Bulacan, with an area of 1,000 sq. m. and another property covered by TCT No. T-
10907 located at Caloocan City with an area of 310 sq. m. xerox copies of which
are attached to the Amended Motion For Collation, marked as Annexes "E’1", "E-
2" and "E-3";
(4). The lot with an area of 310 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas which property
is now titled in the name of the latter’s widow, Zenaida Carlos Nicolas.
"Accordingly, the Administratrix is hereby ordered to include the foregoing properties which
were received from the decedent for collation in the instant probate proceedings.
"SO ORDERED."7
We note that only those lots described under paragraphs 3.1.2, 3.2 and 4 of the "Amended Motion for
Collation" were ordered included for collation.1âwphi1.nêt
On November 18, 1994, petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that
the properties subject of the Order "were already titled in their names years ago"8 and that titles may
not be collaterally attacked in a motion for collation. On February 23, 1995, the RTC issued an Order
denying said motion, ruling that it is within the jurisdiction of the court to determine whether titled
properties should be collated,9 citing Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court which provides that the
final order of the court concerning questions as to advancements made shall be binding on the person
raising the question and on the heir.
Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated February 23,
199510 which respondent opposed.11
On July 18, 1995, the RTC issued an Order, pertinent portions of which read:
"x x x Foremost to be resolved is the issue of collation of the properties of the deceased
Rafael Nicolas which were disposed by the latter long before his death. The oppositor-
applicant Ramon Nicolas should prove to the satisfaction of the Court whether the properties
disposed of by the late Rafael Nicolas before the latter’s death was gratuitous or for valuable
consideration. The Court believes that he or she who asserts should prove whether the
disposition of the properties was gratuitously made or for valuable consideration.
The Court has already set for hearing on July 21, 1995, at 8:30 a.m., the reception and/or
presentation of evidence in the issue of collated properties disposed before the death of
Rafael Nicolas."12
On November 4, 1996, the RTC removed petitioner from her position as administratrix on ground of
conflict of interest considering her claim that she paid valuable consideration for the subject properties
acquired by her from their deceased father and therefore the same should not be included in the
collation;13 and, ordered the hearing on the collation of properties covered by TCT No. T-V-1211 and T-V-
1210 only.14
On November 28, 1996, acting on the impression that the collation of the real properties enumerated in
the Order dated November 11, 1994 is maintained by the RTC, petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a
Motion for Reconsideration praying that her appointment as administratrix be maintained; and that the
properties covered by TCT Nos. T-36989, T-33658, T-36987, T-40333, T-10907 and a portion of TCT No. T-
13206 described as Lot 4-A with 4,009 square meters be declared and decreed as the exclusive
properties of the registered owners mentioned therein and not subject to collation.15
The RTC denied said motion in its Order dated December 23, 1996.16
Petitioners Teresita N. de Leon, Zenaida Nicolas (the surviving spouse of Antonio Nicolas) and the Heirs
of Antonio Nicolas filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction claiming that:
"I
"RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONERS OPPORTUNITY TO VENTILATE THEIR
APPEAL HE INSISTED ON HEARING THE MATTERS ON THE APPOINTMENT OF A REGULAR
ADMINISTRATOR AND COLLATION ON DECEMBER 24, 1996 AND RESETTING ITS
CONTINUATION TO JANUARY 21 and 28, 1997 INSPITE OF THE PENDENCY OF THE NOTICE OF
APPEAL AND/OR RE-AFFIRMATION OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM WHICH ACTS THERE IS
NO APPEAL NOR ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF
LAW."
"II
"RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE DID NOT
INCLUDE IN HIS ORDER-ANNEX J THE HEARING ON THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF TCT NOS.
T-36734, T-36989, T-33658, T-36987, T-40333 and T-10907 (WHETHER THEY ARE STILL PART
OF THE ESTATE OR SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE INVENTORY/ESTATE) THEREBY
ASSUMING WITHOUT ANY BASIS THAT THESE PROPERTIES TO BE STILL PART OF THE ESTATE
OF RAFAEL NICOLAS WHEN THEY ARE NOT BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN SOLD WAY BACK IN
1979 FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATIONS TO PETITIONER TERESITA N. DE LEON AND ANTONIO
NICOLAS HUSBAND OF PETITIONER ZENAIDA NICOLAS."17
After private respondent Ramon had filed his comment, and petitioners, their reply, and after hearing
the oral arguments of the parties, the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals found the petition
devoid of merit, ruling that the Order dated November 11, 1994 directing the inclusion of the properties
therein enumerated in the estate of the deceased Rafael Nicolas had already become final for failure of
petitioners to appeal from the order of collation; that the appeal of the petitioner from the Orders dated
November 4, 1996 and December 3, 1996 removing petitioner as administratrix is timely appealed; and,
observing that the notice of appeal and record on appeal appear to be unacted upon by the RTC, the
appellate court resolved:
"WHEREFORE, while finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge, he
is hereby ORDERED to act on petitioner’s appeal on the matter of the removal of petitioner as
administratrix.
SO ORDERED."18
Hence, herein petition anchored on the following assignments of error:
"FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
"RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED IN THE QUESTIONED
DECISION THAT THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO DATED NOVEMBER 11, 1994 WAS FINAL.
"SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR</P>
"RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED IN THE QUESTIONED
RESOLUTION THAT THERE WAS NO COGENT OR COMPELLING REASON TO DISTURB THE
QUESTIONED DECISION."19
Petitioners claim that: private respondent never presented any document to prove that the properties
transferred by their deceased parents to petitioners are by gratuitous title; private respondent never
notified petitioner of any hearing on said documents to give them opportunity to show cause why their
properties should not be collated; the assailed Order dated November 11, 1994 is arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, confiscatory, depriving them of due process; the said order is interlocutory in nature and
therefore non-appealable; the properties acquired by petitioner Teresita N. de Leon and her deceased
brother Antonio Nicolas, married to petitioner Zenaida C. Nicolas and their children, were sold to them
as evidenced by public documents; and, the properties were already titled in their respective names or
sold to third persons.
Private respondent contends that: due process has been afforded the petitioners when the RTC resolved
the issue of collation of the subject properties after hearing; petitioner deliberately omitted certain
material facts in the petition to mislead the Court because petitioners were actually given at least three
(3) times the opportunity to ventilate and oppose the issue of collation; as stated by the appellate court
in the Resolution promulgated on February 10, 1997, both parties affirmed that the RTC had proceeded
to conduct hearings on January 21 and 28, 1997 as originally scheduled; presentation of evidence had
been terminated and the twin issues of the appointment of a new administratrix and the collation of two
(2) properties covered by TCT No. T-V-1210 and T-V-1211 were already submitted for resolution to the
court below;20 subject properties are collatable under Articles 1601 and 1071 of the Civil Code and
Section 2 of Rule 90 of the Rules of Court and the ruling in Guinguing v. Abuton and Abuton, 48 Phil. 144;
petitioner failed to present evidence that there was valuable consideration for these properties and
failed to rebut the evidence that petitioners do not have the financial capability to pay for these
properties as evidenced by the testimony of credible witnesses who are relatives of spouses decedents.
We find the petition partly meritorious.
Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the Order of November 11, 1994 had become final
for failure of petitioners to appeal therefrom in due time, we hold that said Order is interlocutory in
nature. Our pronouncement in Garcia v. Garcia supports this ruling:
"The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the
filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties,
 and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the
administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law
requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty the court
has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased
should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in
the properties of a deceased person duly call the court’s attention to the fact that certain
properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court’s
duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be
attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the
intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of
the said properties."21 (Emphasis supplied)
A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding,22 can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally.23The rationale therefor and the proper recourse of the aggrieved party are expounded
in Jimenez v. Court of Appeals:
"The patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions
of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, can only be settled in a separate action.
"All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the
administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."24
Further, In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, we held:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or
list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and
good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because
the probate court cannot do so."25
Guided by the above jurisprudence, it is clear that the Court of Appeals committed an error in
considering the assailed Order dated November 11, 1994 as final or binding upon the heirs or third
persons who dispute the inclusion of certain properties in the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. Under the foregoing rulings of the Court, any aggrieved party, or a third person for that matter,
may bring an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims.
Private respondent’s reliance on Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
"SEC. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. – Questions as to advancement
made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of
the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the question and on the heir."
in support of his claim that the assailed Order is a final order and therefore appealable and that due to
petitioners’ failure to appeal in due time, they are now bound by said Order, is not feasible.
What seems to be a conflict between the above-quoted Rule and the afore–discussed jurisprudence that
the Order in question is an interlocutory and not a final order is more apparent than real. This is because
the questioned Order was erroneously referred to as an order of collation both by the RTC and the
appellate court. For all intents and purposes, said Order is a mere order including the subject properties
in the inventory of the estate of the decedent.
The Court held in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals26 that the order of exclusion (or inclusion)
is not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to
the subject lots; that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title
thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.
In the Rodriguez case, the Court distinguished between an order of collation and an order of exclusion
from or inclusion in the estate’s inventory, thus:
"We hold further that the dictum of the Court of Appeals and the probate court that the two
disputed lots are not subject to collation was a supererogation and was not necessary to the
disposition of the case which merely involved the issue of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of the testator’s estate. The issue of collation was not yet justiciable at that early
stage of the testate proceeding. It is not necessary to mention in the order of exclusion the
controversial matter of collation.
"Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and whether Mrs. Rustia’s Torrens
titles thereto are indefeasible are matters that may be raised later or may not be raised at all.
How those issues should be resolved, if and when they are raised, need not be touched upon
in the adjudication of this appeal.
"The intestate and testate proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased
Valero spouses were consolidated, as ordered by the lower court on November 21, 1974, so
that the conjugal estate of the deceased spouses may be properly liquidated, as
contemplated in section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court and Act No. 3176.
"We have examined the expedientes of the two cases. We found that the proceedings have
not yet reached the stage when the question of collation or advancement to an heir may be
raised and decided. The numerous debts of the decedents are still being paid. The net
remainder (remanente liquido) of their conjugal estate has not yet been determined. On the
other hand, up to this time, no separate action has been brought by the appellants to nullify
 Mrs. Rustia’s Torrens titles to the disputed lots or to show that the sale was in reality a No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
donation. refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefore."

"In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of collation and to decide whether
Mrs. Rustia’s titles to the disputed lots are questionable. The proceedings below have not
reached the stage of partition and distribution when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs
have to be determined."27
In the light of the foregoing, Section 2, Rule 90 should be interpreted in the context of Section 1 of the
same Rule, to wit:
"Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. – When the debts, funeral charges,
and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application
of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing
upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming
them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such person may demand
and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributes, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs."
An examination of the subject Order as quoted earlier,28 readily reveals that the presiding Judge failed to
comply with the said constitutional mandate. The assailed Order did not state the reasons for ordering
the collation of the properties enumerated therein. The Order simply directed the inclusion of certain
real properties in the estate of the deceased. It did not declare that the properties enumerated therein
were given to the children of the deceased gratuitously, despite the title in the children’s names or
deeds of sale in their favor. Moreover, in his Comment, private respondent makes mention of the
testimonies of his witnesses but these were not even mentioned in the Order of November 11, 1994.
Petitioner would have been deprived of due process as they would be divested of the opportunity of
being able to point out in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal, any errors of facts and/or law
considering that there were no facts or laws cited in support of the assailed Order of collation. As a final
Order, it is, on its face patently null and void. It could have never become final. A void judgment is not
entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared
inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it.29 For it to be considered as a valid
final order, the RTC must then first rule and state in its order whether the properties covered by TCT
Nos. T-36734, T-36989, T-33658, T-36987, T-40333, T-10907 and the 4,009 square meter lot were
acquired by petitioners from the deceased parents of the parties by onerous or gratuitous title; and must
specifically state in its order the reasons why it ordered the subject properties collated. It is only then
that the order of collation may be the subject of a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal within the
15-day reglementary period. Until and unless the constitutional mandate is complied with, any appeal
from said Order would have been premature.
Either way therefore, whether the Order in question is a final or interlocutory order, it is a reversible
error on the part of the appellate court to rule that the so-called order of collation dated November 11,
1994 had already attained finality.

Based thereon, we find that what the parties and the lower courts have perceived to be as an Order of
As to the prayer of petitioners that the RTC be ordered to give due course to their notice of appeal from
Collation is nothing more than an order of inclusion in the inventory of the estate which, as we have
the Orders dated November 4, 1996 and December 23, 1996 removing petitioner Teresita N. de Leon as
already discussed, is an interlocutory order. The motion for collation was filed with the probate court at
administratrix of the estate of private parties’ deceased parents,30 to approve their record on
the early stage of the intestate estate proceedings. We have examined the records of the case and we
appeal31 and to elevate the records of Special Proceeding No. C-1679 to the Court of Appeals – It is not
found no indication that the debts of the decedents spouses have been paid and the net remainder of
disputed by the parties that said Orders are appealable. In fact, the Court of Appeals had correctly
the conjugal estate have already been determined, and the estates of the deceased spouses at the time
directed the RTC to give due course to petitioners’ appeal and this is not assailed by the private
filing of the motion for collation were ready for partition and distribution. In other words, the issue on
respondent.
collation is still premature.

But, the approval or disapproval of the record on appeal is not a proper subject matter of the present
And even if we consider, en arguendo, that said assailed Order is a collation order and a final order, still,
petition for review on certiorari as it is not even a subject-matter in CA-G.R. SP No. 42958. Whether or
the same would have no force and effect upon the parties. It is a hornbook doctrine that a final order is
not the record on appeal should be approved is a matter that is subject to the sound discretion of the
appealable. As such, the Order should have expressed therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
RTC, provided that Sections 6 to 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court are observed by appellant.
laws on which it is based as mandated by Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines, which provides:
Finally, the elevation of the records of Special Proceedings No. C-1679 to the Court of Appeals for the
purpose of petitioners’ appeal from the order removing the administratrix is unnecessary where a record
"SEC. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
on appeal is allowed under the Rules of Court. The court a quo loses jurisdiction over the subject of the
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
appeal upon the approval of the record on appeal and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties; but retains jurisdiction over the remaining subject matter not covered by the appeal.32
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 28, 1997 and G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011
Resolution dated April 3, 1997 of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED. The Order dated November 11,
1994 issued by the Regional Trial Court and all other orders of said court emanating from said Order EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,
which involve the properties enumerated therein are considered merely provisional or interlocutory, vs.
without prejudice to any of the heirs, administrator or approving parties to resort to an ordinary action SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title. DAGORO, Respondents.

The Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Branch 123) is directed to immediately act, without further x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
delay, on petitioners’ appeal from the Orders dated November 4, 1996 and December 23, 1996, subject
to Sections 6 to 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. No. 177192

No costs.
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,
vs.
SO ORDERED. EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO
DAGORO, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of petitioners Sebastian G. Agtarap
(Sebastian)1 and Eduardo G. Agtarap (Eduardo),2 assailing the Decision dated November 21, 20063 and
the Resolution dated March 27, 20074 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73916.

The antecedent facts and proceedings—

On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 114, Pasay City, a
verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap
(Joaquin). It was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 94-4055.

The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without any known
debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia
(Lucia),5 and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin and Lucia had
three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by three children, namely,
Gloria,6 Joseph, and Teresa7). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9, 1926. They also had three
children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). At the time of his death,
Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving
the said realties and had been appropriating for himself ₱26,000.00 per month since April 1994.

Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him as special administrator to
take possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil fruits, pending the appointment of a
regular administrator. In addition, he prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming and declaring the
named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who would be entitled to participate in the estate; (b) apportioning
and allocating unto the named heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in accordance with law; and (c)
entitling the distributees the right to receive and enter into possession those parts of the estate received for the period and the expenses incurred in the administration, sustenance and allowance of
individually awarded to them. the widow. In accordance with said Financial and Accounting Report which was duly approved by this
Court in its Resolution dated July 28, 1998 – the deceased JOAQUIN AGTARAP left real properties
On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for initial hearing and directing consisting of the following:
Eduardo to cause its publication.
I LAND:
On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting the allegations in the petition,
and conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as special administrator. Two lots and two buildings with one garage quarter located at #3030 Agtarap St., Pasay City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 38254 and 38255 and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasay
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to City, Metro Manila, described as follows:
the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became
the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with the
TCT NO. LOT NO. AREA/SQ.M. ZONAL VALUE AMOUNT
exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the house were
shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant) was built with the 38254 745-B-1 1,335 sq. m. ₱5,000.00 ₱6,675,000.00
exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the appointment of Eduardo as
administrator on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest 38255 745-B-2 1,331 sq. m. ₱5,000.00 ₱6,655,000.00
in the lots is minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed that the best interests
of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as special or regular administrator.
TOTAL------------------------------------------------------------- ₱13,330,000.00
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular administrator of
Joaquin’s estate. Consequently, it issued him letters of administration. II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS:

On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an answer in intervention, alleging that Mercedes is
survived not only by her daughter Cecile, but also by him as her husband. He also averred that there is a BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1) ------------------------------ ₱350,000.00
need to appoint a special administrator to the estate, but claimed that Eduardo is not the person best
BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2) ----------------------------- 320,000.00
qualified for the task.
Building Improvements -------------------------------------- 97,500.00
After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit their respective proposed
projects of partition, the RTC, on October 23, 2000, issued an Order of Partition, 8 with the following Restaurant ------------------------------------------------------ 80,000.00
disposition—

TOTAL --------------------------------------------------------- ₱847,500.00

In the light of the filing by the heirs of their respective proposed projects of partition and the payment of
inheritance taxes due the estate as early as 1965, and there being no claim in Court against the estate of
the deceased, the estate of JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now consequently – ripe – for distribution among the
heirs minus the surviving spouse Caridad Garcia who died on August 25, 1999.
Considering that the bulk of the estate property were acquired during the existence of the second
marriage as shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was
married to Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other than their
negative allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder.
The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap rendered a true and just accounting of his administration from his
date of assumption up to the year ending December 31, 1996 per Financial and Accounting Report dated
June 2, 1997 which was approved by the Court. The accounting report included the income earned and
TOTAL NET WORTH ----------------------------------------- ₱14,177,500.00
WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate of the late JOAQUIN AGTARAP with a total value of
₱14,177,500.00, together with whatever interest from bank deposits and all other incomes or
increments thereof accruing after the Accounting Report of December 31, 1996, after deducting
therefrom the compensation of the administrator and other expenses allowed by the Court, are hereby
ordered distributed as follows:
TOTAL ESTATE – ₱14,177,500.00
CARIDAD AGTARAP – ½ of the estate as her conjugal share – ₱7,088,750.00, the other half of
₱7,088,750.00 – to be divided among the compulsory heirs as follows:
 1avvphi1
1) JOSE (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30
1) JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros Agtarap
2) MILAGROS (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30

₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of

3) MERCEDES (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30

4) SEBASTIAN - ₱1,181,548.30 ₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap

5) EDUARDO - ₱1,181,548.30 2) TERESA AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros Agtarap

6) CARIDAD - ₱1,181,548.30
₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of

The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory heir in the amount of ₱1,181,548.30 and who died in 1996 ₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
will go to Teresa Agtarap and Joseph Agtarap, Walter de Santos and half brothers Eduardo and Sebastian
Agtarap in equal proportions. 3) WALTER DE SANTOS - ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros Agtarap

₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of

TERESA AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66

JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 ₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap

WALTER DE SANTOS - ₱236,291.66

HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66

EDUARDO AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999

₱7,088,750.00 - as conjugal share

Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as follows:
₱1,181,458.30 - as compulsory heir

COMPULSORY HEIRS:
Total of ₱8,270,208.30
1) GLORIA – (deceased) – represented by Walter de Santos –
b) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - ₱1,181,458.38 – as compulsory heir
- ₱295,364.57
₱ 236,291.66 – share from Milagros
2) JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57
c) EDUARDO AGTARAP - ₱1,181,458.38 – as compulsory heir
3) TERESA AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57
₱ 236,291.66 – share from Milagros
4) PRISCILLA AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57
d) MERCEDES - as represented by Abelardo Dagoro as the
surviving spouse of a compulsory heir
Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit ₱295,364.57.
₱1,181,458.38

Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the following heirs of the first marriage stand to receive the
total amount of: REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP:

HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE: 1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP

 2) EDUARDO AGTARAP Jesus Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since he is already deceased (and died without issue),
MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased Caridad Agtarap) his inheritance shall, in turn, be acquired by Joaquin Agtarap.

In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap stand to inherit: Milagros Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since she died in 1996 without issue, 5/8 of her
inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter
Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of Milagros’ brother Jose Agtarap)
SEBASTIAN – ₱4,135,104.10 – share from Caridad Garcia and 1/8 each shall be inherited by Mercedes (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her
₱1,181,458.30 - as compulsory heir daughter Cecile), Sebastian Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
₱ 236,291.66 - share from Milagros

Jose Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since he died in 1967, his inheritance shall be acquired
₱5,522,854.06
by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter
EDUARDO – ₱4,135,104.10 – share from Caridad Garcia Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa in equal shares.
₱1,181,458.30 – as compulsory heir
₱ 236,291.66 – share from Milagros Then, Joaquin Agtarap’s estate, comprising three-fourths (3/4) of the subject properties and its
improvements, shall be distributed as follows:
₱5,522,854.06
Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1999, her share shall be inherited by her children
namely Mercedes Agtarap (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecilia),
SO ORDERED.9
Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolution10 denying the motions for reconsideration of Eduardo
and Sebastian, and granting that of Joseph and Teresa. It also declared that the real estate properties
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification of the
October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However, before the RTC
could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA.
On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads—
Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1996 without issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall
be inherited by Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha),
Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of Milagros’ brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each
shall be inherited by Mercedes (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile),
Sebastian and Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he died in 1967, his inheritance shall be acquired by his wife
Priscilla, and children Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha),
Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap in equal shares.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
Resolution dated August 27, 2001 is AFFIRMED and pursuant thereto, the subject properties (Lot No.
745-B-1 [TCT No. 38254] and Lot No. 745-B-2 [TCT No. 38255]) and the estate of the late Joaquin Agtarap
are hereby partitioned as follows:
Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1984, her inheritance shall be acquired by her
husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile in equal shares.
Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.

The two (2) properties, together with their improvements, embraced by TCT No. 38254 and TCT No.
Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
38255, respectively, are first to be distributed among the following:

SO ORDERED.11
Lucia Mendietta - ½ of the property. But since she is deceased, her share shall be inherited by Joaquin,
Jesus, Milagros and Jose in equal shares.
Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for reconsideration.

Joaquin Agtarap - ½ of the property and ¼ of the other half of the property which pertains to Lucia
Mendietta’s share. In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA denied both motions. Hence, these petitions ascribing to
the appellate court the following errors:

G.R. No. 177192

 1. – The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the aforementioned important
facts12 which alter its Decision;
2. – The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the necessity of hearing the issue of
legitimacy of respondents as heirs;
3. – The Court of Appeals erred in allowing violation of the law and in not applying the
doctrines of collateral attack, estoppel, and res judicata.13
G.R. No. 177099
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
ESTATE OF MILAGROS G. AGTARAP AND ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING HER INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE
OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF HER LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT IN
VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE OF TESTATE PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE
PROCEEDINGS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING THE DECISION APPEALED
FROM FOR LACK OF MERIT AND IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 27, 2001 OF
THE LOWER COURT HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY TCT NO. 38254 AND TCT (NO.)
38255 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF PASAY BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
JOAQUIN AGTARAP MARRIED TO LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR REGISTRATION
UNDER THEIR EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP,
CASADO CON CARIDAD GARCIA. UNDER EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE PROBATE COURT HAS NO
POWER TO DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN AN APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION FOR A TORRENS TITLE UNDER THE
LAW IS ENDOWED WITH INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN THE MANNER INDICATED
IN THE LAW ITSELF.14
As regards his first and second assignments of error, Sebastian contends that Joseph and Teresa failed to
establish by competent evidence that they are the legitimate heirs of their father Jose, and thus of their
grandfather Joaquin. He draws attention to the certificate of title (TCT No. 8026) they submitted, stating
that the wife of their father Jose is Presentacion Garcia, while they claim that their mother is Priscilla. He
avers that the marriage contracts proffered by Joseph and Teresa do not qualify as the best evidence of
Jose’s marriage with Priscilla, inasmuch as they were not authenticated and formally offered in evidence.
Sebastian also asseverates that he actually questioned the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa as heirs of
Joaquin in his motion to exclude them as heirs, and in his reply to their opposition to the said motion. He
further claims that the failure of Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos to oppose his motion to exclude
them as heirs had the effect of admitting the allegations therein. He points out that his motion was
denied by the RTC without a hearing.
With respect to his third assigned error, Sebastian maintains that the certificates of title of real estate
properties subject of the controversy are in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, and
as such are conclusive proof of their ownership thereof, and thus, they are not subject to collateral
attack, but should be threshed out in a separate proceeding for that purpose. He likewise argues that
estoppel applies against the children of the first marriage, since none of them registered any objection to
the issuance of the TCTs in the name of Caridad and Joaquin only. He avers that the estate must have
already been settled in light of the payment of the estate and inheritance tax by Milagros, Joseph, and
Teresa, resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 8925 in Milagros’ name and of TCT No. 8026 in the names of
Milagros and Jose. He also alleges that res judicata is applicable as the court order directing the deletion
of the name of Lucia, and replacing it with the name of Caridad, in the TCTs had long become final and
executory.
In his own petition, with respect to his first assignment of error, Eduardo alleges that the CA erroneously
settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros, in contravention of the principle of settling only one estate in one
proceeding. He particularly questions the distribution of the estate of Milagros in the intestate
proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court for the probate of the
will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she would receive from Joaquin’s
estate. He states that this violated the rule on precedence of testate over intestate proceedings.
Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo contends that the CA gravely erred when it affirmed that
the bulk of the realties subject of this case belong to the first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia,
notwithstanding that the certificates of title were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con
("married to") Caridad Garcia. According to him, the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited
jurisdiction, was not vested with the power and authority to determine questions of ownership, which
properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.
The Court’s Ruling
As to Sebastian’s and Eduardo’s common issue on the ownership of the subject real properties, we hold
that the RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates
only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.16 As held in several cases,17 a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether
testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if
there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question
of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final
determination of ownership in a separate action.18 Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the
estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court
is competent to resolve issues on ownership.19 Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of
each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.20
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all heirs
of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue.
More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to
the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.1auuphi1
It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified petition for judicial settlement of Joaquin’s
estate, he alleged that the subject properties were owned by Joaquin and Caridad since the TCTs state
that the lots were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia. He also
admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to contracting marriage with Caridad, contracted a first
marriage with Lucia. Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, were able to present proof
before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 were derived from a mother title, TCT No. 5239, dated
March 17, 1920, in the name of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero casado con
Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con Lucia Garcia Mendietta (FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES y JOAQUIN
AGTARAP, the first married to Emilia Muscat, and the second married to Lucia Garcia
Mendietta).21 When TCT No. 5239 was divided between Francisco Barnes and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No.
10864, in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was issued for a parcel of
land, identified as Lot No. 745 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral
Record No. 1368, consisting of 8,872 square meters. This same lot was covered by TCT No. 5577
(32184)22 issued on April 23, 1937, also in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia
Mendietta.
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia died on April 24, 1924, and subsequently, on
February 9, 1926, Joaquin married Caridad. It is worthy to note that TCT No. 5577 (32184) contained an
annotation, which reads—
Ap-4966 – NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente certificado de titulo, tal como aparece, tanchando las
palabras "con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a" y poniendo en su lugar, entre lineas y en tinta encarnada, las
palabras "en segundas nupcias con Caridad Garcia", en complimiento de un orden de fecha 28 de abril
de 1937, dictada por el Hon. Sixto de la Costa, juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal, en el
expediente cadastal No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 1368; copia de cual orden has sido presentada con
el No. 4966 del Libro Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo T-No. 32184.
Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.23
Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la Costa, presiding judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, the phrase con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and replaced by en segundas
nuptias con Caridad Garcia, referring to the second marriage of Joaquin to Caridad. It cannot be gainsaid,
therefore, that prior to the replacement of Caridad’s name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon her demise,
already left, as her estate, one-half (1/2) conjugal share in TCT No. 32184. Lucia’s share in the property
covered by the said TCT was carried over to the properties covered by the certificates of title derivative
of TCT No. 32184, now TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255. And as found by both the RTC and the CA, Lucia was
survived by her compulsory heirs – Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or the wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the
debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if both spouses
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.
Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate the
conjugal partnership to determine the estate of the decedent. In fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute
a settlement proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same should be consolidated with the
settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucia’s spouse.24 Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the
estate of Lucia, with respect to the properties covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject of this case,
to her compulsory heirs.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the claim of
Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 conclusively show that the owners of the
properties covered therein were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the registration in the name of Joaquin
Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves scant consideration. This cannot be said to be
a collateral attack on the said TCTs. Indeed, simple possession of a certificate of title is not necessarily
conclusive of a holder’s true ownership of property.25 A certificate of title under the Torrens system aims
to protect dominion; it cannot be used as an instrument for the deprivation of ownership.26 Thus, the
fact that the properties were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, is not
sufficient proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses’ coverture.27The phrase "married
to Caridad Garcia" in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin as the registered owner,
and does not necessarily prove that the realties are their conjugal properties.28
Neither can Sebastian’s claim that Joaquin’s estate could have already been settled in 1965 after the
payment of the inheritance tax be upheld. Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the
estate of a deceased person. As provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court—
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. -- When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the
estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to
which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the
executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the payment of the debts of the
estate, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. The
records of these cases do not show that these were complied with in 1965.
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa, suffice it to say that
both the RTC and the CA found them to be the legitimate children of Jose. The RTC found that Sebastian
did not present clear and convincing evidence to support his averments in his motion to exclude them as
heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of Joseph and Teresa
being the children of Jose was never questioned by Sebastian and Eduardo, and the latter two even
admitted this in their petitions, as well as in the stipulation of facts in the August 21, 1995
hearing.29 Furthermore, the CA affirmed this finding of fact in its November 21, 2006 Decision.30
Also, Sebastian’s insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos are not heirs to the estate of
Joaquin cannot be sustained. Per its October 23, 2000 Order of Partition, the RTC found that Gloria
Agtarap de Santos died on May 4, 1995, and was later substituted in the proceedings below by her
husband Walter de Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with Walter de Santos, Georgina Samantha de
Santos. The RTC likewise noted that, on September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of
court to intervene, alleging that he is the surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the father of Cecilia
Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in intervention. The RTC later granted the motion, thereby admitting his
answer on October 18, 1995.31 The CA also noted that, during the hearing of the motion to intervene on
October 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo did not interpose any objection when the intervention was
submitted to the RTC for resolution.32
instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed by Milagros before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay
City.34 While there has been no showing that the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of her share
from Joaquin’s estate in favor of Eduardo, has already been probated and approved, prudence dictates
that this Court refrain from distributing Milagros’ share in Joaquin’s estate.
It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January 15, 2010, per his Certificate of Death.35 He is
survived by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap (Teresita) and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap (Joaquin
Julian) and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.).
Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November 21, 2006 Decision and the March 27, 2007
Resolution of the CA should be affirmed with modifications such that the share of Milagros shall not yet
be distributed until after the final determination of the probate of her purported will, and that Sebastian
shall be represented by his compulsory heirs.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192 is DENIED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No.
177099 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, such that the Decision dated November 21, 2006 and the Resolution
dated March 27, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: that
the share awarded in favor of Milagros Agtarap shall not be distributed until the final determination of
the probate of her will, and that petitioner Sebastian G. Agtarap, in view of his demise on January 15,
2010, shall be represented by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and
Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.
These cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, for further
proceedings in the settlement of the estate of Joaquin Agtarap. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no compelling reason to hold that both courts
erred in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully participated in the
estate of Joaquin. It was incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent evidence to refute his and
Eduardo’s admissions that Joseph and Teresa were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of Joaquin, and
to timely object to the participation of Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately, Sebastian
failed to do so. Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the right to participate in the
estate in representation of the Joaquin’s compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes, respectively.33

This Court also differs from Eduardo’s asseveration that the CA erred in settling, together with Joaquin’s
estate, the respective estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria. A perusal of the November 21,
2006 CA Decision would readily show that the disposition of the properties related only to the
settlement of the estate of Joaquin. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as cited above,
the RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction to determine who are the lawful heirs of Joaquin, as well as
their respective shares after the payment of the obligations of the estate, as enumerated in the said
provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria in the distribution of the shares was
merely a necessary consequence of the settlement of Joaquin’s estate, they being his legal heirs.

However, we agree with Eduardo’s position that the CA erred in distributing Joaquin’s estate pertinent to
the share allotted in favor of Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a separate proceeding was
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998 PETITION

ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA, petitioner, COMES NOW the petitioner assisted by counsel and unto this Honorable Court most
vs. respectfully states:
COURT OF APPEALS (Special Eight Division), HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, RTC, Branch 14, 12th Judicial
Region, Cotabato City, and FLORITA A. VALLEJO, as Administratrix of the Estate of the late Roberto L. 1. That she is of legal age, Filipino, married but separated from her husband and residing at
Chua, respondents. Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City, Philippines;

KAPUNAN, J.:
Assailed before us in this Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR Sp. No. 33101, promulgated on 19 April 1994 affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Cotabato City in Special Procedure Case No. 331.
As culled from the records, the following facts have been established by evidence:
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo
from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union, the couple begot two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto
Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.
On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
On 2 July 1992, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a Petition1 which
is reproduced hereunder:
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION
2. That sometime from 1970 up to and until late 1981 your petitioner lived with Roberto
Lim Chua as husband and wife and out of said union they begot two (2) children, namely,
Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua who was born in General Santos City on April 28, 1977 and
Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua who was born in Davao City on August 30, 1978. A xerox copy of
the birth certificate of each child is hereto attached as annex "A" and "B", respectively.
3. That the aforementioned children who are still minors today are both staying with herein
petitioner at her address at Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City;
4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above-mentioned minors, died intestate on May 28,
1992 in Davao City.
5. That the aforementioned deceased left properties both real and personal worth
P5,000,000.00 consisting of the following:
a) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT
No. T-12835 with an area of 290 sq. m. estimated at P50,000.00
b) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT
No. T-12834 with an area of 323 sq. m. 50,000.00

OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER c) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT

No. T-126583 with an area of 303 sq. m. 50,000.00

THE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF

d) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT
No. T-126584 with an area of 303 sq. m. 50,000.00
MINORS ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO SP. PROC. NO/ 331

e) Residential house in Cotabato City valued at 30,000.00

and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO, all

f) Residential house in Davao City valued at 600,000.00

surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF

g) Car, Colt Lancer with Motor No. 4G33-3 AF6393 210,000.00

LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

h) Colt, Galant Super Saloon with Motor

FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,
No. 4G37-GB0165 545,000.00

Petitioner
 i) Car, Colt Galant with Motor No. 4G52-52D75248 110,000.00 WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed:

j) Reo Isuzu Dump Truck with Motor 1. That, upon proper notice and hearing, an order be issued declaring minors ROBERTO
No. DA640-838635 350,000.00 RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO CHUA as heirs to the intestate estate
of deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA;
k) Hino Dump Truck with Motor No. ED100-T47148 350,000.00
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petitioner for the administration of the
l) Stockholdings in various corporations with par value estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA;
estimated at 3,335,000.00
3. That the petitioner be also appointed the guardian of the persons and estate of minors
Total P5,000,000.00 ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO CHUA;

6. That deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single and without legitimate descendants or 4. That after all the property of deceased Roberto Lim Chua have been inventoried and
ascendants, hence, the above named minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride expenses and just debts, have been paid, the intestate estate of Roberto Lim Chua be
Alonzo Chua, his children with herein petitioner shall succeed to the entire estate of the distributed to its rightful heirs, the minors in this case, pursuant to the provisions of Article
deceased. (Article 988 of the Civil Code of the Philippines). 988 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

7. That the names, ages and residences of the relatives of said minors are the following, to 5. And for such other reliefs and remedies this Honorable Court may consider fit and proper
wit: in the premises.

Names Relationship Ages Residence Cotabato City, Philippines, June 29, 1992.

1. Carlos Chua Uncle 60 Quezon Avenue, (Sgd.) FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO

Cotabato City (Petitioner)

2. Aida Chua Auntie 55 Rosary Heights, The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on 14 August 1992 and directed that
Cotabato City notice thereof be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Maguindanao and
Cotabato City and or Davao City.

3. Romulo Uy Uncle 40 c/o Overseas

Fishing Exporation On 21 July 1992, herein petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving
Co. Inc., Matina, spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss2 on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner
Davao City alleged that at the time of the decedent's death Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum.

6. That considering the fact that the aforementioned minors by operation of law are to
succeed to the entire estate of Roberto Lim Chua under the provisions of Article 988 of the Private respondent filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss3 dated July 20, 1992 based on the
New Civil Code of the Philippines, it is necessary that for the protection of the rights and following grounds:
interest of Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, both minors and
heirs of deceased Roberto Lim Chua, a guardian over the persons and properties of said (1) That this petition is for the guardianship of the minor children of the petitioner who are
minors be appointed by this Honorable Court. heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides;
7. That herein petitioner being the mother and natural guardian of said minors is also
competent and willing to act as the guardian of minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and (2) That the above-named minors are residents of Cotabato City:
Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua both staying and living with her; that petitioner possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a guardian.
 (3) That the movant in this case has no personality to intervene nor oppose in the granting
of this petition for the reason that she is a total stranger to the minors Robert Rafson
Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua.
(4) That deceased Roberto L. Chua died a bachelor. He is the father of the above-named
minors with the petitioner in this case;
(5) That movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse of the late Roberto
L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the deceased never contracted
marriage with any woman until he died.
On 6 August 1992, private respondent Vallejo filed a Motion for Admission of an Amended
Petition4 "in order that the designation of the case title can properly and appropriately capture or
capsulize in clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any
confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this petition." The amended
petition5 contained identical material allegations but differed in its title, thus:.
IN RE: PETITION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ROBERTO L. CHUA,
DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF
MINORS ROBERT AND RUDYARD, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.
FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,
Petitioner.
Paragraph 4 of the original petition was also amended to read as follows:
4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of Cotabato
City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao City.
The petition contained exactly the same prayers as the original petition.
Petitioner opposed the motion to amend petition alleging that at the hearing of said motion on 24 July
1992, private respondent's counsel allegedly admitted that the sole intention of the original petition
was to secure guardianship over the persons and property of the minors.6
On 21 August 1992, the trial court issued an Order7 denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
The court ruled that Antonietta Garcia had no personality to file the motion to dismiss not having
proven her status as wife of the decedent. Further, the court found that the actual residence of the
deceased was Cotabato City, and even assuming that there was concurrent venue among the Regional
Trial Courts where the decedent had resided, the R.T.C. of Cotabato had already taken cognizance of
the settlement of the decedent's estate to the exclusion of all others. The pertinent portions of the
order read:
At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19, 1992, counsel for movant Antonietta
G. Chua presented 18 Exhibits in support of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of
the decedent and that the latter resides in Davao City at the time of his death. Exh. "1" was
the xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract between the movant and the petitioner.
This cannot be admitted in evidence on the ground of the timely objection of the counsels
for petitioner that the best evidence is the original copy or authenticated copy which the
movant cannot produce. Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition presented the
following: a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that no such marriage
contract was ever registered with them; a letter from Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged
person to have solemnized the alleged marriage that he has not solemnized such alleged
marriage. Exhibit "2" through "18" consist among others of Transfer Certificate of Title
issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of
Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that
he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed
in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the
decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. Petitioner
through counsels, objected to the admission in evidence of Exhibits "2" through "18" if the
purpose is to establish the truth of the alleged marriage between the decedent and
Antonietta Garcia. The best evidence they said is the marriage contract. They do not object
to the admission of said exhibit if the purpose is to show that Davao City was the business
residence of the decedent.
Petitioner through counsels, presented Exhibit "A" through "K" to support her allegation
that the decedent was a resident of Cotabato City; that he died a bachelor; that he begot
two illegitimate children with the petitioner as mother. Among these exhibits are Income
Tax Returns filed in Cotabato City from 1968 through 1979 indicating therein that he was
single; birth certificates of the alleged two illegitimate children of the decedent; Resident
Certificates of the decedent issued in Cotabato City; Registration Certificate of Vehicle of
the decedent showing that his residence is Cotabato City.
It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the truth of her allegation
that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract
which the movant failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates,
passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the
petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the
alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized
the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. Consequently, she has no
personality to file the subject motion to dismiss.
On the issue of the residence of the decedent at the time of his death, the decedent as a
businessman has many business residences from different parts of the country where he
usually stays to supervise and pursue his business ventures. Davao City is one of them. It
cannot be denied that Cotabato City is his actual residence where his alleged illegitimate
children also reside.
The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and
issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the
 subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue (Fule vs. CA, L-40502, November 29, 1976).
Even assuming that there is concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts of the places
where the decedent has residences, the Regional Trial Court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of the decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts (Section 1, Rule 73). It was this Court which first took cognizance of the case
when the petition was filed on July 2, 1992, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 331 and an
order of publication issued by this Court on July 13, 1992.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied for lack of
merit.
On 31 August 1992, upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued an order appointing
Romulo Lim Uy, a first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the decedent's estate. 8
On the same day, the trial court, likewise, issued an Order appointing Florita Vallejo as guardian over
the persons and properties of the two minor children.9
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion dated 25 October 199310 praying that the letters of
administration issued to Vallejo be recalled and that new letters of administration be issued to her.
She, likewise, filed a Motion dated 5 November 199311 to declare the proceedings a mistrial. Both
motions were denied by the trial court in its Order dated 22 November 1993. 12 Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied by the trial court in an Order dated 13 December 1993.13
Assailing the last two orders of the trial court, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
(Rule 65) with the respondent Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. No. Sp. 33101, alleging that the
trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in:
(1) unilaterally and summarily converting, if not treating, the guardianship proceedings into
an intestate proceeding;
(2) summarily hearing the intestate proceedings without jurisdiction and without any notice
to herein petitioner whatsoever; and
(3) issuing the questioned order (sic) on the alleged pretension that herein petitioner has no
personality to intervene in SPL Proc. No. 331 questioning the highly anomalous orders
precipitately issued ex-parte by the public respondent R.T.C. without notice to the
petitioners.
Petitioner in the main argued that private respondent herself admitted in her opposition to
petitioner's motion to dismiss filed in the trial court and in open court that the original petition she
filed is one for guardianship; hence, the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued letters
of administration over the estate of Roberto L. Chua, thereby converting the petition into an intestate
proceeding, without the amended petition being published in a newspaper of general circulation as
required by Section 3, Rule 79.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on 19 April 1994,14 denied the petition ratiocinating
that the original petition filed was one for guardianship of the illegitimate children of the deceased as
well as for administration of his intestate estate. While private respondent may have alleged in her
opposition to the motion to dismiss that petition was for guardianship, the fact remains that the very
allegations of the original petition unmistakably showed a twin purpose: (1) guardianship; and (2)
issuance of letters of administration. As such, it was unnecessary for her to republish the notice of
hearing through a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The amended petition was filed
for the only reason stated in the motion for leave: so that the "case title can properly and
appropriately capture or capsulize in clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings;
thus avoiding any confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this
petition," which was for guardianship over the persons and properties of her minor children and for
the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent who was their father. In other words, there
being no change in the material allegations between the original and amended petitions, the
publication of the first in a newspaper of general circulation sufficed for purposes of compliance with
the legal requirements of notice.
Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the petitioner's remedy is appeal from the orders complained
of under Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, not certiorari and prohibition.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes to this Court contending that
the appellate court committed the following errors:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL PETITION (Annex F, Petition) WAS FOR A TWIN PURPOSE, TO
WIT: FOR GUARDIANSHIP AND FOR INTESTATE ESTATE PROCEEDINGS;
II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS
NO NEED TO PUBLISH THE AMENDED PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE THEREBY CONTRAVENING THE RULES OF COURT AND THE RULINGS OF THE
SUPREME COURT.
III
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT NULLIFYING THE
ORDERS (Annex "P" to "T") PRECIPITATELY ISSUED EX-PARTE BY THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT PRIOR HEARING OR
NOTICE TO HEREIN PETITIONER THEREBY DEPRIVING THE LATTER (ANTONIETTA GARCIA
VDA. DE CHUA ) OF DUE PROCESS AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
IV
 THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY HOLDING
THAT PETITIONER'S REMEDY IS APPEAL.15
In support of her first assignment of error, petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals' conclusion
that the original petition was one for guardianship and administration of the intestate estate is
contradicted by the evidence on hand, asserting that the original petition failed to allege and state the
jurisdictional facts required by the Rules of Court in petitions for administration of a decedent's estate,
such as: (a) the last actual residence of the decedent at the time of his death; (b) names, ages and
residences of the heirs; and (c) the names and residences of the creditors of the decedent. Petitioner
also reiterates her argument regarding private respondent's alleged admission that the original
petition was one for guardianship and not for issuance of letters of administration, pointing to the
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 20 July 1992, where the private respondent alleged.
1. That this petition is for guardianship of the minor children of the petitioner who are heirs
to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court
the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides.16
as well as to the statements made by counsel for the private respondent during the 24 July 1992
hearing on the motion to dismiss:
ATTY. RENDON:
We filed our opposition to the motion to dismiss the petition because this is a petition for
guardianship of minors, not for intestate proceedings. So this is a case where the mother
wanted to be appointed as guardian because she is also the litigant here. Because
whenever there is an intestate proceedings, she has to represent the minors, and under the
Rules of Court in any guardianship proceedings, the venue is at the place where the minor is
actually residing.17
The petition is devoid of merit.
The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the petition is one which includes the
issuance of letters of administration. The title of said petition reads:
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIPS, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSON AND
PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERTO ALONZO AND RUDYARD ALONZO, all surnamed CHUA
and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.18
Likewise, the prayer of the petition states:
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petition for the administration of the
estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA.
The original petition also contains the jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration — A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent'
(c) The probative value and character of the property of the estate;.
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed;
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
(emphasis ours).
The jurisdictional facts required in a petition for issuance of letters of administration are: (1) the death
of the testator; (2) residence at the time of death in the province where the probate court is located;
and (3) if the decedent was a non-resident, the fact of being a resident of a foreign country and that
the decedent has left an estate in the province where the court is sitting.19
While paragraph 4 of the original petition stating:
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above mentioned minors, died intestate on May
28, 1992 in Davao City.
failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of his death, the omission was cured by the
amended petitions wherein the same paragraph now reads:
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of Cotabato
City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao City.20 (Emphasis in the original.)
All told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts required to be stated in the petition for
letters of administration. Consequently, there was no need to publish the amended petition as
petitioner would insist in her second assignment of errors.
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is not related to
the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate as creditor or otherwise. The Rules are
explicit on who may do so:
Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration — Any interested person, may by filing a
written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of incompetency of the person for
whom letters of administration are prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestant's
own right to the administration, and may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any
competent person or persons named in the opposition..
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of administration. An
interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is material and direct, and not one that is only
indirect or contingent.21
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The best proof of
marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to produce. The
lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented,
this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. The
trial court correctly ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order that:
. . . Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar
documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not
registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has
not solemnized said alleged marriage. . . .22
dated 22 November 1993.25 A motion for the reconsideration of this order of denial was also duly
heard by the trial court but was denied in its Order of 13 December 1993.26
Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.27
As to the last assignment of errors, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the proper remedy of the
petitioner in said court was an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action for certiorari; which can be
availed of if a party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Except
for her bare allegation that an ordinary appeal would be inadequate, nothing on record would indicate
that extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition is warranted.
Finally, petitioner further argues as supplement to her memorandum that the ruling of the Court of
Appeals treating the Special Proceeding No. 331 as one for both guardianship and settlement of estate
is in contravention of our ruling in Gomez vs. Imperial,28 which the petitioner quotes:

The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is a function pertaining
Under her third assignment of error, petitioner claims that the trial court issued its orders, Annexes property not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding which the heirs
"P" to "T" without prior hearing or notice to her, thus, depriving her of due process. are at liberty to initiate.

The orders referred to by petitioner are: Order dated 31 August 1992 appointing Romulo Lim Uy, first
cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the estate; Order dated 31 August 1992 appointing
private respondent as guardian over the person and property of the minors; Order dated 5 August
1993, directing the transfer of the remains of the deceased from Davao City to Cotabato City; Order
dated 6 September 1993 directing petitioner to turn over a Mitsubishi Gallant car owned by the estate
of the deceased to the special administrator; and Order dated 28 September 1993, authorizing the
sheriff to break open the deceased's house for the purpose of conducting an inventory of the
properties found therein, after the sheriff was refused entry to the house by the driver and maid of
petitioner.
Petitioner's reliance on said case is misplaced. In the Gomez case, the action before the lower court
was merely one for guardianship. Therefore said court did not have the jurisdiction to distribute the
estate of the deceased. While in the case at bar, the petition filed before the court was both for
guardianship and settlement of estate.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition of petitioner Antonietta Chua is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.

Apart from the fact that petitioner was not entitled to notice of the proceedings of the trial court, not
being able to establish proof of her alleged marriage to the deceased, or of her interest in the estate as
creditor or otherwise, petitioner categorically stated in the instant petition that on 25 October 1993
she filed a motion praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued by the trial court and
another motion dated 5 August 1993 praying that the proceedings conducted by the trial court be
declared as a mistrial and the court orders relative thereto be set aside and nullified. Petitioner further
stated that her motions were denied by the trial court in its Order dated 22 November 21, 1993 and
that on 30 November 1993 she filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial which in turn
was denied by the trial court on 13 December 1993.

Due process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not that an actual hearing should always
and indispensably be held.23 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.24 Here,
even granting that the petitioner was not notified of the orders of the trial court marked as Exhibits
"P" to "T," inclusive, nonetheless, she was duly heard in her motions to recall letters of administration
and to declare the proceedings of the court as a "mistrial," which motions were denied in the Order
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan, respondent.
Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.
Benedicto T. Librojo for private respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Order dated
November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico
A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.
We grant the petition.
II
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens, established
a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey,
Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the
remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p.
35). In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and
grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will
and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states:
If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that
there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall
be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and
distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption (Rollo, p. 41).
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament
containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article VIII of her will states:
If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that
there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall
be presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered and
distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption. (Rollo, p. 31).
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that
gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two
wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of
Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary
were issued in his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein,
filed with the Regional P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos,
Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York.
She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple
consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge Gualberto J. de la
Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special administration in favor of petitioner
upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as
special administration.
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the Philippine Life Insurance
Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy
taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries.
The trial court granted the motion.
Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a manifestation, stating that said
company then filed a manifestation, stating that said company had delivered to petitioner the amount of
P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to
her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and the Family Savings
Bank time deposit certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F.
Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He also manifested that before receiving
petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and
therefore, "in the interest of simple fair play," they should be notified of the proceedings (Records, p.
110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the motions of May 19, 1983.
Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that the "Cunanan
collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" and therefore, they had "no
legal or proprietary interests to protect" and "no right to intervene"; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in accordance with the
solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in this jurisdiction in accordance
with Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code"; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was
presumed that the husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals are neither
distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship is only by institution" under a will or
by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113).
On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983. However, on July 21, the
Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to
disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-
Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the "brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of the
separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner
was the sole heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived them of their right to "due
process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr.,
the executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not notified of the hearings in the
Bulacan court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and concealment committed by" petitioner rendered her
unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of
attorney, authorized his father,
Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. is qualified to be a
regular administrator "as practically all of the subject estate in the Philippines belongs to their brother,
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be
declared null and void; (2) that the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix be set aside; and
(3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased
spouses.
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an inventory or accounting of
all monies received by her in trust for the estate.
In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of her daughter, Dr.
Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan collaterals"; hence they were complete strangers
to the proceedings and were not entitled to notice; (2) that she could not have "concealed" the name
and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the
two wills but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to the case
is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and
that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the executor who, by the
same provision, should himself file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if
the Bulacan estate came from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his worldly goods to
his wife and nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully
disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and irregularly
assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160).
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner and the Cunanan heirs
had entered into an agreement in the United States "to settle and divide equally the estates," and that
under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof
to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185).
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for failure to comply with
the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of the estate for his own benefit. She also
alleged that she had impugned the agreement of November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of
Onondaga, New York which rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding that "all assets are payable to
Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan’s executor to be then distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p.
52).
On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming that they were heirs
by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the
Rules of Court, the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs,
executors, devisees and legatees must be complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the
proceedings in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special administratrix; (3) that
she be ordered to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she had received and to
surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular
administrator.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of the American court
Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized disbursements from the estates as early as July 7, 1982"
(Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings as she had "to
attend to the settlement proceedings" of the estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p.
242). The Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed a manifestation, stating that petitioner had
received $215,000.00 "from the Surrogate’s Court as part of legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement
of November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).
On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the two wills,
recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the submission of petitioner
of an inventory of the property received by her as special administratrix and declaring all pending
incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of
New York on procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills
were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the
presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines.
However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses and the
Philippine law requires three witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each and every page, a
requirement of the Philippine law.
On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated February 21, 1984,
where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New York governing the execution of last wills
and testaments.
On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of petitioner for the
suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on
the other order issued that same day. Contending that the second portion of the second order left its
finality to the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of
the objectionable portion of the said order so that it would conform with the pertinent provisions of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court.
On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, to which the
reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that "(W)hen the last will and testament . . . was
denied probate," the case was terminated and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given
finality. The same Order amended the February 21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to
the estate the inventoried property. It considered the proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed
(Records,
p. 302).
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final settlement and
termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later, petitioner filed a motion praying for the
reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on the strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting
her a period of 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the
wills of the Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted the motion and reconsidered the
Order of April 30, 1985.
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad, filed a motion praying
that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore incapacitated to act as
special administratrix, she (the counsel) should be named substitute special administratrix. She also filed
a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of the
Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the significant probative value of
the exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer and admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan
spouses including all procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection with the said probate"
(Records, pp. 313-323).
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of August 19, 1985,
alleging lack of notice to their counsel.
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the motion for
reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner proved "that the wills of the
testator domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal
property; that letters testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal
and proofs taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being
satisfied with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question." However,
respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and
allowance of wills (Records, p. 381).
On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the foreign law.
After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge issued an order wherein he
conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable
by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the evidence to that effect.
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent Judge ruled in his
order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986"
but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of the testator"
(Records, p. 391).
The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second motion for reconsideration stating
that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the law obtaining in the State of New York" and
praying that she be granted "the opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the State of New
York has on the probate and allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393).
On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of two wills in a single
proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and established mode of probate where one petition
takes care of one will." He pointed out that even in New York "where the wills in question were first
submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings" (Records, p. 395).
On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of July 18, 1986, citing
Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no party may institute more than one suit for
a single cause of action. She pointed out that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses which
contain basically the same provisions as they even named each other as a beneficiary in their respective
wills, would go against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the proceedings"
(Records, pp. 405-407).
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration, citing Benigno
v. De La Peña, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records,
p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time and that the adverse
party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance, petitioner stated that she had
furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel of the Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a "final
ruling on her supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421).
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate wills of two or more different persons even if
they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378).
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the hearing of April
11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on the allowance of wills, and that the
separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings.
II
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before respondent Judge
are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills:
(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose by
the Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs. "F" and "G");
(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and Custodian of the
Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L. Reagan is the Surrogate of the
Country of Onondaga which is a court of record, that his signature and seal of
office are genuine, and that the Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the
respective wills of Evelyn and Jose
(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");
(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore stating that
they have in their records and files the said wills which were recorded on April 7,
1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2");
 (d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh. "G-3" — "G-
6");
(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the genuineness
and authenticity of the exemplified copies of the two wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");
(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the Philippines
in New York (Exh. "H" and "F").
(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly authorized
to grant exemplified copies of the decree of probate, letters testamentary and all
proceedings had and proofs duly taken
(Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");
(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters testamentary were
issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and "I-2");
(i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge Reagan that a
decree admitting the wills to probate had been issued and appointing Rafael G.
Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3" and
"I-10");
(j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings were held
and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5");
(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were properly executed,
genuine and valid and that the said instruments were admitted to probate and
established as wills valid to pass real and personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5");
and
(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the genuineness and
authenticity of each other’s signatures in the exemplified copies of the decrees of
probate, letters testamentary and proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-6" and
"I-6") (Rollo, pp. 13-16).
Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Court’s Decision of April 13,
1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November 29, 1984.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this
country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if
made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides,
or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those
which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine
laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the
Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the
testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted
to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court,
1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except
for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country
is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit the pertinent
procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While
the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is
to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or
denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be
probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular
terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings
for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the
provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in the
administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v.
Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s reciprocal benefit or
for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the
Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and
pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their
joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation
(Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact — petitioner has
always considered herself the sole heir of
Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she
noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she
only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a
nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be
given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2)
means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original
will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and
4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner,
are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of
the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
"court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be
addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable
time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses
and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all
pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34760 September 28, 1973
SERAFIN MEDINA and ROSALIA M. DEL CARMEN, assisted by DOMINADOR DEL CARMEN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBALES and
BEDA GONZALES, respondents.
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for petitioners.
Jose S. Sarte and Felipe K. Medina for private respondent.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this review by certiorari of the appellate court's resolution dismissing the petition filed by petitioners
challenging the lower court's orders appointing private respondent Beda Gonzales as special
administrator of the intestate estate of the decedent Agustin Medina, the Court excludes the said special
administrator from interfering in the possession and enjoyment of the harvests of the property known as
"Bitukang Manok" by petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen to whom the said property had been sold, and
full payment therefor received, by the estate through Gonzales' predecessor with the approval of the
lower court, which overruled Gonzales' opposition thereto as an assignee of some heirs of the estate,
and as one personally interested in the purchase of the property for himself.
The Court's action is based on the established doctrine that a person with an adverse conflicting interest
is unsuitable for the trust reposed in an administrator of an estate. Respondent Gonzales, whose appeal
of the lower court's order of approval of the sale to the Court of Appeals is pending, cannot be at the
same time an appellant in his personal capacity opposing the sale of the property and
an appellee representing the estate and upholding the same sale as made by the estate through
Gonzales' predecessor as special administrator with the due approval and confirmation of the lower
court. Since the estate proceedings have been pending for over 13 years now without the lower court
once having appointed a regular administrator, said court is directed to name a suitable person
as regular administrator charged with the task of accomplishing the administration of the estate with the
utmost reasonable dispatch.
From the papers submitted with the petition, it appears that as noted by respondent court of first
instance of Zambales, presided by Judge Augusto M. Amores in an order dated March 6, 1970,1 wherein
it approved and confirmed the deed of sale executed on May 8, 1969 by then special administrator
Demetrio Encarnacion of the intestate estate of the decedent Agustin Medina covering the sale of its
property known as "Bitukang Manok" for P24,000.00 to petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen, a daughter-
heir of the decedent, the said intestate proceedings have "already lasted for over ten (10) years now
contrary to the spirit of the law in the settlement of estates the most expeditious way", and the said
court expressed its "desire ... to terminate the proceedings once and for all."
Respondent lower court, through its said order, overruled the opposition of therein oppositor-heir
Uldarico S. Medina and of assignee Beda J. Gonzales, private respondent herein, who claimed therein "to
have an interest over the estate on the ground that certain heirs have already sold their shares and/or
interest over the same in his favor" as being "without merit." It found Uldarico's interest as "confined
solely to his desire to partake of whatever share he has in the estate in the same way with that of the
rest of the heirs." It further held that respondent Beda J. Gonzales "could not ... claim a better right over
that of the herein vendee Rosalia Medina del Carmen in the deed of sale because the said Beda J.
Gonzales is merely subrogated, if at all, to the interests of the heirs concerned who according to the
records, have received more benefits from the estate even before its distribution as against that of the
vendee, who according to the records has never received anything yet from the estate."2
In the same order, upon "suggestion and agreement of the parties" which the lower court "considered to
be well taken for the speedy termination of the instant proceedings," it designated its clerk of court,
Atty. Pastor de Castro, Jr. as "special administrator and to qualify immediately as such in lieu of special
administrator Demetrio Encarnacion."3
No regular administrator to settle the estate once and for all appears to have ever been appointed by
respondent lower court during the period of over thirteen years that the estate has been pending
settlement.
Respondent Gonzales appealed respondent court's order of approval and confirmation of the sale of the
"Bitukang Manok" property as an interested party-assignee opposed to the sale executed by the estate
of the deceased Agustin Medina through its then special administrator Demetrio Encarnacion, later
replaced by the clerk of court, Atty. Pastor de Castro, Jr., as above stated, on his assertion that he had
bought the rights of the other heirs of the estate — those of a majority of the heirs, according to his
answer at bar. The appeal is now pending in the Court of Appeals.4
Almost a year later, in an order dated February 11, 1971, acting on the motion dated October 5, 1970 of
respondent Gonzales for appointment as regular administrator of the estate, respondent lower court
appointed him "not as a regular administrator but only as special administrator for the intestate estate
of the deceased Agustin Medina" and he qualified as such upon posting of the bond fixed in the amount
of P5,000.00 and replaced "judicial administrator Pastor de Castro, Jr."5
An urgent motion dated March 22, 1971 to revoke Gonzales' appointment as special administrator on
the ground that "by said order, Beda Gonzales is now assuming the inconsistent positions of
administering the estate especially the Bitukang Manok property and at the same time appealing from
the order approving the sale of that property only for the purpose of enabling himself to buy and acquire
that property to the loss and prejudice of the estate contrary to law"6 was denied by respondent lower
court in its order dated July 21, 1971.7
In the same order of July 21, 1971, said court also rejected the petitioner Rosalia's petition dated May 5,
1971, for the appointment of a regular administrator as "very urgent and necessary" and proposing that
co-petitioner Serafin Medina, as heir and son and next of kin of the decedent, who has no adverse
interests in his favor and against the estate and is a qualified and competent resident of Olongapo City
be named as such, holding that:
... considering that whatever rights and interest the heirs may have over the estate
now under administration by Beda J. Gonzales could be amply protected since the
said special administrator has posted a bond in the amount of P5,000.00;
considering further that there is no showing that said administrator has been
remiss in the performance of his duties or violated the trust reposed on him as
administrator; and in order not to delay any further the termination of this
proceeding which has lagged long enough, the Court finds said petition of Serafin
Medina to be without merit and the same is hereby denied and the appointment
of said J. Gonzales as special administrator is hereby retained.8
Reconsideration having been denied by respondent lower court under its order of September 28, 1971,
petitioners instituted in the Court of Appeals an action for certiorari with preliminary injunction under
date of September 20, 1971, citing respondent Gonzales' conflicting interests as special administrator
and as "interested buyer ... persisting in objecting to the sale, in his desire to be the buyer (of the
Bitukang Manok property) despite Court approval, thereby causing the estate unnecessary delay and
expense to the prejudice of the other heirs" and his interference with and collection of the harvests of
the said property duly sold to petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen, as well as pressing for the appointment
instead of petitioner Serafin Medina, as disinterested heir and next of kin, as administrator of the
estate.9
Respondent court of appeals, however, under its resolution of January 6, 1972, found the "petition
insufficient in substance to merit due course" and ordered the dismissal thereof, on the ground "(1) that
it is not disputed that the lower court has jurisdiction to appoint respondent Beda J. Gonzales as special
administrator; (2) that petitioners merely allege that the lower court had gravely abused its discretion
without any prima facie showing to this effect: (3) considering further that the lower court had
considered and resolved herein petitioners' objections to respondent Gonzales' continuation as such
administrator, to wit, [quoting the considerations stated in the lower court's order dated July 21, 1971,
already quoted hereinabove]; considering, finally, that it is well-settled that the actuations of the trial
court should not be disturbed except upon showing of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the tribunal, involving whimsical and/or capricious exercise of discretion."
Their motion for reconsideration of such dismissal having failed, petitioners instituted the present action
for review on February 23, 1972. The Court issued on February 29, 1972 a temporary restraining order
restraining respondent lower court and respondent Gonzales "from implementing (the lower court's)
orders dated February 11, 1971, July 21, 1971 and September 28, 1971 ... and from otherwise interfering
in the possession by the petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen of a property known as "Bitukang Manok" of
the intestate estate of the deceased Agustin Medina ... and private respondent ... from interfering in the
cultivation and harvests or otherwise disturbing the possession of aforementioned property by said
petitioner." Upon the Court's giving due course to the petition per its resolution of March 24, 1972, it
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to the same effect upon the posting of an
injunction bond of P2,000.00, and such writ was issued on May 29, 1972.
Insofar as the petition assails the appointment of respondent Gonzales as special administrator giving
rise to the anomalous situation "where in an appealed intestate case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
No. 49439-R, entitled "Intestate Estate of the Deceased Agustin R. Medina; Pastor de Castro, Jr. (now
Beda Gonzales) Special Administrator, versus Uldarico Medina and Beda J. Gonzales, Movant's)
the appellate and the appellant are one and the same person," the petition is manifestly meritorious and
must be granted.The sale to Rosalia of the Bitukang Manok property having been approved and
confirmed by respondent lower court over the personal opposition of said respondent on March 6,
1970 which approval he appealed to the Court of Appeals, his subsequent appointment as special
administrator of the estate a year later under respondent lower court's order of February 11,
1971 created a clear conflict of interest that could cause grave damage and prejudice to the estate and
subject it to unnecessary suits.
With specific reference to the Bitukang Manok property as sold by the estate through Gonzales'
predecessor as special administrator and confirmed by the lower court, the same has passed to
petitioner Rosalia's ownership and possession since the court's confirmation of the sale on March 6,
1970 and the estate makes no further claim against the same but on the contrary has defended the sale
and Rosalia's title thereto as the vendee thereof as against Gonzales' adverse opposition in the appeal
brought by Gonzales in his personal capacity. Yet now, as complained of by Rosalia, Gonzales by virtue of
his appointment, as special administrator a year later seeks in such other capacity to interfere with her in
the harvests of the property purportedly on behalf of the estate when in fact he is going against the
official stand of the estate which upholds the sale.
It is readily seen thereby that Gonzales has been placed in an unduly favored position where he may use
his position as special administrator to favor his personal interests as one interested in the purchase of
the property for himself, although he denies obliquely in his brief such personal interest with the
statement that "there is no evidence or pleading of record that (he) is interested in the acquisition for
himself of the Bitukang Manok property ... and it is a matter of record that having acquired the rights
and interests of the majority of the heirs, he had stepped into the shoes of such heirs, hence, his concern
and interest to protect the estate, as special administrator" 10 — which is to say, to protect his claimed
majority interest in the estate, hence his insistence on opposing the sale.
Grave prejudice may thus be inflicted by him on petitioner Rosalia's as an heir as well as the other heirs
such as petitioner Serafin Medina because of the further delay (13 years now) in their receiving their
distributive shares of their father's estate (as against their co-heirs who have sold and assigned their
rights and shares in the estate to Gonzales) as well as to Rosalia as buyer because of Gonzales'
interference with her enjoyment of the property paid for in full by her since 1970.
Hence, the established doctrine that an administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed
where his personal interests conflict with his official duties, by virtue of the equally established principle
that an administrator is a quasi trustee, disqualified from acquiring properties of the estate, 11 and who
should be indifferent between the estate and claimants of the property except to preserve it for due
administration, and who should be removed when his interest conflicts with such right and duly. 12
As restated by the Court in Lim vs. Dias-Millares, 13 "(I)n this jurisdiction, one is considered to be
unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind of hostility to
those immediately interested in the estate.".
The Court noted from the questioned order of February 11, 1971 that respondent Gonzales was
designated special administrator in replacement of the lower court's clerk of court, Atty. Pastor de
Castro, Jr., who had been appointed as such in the earlier order of March 6, 1970. The Court does not
look with favor on such practice of clerks of court or other court employees being appointed as
administrators of estates of decedents pending settlement before the probate court. The objectivity and
impartiality of such clerks of court or other employees so appointed as administrators in discharging
their regular functions may be easily compromised by extraneous considerations. Furthermore, because
of the administrator's fees and compensation payable to them, it is not inconceivable that self-interest
intrudes and consciously or unconsciously, obstacles are placed against the prompt settlement and
termination of the proceedings in derogation of the primordial purpose of the law to strive to have the
estate settled expeditiously and promptly so that the benefits that may flow therefrom may be
immediately enjoyed by the decedent's heirs and beneficiaries. 14 Probate courts are therefore enjoined
to desist from such practice of appointing their clerks of court or other court employees as
administrators or receivers of estates or the like.
On this consideration (the replacement of the clerk of court) and on the further consideration of the
specific and limited powers of special administrators and that their appointment merely temporary and
subsists only until a regular administrator is duly appointed (since Rule 80, section 1 provides for the
appointment of a special administrator as a caretaker only "when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause") 15 the Court has resolved to allow the appointment of
respondent Gonzales as special administrator to stand, insofar as taking care of the other properties of
the estate are concerned, to the exclusion of the Bitukang Manok property already sold by the estate to
petitioner Rosalia del Carmen. (The said property shall pertain to said petitioner's possession and
enjoyment as the vendee thereof and in the event that the appellate courts find cause to set aside the
lower court's confirmation of the sale in her favor in the pending appeal of Gonzales in his personal
capacity, then shall be the time for the estate and/or the heirs to reclaim possession of the property
upon return to her of the purchase price paid by her).
The Court has finally noted that while the estate involved is not large and there seem to be no
complicated questions that have impeded its prompt settlement, and notwithstanding the lower court's
avowed desire to terminate the proceedings once and for all, the said estate proceedings have been
pending now for over thirteen years without the lower court once having appointed
a regular administrator in accordance with the Rules of Court to take charge of the settlement thereof
and the distribution and partition of the net estate to the heirs entitled thereto.
As time and again stated by the Court, while the provisions of the Rules of Court may be deemed
directory in nature, "the speedy settlement of the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of
creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law" 16 and "courts of first instance
should exert themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time they are presented,
and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors and administrators who do not actively
labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher measures." 17
As in the cited jurisprudence, therefore, respondent lower court is directed to name a suitable person or
entity, who is competent and qualified and doesnot suffer from any proscribed conflict of interest, (and
preferably upon the common agreement of the heirs, to avoid any further bickerings)
as regular administrator charged with the task of accomplishing and terminating the administration of
the estate with the utmost reasonable dispatch, with a view to an early distribution of the net estate
among the heirs and persons entitled thereto.
ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal resolution of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified and in lieu thereof,
judgment is entered allowing the appointment of respondent Gonzales special administrator to stand,
insofar as taking care temporarily of the other properties of the estate are concerned, but to the
exclusion of the Bitukang Manok property previously sold by the estate to petitioner Rosalia M. del
Carmen, who is entitled to the enjoyment of said property as the vendee thereof.
The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore granted is hereby ordered liftedexcept as to the portion
thereof enjoining private respondent from interfering in the cultivation and harvests or otherwise
disturbing the possession of the Bitukang Manok property by petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen which is
hereby made permanent.
Respondent lower court is ordered to implement the above directive of this Court to name a suitable
person as regular administrator charged with the task of accomplishing and terminating the
administration of the estate with the utmost reasonable dispatch and to submit a report of his action
thereon to the Court within thirty (30) days from notice of entry of this judgment.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.