G.R. No.
118861 The petitioner herein pleads that this resolution be set aside and nullified for having been
April 27, 1995
EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, petitioner,
vs.
ROSITA C. CUMBA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court revives the issue
of whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions
for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction In the split decision of 4 March 1992 in the consolidated cases of
Garcia vs. De Jesus and Uy vs. Commission on Elections,1 this Court ruled in the negative
because of the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the
constitution or by legislative fiat, of jurisdiction to issue such extraordinary writs. It held
that jurisdiction or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action,
must exist as a matter of law, whether the jurisdiction is original or appellate, and since
these two classes of jursdiction are exclusive of each other, each must expressly conferred
by law. One does not flow, nor is inferred, from the other. This Court proceeded to state
that in the Philippine setting, the authority to issue the aforesaid writs involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction which has always been expressly conferred either by
Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. Although the Constitution grants
the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant it any power to exercise original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus unlike the case of this
Court which is specifically conferred with such authority in Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It
also pointed out that the doctrines laid down in Pimentel vs. COMELEC2 — that neither the
Constitution nor any law has conferred jurisdiction on the COMELEC to issue such writs —
still finds application under the 1987 Constitution.
In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria vs. Commission on Elections, 3 this Court
reiterated the Garcia and Uy doctrine.
In the challenged resolution at bench, the respondent COMELEC adhered to the
affirmative view of the issue, citing as authority therefore its own decision of 29 July 1993
in Dictado vs. Cosico and the last paragraph of Section 50 of B. P. Blg. 697, which reads:
Sec. 50. Definition. —
xxx xxx xxx
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases.
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He
contends that while the COMELEC's position is inherently compelling, it deserves scant
consideration in view of Garcia and Uy and Veloria and the nature and purpose of B. P.
Blg. 697 which was to govern solely the Batasang Pambansa election of 14 May 1984;
hence, it was a temporary statute which self-destructed after such election.
The antecedent facts that led to the filing of this action are uncomplicated and undisputed.
In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent
Rosita Cumba were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes,
Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only
twenty-two votes over the former.
Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte, which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City.
On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to
have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgement
in favor of the petitioner as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the court hereby declares the protestant as
having won the mayoralty election and as duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of
Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the local election held on May 11, 1992, the protestant
having obtained six (6) votes more than that of the protestee's votes.
Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the petitioner and the private
respondent on 1 July 1994.
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC by filing
her notice of appeal and paying the appellate docket fees.
On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.
On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending
appeal, which the private respondent opposed on 22 July 1994.
On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution pending
appeal. The corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private
respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration of the order of execution and the sheriff
held in abeyance the implementation of the writ. This motion was denied on 5 August
1994.
The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to
annul the aforesaid other of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending
appeal and the writ of execution. The petition was docketed as SPR No. 1-94.
On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition.4 The
dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVES that is [sic] has exclusive
authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election
cases as authorized by law, and therefore, assumes jurisdiction of the instant petition for
certiorari which is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is
hereby declared NULL and VOID and the Writ of Execution issued on August 4, 1994
LIFTED.
Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position .as Municipality
Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, pending resolution of the appeal before this
Commission in the case of Relampagos vs. Cumba in EAC No. 108-94.
In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus cases, the
respondent COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction,
viz., Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly
repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),and that it is not exactly correct
that this law self-destructed after the May 1984 election. It further reasoned out that in
the performance of its judicial functions, the COMELEC, is the most logical body to issue
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases where it
has appellate jurisdiction. It ratiocinated as follows:
It is therefore clear that if there is a law which specifically confers jurisdiction to issue the
prerogative Writs, then the Commission has jurisdiction.
Such a law exists. Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697 is that law.
B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE
ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA ON MAY 14, 1984 AND THE
SELECTION OF SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50 provides:
Sec. 50. Definition.— Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or
affecting the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers which may be raised by any
candidate, political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with
the Commission.
The Commission Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
all pre-proclamation controversies.
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.(Emphasis supplied).
We have debated among ourselves whether Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697, has been repealed.
We have come to the conclusion that it has not been repealed. The repealing provision in
the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985), provides:
Sec. 282. Repealing Clause. — Presidential Decree No. 1296 otherwise known as
the The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All other election Laws,
decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this Code is hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook of
Regions IX and XII. (Emphasis supplied).
B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and Section 50 thereof is not inconsistent
with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Besides, in the cited Garcia/Uy cases,
as reiterated in the Veloria case, the Supreme Court itself said, reiterating previous cases,
that implied repeal of statutes is frowned upon, thus:
Just as implied repeal of statutes frowned upon, so also should the grant of original
jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-judicial body be tabooed. (Garcia/Uy/Veloria
Cases: Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
It is equally clear that Executive Order No. 90 . . . did not modify or repeal, whether
expressly or impliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752. It is common place Learning that
implied repeal are not favored in Law and are not casually to be assumed. The first effort
of a court must always be to reconcile or adjust the provisions of one statute with those of
another so as to give sensible effect to both provisions (Jalandoni vs. Andaya, 55 SCRA
261 (1974); Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190, 196-197 (1971); National Power
Corporation vs. ARCA, 25 SCRA 931 (1968); U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil. 208 (1916); and
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377·(1965). Only
when there is clear inconsistency and conflict between the provisions of two (2) statutes,
may a court hold that the provisions later in point of time have impliedly repealed the
earlier ones" that (Philippine American Management Co., Inc., vs. Philippine American
Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 (1973); and Villegas vs. Subido, 41
SCRA 190 (1971) (Larga vs. Ranada, Jr., No. L-7976, August 3, 1984, 164 SCRA 25).
It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 self-destructed after the Batasang
Pambansa elections of 1984; because of the provisions of Section 1 (Title and
Applicability) which provides: "This act shall be known and cited as "The Law on the 1984
Batasang Pambansa Election." It shall govern the election for the regular Batasang
Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral
representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution.
While that may be true with most of its provisions which were applicable only for the
particular election (like election and campaign periods, voting constituency, etc.) most if
not all of the remaining provisions could be applicable to future elections. It is not lost to
the Commission that B.P. Blg. 697 was passed also "for other purposes."
But the important consideration is that the authority granted to the Commission under
B.P. Blg. 697 is not inconsistent with our election laws. It should be mentioned that the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6638 which governed the local elections of January 18,
1988, as to the number of councilors in specified cities (Sec. 3) and the number of
Sangguniang members in different provinces and cities (Sec. 4) are still applicable up to
this day. In fact, it became one of the important controlling provision which governed the
May 11, 1992 elections. If provisions of Republic Act No. 6636 which are not inconsistent
with the present election laws did not self-destruct, why should Section 50 of B.P. Blg.
697?
Another provision which did not self-destruct is that which provides that "any city or
municipal judge, who includes or excludes any voter without any legal basis in inclusion
and exclusion proceedings, shall be guilty of an election offense," although this provision
is found in Section 10 of Executive Order No. 134 supposedly with limited application as
the enabling act for the elections for Members of Congress on May 11, 1987 and for other
purposes.
Clearly the intent of the law, was to give certiorari, jurisdiction to the Commission on
Elections because the Pimentel case said there was none, to fill a void in the law, and
avoid an incongruous situation.
A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately but in its relation to the
statute's totality. Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to "harmonized it with the
pre-existing body of laws." Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must be
reconciled. . . . (Commissioner of Customs vs. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. L-28329,
August 7, 1975, 66 SCRA 113).
xxx xxx xxx
The statutory construction rule is: "When the Legislature enacts provision, it is understood
that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same subject matter and that in the
absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision should be
deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in the prior statutes."
(Legaspi vs. Executive Secretary, L-36153, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 253).
The Commission is the most logical body whenever it performs judicial functions to take
jurisdiction of petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because it has appellate
jurisdiction in election cases granted by the Constitution itself. The Court of Appeals has
no more appellate jurisdiction over such cases And in the case of the Supreme Court,
Justice de Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out, in his dissenting opinion that under the
Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in election cases should
properly be limited to decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections, not
from lower courts.
It was of course different under the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388, September 2,
1971) because the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals then had appellate
jurisdiction in election case decided by the lower courts.
In the Veloria case, it now appears that only the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
have certiorari jurisdiction over election cases from the lower courts because after
reiterating the ruling in the Garcia and Uy cases, the Supreme Court said:
In view of this pronouncement, an original civil action of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus against a regional trial court in an election contest may be filed only in the
Court of Appeals or in this Court being the only courts given such original jurisdiction
under the Constitution and the Law. (Emphasis supplied).
While these two appellate Courts do have the jurisdiction under the Constitution and the
law, it is most logical for the Commission whenever it performs judicial functions to have
the authority to issue these prerogative writs. . . .
...
In traversing the first issue, we are citing our decision laid down in the case of Antonio
Dictado vs. Hon. Rodrigo N. Cosico and Emilio Tiongco promulgated on July 29, 1993. In
this case, the Commission en banc had occasion to rule on the question of whether or not
the Commission has the authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari in election
cases.
The Commission En Banc, speaking through Hon. Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong,
ruled that there is [a] law which grants the Commission, the exclusive authority to issue
special writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases, and there are also
Supreme Court decisions, recent in fact, which declare that the Commission has no such
authority precisely because; according to the decisions, there is no law granting such
authority, and without any hint whatsoever of the existence of Sec. 50 of Batas vs.
Pambansa Blg. 697.
As gleaned from the case of Dictado, respondents were arguing that Sec. 50 of BP Blg.
697 was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985).
Furthermore, in their answer, respondents cited Supreme Court decisions where it was
declared that, indeed, the Commission has no jurisdiction to issue special writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
It is still the position of this Commission that Sec. 50, BP Blg. 697 has not been repealed.
As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power" includes the duty of the Courts of Justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess, of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VII).
Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art.
IX-C, acts as a court of justice performing judicial power and said power includes the
determination of whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the Comelec, by constitutional
mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. 5
It set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the trial court's order
of execution pending appeal and the writ of execution because
[a]t the time the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was filed on July 12, 1994 the court
a quo had already lost jurisdiction over the case for as early as July 8, 1994, it had
already acknowledged through its order issued on that date, the perfection of the appeal
of petitioner as in fact it ordered the elevation of the records of the case to this Honorable
Commission. 6
Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed the instant special civil action.
In the resolution of 21 February 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on
the petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent COMELEC
to cease and desist from enforcing is challenged resolution.
As naturally expected, the private respondent, in her Comment, opposed the petition by
invoking the very arguments adduced by the respondent COMELEC in its challenged the
resolution and the dissenting opinion in the Garcia and Uy cases.
In its comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the respondent COMELEC
postulates that it issued the said resolution after it had taken cognizance of the appeal
interposed by the private respondent from the RTC decision, unlike in the Garcia and Uy
cases, and therefore, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, thus:
it cannot be gainsaid that [it] possesses inherent powers to employ means necessary to
carry into effect the powers conferred upon it by law (Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the Revised
Rules of Court) and verily, there was no need for any statutory grant for that purpose.
Indeed, in annulling the Order of Execution of the Regional Trial Court, public respondent
did not exceed its jurisdiction since its action in this regard was necessary to preserve the
subject of the appeal and to maintain the status quo of the parties pending the final
outcome of its review of the correctness of the appealed decision. 7
It tried to show that in Pimentel and Garcia, the trial courts still had jurisdiction over the
cases unlike in the instant case where the trial court had already given due course to the
appeal and elevated the records of the case to the COMELEC which had taken cognizance
of the appeal.
This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and to decide it on its merits.
The contention of the respondent COMELEC as advanced by the Office of the Solicitor
General is unacceptable. It goes against its theory in the assailed resolution and is not
supported by the facts. The challenged resolution involves a case which the COMELEC
docketed as a special relief case (SPR. No. 1-94). Under Rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure,
the special relief cases are petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and contempt
proceedings. The ordinary appeal from the RTC decision was, as disclosed in the
challenged resolution; docketed as EAC No. 108-94.8 Clearly then, the COMELEC had
recognized and taken cognizance of two cases: one, the ordinary appeal from the RTC
decision (EAC No. 108-94), and two, the special civil action for certiorari docketed as SPR
No. 1-94. The two cases were not consolidated. The dissimilarities between them need no
further elaboration. Since it issued the challenged resolution under the latter case, it
cannot now be heard to state that it issued it as an incident in the former, the ordinary
appeal. This erroneous contention of the Office of the of the Solicitor General
notwithstanding, the position taken by the COMELEC in its resolution now in question
paves the way for a re-examination of this Court's pronouncement in the Garcia and Uy
cases.
As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy, 9 and later, in Veloria, 10 this Court ruled that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such
jurisdiction.
The respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly
granted it such jurisdiction. Indeed, it did. Nevertheless, considering that the said law
was, per Section 1 thereof, "to govern the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa
which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives
thereafter as provided by the Constitution," and in view of the passage of the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) by the regular Batasang Pambansa, 11 this Court is then
confronted with the twin issues of whether said B.P. Blg. 697 became functus officio after
the 14 May 1984 election of members of the regular Batasang Pambansa or the selection
thereafter of the sectoral representatives at the latest, and whether it was repealed by the
Omnibus Election Code.
The Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there are provisions in B.P. Blg. 697
whose lifetime go beyond the 14 May 1984 election or the subsequent selection of sectoral
representatives. In fact, by the very wording of the last paragraph of its Section 50, to:
wit:
Sec. 50. Definition. —
xxx xxx xxx
The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases. (Emphasis supplied).
it is quite clear that the exercise of the power was not restricted within a specific period of
time. Taken in the context of the conspicuous absence of such jurisdiction as ruled in
Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections, 12 it seems quite obvious that the grant was
intended as a remedial legislation to eliminate the seeming incongruity or irrationality
resulting in a splitting of jurisdiction pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Justice De
Castro in the said case.
But did not the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P. Blg. 697? The repealing
clause of the latter reads as follows:
Sec. 282. Repealing clause. — Presidential decree No. 1296, otherwise known as
The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All other election laws, decrees,
executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions
of this Code are hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 .and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook of
Regions IX and XII.
The second sentence is in the nature of a general repealing clause. It has been said:
An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments are
repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity. Repeals must either be expressed or result by
implication. Although it has in some instances been held to be an express recognition that
there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is included and as indicative of the
legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot be deemed an
express repeal because it fails to identify or designate any act to be repealed. It cannot be
determinative of an implied repeal for if does not declare any inconsistency but
conversely, merely predicates a repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict is
found under application of the rules of implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere
mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detriment than an aid to the establishment of a
repeal, for such clause is construed as an express limitation of the repeal to inconsistent
acts.13
This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in the
revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in
the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides
otherwise expressly or impliedly. 14
By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not evidently appear that the
Batasang Pambansa had intended to codify all prior election statutes and to replace them
with the new Code. It made, in fact, by the second sentence, a reservation that all prior
election statutes or parts thereof not inconsistent with any provisions of the Code shall
remain in force. That sentence
predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found
on existing and prior acts of the same subject matter. Such being the case, the
presumption against implied repeals and the rule on strict construction regarding implied
repeals apply ex proprio vigore. For the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws
so that, if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to
express it. The failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute
to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter,
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and
the old laws.15
This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph of
Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code to determine if the former is inconsistent with
any of the provisions of the latter, It found none.
In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon the
ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases, We now hold that the last paragraph of
Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.
remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section
1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the
COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having been settled, we now proceed to review the
substance of the challenged resolution.
That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the
petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all
too obvious. Since both the petitioner and the private respondent received copies of the
decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed within five days 16 from 1 July
1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed
before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim
Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have supplementary effect to the
COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be
deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal,17 or on 6 July 1994.
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee.
On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of
the records of the case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court
was divested of its jurisdiction over the case. 18 Since the motion for execution pending
appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court
could no longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the motion was filed
before the perfection of the appeal. 19 Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has
the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for execution pending
appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged resolution of 9 February
1995 of the Commission on Elections in SPR No. 1-94 entitled "Rosita Cumba vs. Manuel
M. Relampagos, et al. " is AFFIRMED.
The temporary restraining order issued on 21 February 1995 is hereby LIFTED.
No pronouncemnt as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159145
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159145. April 29, 2005]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) of the
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR), REPRESENTED by DAR SECRETARY
ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, petitioner, vs. JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as
Assignee of the rights and interest of FEDERICO SUNTAY, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 66710 granting herein respondents petition for prohibition and its Resolution[2]
denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration.
This Court adopts the appellate courts narration of facts.
On August 4, 2000, Federico Suntay, now deceased, filed a petition for fixing and payment
of just compensation under Presidential Decree No. 27 against the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), the DAR Regional Director for Region IV and the Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank).[3] Docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00, the case was
filed before the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) and raffled to
Adjudicator Conchita Mias. Subject of the case was Suntays landholdings covering a total
area of 948.1911 hectares situated in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro and embraced under
Transfer Certificate of Title T-31. The DAR and Land Bank determined its value at Four
Million Two Hundred Fifty-One Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and 68/100
(P4,251,141.68) or Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos and 50/100
(P4,497.50) per hectare, which valuation according to Suntay, was unconscionably low
and tantamount to taking of property without due process of law.[4]
After summary administrative proceedings, the RARAD rendered a Decision[5] on January
24, 2001 in favor of Suntay, ordering Land Bank to pay the former the amount of One
Hundred Fifty-Seven Million Five Hundred Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-One
Pesos & 30/100 (P157,541,951.30) as just compensation for the taking of a total of
948.1911 hectares of Suntays properties. Land Bank sought reconsideration of the RARAD
decision for not being supported by clear and convincing evidence and for its conclusions
which are contrary to law. However, in an Order[6] dated March 14, 2001, the RARAD
denied Land Banks motion. Land Bank received a copy of the order of denial on March 26,
2001.[7]
On April 20, 2001, Land Bank filed a petition for just compensation[8] with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro against Suntay, DAR, and RARAD. The
petition, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1241, prayed that just compensation for the
taking of Suntays landholdings be declared in the amount of Four Million Two Hundred
Fifty One Thousand, One Hundred Forty-One Pesos (P4,251,141.00). Suntay moved to
dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of capacity to sue, lack of cause of action, and
res judicata. After Land Bank filed its comment on Suntays motion to dismiss, the RTC,
sitting as a special agrarian court, dismissed on August 6, 2001 Land Banks petition for
failure to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period.[9] The special agrarian
court also denied Land Banks Motion for Reconsideration for being pro-forma.[10]
Thereafter, Land Bank appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals by filing a
Notice of Appeal with the special agrarian court.[11]
While the petition for just compensation was pending with the special agrarian court, upon
motion of Suntay, the RARAD issued an Order[12] on May 22, 2001, declaring its January
24, 2001 Decision as final and executory after noting that Land Banks petition for just
compensation with the special agrarian court was filed beyond the fifteen-day
reglementary period in violation of Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure.[13] In its July 10, 2001 Order,[14] the RARAD denied LBPs motion for
reconsideration of the order of finality. On July 18, 2001, the RARAD issued a Writ of
Execution,[15] directing the Regional Sheriff of DARAB-Region IV to implement its January
24, 2001 Decision.
Thus, Land Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction[16] before the DARAB on September 12, 2001
against Suntay and RARAD. The petition, docketed as DSCA No. 0252, prayed for the
nullification of the following issuances of the RARAD: [1] the January 24, 2001 Decision
directing Land Bank to pay Suntay just compensation in the amount of P157,541,951.30;
[2] the Order dated May 22, 2001 declaring the finality of the aforesaid Decision; [3] the
July 10, 2001 Order denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration; and [4] the Writ of
Execution dated July 18, 2001. On September 12, 2001, the DARAB issued an Order[17]
enjoining the RARAD from momentarily implementing its January 24, 2001 Decision and
directing the parties to attend the hearing for the purpose of determining the propriety of
issuing a preliminary/permanent injunction.
On September 20, 2001, Josefina Lubrica, the successor-in-interest of Suntay, filed with
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition,[18] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66710.
The petition, impleading DARAB and Land Bank as respondents, sought to enjoin DARAB
from further proceeding with DSCA No. 0252, mainly on the theory that Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657, which confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant DAR
jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari. On the same day, the Court of Appeals
granted Lubricas prayer for a temporary restraining order.[19] This notwithstanding,
DARAB issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction[20] on October 3, 2001, directing RARAD
not to implement its January 24, 2001 Decision and the other orders in relation thereto,
including the Writ of Execution.
On October 8, 2001, DARAB filed a Comment[21] in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710, arguing that
the writ of certiorari/injunction was issued under its power of supervision over its
subordinates/delegates like the PARADs and RARADs to restrain the execution of a
decision which had not yet attained finality. In an omnibus motion filed on October 10,
2001, Lubrica sought to nullify the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by DARAB in
DSCA No. 0252 and to cite the DARAB for contempt.[22] Land Bank also filed its
Comment[23] on October 15, 2001, raising the prematurity of Lubricas petition for
prohibition. It contended that the issue of whether or not DARAB can take cognizance of
Land Banks petition for certiorari may be elevated to the Office of the DAR Secretary, in
accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Land Bank also
questioned Lubricas personality to file the petition for prohibition considering that she
never intervened in the proceedings before the RARAD.
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision[24] on August 22, 2002. The
appellate court ruled that petitioner DARAB had no personality to file a comment on
Lubricas petition for prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals because DARAB was a mere
formal party and could file a comment only when specifically and expressly directed to do
so. The appellate court also ruled that DARABs exercise of jurisdiction over the petition for
certiorari had no constitutional or statutory basis. It rejected DARABs contention that the
issuance of the writ of certiorari arose from its power of direct and functional supervision
over the RARAD. In sum, the Court of Appeals declared that DARAB was without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of DSCA No. 0252 and issued a Writ of Prohibition,
perpetually enjoining DARAB from proceeding with DSCA No. 0252 and ordering its
dismissal.
Hence, the instant petition, in which DARAB assigns the following errors to the Court of
Appeals:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it ruled:
1. THAT THE PETITIONER (DARAB), BEING A FORMAL PARTY, SHOULD NOT HAVE FILED
COMMENT TO THE PETITION AND INSTEAD, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CO-RESPONDENT
LAND BANK, THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY OF CARP;
2. THAT PETITIONER HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER DSCA 0252 WHICH IS A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI; AND
3. THAT WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED BY DARAB IN DSCA 0252 WAS NULL
AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED IN VIOLATION OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER IT ISSUED.[25]
This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the DARAB does not have
jurisdiction over Land Banks petition for certiorari.
Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must
exist as a matter of law.[26] It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be
expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law.[27] It is never derived by implication.
Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all
courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which
have such power are expressly designated.[28]
Pursuant to Section 17 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 and Section 13 of E.O. No. 129-
A, the DARAB was created to act as the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR. With the passage of
R.A. No. 6657, the adjudicatory powers and functions of the DAR were further delineated
when, under Section 50 thereof, it was vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources and the Special Agrarian Courts. The same provision granted the DAR the
power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of
reports, compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories
and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and enforce its writs through sheriffs or
other duly deputized officers, and the broad power to adopt a uniform rule of procedure to
achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases before it.[29] Section
13 of E.O. No. 129-A also authorized the DAR to delegate its adjudicatory powers and
functions to its regional offices.
To this end, the DARAB adopted its Rules of Procedure, where it delegated to the RARADs
and PARADs the authority to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and
disputes, and incidents in connection therewith, arising within their assigned territorial
jurisdiction.[30] In the absence of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the
said extraordinary writ of certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with only limited
jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over Land Banks petition for certiorari. Neither the
quasi-judicial authority of the DARAB nor its rule-making power justifies such self-
conferment of authority.
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative
agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the
extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not
wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.[31] The
grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied. There is no question
that the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in all other quasi-
judicial agencies, bodies and tribunals, is in the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction,
that is, the authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the DARs competence
and field of expertise. In conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the
legislature could not have intended to create a regular court of justice out of the DARAB,
equipped with all the vast powers inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is
only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not include authority over
petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229
and E.O. No. 129-A.
In addition, Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure allows a party who does not
agree with the RARADs preliminary valuation in land compensation cases fifteen (15) days
from receipt of notice to bring the matter to the proper special agrarian court, thus:
SECTION 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary
determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but
shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to
only one motion for reconsideration.
In Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals,[32] this Court affirmed the dismissal of
a landowners petition for judicial determination of just compensation for its failure to file
the petition within the fifteen-day reglementary period provided under Rule XIII, 11 of the
DARAB Rules of Procedure.
In the instant case, Land Bank received a copy of the RARAD order denying its motion for
reconsideration on March 26, 2001. Land Bank filed the petition for just compensation
with the special agrarian court only on April 20, 2001, which is doubtlessly beyond the
fifteen-day reglementary period. Thus, the RARAD Decision had already attained finality in
accordance with the afore-quoted rule, notwithstanding Land Banks recourse to the
special agrarian court.
DARAB takes exception to the general rule that jurisdiction over special civil actions must
be expressly conferred by law before a court or tribunal can take cognizance thereof. It
believes that this principle is applicable only in cases where the officials/entities
contemplated to be subject thereof are not within the administrative power/competence,
or in any manner under the control or supervision, of the issuing authority.
This Court is not persuaded. The function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court
within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[33] In the instant case, the RARAD issued
the order of finality and the writ of execution upon the belief that its decision had become
final and executory, as authorized under Section 1, Rule XII of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure. It is worth noting that in its petition, DARAB maintains that in preventing the
RARAD from implementing its decision, it merely exercised its residual power of
supervision, to insure that the RARAD acted within the bounds of delegated authority
and/or prevent/avoid her from committing grave and serious disservice to the
Program.[34] DARABs action, therefore, is a rectification of what it perceived as an abuse
of the RARADs jurisdiction. By its own admission, DARAB took upon itself the power to
correct errors of jurisdiction which is ordinarily lodged with the regular courts by virtue of
express constitutional grant or legislative enactments.
This Court recognizes the supervisory authority of the DARAB over its delegates, namely,
the RARADs and PARADs, but the same should be exercised within the context of
administrative supervision and/or control. In the event that the RARADs or PARADs act
beyond its adjudicatory functions, nothing prevents the aggrieved party from availing of
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts.
That the statutes allowed the DARAB to adopt its own rules of procedure does not permit
it with unbridled discretion to grant itself jurisdiction ordinarily conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. Procedure, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is the means by
which the power or authority of a court to hear and decide a class of cases is put into
action. Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and not substantive. They cover only
rules on pleadings and practice.[35]
While the Court of Appeals held that the DARAB should not have participated in the
proceedings before said court by filing a comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710, this Court
considers satisfactory the explanation of the DARAB that it has a peculiar interest in the
final outcome of this case. As DARAB pointed out, while it is only an adjunct of, it is at the
same time not totally independent from it. The DARAB is composed of the senior officials
of the DAR, who are guided by the States main policy in agrarian reform when resolving
disputes before the DARAB. The DARABs interest in the case is not purely legal but also a
matter of governance; thus, it cannot be strictly considered as a nominal party which
must refrain from taking an active part in the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132467
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132467. October 18, 2004]
SOCORRO CHUA, JUAN TUMALA, ESTELITA DIONISIO, SOLEDAD CUDERA, SEVERINO
TAMAYO, AURELIO NAVA, EVELYN VILLANUEVA, CHRISTOPHER YANZA, ADELAIDA
GONZALES, TEOFILO FERRERIA, and AGAPITO DIMALANTA, petitioners, vs. ROMUALDO
SANTOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ASSISTANT BUILDING OFFICIAL OF THE CITY ENGINEERS
OFFICE OF QUEZON CITY, RAYMUNDO AGUARAS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF
ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, CITY ENGINEERS OFFICE OF QUEZON CITY, HERCULANO
BERONILLA, BENIGNO SANIEL, TOMAS SANIEL and NORMA SANIEL, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is an alternative petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the
reversal of the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46034, dismissing
the petition for certiorari of the petitioners and the resolution of the appellate court
denying their motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Isabel C. Balles, who was married to Mariano Balles, was the owner of a residential land
located in Scout Chuatoco Street, Barangay Paligsahan, Diliman, Quezon City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 339356 issued by the Register of Deeds.[2] After
the death of the spouses, TCT No. 339356 was cancelled by TCT No. ET-80465 issued
under the names of their heirs, Benigno, Tomas, Norma, Manuel and Lawrence Balles.
In the meantime, on November 28, 1996, the registered owners, through counsel, filed a
letter-complaint against the petitioners[3] for the demolition of houses and/or huts which
stood on the property, alleged to have been constructed without the requisite building and
occupancy permits from the City Building Office, and without the knowledge of the
registered owners. The case was docketed as Case No. 97-12.
On March 31, 1997, Romualdo C. Santos, the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the City
Building Office, issued a Resolution ordering the petitioners to self-demolish their
respective houses/huts within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof, with a warning that if
they failed to comply with the resolution, the complainant will with force, effect the
demolition at the expense of the respondents. The dispositive portion of the resolution
reads:
Viewed in the light of the absence of building-occupancy permits, demolition of hereby
structure is hereby ordered, being an illegal construction, structural hazards, no electrical,
plumbing/sanitary permits secured for the structure, violative of the National Building
Code.
Respondents are, therefore, ordered to self-demolish their structures within 15 days from
receipt hereof, otherwise, demolition of the structures will be effected by the complainant,
the expenses thereof charged to their account, without prejudice to the filing of
appropriate cases for Illegal Construction/Occupancy with the City Prosecutor Office of
Quezon City.[4]
On April 21, 1997, the petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages against
Building Officer Romualdo C. Santos, and the registered owners of the property and their
counsel in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order or a writ for preliminary injunction to enjoin the demolition of their
houses.
The petitioners alleged, inter alia, in the complaint that they had been occupying the
property as lessees of Isabel Balles for more than ten years; after the demise of the
Spouses Balles, they continued occupying the property as lessees, paying their rentals to
Lawrence Balles, the only heir of the spouses who had constructed his house on the
property; during the period that they had been in possession of the property, the
registered owners never disturbed them of said possession; the respondent Romualdo C.
Santos usurped the power of the judiciary by ordering the demolition of their houses/huts
thereby impliedly ordering their eviction from the property; and by his action, respondent
Santos deprived the petitioners of their constitutional rights to due process. The
petitioners prayed that, after due hearing, they be granted the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, plaintiffs respectfully pray that judgment be
rendered:
a) immediately ordering defendants to restrain defendants from implementing the
unconstitutional and illegal resolution of respondent Santos in his capacity as OIC-Building
Official dated March 31, 1997 and pending the trial on the merits that a restraining order
be issued immediately enjoining defendant from enforcing the questioned resolution and
after trial making the injunction permanent;
b) Ordering defendants solidarily to pay plaintiffs solidarily (sic) the sum of P100,000.00
[for] exemplary damages; P100,000.00 as moral damages; P20,000.00 as attorneys fees
and P1,000.00 as appearance fee for each day of hearing.
c) Ordering defendants solidarily to pay the costs of this suit.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies as as (sic) just under the
circumstances.[5]
However, on September 25, 1997, the trial court issued an Order[6] denying the
petitioners plea for a writ of preliminary injunction, relying on Section 301 of the National
Building Code and Section 3.8 of Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 1096. On
November 4, 1997, the Building Official issued a Notice of Demolition.[7]
The petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals for the nullification of
the September 25, 1997 Order of the trial court, and prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order/or writ of preliminary injunction. On November 28, 1997, the
Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the following grounds:
(1) The certification of non-forum shopping was signed merely by one (1) of the
petitioners, and not by all of the petitioners, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended;
(2) Petitioners failed to accompany the Affidavit of Service with a written explanation why
service of a copy of the special civil action to private respondents were not personally
made, in accordance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
requires that service pleadings shall be done personally whenever practicable;
(3) Petitioners failed to ask for a reconsideration of the order of the respondent court,
rendering the instant special civil action dismissible (Santos v. Vda. De Cerdenola, 5 SCRA
823; Del Pilar Transit, Inc. v. Public Service Commission; D. C. Crystal, Inc. v. Laya, 170
SCRA 734).[8]
The petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof on December 22, 1997 with
a plea that the Rules of Court could be applied liberally in their favor. On January 15,
1998, the appellate court issued a Resolution[9] denying the said motion of the
petitioners.
On January 19, 1998, the Asst. City Building Official issued an Order[10] reiterating his
order for the demolition of the houses/huts of the petitioners.
On February 4, 1998, the petitioners received a copy of the Resolution of the appellate
court denying their motion for reconsideration.[11]
On March 23, 1998, the petitioners filed the alternative petition at bar contending that:
THE RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND INJUNCTION ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS AND DENIAL OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION VIOLATED THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF RULES OF PROCEDURES
AND IS AGAINST THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT.[12]
...
THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION AND NOTICE OF DEMOLITION WERE ILLEGAL AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL HAVING BEEN ISSUED, CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY WITHOUT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE SAME AND AGAINST THE PROVISIONS OF P.D. 1096 AND
RULE VII OF ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES.[13]
...
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING AND CIRCUMVENT
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS TO EJECT PETITIONERS.[14]
...
PUBLIC RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE DIZON FAILED TO SEE THIS FORUM SHOPPING
SCHEME OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR INJUNCTION EVEN WITHOUT HAVING
COMPLETELY HEARD PETITIONERS AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND DESPITE THE
ILLEGALITY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION.[15]
...
THE SURPRISE PARTIAL DEMOLITION OF PETITIONERS HOUSES ON FEBRUARY 10, 1998
WITHOUT PREVIOUS NOTICES SENT TO PETITIONERS VIOLATED R.A. 7279
REQUIREMENTS ON DEMOLITION.[16]
...
PETITIONERS HAVE NOT VIOLATED P.D. 1096 BECAUSE THEIR HOUSES WERE ALREADY
IN EXISTENCE LONG BEFORE THE NATIONAL BUILDING CODE TOOK EFFECT IN 1977.[17]
The petition has no merit.
The instant alternative petition is destined to fail. The petitioners cannot delegate upon
the Court the task of determining under which rule the petition should fall. The remedies
of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[18]
Under Rule 56, Sec. 5(f) of the Revised Rules of Court, a wrong or inappropriate mode of
appeal, as in this case, merits an outright dismissal.
Every lawyer[19] should be familiar with the obvious distinctions between a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 and an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. For one, that under Rule 45 is a continuation of the judgment complained of,
while that under Rule 65 is an original or independent. It is, likewise, settled that
generally, the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 will not be allowed as a
substitute for failure to timely file a petition for review under Rule 45 or for the lost
remedy of appeal.[20]
Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any
case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed
to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case.[21] Under Rule 45, the reglementary period to
appeal is fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or denial of the motion for
reconsideration.[22]
Here, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 15, 1998 denying the motion
for reconsideration of its Resolution dated November 28, 1997 was received by petitioners
on February 4, 1998.[23] Thus, they had until February 19, 1997 within which to perfect
their appeal. The petitioners failed to do so. What they did was to file the instant petition,
designating it in both the caption and the body as one for Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 or Certiorari under Rule 65 and Injunction with Prayer for a Restraining
Order, reiterating the issues and arguments they raised before the Court of Appeals.
For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, the petitioners must
show that they have no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
against their perceived grievance. A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it
will promptly relieve the petitioners from the injurious effects of the judgment and the
acts of the lower court or agency. In this case, appeal was not only available but also a
speedy and adequate remedy.[24]
Clearly, the petitioners interposed the present special civil action of certiorari as an
alternative to their petition for review on certiorari not because it is the speedy and
adequate remedy but to make up for the loss of the right of ordinary appeal. It is
elementary that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for
an appeal, where the latter remedy is available, as it was in this case. A special civil action
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a cure for failure to timely file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Rule 65 is an independent action
that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal,
including that under Rule 45, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by ones own
neglect or error in the choice of remedies.[25] Although there are exceptions to these WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals are
rules, among them are: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued
are null and void; (d) or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of G.R. No. 156067
judicial authority,[26] none is present in the case at bar. The petitioners failed to show
circumstances that would justify a deviation from the general rule as to make available a THIRD DIVISION
petition for certiorari in lieu of taking an appeal.
[G.R. No. 156067. August 11, 2004]
Based on the foregoing, the instant petition should be dismissed.
MADRIGAL TRANSPORT, INC., petitioner, vs. LAPANDAY HOLDINGS CORPORATION;
In any case, even if the issue of the petitioners lapses are brushed aside and recourse MACONDRAY AND COMPANY, INC.; and LUIS P. LORENZO JR., respondents.
under Rule 65 is allowed, the same result would be obtained for the reason that the
appellate courts resolutions are in accord with the Rules of Court. DECISION

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari and injunction, among other PANGANIBAN, J.:
grounds, that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the
The special civil action for certiorari and appeal are two different remedies that are
petitioners.
mutually exclusive; they are not alternative or successive. Where appeal is available,
Anent this ground, the petitioners submit that a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. Basic is
procedure is called for since the objectives of the rule on certification of non-forum the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.
shopping had been substantially complied with. Citing jurisprudence, the petitioners aver
The Case
that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and, thus, should not be interpreted with such absolute
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.
February 28, 2002 Decision[2] and the November 5, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 54861. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
We are not convinced.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, private respondents Lapanday

Section 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides that it is the
and Lorenzo, Jr.s Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 February 2000 is GRANTED.
plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath the certification against forum
Accordingly, the Resolution dated 10 January 2000 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE,
shopping.[27]
thereby dismissing the Petition for Certiorari dated 10 September 1999.[4]
In the petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals, the
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
verification/certification[28] was signed only by petitioner Socorro Chua. There was no
showing that petitioner Chua was authorized by her co-petitioners to represent the latter
The Facts
and sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Chua knew, to
the best of her knowledge, whether her co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or
The pertinent facts are undisputed. On February 9, 1998, Petitioner Madrigal Transport,
claims filed or pending. We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter
Inc. (Madrigal) filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the Regional Trial Court
involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification on
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 49.[5] Subsequently, on February 21, 1998, petitioner filed a
non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.
Complaint for damages against Respondents Lapanday Holdings Corporation (Lapanday),
The petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.
Macondray and Company, Inc. (Macondray), and Luis P. Lorenzo Jr. before the RTC of
Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
Manila, Branch 36.[6]
construction.[29]
In the latter action, Madrigal alleged (1) that it had entered into a joint venture
In view of the conclusions arrived at above, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other
agreement with Lapanday for the primary purpose of operating vessels to service the
issues raised in this case.
shipping requirements of Del Monte Philippines, Inc.;[7] (2) that it had done so on the
strength of the representations of Lorenzo, in his capacity either as chairman of the board
or as president of Del Monte, Lapanday and Macondray; (3) that Macondray had
thereafter been appointed -- allegedly upon the insistence of Lapanday -- as broker, for
the purpose of securing charter hire contracts from Del Monte; (4) that pursuant to the
joint venture agreement, Madrigal had purchased a vessel by obtaining a P10,000,000
bank loan; and (5) that contrary to their representations and guarantees and despite
demands, Lapanday and Lorenzo had allegedly been unable to deliver those Del Monte
charter hire contracts.[8]
On February 23, 1998, the insolvency court (RTC Branch 49) declared petitioner
insolvent.[9] On March 30, 1998 and April 6, 1998, Respondents Lapanday, Lorenzo and
Macondray filed their respective Motions to Dismiss the case pending before the RTC
Branch 36.[10]
On December 16, 1998, Branch 36 granted the Motion, for failure of the Complaint to
state a cause of action. Applying Sections 32 and 33 of the Insolvency Law,[11] the trial
court opined that upon the filing by Madrigal of a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, the
latter lost the right to institute the Complaint for Damages. The RTC ruled that the
exclusive right to prosecute the actions belonged to the court-appointed assignee.[12]
On January 26, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which was later
denied on July 26, 1999.[14] Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the December 16, 1998 and the July 26, 1999
Orders of the trial court.[15] On September 29, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution
requiring petitioner to explain why its Petition should not be dismissed outright, on the
ground that the questioned Orders should have been elevated by ordinary appeal.[16]
On January 10, 2000, the appellate court ruled that since the main issue in the instant
case was purely legal, the Petition could be treated as one for review as an exception to
the general rule that certiorari was not proper when appeal was available.[17]
Respondents Lapanday and Lorenzo challenged this ruling through a Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 10, 2000.[18] The CA heard the Motion for
Reconsideration in oral arguments on April 7, 2000.[19]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Issues
In its Statement of Issues, petitioner contends:
I
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed egregious error by ruling that the order of the
lower court which granted private respondents Motions to Dismiss are not proper subjects
of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
A. Section 5, Rule 16 does not apply in the present case since the grounds for dismissal
[were] petitioners purported lack of capacity to sue and its failure to state a cause of
action against private respondents, and not any of the three (3) grounds provided under
said provision, namely, res judicata, extinction of the claim, and Statute of Frauds.
B. Section 1 of Rule 41, which is the applicable provision in petitioners case, expressly
proscribes the taking of an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration or
one which dismisses an action without prejudice, instead, the proper remedy is a special
civil action under Rule 65.
C. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was correctly resorted to by petitioner from the
dismissal order of the lower court, which had clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error in ruling that it had no
jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner before it.
A. Section 2, Rule 50 nor Section 2(c) and Section 2(c), Rule 41 find no application in the
present case, since said rule contemplates of a case where an appeal is the proper
remedy, and not where the appropriate remedy is a petition for certiorari where questions
of facts and laws may be reviewed by the court a quo.

B. The court a quo erroneously concluded that it has no jurisdiction over the subject
On February 28, 2002, the appellate court issued the assailed Decision granting
matter of the petition based on the wrong premise that an appeal from the lower courts
Respondents Lapanday and Lorenzos Motion for Reconsideration and dismissing Madrigals
dismissal order is the proper remedy by applying Section 2, Rule 50 and Section 2(c),
Petition for Certiorari. The CA opined that an order granting a motion to dismiss was final
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.[24]
and thus the proper subject of an appeal, not certiorari.[20]

The Courts Ruling

Furthermore, even if the Petition could be treated as an appeal, it would still have to be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, according to the CA.[21] The appellate court held that
The Petition is unmeritorious.
the issues raised by petitioner involved pure questions of law that should be brought to
the Supreme Court, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 50 and Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the
First Issue:
Rules of Court.[22]
Remedy Against Dismissal of Complaint
Hence, this Petition.[23]
The resolution of this case hinges on the proper remedy: an appeal or a petition for
certiorari. Petitioner claims that it correctly questioned the trial courts Order through its
Petition for Certiorari. Respondents insist that an ordinary appeal was the proper remedy.
We agree with respondents.
Appeal
Under Rule 41, Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
the Rules of Court to be appealable.[25] The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or
final order is also provided in Rule 41 as follows:
Section 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required
except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the
law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and
served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved,
the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Rule 45.[26]
An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so
that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or
judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. Au contraire, an interlocutory order does
not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something to be done as regards the merits
of the latter.[27]
Petition for Certiorari
A petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65, which reads:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.[28]
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for
any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds
of its jurisdiction.[29]
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2)
such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[30]
Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority.[31] There
is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory
authority.[32] Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[33]
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which
shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.[34] In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained
the simple reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every
error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice
would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil
action of certiorari.[35]
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower
court -- on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision.[36] Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it
has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of
certiorari.[37] Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a
mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy. [38]
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and
power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in
accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts.
[39] An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is
an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the
rendition of the judgment or order complained of.[40] The parties to an appeal are the
original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the
aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-
judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents,
respectively).[41]
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court
so declare are appealable.[42] Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for
certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an
appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate
remedy.[43]
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from.[44] Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
days from the said notice of judgment or final order.[45] A petition for review should be
filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the
petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.[46] In an appeal
by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of
judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration.[47]
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from
the notice of judgment, order, or resolution.[48] If a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the
motion.[49]
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally
required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and
adequate remedy expressly available under the law.[50] Such motion is not required
before appealing a judgment or final order.[51]
Certiorari Not the Proper Remedy if Appeal Is Available
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be
entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are
mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.[52] Hence, certiorari is not and cannot
be a substitute for an appeal, especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of
remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.[53] One of the requisites of certiorari is that there
be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.[54] Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion.
Second Issue:
CA Jurisdiction
Petitioner was ascribing errors of judgment, not jurisdiction, in its Petition for Certiorari
filed with the Court of Appeals. The issue raised there was the trial courts alleged error in
dismissing the Complaint for lack of cause of action. Petitioner argues that it could still
institute the Complaint, even if it had filed a Petition for Insolvency earlier.[55] As
petitioner was challenging the trial courts interpretation of the law -- posing a question of
law -- the issue involved an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. An error of judgment
committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not necessarily
equivalent to grave abuse of discretion.[56]
The instant case falls squarely with Barangay Blue Ridge A of QC v. Court of Appeals.[57]
In that case, the trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state
a cause of action. After the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The appellate court denied the Petition on the ground
that the proper remedy was appeal. Holding that an error of judgment should be reviewed
through an ordinary appeal, this Court upheld the CA.
The Dismissal -- a Final Order
An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order.[58] It is not interlocutory
because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower
court. Therefore the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.[59]
Petitioner avers that Section 5 of Rule 16[60] bars the filing of an appeal when the
dismissal is based on lack of cause of action. It adds that Section 5 limits the remedy of
appeal only to dismissals grounded on prior judgments or on the statute of limitations, or
to claims that have been extinguished or are unenforceable. We find this interpretation
absurd.
The provision is clear. Dismissals on the aforesaid grounds constitute res judicata.
However, such dismissals are still subject to a timely appeal. For those based on other
grounds, the complaint can be refiled. Section 5, therefore, confirms that an appeal is the
remedy for the dismissal of an action.
Citing Sections 1(a) and 1(h), Rule 41,[61] petitioner further claims that it was prohibited
from filing an appeal. Section 1(a) of the said Rule prohibits the filing of an appeal from an
order denying a motion for reconsideration, because the remedy is to appeal the main
decision as petitioner could have done. In fact, under Section 9, Rule 37, the remedy
against an order denying a motion for reconsideration is to appeal the judgment or final
order. Section 1(h) does not apply, because the trial courts Order did not dismiss the
action without prejudice.[62]
Exception to the Rule Not Established by Petitioner
We are not unaware of instances when this Court has granted certiorari despite the
availability of appeal.[63] Where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary
methods of appeal may not prove adequate -- either in point of promptness or
completeness, so that a partial if not a total failure of justice could result -- a writ of
certiorari may still be issued.[64] Petitioner cites some of these exceptions to justify the
remedy it has undertaken with the appellate court,[65] but these are not applicable to the
present factual milieu.
Even assuming that the Order of the RTC was erroneous, its error did not constitute grave
abuse of discretion. Petitioner asserts that the trial court should not have dismissed the
Complaint or should have at least allowed the substitution of the assignee in petitioners
stead.[66] These alleged errors of judgment, however, do not constitute a despotic,
capricious, or whimsical exercise of power. On the contrary, petitioner availed of certiorari
because the 15-day period within which to file an appeal had already lapsed. Basic is the
rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.
As previously stressed, appeal -- not certiorari -- was the correct remedy to elevate the
RTCs Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. The appeal, which would have involved a pure
question of law, should have been filed with the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 2 (c)
of Rule 41 and Section 2 of Rule 50,[67] Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED, and the challenged Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172299
THIRD DIVISION
ALFREDO TAGLE,
Petitioner,
- versus -
EQUITABLE PCI BANK (Formerly Philippine Commercial International Bank) and the
HONORABLE HERMINIA V. PASAMBA, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch
82, City of Malolos, Bulacan,
Respondents.
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 22, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Alfredo Tagle (petitioner Alfredo) stemmed from the following Resolutions promulgated by
the Court of Appeals: (1) the 6 September 2005 Resolution[1] dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari filed by petitioner Alfredo, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, assailing the 4
April 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82, City of Malolos, Bulacan, in
LRC Case No. P-71-2004[2]; (2) the 16 February 2006 Resolution[3] denying petitioner
Alfredos Motion for Reconsideration; and (3) the 11 April 2006 Resolution[4] denying
petitioner Alfredos Second Motion for Reconsideration.[5]
Petitioner Alfredo urges this Court to set aside, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the 4 April 2005 Order[6] of the RTC in LRC
Case No. P-71-2004, which denied petitioner Alfredos Motion to Stop Writ of Possession.
He prays that this Court certify for review with prayer for preliminary injunction to stop
the writ of possession [of] the property located at Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag,
Bulacan and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-143715 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Bulacan [subject property] and after due hearing, let judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of the Honorable Regional Trial Court
Branch 82, [City of Malolos, Bulacan,] and the Court of Appeals as the law requires with
costs.[7]
 According to petitioner Alfredo, the subject property is registered in his name and was
constituted as a Family Home in accordance with the provisions of the Family Code. He
and his wife Arsenia Bautista Tagle (Arsenia) never mortgaged the subject property to
respondent Equitable PCI Bank (respondent E-PCI) whether before or after the subject
property was constituted as their Family Home. It was Josefino Tagle (Josefino), who was
not the owner of the subject property, who mortgaged the same with respondent E-PCI.
Josefino was religiously paying the installments on his mortgage obligation and had paid
more than half thereof. Josefino, however, passed away. Petitioner Alfredo was then
forced to assume Josefinos outstanding mortgage obligation. Even as petitioner Alfredo
was already paying Josefinos mortgage obligation in installments, respondent E-PCI still
foreclosed the mortgage on the subject property. [8]
On the other hand, respondent E-PCI recounts that the subject property was formerly
registered in the name of petitioner Alfredo. It was mortgaged, pursuant to a Special
Power of Attorney executed by petitioner Alfredo, to secure the obligation of the spouses
Josefino and Emma Tagle with respondent E-PCI. Respondent E-PCI foreclosed the
mortgage on the subject property upon default in payment by spouses Josefino and
Emma, and upon the expiration of the period of redemption, caused the consolidation and
transfer of the title to the subject property in its name. Consequently, respondent E-PCI
filed with the RTC a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession of the subject property,
which was docketed as LRC Case No. P-71-2004. Petitioner Alfredo, however, filed a
Motion to Stop Writ of Possession on the ground that the subject property is a Family
Home which is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. [9]
On 4 April 2005, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying petitioner Alfredos Motion,
the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Stop Writ of Possession is hereby
DENIED.
Thereafter, petitioner Alfredo[12] elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a Petition
for Certiorari [and Prohibition] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, assailing and seeking the nullification and the setting aside of the
denial of his Motion to Stop Writ of Possession.
In a Resolution dated 6 September 2005, the appellate court resolved to dismiss the
petition, stating thus:
The instant petition is not accompanied by (i) the order denying petitioners motion to
exempt from foreclosure of mortgage; and (ii) a relevant and pertinent document, i.e.,
motion to exempt from foreclosure of mortgage (Sec. 1, Rule 65, in relation to Sec. 3,
Rule 46, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED outright.[13]
In due time, petitioner Alfredo moved for the reconsideration of the afore-quoted
Resolution.
On 16 February 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner
Alfredos motion for reconsideration, decreeing that:
Petitioner [Alfredo] seeks reconsideration of Our resolution dated September 6, 2005
dismissing the petition for not being accompanied by the order dated April 4, 2005
(denying his motion to exempt from foreclosure mortgage) and motion to exempt from
foreclosure of mortgage. Instead of the aforesaid order and motion, however, petitioner
submitted certified true copies of the order dated June 21, 2005 (which was already
attached to the petition) and motion to stop writ of possession.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.[14]

Undaunted still, petitioner Alfredo once more filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
In denying the motion, the RTC held that:
appellate courts 16 February 2006 Resolution.
In the case at bar, the mortgage transaction happened on May 9, 1997 (Exhibit D), after
On 11 April 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated the last of its Resolutions, denying,
the effectivity of the Family Code.
as expected, petitioner Alfredos Second Motion for Reconsideration, stated in full below:
With Article 155 in application, it is crystal clear that this instant case does not fall under
For consideration is petitioners [Alfredos] motion for reconsideration of Our February 16,
the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code, as the case stemmed from
2006 resolution denying its (sic) motion for reconsideration of Our resolution dated
the mortgage transaction entered into between the [herein respondent E-PCI] and [herein
September 6, 2005 dismissing the petition.
petitioner Alfredo and his spouse Arsenia] dating back in (sic) 1997. This fact will militate
against the so-called exemption by sheer force of exclusion embodied in said article.
Appellant has not cured the formal defects of the petition noted in Our resolution dated
Hence, the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by [petitioner Tagle and his spouse
September 6, 2005. And, more importantly, a second motion for reconsideration of a final
Arsenia].[10]
order is not allowed (Sec. 5, Rule 37, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Obando vs. Court of
Appeals, 366 SCRA 673).
Petitioner Alfredo and his spouse Arsenia filed with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration
of its foregoing order. However, it was likewise denied by the RTC in another Order[11]
WHEREFORE, the subject motion for reconsideration is DENIED.[15]
dated 21 June 2005.
 Hence, this Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Petitioner Alfredo filed the instant petition designating it in both the caption and the body
as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. He anchors the present
petition on the sole issue of whether or not the subject property subject of the mortgage
being a family home is exempt from foreclosure of mortgage.[16] He argues:
That from the records of the mortgage, the same was not constituted before or after the
constitution of the family home by the petitioner and as such the Honorable Court of
Appeals has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in the proceedings complained of.[17]
He thus prays for this Court to issue a preliminary injunction to stop the implementation
of the writ of possession of the subject property, and after due hearing, render a
judgment annulling or modifying the proceedings before the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, with costs.[18]
On the other hand, respondent E-PCI counters that the petition at bar must be dismissed
on the following grounds:
First, petitioner Alfredos Petition for Certiorari with this Court failed to comply with the
technical requirements of the Rules of Court[19] for petitions for certiorari in that (a) the
present petition was filed out of time considering that the 60-day period within which to
file the same was reckoned from receipt of the 11 April 2006 Resolution denying petitioner
Alfredos second Motion for Reconsideration, instead of the 16 February 2006 Resolution
denying his first Motion for Reconsideration;[20] (b) petitioner Alfredo did not allege in
the present petition that the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction[21] when it dismissed his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 for failure to
attach thereto certified true copies of the 4 April 2005 RTC Order denying his Motion to
Stop Writ of Possession, as well as the very motion subject of the assailed order; (c) the
present petition lacks the proper verification and is considered an unsigned pleading which
produces no effect whatsoever;[22] and (d) the present petition requested for the
issuance of an injunction without stating the grounds therefor.[23]
Second, petitioner Alfredos second Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Court of
Appeals is prohibited by law,[24] as a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or
final resolution is clearly disallowed by Sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
And third, granting arguendo that the petition at bar was properly filed by petitioner
Alfredo with this Court, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 for failure of petitioner Alfredo to submit the required
documents.[25]
Respondent E-PCI then concludes that the present Petition for Certiorari was filed not to
question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals but as a vain hope of appealing the Order
dated April 4, 2005 issued by the Regional Trial Court x x x.[26]
In reply to the foregoing counter-arguments, petitioner Alfredo contends:
1. That Rule 52 Sec. 2 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure is not applicable to the
present case because what is applicable is a Second Motion for Reconsideration in the
Supreme Court;
2. That the 60 day period within which petitioner [Alfredo] may file subject
Petition for Certiorari has been reckoned from April 11, 2006 denying the petitioners
[Alfredos] Second Motion for Reconsideration and the Rules of Court does not
distinguished (sic) whether the denial is first or second;
xxxx
4. That the issue of whether or not the mortgage was executed before or
after the constitution of the Family Home is a necessary question in a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65; and
5. That the verification based on personal knowledge is proper because the
Rules of Court did not distinguish whether the facts is based on personal knowledge or an
(sic) authentic records;[27]
For its substantive as well as procedural infirmities, the instant petition must be
dismissed.
Given the above-stated arguments raised by both parties, the threshold question that
must be initially resolved is whether or not the present Petition for Certiorari filed under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy for petitioner Alfredo to avail
of in seeking the reversal of the three Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 6
September 2005, 16 February 2006 and 11 April 2006.
A petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
reads:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of [its or his] jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
A special civil action for Certiorari, or simply a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is
only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[28]
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such cannot be used for
any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds
of its jurisdiction.[29]
For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites that have to concur are:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[30]
The phrase "without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of
authority[31] or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or
causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack
of power to exercise authority.[32] "Excess of jurisdiction" occurs when the court
transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority;[33] or results when an act,
though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer (to do) is not authorized,
and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone
authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting.[34] While that of
"grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; simply put, power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and
such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.[35]
In the present case, there is no question that the 6 September 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner Alfredos petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 is already
a disposition on the merits. Therefore, said Resolution, as well as the Resolutions dated 16
February 2006 and 11 April 2006 denying reconsideration thereof, issued by the Court of
Appeals, are in the nature of a final disposition of CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 by the appellate
court, and which, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, are appealable to this
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, viz:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the words of Rule 45, it is crystal that decisions (judgments), final orders or
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action
or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review,
which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.[36]
In the case at bar, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner
Alfredos petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 were final orders.[37] They were not
interlocutory because the proceedings were terminated; and left nothing more to be done
by the appellate court. There were no remaining issues to be resolved in CA-G.R. SP No.
90461. Consequently, the proper remedy available to petitioner Alfredo then was to file
before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court of the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, and not a special civil action for
certiorari.
From the foregoing discussion, it is fairly obvious that the third requisite for a petition for
certiorari is wanting, that is, there must be no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The availability to petitioner Alfredo of the remedy
of a petition for review on certiorari from the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
effectively barred his right to resort to a petition for certiorari.
Basic is the rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is
available to an aggrieved party. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it
will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts
of the lower court or agency.[38] In this case, appeal was not only available but also a
speedy and adequate remedy.[39] Moreover, petitioner Alfredo failed to show
circumstances that would justify a deviation from the general rule as to make available to
him a petition for certiorari in lieu of making an appeal.
Petitioner Alfredo failed to show any valid reason why the issue raised in his petition for
certiorari could not have been raised on ordinary appeal by certiorari. He simply argued
that the appellate court gravely abuse its discretion which amounted to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 and not finding that the
subject property covered by the Writ of Possession was a Family Home, hence, exempt
from execution or forced sale. He did not give a single explanation as to why the errors
committed by the Court of Appeals cannot possibly be cured by ordinary appeal under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
cumulative.[40] Time and again this Court has reminded members of the bench and bar
that the special civil action of Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost
appeal[41] where the latter remedy is available; especially if such loss or lapse was
occasioned by ones own negligence or error in the choice of remedies.[42]
 To be sure, once again, we take this opportunity to distinguish between a Petition for
Review on Certiorari (an appeal by certiorari) and a Petition for Certiorari (a special civil
action/an original action for Certiorari), under Rules 45 and 65, respectively, of the
Revised Rules of Court. Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,[43]
summarizes the distinctions between these two remedies, to wit:
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the
simple reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every
error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice
would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil
action of certiorari.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower
court -- on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari.
Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of
judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and
power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in
accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts.
An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an
original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the
rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original
parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved
party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial
agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of
Court so declared are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for
certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an
appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate
remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the
said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served
within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioners timely
filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the
petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order,
or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from
the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the
motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally
required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and
adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before
appealing a judgment or final order.
Evidently, therefore, petitioner Alfredo erred in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an
ordinary appeal by certiorari, already a sufficient justification for dismissing the instant
petition. But even if his present petition is given due course, we still find it bereft of merit.
When the Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, it did
so on the ground that petitioner Alfredo failed to attach certified true copies of the
following: (1) the 4 April 2005 Order of the RTC in LRC Case No. P-71-2004 denying
petitioner Alfredos Motion to Stop Writ of Possession; and (2) petitioner Alfredos Motion to
Stop Writ of Possession submitted to the RTC. Suitably, therefore, the proper issue which
petitioner Alfredo should raise before this Court in his instant Petition for Certiorari should
be whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing his
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 for failure to attach thereto the pertinent documents.
In dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, the appellate court relied on Sec. 1,
Rule 65, in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 46, of the Revised Rules of Court. Sec. 1 of Rule
65[44] reads:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of [its or his] jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (Emphasis supplied.)
And Sec. 3 of Rule 46[45] provides:
 SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The
petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and
respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the
case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates
showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was
received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice
of the denial thereof was received.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on
the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the
petitioner and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true
copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions
of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent
thereto. The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly-
authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office
involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite number of copies of
the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached
to the original.
xxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
The afore-quoted provisions are plain and unmistakable. Failure to comply with the
requirement that the petition be accompanied by a duplicate original or certified true copy
of the judgment, order, resolution or ruling being challenged is sufficient ground for the
dismissal of said petition. Consequently, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 for non-compliance with Sec. 1, Rule 65, in relation to
Sec. 3, Rule 46, of the Revised Rules of Court.
It is true that in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
interest of substantial justice,[46] this Court has, before,[47] treated a petition for
certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari
was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on
certiorari;[48] (2) when errors of judgment are averred; [49] and (3) when there is
sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.[50]
But these exceptions are not applicable to the present factual milieu.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court:
SEC. 2. Time for filing; extension. The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the
petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the
judgment. x x x.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of petitioner Alfredo in CA-
G.R. SP No. 90461 by virtue of a Resolution dated 6 September 2005. Petitioner Alfredos
Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition was denied by the appellate
court in its Resolution dated 16 February 2006. Petitioner Alfredo thus had 15 days from
receipt of the 16 February 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals within which to file a
petition for review. The reckoning date from which the 15-day period to appeal shall be
computed is the date of receipt by petitioner Alfredo of the 16 February 2006 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals, and not of its 11 April 2006 Resolution denying petitioner Alfredos
second motion for reconsideration, since the second paragraph of Sec. 5, Rule 37 of the
Revised Rules of Court is explicit that a second motion for reconsideration shall not be
allowed. And since a second motion for reconsideration is not allowed, then unavoidably,
its filing did not toll the running of the period to file an appeal by certiorari. Petitioner
Alfredo made a critical mistake in waiting for the Court of Appeals to resolve his second
motion for reconsideration before pursuing an appeal.
Another elementary rule of procedure is that perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. For this reason,
petitioner Alfredos failure to file this petition within 15 days from receipt of the 16
February 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his first Motion for
Reconsideration, rendered the same final and executory, and deprived us of jurisdiction to
entertain an appeal thereof.
The relaxation of procedural rules may be allowed only when there are exceptional
circumstances to justify the same. Try as we might, however, we fail to find the existence
of such exceptional circumstances in this case, and neither did petitioner Alfredo
endeavour to prove the existence of any. In fact, there is total lack of effort on petitioner
Alfredos part to at least explain his inability to comply with the clear requisites of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Worth noting is the observation of respondent E-PCI that, essentially, petitioner Alfredo is
using the present Petition for Certiorari, to seek the reversal and setting aside of the 4
April 2005 Order of the RTC, and not to assail the three Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals. This he cannot validly do for it is an apparent disregard of the proper exercise of
jurisdiction by the appellate court. We cannot overlook the ruling of the Court of Appeals
and proceed right away to a review of the RTC order, absent any error of judgment or
jurisdiction committed by the former.
All told, a perusal of the challenged Resolutions of the Court of Appeals fail to illustrate
any reversible error, much less, a showing of any iota of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the appellate court, to warrant
the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in the case at bar.
Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced and our disquisition above,
without need of further delving deeper into the facts and issues raised by petitioner
Alfredo in this Petition for Certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction, we hereby
dismiss the instant petition for being the wrong remedy under the Revised Rules of Court,
as well as his failure to sufficiently show that the challenged Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals were rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The three Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 2005, 16
February 2006 and 11 April 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against petitioner Alfredo Tagle.

SO ORDERED.