Ople v.

torres

Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz:
one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and
January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the
Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8,
1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

Issue: Petitioner contends:

A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O.
NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM
WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."

Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of
a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being
unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.

Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative
Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System.
Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of
national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of
policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-
important freedom of thought.

Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no
right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot
transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can
avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have
difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No.
308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

In view of standing
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds
to implement A.O. No. 308.

The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing
rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se
and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure
its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No.
308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS)
caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.

In view of the need for Legislative Act

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in
the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the
sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to
be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders."

Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond
the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification
that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident,
and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make
laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and
cannot be allowed.

In view of right to privacy

 Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on
two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness,
the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to
privacy in clear and present danger.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number
(PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the
use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our
antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to
biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the
adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for
development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but
for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly,
the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN .

His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for
loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication,
hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and
formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for
gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities
to resist.

Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet,
there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control
programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty,
can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the
system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which
will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The
lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of
abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may
pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can
be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the
very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an
annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on
the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty
in the public service.

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a
compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.

People v jalosjos
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined
at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of
popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of

House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted
by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of
Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.
Trillanes v Pimentel
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and
publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of
negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening.

In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was
charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained
in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.

Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The
RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set
aside orders of the RTC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to
work and serve his mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of
detention prisoners who are held without bail
HELD:

No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election
to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties
of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by
reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of
imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude
involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained
in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies
the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates
the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal
action."

Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People
v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence
can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Trillanes’ election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate

The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In
a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge.
Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate,
"they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of
the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate
of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the
rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been
an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not
to mention the 24 membersof the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues
to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.

Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner
failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December
2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed
as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist
the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks
on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

Cabangbang

Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of

its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication
of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with
the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with
communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to
place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others,
under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used
as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of
general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of
damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous.
Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of
the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and
in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not
be questioned in any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in
session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and
other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing
its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was
published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is
obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing
his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not
absolutely privileged.
Osmena v. pendatun

In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the
said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House
Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña
during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be
subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.

Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers
that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court
has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.

ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?

HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon
members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a
democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being
made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of
Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his
words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s
petition is dismissed.

Sarmiento v mison
FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of
the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento
assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison,
without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full
authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the
consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in
constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those
within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required.
The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Deles v ca
FACTS:
On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President
pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. In the May
12, 1988 meeting of the Committee on Appointments ruled against the position of petitioner Deles.
Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles contends that her appointment as Sectoral Representative for Women
by the President does not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments to qualify her to take
her seat in the House of Representatives.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments

HELD:
The first group of people that may be appointed by the president, as previously stated in the Sarmiento v.
Mison case, are “the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.” Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives
in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of
Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives are among the “other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII (or the first group of people who
may be appointed) whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Civil liberties union v exec

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of
the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or
positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union
(CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being
challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the
Constitution which provides:

“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.”

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the
Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3,
par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure
multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution
itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of
Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general
rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot
override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.

Estrada v desierto
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other
forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13,
2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the
Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were
only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing
damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the
entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against
Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the
seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took
her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left
Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin
the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of people power of freedom of
speech and freedom of assemblyto
exercise of the people power of petition the government for redress of
revolution which overthrew the whole grievances which only affected the office
government. of the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy
of the new government that resulted intra constitutional and the resignation
from it cannot be the subject of judicial of the sitting President that it caused and
review the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against
prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present
when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant
issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he
did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency
as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt
referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the
country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after
January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as
Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer
temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to
Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision
of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity
from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice
system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be
easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to
show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform.
Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the
publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be
more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, Estrada vs Arroyo Case Digest, Estrada vs Desierto Case Digest

Soliven v makasiar

Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel by the
then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar
averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He
grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would
sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely
she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president
may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.

HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure
the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s
time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an
accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the
court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

Gloria v ca

FACTS

Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public school teachers. Some time in
September and October 1990, during the teacher’s strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason
they were administratively chargedwith 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil Service Rules; 3)
gross neglect of duty; 4) refusal to perform official duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They were placed under preventive suspension.
Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day period. Margallo was dismissed from the service. The
three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to
reprimand only. Hence their reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back wages
during the period of their suspension and pending appeal (before the CA exonerated them).

ISSUE

Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if they are
subsequently exonerated.

HELD

YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back wages, the
respondent must be exonerated from the charges and his suspension be unjust. Preventive suspension
pending appeal is actuallypunitive, and it is actually considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated
and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence he should be reinstated with full
pay for the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service Decree states that the
respondent “shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in
the event he wins.” On the other hand if his conviction is affirmed the period of his suspension becomes
part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the respondents won in their
appeal, therefore the period of suspension pending their appeal would be considered as part of the
preventive suspension, entitling them to full pay because they were eventually exonerated and their
suspension was unjustified.
They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still reprimanded.

Neri v senate committee

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the
amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other
hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC
tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that
he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether
or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and
Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive
privilege.

HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s
cabinet. And

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Soriano v lista
Facts: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice
Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office without confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office, which requires confirmation of the
COA.

Held: Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act or
statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in
immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot even be classified as a
taxpayer’s suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not involve the exercise by
Congress of its taxing power.
Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was transferred from the Department of
National Defense to the Office of the President, and later to the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC).

Bengzon v drilon

In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed”
during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement
benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a
need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among government officials.
However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law
should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.

Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the
court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644)
because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v.
Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never
repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.

Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992,
Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment
in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein
are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of the government; among such
obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.

However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired
justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed
when she vetoed H.B. 16297.

This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside
and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or
amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.

The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to
disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an
item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents
vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must
veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at
all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She
merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other
items covering obligations to the other departments of the government.

Nitafan v cir

FACTS:

Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR, all with stations in
Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries.

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said
Constitution."

ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

HELD:

No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all
taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of
the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention
that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution´ of salaries of judicial
officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting
service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other
employees.

Ibp v Zamora

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada,
in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme
over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake
the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

Oposa v factoran

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit
of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as
well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Norton v Shelby

his Court follows the decisions of the highest court of a state in construing the constitution and laws of
the state unless they conflict with or impair the efficacy of some principle of the federal Constitution or
of a federal statute or a rule of commercial or general law.

The decisions of state courts on questions relating to the existence of its subordinate tribunals and the
eligibility and election or appointment of their officers and the passage of its laws are conclusive upon
federal courts.

Page 118 U. S. 426

Following the decision of the highest court of the Tennessee in Pope v. Phifer, 3 Heiskell 691, and other
cases, this Court holds that the Board of Commissioners of Shelby County, organized under the Act of
March 9, 1867, had no lawful existence; that it was an unauthorized and illegal body; that its members
were usurpers of the functions and powers of the justices of peace of the county; that their action in
holding a county court was void, and that their acts in subscribing to the stock of the Mississippi River
Railroad Company and issuing bonds in payment therefor were void.

While acts of a de facto incumbent of an office lawfully created by law and existing are often held to be
binding from reasons of public policy, the acts of a person assuming to fill and perform the duties of an
office which does not exist de jure can have no validity whatever in law.

An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

The action of a minority of the justices of the peace of the County Court of Shelby County, Tennessee,
prior to May 5, 1870, did not operate as a ratification by the county court of the previously invalid
subscription of the county to stock in the Mississippi River Railroad Company, and on and after that day,
on which the new Constitution of Tennessee took effect, no ratification could be made without previous
assent of three-fourths of the voters of the county.

This suit was brought to enforce payment of twenty-nine bonds for $1,000 each issued by the Board of
Commissioners of Shelby County in payment of a subscription by the county to stock in the Mississippi
River Railroad Company. The form of the bond appears in the opinion of the Court, post, p. 118 U. S.
434.

On the 25th February, 1867, the county court of any county through which that railroad might run was
authorized to subscribe to its capital stock. Laws of 1866-1867, page 131, c. 48, § 6, [Footnote 1]

Page 118 U. S. 427

which power was enlarged November 5, 1867, Private Acts 1867-8, 5. [Footnote 2]

On the 7th day of the following March, the legislature reorganized the City of Memphis, and enacted
that the powers theretofore vested in the Quarterly Court should be vested in a Board of Commissioners
created by that act. Acts of 1867-1868, c. 46, �� 21, 25. [Footnote 3]

This act was subsequently held by the Supreme Court of Tennessee to be unconstitutional and invalid,
and the board created by it to have had no legal existence. The board, however, before it was so held
had organized and had performed the functions of the County Court until November, 1869, and, among
other things, had subscribed in the name of the county to stock of the Mississippi River Railroad
Company and had issued bonds in payment therefor, of which bonds those in suit were part. It had
received certificates of stock in

Page 118 U. S. 428

exchange for its bonds, and had and has since exercised its rights as a stockholder.

Before the Board of Commissioners abdicated, they ordered taxes to be levied to pay these bonds, and
the justices of the peace, upon resuming functions, received the money collected on the tax and paid
the interest on the bonds and paid the principal bonds maturing. This was continued, and thus a large
amount of interest has been paid on the bonds, and a large part of the principal has also been paid,
since the County Court resumed its functions.

On the 5th May, 1870, a new constitution came into force in Tennessee, which contained the following
provisions:

"But the credit of no county, city, or town shall be given or loaned to or in aid of any person, company,
association or corporation, except upon an election to be first held by the qualified voters of such
county, city, or town, and the assent of three-fourths of the votes cast at said election, nor shall any
county, city, or town become a stockholder with others in any company, association, or corporation
except upon a like election and the assent of a like majority."

"All laws and ordinances now in force and in use in this state not inconsistent with the constitution shall
continue in force and use until they expire or be altered or repealed by the legislature. But ordinances
contained in any former constitution or schedule thereto are hereby abrogated."

A large part of the payments of principal and interest above referred to was made after this constitution
came into force.

The court below ordered a verdict for the county, and from the judgment entered on such verdict this
writ of error was taken.

Manila motors v flores