KERALA SOCIOLOGIST

40 (2), December 2012, pp. 119-141

@ Kerala Sociological Society
ISSN:0975-8933

Civil Society with Fractured Social Capital:

Foregrounding Contemporary Dalit and
Adivasi Assertion in Kerala
Suresh Babu G.S.

This paper seeks to understand intricacies of civil society in the light

of social capital that is well accounted in Kerala. The attempt here is
not only to locate civil society in shaping modern society via
radicalizing democratic practices, but also address multiple contexts
of deprivations expressed in the form of protests. It is being argued
that the quality of civil society is largely dependent upon the extent
of social capital possessed by the diverse social spectrum of society
unleashed through their constant protest and collective mobilisation.
This would remind that because of these protests, spearheaded by
the marginal groups of Kerala, that squarely challenge the hege-
mony of the state, its discriminatory policies and exclusionary ten-
dencies. While juxtaposing the imaginative Kerala Model of Devel-
opment by social sectoral development, the paper examines the fac-
tors and forces of cumulative deprivation and systematic
marginalization of the subaltern sections like Dalits and Adivasis in
the state. The paper specifically investigates certain generic pro-
cesses such as articulations of cultural identities, origins and impli-
cations of social protests, formation of civic organizations and groups,
and networking of associations to unpack the emerging tendencies of
exclusion.

Keywords: Civil society, Social capital, Protest, Dalits and Adivasis,

Kerala
 Suresh Babu G.S.

Introduction

A striking balance between civil society and social capital is being articu-
lated, at times, when developing societies strive for making participatory
democracy meaningful. This paper recasts civil society in the light of social
capital that is well accounted in Kerala, the state of India. The attempt here
is to locate civil society in its context specific to make-sense of its role in
road to modern state apparatuses, thereby radicalizing democratic practices.
The paper focuses on the dynamics of civil society that rests in a specific
historicity with multiple actors involved in Kerala. It is no way to suggest
that the entirety of civil society was born out as an autonomous entity. In-
stead, what we propose is the social capital that in fact would always condi-
tion the centrality of civil society. It is assumed that the quality of civil soci-
ety is largely dependent upon the extent of social capital possessed by the
diverse social spectrum of society unleashed through their constant protest
and collective mobilisation. This would remind us once again that because of
these protests, spearheaded by the marginal groups of Kerala, that squarely
challenge the hegemony of the state, its discriminatory policies and exclu-
sionary tendencies.
The experimental bit of the paper examines the trajectory of social capital
on the one hand and civil society on the other. For this purpose, we examine
certain generic processes such as articulations of cultural identities, origins
and implications of social protests, formation of civic organizations and
groups, and networking of associations in the historical milieu of Kerala
society. True, theoretical congruence of civil-society and social-capital can
easily be reflected the way development model was conceived and informed,
whilst one traverses into the successive normative conditions for the state
formation and its expediency. Moreover, collective effort of the several exi-
gencies with social sectoral development led to the creation of an imagina-
tive development model paradigm. These developmental successes, in fact,
are tied up with exclusively high level of social capital. Even a casual ob-
server can easily take note of it (Heller 1999). However, the highly cel-
ebrated Kerala model is not left without criticism. One of the challenges was
that of a cumulative deprivation and systematic marginalization of the sub-
altern sections that has been a blot onto the very Model. Nonetheless to
mention, persistent exclusion left out the marginalized communities to es-
chew the fruits of development itself. Although, social sector development is
effectively driven by the state apparatuses through its new governing strate-
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gies, it could not arrive at a threshold to address the questions of marginality

(Deshpande 2000; Kunhaman 2002; Bijoy and Raman 2003; Bhaskaran 2004;
Tharakan 2006; Rammohan 2008; Raman 2009; Sreerekha 2010). Among
other things, magnitude of the social deprivation found among Dalits and
Adivasis in Kerala empirically reflects multiple forms of marginalities.
Recent Dalit and Adivasi upsurge in the landscape of Kerala is a stand
point of the cultural poverty of civil society and, it exposes unintended con-
sequences of the state-driven developmental paradigm. With entrenched so-
cial capital, the voices of former could not channelized to the latter. Para-
doxically, we often forget the fact that it is because of the collective effort
and struggles of the marginalized that contributed to shape the very public
sphere. As a historical process, the presence of state-civil society engage-
ments in Kerala has strongly been associated with the lower-class mobiliza-
tion and their constant protest. It is from the bottom up mobilization pro-
duced state-society engagement that set the ground for deepening democracy
in Kerala (Heller 2000). However, in its new avatar, the neo-liberal logic of
the state not only curtails their freedom, but write-off resourceful geographi-
cal locations before the multi-nationals for profit maximization. The subal-
tern communities, in this backdrop, have been marginalized on two grounds.
At one level, social stigma attached with historically and limited organic
intellectual voice, and on the other, the state-sponsored marginalization. The
former was seen in the form of poor as an object of development and high
levels of deprivation as against the general populace and agents of reforms.
The latter, on the other hand, spiraled onto a set of policy failures such as
land reform, displacement and misappropriation of development funds etc.
Precisely, failure of the past reforms, feeds on to the undesirable consequences
today as well as in the future. As a result, we are unable to quantify things as
it already transformed into quality as shown to be new conditions of exclu-
sion.
By locating contemporary Dalit and Adivasi1 assertions into the post-
developmental state of Kerala, this paper demonstrates the fractured social
structural relationship between civil society and social capital, held with the
marginalized sections, to engage with democratic process. True, sheer negli-
gence of sociological mapping of a society, that is happened to be marginalized
historically, has been dispersed from civil society engagement and the state
driven development paradigms. It perhaps shows the intellectual bankruptcy
that tends to reduce all our socio-cultural transactions in a sheer number
game without crafting serious critical understanding of their socio-cultural
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locations. Perhaps, the culture themselves feed on to reproduce hegemony

and thereby exclusion. No doubt, there are qualitative transformations no-
ticed in society, but never encountered with reflexive questions like whether
these changes are desirable, sustainable and inclusive?
Empirical location of the paper would draw lessons from the contem-
porary Dalit and Adivasi assertions that are much more crystallized in the
post-reform period. The organized protest would reflect the conditions of
multiple forms of marginalization and show how this counter hegemonic
discourse puzzled the state as well as the civil society equally. A critical
examination of these protests would also shed light on the mismatch between
the civil society in general and fractured social capital among Dalits and
Adivasis in particular. In doing so, this would foreground the meanings of
everyday struggle that are expressed both in material and cultural terms.
Elsewhere, it has been conceptualized that the Dalits protest are cultural
protest too (Mohan 2006). Moreover, a critical understanding of the civil
society paradigm to make an inclusive domain, in itself, is failed to accom-
modate subaltern voices because of the hegemony of the nasty politics and
narrow minded intelligentsia. The state of intelligentsia with its conventional
Marxist conceptual tools have tightened the conceptual boundaries of social
sciences and pushed into a state of suffocation. They introduced concepts
such as class, exploitation, proletariat, labour and alienation for everybody
including Dalits. This by implication suggests that the Dalits and Adivasis
were left out with no historical imagination (Guru 2002) of their own and,
therefore, lacking theoretical consciousness. Hence, our enquiry also criti-
cally looks at the inherent epistemological problems of the intellectual en-
quiry on Dalit questions and their development.

Civil Society and Social Capital:

Conceptual Base

Civil society is a dominion of free association, located as opposite to com-

munity on the one side, and the state on the other. While placing civil society
as a paradigm, it opens up two possibilities; conceptual as well as a practical
concerns in which the modern subject-hood resurges inter-subjectively by
mutually recognizing right and duties. Civil society assumes its significance
and discharges its role, as and when, the political system requires the former’s
intervention for the sustenance of liberal democratic regime for the latter.
The domain of civil society was considered to be functional model for mod-
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ern democracy. In this scheme, civil society as a pragmatic tool seeks to

establish relationship between democracy and socialism. Precisely, citizen-
ship on the one hand and civil society on the other radicalizes modern demo-
cratic tradition (Khilnani 2001: 16). In other words, civil society is the achieve-
ment of the modern state which mediates and unifies the duality of civil life
and political life by means of institutional framework. Recently, participa-
tory form of governing process, in fact, seems to be an appropriate medium
which perhaps mediates much effectively between the political society and
the state (Glasius et. al. 2004: 4).
Developing society like India, the striking issue of civil society, indeed,
was to organize and structure, political life. Democratic politics in India
created a new space for individuals and groups to debate and contest range
of issues from state policies to economic development. This new political
arrangement brought about fresh discourses on values, priorities and inter-
ests in the public life. These contestations unleashed by the public actions
have two features; propensity to articulate issue and politicize felt needs to
get attention from the state for immediate action, and involvement in the
economic development through varieties of social movements, non-govern-
mental organizations. It further expands to the broader concerns that affect
most of people belonged to the depressed sections. Public action, the core
string of civil society is an effective tool for social transformations (Khilnani
2004: 104 -105). Both the welfare state and its developmental goals were set
for the cause of its people (Parekh 2004: 20) due to its effect. To that extent,
the state in India is not only responsible for nurturing civil society, but un-
derstood for its sustenance as well.
It is true that in diverse societies, different internal mechanisms, limit
the associational freedom in the public sphere, for instance, tribe or caste in
India. The poor and marginalized, on the other hand, are atomized and over-
whelmed by a sense of powerlessness to hold a confidence to set up vibrant
associations. Therefore, the deprived struggle to organize themselves and
since organization represents power, their failure led to perpetuate and inten-
sify powerlessness (Parekh 2004: 23 - 24). The aggrieved parties at the time
of crisis, within the establish institutions, might force to form associations
based on their primordial collectivities (Kaviraj 2001: 321). In a hierarchi-
cal and heterogeneous society like India, these collectivities can also be quali-
fied as legitimate inhibitions of civil society, provided non-violent means
strictly was pursued for their goals (Oommen 2004: 114).
Quality of civil society is largely dependent upon the extent of face-to-
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face interaction between citizens in associations based on the normative prin-

ciples of trust in a modern democratic system (Putnam 1993a). Social capi-
tal underlines certain features of social organization, such as, network, norms,
and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefits.
Subsequently, it brings about the benefits of investment in physical and hu-
man capital. Its assessment is purely based on externalities i.e. ‘trust’ where
the degree of social network of individuals and groups determine the extent
and quality. However, if a society is driven by hierarchical principles of
authority, trust and network is less likely to be produced (Fukuyama 1999).
It is the social capital derived from the interactions between the members in
social networks and voluntary associations that create conditions for civil
society. In other words, the extent of cutting across social ties, networks and
institutional that make civil society as workable model. A tradition of per-
petual civic engagement-voter turnout, news paper readership, membership
in associations and literary circles, lions club, and soccer club-is the hall
mark of social capital (Putnam 1993b). Moreover, general cooperation and
working together as a community has been a substantial stock of social capi-
tal. In an ideal situation, social capital facilitates coordinated action between
individuals and in turns makes collective action with less risk and cost.
It is being argued that social capital has function as it endorses a nor-
mative content of the structure-trust and reciprocity-striving for good gov-
ernance and development. To that extent, social capital permeates to access
resources in social network (Lin 1999: 47). Accessing resources, in fact, are
the instruments for investment or mobilization in society. Hadenius (2004:48)
reiterates that social capital to be seen as a collective domain of citizenship
where relationship between the citizens for a common interest would prevail
upon. To Hadenius, both attitudes and real resources are required to buildup
this relationship. If the former dealt with the notion of trust (solidarity and
responsibility) identical to larger unit, the latter was an instrument (devise)
to pursue coordinated collective goal. Once social capital was put in place, it
is believed that, formal public institutions would begin to roll onto a desired
direction.

Limits of Civil Society and Social Capital

Civil society and social capital paradigm, indeed, is the striking theoretical
framework in a modern democratic institutions, to examine how and on what
extent citizens are associated within the state-society framework. As they
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keep changing according to context specificities, their spatio-temporal vari-

ability needs to be assessed. However, in Indian society, they are to be vali-
dated in diverse social groups, particularly among the deprived sections,
both in terms of accessibility and desired outcome. Issues of social inequali-
ties, are not merely depended upon economic factors, but also explain condi-
tions of social transformation (particularly, structural conditions) of differ-
ent sections of society. Social capital can be, thus, a conceptual tool to ana-
lyze the pervasive attitude among different social categories in collective life
(Narayan 1999). At times, it reminds us that the nexus between the tradi-
tional social structures like caste system and new modes of social network in
modern India (Srinivas and Beteille 1964) become precondition for access-
ing social capital. Subsequently, studies revealed that how associational life
is unevenly distributed among social groups in India as the society is deeply
divided and hierarchically arranged based on caste system (Pai and Narayan
2003). Moreover, perpetuation of these traditional value systems, in other
words, left a little room for trust or interaction between groups. This also
gives signal on how the historically disadvantaged and marginalized sections
with their entrenched social capital are deprived in the democratic gover-
nance process.
It is being argued that an extreme form of disparity, discrimination and
exploitation are likely to get institutionalized in the modern-state too. Given
the centrality of institutionalized discrimination, the discriminated would al-
ways feel alienated from the system. Hence, disparity, discrimination and
collective alienation feed on each other (Oommen 2004: 154). The alienated
cannot urge to participate in the system since they cannot hold minimum
social capital to reach out to the system. In India, for instance, age old social
stigma, a negative social capital, based on caste; deny full participation in
the public sphere. As a result, certain sections were left out from full citizen-
ship. Often, the modern state in India itself led for the poverty of
marginalization. For instance, through different developmental activities of
the state, such as reserved constituencies, subsidiaries, below poverty line
card holders, caste certificate, etc. deny Dalit citizenship identity (Guru 2005:
270). In this backdrop, unleashing of cumulative deprivation, is the begin-
ning of any form of social protests and conditions for movements to be born.
No wonder, it is the new social movements that, subsequently, nourish the
idea of civil society in our times (Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001 and Oommen
2004) to radicalize democratic aspirations of the deprived worldwide. In our
investigation, both civil society and social capital are narrowed down to
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make sense of the life conditions of Dalits and Adivasis in Kerala. Civil
society in general can be an outcome of protest spearheaded by the diverse
social groups in the state and enabled critical social capital. Therefore, Dalit
and Adivasi struggles in the contemporary times with fragmented social capi-
tal-multiple deprivations-is an epistemological location in our analysis. These
local/micro protests have both local implications and global ramifications.
Moreover, they too generate pressures from below and from above to recycle
democratic institutions.

Protests and Collective Mobilization:

Beginning of Modernity

It is true that there are social historical forces and their ideological positions
in the nineteenth century that contributed to shape civil society with high
quality of life in Kerala today. It is to be noted that the first set of popular
protest foreground in Kerala was in the form of identity politics and it was
not class politics-the bulwark of Left Politics (Oommen 2004 and 2009: 29).
Instead of projecting developmental trajectory as a result of full literacy rate,
education, foreign influence and land reform, Aloysius (2005) argues that it
was to be seen as an ideological and attitudinal transformation that shaped
social relations. Consequently it brought about inclusive collective action
among the lower rungs of society against the spirit of region specific socio-
cultural hierarchy. In the process of transformation through civil society
engagements, all the social categories could effectively participated and mu-
tually benefited.
In fact, social scene in the pre-modern Kerala, similar to the rest of
India, was highly conservative and hierarchically organized based on caste
system. Cultural backwardness, in fact, was tyrannical than feudalism as
Namboodiripad (2010: 111) described it as Jati-Jenmi-Naduvazhi
Medhavitvam. It means multiple forms of domination of the upper caste, the
jenmies and local chieftains. No doubt, the origin and development of jajmani
system here was inseparably linked up with the existence and development
of the caste hierarchy (ibid 112) classified into three groups as Namboodiri
(Bhrahmins), backward communities (Ezhava) and slave (Paraya and Pulaya)
castes (Travancore census 1854). As usual, Bhrahmins were free from all
societal and religious disabilities, and enjoyed absolute freedom. But below
of them, were treated as low caste and all of them, in one way or another,

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subjected to practicing untouchability and unseeability in different degrees.

Slaves were marketable commodity, at any time can be bought and sold or
hired and presented as a gift. Lower caste women were not allowed to cover-
up the upper part of their body. Other groups like Christians and Muslims
too, attenuated and perpetuated class divisions within themselves, despite
their egalitarian vision of social order.
The mass movement spearheaded by the Ezhava communities in 19th
century to enter into the Vaikam temple was the first conscious collective
protests against the oppressive order. The Shanars, an untouchable commu-
nity with the spread of education and new profession, left their customs and
traditions, and fought against the civil disabilities. Abstain from customary
practices, obviously, led to widespread conflict as well. However, from 1812
onwards, the native governments were proactive, for instance, sanctioning
legal protection for freedom and liberation. Social and economic bondages
which the slave castes were held, was absolutely tyrannical. Due to the tre-
mendous pressure from the missionaries and British officials, the Tranvancore
state abolished slavery in1853. Although Christianity spread among the lower
castes in Kerala, missionaries could not understand the doubleness2 of the
movement spearheaded by the lower caste. Paradoxically, very little schol-
arly attempt has been made to account how the autonomous cultural protest
challenges the burdens of tradition on the one hand and shield away colonial
modernity. Instead, what one sees the perpetual overriding of class
determinance and thereby overarching class analysis.

Class mobilization:
Appropriation of Political Society?

It is to be noted that, the nature-culture relations have always been balanced

in the political geography of Kerala, for instance, till mid nineteenth century,
two third of the land mass was with thick forest and communities were prac-
ticing sustenance agriculture, by primarily depending upon the balanced eco-
system connecting forest on the one side and rivers and sea-coast on the
other. Hence, they were unknown to what growth is all about (Balakrishnan
2008: 343 - 352). When the substance agrarian societies were restructured
with economic growth motives in the later stage, led to the crystallization of
feudalism and division of labour based on rigid caste hierarchies. Appro-
priation of private property by clearing forest land and using slave labour

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(essential for domestication of agriculture) led to structural change. Simi-

larly, elsewhere, while examining these structural changes and stratification,
comparative studies have also brought about to understand the dynamics of
power relations of caste, class in modern India (see Beteille 1998)
Transformation from substance to growth economy, in fact, directly or
indirectly demonstrates these socio-historical changes of the 19th century
Kerala. From 1930’s onwards the onslaught of class formation were pro-
nounced along caste lines, however subjective awareness of these formation
were found to be very negligible. True, there were classes, but was little
class consciousness. In other words, communal and caste consciousness,
however, was intense, and caste roughly coincided with class agitation, against
caste disabilities, led the poor towards class consciousness. Caste-class dia-
lectics as Jeffry argues, turned out to be a tremendous force as a historical
process, though their structures varied in different regions of Kerala (Jeffrey
2010: 8).
In this backdrop, new forms of social (class) mobilization under the left
politics, was mainly found in the agrarian sector. There were generally three
distinctive categories of organizations in the agricultural sector; (a) laborer’s
union, (b) tenants’ association and (c) farmers’ association (Alexander 1982).
The lower sections not only were victimized, but also subjected to hold the
same ideology, as militant groups, formed several unions were both in rural
and urban areas. In fact, community organizations limited their broader agenda
of socialism into wage issues for the proletariat class. This class dynamism,
born out from the discursive social formation, outside the ambit of state
mechanism, curtailed the organic wings of lower social categories particu-
larly the Dalit and Adivasi communities. In other words, the dynamics of
cultural protests waged by the subaltern communities of the 19th century was
completely subordinated and hijacked by the party outlets in Kerala. For
instance, biography of Adivasi leader, C.K. Janu, and similar empirical studies
shed light on how the political parties appropriated the subaltern leaders and
their culture power. It implicitly led to the perpetual dependency among the
Dalit to articulate their problems with alien concepts like class, and alien
political parties, like left parties. This was largely done through conceptual
machinery to translate cultural consciousness to labour consciousness by the
intelligentsia. Of late, over and above class consciousness, at times, led to
violence as well.

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Social capital:
Circulation of Class to Caste

As part of politico-civilizational task, the British regime in India, particu-

larly imparting western education and recruiting in their administration in
the colonial period, were targeted only privileged sections of society. In the
wake of post-independent India, the same group tried to capitalize pre-exist-
ing assets and privileges that enabled them to speedup socio-economic trans-
formation, than rest of the communities. Transformation of a colonial form
of modernity was specifically found among the middle class in India, who
were primarily drawn from the upper strata of caste hierarchy. By capitaliz-
ing pre-existing statuses, traditions, and appropriating the advantages of
western education, this very class began to keep distance themselves from
lower strata, and excluded the rest from sharing common resources (Joshi
2005). Hence after independence, the entirety of Dalit issues were thrown
exclusively to the state apparatuses and, through time, they have increas-
ingly become the object of organized charity. It is not to undermine the cen-
trality of state in this context, by reiterating the fact that caste based ritual
practices were reduced due to new legislations at large extent. In fact, there
was a process of translating cultural capital into social capital and capital
assets. Though major caste/community organizations proclaimed that they
would keep distance from the direct politics in 1948, in reality dominant
organizations belong to Nair and Christians were continued to engage in
direct politics. This double stand was betrayal to other organizations spear-
headed by the depressed sections (Kochu 2009). The politically connected
dominant groups with a series of appropriation of the state resources gradu-
ally became better off. The social capital already accumulated by the domi-
nant caste groups3, in fact, were not ready to share with those who com-
pletely lacking it historically due their socio-cultural location. Instead, the
emerging ruling elites, political parties and civil society born of their hege-
monic cultural capital began to play out with Dalits and Adivasis.
In this gamut of cultural politics, it is reasonable to argue that how land
reform policies of the first government was completely jeopardized by the
dominant social groups on the one side and the congress party on the other.
The land reform policy, indeed, was neither a modern phenomenon nor a gift
from the enlightened state, instead, it was a process necessitated by the pro-
tracted struggles of the peasants in the lower strata of society (Omvedt 1982
and Radhakrishnan 1981). However, the policy was sliced into fragments
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after a serious of court petition lodged by the landlords with the support of
the mainstream political parties. Moreover, the successive governments had
no political will to implement successfully in time. Two enlightened organi-
zations, Nayar Service Society (NSS) and the Christian Churches backed by
the Congress-dominated coalition of opposite party under Vimochana
Samaram (Liberation Struggle) disowned the radical land reforms Act of
1957 (Radhakrishnan 1981:A129). Unnecessary time lagging taken for the
implantation of land reform, in other words, benefited the landlords and their
perpetual claims and reclaims for retaining surplus land with them.
While critically analyzing the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill
1979, Tharakan was of the view that, because of the monopoly of the higher
caste, Dalits could not have gained much from the land reforms. He says:
Since access to the land market in Kerala, was traditionally dic-
tated by the caste hierarchy, there was virtual monopoly of the higher
castes and communities in respect of both ownership and tenancy rights
on land. From this we surmise that the benefits of abolition of tenancy
would have also accrued to those castes and communities who formed
the bulk of landless agricultural population. For the latter, gains from
land reforms would have been limited to the benefits from conferment
of ownership on Kudikidappu. Though socially significant-they being
the most deprived sections of the agrarian population-the actual gain
through this measure was quite marginal, at a rate of only 0.8 acres per
family (Tharakan 1982: 158).
Implementation of land reforms for which Kerala is well known and the
legitimate claim of the Dalits, who have traditionally been tillers of the soil,
for cultivable land, had never been recognized. The Adivasis, on the other
hand, have been deprived of their land-base by marauding non-tribal immi-
grants with the help of state machinery. Both communities these sections
have been considered only as eligible for ‘charity and welfare’ (Kunhaman
2002:100). True, the dominant groups, by its hegemonic relations with the
state apparatuses, were completely destabilized its willpower to implement
land reform.

Intellectual Capital:
a ‘Closed’ Civil Society?

While critically analyzing the role of media in creating vibrant civil society
and social transformation, Robin Jeffrey’s studies on [Not] Being There:
Dalits and India’s Newspapers poses a question of why no Dalits and their
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voices in the news room. Perhaps, Kerala known for its mass media circula-
tion and literary culture is not different from the rest of India with regard to
caste prejudices (Jeffrey 2010: 201). True, complete absence of Dalits in the
media houses may lead to high probability of biasness and stereotype of
generating news on Dalit question. Contrary to this, readership, as empirical
study shows, were shown to be better among Dalits in Kerala. While analyz-
ing the extent of social capital, from a sample study, indicates positive trends,
for instance, political participation, involvements in associations and net-
works. But, it was differently distributed among different social categories.
An empirical study reveals that primordial identities, such as caste/religion
(2 and 4 percent respectively), were meager before linguistic identity (51
percent). Apparently, every day 87 and 79 percent used to read news paper
and listen to radio news respectively. Every second person in the state used
to discuss ‘public issues’ outside the household in every day. Interestingly,
data on the lower strata of society, such as Dalits and Adivasis in all three
indicators were observed to be better than the rest (Blomkvist 2003).
It implicitly shows that the people with less socio-economic resources
tends to establish and engage themselves in organizations, such as, primarily
trade unions and large chunk of voting turn out for the Left Party. However,
within the same group relatively with education and income, is less likely to
take part in politics (ibid). In other words, human capital possessed through
education and other advantages from the state, at times, has not yet helped
Dalits and Adivasis to form social capital in the different domains of public
life. The cultural capital with social stigma of caste, perhaps, perpetually
displaces them both epistemologically and empirically from the public sphere.
Moreover, rest of the social groups who have already possessed social capi-
tal through education and relative developmental benefits largely gained from
the state exchequer were not ready to share these scarce resources with de-
prived sections. For instance, major chunk of privately managed and publically
funded educational institutions in Kerala have not yet ready to operationalise
affirmative action policies challenges the very notion of equality in circulat-
ing full knowledge capital among Dalits. Had they been accommodated way
back in 1957, they would have mobilized now not merely in terms of sharing
common resources, but also developing their own intellectual capital for the
development of themselves and society at large thereby greater inter-subjec-
tivity. In all probability, they would have relatively improved cultural and
intellectual energy to cope up with knowledge economy in the new social
order of things. It is heartening to know that only 3.5 percent (6554) teachers
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were in the state belong to Dalits and Adivasis against the total 185064
teaching post (GOK 2003). Wittingly, both the state and the civil society
players totally excluded Dalits from circulating intellectual growth process
(Babu 2010: 214-215). Above all, due to the overarching of intelligentsia
with one dimensional class analysis, displace the Dalits organic voice to
articulate themselves.
It is being argued that the development experiences on the unique social
sector development of Kerala, was based on ‘averages’. In this average game,
subaltern communities for instance, Dalits, Adivasis, and fish folk, were
kept out its general achievements. Right to live in their cultural habitat has
threatened as and when the state announces mass displacement in the name
of ‘development and progress’. True, without paying attention to the cultural
sensitivity attached with their lived experience. In this context, Adivasi leader
C.K. Janu states that,
The life-cycle of our people, their customs and very existence are bound
to the earth. This is more so in any other societies. When projects are
designed without any link to this bound, our people suffer. This may be
wrong if looked at from the point of view of civil society. But it is self-
evident when we go to the newly formed colonies (Bhaskaran 2004:
47).
No doubt, there are critical reflections by the organic intellectuals on
not only challenging the oppressive character of the state, but also articulate
with their own terms grounded on everyday life experiences. However, civil
society with its hegemonic cultural order and alien theory of class completely
displace organic voices that are essentially available within the democratic
system. This implicitly shows fixed ontology of civil society of Kerala on
Dalit and Adivasi question that supposed to be inclusive and holistic.

Breaking the Silence:

Paradoxes of Development Pathology

Contemporary Dalit assertion underlines a wide range of questions, such as

development, culture, knowledge and identity. A critical understanding of
these protests also describes the relations of oppressions at multiple levels. It
also cracks the foundation of the highly celebrated Kerala Model as a result
of the persistent exclusion of the marginalized from partaking the benefits of
development itself. Corollary to this, neo-liberal logic and increasing con-
sumption pattern due to remittance from outside the state and India, chal-

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Civil Society with Fractured Social Capital Foregrounding

lenges the alternative sustainable development model. High rate of consump-

tion may lead to ruthless environmental unsound production such as over
utilization of non-renewable natural resources like forest, water, river sand
etc (Tharakan 2006: 5). Accepting this fact, the structural implications of
the reform policies in the backdrop of the globalization in the state seem to
be much deeper.
As part of neo-liberal agenda, Kerala too geared up for external finan-
cial aid from Asian Development Bank (ADB). Such an agenda, Raman
(2009: 300) of the view that undermines the social democracy on two grounds;
(a) collapse of the very model and (b) the demise of an icon left. If the former
assumes significant, when there is a tremendous pressure from the external
agencies over restructuring domestic policies to qualify for loan conditional-
ity. No doubt, the entry of neo-liberal reforms into the traditionally grown
democratic institutions in the state would gradually erode it political and
self-respect of the majority of the people and it further leads to marginalization
of the poor.
Series of protests spearheaded by the Dalits and Adivasis in the post-
reform period, in fact, foreground the growing disengagement between the
society-state relationship on the questions of development and assertion for
self-respect and dignity. A common issue centered on these protests was on
the question of land distribution, particularly for landless Dalits and Adivasis.
To begin with, outbreak of Adivasis protests in Muthanga in Wayanad dis-
trict of Kerala in 2003. The protestors met with unprecedented brutal repres-
sion by the state and completely violated the constitutional rights of the in-
digenous people. Subsequently, landless Dalit families in Chengara in
Pathanamthitta district began another protest in 2007. Though the state handle
these agitations with extreme violence, different strategies were sought out.
If the treatment for the former was with extreme terror, the latter was with an
engineered program of how to deal Dalit issue by themselves. As a part of
political engineering, the district collector and superintend of police belong
to Dalit communities were appointed at the time of protest (Paithalen 2008).
As if the developmental question of Dalits is exclusively remained with them
and, signals out no genuine business of the state in this regard.
Needless to mention, these protests broke and created new grounds in
the history of Dalit and Adivasi assertion in the state. For instance, it send
out a clean chit to the state that they were not for bread and clothing, instead,
hungered for their basic resources which would fetch food and shelter (Raman
2002). At one level, it striped off the state’s claims over its successful land
133
 Suresh Babu G.S.

reform and unmasks its historical failure to bring about any substantive
change. On the other hand, the protesters challenged the authorities for the
illegal encroachment4 and transfer of forest land to the private and multina-
tional companies. Similarly, the Aralam farm story reveals another telling
consequences of how the state converting large portion of farm land into
private limited company although half of its portion would have been used
for rehabilitating the landless as part of post-Muthanga agreement (Sreerekha
2010). Interestingly, soon after these protest, there has been a public atten-
tion, particularly media unearthing outsiders and private companies who
illegally encroach the forest land with the support of the political parties5.
The popular Plachimada struggle, triggered off in the Palaghat district of
Kerala, against Coca-Cola Company shows how the state is insensitive to
the ecosystem and subsequently privatizing the natural resources that are
being critical for the survival of subaltern communities. Paradoxically, the
state went on to violating the land utilization act for the multinational com-
panies to establish their project, began to exploit natural resources indis-
criminately. It completely jeopardizes the state being privileged over its suc-
cessful land reform policies for the landless masses. Ironically, it was under
the left front government, the company got sanction to began its bottling
plant in 1998 (Pillai 2008:126-129). The class character of the state, in other
words, was exposed once again.
Among other things, these observations show that the complete be-
trayal to the subaltern communities in Kerala largely by the state and its neo-
liberal logic of development. These new changes, coupled with other things,
shed light on the contemporary understanding of growing awareness of op-
pression (Raman 2007) and deep anxiety of our future. The huge gap be-
tween what the projected model of the state on the one hand and the everyday
tyranny of the Dalits on the other shows the fragmented social capital of the
community and it inability to arrive into the threshold of civil society en-
gagements. In other words, the fragmented social capital shows the multiple
deprivations of caste, class and power relations that circulate at various
levels. General developmental deprivation index captured by the Human
Development Report (2005) of the state, for instance, point to this fact. To
begin with, deprivation index based on the crucial variables such as quality
of house, access to drinking water, good sanitation and electricity, the dis-
parity among Dalits were found to be apparent. The incidence of deprivation
among them in Kerala was reported to be 45.5 and 57.9 respectively how-
ever, for total population of the state was 29.5. It is to be noticed that, in all
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Civil Society with Fractured Social Capital Foregrounding

districts, the deprivation index shows higher than 50 among the Adivasi popu-
lation.
Though the social disabilities were sought to be removed through legis-
lation, political economy of the state through a set of reforms not only changed
the extent of social conditions of Dalits and Adivasis, but also worsened
further. For instance, agriculture was the backbone of the lower castes in
terms of their social, economic and occupational life, apart from given stig-
matized identity. A comparative study among the agricultural labourers over
the years shows tremendous change. Among the Dalits, for instance, it came
down to 55.79 percent in 1968 from 66.34 in 2005. Similarly, among Adivasis,
it was 33.92 from 81.42. Among the backward classes 16.86 and 38.92 and
others it was 19.32 from 16.61 respectively. If the change among the adivasis
agricultural lobourers were fallen down to 47 percent followed by other back-
ward classes by 21.16 percent and Dalits by 10.55 percent, for the rest it
was increased by two percent (see UNDP 2005 and Sivanandan 1979)
Occupational changes among the Dalits and Adivasis were largely due
to the lack of cultivable land holding and most of them were reported to be
landless6. Similarly, 19 percent, Dalits were under below poverty line al-
though they constitute 9.81 percent of the total population of the state. In the
case of Adivasis, it was thirty percent, though they form only 1.14 share of
their total population (UNDP 2005). It shows how the state driven welfare
programs were conceived with uncritical to its long term implications. As
the available data shows, Dalits are huddled in around 12,500 colonies oc-
cupying just 3/5 cents7 (one cent is 1/100 of an acre). Moreover, while
narrating the social settings of residential areas in rural villages in Kerala,
Osella and Osella (1998:190) reveals that the Dalits were continued to live
on segregated areas at the edges of the paddy-field where they are still over-
whelmingly employed as labourers.
In addition to that, micro-studies on the newly decentralized planning
process, which happened to redefine development and participation with its
popular campaign, shows that it failed to retool on how to redefine priorities
according to felt needs of marginalized communities like Adivasis. As a re-
sult, as and when Grama Panchayats formulate policies exclusively for
Adivasis development, the latter remained to be passive recipients without
much critical reflections on how to redefine their priorities, methods of imple-
mentation etc (Suresh 2009). There was a representation of voluntary
organisation among Dalits and Adivasis in different committees in order to
prevent the habits of diverting special component plan (SCP) funds and
135
 Suresh Babu G.S.

monitor inadequacies in the expenditure. Now, Dalit organisations alleged

that representation of them, in such committees, were purposefully termi-
nated from the local bodies8.

Post-developmental State and Society

The context in which the Dalit and Adivasi protest in Kerala needs a theo-
retical reflection in the light of post-developmental sensibility. To begin with,
post-developmental state has increasingly become alien to its people as it
sponsors violent means to debunk the cultural protest waged by the deprived.
Secondly, the aggrieved parties critically evaluate the crisis of development,
and subsequently articulate with new set of social actors and networks being
labeled as new social movements. The crisis of development, perhaps is its
uncritical imagines of new domains which leave behind the developmental
process. As against the conventional system of development, new enquiry
seeks out fresh areas of resistance and political practice (Escobar 1992).
Demise and failure of development led to the emergence of new social move-
ments with new set of question, including very paradigm of development.
It’s universalizing appeal, sometimes, critical to the nation-state and tran-
scends its boarders too. Instead of addressing social problems, the welfare
state itself payoff new set of problems to its citizens.
The recent Dalit and Adivasi upsurge crack the base of claims made by
the civil society apparatuses and social capital nurtured by the imaginary
model of development of the state. A fundamental question one may ask that
why civic engagements of the social collectivities in addressing the problems
of social inequalities, and democratization of public spaces remained to be
silent in the aftermath of state formation of Kerala. The reason for silence
can be two. First, the state has slowly assumed a centripetal force, in and
above of all developmental questions of its citizens, through manipulation of
public policies. Corollary to this, post-colonial state formations, with its
new imaginaries of development and transformation, created enthusiasm,
though short-lived, among the people of Kerala. Secondly cooption of cul-
tural collectivities under the two dominant oppositional political parties, re-
sulted to scuttle the autonomous organic voices supposed to be emerged even
after the state formation. The public sphere derived from diverse cultural
protests, were tightened by alien concepts like proletariat class and as a
result there was a hegemony of the state with its class nexus. Overpowering
of class above of multiple social deprivations virtually silenced the organic
136
Civil Society with Fractured Social Capital Foregrounding

voices of the marginalized sections. Obviously a passive attitude was the

outcome of civil society, as a critical domain after the state formation. Dalit
upsurge, in this context, fundamentally outlines squarely the persistent
marginalization in the highly celebrated Kerala Model of Development and
multiple pressures unfolded in neo-liberal agenda of the state.
The emerging new militant movements in Kerala, for instance, has to
be a critical pedagogical lesson both for the civil society players and the
state actors to makes sense of the deeper fragmentation of the life world of
the Dalit and Adivasis as a community. Such a lesson would visualize a
space for public engagement of diverse sections of society. Reinvention of
tradition with new insight by the new social movements spearheaded by the
subaltern communities all over India has already begun to fight against the
victimization of the ideological and repressive apparatuses of the state. These
movements, in fact, are impregnated with new forms of local rationalities as
against the given class consciousness. They also articulate the multiple forms
of exclusionary practices and suggest alternative strategies to overcome from
it.

Notes

1. Though the category dalits includes adivasis in its conceptualization, recent

trends show conceptual derivation in the academic discourses. Hence, acknowl-
edges the sensitivity of the latter at par with former in this paper by its presence
beyond their conceptual differences.
2. Doubleness means new structure and political agency capable of creating fresh
discourse (Mohan, 2006)
3. Appropriate to use this category in Kerala as well for a comparative under-
standing of how caste, through times, became a social capital for certain caste
groups
4. It is because of the continuous protests by Dalits and Adivasis in Kerala, a
committee constituted by the Supreme Court of India revealed that 800 hectors of
land was illegally encroached (see Keralakaumudi Daily News [Malayalam], 1st
May 2010.
5. Keralakaumudi, 29th January and 20th February 2010.
6. In 1968, the report showed that 51 percent SCs and 74.9 percent STs were
landless as against 32.8 percent in the overall state (see Report on Socio-Eco-
nomic Survey of the Caste/Communities in Kerala, 1968, Bureau of Economic
and Statistics, Trivandrum). However, in 2003 data shows, 3.76 lakhs SCs were
landless households and among STs, there were 22491 households and 30981

137
 Suresh Babu G.S.

were with less than one acre (see GOK. 2003, and to know micro impacts See
Saradamoni 1981).
7. www.civilsocietyonline.com/jan08/jan0819.asp (accessed on 15th Sept. 2009)
8. For instance, its District level convention of Kerala Pulayar Maha Sabha (KPMS),
one of the strong Dalit organisation in Kerala held in Nedumangadu,
Thiruvanthapuram; the state secretary revealed that how Dalits representation
purposefully avoided by excluding from such committees (Keralakaumudi, 1 Janu-
ary 2009, Trivandrum edition).

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Suresh Babu G.S. is Asst. Professor in the Dept. of Sociology, University of Jammu,
Jammu and Kashmir.
Email: gssbjnu@gmail.com

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