People v. Hon.

Bonifacio Maceda
January 24, 2000

This case stems from denial by the SC of the People’s motion seeking
reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision holding that respondent Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T.
Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Antique RTC, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario,
during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient
reason was shown why Javellana should not be detained at the Antique
Provincial Jail. The trial court’s order specifically provided for private
respondent’s detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private
respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as
detention prisoner in said residence. It was howevere found that the order was
not strictly complied with because Javellana was not detained in the residence
of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man,
including engaging in the practice of law.

Held:

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal
cases against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the
law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private
respondent Javellana with the obligation “to hold and detain” him in Atty. del
Rosario’s residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional
trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to
be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of
court must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is

deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of
liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against
him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage
in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. LADAGA 350 SCRA 326 [2001]
Wednesday, January 21, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Legal Ethics

FACTS: Atty. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of Court, acted as pro bonocounsel for
a relative in a criminal case, without the previous authority from the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court as required by the Administrative Code. An administrative
complaint was filed against Atty. Ladaga for practicing law without permission
from the Department Head (CJ) as required by law. Atty. Ladaga justified his
appearance as he merely gave a free legal assistance to a relative and that he
was on an approved leave of absence during his appearances as such counsel.
Moreover, the presiding judge of the court to which he is assigned knew his
appearances as such counsel.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as a pro bono counsel for a relative
constitutes practice of law as prohibited by the Administrative Code.

HELD: No. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of the statute should be
customarily or habitually holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. It does not pertain toisolated court
appearances as in this case. Nevertheless, for his failure toobtain a prior
permission from the head of the Department (CJ) as required by law, respondent
was reprimanded.

In Re: Almacen
31 SCRA 562 – Legal Ethics – A Lawyer’s Right to Criticize the Courts
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost
in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the
opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of
hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the
Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard
to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on
certiorari before the Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a
minute resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as
unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender
his lawyer’s certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing
his profession when members of the high court are men who are calloused to
pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged
that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without
knowing the reasons why and that he became “one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb.”
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the Court
wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not
surrender his lawyer’s certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to.
Almacen then asked that he may be permitted “to give reasons and cause why
no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public
hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is “the
complainant, prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed
because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for
every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively
carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide
“only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate
importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not
a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said
criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful
and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of
the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he
should have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the
opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not
be entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason
why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.

IN RE LANUEVO
Facts:
Disbarment proceedings were filed against the Bar Confidant, Victorio Lanuevo
and a 1971 bar candidate, Ramon Galang, and disciplinary action against five
bar examiners for acts and omissions committed in the 1971 bar examinations.
Based on a confidential letter from a bar flunked, The Supreme Court checked
the records of the 1971 bar examinations. As a result thereof, the grades in five
subjects of an examinee (Ramon Galang) were found to be charged, which,
however, were the properly initialed and authenticated by each of the examiner
concerned. Upon investigation, the Bar Confidant admitted in his sworn
statement having brought back the five examination notebooks to the examiners
for re-evaluation. In turn, the five examiners admitted, in their individual sworn
statements, having re-evaluated and re-checked the notebooks involved (all of
which had failing marks) upon the representation made to each of them
separately and individually by the Bar Confidant that examiners were authorized
to do so and that the examinee concerned failed only in his (examiner
concerned) particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. On the
other hand, Ramon Galang denied any knowledge of the actuation's of the Bar
Confidant.
The Supreme Court, holding that the Office of the Bar Confidant has absolutely
nothing to do with the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after the notebooks are
submitted by the examiners and, that, therefore, the deception made by the Bar
Confidant was in violation of the trust and confidence reposed in him, disbarred
the Bar Confidant and ordered his name stricken from the roll of attorneys.
With respect to respondent Ramon Galang, the Supreme Court likewise disbarred
him because of the highly irregular manner of his passing the bar which was
effected through an authorized re-evaluation of his examination notebooks, and
on the ground that he fraudulently concealed and withheld his pending criminal
case for slight physical injuries in all his seven applications to take the bar
examinations which indicates his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity
and good demeanor.
Respondent Bar Examiners were reminded to exercise the greatest or utmost care
and vigilance in the performance of their duties as such.